After reading the two texts, what is your take on the 2017 TPNW ("nuclear ban treaty")? This time, formulate your reflection (at least partly) as a response to one of your colleague's arguments. That is, present your own original argument and, at the same time, address what others have already said; explain where and why do you agree or disagree.
My position concerning the issue of TPNW corresponds with many of Onderco’s remarks. First objection to the treaty revolves around practical aspect of disarmament. Optimistic standpoints assume that said initiatives will raise public opinion against possesion of nuclear arsenal and that it will set new norms in current order of things. I don’t consider it naïve to hope for a more just and peaceful world, but i also don’t consider it possible, at least in the case of nuclear weapons. There is a hypothesis, that the new goals envisaged by TPNW and upheld by a significant majority of states will gradually change mind of general public, who will in the end push leaders of NWS to abide these rules. Convincing general public to more vocally support nuclear disarmament might be possible, as we’ve seen few times in history, however I seriously doubt about forcing nuclear powers to disarm. Even if some democratic NWS listened to these calls and showed some willingness, it won’t happen unless others would do the same. And especially by authoritarian regimes it is hardly imaginable that they would give up major source of their power.
Whilst my first argument against TPNW concerned feasibility, my second questions its desireability. Although I understand the frustration felt by many NNWS, as they are both practically and legally inferior to NWS, it is in my opinion not in their interest to challenge current oligopoly in nuclear affairs, as it endangers the stability of the regime and thus survival of all. Substantial part of the so called „Great bargain“ was not a prospect of equality in world order, but rather a guarantee of some sense of security with brighter perspectives, that we would not destroy the whole planet. Current nuclear regime, although full of flaws and inequalities, has so far achieved that. TPNW strives however to undermine such arrangement, although with noble intentions. However if we were to strip the great powers of their nuclear arsenal, there would no safeguards. All international institutions and other agencies are dependent on the ability of the handful of great powers to enforce their will. And since I consider this coercion crucial to maintain some degree of control and stability in nuclear world, it convinces me that TPNW and nuclear disarmament are not desirable.
Whilst my first argument against TPNW concerned feasibility, my second questions its desireability. Although I understand the frustration felt by many NNWS, as they are both practically and legally inferior to NWS, it is in my opinion not in their interest to challenge current oligopoly in nuclear affairs, as it endangers the stability of the regime and thus survival of all. Substantial part of the so called „Great bargain“ was not a prospect of equality in world order, but rather a guarantee of some sense of security with brighter perspectives, that we would not destroy the whole planet. Current nuclear regime, although full of flaws and inequalities, has so far achieved that. TPNW strives however to undermine such arrangement, although with noble intentions. However if we were to strip the great powers of their nuclear arsenal, there would no safeguards. All international institutions and other agencies are dependent on the ability of the handful of great powers to enforce their will. And since I consider this coercion crucial to maintain some degree of control and stability in nuclear world, it convinces me that TPNW and nuclear disarmament are not desirable.
I have to agree with many statements pointed out by Albert. Despite Nina Tannenwald advocating positively about TPNW I have to be as skeptical as Onderco. She pointed out convincing arguments for disarmament as well as some trends only functional in a fully democratic world without revisionist states with a nuclear arsenal.
The goal of the treaty is to delegitimize the nuclear deterrence policies but I think it would trigger the complete opposite. As Onderco points out many shortcomings of the treaty, mainly the lack of verification of disarmament, that need to be adjusted to become more appealing the future isn’t bright. Nuclear weapons are nothing but a reaction to the security dilemma states face. I am convinced that as Albert said, if we will contest the current oligopoly and eventually NWS disarm at different paces it will create a challenge to the balance of power. It could create gaps in NWS war strategies and policies which could start a chain reaction and escalate tension which could eventually trigger nuclear clash. If we take into consideration the current hostile environment when Putin holds the world hostage with his rhetoric about the usage of nukes we can surely tell that disarmament will not lead to a safer place and it is unachievable.
I view the usage of nuclear weapons mainly from the environmental impact of its additional damage (change of currents, agricultural disasters, seismic activities, changing weather patterns) as I noted in my previous reflections. This treaty sends a strong message and desires to have a planet without nukes but the obstacles identified by Onderco need to be solved such as norm spiral, domestic politics over international, nuclear weapon states would start complying with the treaty’s provisions only if they expected their counterparts to comply and absence of public pressures in revisionist autocratic.
As Albert said, the world wouldn’t have supervision over the disarmament creating a favorable position for the cheaters who would have an advantage over their disarmed counterparts. But even if we could disarm the whole world, we would have to reduce the conventional arsenal as well. Who can guarantee us that we will not build the stockpiles again? As was said by Nina Tannenwald and environmental research a small number of nukes can destroy the world.
The goal of the treaty is to delegitimize the nuclear deterrence policies but I think it would trigger the complete opposite. As Onderco points out many shortcomings of the treaty, mainly the lack of verification of disarmament, that need to be adjusted to become more appealing the future isn’t bright. Nuclear weapons are nothing but a reaction to the security dilemma states face. I am convinced that as Albert said, if we will contest the current oligopoly and eventually NWS disarm at different paces it will create a challenge to the balance of power. It could create gaps in NWS war strategies and policies which could start a chain reaction and escalate tension which could eventually trigger nuclear clash. If we take into consideration the current hostile environment when Putin holds the world hostage with his rhetoric about the usage of nukes we can surely tell that disarmament will not lead to a safer place and it is unachievable.
I view the usage of nuclear weapons mainly from the environmental impact of its additional damage (change of currents, agricultural disasters, seismic activities, changing weather patterns) as I noted in my previous reflections. This treaty sends a strong message and desires to have a planet without nukes but the obstacles identified by Onderco need to be solved such as norm spiral, domestic politics over international, nuclear weapon states would start complying with the treaty’s provisions only if they expected their counterparts to comply and absence of public pressures in revisionist autocratic.
As Albert said, the world wouldn’t have supervision over the disarmament creating a favorable position for the cheaters who would have an advantage over their disarmed counterparts. But even if we could disarm the whole world, we would have to reduce the conventional arsenal as well. Who can guarantee us that we will not build the stockpiles again? As was said by Nina Tannenwald and environmental research a small number of nukes can destroy the world.
After reading the texts, I have mixed feelings about the future of the TPNW. Onderco’s hypothesis that an all-out nuclear ban treaty would not strengthen norms, but rather promote cheating and deception in this space is significant. Yes, the lack of an overarching verification mechanism and international organizations to back this up does not exist right now, but that doesn’t mean these cannot be created and established in the future. Given that the TPNW was passed in 2017, I see it as an endeavor likely to be pursued. The key issue is the absence of all NWS in the treaty, which as Tannenwald points out, may serve to justify these states’ continuation of nuclear proliferation.
I agree with Albert’s sentiment that the goals of the TPNW will not change most of the public opinion. The question of global security contingent on states’ use or nonuse of nuclear weapons is grander and more ambiguous than the humanitarian impacts of weapons such as land mines, in which civil society and humanitarian campaigns have been successful in the past. The potential for total destruction of societies and the environmental impact, as Jiří mentioned, are difficult to imagine and thus lack the emotional aspect that the land mine campaigns were reliant on.
Albert’s stance that the TPNW could undermine the current stability that we have seen in the NP regime makes sense, but I see no harm in additional states seriously committing the outlawing of nuclear weapons. The main issues will stem from NWS such as the United States and Russia leaning on the NPT as a given right to retain their weapons and continue testing, especially in the absence of a specified timeline. Ultimately, I’m optimistic about the TPNW, as it signifies a step forward in a long journey towards nuclear disarmament and establishing the norms that are a necessary prerequisite for all states to join in.
I agree with Albert’s sentiment that the goals of the TPNW will not change most of the public opinion. The question of global security contingent on states’ use or nonuse of nuclear weapons is grander and more ambiguous than the humanitarian impacts of weapons such as land mines, in which civil society and humanitarian campaigns have been successful in the past. The potential for total destruction of societies and the environmental impact, as Jiří mentioned, are difficult to imagine and thus lack the emotional aspect that the land mine campaigns were reliant on.
Albert’s stance that the TPNW could undermine the current stability that we have seen in the NP regime makes sense, but I see no harm in additional states seriously committing the outlawing of nuclear weapons. The main issues will stem from NWS such as the United States and Russia leaning on the NPT as a given right to retain their weapons and continue testing, especially in the absence of a specified timeline. Ultimately, I’m optimistic about the TPNW, as it signifies a step forward in a long journey towards nuclear disarmament and establishing the norms that are a necessary prerequisite for all states to join in.
Based on the readings I am more inclined to Onderco’s side. The TPNW is of course ambitious in a good way, but it should be pointed out that ideas about eventual disarmament of nuclear weapons are almost as old as nuclear weapons. I firmly believe that treaties to which NWS are not parties to– and even their allies are not, as is the case with TPNW – is bound to be forgotten. Onderco makes excellent case when refuting the sincere hope of disarmament optimists that a formation without NWS would somehow affect their behaviour and eventually they would ratify it. Moreover, there is the strong argument that when disarming of nuclear weapons, states would look for ways to improve their conventional warfare to match their foes, leading to possible arms races. Thus agreements on limitations of conventional weapons would have to be discussed simultaneously.
Another issue is the comparison of nuclear arms disarmament with similar incentives considering weapons of mass destruction to frame them as a humanitarian issue. Onderco correctly points to similar difficulties faced – mainly the missing powers in Mine ban treaty, such as the U.S., Russia, China, India. Additionally, an argument can be made that treaties considering other WMD face similar issues about verification.
As for my colleagues’ argument, I definitely subscribe to Albert’s arguments about non-desirability of TPNW. International actors can surely launch new campaigns and “roadmaps” or “first steps” toward disarmament and outlawing WMD. But why when these steps were already made? Eventual disarmament is already contained in other treaties, so why would states now feel the need to. In this sense I am in opposition to Alison’s final statements that (NNW) states, as these are necessarily futile when powerful states oppose them from the beginning, and instead commons forces can be used elsewhere in improving existing networks.
According to the readings I strongly stand behind Onderco´s statements because of few, in my opinion, key points. The TPNW does adress disarmament and provides the filling of the "legal gaps", as Tannewald says, but on the other hand misses the neccessary steps that have to be taken to verify the disarmament itself. The other point is that the countries would eventually withdraw from the NPT, which I agree with Onderco that it would definetly cause confusion and maybe eventually loss of cooperation between parties on disarmament. On the other hand I really like the idea by Tannewald, that states that the non-nuclear powers have to come with such proposal, because of lack of willingness from the NWS, to make some progress on their own.
To react to my colleagues, I found Marek´s observation that with nuclear disarmament it could be expected for the states to find ways to improve conventional weapons which could lead to arms races very valuable. I as well agree with the argument that the verification of others WMD faces the same issues as this TPNW.
I would like to oppose the desireability of TPNW as Albert stated that it is not desirable. In my opinion, I see the disarmament process as something that has to come to stop NWS and all states from possible total nuclear war (in extreme circumstances of course) and destroying our planet. I think we should want to abolish the use of nuclear weapons as fast as possible, but only under circumstances that will let international community to oversee this process with the proper arrangements and verification methods.
To react to my colleagues, I found Marek´s observation that with nuclear disarmament it could be expected for the states to find ways to improve conventional weapons which could lead to arms races very valuable. I as well agree with the argument that the verification of others WMD faces the same issues as this TPNW.
I would like to oppose the desireability of TPNW as Albert stated that it is not desirable. In my opinion, I see the disarmament process as something that has to come to stop NWS and all states from possible total nuclear war (in extreme circumstances of course) and destroying our planet. I think we should want to abolish the use of nuclear weapons as fast as possible, but only under circumstances that will let international community to oversee this process with the proper arrangements and verification methods.
In his essay, Michal Ondero’s main assertion is that the Treaty on The Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is ‘Unlikely to lead to nuclear disarmament’, arguing that the treaty does not address fundamental issues within the global nuclear order. Furthermore, Ondero raises several interesting concepts, crucial to our understanding of not only TPNW, but the landscape of a world wherein Nuclear Weapons are no longer present.
The position that TPNW will not lead to disarmament is something which I think most can agree with, especially considering that, in essence, all nuclear states and their allies are not and do not plan to become party to the treaty. Does this then render the treaty ineffectual? Ondero makes clear that despite its inability to directly achieve disarmament, the treaty still plays an important role in the global nuclear order with respect to the strengthening of norms within the system. Through this treaty, a new and stronger ‘taboo’ emerges which states will, over time, ‘learn to accept the language of the norm’ and ultimately comply with it. Nina Tannenwald further explores this idea in her Washington Post article, demonstrating that even if nuclear nations and their allies do not cooperate or participate, the norms within the global nuclear order can be strengthened. Similar to how biological or chemical weapons are banned, this treaty creates the precedent and framework wherein nuclear weapons could become a weapon class which is prohibited entirely.
My classmates have raised several interesting and inviting arguments regarding the desirability of TPNW as well as the concept of a nuclear-free world. While I do understand that TPNW appears to take a somewhat extensive approach, I’m not sure I agree with Marek that other treaties such as NPT already have the issue covered. TPNW not only serves to normalize a framework of no nuclear weapons within the global order but simultaneously strengthens norms where necessary. One of the vital norms that the treaty can embolden is shown as the world expresses their disapproval and discontent towards the substandard attempts towards disarmament from nuclear-armed nations.
While I don’t see TPNW as an effective tool in the direct attempt to achieve nuclear disarmament, I do find it a strong asset to the nuclear global order which will serve to demonstrate the concerns of non-nuclear states where treaties such as NPT have failed in the past.
The position that TPNW will not lead to disarmament is something which I think most can agree with, especially considering that, in essence, all nuclear states and their allies are not and do not plan to become party to the treaty. Does this then render the treaty ineffectual? Ondero makes clear that despite its inability to directly achieve disarmament, the treaty still plays an important role in the global nuclear order with respect to the strengthening of norms within the system. Through this treaty, a new and stronger ‘taboo’ emerges which states will, over time, ‘learn to accept the language of the norm’ and ultimately comply with it. Nina Tannenwald further explores this idea in her Washington Post article, demonstrating that even if nuclear nations and their allies do not cooperate or participate, the norms within the global nuclear order can be strengthened. Similar to how biological or chemical weapons are banned, this treaty creates the precedent and framework wherein nuclear weapons could become a weapon class which is prohibited entirely.
My classmates have raised several interesting and inviting arguments regarding the desirability of TPNW as well as the concept of a nuclear-free world. While I do understand that TPNW appears to take a somewhat extensive approach, I’m not sure I agree with Marek that other treaties such as NPT already have the issue covered. TPNW not only serves to normalize a framework of no nuclear weapons within the global order but simultaneously strengthens norms where necessary. One of the vital norms that the treaty can embolden is shown as the world expresses their disapproval and discontent towards the substandard attempts towards disarmament from nuclear-armed nations.
While I don’t see TPNW as an effective tool in the direct attempt to achieve nuclear disarmament, I do find it a strong asset to the nuclear global order which will serve to demonstrate the concerns of non-nuclear states where treaties such as NPT have failed in the past.
Both of the assigned texts talk about the TPNW of 2017, while arguing different opinions. Tannenwald is much more optimistic about the potential impact of TPNW, Onderco on the other hand, is much more pessimistic. What I found interesting on the text of Tannenwald is the emphasis on the role that civil groups played in the process. I think this point is crucial to understand and potentially predict the ways in which the concept of nuclear disarmament will develop. In history, it was almost exclusively agenda of the states, which played a key role in development of nuclear weapons and the first NPT. In today's world the role of NGOs is much bigger than in the past, therefore it makes a lot of sense to estimate that they will be the key actors which might make states give up their nuclear weapons. I think it essentially has to be them, because the NWS are unlikely to disarm willingly without any external pressure.
Tannenwald also mentions that all NATO states (except for the Netherlands) boycotted the negotiations of this treaty. It makes me wonder if the new NATO candidates that applied because of the Russian invasion will be inclined to change their stance on disarmament if there is a similar negotiation in the future.
I think my colleagues have raised many interesting points. I cannot agree with Albert about the undesirability of the TPNW, since I think any initiative which promotes disarmament is good, despite its questionable effectivity. The point Jiří made about environmental impacts of potential nuclear strikes could serve as an important tool to reframe public debates. I would say that nowadays climate protection is a very important topic, therefore framing even nuclear weapons tests as an environmental problem as well as a security one could be a way to change the public opinion.
Tannenwald also mentions that all NATO states (except for the Netherlands) boycotted the negotiations of this treaty. It makes me wonder if the new NATO candidates that applied because of the Russian invasion will be inclined to change their stance on disarmament if there is a similar negotiation in the future.
I think my colleagues have raised many interesting points. I cannot agree with Albert about the undesirability of the TPNW, since I think any initiative which promotes disarmament is good, despite its questionable effectivity. The point Jiří made about environmental impacts of potential nuclear strikes could serve as an important tool to reframe public debates. I would say that nowadays climate protection is a very important topic, therefore framing even nuclear weapons tests as an environmental problem as well as a security one could be a way to change the public opinion.
Although I count myself to be on the more sceptical side of the spectrum, I would not go as far as Onderco. I believe that any form of disarmament on a treaty-based level amongst greater number of states is good, because it gives platform for future talks and new treaties. Starting from scratch is always harder than building upon something already existing and proven. I understand Onderco’s point about the possibility of increased risk of so-called cheaters in the future, I partially agree with it as well, but here I think the question is more philosophical than practical, which would take up too much time to disentangle.
I agree with Jiří’s take that Tannenwald in my view focuses too much on a system that works mostly in a democratic and liberal system. This would mean that the other countries would need to join this system or it just needs to be accommodated to them, I view it as a form of Kant’s idea of democratic/ideological peace, where all likeminded states wouldn’t be a threat to one another.
As for Kristyna’s reflection, I think she raises an excellent point. NGOs have been vital in pushing for disarmament, however, I still believe and NGOs are being heavily countered by intrastate pressure groups that are doing their best to fight against disarmament. With each new crisis arising across the world, be it Russo-Ukrainian war, rising tensions in Asia due to China, or many more, these groups can use such developments to gain traction again. So although they are obviously not NGOs themselves per se, I think this ongoing ‘battle’ between NGOs and their shadow counterparts is such as important as the discussion on the interstate level.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) does not change anything on the ground. The nuclear weapon states are not party to it, thus they do not feel obliged to respect and uphold the ban on nuclear weapons, and related activities. Nonetheless, I would agree with Tannenwald on the normative impact this has on the nuclear order. Perhaps it is still early, and the NWS can afford to ignore the treaty completely. The main impact, in my opinion, will be felt in the future, as pressure grows on states to dismantle their nuclear arsenal. Norms do shape the international order, albeit in a discrete and slow way.
It is my belief that the only way to do away with nuclear weapons is by making them ethically undesirable. As Onderco correctly points out, states feel compelled to develop them because of security dilemmas they face, and even without nuclear weapons, states would still hold arms races in conventional weapons. However, no weapon created thus far has the devastating potential of a nuclear strike. Not even close. That is why I believe that any step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, no matter how small or insignificant it may seem at first, is a step towards a safer world. Conversely, I disagree with Onderco’s notion that the TPNW jeopardizes the nuclear order by destabilizing the NPT.
As for my colleagues’ thoughts, Kristyna’s position that any step towards disarmament is good aligns with my stance. Also, I would agree with Louis’ normative angle of the TPNW, and I share Alison’s optimism towards the impact of the treaty down the line. I disagree with Marek’s view that the TPNW will fade into obscurity, and with Albert’s opinion that it harms the current order in nuclear affairs.
It is my belief that the only way to do away with nuclear weapons is by making them ethically undesirable. As Onderco correctly points out, states feel compelled to develop them because of security dilemmas they face, and even without nuclear weapons, states would still hold arms races in conventional weapons. However, no weapon created thus far has the devastating potential of a nuclear strike. Not even close. That is why I believe that any step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, no matter how small or insignificant it may seem at first, is a step towards a safer world. Conversely, I disagree with Onderco’s notion that the TPNW jeopardizes the nuclear order by destabilizing the NPT.
As for my colleagues’ thoughts, Kristyna’s position that any step towards disarmament is good aligns with my stance. Also, I would agree with Louis’ normative angle of the TPNW, and I share Alison’s optimism towards the impact of the treaty down the line. I disagree with Marek’s view that the TPNW will fade into obscurity, and with Albert’s opinion that it harms the current order in nuclear affairs.