

4 National integration

As Karl Deutsch has observed on more than one occasion, the story of mankind in its social and political aspects can be regarded as the story of how small groups became amalgamated into larger units. In this book, however, we are concerned neither with the way in which kinship groups became amalgamated into tribes nor with the way in which nations may become merged into international communities in the future. Our concern is with the way in which ethnic and cultural groups have become wholly or partly merged into national societies so as to support the political organization of the national state.

This is a process common to virtually all national states, for only a handful of them are ethnically and culturally homogeneous in the way that seems to be assumed or implied by nationalist theory. Japan, Sweden and Portugal certainly qualify as homogeneous. However, some states with the longest history of institutional unity within their present borders, such as France and Spain, have minorities that are not yet, or were only recently, fully assimilated within the national society. And the majority of states have sizeable ethnic or cultural minorities among their citizens. These include the three states chosen for case studies in this book as well as Belgium, Switzerland and Yugoslavia in Europe, the USA and nearly all the countries of Latin America, and every state in Africa. The process of national integration is a common feature of the recent history of the great majority of countries.

As a process, national integration is partly a by-product of other social and economic developments, partly the result of deliberate government policies. The unplanned component of integration is commonly called social mobilization. It is basically the process by which industrialization induces workers to leave their native villages so as to seek work in the new industrial areas, thus eroding the social communities of rural areas and mobilizing the workers for absorption into the larger national society. Kinship links become weaker, local languages or dialects give way to the dominant national language, local cultures and customs lose their hold. As small industrial concerns are swallowed by larger ones, as means of

transport are improved, the process continues. The improvement of means of transport is accompanied or followed by the development of the mass media of communication, organized on a national basis, so that members of what were once distinct communities become gradually merged into the national whole.

The process does not always work as smoothly as the above sketch suggests, but the sketch serves as a model of what has happened to some extent in most industrial societies and is assumed by some theorists to be an inevitable process. Karl Deutsch and his colleagues have suggested that compiling an index of personal transactions between people of different regions, including correspondence and telephone calls as well as face-to-face contacts, can provide a guide to the extent of social integration in the wider society of which the regions form a part. Up to a point this has been confirmed by experience, but the process is not always straightforward. Thus, the greater rate of communication between Quebec and the rest of North America in the 1960s strengthened separatist sentiments in the province, because Quebec nationalists realized that their language and culture were being threatened.

The other component of national integration consists of government policies designed to change people's attitudes and loyalties. By developing national institutions and exploiting tactics of political socialization, the attempt is made to replace local and sectional loyalties by an overriding sense of national loyalty. This process is known as nation-building. Some examples will be given later, but before considering these processes in practice it is important to take note of the normative arguments that are always present, even if not always acknowledged, in discussions of the topic.

The arguments for national integration

Four arguments have been advanced over the past two centuries in favour of the process of national integration. The first, in terms of its origin, is an argument about historical necessity. In Hegel's view the future of mankind lay in the organization of national states and any process that advanced or facilitated this development could therefore be justified as being part of the unfolding of the world spirit or march of history. The integration of cultural minorities into larger societies might or might not be welcome to the members of those societies, but civilized nations, by which term Hegel meant nations that were in the forefront of progress, would be justified in regarding and treating as barbarians those who lag behind them in institutions

which are the essential moments of the state' (Hegel, [1812] 1952, para. 351).

Marx and Engels held views that were closely related to this one, although expressed in different terms. There is no space in this book to elaborate on the complexities of Marxist attitudes to nationalism and related questions, which have been authoritatively explained by Walker Connor (Connor, 1984). However, it may be said that the common thread running through these attitudes was to regard nationalist movements in instrumental terms, to be given approval or disapproval not for their own sake but in so far as they seemed likely to aid or hinder the development of progressive tendencies in history. Nationalist movements within the Austro-Hungarian Empire were welcomed as that empire was seen as an obstacle to progress, but no sympathy was wasted on movements within national states defending the rights of small cultural minorities whose fate, as Marx described it, was to be consigned to the rag-bag of history. Not to be outdone, Engels described such minorities as remnant peoples and national refuse.

A second line of argument, more acceptable to the Anglo-Saxon mind than these Teutonic pronouncements, was developed by nineteenth-century British liberals. This was the argument that integration, in the form of social assimilation, would be beneficial to the minorities who were assimilated. They might not welcome it, but in the long run it would be good for them. In 1839, for instance, Lord Durham made the following points in support of his contention that a primary purpose of British policy in Canada should be to assimilate and anglicize the French-Canadian community.

The language, the laws, the character of the North American continent are English; and every race but the English . . . appears there in a condition of inferiority. It is to elevate them from that inferiority that I desire to give to the Canadians our English character. I desire it for the sake of the educated classes, whom the distinction of language and manners keeps apart from the great Empire to which they belong . . . I desire the amalgamation still more for the sake of the humbler classes . . . The evils of poverty and dependence would merely be aggravated . . . by a spirit of jealous and resentful nationality, which should separate the working class of the community from the possessors of wealth and employers of labour. (Durham, [1839] 1912, pp. 292-3)

A similar argument was put forward in 1847 by the Commissioners on Welsh Education, in regard to the desirability of anglicizing

the Welsh community: 'The Welsh language is a vast drawback to Wales, and a manifold barrier to the moral progress and commercial prosperity of the people . . . It bars the access of improving knowledge to their minds' (quoted in Coupland, 1954, pp. 188-9).

In 1861 the same general point was made by John Stuart Mill in his book on representative government. Addressing the problem of national minorities, he declared himself in favour of their assimilation:

Experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another: and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race the absorption is greatly to its advantage. Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated people - to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French protection, and the dignity of French power - than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as members of the British nation. (Mill, [1861] 1946, pp. 294-5)

A third argument in favour of integration was also put by Mill. This is that representative government should be based on feelings of national unity and would be difficult to operate if those feelings had not been developed. Linguistic differences among the population would accentuate the difficulties. In Mill's words:

Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist. (Mill, [1861] 1946, p. 292)

This point, put rather casually by Mill, would be better expressed in the proposition that representative democracy can only work in a society with a body of floating voters ready to change their partisan support in response to changing party policies and political conditions. If the society is divided on ethnic or religious or linguistic lines to such a degree that membership of these communal groupings

determines partisan loyalties, then there is likely to be no alternation of political power, no readiness to compromise and no acceptance of majority rule by the minority. Northern Ireland is an obvious example and the point seems to be proved by the failure of democratic institutions throughout tropical Africa, where tribal loyalties have largely determined political support.

This argument, which in its pure form cannot be denied, has been taken by both European social democrats and American exponents of modernization theory to mean that economic issues are the only proper issues to divide the parties and form the content of electoral debate, ethnic and cultural loyalties (sometimes described as 'primordial loyalties') being undesirable hangovers from more primitive stages of political development. However, hangovers cannot be wished out of existence.

A fourth and final argument in favour of national integration is that it is the only secure basis of political authority. This argument, already mentioned in Chapter 3, is frequently neglected in discussions by political theorists but rarely forgotten by those who wield power in divided societies.

These arguments, which would be disputed by many liberals in the 1980s, reigned almost without challenge from the 1850s to the 1960s. A few conservatives regretted the loss of local customs, but liberals and socialists regarded assimilation into a national society as a necessary aspect of progress. Nation-building was looked upon as an incontrovertibly desirable activity.

The practice of nation-building

The steps taken to promote nation-building can be divided into two categories. On the one hand, there are direct initiatives taken to foster integration and a sense of national identity and pride. On the other hand, there are reactive measures taken by governments to minimize the political effects of ethnic and cultural cleavages within society.

An obvious initiative is the creation of symbols of national identity. Flags, anthems and uniforms all serve this purpose. Sports teams may also do so, particularly if successful in international competition. In recent years new states have thought it important to establish national airlines, sometimes at great expense, to symbolize both the independence and the modernity of their nations. As Minogue has pointed out, new names for towns, new buildings and

even new capital cities have been thought necessary parts of what he calls 'the equipment of a proper nation' (Minogue, 1967).

A second and more important feature of nation-building is socialization through the educational system. The earliest of nation-builders, Napoleon, put the matter as follows in 1805:

There will be no political stability so long as there is no teaching body based on stable principles. So long as children are not taught whether they must be republicans or monarchists, Catholics or free thinkers, etc., the state will not constitute a nation but will rest on vague and shifting foundations, ever exposed to disorder and change. (Quoted in Herold, 1955, p. 118)

This far-sighted remark is put into historical perspective by the fact that during the last three decades of the nineteenth century French state schools were teaching their pupils the virtues of the Republic while Catholic schools were recommending the advantages of a monarchy, as a hangover from which national disputes about the case for giving state grants to Catholic schools continued until as late as the 1950s.

In practice all state educational systems socialize their pupils regarding the virtues of the nation to which they belong, though some do so more openly than others and the virtues stressed naturally vary. American schools are the most open, with their requirement that children salute the national flag every morning, in each classroom, and their practice of preaching the virtues of American democracy at every opportunity. British schools are much more discreet, but the message about British national achievements is certainly put across in history lessons. Canadian schools have a more ambiguous task, for the history of their country is one of division rather than unity, but there is now a good deal of propaganda about the virtues of bilingualism and multiculturalism. How far this contributes to a sense of national identity and pride is not entirely certain.

Another aspect of nation-building is the establishment of political institutions seen to represent all sections of society. In liberal democracies this is done by the institution of competitive elections for office, with the peripheral regions sometimes being accorded more-than-proportional representation to make them feel less dependent on the centre. Thus, Scotland and Wales have more Members of Parliament than England, in proportion to their relative populations, while Ireland was heavily over-represented when it was an integral part of the United Kingdom. In Canada and

Australia the upper houses of Parliament give disproportionate representation to the smaller provinces and states, while in Canada there are also elaborate conventions that assure the peripheral areas representation in the federal cabinet. In the United States the coincidence of several elections on the same day enables the parties to nominate 'balanced tickets' in areas of mixed ethnic origin, so that each ethnic group will find familiar names on the list of candidates. In states without competitive elections, such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, care is often taken to ensure that decision-making bodies contain well-advertised representatives of ethnic or regional minorities.

Institutional arrangements of this kind give peripheral regions or ethnic minorities influence on the input side of the governmental process. This influence is likely to be integrative in its effects if the regions or minorities are represented by national parties, but disintegrative if they are represented by regional or communal parties, as is now the case, for instance, in Belgium. This is a factor that cannot always be planned for by nation-builders.

On the output side, efforts are made to ensure that minorities gain financial benefits from the activities of the national government. In a centralized political system, the poorer regions benefit automatically from the fiscal redistribution that occurs as a consequence of the provision of uniform public services. The wealthier regions contribute more per head in taxation while the poorer regions receive more per head in the form of public expenditure. In so far as ethnic minorities are concentrated in poorer regions, this process helps ethnic minorities. Sometimes this automatic equalization process is bolstered by deliberate government policies, as in the United Kingdom where Northern Ireland is heavily subsidized through transfer payments and Scotland does somewhat better than would be expected. In decentralized systems where many public services are provided by provincial or state authorities, fiscal redistribution of an automatic kind will be more limited in scope, but may be supplemented by a deliberate policy of redistribution. In Canada the Tax Equalization Scheme has this effect while in Australia the policies of the Commonwealth Grants Commission achieve the same end in a more radically egalitarian way. While the manifest function of such measures may be to promote economic welfare and achieve approximately equal standards of social service provision across the country, their latent function is to demonstrate to residents of poorer regions that the national state brings them positive benefits.

A different kind of nation-building activity occurs when national

governments take steps to reduce the impact of ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages in society. Ethnic cleavages cannot be reduced directly by governmental action, but insistence on unsegregated schools and legal bans on ethnic discrimination may lead in time to the erosion of ethnic barriers, to intermarriage and to a situation in which ethnic consciousness diminishes. This is part of the process envisaged by the American view of their society as a 'melting pot'.

Religious cleavages are intrinsically less permanent than ethnic cleavages in that they can be eroded by conversion or the growth of agnosticism. People cannot change their ethnic identities, though these may become less salient to them, but they can change their religious affiliations. It is sometimes forgotten that many states have at some stage in their development discouraged minority religions. In eighteenth-century England only members of the Church of England were enfranchised, and it was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that all religious barriers to membership of the House of Commons were removed. In the United States Mormons were forced to leave the eastern part of the country for a position of relative exile in the Rocky Mountains. In the Sudan, members of predominantly Christian tribes have been penalized in the 1980s by the imposition of Islamic rules of evidence on courts throughout the country, whereby judges are forced to give more credence to the evidence of Muslims than to that of infidels whenever there is a conflict of evidence. Examples could be multiplied but the general point is clear.

Irspective of government action, religious faith in western societies has been sharply eroded in the twentieth century by the growth of industrialization, urbanization and affluence. Large cities like London, Paris and Frankfurt have become essentially irreligious, or de-Christianized as the Catholic Church in France puts it. This development has enabled these countries to resolve issues such as aid to church schools, divorce laws, abortion laws and censorship that posed difficult political problems in the not-so-distant past. Only the United States and, to a lesser degree, Canada have escaped this trend, the price of continued religiosity in America being indicated by the fact that in 1986 twenty-eight abortion clinics there were bombed by Christian zealots.

In countries where religious faith has not declined, the existence of religious cleavages sometimes creates difficult political problems. In Northern Ireland the Protestant and Catholic communities live side by side in a condition of mutual hostility punctuated by sectarian violence and assassinations. The existence of Protestant and Catholic schools, both enjoying state support, keeps the children apart and

leads to their being socialized into hostility by the different versions of history that are taught. In India an uneasy truce between Hindus and Sikhs has been broken in the 1980s by violent behaviour by Sikh nationalists, while Mrs Gandhi paid with her life for her symbolic gesture of appointing Sikhs as her personal bodyguards. In the Middle East there is a conflict between Sunni Muslims and Shi'ite Muslims. In situations like this there is little that governments can do except try to divert religious passions away from politics into more innocuous activities like festivals.

Linguistic cleavages pose problems of a different kind. They are more certainly divisive than religious cleavages, since they directly hinder personal communication and nobody can turn a blind eye to them. They also involve the state in a more necessary way, for the government has to designate an official language whereas it can avoid designating an official religion. On the other hand, minority languages are more certain to fall into disuse, if given no official encouragement, than minority religions are. It is psychologically and mentally costly for people to be bilingual, because the human brain is reluctant to store a multiplicity of labels for a single object or concept (see Laponce, 1987, Ch. 1). The consequence is that, in any given territory, there is a general tendency for one language to become dominant and the other to fade away. This process may be delayed if the minority language has a functional sphere in which it is unchallenged, as Welsh was unchallenged for many years as the language of the Methodist church in rural Wales, but it is rare for two languages to survive in general use in the same territory for more than a generation or two.

To say this is not to say that the decline of a minority language will necessarily be a painless process. People tend to be attached to the language of their forefathers and to resent its decline, particularly if this threatens to involve the loss of a considerable body of literature. Protests about the matter may create political conflict, as in Wales since the early 1970s.

When faced with a multilingual society, government leaders have three possible lines of policy to pursue. First, they can designate the majority language as the only official language and hope that minority languages will gradually fall out of public use, possibly hastening this process by measures such as banning their use in schools. After the Highland Rising of 1745 the English and the lowland Scots took active steps to discourage the use of Gaelic in the Scottish Highlands, with the result that the language became virtually extinct on the Scottish mainland, although it still survives in the Western Isles. French authorities in the nineteenth century

encouraged the decline of the Breton language in north-west France, punishing children heard using the language to each other on school premises and adding insult to injury by putting notices on official buildings reading 'Spitting and Breton forbidden'. The English prohibited the use of Welsh in schools for some years.

Measures of this kind involve a cultural loss for a political gain, any overall assessment of their merits being dependent on personal values as the loss and the gain are different in kind. Who can say, in a way likely to command authority, whether England is better or worse off for the extinction of the Cornish language in the south-west and the Cumbrian in the north-west, Scotland better or worse off for the extinction of Gaelic on the mainland, France better or worse off for the virtual extinction of Occitan and Provençal?

A second possible line of policy is to divide the country up into linguistic areas, with one language in each area being designated as official but the national government required to be bilingual or trilingual. This is the policy pursued with marked success in Switzerland, where German, French and Italian are official languages in distinct areas of the country. To ensure that this tidy arrangement is not disturbed by personal mobility, Swiss state schools teach only in the official language of the area, apart from a few small bilingual districts where instruction is offered in two languages. In some parts of Switzerland the language of instruction in private schools is regulated with the same social and political purpose; thus, a French-Swiss family moving to Zurich can have their children educated in French at a private school, but only up to a maximum of three years. All subsequent education has to be in German (McRae, 1983, p. 148). Citizens may communicate with the federal government in any of the official languages, though the working language of the Swiss Parliament and the federal public service is German, the majority language among the population as a whole and the dominant language of the area in which the national capital is situated.

Belgium is another country that operates largely on the same principle, known as the territorial principle of bilingualism. That it has not worked so smoothly in Belgium is largely due to the fact that the national capital has French as its dominant language although it is geographically situated within the half of the country that has Flemish as its official language. At the insistence of Flemish leaders, Brussels has been made officially bilingual and much political energy is devoted to protecting the rights of Flemish-speaking residents of the city. As Laponce has noted, the territorial principle of bilingualism can be harsh in its application if citizens are not so neatly

divided by geography as the Swiss are. A case in point is the University of Louvain, which had to abandon its bilingualism in the face of Flemish insistence that all courses given within Flanders should be given in Flemish, forcing its francophone professors and students to move elsewhere (see Laponce, 1987, p. 175).

A third possible line of policy is for the government to apply the personality principle of bilingualism, as it is known. This is to specify that both majority and minority languages should be official throughout the country, with citizens able to do business in either when communicating with public officials and with steps taken to protect the rights of language groups who happen to be in a minority in their area of residence. This is the choice made in Canada, with increasing efforts being made since 1969 to ensure that the policy is reflected in practice.

Whereas applying the territorial principle can in some circumstances be harsh, applying the personality principle is invariably expensive. It is expensive for government agencies, compelled to operate in more than one language; expensive for commercial firms, compelled (at least in Canada) to print bilingual labels and instructions; expensive in terms of lost job opportunities for those people (in Canada the great majority) who are wholly or substantially unilingual; expensive in educational costs if serious efforts are made to ensure that most people become bilingual. Partly for these reasons, it tends to be an unpopular principle in areas of the country that remain substantially unilingual. The politics of language in Canada will be discussed further in Chapter 8.

For political leaders concerned to build a sense of nationhood, the choice between these three policies is sometimes quite difficult. Any choice is likely to upset some citizens and linguistic rivalries have caused political tensions in countries as varied as Britain, Canada, India, Malaysia and the Soviet Union.

Arguments for social pluralism

Since the 1960s, much liberal opinion in the west has swung away from the belief that the assimilation of minorities is a necessary process in the building of a nation, towards the view that a pluralistic society is in some circumstances more desirable. While the main reasons for this change of emphasis have been practical, some quite reasonable theoretical arguments can be adduced in its favour. For instance, J. S. Mill's arguments for assimilation as the best basis for democratic government, though impressive, are not watertight.

There is some inconsistency between Mill's treatment of majority interests and minority interests. The majority interest is viewed as a collective interest, in the smooth running of representative institutions and the accompanying development of a more civilized and progressive society. The minority interests are individual interests, in the possibility of each individual improving his position. There is no consideration of what might be regarded as the collective interest of the minority, to preserve a distinctive culture and way of life.

At a more material level, it seems clear that the process of integration invariably benefits some members of each cultural minority more than others. It benefits the middle classes more than the workers, and benefits people engaged in commerce and industry more than those engaged in agriculture. It is for this reason that the Welsh nationalist leader Gwynfor Evans described English as 'the language of getting on in the world'. It is not a coincidence that the extension of the franchise to Welsh and Scottish citizens who had not got on in the world, in 1867 and 1884, was followed by protests about Anglicization and centralization that had not been heard earlier.

The change in liberal attitudes towards integration did not spring from reflections of this kind, however, so much as from mounting evidence that the significance of ethnic and cultural divisions was not withering away in the manner that had been predicted. The first well-publicized piece of evidence was perhaps the study of New York City published in 1963 under the title *Beyond the Melting Pot*. This was a descriptive study of five of the six main ethnic groups in New York (Anglo-Saxons excluded) by two sociologists, which made an impact on public opinion because its title challenged one of the basic assumptions of American society and the book was written with considerable verve. The authors concluded the book by saying that 'religion and race define the next stage in the evolution of the American peoples' (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963, p. 315).

A second and more important milestone in the change of liberal opinion was the realization, forced upon the American public by the race riots of the late 1960s, that racial conflict between blacks and whites was going to cause immeasurable damage to American society unless it could be contained by clear changes of policy leading to a modification of black attitudes. The Kerner Report (Kerner, 1968) recommended just such a change and American attitudes to racial problems within their society have not been the same since it was published.

Outside America, other developments pushed home the same lesson, that ethnicity was a vital force in political life that could not

be dismissed as obsolescent. In Africa, tribal rivalries destroyed one infant democratic system after another, while Nigeria plunged into a protracted civil war following the attempted secession in 1966 of a region governed by a tribal group excluded from national power. In western Europe, minority nationalist movements became unexpectedly prominent, with the Scottish and Welsh nationalists winning elections and the Basque and Breton nationalists setting off bombs. In Northern Ireland, the simmering conflict between Catholics and Protestants exploded into bloodshed in 1969, starting a prolonged period of sectarian evidence that reminded observers not to underestimate the political significance of religion. The lesson was rammed home by the increased tension in the Middle East.

All in all, the main political development of the late 1960s and the 1970s was the upsurge in ethnic and cultural conflict. Political scientists, having entirely failed to predict this development, reacted to it in various ways. In 1968 Lijphart's book on *The Politics of Accommodation*, while basically an account of politics in the Netherlands, carried the more general message that political scientists should question the assumption that social homogeneity is necessary for democratic institutions to flourish (Lijphart, 1968, Chs 1 and 10). In 1972 and 1973 Walker Connor published influential articles on the political significance of ethnicity, including one about the loss of minority cultures with the pointed title 'Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?' (Connor, 1972). In 1974 McRae edited a book entitled (and advocating) *Consociational Democracy* (McRae, 1974), while in the following year Hechter used the phrase 'internal colonialism' to describe the position of ethnic minorities within the national state (Hechter, 1975). These and similar works created a minor revolution in thinking about the process of national integration, based upon the propositions that the assimilation of minorities was not taking place in the way previously imagined, was not necessary to the stability of the state, and possibly was not even desirable.

Patterns of integration

It is not necessary to accept these propositions in full, for the world contains many examples of former minorities that have been assimilated into larger societies and, as noted in connection with the decline and death of languages, there are no overriding values that would enable us to pronounce this desirable or undesirable. What is involved is the replacement of a large number of folk cultures by a much smaller number of high cultures, each embracing a larger

population and covering a wider area (on this, see Gellner, 1983, Ch. 4). This process can be admired or regretted, according to the outlook of the observer. The change of emphasis in recent thinking makes it appropriate, however, to break down the concept of integration into smaller categories. Irrespective of personal values, it was clearly too simple to equate integration with assimilation, just like that.

It may be noted, first, that both economic and political integration can be distinguished from social integration, though they are of course related to it. Secondly, it is helpful to distinguish three patterns or degrees of social integration. A peripheral community may become completely assimilated into the larger society, accepting the values and customs of that society while losing the distinctive values and customs it once had. It will be convenient to reserve the word 'assimilation' for this process. An alternative is for the peripheral community to become merged into the larger society, while contributing its distinctive values to that society so that the resulting values and customs are a blend. The American term 'melting pot' signifies this process, for the American view was that their successive waves of immigrants should all contribute something to the new American identity and way of life.

Another possibility is for the peripheral community to remain culturally distinctive, while yet being part of the larger society in terms of government, free trade and communications. Rural Wales, for instance, was in this relationship to the rest of Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Welsh language was still the most common medium of speech in the rural areas. Australian Aborigines are in this situation today, in all but a few areas of the largest cities. So are the various tribal groups in the former British colonies of Africa, though some of the former French colonies appear to have a detribalized elite. The Malay and Chinese peoples of Malaysia are in a somewhat similar position, culturally distinct though without any implication of superiority of one over the other. The condition can conveniently be called cultural pluralism.

In respect of economic relationships, it is helpful to distinguish between full integration and partial integration. Full integration is to be found where there is no significant correlation between ethnic (or cultural) origins and occupation or income. If a chart is imagined in which the vertical axis indicates levels of occupation and income while the horizontal axis indicates ethnic identity, the lines separating ethnic groups will be vertical in a situation of full integration. In conditions of partial integration, the lines separating ethnic and

cultural groups will be sloping, showing that members of some groups have a significantly better chance of economic success than members of other groups. If the lines separating ethnic and cultural groups turn out to be horizontal, so that no members of the underprivileged group achieve superior economic positions, this would indicate a society characterized by economic segregation. In practice it is difficult to think of a society other than South Africa that is in this position, but it clearly deserves a separate category even though the category may have only one member.

In respect of political relationships, there are four categories. A condition of political assimilation is found in societies where ethnicity is of no political significance, with candidates for political office being chosen irrespective of their ethnic origins and government policies having no bearing on the status or relationships of ethnic or cultural groups. As an example, the Jewish community in Britain is in this position. Being Jewish or gentile has no significant bearing on a person's candidature; nobody notices how many Jewish politicians secure ministerial office; and there are no laws or policies that have special relevance to Jews. It is perhaps noteworthy that the appointment of an MP of Lithuanian Jewish origin as Secretary of State for Scotland in 1985 was accepted without criticism and almost entirely without comment; it was important that the office should be filled by a Scotsman, but a Lithuanian Jewish Scotsman qualified as well as a clansman from the Highlands.

A very different situation exists when there is general awareness of ethnic and cultural differences and a policy of accommodation is pursued so that members of minority groups shall not feel left out or discriminated against. In this case parties make a point of considering ethnic origins when nominating candidates, as in the practice of choosing a balanced ticket in the larger American cities. Government policies and appointments will also take constant account of ethnic or cultural differences if accommodation is the name of the game.

A third possibility is that the ethnic groups will be in a state of political conflict, with parties organized on ethnic lines, little readiness to co-operate or even to reach compromises between them, and government policies having a strong bias in favour of the winning group. This was the situation in most African states during the short periods of democracy that followed their independence. It was also the situation in Northern Ireland when the province had its own Parliament.

Finally, there are some political systems in which particular ethnic groups are completely excluded from the normal channels of power

and treated only as objects of policy. This is clearly the situation of blacks in South Africa, which is the extreme case. However, Australian Aborigines, North American Indians and Canadian Inuit are in substantially the same position politically, in that they exert virtually no influence through the normal process of elective representation. They are treated much better than South African blacks and are increasingly consulted about policy, to the point of being negotiated with over some issues, but their channels of influence are segregated from those of white citizens in the same country. It will be appropriate to call this situation one of majority control.

It follows that we can draw up a list of categories that will serve as a broad conceptual framework for the analyses of experiences of national integration that will be presented in Part II of this book.

Social integration	Assimilation
	The melting pot
	Cultural pluralism
Economic integration	Full integration
	Partial integration
	Economic segregation
Political integration	Political assimilation
	Accommodation
	Ethnic conflict
	Majority control

Before we turn to the case studies, however, it is important to examine two other theoretical questions, of a normative rather than a sociological character. One is the question of whether ethnic and cultural minorities within a state can reasonably be said to have rights, and if so what these rights may be. The other is the question of whether geographically concentrated minorities can be said to have a right to secede from the state in certain circumstances, accompanied by some discussion of the conditions that lead such minorities to make this claim. These theoretical questions will be examined in Chapters 5 and 6.