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Anti-Catalanism, Moral Panics and the Catalan Language: The Case of *Ciudadanos de segunda*

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Increasingly fervent expressions of anti-Catalanism by Spanish institutions and individuals are one of the reasons behind the Catalans' increasing support for independence. Negative categorisations of the Catalans partly revolve around the use of Catalan as the main medium of instruction in education, portrayed as an aggressive attempt to rid the region of the Spanish language. This specific form of anti-Catalanism is examined through the television documentary *Ciudadanos de segunda,* which constructs an unambiguous condemnation of Catalan language policies out of seemingly balanced interview material. The film is analysed in the light of theories of moral panic as applied to language issues by Sally Johnson (1999) and others. The analysis reveals that the documentary bears the hallmarks of an attempt to create a moral panic, which, although not fully successful, did contribute to an on-going campaign of sensitization waged by the right-wing Spanish media to promote negative images of Catalonia to other Spaniards.

Keywords: Catalonia; Catalan language; moral panics; documentary ethics; linguistic immersion

Introduction

One of the factors often mentioned by Catalans to explain their growing support for independence is an increasingly intolerant attitude towards them from other Spaniards.[1] For example, in the book *What Catalans Want*—a series of interviews with prominent Catalans and Catalanophiles published in 2011—several of the contributors cite examples of anti-Catalanism, claiming that it manifests itself in various ways.[2] Joan Ramon Resina says the phenomenon has a long history and shows parallels with anti-Semitism: 'From the mid-19th century onwards, the Catalans have tended to be portrayed as the Jews of Spain'.[3] Moisès Broggi identifies anti-Catalanism as one of the key causes of the Spanish Civil War,[4] while Eugeni Casanova and Jordi Llisterri state that even today 'the leadership of the Spanish Church is profoundly anti-Catalan'.[5] Pedro Morón de la Fuente laments the 'bias some [Andalusian] immigrants have against almost everything that is Catalan' and says 'it's an attitude I have come to see as something clearly fostered in Madrid'.[6] Even Alex Rietman, a Dutch journalist working in Barcelona, complains that 'I find it grotesque that the Madrid press has portrayed children as terrorized victims, 'forced' to speak Catalan even in the playground. That is an absolutely false image fostered by sectarian communications media and anti-Catalan activists close to the extreme right'.[7] Such forms of anti-Catalanism engender strong feelings of injustice

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amongst those who see themselves as unfairly targeted by these attitudes, and for some this is proof of Catalonia's fundamental incompatibility with Spain.[8]

Of course, anti-Catalanism is by no means the only reason why support for independence has more than doubled since 2005.[9] Other concerns include: the lack of investment by the state government in Catalan infrastructure such as passenger and freight transport links; the high percentage of taxes collected in Catalonia that is used to support the poorer regions of Spain; successive Spanish governments' refusal to recognize Spain as a multilingual and multicultural 'nation of nations'; and the continuing limitations on the political competencies that can be exercised by the Catalan Autonomous Government (the *Generalitat*).[10] The main catalyst for this increasing frustration was the drafting, approval and post-hoc amendment of the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy; this process culminated in the text that had been sanctioned by Catalans in a 2006 referendum being altered by a ruling from Spain's Constitutional Court that was finally delivered in 2010.[11] The ill-feeling generated in this process has been prolonged by Spain's ongoing economic woes since the global financial crisis began in 2007, and the election of the right-wing *Partido Popular* (PP) to power in Spain in November 2011. The PP has blamed spending by the Autonomous Communities for much of Spain's debt and has threatened to rein in their powers.

Even though the debates on these issues have many different facets, they have had the general effect of increasingly polarizing opinion in Spain on the question of whether the Catalans have the right to decide their own political future or whether their demands are unreasonable and selfish. As a result, examples of anti-Catalanism in the media and Spanish politics have increased, with the more extreme versions coming from right-wing Spanish nationalist perspectives.[12] This means that the image of the Catalans held by non-Catalans in Spain has become increasingly at odds with the Catalans' own self-image. In some cases, in fact, the two are diametrically opposed: Catalans see themselves as industrious and entrepreneurial while other Spaniards see them as money-grabbing; they see Catalan nationalism as inclusive and civic while others see it as exclusive and ethnic; they see the Catalan language as an open route to integration in Catalan society, whereas others see it as a deliberately-enforced social, political and economic barrier.[13] This polarization further cements the feelings of marginalization experienced by many Catalans.

According to Richard Jenkins, even though a group's self-image and public image do not bear any necessary relation to one another, there will always be at least some kind of interaction between the two, 'some process of conscious or unconscious adjustment in the ongoing making and re-making of social identity'.[14] Furthermore, the ethnic categorizations that lie at the heart of this process not only lead to stereotyping in everyday discourse, they also become institutionalized. This is why, as Rogers Brubaker puts it, '[c]ategorization and classification in […] formal and informal settings are increasingly seen as not only central to but as *constitutive* of ethnicity, race and nationhood'.[15] The process by which Catalans are categorized through anti-Catalan discourse can therefore be described as constitutive of both Catalan and Spanish identities. In other words, the margins help to define the centre as part of the same process by which the—more powerful—centre imposes its own definitions on the margins.

To analyse this process, we would need to examine a specific example, rather than rely on general comments such as those in *What Catalans Want,* as these help to identify the kinds of categorization being made but not how they are generated and propagated. This article will therefore centre on the particular issue of negative attitudes towards the Catalan language, and examine how these were portrayed in a specific

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cultural product: the television documentary *Ciudadanos de segunda*.[16] The main subject of this documentary was the use of Catalan in education, which was alleged to result in discrimination against Spanish speakers. After a brief introduction to the evolution of attitudes towards the Catalan language since the end of the Franco dictatorship in 1975, I will argue that the anti-Catalan discourse in *Ciudadanos de segunda* can best be conceptualized as an attempt to engender a moral panic amongst its (non-Catalan) target audience.

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The Evolution of the Language Question in Catalonia

One of the main areas of consensus to arise in Catalonia towards the end of the Franco dictatorship was that any return to democracy should facilitate the re-establishment of Catalan as Catalonia's *llengua pròpia* (own language). While Catalan had continued to be spoken and written in some contexts, its absence from the education system, public life and the media had made it difficult for parents to pass it on to their children and for newcomers to become proficient users. Despite some negative reactions from monolingual Spanish speakers resident in Catalonia—such as the 'Manifiesto por la igualdad de los derechos lingüísticos en Cataluña' signed by 2,300 academics and professionals in 1981—it was generally seen as necessary that this situation be rectified. This consensus was reflected in the Catalan parliament's unopposed passing of the Linguistic Normalization Act of 1983, which built on the declaration in Catalonia's Statute of Autonomy that had made Catalan co-official with Castilian in the region. The Act laid out the general principle that, as Catalonia's 'own language', Catalan should be present as the main language of communication in the areas of public life covered by the competencies of the *Generalitat de Catalunya,* which included education.[17] It was on this basis that a gradual strengthening of the position of Catalan in schools took place, as the language moved from being a separate subject to a medium of instruction. This was consolidated in the early 1990s with a decree that teaching should mainly be through the medium of Catalan (apart from separate Spanish language and literature classes) in all but the earliest years, and then only if necessary.[18]

It was at this point that disagreements over language policy started to surface in the Catalan parliament.[19] The main question was how much the *Generalitat* should be permitted to interfere in people's choice of language, with some parties advocating more interventionist policies and some less. The catalyst for the public airing of these disagreements was the drafting of the Linguistic Policy Act (1998), which drew together previous legislation but was, in the end, only able to extend it into relatively minor areas such as product labelling and the right to expect private companies based in Catalonia to be able to attend to customers in Catalan. Not only was the new Act not passed unanimously, it also generated much debate in the media and intellectual circles. The clearest expression of opposition came from a group calling themselves the *Foro Babel*—not an organization as such but a loose collection of Catalan intellectuals who were opposed to further political intervention in language use.[20] In 1997 they produced a *Manifiesto*, which was signed by a number of high-profile writers and other cultural figures, calling for Catalonia's bilingualism to be respected and the *Generalitat* to remain neutral on the issue of the language choices of Catalonia's residents.

These attempts to consolidate the position of Catalan have suffered from what Kathryn Woolard calls the lack of 'anonymity' of minority languages: their inability, unlike hegemonic languages, to transcend an association with a specific ethnic or social group.[21] As a result, local, regional and state-wide media attention has increasingly been

drawn to the linguistic situation in Catalonia. A controversial headline in the newspaper *ABC* in 1993 accused Catalan language policy of being '[c]omo Franco pero al revés',[22] and the drafting of the Language Policy Act produced similarly negative responses in the Spanish press. Not surprisingly, the debates around the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy that began in 2005 further increased this scrutiny, especially as the Statute extended the principle of the 'duty to know' Spanish—enshrined in the Spanish Constitution—to Catalan.[23] Subsequent challenges heard by Spain's Constitutional Court forced the 'reinterpretation' of this article to give the duty to know Catalan a lesser legal force than the equivalent constitutional duty to know Spanish. It also declared unconstitutional a statement that Catalan was the 'preferred' language for use in public administration and the publicly-owned media. Nevertheless, the ruling did not challenge the basic premise that Catalan 'és també la llengua normalment emprada com a vehicular i d'aprenentatge en l'ensenyament' (is also the language normally used for teaching and learning in education).[24]

Naturally, the ruling did not signal an end to controversies over the use of Catalan in education. In 2009, the Catalan parliament passed a new Education Act that reaffirmed the status of Catalan as the main medium of education and the normal language of school administration, as well as the principle that schoolchildren should not be separated on the basis of their maternal language. It also stressed that adequate support should be provided for non-Catalan-speaking students. At the end of 2010, Spain's Supreme Court issued a judgement that Spanish as well as Catalan should be used as the medium of education in all schools, following a petition by a group of three families. Although this was challenged in the Catalan courts and never implemented, the issue resurfaced in the form of a stipulation in the *Ley Orgánica para la Mejora de la Calidad Educativa* (2013) that publicly-funded education through the medium of Spanish should be available in all Autonomous Communities. Furthermore, the law reduced co-official languages to the status of optional rather than core subjects in the national curriculum.

These high-profile legal wrangles risk giving a false impression of Catalans' attitudes to linguistic immersion. Surveys tend to show a majority are in favour either of all classes being taught in Catalan or the majority in Catalan with some in Spanish. For example, a survey conducted by *El Mundo* in 2010 asked whether respondents in Catalonia thought it was a good thing that the vast majority of subjects in schools were taught in Catalan, with 40.2% replying that this was 'good' and 25.4% 'very good'.[25] The number of formal requests by parents to have their children taught in Spanish is very small (affecting only seven pupils in Barcelona in 2013–14),[26] and in the same *El Mundo* survey, only 7.7% of respondents thought the immersion policy was 'very bad'.

Moral Panics about Language

The attempt to return Catalan to a 'normal' position within society, especially by means of the education system, has drawn most criticism from those few residents who feel that it disadvantages them or their family, and/or goes against liberal principles because it impinges on the rights of the individual.[27] However, many of the most vociferous attacks on Catalan linguistic policy have come not from residents of Catalonia but from the right-wing Spanish media, as in the case of the '[c]omo Franco pero al revés' headline referred to above. This is of course unsurprising given that Spanish nationalism—unacknowledged and 'banal' as it may be—and a rejection of further autonomy for the regions are key aspects of right-wing politics in Spain.[28] However, the hyperbole

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generated by the question of language rights in Catalonia, as evidenced by the above headline, suggests the possibility that the right-wing media have attempted to steer public debate towards a fully-fledged moral panic about the issue.

The sociological concept of the moral panic has attracted its fair share of criticism, but persists as a way of thinking about the ways in which anxieties about social issues spread among populations and grow in intensity. The term has also entered into the vocabulary of the general public. As Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda define it, '[t]he *moral panic* is a scare about a threat or supposed threat from deviants or "folk devils", a category of people who, presumably, engage in evil practices and are blamed for menacing a society's culture, way of life, and central values. The word "scare" implies that the concern over, fear of, or hostility toward the folk devil is *out of proportion* to the actual threat that is claimed'.[29] Given that such a scare would have a very small reach if it could not be effectively communicated, the media are of course central to the process. Not only do they report issues that certain sections of society have identified and wish to warn others about, they are also sometimes responsible for the generation of moral panics.[30] In part, this is because of the imperative to provide interesting stories that will improve readership/audience figures. Furthermore, of course, the media also play a role in setting political and social agendas through their editorial stance.[31] The media are crucial in sensitizing their audience to particular themes, and can easily make an issue seem more serious than it is simply by reporting incidents during a moral panic that would previously have gone unreported.[32] Nevertheless, moral panics cannot be sustained indefinitely and therefore tend either to be short-lived and 'one-off', or to return in waves, perhaps with a slightly different focus each time.

In analysing a putative moral panic, there are certain questions that need to be addressed, most obviously who the 'folk devil' is in this case; how this 'folk devil' threatens the group(s) responsible for propagating the scare; and if the scare is out of proportion to the actual threat. Furthermore, given that the scare usually functions as a scapegoat for a deeper problem that is more difficult to attack directly, we would need to think about what that hidden element would be in the particular case we are addressing. We can also ask where the scare has originated: in an elite, a middle-level interest group or a grassroots movement.[33] As explained above, the media themselves—or a defined section of the media—can form one of these interest groups.

Although topics such as drugs, crime, gang violence and other forms of anti-social behaviour are the classic targets of moral panics, various academic authors have also found the concept of the moral panic useful when talking about language-related issues.[34] Sally Johnson explains its possible applications as follows:

> I see considerable potential for the concept of moral panics about language: using public debates on language to document a) the manner in which public concerns about language function as a vicarious front-line for other social conflicts; and b) the way in which the views on language thereby expressed represent not only attempts to regulate the language usage of others but ultimately to eliminate some on the grounds of 'socially unacceptable difference'.[35]

It is my intention to apply the concept of the moral panic, and Johnson's two specific analytical frameworks, to a particular media representation of linguistic rights in Catalonia. The idea is to provide a specific example of the ways in which anti-Catalan discourse operates in the Spanish media, and the way in which this interacts with concerns prevalent in right-wing Spanish politics. By doing so, we can interrogate the

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categories and stereotypes employed in this discourse and reveal some of their 'group-making' effects.[36]

Ciudadanos de segunda

In April 2007, the public regional channel *Telemadrid* broadcast *Ciudadanos de segunda*,[37] a documentary which argued that Spanish speakers in Catalonia were being systematically discriminated against by the Catalan education system. The documentary was made by *El Mundo TV*, a production company belonging to the *Unidad Editorial* media group that houses the newspaper of the same name. It was to be the first in a series of investigative reports for *Telemadrid* covering current themes in Spanish society and politics.[38] Both *Unidad Editorial* and *Telemadrid* tend towards conservative views on social issues and are editorially inclined towards support for the *Partido Popular*. It should also be noted that the documentary was broadcast just after the implementation of Catalonia's 2006 Statute of Autonomy, while several issues surrounding it were still to be resolved, including the challenges put to Spain's Constitutional Court and negotiations around increased funding for Catalonia.

The documentary includes a series of interviews with people from different sides of the debate. On one side, we find (among others) a parent who has been struggling against the system for years to have his daughter educated in Spanish (Carmelo González), a lecturer at the University of Barcelona who has been abused and threatened for teaching in Spanish (Francisco Caja),[39] and an Italian living in Barcelona who is concerned that it is detrimental to her internationally-mobile children to be taught in Catalan (Alessia Contella). The opposite point of view is put forward by participants such as actor and pro-independence activist Joel Joan, journalist Miquel Calzada (Mikimoto), writer—and at that point director of Spain's National Library—Rosa Regàs, and 'language activist' David Vila. These interviews are relatively balanced, in the sense that equal time and freedom of expression appears to be given to both sides.

However, this apparent equity of treatment is negated by two other features of the documentary. Firstly, the programme contains footage shot clandestinely in schools, as an unidentified reporter tries to find one that will agree to educate her young child in Spanish. Not only is this quest unsuccessful, the reporter also uncovers other causes for concern: maps on classroom walls that concentrate on the *Països Catalans* and ignore the existence of Spain, and school notices written in a Spanish riddled with errors attributable to the grammatical influence of Catalan. Most importantly, though, the voice-over commentary is unashamedly one-sided, and the interviews have no influence on the narration or the conclusions it draws.

A few examples should suffice to give a flavour of the tone and content of these pronouncements (these will be referred to later by number):

1. 'Cuando el catalán se cruza en el camino de alguien que no lo habla, le convierte en un ciudadano de segunda'.
2. 'Catalanes, riojanos, canarios, cualquiera que no hable catalán y todo aquél que no piense como la mayoría en Cataluña se expone a sufrir la presión de los que han decidido imponer su lengua y su ideología a toda posta'.
3. 'El 94% de los residentes en Cataluña entiende el catalán, lo saben hablar y leer más del 70%, y casi el 50% es capaz de escribirlo. A merced de las cifras, no parece que el catalán sea una lengua tan apartada de la sociedad, tan marginada como algunos aseguran, una excusa que les sirve para justificar todas las presiones'.

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And the final words of the documentary:

4. 'Campos de fútbol transformados en templos de difusión del catalanismo. Colegios donde el castellano ha perdido todo el protagonismo. Ciudadanos amenazados. Comerciantes sin libertad y perseguidos por las sanciones. Es la radiografía de una Cataluña, de una sociedad que navega entre dos lenguas enfrentadas. Hablar en castellano o hablar en catalán. Parlar en català o parlar en castellà'.

Any close analysis of this one-sidedness in the commentary must necessarily be preceded by a brief discussion of the ethics of documentary filmmaking. Unthinking viewers who assume that it is possible for a documentary to present an 'objective' and 'impartial' position on a subject are of course mistaken.[40] Documentary makers will always be able to present only their own version of 'the truth' about a particular subject.[41] However, this does not exempt them from ethical responsibility for the way in which this 'truth' is presented. While ethical concerns are often discussed primarily as they relate to the treatment of participants, more relevant here is the responsibility the filmmaker has towards the audience.[42] As Garnet Butchart explains, the assumption that filmmakers will discharge this responsibility ethically is 'based largely on a kind of faith', including 'faith that what we see in the documentary image will be a fair and reasonably accurate account of events'.[43]

When documentaries are perceived to have broken this faith, whether intentionally or as the result of sloppy practices, viewers may become upset or angry. This is especially the case if they feel themselves to belong to a particular group that has been unfairly represented on screen. However, as Butchart says, '[a] given documentary is but a depiction, a work reflective of the intentions of the filmmaker rather than of an available real'.[44] Therefore, the essentially subjective nature of the truth claims presented in any documentary make it difficult to draw a strict line between responsible and irresponsible filmmaking. It is also true, as Paul Ward points out, that it can sometimes be ethically acceptable to present a one-sided argument, because 'to remain stubbornly "impartial" and "balanced" in the face of clear *imbalances* in the real world is to actually misrepresent that world and the power struggles that go on within it'.[45]

Given the lack of a clear boundary between acceptable and unacceptable practices in documentary filmmaking, how might we be able to evaluate whether the one-sidedness of *Ciudadanos* is justified or unjustified? It is here that we can return to the concept of the moral panic, since as Goode and Ben-Yehuda point out, exaggeration and one-sidedness are typical features of the discourse of moral panics: 'Exaggerated and one-sided claims stimulate more outrage, attract more attention, and generate more resources for the cause than assertions that are nearer the literal truth'.[46] A documentary that was attempting to generate a moral panic would therefore be more prone to exaggeration and one-sidedness. Factual exaggeration can of course be tested, and those who take a 'contextual constructivist' approach to moral panics would do so as part of their analysis.[47] However, my analysis here will not concentrate on this kind of factual refutation, partly because this has already been done by a team from the *Universitat Oberta de Catalunya,* who have drawn together data from various sources to show that children educated in Catalonia perform as well as children from monolingual regions in all relevant areas, including their use of Spanish.[48] It is also true that the same statistics have in some cases been used to prove opposing arguments. For example, a survey carried out by the *Instituto DYM* for the newspaper *ABC* in 2010 was used by *ABC* to prove

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Table 1. Comparative table of words and phrases from *Ciudadanos de segunda*.

'Catalan'	'Spanish' or 'other'
obstáculo	lengua materna
lengua dominante	lengua común
monopoliza las aulas	boicoteado
dueño y señora de los colegios, la publicidad	imposibilitada de escolarizar a sus hijos en castellano
se ha apoderado del ámbito comercial	Perjudicados
implantar a través de la fuerza	deberán olvidarse de su propio idioma
medidas estrictas	no se le respeta ni su propio nombre
controles	sin libertad
exigencias	insultos
sanciones	Sancionados
está apartando el castellano del día a día	obligados a aprender el catalán
imponer	Amenazado
ideología	inferioridad de condiciones
obligando	Obligados
exige	tiene derecho

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that '[o]cho de cada diez catalanes quieren que la enseñanza sea bilingüe'.[49] However, *Libertad Digital* interpreted the same results as meaning that 51% of respondents were in favour of education being either mainly or totally in Catalan, with only just under 40% wanting a '50/50' bilingual model.[50] Evidence of students' capabilities in using Spanish and Catalan at various stages of their schooling has also been twisted to serve both camps.[51]

Instead, I propose to examine those aspects of the problem 'which cannot be assessed quantitatively'.[52] These include the way anti-Catalan discourses are constructed, and the hidden concerns for which the Catalan language may be acting as a scapegoat. As Butchart says, 'truth in documentary must be pursued without advance knowledge of what it will look like'.[53] In contrast, purveyors of moral panics must by definition already have a sense of certainty about 'the truth', because their goal is to spread this knowledge and encourage others to act on it. If there is evidence within the documentary itself that the makers were searching for proof of something they had already made up their minds to be true, then we can conclude that the documentary format has been pressed into service for a reason other than the pursuit of investigative journalism.

The obvious place to start is with an analysis of the language used in the voiceover of *Ciudadanos de segunda*. Such an analysis reveals a very simplistic binarism in its treatment of the question of bilingualism in Catalonia. The following table of words and phrases taken from the commentary (Table 1) makes it clear that this binarism revolves around a discourse of 'oppressor and oppressed'. The headings of the table are in inverted commas to denote the fact that the agents and victims of this oppression are never directly defined. In the case of 'Catalan', this sometimes seems to mean Catalan speakers or even—as in example 1 above—the language itself. At other times 'Catalan' seems to signal particular sub-sets within the larger group of Catalan speakers, such as the politicians who make education policy and impose sanctions on businesses. The same ambiguity applies to the 'opposite' category, as it sometimes refers specifically to Spanish speakers and sometimes to those with any other native language. The words and phrases in the table are just a sample and have been arranged into loosely-related

pairs for ease of comparison.[54] We can clearly see from this that 'Catalan' is categorized as the 'unnatural oppressor', and 'Spanish' or 'non-Catalan' speakers as the 'innocent oppressed'.

Another related feature of the language of the narration is the differential treatment of statements by 'Catalan speakers' and 'Spanish speakers' (again bearing in mind that these groups are never satisfactorily defined in the documentary, and no allowance is made for bilingualism even though many of the pro-Catalan contributors actually reply in Spanish). Accusations made by those who claim to have been discriminated against as Spanish speakers are reported as simple matters of fact, as shown in examples 2 and 4 of the narration (given above). On the other hand, accusations related to claims that Catalan speakers are marginalized are prefaced by phrases such as 'considera que', 'asegura que', or 'según él', thus making it clear that they consist of subjective opinions and casting doubt on their legitimacy.

The concluding words of the documentary serve to reinforce the binary discourse of oppressor and oppressed by stating that Catalan and Spanish are 'lenguas enfrentadas' and a choice has to be made between one or the other (example 4). This view stands in direct opposition to the dominant discourse in Catalonia, which revolves around the notion of 'convivència'. Jacqueline Hall defines this term as meaning that the Catalan and Spanish languages live together harmoniously, and states that 'there is no language conflict in Catalonia today' but simply 'a more balanced exercise of language rights' than has been the case in the past.[55] This includes the right to engage in 'passive bilingualism', with each speaker sticking to his or her preferred language. While the situation is rather more complex than Hall's take on this suggests—partly because of an influx of immigrants that largely took place after her book was published—it is certainly true that in daily life residents of Catalonia are rarely confronted with a situation in which they are forced consciously to choose between Catalan and Spanish. Instead they move fluidly through a linguistic landscape characterized by code-switching and accommodation.

The main strategy employed in *Ciudadanos de segunda*, then, is to construct Catalan speakers as the in-group and Spanish speakers as the out-group, denying any possibility of mobility between the two. The group identified as 'Catalan' becomes the 'folk devil': the oppressor that denies the rights of Spanish-speakers and threatens their way of life.[56] The complaints of Catalan contributors to the documentary that their language is under threat and requires active protection are dismissed by portraying Catalan speakers as the linguistic majority (in Catalonia) rather than a minority (in Spain). In the process, the power and agency of Catalan speakers is exaggerated through a focus on aspects of Catalan language policy—sanctions for failing to have shop signs in Catalan, for example, or attempts to force Hollywood distributors to dub films into Catalan—that in reality have had very limited effects. The focus on the rights of schoolchildren also reinforces the demonization of 'the Catalans', since who could fail to be moved by tales of children being deprived of the right to a proper education and used as pawns by nationalist propagandists?

However, as we have already noted, one of the main features of a moral panic is that the subject of the scare is normally simply a scapegoat for something deeper and less easy to articulate. In order to argue that *Ciudadanos de segunda* bears the hallmarks of an attempt to generate a moral panic, we have to ask what is the real issue being concealed by this focus on the use of Catalan in education. Interestingly, the documentary itself contains a clue to this, when Joel Joan protests that '[e]n tot cas és un problema que sortirà a la tele nostra, no a Telemadrid. A Telemadrid què cony li importa

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[...] ¿Què estan, defensant el castellanoparlant?' (in any case it's a problem that should be aired on Catalan television, not *Telemadrid*. What the hell does *Telemadrid* care […] What are they doing, defending Castilian speakers?).[57] This is indeed the question, but the answer is not simply that they are defending Spanish speakers: there are indications that in fact they are defending their own preferred version of the cultural and territorial integrity of Spain.

Evidence of this comes in two main forms: a preoccupation with the way in which Catalans speak about their territorial relationship with their neighbours, and the inclusion of statements about independence from those defending the Catalan point of view. The map of the *Països Catalans* found by the undercover reporter on the classroom wall is only the beginning, as the teacher goes on to explain how children are taught about the relationship between these different areas, to the effect that—as the voiceover puts it —'los países catalanes son un territorio compartido por cuatro estados: España, Francia, Andorra e Italia'. Later on, the documentary returns to this theme to complain that it is no wonder Joel Joan cannot understand why people from Madrid are interested in language rights in Catalonia, when every day he is subjected to weather forecasts that cover only the Catalan-speaking areas and lump the rest of Spain in with 'Europe'. Finally, we see images of a map of the *Països Catalans* being spread out on the pitch at the *Camp Nou* before a match. (To add insult to injury, this was not a random act but had been authorized by the club.) Furthermore, Joel Joan and Miquel Calzada both make statements related to Catalan independence: Joan says Catalans should have the right to choose whether they want to belong to Spain or not, while Calzada makes it clear that he cannot identify himself as Spanish and would prefer to be a citizen of an independent Catalonia.

As Angela McRobbie puts it, 'at root the moral panic is about instilling fear in people'.[58] It does not make sense for the documentary to play only on people's fears that one day their Madrid-born children or grandchildren might move to Catalonia and find themselves having to learn Catalan. The more real and tangible threat for someone who believed that Spain was one nation and should remain so would be the threat of Catalan separatism. The Catalan language is therefore used as shorthand for demonizing Catalans and a scapegoat for more fundamental concerns about the unity of Spain. Furthermore, there is an implicit political message in the documentary: that since the PP is the party that has taken the most hard-line stance against separatism and greater powers for the Autonomous Communities, viewers concerned about the threat should vote for the PP.

Needless to say, Catalan politicians and commentators very quickly refuted the claims made in *Ciudadanos de segunda*. It is not surprising that, for example, David Madí of the Catalan nationalist party *Convergència i Unió* criticized the documentary as 'irresponsible', while Joan Ridao of *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* demanded that the *Generalitat* take action against *Telemadrid*.[59] However, it is noteworthy that even Josep Piqué, the then president of the PP in Catalonia, took issue with the version of Catalonia's linguistic reality portrayed in *Ciudadanos*: 'A la societat catalana no hi ha problemes essencials sobre la llengua, tot i que no nego que hi hagi alguns problemes puntuals' (There are no fundamental issues regarding language in Catalan society, although I don't deny that some do arise on occasion).[60] If it was hoped, then, that the documentary would have the secondary effect of stirring up ill-feeling among Spanish speakers in Catalonia itself, Piqué's reaction suggests that the attempt was unlikely to succeed unless they were already convinced that there was a problem.

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However, more pertinent to our discussion of the film's role in attempting to generate a moral panic would be evidence of its impact amongst its primary target audience in Madrid. While this is in many ways hard to gauge, there is some evidence that leads to the conclusion that the documentary had no substantial impact on *madrileños*. Firstly, it was viewed by only 149,000 people despite being shown at the peak audience time of 11pm.[61] Even though the film has been available to view on various websites ever since its first screening in April 2007, its immediate impact on viewers was clearly very limited. Secondly, I have been unable to find press reports from the days following the screening that discuss the documentary from anything other than a critical point of view. These criticisms came not only from Catalans but also from employees of *Telemadrid*, whose union representatives issued a statement deploring the documentary and stating that no employee of *Telemadrid* had any hand in its production.[62] The then Minister of the Interior for the Spanish Socialists (PSOE), Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, also attributed the documentary directly to the influence of the PP, and attacked it for trying to '"resucitar la historia siniestra" de la batalla lingüística entre el catalán y el castellano' that they had already tried to propagate during the discussions on Catalonia's Statute of Autonomy.[63] These criticisms from the Spanish left highlight the predominantly right-wing nature of these particular kinds of attacks on the Catalan language, as is consistent with the conservative nature of moral panics.

Ciudadanos de segunda was therefore ineffective as a tool for creating a moral panic, for several reasons. First of all, the producers appear to have misjudged the extent to which the people of Madrid cared about the issue of Spanish-speakers in Catalonia, as evidenced by the poor audience figures and the lack of positive reactions to the documentary. Secondly, their exaggeration of the issues went too far and was too noticeable, partly because of the disjuncture between the voice-over and the interviews. Given that the documentary's makers appear to have set out to prove their own point of view rather than to investigate the subject with an open mind, they were perhaps expecting that the statements by Joel Joan, 'Mikimoto' and others would appear naturally absurd or deplorable to any *madrileño* who heard them. While there were no doubt some viewers who did have that reaction because they already agreed with the documentary's position, the filmmakers had no mechanism for convincing others except the crude and overblown statements in the commentary. For this reason, it was unable to generalize the moral panic, which—if it existed at all—remained confined to the same small group of right-wing Spanish nationalists.

Conclusions

In many ways, the documentary's lack of effectiveness is unsurprising and attributable to much broader factors than the characteristics of this particular film and its intended audience. As Angela McRobbie has argued, today's media landscape—its webs of influence, and its connections to lived social and political realities—is so complex that true moral panics are much harder to create and sustain.[64] Drawing on McRobbie's arguments, Daniel Biltereyst puts the problem like this: 'The intentional production, or the simulation of, a (possible) moral panic only rarely leads to real moral panics […]. In a postmodern environment, these (potential) moral-panic stories are woven into a massive flow of other media stories, events and voices from various horizons. In this context, the chance that they really lead to a momentum of moral outcry is fairly small, at least as a result of specific issues whipped up by the media'.[65] However, this does not mean that the deliberate attempt to create a moral panic has no effect whatsoever, as it con-

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tributes to the sensitization of the public, or a section of the public, towards the issues.[66] For example, a viewer who had already seen *Ciudadanos de segunda* might have been more receptive to the message in a later documentary, *Cataluña: violencia callejera*, also shown on *Telemadrid*.[67] This used similar scare tactics, purporting to reveal a shocking increase in separatist gang violence in Catalonia and likening it to *kale borroka* (separatist urban violence in the Basque Country). Again, the message seemed to be that pro-independence Catalans were deviants, and viewers in Madrid should be concerned enough about this to support the PP's strong stance against Catalan sovereignty.

Naturally, Catalans have always tended to construct their national identity by categorizing themselves as different from other Spaniards. What is less often acknowledged is that Spaniards also constitute their national identity with reference to their differences with the Catalans.[68] This process is necessarily ambivalent, in the sense that much Spanish nationalist rhetoric revolves around denying that there are any substantial differences. This of course makes it easier to argue that Catalans should accept that they are also Spanish and stop pushing for cultural and political recognition as a separate group. Generally, Catalan reactions against this imposition of sameness only strengthen the resolve of Spanish nationalists to deny the differences. At first glance, rhetoric like that deployed in *Ciudadanos de segunda*, which constructs the Catalans as 'deviants', seems to risk highlighting the differences to the detriment of the similarities. However, the implicit emphasis is on the correction of this 'socially unacceptable difference' rather than any potential push to 'eliminate' the deviant from society.[69]

This desire to 'centre the margins' ignores the role they already play in constituting the centre through their difference. In fact, as Richard Jenkins says, ethnically-based categorizations such as those deployed in anti-Catalanist statements 'tell us about the categorizers—how they see themselves and their objectives—more than the categorized'.[70] The unifying objectives of Spanish political nationalism are clear enough, and they have already been identified as a part of the sub-text of *Ciudadanos de segunda*. On the other hand, what these negative categorizations of Catalans say about the construction of Spanish identity ('how they see themselves') is much harder to pin down. Maybe the Catalans' relative certainty about their own identity actually highlights gaps in other Spaniards' sense of their collective self.[71] In other words, negative categorizations of the Catalans might substitute for 'missing elements' in the self-categorizations of those who consider themselves only Spanish. The difficulty—especially from the point of view of an academic researcher—is proving this theory, since we would be attempting to investigate an absence rather than a presence.

Nevertheless, an analysis of the arguments put forward in media such as *Ciudadanos de segunda* does allow us to demonstrate the importance of language as a 'vicarious front line' in the conflict between Catalan and Spanish nationalisms,[72] and to dissect the discursive paradigms that are used to construct this conflict. It also illustrates the on-going campaign of sensitization waged by the right-wing Spanish media that keeps issues to do with Catalonia in the minds of voters in national elections, even when these are absent from party manifestos. Although it may be couched in the more liberal-sounding terms of individual language rights or constitutional patriotism,[73] this sensitization is clearly predicated on deep-rooted forms of ethnic categorization, whose effect is to reinforce negative stereotypes and widen the ever-increasing gap between Catalan and Spanish nationalist positions. It is therefore little surprise that many Catalans are finding it harder and harder to maintain a sense of dual Catalan/Spanish identity, with all the political consequences this entails.

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Notes

1. I use 'Catalans' throughout to signify 'people who self-identify as Catalan', unless the term is otherwise qualified. 'Catalonia' refers only to the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, not to the *Països Catalans* (Catalan Countries), a term used to refer to all the Catalan-speaking areas of Europe. I would like to thank Stewart King and Miquel Strubell for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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4. Strubell and Brunet, *What Catalans Want,* p. 104.
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12. See, for example, Sergi Cortiñas Rovira and Carles Pont Sorribes, 'The Daily Press and Political Communication: The Perception of the Statute of Catalonia in Twelve Daily Spanish Newspapers', *Catalan Social Sciences Review,* 1, 2012, pp. 31–45.
13. On the last point, see Juan R. Lodares, 'La comunidad lingüística en la España de hoy. (Temas y problemas de diferenciación cultural)', *Bulletin of Hispanic Studies,* 82:1, 2005, pp. 1–15; and Joan-Lluís Marfany, 'The Catalan Question Revisited: On Lodares, a Dubious 'Linguistic Community' and Imaginary Threats To It', *Bulletin of Spanish Studies,* 83:7, 2006, pp. 939–55.
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15. Rogers Brubaker, 'Ethnicity, Race and Nationalism', *Annual Review of Sociology,* 35, 2009, pp. 21–42, pp. 32–33. Emphasis in original.
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23. See Article 6.2 of Catalonia's 2006 Statute of Autonomy, and Colino, 'Constitutional Change', p. 275.
24. Article 6.2 of Catalonia's 2006 Statute of Autonomy Article.
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69. Johnson, ‘From Linguistic Molehills’, pp. 27–28.
70. Jenkins, *Rethinking Ethnicity*, p. 62.
71. The problem of Spain’s own identity is expressed, for example, by three contributors to the documentary *Spain’s Secret Conflict* (dir. Gary Gibson, 2010): Jaime Pastor, Encarnación Valenzuela and Fernando Sánchez Dragó. Sánchez Dragó says ‘el español es el único ser humano que duda continuamente de su propia identidad’. (For more empirical evidence of Spaniards’ insecurity about expressing their national identity see Antonia María Ruiz Jiménez and Carmen González Enríquez, ‘La identidad nacional y europea de los ciudadanos españoles: Un estudio cualitativo de entrevistas y grupos de discusión’, *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, 136, April-June 2007, pp.143–78, pp. 150–54.)
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