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4 Shifting dilemmas

Multiculturalism and integration policies in Europe

James Jupp

Introduction

The concept of the nation-state based on a common culture developed from the French Revolution and the work of German theorists such as G. W. F. Hegel. It assumes uniformity in language and beliefs, although not necessarily in religion. In Europe and Asia, historical myths sustain the idea that the nation has evolved over many centuries, conquered many enemies and developed unique ways of doing things. These may be as trivial as drinking beer rather than wine or as complex as having a unique language.

The myths, traditions and language that allegedly give form to a nation-state come into conflict with multiculturalism as a method for integrating immigrants or other ethnic minorities, which is consequently resented. Assimilation is often preferred, both officially and by the majority of the public. Those who have immigrated from other nation-states may find this difficult to accept. Multiculturalism has more to offer them. The same is true for indigenous minorities who may have an ethnic homeland within the larger society. These two social groups may have different strategies for dealing with their alienation from the dominant culture. They may seek devolution within a homeland if they are indigenous, or they may prefer to socialise with their compatriots if they are immigrants. Both responses are widely found in Europe and sometimes encouraged by the EU. In the past, however, both social groups have often been rejected and considered divisive and their subjects criticised, isolated or, in extreme cases, driven out altogether. The most extreme form of insistence on a uniform common culture was in Nazi Germany. Much support for European multiculturalism reflects a desire to reject that history. But it is often a reflection of liberal democratic values that hold that individuals must choose their values and lifestyle for themselves. Multiculturalism, as a management technique for integrating immigrants, has had the greatest impact in the Scandinavian states. Assimilation into the nation-state has had more influence in Greece, Austria, Poland and Hungary. Within the EU, the assimilation approach has recently begun to challenge the multicultural consensus. The election of conservative governments has reduced support for multiculturalism in states like Sweden as it has in Canada and Australia earlier.

Managing cultural diversity

Most nation-states' are culturally and religiously varied and have become increasing so due to the ease of travel and the size of migration (Hammar 1990).[1] The self-determination of nations, based on the assumption of ethnic uniformity, does not take into account minorities within the nation or the economic viability of self-determination. Many states have also experienced ethnic conflict and the forced movement of people within its boundaries, giving rise to the United Nations refugee category of internally displaced persons. The poor moving to richer societies and the persecuted to safer havens have unleashed significant changes in countries receiving such people. It was mainly to manage the impact of these changes that policies broadly termed 'multicultural' were introduced in many developed democracies from the 1970s.

Most nation-states are based on myths of common cultures, beliefs, ideals and inheritances. Interestingly, religion is not always considered an important consolidating factor. However, the reality for most nation-states has recently been a degree of cultural fragmentation following the creation of many new post-colonial states with mixed heritages and the increasing variety in the ethnic composition of populations created by mass migrations. As guardians of the national ideal and preservers of social cohesion, governments have been faced with the task of managing diversity (Dacyl & Westin 2000; Joppke 1999).

The diversity being managed varies greatly with the laws of the managing authorities (Bauböck, Heller & Zollberg 1996). In Germany, the United States, Australia, South Africa, Canada or New Zealand, race may have been a central factor in determining civil rights, but this was not the case in the United Kingdom or in France. No language but French has official status in France, while in South Africa, whose population size is comparable to that of France, eleven languages have official status. The only common factor in language policies in democracies is that 'indigenous' languages (Welsh, Irish, Frisian, Basque) have official standing but 'migrant' languages (Punjabi, Bengali, Tamil, Gujerati, Chinese) do not, despite often being spoken by more people (Kraus 2008). Migrants may be tested in the official language before being granted citizenship. Religious tests are not normally a basis for citizenship and are constitutionally banned in the United States, France and Australia.

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1   For a much earlier secular theorising of diversity within the multicultural Austro-Hungarian empire, see Bottomore (1978).

Apart from race and language, other factors likely to be managed in multicultural democracies in Europe and elsewhere include external loyalties, customs and practices, and legal principles. Diversity is often managed through citizenship policies, which are varied in the degree to which citizens can maintain their cultural heritage. Dual citizenship was only made available to United States and Australian citizens in the early 21st century, having always been available to the British. Based on legislation dating from 1911, German nationality was based on German ancestry and only recently became readily available to others.

Multiculturalism, integration and assimilation

The essential feature of multiculturalism that distinguishes it from other methods for ethnic management is its recognition of the continuing influence of ethnic variety and catering for it in the delivery of services and the protection of rights, usually in consultation with those affected (Parekh 2006). This approach rejects the concept of immigrant assimilation into the majority culture within one lifetime. It sits comfortably with the notion of racial equality but not of cultural relativism, as it is essentially liberal. This goes beyond classical liberalism in maintaining minority languages, religions and cultures, provided these are deemed by the state as consistent with social cohesion and harmony. An extreme version of multiculturalism is devolution or federalism on a cultural basis, as in India. An original model was designed in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and collapsed with the end of the communist systems. A religious basis for such devolution is rare. One example still survives in Northern Ireland, which was designed in 1921 to protect the Protestant minority from control by Catholic Ireland.

Opponents of multiculturalism frequently use the spectre of ethnic federalism or secession as a threat to the cohesion of existing nation-states. But ethnic federalism or secession usually needs a viable geographical basis, whereas immigrants are scattered between different cities. Québec separatism in Canada and Swiss federalism depend on the principle of 'first arrivals', not recent immigration.

The democracies adopting multiculturalism since the 1970s have been overwhelmingly Christian, if only nominally. Ethnicity was normally defined in secular, and especially linguistic, terms. Even this could be politically disruptive, as in Belgium, but was often resolved by bilingualism (as in Canada, Spain, Wales, New Zealand, Finland and Switzerland). Prior to the 1970s, no Western democracy had a substantial non-Christian population

with a geographical base. Minority issues in countries such as the United States, Britain, France and the Netherlands were defined in racial terms. This changed quickly and sometimes dramatically in the period between 1970 and 2000 (Kucera, Uçarer & Puchala 2000).

Immigration, refugees and religion

While the largest number of migrants is found in the largest states (the US, Germany, France, Spain and Britain), the largest proportions are found in quite small states such as Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden, and in the four 'settler' societies of the US, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Most states do not keep census figures on religion, which are prohibited altogether in the US in order to maintain the separation of church and state. Australia, Canada and New Zealand all keep census data on birthplace, language and religion. The UK started to do so in 2001 to identify its large South Asian population. The only languages recorded in the UK are Welsh and Scottish Gaelic. Australia and Canada record not only about 100 overseas languages but also a wide range of Aboriginal languages, many spoken by very small and declining numbers (Jupp & Clyne 2011). Many multicultural democracies with multicultural policies have an inadequate statistical base to judge whether such policies have any impact. Controversially, much of the census data gathered in the UK and the US are based on racial identity (e.g. Black British, Hispanic), while neither Germany nor France have census data on their large Muslim populations.

Table 4.1   Foreign born and Muslim population of 21 selected democracies

State	Population	Foreign Born	Muslim
	(million)	(%)	(%)
Austria	8.3	14.9	4.2
Australia	22.3	26.9	2.2
Belgium	10.7	6.9	5.9
Canada	33.3	20.1	1.9
Denmark	5.5	9.5	3.7
Finland	5.3	3.8	0.1
France	63.1	10.2	6.3
Germany	82.1	12.3	4.0
Greece	11.2	8.7	0.9
Hungary	10.0	3.1	0.2

State	Population	Foreign Born	Muslim
	(million)	(%)	(%)
Ireland	4.5	13.8	0.7
Italy	59.8	5.6	1.0
Netherlands	16.4	10.1	3.5
New Zealand	4.3	23.0	0.9
Norway	4.8	7.4	2.0
Portugal	10.6	7.2	0.1
Spain	45.6	10.8	2.0
Sweden	9.2	12.3	3.6
Switzerland	7.6	22.9	4.3
United Kingdom	61.4	10.2	4.7
United States	304	12.8	0.5

Note: Muslim populations are mainly estimates; other totals are census-based. Definitions of overseas/foreign born birth vary. These figures should not be used for exact calculations.
Sources: *2011 Pew Forum on Religion*; UN *World Population Policies*

Multiculturalism in action

A common criticism against multiculturalism is that it has never been defined. It would be more correct to say that it has been defined in action as a set of policies that varies from state to state. A further criticism is that it regards all cultures as equally valid and thus privileges practices that may be incompatible with liberal democracy. This is quite untrue but is particularly relevant to the accommodation of religious variety (Levey 2008). Social situations, political traditions and ethnic and linguistic variety differ between one democratic nation-state and another. Consequently, there are few uniform features of multiculturalism or of the challenges to it. Nonetheless, we can identify several features:

(a) Some states have never officially adopted multiculturalism: the United States, Germany, France, Greece, Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Finland and Ireland (Brubaker 1992). Italy, Finland, Germany and Ireland have official bilingualism for small indigenous minorities, but not for immigrants. The United States has official bilingualism in some Hispanic and Chinese areas, but English Only policies elsewhere (Higley, Nieuwenhuysen & Neerup 2009). These states may have local government based services of a multicultural nature for immigrants, as in Copenhagen, Berlin, Los Angeles, New York, Vienna and Bologna.

(b) States that have devolution on a cultural or linguistic basis: Spain, Switzerland, and Belgium. These are responding to local political

imperatives and do not make similar concessions to immigrants. Spain and Belgium have had serious problems of ethnic separatism based on language, which were resolved by devolution to French and Flemish in Belgium and to Catalan and Basque in Spain.

(c) States that have a degree of multiculturalism nationally and locally but not as a stated national policy: United Kingdom. British multiculturalism has political and cultural devolution for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, but not for migrants.

(d) States which have a fully developed national policy for immigrants, settled groups and indigenous people on a secular basis; Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, Norway. All have critics within the political system.

(e) States that have adopted and then rejected multiculturalism: Netherlands.

Special services for immigrants are maintained in major cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam. All Dutch political parties now oppose further immigration

Defining multiculturalism in practice

The levels and origins of immigration are varied and change over time. Discrimination based on race may be modified or abandoned, as in Australia, New Zealand, the United States and Canada. People not previously sought may be permitted or even encouraged to enter. An important aspect has been limitations on those unable to speak the majority language, even though they had previously been attracted as factory workers (e.g. in Australia and Germany). The political situation, such as changes of government, also influences the adoption of multicultural policies. In general, the liberal or social democratic side of politics has tended to be more favourable to multiculturalism, while conservatives see themselves as defenders of the nation-state and of Christian and national values. The picture is more nuanced when we include trade unions, which traditionally belong on the left side of the political spectrum but object to immigrant labour, and the business world, which tends to be conservative but supports immigration when it can fill gaps in the labour force and create growth in the domestic market.

  Each multicultural programme is developed at the level of the nation-state, although local government may have a role and the EU works towards

uniform regulations and the protection of minority languages, however slowly (Kraus 2008). States like Germany and France deny that they implement multicultural policies, but cities within them may well provide services similar to those provided by governments pursuing multiculturalism such as in Sweden or Australia. Much public policy in the United States is implemented at the state or local level, or by judicial decisions.

Constructing a single model of multiculturalism from these varied situations is much easier for those opposed to the whole enterprise than for those in favour of it. In 2010-2011, the national leaders of Germany, France and Britain all declared their scepticism, while the Netherlands and Denmark had already cut back on a number of services for immigrants and became more vocal in their defence of the national 'way of life'. A change in government in both Australia and Canada had led to a move away from multiculturalism (Jupp 2007), but with Australia changing its government again, it reverted to the previous model. In the same short period of time, a single Norwegian massacred 77 people at a camp of social-democratic youth in a self-declared war against multiculturalism and the Muslim drive to world domination (Berwick 2011). All these events, including the London riots of 2011, were thrown into a mixture of arguments that had little to do with the modest and helpful social programmes that characterised multiculturalism in those democracies that endorsed them.

Islam and the backlash

In most societies, the arrival of migrants from different religious and cultural backgrounds is controversial. A popular argument that has gained acceptance in recent years is set out in *Bowling Alone*, a book by Robert Putnam (2000). In his view, modern society has spawned a greater degree of suspicion as people of different cultures live and work in close proximity to each other. This is the case in many American cities. This additional weapon in the armoury of opponents of multiculturalism is more sophisticated than the previous claims that America was becoming flooded with foreigners because it had lost control over its borders (Brimelow 1995). Even more influential for public policy was Samuel Huntington's prediction that civilisations – and not nation-states – will clash, and that a conflict was imminent between the Islamic and the Western democratic civilisations (1996). This prediction preceded the major involvement of the United States in Muslim countries such as Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan and its eventual support for the 'Arab Spring' of 2011.

These intellectual propositions were most influential in the US, where they originated, but were politically more relevant in Europe, to which an increasing number of Muslims had been emigrating from the 1960s (McGarry & Keating 2006). Britain, France and Germany had all encouraged immigrants from Pakistan, North Africa and Turkey respectively (many of whom were Muslims) as a source of industrial labour (Castles 1984; Castles & Miller 1998; Kucera et al 2000). Several other states had resistance to Muslims engrained in their national cultures, most notably Greece, Spain and Serbia. Roma, many of them Muslims, started moving into Western Europe from the Balkans and central Europe as the European Union expanded and lowered its international borders (Hellyer 2009). Initially, these arrivals were resented for relying too much on state welfare, but they were not considered a threat to the indigenous culture (Banting & Kymlicka 2006). This changed over the years as Muslims began to settle permanently, raise families, build mosques and enter local politics. Such fears were realised with the wave of terrorism from 2000, which included major bombings in Europe and Britain as well as 9/11. Huntington's clas of civilisations was already starting. It cut right through disintegrating Yugoslavia and swept into Iraq and Afghanistan.

Multiculturalism had originally been a programme for settling similar but not identical people. It was strained in Britain when migrants began to wear South Asian clothing and immigrants from Africa and the Caribbean stood out due to the colour of their skin. Australia and New Zealand had few highly visible non-European immigrants until the 1970s. Race riots and tensions began in England as early as 1958, and race has remained a political issue up to the present. In Australia, the Immigration Restriction Act prohibiting non-white people from settling was dismantled just six years before a multicultural policy was adopted in 1978.

Canada also had very little non-European immigration originally, although it invented an official classification of 'visible minorities'. These were to receive assistance and protection. While these changes opened up the whole world's access to the richer societies, migrants remained overwhelmingly poor, uneducated and therefore at the lower levels of the labour market and society in general (Schierup, Hansen & Castles 2006). In Britain, however, the great majority of immigrants were British subjects and their access to political life was easier than elsewhere.

Race remained at the heart of the multicultural problem until the end of the century, especially in Britain. Consequently, the possibility that religion was a different social category and the cause of social problems tended to be either overlooked or focused on anti-Semitism. Race-relations agencies were

set up with the best of intentions, only to become involved in definitional problems such as whether Jews and Sikhs were a 'race' or whether religions should be protected from defamation and blasphemy (as they had been in past centuries and were in some Muslim states). But the greatest problems arose from the spread of Islamist terrorism and its alleged basis in Islamic values.

Armed with Huntington's thesis, many subscribed to the idea that Islam was at war with the West in general and with Christianity and democracy in particular. This view was sustained in the light of well-publicised statements by a handful of *imams* and *ayatollahs* who said precisely that. Throughout Europe, the popular media was hungry for anti-Islam stories, from the Middle East and Central Asia. One event that had the effect of turning the Netherlands away from its once liberal policies was the murder in 2004 of film producer Theo van Gogh by a Muslim of North African descent. The murder of politician Pym Fortuyn, an opponent of Muslim immigration, also played a part in the growing disillusionment with multiculturalism, even though his assassin was Dutch.

Clashes with the majority culture

That some religious practices and attitudes clash with established liberal traditions and laws is undeniable in all secular democracies, as in many others. Religions tend to be conservative, especially those claiming authority from sacred texts interpreted over long periods of time by clerics and theologians. The widespread belief among Muslims that electoral politics are *haram* (forbidden) is an important example. Established democracies, in contrast, have mostly undergone dramatic changes in laws relating to gender, race, electoral systems and the public role of religion since 1945. The approved multicultural method of coping with clashes between majority religions and minority practices and laws is negotiation (Banton 1985). This assumes an authoritative religious leadership with whom negotiation is possible. It becomes more difficult when there is no generally agreed leadership, or when fundamentalist groups within a religion do not accept compromise over what they regard as God's demands.

Islam, Buddhism and Sikhism all lack unchallenged centres of authority, but the problem lies not only with non-Christian religions. With one billion Christians and a similar number of Muslims in the world, multicultural variety within religions is as likely as between them. There is no real reason why the secular state should worry about the *hijab* any more than it now

does in Britain about the Sikh turban or even the ritual knife, the *kirpan.*
That the full *burqa* may upset people when worn in public places might be a
piece of advice given by Islamic *imams* to their flock. Compromise works in
two directions. The clue to its success is that neither the secular state nor the
religious minority refuses to compromise. Muslim representatives in several
democracies have asked for 'legal relativism' or the limited application of
shariah law, as in some Asian states. This applies only in limited areas, but
as soon as these claims become politicised, conflict escalates, despite the
fact that Jewish communities have successfully negotiated similar minor
concessions over many years and that Jehovah's Witnesses have contracted
out of many civic obligations.

Multicultural approaches favour ecumenical collaboration and enhance
the likelihood of mutual understanding and compromise (Modood 2006;
Norris & Inglehart 2012). Confrontation and prohibitions have the opposite
effect. Banning the *hijab*, opposing the building or use of mosques and
temples, or even the wearing of distinctive and religiously sanctioned cloth-
ing have all occurred in otherwise liberal democracies. Many controversial
issues have been resolved in recent years, including the exemption of some
minorities from military service or voting; the burial or cremation practices
of Muslims, Jews and Hindus; ritual slaughtering for Muslims and Jews;
interest-free banking and finance; religious holidays; marriage and divorce;
school and sporting uniforms; and food choices in public institutions. The
great majority of these can be, and have been, negotiated in liberal, multi-
cultural societies. *Shariah* law, however, is so extensive in its implications
that only selected elements have been accommodated.

At the core of many difficulties of adaptation and compromise is the role
and social position of women (Hassan 2008). Most developed democracies
have radically advanced their legislation for gender equality since the 1960s.
These reforms go well beyond the beliefs of newcomers and, indeed, of
many religious institutions, including Christian ones. As many support-
ers of multiculturalism also support gender equality, this creates a strain
within the ranks of reformers, which is often extended to attitudes towards
homosexuality. Media excitement about issues such as female circumcision
or honour killings keeps the debate heated. Both are illegal in multicultural
democracies and are not confined to Muslims or even at all common.

The most serious problem in gaining acceptance for multiculturalism
in recent years has been the rise of Islamic terrorism, as evidenced by the
9/11 attacks in the US and related attacks in Britain, France, Spain and the
Netherlands. The three most committed multicultural societies – Canada,
Sweden and Australia – have not had this experience, but have detected

and frustrated potential plots. When multiculturalism was first developed in the 1970s, violence was associated with nationalism rather than religion, but since 2000, Islamic terrorism has been one of the central concerns in managing diversity. It has destroyed multicultural programmes in countries like the Netherlands and Denmark and justified assimilative and repressive policies throughout the democratic world.

The impact on public policy

While much attention has been focused on specifically anti-immigration and extreme 'right' parties, most public policy continues to be made by longstanding ruling parties responding to their electorates. As most European governments are coalitions or dependent on minority support, anti-immigration parties may exert considerably more direct influence than they do in the one- or two-party governments of Britain, Australia, Ireland, Sweden and New Zealand. They may even, as in the Netherlands, give power over immigration to a minister from a minority party. But a more normal reaction in all systems has been for the major conservative party to pre-empt nationalist and even xenophobic policies and thus hope to undermine the vote for opponents. In Canada, the initially influential Reform Party, which specifically opposed multiculturalism, merged into the Conservative Party in 2003. It had secured 19.4 per cent of the national vote in 1997.

Anti-immigration sentiment has also exerted influence on the major party of the left. British Labour, like many of its European counterparts, began to stress the need for national unity and social solidarity from 2001. Australian Labor endorsed many of the policies of the Liberal government in 2001 in response to the 9/11 attacks. Other social democratic parties were less willing to shift, but some suffered electorally as a result. Not all conservatives succeed (see Table Two). In Austria, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) lost half its vote in 2002, but this went over to the mainstream Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP). In Switzerland, the Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP) supported a referendum, opposed by all other parties, that would have made it almost impossible for asylum seekers to enter by land. This was narrowly defeated by referendum in November 2002. The French Front National saw its vote rise and fall and then rise again with a change in leadership.

Policy shifts in the last decade in a rightward direction may be summarised as:
–   Reasserting national culture, assimilation and loyalty;
–   Tightening control over asylum seekers and immigrants;

- Seeking international co-operation in controlling movement;
- Reducing commitments to multiculturalism and humanitarianism;
- Attempting to institute more 'rational' immigration systems;
- Increasing resources and powers for security organisations.

These shifts have not destroyed the work of previous decades in protecting human rights and racial equality, nor have there been blanket prohibitions on manifestations of religious variety or the expression of unpopular views, but progress towards more effective multiculturalism has stalled. The equation of Islam with terrorism has made life difficult for many Muslims, and some Muslim activists have not made the lives of their coreligionists any easier by expressing extreme conservative views consistent with their own religious beliefs but alien to the liberal humanist reforms that underlie multiculturalism. Some Christian revivalists and Pentecostalists have willingly joined in the battle.

The enemy within

Many critics of multiculturalism and of 'alien' immigration fear the possibility of an 'enemy within' either subverting the national culture or threatening law and order. The enemy within has shifted over the years from the Irish to the Mafia and now to the Islamic fundamentalists. This fear has less to do with race but more to do with culture. It is fed by American Internet attacks on 'Eurabia' by prolific writers such as Bat Ye'or (see Berwick 2011; Bat Ye'or 2005). However, the 'enemy within' – the ones subverting liberal democracies – might well be the militant opponents of multiculturalism (Gibson 2002; Mudde 2007; Ignazi 2006; Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). The extreme examples are, of course, the one-man assassin Anders Breivik in Norway in 2011, and his predecessor, Timothy McVeigh, in Oklahoma in 1995. Between them, they killed over 300 innocent people, more than most Islamic terrorists in liberal democracies have done apart from 9/11. Both saw themselves as supreme patriots. Breivik quotes Robert Spencer and Bat Ye'or at great length in his massive manifesto (Berwick 2011). Robert Spencer, an American Catholic, is the director of Jihad Watch, author, journalist and broadcaster.

These extreme individuals are exceptional. They are much less influential than political parties, the media and organisations that oppose multiculturalism and internationalism and defend the nation-state and its unique culture, often combining this with open or qualified racism (Bauböck et al 1996; Brubaker 1992). While Muslim and other active terrorists may be

outlawed and hunted down, these respectable critics can often use the machinery of electoral politics and freedom of expression and publication. They may even have close relationships with long-established major parties or have infiltrated their organisations. Their overt aims of defending the nation against outsiders often have a considerable basis in public opinion. Their natural constituency is amongst conservatives and the religious, but this is not universal. Nor is their social basis only in the '*lumpen* proletariat'. Most of their leaders are middle class. Their organisational heritage can often be traced to anti-Semitism or fascism, but this has been abandoned in favour of their prime target, Islam. Indeed, extremists as varied as Breivik in Norway and Geert Wilders, a right-wing politician in the Netherlands, have regarded Jews in general and Israel in particular as valuable allies against the Muslim threat (Vossen 2011). The Greek Golden Dawn is fairly unique in favouring openly fascist symbols and arguments, though these are important in some states of the former Soviet Union, including Russia.

In post-war Britain, the remnants of Mosley's pre-war British Union of Fascists formed and reformed in the League of Empire Loyalists, the National Front and the British National Party (BNP), which is currently outflanked by the English Defence League, whose main concern is with Muslims. Organised racism has had little electoral success in any of the English-speaking democracies. A galaxy of fearsome American Internet warriors, such as the Aryan Nation or Storm Front, has a wide-ranging audience. However, most of the influential criticism of multiculturalism and Islamism comes from willing journalists and broadcasters in the mass media and conservative politicians. For example, Wilders, the Dutch leader of the PVV party, has been officially invited to conferences of the British Conservatives and the Australian Liberals in recent years.

In much of Europe, the rise of right-wing, anti-immigration and anti-Muslim parties can be spectacular, aided by proportional representation systems that allowed them to gain parliamentary seats even with small electoral followings. Openly racist, fascist or Nazi parties are outlawed in Germany, and the vote for extreme nationalist parties is very small. Elsewhere, such parties have been doing very well, with the exception of the French Front National of Jean Marie Le Pen, which was temporarily affected by splits (Berezin 2006), and the Dutch PVV, which lost one-third of its support in the 2012 elections. This has not affected the open hostility to Muslims shown in some recent French legislation, but France and Germany were never officially multicultural (Brubaker 1992).

Anti-immigration and anti-Muslim parties have scored well and are increasingly present in the smaller EU states. Their voters feel that their

distinctive culture is under threat, even when, as in Finland, there is almost no Muslim population. Hostility to the EU characterises almost all of the far-right parties, including those in Britain like the BNP and the UK Independence Party (UKIP). Ironically, the proportional representation electoral system allows small parties like UKIP or the BNP to be elected to the European parliament, even when they cannot get elected to their own national parliament. Such parties have informally allied with the French FN and Hungarian Jobbik to form an EU parliamentary party, the European Alliance of National Movements (EANM).

Table 4.2   Support for anti-immigration parties in Europe and Australasia

State	Party	Recent Vote (%)	Election Year	Government/Opposition
Austria	FPÖ	18.0	2011	Government
	Alliance (BZÖ)	10.7	2011	Government
Belgium	VB	7.8	2010	Opposition
Denmark	Danish PP (DF)	12.3	2011	Opposition
Finland	PS-True Finns	19.1	2011	Opposition
France	Front National	13.6	2012	Opposition
Germany	NPD/REP/DVU	1.8	2009	Not applicable
Greece	Golden Dawn	7.0	2012	Opposition
Hungary	Jobbik	16.7	2010	Opposition
Ireland	Imm. Control P.	n.a.	2011	Not applicable
Italy	Lega Nord	8.3	2008	Government
	La Destra	2.4	2008	Not applicable
Netherlands	PVV	10.1	2012	Opposition
Norway	Progress Party	22.9	2009	Opposition
Poland	Polish National Party	0.29	2005	Not applicable
Portugal	Popular Party	11.7	2011	Government
Spain	MSR/Esp.2000	0.03	2011	Not applicable
Sweden	Swedish Democrats	5.7	2010	Opposition
Switzerland	Swiss PP (SVP)	25.9	2011	Government
United Kingdom	BNP	1.9	2010	Not applicable
	UKIP	3.1	2010	Not applicable
Australia	One Nation	0.2	2010	Not Applicable
New Zealand	NZ First	6.6	2011	Opposition

Note: 'Government' means either that the party is in government or that the government depends on the party in parliament. 'Opposition' means that the party is represented in parliament but that it does not support the government. 'Not applicable' means that the party is not represented in parliament. 'Recent vote' is for the latest lower house election.
Source: European Election Data Base

Multicultural policies have been hit by the decline of social democracy, the reassertion of the nation-state and its official culture, the EU economic crisis and the willingness of secular authorities to defend Christian values against Islam. This is a formidable challenge. The result, so far, has been a decline in support for multiculturalism and its abandonment by many liberal democracies. Yet the 'enemy within' – the Muslims – are still there and still need to be brought within the political fold as their locally born and citizen numbers increase. Most liberal democracies are multilingual, multi-religious and multinational, in varying degrees and from different sources. Simply discriminating against one group alienates members of that group and identifies it as a problem. Most European and English-speaking democracies, other than the United States, are not predominantly 'religious' and aim to equalise the rights and duties of all their citizens, even those who are not Christians. But such an aim becomes less likely to be reached as support for multiculturalism recedes and draconian security, immigration and refugee policies are adopted.

The challenges to multiculturalism in liberal democracies

Several common features emerge from this apparent confusion. One is the continuing adoption of multicultural and multilingual services and organisations in cities of immigrant concentration. This is pragmatic and not directly aimed at social cohesion, integration, or nation-building. Such services are most common with social democratic/reformist city councils, but not confined to them. Another common feature is that language diversity is not institutionalised for immigrants, but only for long resident minorities (Kraus 2008). Emphasis is put on learning the majority language, usually as a precondition for citizenship. Otherwise, language policies are mainly directed towards conveying official and useful information. In practice, most European education systems aim at proficiency in up to four languages, which is not the case for English-speaking societies. These are not usually the languages of recent immigrants. Another common feature, as outlined already, is that discriminatory policies are advocated against Muslims but only accidentally affect other religions.

Significantly for the above discussion, Muslims are not normally seen as the core of a particular problem in those societies where they form one per cent or less – namely Finland, Greece, Italy, New Zealand and Portugal. The newly emergent Greek Golden Dawn is hostile to all non-Greeks, specifically mentioning Albanians, but not for religious reasons. Where the percent-

age of Muslims rises from as low as 2.2 per cent (Australia) up towards six per cent (France), there is hostility, fear and anxiety. Immigration, multiculturalism and Islam become major overlapping issues advanced by minority parties, by elements within the conservative majority, and by social democratic parties responding to working class voters. The obsession of many democracies with the threat from their Muslim minorities has become a significant distraction from a variety of social problems. It leads to the redirection of growing resources and powers that could be used more fruitfully.

Islam presents a threat that liberal policymakers in democratic nation-states believe they have to cope with (Klausen 2005; Poynting & Mason 2008; Michaelsen 2012). Arguably, Islam is the only or most important issue not only in the smaller EU states but in the EU as a whole. However, even EU critics of conservative origin such as the UKIP mention Islamic fundamentalism as one of their targets. Traditional racism based on physical appearance has become discredited, except for such marginal street gangs as the English Defence League or German neo-Nazis. Anti-Semitism has withered. Defending the European Christian heritage against Islam has taken its place. The 'war against terror' has become the 'war against Islam' in many eyes, including those of Muslims.

Multiculturalism in Western democracies now faces three intertwined dilemmas: a reassertion of loyalties to the nation-state; a fear of being overrun by outsiders; and a specific objection to Muslims. These may have an underlying element of economic fear and resentment, but their impact is often greatest in the richer nations of Europe, as suggested by the vote for hostile parties in Switzerland, Norway and Austria. All but six member states of the European Union have smaller populations than Australia. They also have distinct languages and historical traditions. The fear of being swamped by another culture has considerable force. As long as there are wars, dictatorships or social breakdown in Africa, Asia and Latin America, there will be refugees in numbers large enough to sustain these fears and undermine support for multiculturalism. The political opponents of multiculturalism will be identified with national, regional and international policies designed to limit immigration. They will also discourage the maintenance of minority beliefs and practices by those already within the state borders through previous migrations or – increasingly, by birth. The nation-state then becomes an agency for imposing values, frequently of religious origin – on its own citizens, many of whom may not share them.

There is already escalating resentment and hostility towards these trends among some ethnic minorities, often compounded by high levels of youth

unemployment. The London riots, the Occupy movement on Wall Street and the Greek demonstrations against the budget cuts demanded by the EU leaders suggest that spontaneous youth rebellions may be the next challenge to social cohesion. These are likely to be 'multicultural', but not in the benign sense used until recently. Post-rioting research by the London School of Economics suggests that half the London rioters were students, half were Black British and the majority were unemployed. Resentment against the police was widespread, as was the case 30 years before during the Brixton riots of 1981. In the most recent riots, religion is irrelevant, but youth and ethnic disadvantage are not. Where religion is relevant is in the regular rioting over 'insults to the Prophet', from the fatwah on Salman Rushdie to the international events of 2012. Even then, the common factor is the clash between youths and the police, with community leaders expressing their disapproval.

Equally threatening are armed gangs in the drug trade, where similar influences are at work. Criminal gangs often have an ethnic dimension, but multiculturalism has little to offer by way of solutions. Yet organised crime may be a greater threat to social cohesion than the often individual acts of jihadist terrorists. Major resentments no longer focus on the fear of labour competition, as in the past, but often on the threat to welfare states from the arrival of poor immigrants demanding government support. The common factor remains the idea that a nation-state must rest on a grouping bound together by common interests and a common culture. Erosion of this principle is believed to undermine the whole of society. Thus even well-educated and highly skilled immigrants may present a threat to national unity. This is particularly challenging when economic policies do not deliver obvious benefits, as currently is the case in much of Europe. Multicultural policies have rested on societies that usually provide prosperity and security. This is no longer self-evident.