The Paasikivi Line in Finland's Foreign Policy
Author(s): Allan A. Kuusisto
Source: *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 1, Part 1 (Mar., 1959), pp. 37-49
Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/444190
Accessed: 10-04-2020 15:48 UTC

# THE PAASIKIVI LINE IN FINLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY

ALLAN A. KUUSISTO*
*University of New Hampshire*

FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II, Finland's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union has consistently followed the so-called Paasikivi Line. This policy deserves investigation for its approach to the Soviet and for its possible contribution to East–West relations generally, since the Kremlin leaders have apparently accepted it as a satisfactory arrangement for coexistence with an independent, non-Communist nation with which Russia shares some seven hundred miles of border. It is the purpose of this article to explore the concepts and measures underlying the Finnish policy and to evaluate their significance.

The Paasikivi Line is compounded from the views and diplomatic practices of its conservatively-oriented author, the late Juho K. Paasikivi — Prime Minister, 1944–46, and President, 1946–56 — and his successor, the Agrarian party leader Urho Kekkonen — Prime Minister on five occasions between 1950 and 1956 and President since 1956.[1] Paasikivi's beliefs in rapprochement with Russia had been consistently held for nearly a half-century before he became responsible for Finland's policies after the armistice of 1944. Kekkonen's conversion from anti-Russian views occurred during the Continuation War, 1941–44, although he had advocated moderation in policy as early as 1937.[2]

The Paasikivi Line is based on the assumption that the Soviet Union's interest in Finland is pre-eminently a security interest and that occupation and satellization are not necessary to ensure achievement of this objective. It holds that if Finland initiates friendly and co-operative measures to convince her neighbor that hostile actions by her, or even through her territory, will henceforth be prevented, the Soviet will in turn co-operate to the extent of accepting Finland's independence and its freedom of choice in other respects, including the conduct of its own internal affairs and those aspects of its external relations which do not affect the Soviet Union's strategic interests. This case is based partially on historical evidence of

* The author is indebted to the Joint Committee on Slavic and Eastern European Studies of the Social Science Research Council and the Central University Research Fund of the University of New Hampshire for grants in aid of his study of Finland's politics since World War II.

[1] Recently published views of both men provided invaluable source material for this article: J. K. Paasikivi, *Paasikiven muistelmia sortovuosilta* (2 vols.; Porvoo and Helsinki, 1957), hereafter referred to as *P.M.S.*; *idem*, *Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939–41* (2 vols.; Porvoo and Helsinki, 1958), hereafter referred to as *T.M.S.*; *Paasikiven linja I. Juho Kustaa Paasikiven puheita 1944–1956* (Porvoo and Helsinki, 1956); and Kustaa Vilkuna (ed.), *Maan puolesta. Urho Kekkosen puheita ja kirjoituksia 1938–1955* (Helsinki, 1955).

[2] Urho Kekkonen, "Mitä ylioppilasnuoriso tänään, sitä kansa huomenna," *Suomalainen Suomi*, No. 2 (1937), p. 115.

special Russian forbearance toward Finland and partially on an interpretation of geopolitical circumstances in northern Europe.

Paasikivi's views were inherited from his turn-of-the-century political mentors, the Old Finns, who firmly believed that the best means of alleviating the more stringent Russification measures of Czar Nicholas II was through a policy of friendship. The Old Finns, such as Yrjö Sakari Yrjö–Koskinen and E. G. Palmen, thought that Finnish nationalism was advanced most effectively if its supporters constantly remembered that overwhelming imbalances of power meant that Finland must avoid conflict with Russia. International law and justice, otherwise excellent ideals for mankind, were insufficiently developed to serve Finland, and world opinion was too amorphous.[3] What conditions of coexistence could be arranged through a co-operative approach toward Russia the Old Finns were not prepared to say, but they insisted that it was perhaps to the stronger party's advantage to find mutually satisfactory arrangements.[4]

The Old Finns dismissed a persistent belief in majority circles that internal uprisings in Russia would momentarily rescue Finland's rights. Although social deterioration in Russia was clearly evident, the soundest policy-assumption was that the culmination of such a development might be postponed for decades. A more powerful nation, like Poland, might carry on an active nationalist struggle against Russia for decades, but Finland did not have the resources for prolonged activism.[5] The Old Finns would sanction force only if a policy of co-operation, which included sacrifice of precious rights, had demonstrably failed.[6]

Paasikivi remained convinced of the essential soundness of the Old Finns' reasoning, despite ultimate realization of Finland's independence by means widely different from those which Yrjö–Koskinen and his followers advocated. Most significantly, he considered the Old Finn approach as applicable for Finland in its relations with the Bolsheviks as with the Czars, although he recognized that the Soviet Union was an imperialistic and military great power jealous of its honor and that Lenin was a cynical dictator who construed pacifism and antimilitarism as peculiar diseases of small or weak countries to be exploited by the strong.[7]

Paasikivi's basic tenet was that small states would be mercilessly slaughtered if they stood in the way of great powers. Although he conceded that

[3] *P.M.S.*, I, 50, 53.

[4] The Old Finns and Paasikivi were influenced by two earlier developments in which friendly approaches by Finland toward the Czar had patently succeeded: (1) at the time of the Russian conquest of Finland in 1809 when Finnish generals in the Czar's service, such as Yrjö Sprengtporten, persuaded Alexander I to grant Finland semi-autonomy within the empire; and (2) in the 1860's when tactful, albeit vigorous, pressures for liberalization of Finland's government won the support of Alexander II.

[5] *P.M.S.*, I, 11.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 77.

[7] *T.M.S.*, I, chap. 3.

occasionally great-power rivalries create balances of power which permit small states breathing space, he felt that Finland's geographic proximity to Russia afforded little opportunity for outside assistance under any circumstances. The other great powers, Great Britain, France, the United States, and even Germany, were simply located too far away to assist Finland.[8] Even a Nordic defense pact to protect the neutrality of Scandinavia and Finland from great power conflagrations, an approach which Paasikivi approved, must be built on Soviet appreciation that such a pact's aims were in no way opposed to her interests.[9]

Paasikivi also insisted that it was unrealistic for Finns to hope for the collapse of the distrusted Bolsheviks. Whoever filled the vacuum created by Bolshevik collapse would inherit the resources and potentials for great-power status and Finland would still be confronted with the problem of survival. Implicitly, even if the successor government were based on constitutional, democratic principles, the problem of survival would still continue.[10] In any instance, it seemed clear to Paasikivi after 1930 that Soviet strength had reached such proportions that anticipation of its downfall had no role in policy considerations.[11]

## I

Much like Winston Churchill in Great Britain during the 1930's, Paasikivi's outspoken and unpopular views reduced his opportunities to influence foreign policy. However, when Finnish governments found themselves in ticklish diplomatic discussions with the Soviet Union, they called on his services.[12] Thus, he led the Finnish delegation to Dorpat, Estonia, in 1920 to negotiate a treaty of peace with the Soviet Union. Despite some difficult problems, including the troublesome border problem, Paasikivi proved an adept horse-trader, conceding occasionally but winning concessions in turn. To the Soviet Union Paasikivi conceded East Karelia which had never actually been in Finland's possession but which rabid ultranationalists considered a part of Finland *irredenta*, and received from the Bolsheviks the Arctic port of Petsamo. Most remarkably, he won Soviet acquiesence in a Finnish–Soviet border only thirty-two kilometers from Leningrad. By diplomatic standards the negotiations were successful, but in the internal political circumstances of Finland, the treaty and its negotiators were considered failures. The incumbent Erich government won parliamentary sup-

[8] *T.M.S.*, II, 7.

[9] Paasikivi made an extensive effort to convince the Bolsheviks of the desirability of a Nordic defense pact in 1940. *Ibid.*, chap. 4.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 5. By 1944 Kekkonen was prepared to agree with most of Paasikivi's reasoning. See Pekka Peitsi (Urho Kekkonen), *Tässä sitä ollaan* (Helsinki, 1944).

[12] Paasikivi was aware of the misgivings with which governments resorted to his services. *T.M.S.*, I, 56.

port for the treaty but never quite recovered from the resultant unpopularity.[13]

When Soviet pressures approached ultimatum proportions in the fall of 1939, the government again called on Paasikivi. Somehow through the confidence he could generate in Moscow toward himself, personally, but without violating the strict instructions of the government back home with which he did not agree, Paasikivi had to ward off Soviet demands.[14] Inevitably, he failed in his assignment, but this did not end his usefulness, and during the ensuing war he served as a peace negotiator for the government. Finland in defeat was compelled to surrender more territory than the Soviet had sought before the war and to grant its long-time illegal Communist party full legal rights in its internal affairs. However, the country remained unoccupied for the moment, still in command of its own military forces and theoretically, at least, free to choose its own internal course.[15]

The Winter War won Finland sympathy in the world, and it produced unprecedented unity within the country in support of its rights, yet Paasikivi continued to feel that the war could have been avoided if Finland had demonstrated a more friendly disposition toward the Soviet's efforts to defend its interests in the Baltic area.[16] In this respect, Paasikivi's views conflict with prevalent Finnish and Western opinion that the country achieved grudging recognition for its independence from the Soviet by fighting and that she thereby avoided the fate of the Baltic countries. It was contended that Paasikivi's views would have created defeatism and guilt in Finland with disastrous effects on the moral unity which the public had heretofore shown in support of its rights.[17] Moral unity, belief in law and

---

[13] Paasikivi regretted his own successes at Dorpat subsequently: "Had we been farsighted statesmen, we would have understood that the further from Leningrad we could settle on the border, the greater would have been Finland's possibilities to preserve its independence." (Tr. author's.) *Paasikiven linja I. Juho Kustaa Paasikiven puheita 1944–1956, op. cit.*, p. 46. See also Kalle Lahteenoja, "Helmikuun manifestosta Tarton rauhaan," in Kauko Kare (ed.), *J. K. Paasikiven valtakunnan elämäntyö* (Forssa, 1956), pp. 41–44.

[14] Paasikivi's misgivings about Finnish policy were expressed forcefully in a letter to the Social Democratic leader Väinö Tanner on July 17, 1939. *T.M.S.*, I, 9–11.

[15] Winter War diplomacy has been recorded from many perspectives. The most thorough and dispassionate account in Finnish is Max Jakobson's *Diplomaattien talvisota Suomi maailman politiikassa 1938–1940* (Helsinki, 1956). Shorter scholarly accounts in English are included in Anatole G. Mazour, *Finland between East and West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); C. Leonard Lundin, *Finland in the Second World War* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1957); and Albin T. Anderson, "Origins of the Winter War, A Study of Russo–Finnish Diplomacy," *World Politics*, VI (January, 1954), 169–89. Memoirs of Finnish participants in the diplomacy available in English include Foreign Minister Väinö Tanner's *The Winter War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), and Marshal Karl G. Mannerheim's *The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim*, London, 1953. Most of *T.M.S.*, Vol. I, not translated into English, is devoted to this subject.

[16] *T.M.S.*, II, 180–84.

[17] See, for instance, Yrjö Niiniluoto, "Paasikivi ja talvisota," *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 15, 1958.

justice, and a willingness to fight were considered all-important weapons for a small nation in its struggle for survival against a great power known for its unreliability.

Paasikivi was not unmindful of the psychological and even moral factors at work in the defense of the homeland, but he lamented a concurrent lack of appreciation of more important power factors and historical perspectives. He saw only two alternatives in Russia's policy toward Finland: (1) complete subjugation at some future time appropriate to her time schedule; or (2) acceptance of certain territorial concessions as sufficient for her needs.[18] Since historically Russia had been content with the latter, Paasikivi thought it was likely that this was still the case. He was strengthened in this impression by the 1940 Moscow agreement ending the Winter War which permitted Finland a precarious independence.

Paasikivi maintained that subjugation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all of whom had accommodated Soviet territorial demands, provided no key to the Soviet's policy toward Finland. In a letter to Tanner in December, 1940, he noted that Finland had been treated differently from the Baltic states in Russian policy from Peter the Great's time to the present. Finland need not be occupied for Russian interests to be served, whereas the Baltic countries were both militarily and economically considered integral parts of Russia.[19]

But even if the Soviet Union aimed to subjugate Finland, Paasikivi considered the circumstances of 1939 ill-suited for a war of survival. Since Finland had no promises of support from the outer world and its defense preparations were poor, and since Russia was assured by the August, 1939, Molotov–Ribbentrop pact of noninterference by Germany, the Finnish decision to risk war was a mistake. If the Finns had ceded the territories to the Soviet Union, they would have gained time to prepare their defenses for a more effective struggle if it ultimately proved necessary.[20]

In the period between the Winter War and the outbreak of the Continuation War in June, 1941, Paasikivi served as Minister to Moscow, working to implement the peace terms while the government back home was granting transit rights through Finnish territory to the Nazis and otherwise creating circumstances for renewed hostilities with the Soviet Union.[21] During the Continuation War in which Finland was a cobelligerent of Germany, Paasikivi was employed briefly in the spring of 1944 to open peace talks with

[18] *T.M.S.*, II, 187.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 181.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] For a defense of Finland's policies before and during the Continuation War, see John H. Wuorinen (ed.), *Finland and World War II 1939–1944* (New York: Ronald, 1948). For a critical view, see Lundin, *op. cit.* *T.M.S.*, Vol. II, is devoted in large part to the author's diplomatic contacts with Soviet leaders in 1940 and 1941.

the Soviet. His entry to effective political leadership awaited the emergency which followed the armistice in September, 1944.

## II

Finland's situation following its second defeat by the Soviet Union in four years provided the most challenging circumstances for Paasikivi to test his theories of Finnish–Soviet relations. Inevitably, the newly-elected President Mannerheim appointed him Prime Minister, for, in Kekkonen's terms "Paasikivi is probably the only Finnish politician toward whom there is any feeling of trust in the Soviet Union." [22] Paasikivi's task, difficult enough in the shock and demoralization which accompanied defeat, was magnified by the terms of the armistice. Finland was subjected to a reparations bill of $300,000,000 to be paid in six years, a loss of one-tenth of her land, and drastic interdictions on the conduct of her internal politics. To be sure, Soviet wrath fell short of all-out occupation probably because she needed all her available manpower for the "liberation" of East Europe and Berlin, but Finland's independence seemed more fictional than real. In addition to assuming responsibility for subduing some 200,000 Nazi troops in northern Finland, Finland was compelled to permit Soviet troops transit rights to a base leased to the erstwhile foe at Porkkala just outside Helsinki, to reduce its defense forces to skeleton proportions, and to disband all organizations of Fascist leanings or of known anti-Soviet disposition. She was obligated to apprehend and try her wartime leaders for war crimes and to free all Communists and fellow-travelers who had been detained during the war. An Allied Control Commission, with André Zhdanov as head Soviet representative, was to oversee enforcement of these conditions, pending enactment of a peace treaty.

To implement the armistice, Paasikivi was compelled to ask decree powers to continue wartime censorship, to curb economic rights, to seize land, and to ban various organizations, including the Civil Guard which had played a vital role in all of Finland's wars since the Civil War of 1918. He felt pressured to take Communists into the government, granting them control of the vital Ministry of Interior among other important offices. He banned many of his old friends from political activity, including Tanner, and was ultimately responsible for deciding who would be arrested and tried as war criminals. Many of these decisions ran counter to Finland's

[22] Urho Kekkonen, "Rauhan presidentti ja rauhan hallitus," a memorandum sent to Marshal Mannerheim on June 29, 1944, insisting that the essentially nonpolitical Mannerheim, who had the confidence of the Finnish people and was acceptable to the Soviet Union, permit parliament to elect him President and that he, in turn, appoint Paasikivi as his Prime Minister. Two months later when President Risto Ryti resigned, Mannerheim was elected to the office and the following November Paasikivi became Prime Minister. Vilkuna, *op. cit.*, pp. 89–91. Molotov had once observed to Paasikivi that he was the only Finnish leader who really hoped for good relations with the Soviet Union. *T.M.S.*, II, 78.

constitutional, democratic system, while others jeopardized the country's security; but it seems clear that if Paasikivi had not presided over the implementation of the armistice, the task would have gone to someone from the far left of Finnish politics. In such an instance, revenge motives would have been added to a need to accommodate the Allied Control Commission.

With Soviet artillery at Porkkala a scant fifteen miles from Helsinki, efforts at Finnish friendship toward the Soviet Union had to oppose feelings of fear and suspicion.[23] A Finland–Soviet Union Society, established after the armistice, and which Paasikivi joined along with Kekkonen and others to promote friendly relations with the powerful neighbor, soon attracted a full house of Communists, fellow-travelers, and band-wagon opportunists who seemed to want nothing less than the Sovietization of the country. In these circumstances, the Paasikivi approach had a difficult time achieving public understanding, and Paasikivi personally was in jeopardy of being used by the Communists for their cause.

Paasikivi's preference was to concentrate on foreign policy and to leave internal problems to his ministers, insofar as he could find trustworthy "tight-rope walkers" to whom he dared delegate authority; i.e., non-Communist politicians who understood the thin line Finland had to follow and who were acceptable to the Soviet Union. Since completely acceptable candidates could not always be found (the Prime Minister in the first two years of Paasikivi's Presidency, 1946–1948, was Mauno Pekkala, a left-wing Social Democrat who had joined the Communist-led Finnish People's Democratic League), Paasikivi had to follow internal affairs closely.[24] Not until anti-Communist forces decisively gained the upper hand in 1948 and thereby ended any immediate threats of an internal coup was Paasikivi freed from his vigil.[25]

Despite rather meager returns in the first years, Paasikivi undeviatingly pursued his policy of friendship toward the Soviet. Occasional signs of thaw, such as Soviet easing of war indemnity payments, trade concessions, and tolerance of Finnish acceptance of loans from Sweden and the United States, were more than cancelled by setbacks, imposed directly by Soviet action or by Finnish fears of Soviet opposition. Included among such setbacks were the Soviet's unrelenting stand at the Paris Peace Conference in

[23] For a study of the political climate of 1944 and 1945, see Lauri Hyvämäki, *Vaaran vuodet 1944–1948* (Helsinki, 1955), pp. 1-102.

[24] Finland's constitutional system and post-armistice political circumstances combined to give the President strong powers both in foreign and internal affairs. However, even as Prime Minister, Paasikivi enjoyed larger powers than usual for that office, thanks to President Mannerheim's delegation of responsibility to him.

[25] Three developments in 1948 effectively quashed the internal Communist threat: (1) Paasikivi's ouster of Communist Minister of Interior Yrjö Leino following the parliament's vote of no confidence in him during May; (2) loss of eleven parliamentary seats by the Communists in the July elections; (3) formation, following the elections, of a government, the Fagerholm Cabinet, from which Communists were excluded.

1946 to Finland's mild efforts at amelioration of the armistice terms, Finland's decision not to participate in the Marshall Plan meetings at Paris in 1947, and Soviet veto of Finland's membership in the United Nations. The Finnish government's decision to forego Marshall Plan participation was probably the most painful of these; it was made in opposition to the affirmative response of Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee and to the country's known need for economic aid. It seemed, to many observers, a lamentable decision casting Finland in the Eastern camp for good.[26]

## III

A decisive turn in Finnish–Soviet relations came in 1948 with the negotiation of the Agreement of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance. Both non-Communist Finnish and Western opinion feared the beginning of the end for the country when Stalin's invitation to Paasikivi to negotiate a pact was made public — concurrent developments in Czechoslovakia seemed to indicate that Finland's moment for subjugation had arrived.[27] The six-weeks' interval from the receipt of Stalin's letter to the signing of the pact on April 6 proved as nerve-wracking as any the nation had ever lived through.

But if the Soviet had aimed at Finland's subjugation, the pact did not accomplish that purpose. Indeed, the wording of critical Articles 1 and 2 indicated that the treaty was tailored to suit the Paasikivi Line. Finland agreed in Article 1 that in the eventuality she, or the Soviet Union through her territory, became the object of an armed attack by Germany or any state allied with the latter, she would fight to repel the attack. If Soviet help were necessary in the defense of Finland's territorial integrity, it would be made available subject to mutual agreement between the two countries. In Article 2 Finland agreed that she would confer with the Soviet "if it is established that the threat of an armed attack as defined in Article 1 is present." Other articles contained the concept of mutual respect of sovereignty and integrity and of noninterference in the internal affairs of the other party.

The pact precluded Finnish military alignment with the West, but it did

---

[26] For instance, the *Hufvudstadsbladet* on July 9, 1947, maintained that Finland's refusal to participate in the meetings would arouse distrust and estrangement toward her among Western countries. The *Helsingin Sanomat* took much the same editorial stand on July 6, 1947.

[27] The *Uusi Suomi*, March 25, 1948, quoted Sumner Welles as saying that Finland will be compelled to sign an agreement that will erase the last vestige of independence. *Kauppalehti*, March 11, 1948, reported that an American Congressman, Representative Warren Harris, had written the Secretary of Commerce urging him to stop ammonium nitrate shipments to Finland, since it was clear Finland was in line for Soviet subjugation and must be considered an enemy of the United States. The four leading non-Communist dailies in Helsinki, *Uusi Suomi*, *Hufvudstadsbladet*, *Helsingin Sanomat*, and *Sosialidemokraatti*, all lamented the need of a treaty in their February 28, 1948, editorials.

not stipulate any restraints nor any obligations to confer with the Soviet concerning Finland's nonmilitary relations with the West. There was no obligation to join in any larger Communist defense pact, such as the subsequent Warsaw Pact, nor in defense of Soviet interests elsewhere but on Finland's own territory. In addition, Finland remained in independent control of its Army and military policy. The pact granted the country a precarious neutrality in the cold war. Given Paasikivi's interpretation of small power-Soviet relations, this was as much as could be anticipated.[28]

Following ratification of the treaty, Finnish–Soviet relations gradually relaxed. Soviet surveillance of Finland's government continued, but the limits of tolerance broadened. Between 1948 and 1955, Finland whittled away at the more onerous restrictions on its self-government. The war responsibles were freed from prison, including Tanner and Ryti, and by 1951 Tanner was elected to Parliament without more than propaganda rumblings from Moscow. Finland signed an agreement with the United States in 1949 providing for visits of Finnish students to the United States, and this was augmented by a Fulbright agreement in 1952 which brought American scholars to Finland for the first time the following year. The Soviet Union seemed to accept Finland's demarcation line between questions of military or political importance on which agreements with the West were taboo and other questions, principally cultural and economic, which were appropriate for negotiation. When the Nordic Council was formally constituted in Copenhagen in 1953 and membership tendered Finland, the government refrained from participation since it was not clear whether the Council would concern itself with East–West alignments. Similarly, in internal affairs as late as the presidential election of 1956, it seemed necessary for war responsibles to refrain from candidacy for fear of aggravating the Soviet. This affected Tanner primarily, since there was considerable sentiment, perhaps even enough for election, behind the old Social Democrat.

One question on which there was serious disagreement within the country after 1948 concerned Finland's responsibility to influence other Nordic countries to accept the Paasikivi Line in their own policies. Beyond doubt, there was consensus on the vital relationship of Sweden's neutrality to the retention of Finland's freedom; there was perhaps as much a Stockholm as a Moscow orientation to Paasikivi's and Kekkonen's policies.[29] But what role did Finland have in seeking to convert Sweden and the other Scandi-

[28] Paasikivi explained to the public on April 9, 1948, that the wording of Article 2, the most bothersome for Finnish opinion, was actually the wording incorporated into the Finnish delegation's original instructions. *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 10, 1948. It should be noted that Paasikivi did not participate in the negotiations personally but that Kekkonen played a central role in the actual diplomatic maneuvering at Moscow. For Kekkonen's discussion of the pact, see Vilkuna, *op. cit.*, pp. 220–24.

[29] See, for instance, former Foreign Minister Reinhold Svento's comments in this connection in Kare, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

navian countries to a friendship and accommodation policy toward the Soviet? Prime Minister Kekkonen, believing that it was in Finland's interest to convert the other northern countries to the Paasikivi Line, explicitly suggested this in a speech in January, 1952. Since invasion of the Soviet Union through Finland by a Western power was possible only through Scandinavia, Kekkonen sought to close off this possibility and thereby prevent invocation of the 1948 pact.[30] But reactions throughout Scandinavia and in Finland were so distinctly hostile that the government retreated to a more limited objective of simply seeking Scandinavian acceptance and understanding of the necessity of the Paasikivi Line for Finland.[31]

The emergence of Khruschev and Bulganin to Kremlin leadership resulted in striking developments in Finland's situation. Soviet withdrawal from Porkkala, extension of the 1948 pact for twenty years, liberal trade concessions and loans, and acceptance of Finland's membership in the United Nations and the Nordic Council followed within months the establishment of the new Kremlin regime. Exchanges of visitations by the leaders of the two countries created the impression that the Soviet was willing to work out its relations with Finland on Paasikivi's terms.[32] Paasikivi's speech at the Moscow banquet celebrating the Porkkala withdrawal reveals his obvious satisfaction: "I am here in Moscow for the seventh time for negotiations on affairs of state concerning Finland and the Soviet Union. But this is the first time I return to our capital satisfied." [33]

Despite these expressions of satisfaction, Paasikivi and Kekkonen continued to interpret Soviet friendship with grave caution. Exchanges of visits, regardless of their surface cordiality, were also occasions for Soviet demands on Finland which, if accepted *in toto*, could jeopardize Western understanding of Finland's neutrality.[34] Membership in international and regional organizations was similarly full of pitfalls. Consequently, the Finnish government has construed its role in the Nordic Council as being limited to economic and social co-operation, and it has avoided expression

[30] Vilkuna, *op. cit.*, pp. 228, 229.

[31] Stockholm's *Dagens Nyheter* went so far as to conclude that the suggestion was "a part of Communist propaganda." Cited in *Helsingin Sanomat*, January 25, 1952. The *Uusi Suomi* and *Sosialidemokraatti* in January 24, 1952, editorials, and the *Helsingin Sanomat* on January 26, 1952, severely criticized the Prime Minister for his diplomatic blunder.

[32] In October, 1954, Paasikivi was awarded the Order of Lenin for "his outstanding . . . contribution . . . to the cause of the development of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Finland." *New York Times*, October 6, 1954.

[33] *New York Times*, September 20, 1955.

[34] For instance, at the time of Kekkonen's state visit to the U.S.S.R. in May, 1958, the Soviet obviously insisted that the Finnish President give his seal of approval to Soviet stands on disarmament and Communist China's membership in the United Nations which were then duly transcribed for world propaganda use in the official communiqué released at the end of the visit. See the communiqué in *Helsingin Sanomat*, May 31, 1958.

of preference in the United Nations whenever necessary to protect its neutrality. Finland's first attendance at the General Assembly in the fall of 1956 coincided with that body's discussion of Soviet interference in the Hungarian revolt. Although non-Communist opinion in Finland strongly supported the Hungarian Freedom Fighters,[35] the official delegation limited itself to a hope that Soviet forces would withdraw and then abstained in the voting. On the other hand, Finland voted to support the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and then contributed a detachment to this Force, but these were actions which did not conflict with Soviet interests.

However, while the Nordic Council and, more particularly, the United Nations created new pressures on Finnish neutrality, participation in these organizations served to dissipate a feeling of isolation within the country. Membership provided opportunities for new areas of co-operation with non-Communist nations, such as participation in the United Nations Emergency Force, and thereby bolstered Finland's prospects for securing understanding of its precarious perch. It was even possible in 1958 for Finns to contemplate membership in a Nordic "Common Market."

## IV

Since the answer is locked in the Kremlin, no final conclusion can be reached concerning the Paasikivi Line's role in salvaging Finland's independence and in permitting it to avoid satellization. However, considering the punitive nature of the armistice and peace treaty and the stark hostility of Soviet leaders toward Finland in 1944, it seems plausible to contend that Finland's nonprovocative and friendly approach has influenced Soviet policy. For all they are worth, Soviet pronouncements on Finnish–Soviet relations create this impression.[36] In the face of Finland's willingness to accommodate the Soviet's strategic interests, direct military intervention became unnecessary for security purposes. On the other hand, the Soviet could turn this unexpected relationship into a propaganda show window of model relations between a Communist and a non-Communist state — a natural tactical response particularly after Western resistance to Soviet policies began to harden.[37] The retreat from Porkkala in 1955 at the height of the initial "Geneva period" in Soviet policy and Khruschev's and Bulganin's visit to Finland in 1957, the first state visit to the West after the Hungarian Revolution, involved exploitation of this "island in the West" to confound and disarm the non-Communist world.

[35] Yrjö Niiniluoto, *Mitä on olla Suomalainen?* (Helsinki, 1957), p. 207.

[36] See E. Ambartsumov, "Soviet–Finnish Relations — Relations of Peace and Friendship," *International Affairs: A Monthly of Political Analysis* (Moscow), October, 1955, pp. 44–53.

[37] On the other hand, military occupation of Finland especially in or after 1948 would have resulted in a propaganda fiasco for the Soviet in all likelihood.

The Paasikivi Line, however, can not be extracted from a complex network of causal forces which have combined to create the peculiar circumstances for Finland's continuing independence. Internal resistance to Communist infiltration was unquestionably involved in the denouement. Official friendship toward the Soviet never blinded the country into softness toward its own Communists. The vigorous measures taken by anti-Communists in Finland to halt Communist infiltration prevented the fate that befell Czechoslovakia and created the conditions in which the Paasikivi Line could be successfully employed externally. The successful synthesis of self-restraint in relations toward the motherland of communism with firmness toward local Communists called for wholesale doses of public understanding and tact.[38] A basic strength of the Paasikivi Line has been its continuing reliance on the rational approval of a citizenry which remains free to criticize its current implementation and to shape its future course. Thus the policy avoids the dangerous public frustrations and repressions inherent in a policy foisted from above on the government's terms alone.

Despite Paasikivi's and Kekkonen's cautious approach to external help, dictated more by the sensitivities of the Soviet than by a lack of appreciation of its importance, it seems likely that Finland's survival has been abetted by neighboring non-Communist states' discreet policies. Paasikivi's accommodation theories actually differed little from those of Maniu, Mikolajczyk, and Beneš, but where Rumania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia are hopelessly sandwiched between Russia and Germany, Finland fortunately adjoins free Scandinavia. Military occupation of Finland would probably have provoked Sweden, the pivotal North European country, into surrender of its neutrality in favor of participation in Western containment schemes, a development far costlier to the Soviet than benefits resulting from satellization of Finland. Similarly, Soviet military action would probably have influenced Norway and Denmark into non-qualified acceptance of American arms aid within the NATO framework.[39]

In a passive but nonetheless important manner the great powers of the West, most particularly the United States, have contributed to Finland's survival. Despite its tendency toward moralistic judgments about neutrals, the United States has indicated remarkable sophistication in its adjustment to the Paasikivi Line. It has provided loans which have unquestionably sustained the Finnish government's ability to meet reparations commitments and to adjust economically, and it has made these gestures without insist-

[38] The former Social Democratic party secretary Väinö Leskinen feels that Paasikivi deserves little credit for this internal setback to the Communists. See Väinö Leskinen, "Mitä on Paasikiven linja?" in Kare, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[39] See I. William Zartman, "Neutralism and Neutrality in Scandinavia," *Western Political Quarterly*, VII (June, 1954), particularly pp. 152–58, and John H. Wuorinen, "Neutralism in Scandinavia," *Current History*, November, 1956, pp. 276–80.

ing on a political *quid pro quo*.[40] Quietly but effectively, the United States has bolstered anti-Communist sentiment in Finland with its cultural exchange program which has an advantage over a similar Soviet effort in that it works in a traditionally sympathetic context. United States forbearance from forcing the Finnish government into choosing between East and West represents a realistic, empirical adjustment to a complex problem which appears to have been in the best interest of both countries.

In the last analysis, it is dubious whether the Paasikivi Line provides a precedent for solution of problems in East–West relations generally. The *Economist* has suggested unification of Korea along the Finnish model,[41] but Finland's situation results from historical and geographic circumstances difficult, if not impossible, to find elsewhere. Finland's strong Western constitutional and political orientation, historic relationship with Russia, geographic propinquity to Scandinavia, avoidance of foreign occupation after World War II, and postwar leadership have combined to make possible a precarious but nevertheless real neutrality. Application of a Finnish-type solution in another country would probably be artificially contrived and would therefore not readily take root unless most of the above conditions existed. Despite this conclusion, however, it is possible that the generally satisfactory experiences of both the Soviet Union and the West in their adjustment to Finland may have generated some faith in tolerance, if not in encouragement, of third-state formulae for survival which do not bear their own authorship.

[40] See John H. Wuorinen, "Finland," in Stephen Kertesz (ed.), *The Fate of East Central Europe* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1956), pp. 321–37. Also note the views of the former Ambassador of Finland to the United States Johann Nykopp, quoted by Roscoe Drummond in the *New York Herald Tribune*, European Edition, June 4, 1958.

[41] "A Finland in Asia?" *Economist*, May 31, 1958, pp. 769–79.