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GLOBAL APARTHEID

Refugees, Racism, and
the New World Order

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Introduction

The theme of this collection of essays is the impact of postindustrialism, postmodernism, and globalization on international migration, racial conflict, and ethnic nationalism. Throughout the developing world there are mass movements of population from rural to urban areas, driven by overpopulation and poverty. Some cross international borders in their search for a better life. An estimated 70 million persons live and work in other countries, and more than a million emigrate permanently every year (Appleyard 1991; UNFPA 1993). Migration in and between advanced postindustrial societies tends to be a multiway movement with only small net gains and losses. However, migration from less developed regions leads to enormous pressure on cities without much relief to the rural areas where rates of natural increase are high. The world's population is growing at an annual rate of 1.7 per cent, or more than 95 million. The total will exceed 6 billion by the end of the century. If present trends continue, the proportion of the world's population living in what are now industrialized countries will fall from one-fifth to one-sixth of the total by the year 2025 (see Appendix 2, Table 1). The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis used world population projections and computer simulations that took into account ecological feedback effects. Various scenarios were explored with different assumptions concerning fertility, mortality, and migration. They concluded that:

The population in today's less developed countries will under all scenarios increase by at least 70 percent, or 1.3% annually by 2030, while the direction of change is uncertain in the more developed countries. Without immigration and under low fertility assumptions TFR = 1.1) the MDC's population size would start to decline soon after the turn of the century (Lutz, Prinz, and Langgassner 1993:5). (TFR is total fertility rate; MDC is more developed countries)

Refugees are a growing element in the complex population movements associated with the new world order (or disorder) that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. Western European countries have taken severe measures to deter and exclude spontaneous arrivals of asylum seekers. As a result, the numbers arriving fell from 693,100 in 1992 to nearly 543,200 in 1993. Europe is not the only continent to be affected. Superpower confrontations in Africa, Central America, the Middle East, and Asia left a legacy of ethnic conflict and population displacement that spilled over into Europe, North America, and Australasia. Radical changes in southern Africa have also created new challenges.


There are an estimated 16.3 million refugees and asylum seekers around the world (see Figure Intro. 1). The largest source countries are Afghanistan, Palestine, Mozambique and the former Yugoslavia. In addition, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recognizes 6.6 million people in refugee-like situations.¹ The majority are still in their regions of origin, having sought shelter in their own or neighbouring countries. In December 1993, only 104,000 of those currently seeking asylum were in the United States, 30,500 in Canada, and 3,000 in Australia. Those who had other humanitarian claims but did not meet the UN Convention definition (see Appendix 1), included people fleeing conflicts in the Middle East, Central America, and Asia. To these must be added 25 million people who were internally displaced within their own countries as a result of civil wars, ethnic conflicts, or environmental disasters. The largest numbers were in the Sudan, South Africa, Mozambique, Somalia, and the Philippines (US Committee for Refugees 1993: see Appendix 2, tables 2 to 6).

Population pressures are not the only cause of ethnic conflict, although they contribute to its intensity. Racism, ethnocentrism, religious bigotry and prejudice, nationalism and ancient rivalries, intensified by economic competition, all play a part. The economically privileged seek to protect their advantage while the absolutely and relatively deprived fight for their piece of the pie. One response to these conflicts is to create barriers to stem the flow of migrants and protect the political power, economic benefits, and social status of the numerical minority.

Apartheid

In 1953, just six years after the nationalist government came to power in South Africa, I wrote a book, *The Colour Problem*, which examined racial relations in various countries (Richmond 1955). At that time, I suggested that two elementary processes of social organization are involved in the examination of migration, race, and ethnic relations. The first is the principle of *superordination/subordination*. The second is the principle of *separation/integration*. Each is a continuum involving varying levels of inequality in the distribution of status and power, together with degrees of segregation and dispersion of the populations concerned. When these two bases of social organization are combined, four main types of system are possible, although there are many variations when other factors, such as demographic ratios, levels of economic development, and degrees of similarity and difference in language and culture are taken into account. Extreme differences in power and status, combined with geographic and social separation, lead to *apartheid*. Similar differences in power and status in an integrated system lead to *class differentiation*. When power and status are more equally distributed and combined with separation, the result is *self-determination*. This may take a variety of forms ranging from separate statehood to a high degree of autonomy within an existing state. The

Figure Intro. 1 Refugees and asylum seekers



SOURCE: UN High Commissioner for Refugees and US Committee for Refugees

combination of relative equality on the dimension of superordination/subordination and integration (in geographic as well as sociocultural terms) leads to *assimilation* (Richmond 1955:27). In the latter case, there may be convergence towards the characteristics of a numerical majority group or various forms of *cooptation* in which different groups experience change in response to endogenous and exogenous pressures (technological, economic, political, and social). The first four chapters of this book are an attempt to revise and elaborate the theoretical basis of my earlier work in the light of contemporary developments in sociological thought.² Later chapters apply this revised theoretical framework to various situations, using a comparative perspective within the contemporary world system.

The Colour Problem (1955) contained a chapter entitled 'Apartheid and White Supremacy in South Africa'. The book was banned in that country, although a few copies were smuggled in by travellers who disguised it as a novel. I wrote 'in South Africa a large majority of the European population position and to be determined to hold on to, if not extend, its own privileged position and to exclude non-Europeans from a full share in the government of the country, now or in the future. For this reason racial relationships in South Africa are bound to deteriorate until the pressure on non-Europeans becomes so great that a major upheaval ensues. The only alternative would appear to be a widespread change of attitude on the part of Europeans, when and if the grim consequence of present policies is fully appreciated'

(Richmond 1955:81). Six years later when a revised edition of the book went to press, the treason trials started and Nelson Mandela began his long period of detention. I wrote then 'Afrikaner nationalism, as a sociological phenomenon is understandable enough. But it is obvious that the problems of a plural society cannot be solved by means of the unbridled assertiveness and unlimited pretensions of a single racial group, reinforced by fear and relying purely on violence. For a time Europeans in South Africa will be able to maintain their supremacy through political oppression backed by tanks and machine-guns such as those used at Sharpeville in 1960. But Nemesis is bound to follow' (Richmond 1961:134-5).

More than thirty years later, and after much more violence and bloodshed, the 'White' South African government finally recognized the impossibility of maintaining its exclusive power. Nelson Mandela was released and exiled leaders of the African National Congress were allowed to return. The first steps towards democracy and power-sharing were taken, although there is still resistance from 'White' extremists and factional fighting among the African population. For the first time, elections based on universal franchise were held in April 1994. It remains to be seen whether the transfer of power can be achieved peacefully. The attitudes, values, and social practices that constituted apartheid will not disappear overnight, although many were obsolete before being formally abolished (Adam and Moodley 1993). Already some 'White' Afrikaners are demanding a separate and independent state for themselves and are prepared to fight for it.

When the first Dutch settlers arrived in South Africa in 1660, they wanted to build a canal that would separate the Cape Peninsula from the rest of the continent, but that proved impractical. Instead, they planted a hedge of bitter wild almond in order to keep out the Hottentot and other 'Black' African peoples. The remnants of that hedge are still to be found in Cape Town's botanic garden. Symbolically, it persists in the numerous laws and customs that still keep 'Whites' and 'Blacks' apart (Hewson 1989; Sparks 1990:xvii).

The end of official apartheid in South Africa coincides with growing fears elsewhere in the world concerning the impact of mass migration and consequent conflicts in polyethnic and multiracial societies. New hedges are being built. Increasingly repressive and restrictive measures to restrain the flows of migrant labourers and refugees from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America are being imposed. Today we guard our airports, interdict undocumented travellers, build electronic fences, maintain coastguard patrols, and use computerized data banks to ensure that our borders are not infringed. Armed guards patrol frontiers and gunboats turn back ships loaded with asylum seekers and so-called 'illegal' immigrants. Advanced technologies, including infrared surveillance, fingerprinting, and computer data banks are being used to exclude unwanted persons. In some countries, voting rights and citizenship are denied, even to long-term residents, unless they are of the same ethnic origin as the majority group.

The term 'ethnic cleansing' has entered our vocabulary, although 'pogrom', 'genocide', and 'extermination' would be more apt descriptions of what is happening, not only in the former Yugoslavia but also in other parts of the world where indigenous populations and ethnic minorities are oppressed.

The predominantly 'White' and wealthy countries of North America, Europe, and Australasia endeavour to protect themselves from what they believe are imminent threats to their territorial integrity and privileged lifestyles. Wealthier enclaves in Asia and elsewhere follow suit. Global population pressures, economic crises, and shifts in political power generate profound insecurities in the old, new, third, and fourth worlds alike. Typically, dominant groups take defensive measures against external 'enemies' and threaten internal minorities. The result is further conflict and an even greater propensity to migrate. As economic interdependence encourages transnational movements of capital and tends towards a 'borderless world', political and social pressures pull in the opposite direction.

A central paradox emerges from an analysis of international migration in the last decade. The actual numbers crossing international borders, legally and illegally, rose substantially. One response was to offer amnesty, an adjustment of status, to *de facto* immigrants who had established themselves. At the same time, public opposition to immigration increased and, in some countries, precipitated violent protests and attacks on foreigners. Governments responded by tightening controls in an attempt to stem the flow. In so doing they labelled as 'illegal' or 'undesirable' people who earlier, would have been welcomed either as useful workers or as escapees from oppressive regimes. It now seems that a generous policy towards refugees was a cold war luxury, and even then one mainly reserved for Europeans. That is why new policies can be described as a form of *global apartheid*.

In order to understand the radical changes that are occurring in the world system, it is important to understand the demographic and sociological transformations that are occurring. This book is about those changes.

Notes

¹ Refugees movements are volatile and hard to quantify. Estimates vary according to the definition used and the time period under consideration. In late 1993, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 'was responsible for the protection and assistance of an estimated 23 million persons in 143 countries, comprised of more than 16 million refugees, at least 2.9 million IDP's (internally displaced persons) and 3 million others, including victims of war and returnees' (UNHCR 1994:2).

² I have been influenced by the writings of Anthony Giddens, although the latter has no responsibility for my use or misuse of his ideas. For a critical discussion of Giddens's structuration theory, see Cohen (1989), Bryant and Jary (1991), and Craib (1992).

chapter one

Theoretical perspectives

There is no single theory of migration nor one sociological explanation of ethnic relations or racial conflict. Various writers have adopted different theoretical frameworks depending on their epistemological assumptions and value premises. Classical theorists, such as Marx and Weber, have been influential in Britain and Europe (Mason 1986). Robert Park, Louis Wirth, Herbert Blumer, and others in the 'Chicago School' laid the foundations for much of the writing about 'race' and 'ethnicity' in the United States (Lal 1986). In Canada, the Chicago influence was also present in the pioneer work of Carl Dawson, Lloyd Reynolds, and Everett Hughes at McGill (Clark 1975; Ostow 1984). Later John Porter brought ideas from the work of L.T. Hobhouse, Morris Ginsberg, and the Fabian-socialist traditions of the London School of Economics to an analysis of the Canadian 'vertical mosaic' (Heimes-Hayes 1990; Porter 1965). In the chapters that follow, I have adopted an eclectic approach endeavouring to achieve a synthesis of those theories that have explanatory value in particular context, especially those of Anthony Giddens. His work is grounded in classical sociology, but breaks away from it to provide in *structuration theory* 'a conceptual scheme that allows one to understand both how actors are at the same time the creators of social systems yet created by them' (Giddens 1991:204).

Among the key concepts necessary to understanding the sociological dimensions of international migration and related questions of 'race' and ethnic relations are power, conflict, agency, structuration, security, identity,

and communication. In turn these are related to questions of class ethnicity, racism, domination, migration, and the cooptation of linguistic, religious, and cultural groups in quasi-sovereign states that are part of a world system. That system is currently experiencing radical change as it moves from modernity, through late modernity, to an uncertain postmodern phase that promises the possibility of chaos.

Power

Power is a key concept in social theory, although its precise definition and significance remain controversial. In its most abstract formulation, power is the capacity to achieve individual or collective goals through cooperation and, if necessary, by overcoming opposition. Sociologists writing in the 'political economy' tradition generally reduce questions of power to economic relations of production. In the classic version of Marxist theory, power derives from private property and capital accumulation and is expressed in class struggles. The state is an agent of the bourgeoisie. The military, the bureaucracy, and the legislative institutions of the modern state are not autonomous. They are the political arm or 'executive committee' of the ruling capitalist class. Only when revolution succeeds in overthrowing the capitalist system will the state wither away. Meanwhile, social conditioning induces subordination and can only be overcome by a demonstration of the false consciousness that diverts the proletariat from a recognition of their real interests. 'Race', ethnicity, and religion are among the forms of false consciousness in question. The ruling class exploits these divisions as a means of maintaining power and reducing the propensity to revolt. From this perspective, 'racism' is simply a manifestation of class struggle, particularly its colonial phase (Cox 1948). More sophisticated versions of neo-Marxist theory recognize the relative autonomy of the state and other institutions (Miles and Pithzakalea 1980; Poulantzas 1975). A good example of this approach is the work of Stuart Hall (1980). He identifies 'structures of dominance' in situations of racial conflict. While emphasizing the importance of class, he avoids the limitations of classical Marxism, including economic determinism, reductionism, and lack of historical specificity (Hall 1980:336). According to Hall, socially constructed definitions of 'race' are the 'modalities' and the 'medium' through which social and economic class relations are lived and experienced (Hall et al. 1978:394).

Others writing in a neo-Marxist tradition have followed Cox in recognizing the reality of a global economic system. For example, Miles (1987) emphasizes the importance of 'unfree labour' in capitalist societies. Beginning with slavery and proceeding through various forms of migrant labour *Gastarbeiter* and other temporary workers, there are pools of unfree labour. They are all subject to strict controls over their movements and have limited

rights. Miles elaborated on the concept of a 'reserve army of labour' deemed necessary to profitability and capital formation. In the same theoretical framework, Satzewich (1991) examined the incorporation of foreign labour in Canada in the immediate postwar period when Canadian farmers relied heavily on European displaced persons to meet largely seasonal labour shortages. Later these were replaced by contract workers from the Caribbean.

An alternative view of power was put forward by Max Weber (1947). His classic definition of power (*Macht*) is 'the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.' He rejected the view that property was the sole source of power. He went on to define 'imperative control' (*Herrschaft*) as 'the probability that a command with given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.' In turn this was related to the idea of discipline, or habitual and be exercised legitimately, but said little about its illegitimate uses, including exploitation, domination, and coercion. Power was exercised as legitimate authority when it was based on tradition, bureaucratic rule of law, or listed systems by appealing to a higher moral authority.

Power in Max Weber's writings was related to questions of class, status, and political party. Status groups differed from classes in that the basis of their rank is related to their (often inherited) lifestyle and the honour and respect that they commanded. The latter was sustained through preserving links between class and status groups to the extent that the latter could control the allocation of material and symbolic resources. For Weber, class relations are related to market situations, economic exchange, and competition. The distinction between status and class was connected with Weber's sociology of religion and his understanding of ethnicity. Status groups had their historic origins in feudal systems, but they are also linked to 'race', language, religion, nationality, and cultural differences. Social 'closure' arises as a result of defining membership in terms of ascriptive criteria. Competition creates interest groups that endeavour to control competition by monopolistic practices that in turn provoke retaliation by others (Weber 1968).

Neo-Weberian writers have related status groups to the cultural division of labour that occurs when ethnic or religious groups interact (Hechter 1978). When the occupational characteristics, income distribution, voting behaviour, and intermarriage patterns of ethnic groups in contemporary societies (such as Britain, the United States, or Australia) are examined, varying degrees of hierarchy and segmentation are observed. These reflect a cultural division of labour that has its roots in historical circumstances of conquest, migration, and ethnic stratification (Hechter 1975, 1978).

John Rex makes extensive use of Weber's theories of class and status in his discussion of 'race' and ethnicity in Britain (Rex 1986; Rex and Tomlinson 1979). He distinguishes between the situation of immigrant minorities in Britain and the United States. In the latter 'an individual is assimilated and accepted when he is capable of standing on his own feet as a property-owning individual' (Rex 1986:68). Although he sees the United States as an open society in which there are opportunities for immigrants to achieve social mobility, he recognizes that it is relatively closed to 'Black' Americans. The biggest divide in that country is racial (Rex 1986:62). In a welfare state such as Britain (at least before the Thatcher/Major era), immigrants were obliged to gain acceptance in a working class that had particular social rights relating to citizenship, collective bargaining, housing, and education. Noting that Weber defined class in terms of a market situation and a differential distribution of property, Rex argues:


Taking this only a stage further we may say that wherever there is a system of allocation of scarce resources of any kind there will be classes. This Weberian revision of Marxism suggests that under the 'Welfare state deal' the position of the working class is defined in terms of certain social rights, and that whether or not any minority groups [sic] is part of the working class depends upon whether it shares fully these rights (Rex 1986:68)

Power and structural theory

It is important to recognize that power is necessarily implicated in all forms of action whether cooperative or conflicting. It requires the mobilization of resources as a means towards the achievement of goals. These resources may be individual or collective. They are both material and symbolic. The principal components of power in any behavioural context are shown in Figure 1.1.

In Giddens's terminology, material resources are allocative and symbolic resources are authoritative (Giddens 1984:258-62). The latter are non-material resources that derive from social interaction and involve organization of social time-space. Material resources include energy, raw materials, and property as a means of production, together with the artefacts, goods, and services that are generated through action. Symbolic resources are derived initially from the acquisition of language and the capacity to communicate. Closely linked are intelligence, information, knowledge, art, science, and technology. In turn, these depend upon a capacity to organize, manage, and develop skills and perform efficiently. Individual action assumes will-power or a commitment to particular goals and a need for achievement. This is related to individual self-consciousness and a sense of identity. These propensities translate collectively into group consciousness and solidarity in the pursuit of common objectives. Neither material nor symbolic resources are distributed equally between individuals and collec-

Figure 1.1 Power and mobilization



activities. This asymmetrical distribution gives rise to 'structures of domination' embedded in political, economic, and social institutions that can be oppressive. Giddens (1981:60) emphasizes that exploitation is more than purely economic in form. It can occur whenever power is used for sectional interests at the expense of other individuals or groups. Exploitation can be physical or psychological. It implies the manipulation of others through ideological indoctrination as well as material deprivation.

Power relations are not necessarily a zero-sum game, although they may be under some circumstances. As Parsons (1963) and others have shown, power (and the resources that create it) can be increased through the division of labour and cooperative activity. In this respect, power is like money. It facilitates the achievement of collective goals that can be expanded through the exercise of trust and confidence in others, including leaders. A process of legitimation generates authority and willing compliance by followers. Boulding (1989:25) distinguished three categories of power based upon threat, exchange, and 'love'. These are institutionalized in the political/military, economic and social systems, respectively, in different proportions. The political/military system relies primarily on threat (with an admixture of promises and rewards), the economic system depends


primarily on exchange, and the social system on mutual support or integrative power. A somewhat similar view of power is expressed by Calbraith (1985) who identifies the main sources of power as personality, property, and organization. He distinguishes between compensatory and condign power in terms of the difference between positive and negative reward (or punishment).

Power relations are always two-way and involve varying degrees of autonomy and dependence. In this sense there is a dialectic of control, reflecting the capacity of the less powerful to manage resources (particularly symbolic ones) to their advantage, even when filling subordinate roles (Giddens 1984:16). Power implies the capacity to transform social relations and involves degrees of autonomy and dependence. Even those exercising substantial power and influence depend on others to carry out orders, but compliance cannot be assumed in all circumstances. The Parsonian or functionalist view of system integration assumes a greater degree of consensus than is characteristic of most organizations and societies (Parsons 1971). Norms are frequently contested and scarce resources give rise to struggle.

Force is an option not infrequently used by dominant individuals and groups to overcome opposition, and may be used by minorities in defence or retaliation. Violence is not to be equated with power. In fact, the resort to violence is itself an indication that legitimate power and authority are weak. Violence is instrumental, requiring weapons ranging from fists to bombs: 'like all means, it always stands in need of guidance and justification through the end it pursues' (Arendt 1970:51). Coercion may be physical or psychological. It involves the threat of violence or deprivation and the generation of fear. However, conformity and submission may be achieved by a variety of measures, beginning with the earliest childhood socialization and educational experiences. Behavioural conformity may be based on conditioning, physical rewards and punishments, expressions (or withdrawal) of love and approval, as well as material inducements. In adults may be used. Between these extremes are the contemporary instruments of persuasion available to economic and political powers in the form of advertising and propaganda through the mass media. This facilitates what Noam Chomsky (Herman and Chomsky 1988) calls the 'manufacturing of consent': in a totalitarian society or a democratic one during wartime, the state plays a significant role in this process. However, in a (relatively) free society opposing political parties ensure that there is more than one set of policy options and the degree of hegemony is reduced. At other times, religious leaders may be openly critical of government policies and materialistic philosophies of a consumer society.

Corporate advertising is clearly designed to generate a consumer mentality and influence choice and market share for particular products and services. Similar techniques are used by politicians competing for power in

Figure 1.2 Hegemonic power elites and establishment linkages



a (relatively) democratic society. The degree of competition may vary in both political and economic systems. There are marked tendencies towards oligopoly in contemporary capitalist societies, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet system, which used central state control of the economy, a more widespread adoption of free market ideologies has occurred. In other situations, religious denominations may apply their formidable resources of indoctrination (now reinforced by the use of television) to influencing attitudes, values, and behaviour. In some situations such as war, religious leaders appear to concur with the political and economic elites in given nation or cultural entity. However, in a plural society, the competing expectations and ideologies of different authorities may cancel each other out, leaving individuals in an anomie state of indecision or conflicting aspirations.

A key question concerns the degree of concentration and dispersion of power in a given system. A structure of domination may be totalitarian and highly centralized with close links between those exercising power in different spheres. Alternatively, more democratic systems exhibit greater equality in the distribution of resources and the capacity to fulfil individual and minority aspirations. The concept of a power elite implies a high degree of connectedness between the institutional spheres of power and the incumbents of powerful positions, who form a self-perpetuating establishment. The term 'hegemony' describes a situation in which a dominant class or group is able to influence the symbol systems of a society in such a way that their own position is accepted as legitimate with a minimum of doubt or

opposition (Gramsci 1988). Such a closely knit system is represented in Figure 1.2 where the network linkages are mutually reinforcing.

In the contemporary world system, the role of the 'military-industrial complex' is critical. First identified by President Eisenhower and expounded by C.W. Mills (1956), the term has conspiratorial flavour. Nevertheless, the reality of a global arms bazaar and the threat of nuclear annihilation cannot be ignored. In the aftermath of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, armament manufacturers continue to compete for markets, new states and old have access to enormous stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons, while defence expenditures by superpowers and the governments of developed and developing countries have been only slightly reduced (see Table 7). Furthermore, terrorist groups purporting to represent minority interests or frustrated nationalist ambitions endeavour to force concessions from those they perceive as oppressors. There are not only more overt ethnic conflicts but an increasing propensity to use violence to promote or suppress them.

Power is not only centred in formal organizations and institutions. It is inherent in the day-to-day relations of people, beginning in parent-child relationships and continuing through life. In this sense, it is embedded in discourse and everyday practices. This aspect has been well documented in the writings of French philosopher Michel Foucault in his studies of power and knowledge, the history of prisons and mental hospitals, and in research dealing with sexuality (Foucault 1973, 1978; Rabinow 1984). In various disciplinary situations, human beings are made subjects and 'objectified'. That is, they are treated in categorical ways and divided from others. What Foucault calls 'dividing practices' separate people according to criteria such as age, gender, 'race', class, religion, or other ascriptive criteria. These categories become 'discursive facts' that influence how people interact and perceive others. Behaviour may be termed 'deviant' if it is perceived as threatening to a dominant group; it may also be invoked to justify incarceration in prisons, hospitals, or asylums or to justify expulsion from a community. In some institutions, 'expert' knowledge is used to impose discipline and achieve behavioural modification. Dividing practices are techniques of domination that tend to be reinforced in the individual through the process of internalization. Others' perceptions of the person, his or her identity and 'place' in society, are actively incorporated into the subject's self-image. Classification of people as 'immigrants', 'refugees', 'visible minorities', etc., controls and facilitates techniques of administration (Wong 1989). Apartheid institutionalizes such dividing practices.

Foucault (1978) traced a direct link between the objectification of the subject and the growth of government controls and policing, the collection of demographic statistics and the emergence of what he calls 'bio-power'. He examined the history of the death penalty, the technology of war, and the techniques of power available to the state and its representatives.

Among the most important is the capacity for surveillance. Beginning with the simplest forms of observation and record keeping by bureaucrats, this process has become one of the most important loci of power in late modern society. Security systems, electronic record keeping, computerization, identity cards, passwords, and restricted access to databases are all ways in which information has become a powerful tool in the hands of those exercising power (Poster 1990). States wishing to exercise control over people entering and leaving their territory have been quick to grasp the importance of these surveillance techniques.

Foucault (1978) also demonstrated the relation between sexism and racism. He recognized blood relations as an important element in the mechanism of power. Kinship relations, alliances, the inheritance of property and sovereignty, and differentiation into estates and castes were all manifestations of this. A preoccupation with 'blood and the law' influenced the administration of rules concerned with sex and marriage. He suggested that in the second half of the nineteenth century, consanguinity became linked to a biological concept of 'race'. 'Racism took shape at this point (racism in its modern "biologizing" statist form): it was then that a whole politics of settlement (*peuplement*), family, marriage, education, social hierarchization, and property, accompanied by a long series of permanent interventions at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race' (Rabinow 1984:270-1). He linked this tendency to the growth of the eugenics movement and eventually to the fanatical concerns of Hitler and the Nazis with questions of 'blood' and 'race'.

The process of 'racialization' of the world's population has also been traced by Banton (1977). The earliest European explorations of Africa, Asia, and the Americas led to a preoccupation with categorizing human beings into types on the basis of physical and cultural characteristics that were assumed to be biologically determined and hierarchically arranged. From Gobineau's *Essay on the Inequality of Human Races* (1853) 1915 through the pseudo-scientific writings of the Social Darwinists to the eugenics movement, there was a direct intellectual link to the excesses of racism, anti-Semitism, and the Jewish Holocaust under the Nazis. Ironically, Banton (1977:155) noted that 'although racial identification was first employed by whites as a tool for putting blacks at a distance', some Afro-Americans and other politically organized minorities use the concept of 'racial solidarity' to promote ethnic pride and counter the dominance of 'Whites'. Militant anticolonialists adopted a similar position in an effort to mobilize opposition to imperialist domination (Fanon 1967). More recently, 'political correctness' has become a slogan and a means for minorities to pressure majorities into changing attitudes and behaviour, sometimes at the risk of reactionary intolerance.

Banton

Conflict

Although conflict is not a necessary outcome of the asymmetrical distribution of power and resources, it is a frequent concomitant. As Giddens (1984:283) states:

It is a mistake to treat power as inherently divisive but there is no doubt that some of the most bitter conflicts in social life are accurately seen as 'power struggles'. Such struggles can be regarded as to do with efforts to subdivide resources which yield modalities of control in social systems.

Conflict arises when there is competition for scarce resources (material and symbolic) and/or when there is an opposition or lack of consensus concerning goals to be achieved. Conflict may also be the result of contradiction. This occurs when there is an opposition of structural principles or when the core value system of a society defines certain goals and ideals, but fails to provide the necessary institutional means for their achievement. Giddens suggests 'contradiction is likely to be linked directly to conflict where perverse consequences ensue' (1984:317). He gives, as an example, the urban rioting that occurred in Detroit in the late 1960s. This was seen at the time to be related to inadequate welfare services and employment opportunities for 'Blacks' in the city. When these were improved, it encouraged more poor people to migrate to the city to take advantage of the programs offered. This exacerbated rather than improved the situation.

Bialock (1989) examined the relation between power and conflict within the framework of a general systems theory. He treated power as a multiplicative function of resources combined with the degree and efficiency of their mobilization. When two or more individuals or groups interact, the outcome of a conflict will depend upon definition of goals, choice of means, and effective mobilization of resources. These in turn may be influenced by various environmental constraints. His models of power and conflict are predicated upon a 'modified subjective expected utility' perspective (Bialock 1989:33). This assumes 'rational actors', but the approach is modified by a recognition of the bounded nature of decision making and the influence of various situational determinants. The resulting models incorporate factors such as alliances, ideology, degrees of consensus, myths of invincibility, fatigue levels, willingness to negotiate, etc. Such multivariate complexity makes it extremely difficult to predict the actual outcome of conflicts. Bialock concludes his analysis by warning against the dangers of oversimplified explanations and subsequent naive policy recommendations (1989:251).

Agency

The study of social systems and behaviour raises difficult questions concerning the freedom of individuals and collectivities to determine their own

utures. This is particularly evident in the sociological study of nationalism, migration, 'race', and ethnic relations. Deterministic theories, whether formulated in terms of 'manifest destinies', 'chosen peoples', evolutionary theories of change, or materialist views of history and class conflict leave little room for individual choice. Marx's famous dictum that people make history but not in circumstances of their own choosing has been generally interpreted in a deterministic way, but it can also be understood as a more dynamic relation between individual choices and the structural constraints and facilitators within which those choices are made. The role of leaders is critical. Power-holders in all spheres of life, but particularly in economic and political organizations, can have a substantial impact on history. So also can those in minority status when consciousness is raised and collective action occurs.

There is a long-standing dispute in the social sciences between structural analyses and those that emphasize 'methodological individualism' (O'Neill 1973). Those who advocate the former espouse explanations of behaviour that depend upon the subjective state of mind of individuals or that attribute purpose and goals to collectivities. They believe that structures or networks of social relations can be studied independently of the actors. Social systems exhibit properties that are more than the sum of their parts. The proponents of methodological individualism insist that society can only be understood in terms of the individuals who participate in it. Only individuals are real, it is argued; everything else is abstraction or metaphor. Such a view insists that there can be no social scientific 'laws' unless they are expressed in terms of the psychological predispositions of individuals. Structural theorists, whether those of the functionalist and consensus school or those who adopt a more radical conflict approach, regard such assertions as reductionist.

The debate concerning agency is evident in the writings of various sociologists who have addressed issues of racism and ethnic relations. It is sometimes confused with alternative radical or conservative views, on the one hand, and with disputes concerning the extent to which competition gives rise to social exchange and rational choice on the other. For example, Hechter (1975) began his own research on colonialism and nationalism by emphasizing the importance of structural determinants embedded in historical circumstances. Subsequently, he recognized the limitations of this approach. 'Individuals typically have some choice-making discretion in all groups and societies. To the extent that they have such discretion, their behaviour will confound expectations derived from theories that only countenance aggregate-level causal factors' (Hechter 1986:267).

Both Hechter (1986) and Banton (1983) emphasize the importance of rational choice. The approach has its roots in economic theories of market behaviour. It has been adapted by anthropologists and sociologists who focus on questions of social exchange and the transactional nature of human interaction. Thus, Frederik Barth (1969) developed a theory of

orig. factors + human agents
sub. line

ethnic groups, social exchange, and boundaries of social relations that was heavily influenced by 'games theories' in micro-economics. As developed by Banton, the theory is predicated on the assumption that individuals endeavour to maximize net advantage, and that choices made in the past constrain those that can be made now and in the future (Banton 1983:104). Individual competition for resources (including such symbolic ones as status and prestige) tends to break down group boundaries, whereas group competition tends to reinforce them.

Transactional theories based on the premise of individuals making rational choices in order to maximize or achieve optimal satisfaction leave open the question of how value preferences arise in the first place or how they may be changed. There are elements of tautology and other weaknesses in the explanations provided (Dex 1985). Such theories have been severely criticized by writers in both the Marxian and Weberian traditions of sociology. For example, M.G. Smith (1985:495) points out the failure to incorporate power differentials into the models. The theory is biased towards the perspective of dominant groups.

Anyone acquainted with the historical record of white and non-white relations in Africa, Australia, Melanesia, the Caribbean and the Americas will be surprised that one of the leading experts in this field has tried to analyze and 'explain' them as outcomes of rational choice and action to maximize net advantage by all their participants... one wonders what a rational choice theory applied to contexts of this kind written by a scholar of the dispossessed, exploited or exterminated peoples would look like (Smith 1985:497)?

While adopting the perspective of methodological individualism, John Rex is also critical of rational choice theory. He emphasizes the importance of structural factors as well as the actions of individuals. He notes that 'the external social constraints upon our conduct can be analyzed in terms of the actions of other individuals, even though these themselves have been organized in long chains in which the constraints are themselves constrained' (Rex 1985:560). He suggests that a theory of 'race' and ethnic relations must explain what separates groups and what brings them together, what leads to increased or diminished salience of group boundaries as well as how 'race' and ethnicity are related to political-and-economic structures, including questions of class conflict (Rex 1986:18-37).

Questions of human agency and the dispute between structural theorists and methodological individualists have been helpfully reviewed in the work of Anthony Giddens (1984:207, 221). He argues that structural sociology and methodological individualism are not mutually exclusive alternatives.

The methodological individualists are wrong in so far as they claim that social categories can be reduced to descriptions in terms of individual predicates. But they are right to suspect 'structural sociology' blows out, or at least radically underestimates, the knowledgeability of human agents, and they are right to insist that 'social forces' are always nothing more and nothing less than mixes

of intended or unintended consequences of action undertaken in specifiable contexts (Giddens 1984:220).

Giddens raises the further question of whether collectivities are actors. When we say 'the government' did this, or 'Blacks in Los Angeles' reacted in a certain way, we are using a shorthand description of a complex process that involves the reflexive monitoring of behaviour.¹ Formal organizations such as corporations and governments have elaborate decision-making rules that legitimate certain actions taken in the name of the organization, even when not all its members concur in the decision. The same is not true of looser associations of individuals and groups whose behaviour may appear to be more spontaneous and disorganized. However, even in the extreme case of crowd behaviour and rioting, there is still a feedback element. The actions of individuals have significant repercussions for others and for the system within which they play a variety of different roles.

The multivariate complexity of human behaviour and the social systems they create produces a high degree of indeterminacy in outcome. It must be understood that theories in the social sciences are necessarily probabilistic, not deterministic. The variables studied in social systems are interactive (in the sense that the consequence of event A may be different in the presence of variable B than in the presence of variable C); they are generally multiplicative rather than additive, meaning that a combination of circumstances will generate consequences that are more than the sum of the parts. Models of social behaviour are reductive in the sense that subsequent actions can feed back on previous ones, thereby having either positive (exaggerating) or negative (inhibiting) effects.

It is tempting to draw an analogy between the characteristics of social systems and mathematical 'chaos theory', although care must be taken not to stretch the comparisons too far. At best, they serve as a metaphor. Chaos theory is based on the proposition that random behaviour, irregularities, bifurcations, and apparently chaotic observations may, over a long period, display regularities that can be expressed mathematically. Crystallographers, ecologists, meteorologists, cosmologists, and other scientists have found unexpected order emerging out of systematic observation of events that cannot be experimentally controlled in a positivistic manner. One important contribution of chaos theory has been the realization that randomness (including noise and error) must be built into realistic theories. Very small differences in input can produce unexpected outcomes. One of the best examples has been labelled the 'butterfly effect'. It helps to explain why meteorological forecasting is so difficult. Hypothetically, the flight of a butterfly in a certain location could so affect wind currents in one place that it could whip up a storm in another. The theory suggests that in any system there is a sensitive dependence on initial conditions, but small interferences can have enormous and unpredictable consequences (Gleick 1987). By analogy, the assassination of a leader in one country may result in a world

war, or a small fluctuation in the price of oil could lead to the fall of a government. There is a sense in which human societies are open and 'fractal' rather than closed and cybernetic. That is, they are the result of numerous coordinated, uncoordinated, and random events rather than directed patterns and some order may emerge out of the chaos, but it is doubtful if these can be reduced to mathematical formulae. Even though computer modelling of demographic and economic systems has become quite sophisticated, it is only possible to make limited projections based upon the parameters and assumptions built into the models. Most of these are 'linear'; they rarely incorporate the feedback effects that are critical in the modelling of mathematical chaos systems. This is partly because social scientists still have inadequate measures of the many behavioural variables that enter into the system.

Other mathematical theories that, again by analogy, throw some light on social behaviour are those associated with stress. Catastrophe theories have been developed in engineering and the study of the physical properties of metals, etc. The cumulative effects of small stresses can lead to the total collapse of a complex structure, a breakdown in the functioning of a machine, or the phenomenon of metal fatigue, leading to changes in the chemical or physical characteristics of the material, often with catastrophic results (Zeeman 1977). Again, it would be inappropriate to apply such mathematical theories directly to the study of social systems. Nevertheless, in a qualitative rather than quantitative sense, there is no doubt that cumulative stress and tension can have very harmful effects, both on the physiological and psychological well-being of individuals, but also on the social systems of which they are a part. Rapid and unpredictable change is a major source of stress.

The concept of 'hyperchange' describes a combination of linear, exponential, discontinuous, and chaotic (or random, disorderly, and unpredictable) change. To this should be added the possibility of regressive or retroactive change and the consequences of positive and negative feedback that may lead to a slowing down or acceleration of change and influence the direction of movement. Learning from experience is rendered difficult under these conditions.

Under normal conditions, the reflexive nature of human behaviour enables learning to occur, which, in turn, makes forethought and planning possible. When situations are changing rapidly, this may not be possible. Furthermore, human behaviour is not governed by cognitive processes and rational choices alone. Even when all the necessary information is available to make decisions that will maximize net advantage, non-rational and irrational choices are often made. Instinctive drives, unconscious desires, and overriding passions frequently subordinate rational calculation. The situation is further complicated by the question of time-span. Choices that may seem rational in the pursuit of short-term goals, that are designed to

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benefit particular individuals and groups, may be counterproductive, and even seriously destructive when longer-term consequences and the effect on others (or on the biophysical environment) are taken into account.

It is no exaggeration to link persistent racial, ethnic, and national conflict to the collapse of stable political orders, economic crises, social upheavals, and violence, ranging from murder and suicide to civil war. Giddens's theories of structuration are helpful in understanding both the nature of social order and the spread of violence (Giddens 1985, 1987).

Structuration

By emphasizing the importance of agency, Giddens is able to transcend the split between structural theories and individualistic ones. He defines 'structuration' in terms of process, i.e., 'the structuring of social relations across time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure' (Giddens 1984:376). By 'duality' he means that structures are both the medium and the outcome of recursively organized conduct. Systems do not exist outside of action, but are being constantly produced and reproduced (with or without modification) over time and space. Structures are themselves derived from rules and resources, as systems are patterned with varying degrees of internal cohesion and conflict. Structures are virtual in the sense that they have no physical reality. Nevertheless, they exist as principles that govern conduct and social practices. Structural properties are expressed as forms of domination and power (Giddens 1984:18). Rules exhibit varying degrees of intensity, explicitness, formality, and sanctioning. Social structures constrain behaviour, limiting choices and narrowing options, but they also enable, thus facilitating action that could not occur otherwise. Giddens distinguishes structures of signification, domination, and legitimation. Each has a corresponding institutional order. Signification refers to symbolic orders and modes of discourse; domination to political and economic institutions (resource allocation) and legitimation to legal institutions (Giddens 1984:31).

In applying structuration theory to the study of migration, 'race', and ethnic relations, signification, domination, and legitimation are key concepts. Each interacts with the other. Terms such as 'race', 'ethnicity', 'migrant', 'refugee', and 'visible minority' are symbolic signifiers. They categorize people according to particular criteria that, in turn, convey complex sets of meaning according to the historical context and specific situations. They are closely linked to 'structures of domination' due to the unequal distribution of resources. Legitimation involves normative regulation and determines the rights and obligations pertaining to particular statuses.

Following Weber, Giddens distinguishes between class and status. Classes are economic interest groups arising from the allocation of property and other resources, including human capital. They reflect market positions

and the degree to which mobility opportunities exist. Class-divided societies are those in which position is largely determined by birth, where the state plays a dominant role, and there is a marked division between urban and rural areas. Modern capitalist societies are class societies in which there is a competitive labour market involving all economically active populations. A distinction is made between class 'consciousness' and class 'awareness'. The latter implies shared attitudes, values, and lifestyles, but not necessarily awareness of collective class interests.

Giddens modifies Weber's view of status groups by separating distributive groupings, based on consumption patterns, from forms of social differentiation derived from non-economic criteria of honour and prestige. Giddens rejects the view that racial and religious divisions are necessarily incompatible with the formation of class consciousness. Rather than hindering such class formations, he suggests that where class coincides with the criteria of status group membership, class consciousness may be enhanced. He states that class structuration may be increased:

... where structuration deriving from economic organization 'overlaps' with, or... is 'superimposed' upon, that deriving from evaluative categorisations based upon ethnic or cultural differences. Where this is so, status group membership itself becomes a form of market capacity. Such a situation frequently offers the strongest possible source of class structuration (Giddens 1981:112).

I follow the terminology introduced by Milton Gordon, who uses the term *ethnocracy* to describe the intersection of class and ethnicity (Gordon 1978:134-6). In the United States and Canada, relative concentrations of particular immigrant and ethnic groups in certain industries and occupations have persisted since the turn of the century (Lieberson and Waters 1988:249). However, the relations of a postindustrial ethclass are not necessarily limited by the boundaries of a single state. Within a global system, an ethclass may be located in another region or continent and still experience a conflict of interest with classes located elsewhere in the world. Such transnational ethclasses do not interact on a local neighbourhood or community basis, nor are they formally organized in labour unions or professional associations. They are loosely connected by transnational communication networks. Examples range from Hong Kong entrepreneurs and Arab oil magnates at one end of the scale to Mexican farm workers and Filipino domestics on the other. In between are Amerindian steel rig workers and Japanese auto industry managers. The single common denominator is their mobility. They follow the global demand for their services.

There is no logical reason why the relations between ethnic groups should not be based on equality, cooperation, and social exchange, but in practice this is rarely the case. Initial inequalities in the distribution of resources are exacerbated by uneven development and exploitation. War, racism, and colonialism have created a complex system of ethclass relations that extend

throughout the global system. It is the basis of much overt conflict. Economic insecurity is a critical factor in structuration of ethclass relations.

Security and Insecurity

Everyday life depends upon routine that, in turn, assumes a degree of predictability and trust in others. Feelings of anxiety are generated when routines are interrupted. Confidence and trust are essential elements in early socialization, creating feelings of ontological security. R.D. Laing (1960:39) defined primary ontological security in terms of an individual's self-confidence, derived from a sense of the permanency of things and the reliability of natural processes. He notes that in extreme cases, a person may experience engulfment, implosion, or petrification when faced with life-threatening crises or the collapse of the normal routines of daily life. Becoming a refugee, a prisoner-of-war, or the victim of torture, a pogrom, or systemic 'ethnic cleansing' generates extreme ontological insecurity. Reaction may take various forms ranging from fear, rage, and retaliation to hiding, flight, apathy, temporary derangement, psychosis, murder, or suicide.

Giddens (1990:7-10) draws attention to the themes of security versus danger, and trust versus risk in the development of modern social institutions. Modernity opens up numerous opportunities for material advantage and rewards. It increases life expectancy and enhances security in many ways. However, it also has negative consequences. Industrial work can be exploitative and degrading; political power may be abused through surveillance, bureaucratization, and oppressive treatment of minorities; economic systems may collapse and service delivery fail; ecological disasters are imminent as the environment is threatened by global warming and ultraviolet radiation; above all, military power generates enormous risks in an age of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction. These are the 'dark sides' of modernity (Giddens 1990:151-8).

Secondary ontological insecurity arises when particular spheres of social life are threatened. The death of a loved one, the experience of divorce, or the loss of a job are among the traumatic events that can generate extreme anxiety, the depth of which will depend upon the availability of practical and moral support systems. The duration of the feelings of insecurity will depend upon the individual's ability to restore normal routines, re-establish trust, and achieve confidence in himself or herself and others. Secondary security depends upon the predictability and reliability of key political, economic, and social institutions. When political systems degenerate into anarchy and civil war, or revolutions overthrow established forms of government, security is threatened. Giddens (1985:196) identifies the 'existential contradiction' between nature and society, life and death, which in the modern state is replaced by a structural contradiction reflected in the 'sequestration' of the experiences of sexuality, birth, death, and sickness.

When the routines of social life are seriously disrupted, 'large segments of modern life engender a basis for affiliation to symbols that can both promote solidarity and cause schism' (Giddens 1985:197). One of these is the phenomenon of nationalism.

Sovereignty, citizenship, and nationalism are related to the administrative unity of the state. All are affected by contemporary trends towards regionalization and globalization. There are contradictory pressures towards increased autonomy and local control on the one hand and loss of sovereignty through military and political alliances and economic union on the other. Giddens notes the 'Janus-faced' character of nationalism, vacillating between democratic and 'exclusivist' forms. When the ontological security of individuals is in jeopardy and there are high levels of anxiety, mass support may be generated for populist causes. Nationalism is rooted in the history of modern societies that form conceptual or 'imagined' communities with invented traditions (Giddens 1985:219; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Postindustrial societies have experienced a resurgence of nationalism that is related to globalization on the one hand and competition for power by local, regional, and ethnic power élites on the other (Richmond 1988c:141-82). Political and economic insecurity are concomitant outcomes.

Economic insecurity is the consequence of various factors ranging from crop failure and famine, through recession and prolonged unemployment, to structural adjustment and the long-term consequences of industrial or postindustrial revolution. Economic insecurity is closely correlated with manifestations of ethnic prejudice and discrimination (Richmond 1950, 1988c). This does not mean that it is the only determinant. Prejudice and discrimination, including anti-Semitism, racism, and other forms of ethnocentrism and conflict, have complex roots in historical contexts, cultural traditions, religious beliefs, social institutions, and psychological predispositions (Sniderman et al. 1993). Prolonged unemployment or other threats to income security and livelihood generate feelings of insecurity that may result in the scapegoating of ethnic minorities. Periods of economic recession provide the underlying conditions that increase the probability of ethnic conflict. Sudden increases in the level of unemployment may precipitate outbreaks of violence. Given the multivariate and probabilistic nature of social causality, there is no determinate link between unemployment and ethnic tension. However, when full employment ceases to be a goal of economic policy and competition in the labour market is intense, racial conflict is likely to intensify. Questions of primary and secondary ontological security are closely related to those of individual and collective identity.

Identity

As mentioned earlier, gender, age, 'race', language, nationality, and religion are among the ascriptive bases on which people define their identities.

To these may be added achieved characteristics, such as occupation, which play an important part in the formation of personality and self-definitions. The plural noun is necessary because individual identities are multiple, situationally determined, and influenced by context. They are reflexively organized and redefined subjectively over time. Self-definitions of identity do not always correspond with the identities attributed by others, which may be based upon different criteria and perceptions.

An ontologically secure individual is able to integrate different facets of self-identity into a consistent whole. Anxiety-creating situations threaten that sense of wholeness and continuity through time and space. Modern social life tends to be pluralistic and segmented. It is also changing rapidly and involves risk. This can lead to the fragmentation of identity. A cosmopolitan person may thrive in a situation of ethnic diversity and rapid social change. A less secure person may experience a serious identity crisis. Any one faced with a devastating loss will feel threatened. Examples include members of a dominant group experiencing decline in power and prestige, or others who are chronically unemployed, those who become refugees, together with the victims of war or racial oppression. They may react by becoming confused, or by seeking someone to blame. Others may compulsively and rigidly emphasize one aspect of their experience, asserting their identity through authoritarian conformity (Fromm 1941; Giddens 1991:189-91). In turn, authoritarianism is closely linked to expressions of ethnic prejudice, adherence to fascist-type ideologies and membership in neo-Nazi parties (Adorno 1950; Altemeyer 1988).

Even when there is biological basis for defining identity, as in the case of gender, the actual behavioural manifestations are socially constructed and culturally determined. Both the subjective and objective aspects of gender identity vary according to historical era and cultural milieu. From infancy, children are taught how to behave in accordance with gender roles, which begin with dress and proceed through toilet training, dolls, toys and games played, to rules governing appropriate behaviour in adolescence and adult life. Sexual orientation may or may not involve an element of choice after puberty, but in almost all other respects, gender roles are ascribed, as are those pertaining to age.

'Race' is similarly a social construct, the cultural meaning of which varies according to time and place. From a strictly biological point of view, there are no 'races', only gene pools that determine the statistical probability that certain physical traits, such as skin pigmentation or hair form, will appear in each generation. There has been so much miscegenation over the centuries that almost any large population will exhibit a mixture of such physical traits (Hulse 1969). Notwithstanding the claims of some pseudoscientific studies, there is no reliable evidence that they are linked to any cultural, social, or psychological characteristics. It is the mark of a racist society that skin colour or other physical attributes are used as a basis of social (and sometimes legal) classification. A society 'structured in dom-

inance' tends to use gender and 'race' as bases of superordination and subordination. Furthermore, persons of mixed Afro-European or Eurasian descent are often allocated to subordinate status, irrespective of their actual genetic inheritance or physical appearance. In extremely racist systems, such as those prevailing in South Africa or the southern United States until recently, light-skinned persons who might have been able to 'pass as White' were nevertheless compelled to remain within segregated communities and suffered the same discrimination as their darker complexioned relatives.

Terms such as 'White', 'Coloured', 'Negro', 'Black', 'person of colour', or 'visible minority' are all social constructs, the use of which reflects changing perceptions and shifting power relations. Political mobilization and consciousness-raising efforts have tried to unite disparate communities under a single banner. Slogans such as 'Black is beautiful' and 'Black power' have been used, with varying degrees of success, to bring together subordinated minorities of ultimately African, Asian or other non-European descent. However, antiracist movements have tended to split as some minorities become more socially mobile than others and cultural divisions assume greater salience. As Rattans (1992:40) notes in the case of Britain, 'Partly influenced by the Black Power Movement in the US, the category "black" became, for the late 1960s, an important focus, especially among left anti-racists, for mobilizing the growing communities of Afro-Caribbean and Asian descent... But the cultural essentialism at its core has begun to disintegrate.' There has been an ethnic backlash and protest against cultural homogenization as well as neglect of the problems facing other immigrants groups, such as Turks and Greek Cypriots.

In Canada, there are similar difficulties with the term 'visible minority'. It was first introduced in the context of employment equity and affirmative action programs as a euphemism for 'race' (Abella 1984:46). Visible minorities were among several target groups that also included women, native peoples, and the disabled, all of whom were recognized as having suffered systemic and institutionalized discrimination in the past. Subsequently, Statistics Canada was asked to provide estimates of the numbers of people at risk in each of these categories (Boxhill 1984, 1990). This statistical exercise, using census data and immigration figures, aggregated people by various criteria, including birthplace, ethnic origin, and language. As a result, the Canadian-born descendants of 'Black' Empire Loyalists, who had been in Canada for generations, were lumped together with recently arrived refugees from Africa and Asia, immigrants from Latin America, and affluent business investors from Hong Kong!

There are cross-cutting links between sexism and racism to the extent that both gender and 'race' have been used to oppress. The status of women in particular ethnocultural groups varies considerably. In the United States and elsewhere, the feminist movement has sometimes brought together women of different 'races' and at other times they have been divided in their fight against discrimination (Davis 1983). In Canada, Aboriginal women

have experienced discrimination within their own communities. Together with 'Black' feminists, they tend to regard the concerns of 'White' middle-class women as irrelevant to their fight against oppression. As stated by Stasiulis (1990:288), 'Black feminist analyses reveal how, for both white women and women of colour, the relationship to the family, state, production and reproduction has been mediated simultaneously by class interests, gender divisions, and white supremacist logics, in a way that has constructed barriers to sisterhood across racial lines.'

Attempts to categorize people by 'race' must be distinguished from ethnicity. The latter combines different dimensions of cultural identity into a relatively coherent whole. It is not synonymous with minority status or with the whole of culture. Only those aspects that are salient in group formation are selectively used as signifiers. It is a 'self-other' or 'us and them' definition, using particular attributes that are socially constructed and then internalized in the process of personality development and identity formation. Language, religion, and nationality combine in different ways to form ethnocultural groupings and ethnonational political movements. Language plays a critical role, not only as an ethnic signifier in its own right, but also as the medium through which ethnic consciousness and ethnic groups are formed. Fishman (1989:7) emphasized this aspect when he stated:

At every stage, ethnicity is linked to language, whether indexically, implementationally or symbolically. There is no escaping the primary symbol-system of our species, certainly not where the phenomenology of aggregational definition and boundary maintenance is involved, when ethnic being, doing and knowing is involved. Initially however, language is but one of a myriad of minimally conscious discriminanda.

Fishman goes on to point out that language may become a rallying cry, and that it also plays a part in defining religious identity by raising 'language into the pale of sanctity even in a secular culture'. In the Canadian case, there are strong historical links between religion (Roman Catholicism) and the French language, particularly in Quebec. In turn, these have been moulded into a powerful sense of national identity. For generations, Quebecers have been taught that they have a unique heritage that differs profoundly from that of *les anglais*, who are seen as conquerors and oppressors. Even when English Canadians or immigrants living in Quebec speak French fluently, they are not regarded as *pur laine* or 'true' French Canadians.

Care must be taken to distinguish ways in which people may be categorized by 'ethnic origin' (for census-taking purposes or legal registration) and the way in which they define themselves. In censuses it is clear that multiple ethnic origins are characteristic of contemporary societies, such as the United States and Canada, that have experienced substantial waves of immigration over long periods. There has been extensive intermarriage

between ethno-religious groups with consequent diversification of the population even though complete assimilation to the characteristics of the majority of dominant group has not occurred. Lieberman and Waters (1988) described the many strands that have contributed to the American cultural fabric and the extent of intermarriage. They describe the resulting patterns as an 'ethnic flux' (Lieberman and Waters 1988:267). Many respondents in censuses and surveys decline to use an ethnic designation. In 1980, 12 per cent of the population preferred simply to define themselves as 'American'. Similarly in Canada in 1991, 29 per cent of the population reported more than one ethnic origin, and over a million people insisted on describing themselves as 'Canadian', although this was not an option on the census form.

Communication

Humans communicate through all five senses: touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing. Each is important, particularly sight and hearing, which play a critical role in the development and learning of language. When either or both of these senses are impaired, touching assumes greater significance, making communication possible through braille and other means. There are cognitive and conative aspects to all communication. Understanding is more than the exercise of reason. It involves feelings and emotions. It is a social act. To be intelligible, communicative actions must take place within a given speech community. This involves a shared culture and symbolic interaction according to learned rules of behaviour. Language is at the core of self-identity. 'Unless the subject externalises himself by participating in interpersonal relations through language, he is unable to form that inner center that is his personal identity. This explains the almost constitutional insecurity and chronic fragility of personal identity—an insecurity that is antecedent to cruder threats to the integrity of life and limb' (Habermas 1990:199).

Habermas (1990) defines the *lifeworld* in terms of symbolic structures reproduced through cultural tradition, social integration, and socialization. Strategic behaviour oriented towards success in a power struggle or competitive situation may involve manipulating others' definition of the situation. Action oriented towards understanding others' definition of the situation involves reaching agreement as a means of coordinating action and reaching consensus. The lifeworld is the context in which communicative action takes place. It is a circular process that feeds back on itself and is modified by the actors as they communicate. 'The shared lifeworld offers a storehouse of unquestioned cultural givens from which those participating in communication draw agreed-upon patterns of interpretation...' (Habermas 1990:135).

Habermas defines an 'ideal speech situation' as one that is free from systemic distortion. This means an absence of constraint or domination,

unrestricted discussion, a complementarity of expectations, and unpaired self-presentation. Needless to say, such conditions are not easily achieved and much communication in practice is impaired as a result. Although Habermas defines *ideology* as 'systematically distorted communication', it is more appropriate to recognize with Giddens (1987:270) that 'modes of signification are ideological when they are pressed into service of sectional interests via the use of power'. Racism is such an ideology and so also are sexism, chauvinism, and jingoistic forms of nationalism. Following Freire (1973), O'Neill points out that 'the oppressed are the instruments of a culture of silence, which is maintained by the political control of language and education' (O'Neill 1985:66). Human dialogue requires common understanding and a removal of barriers.

There are barriers to communication between people who speak a different language, which are not completely overcome by the use of interpreters and translators. Even when language itself is not the obstacle, there are other impediments to mutual understanding. Human beings depend upon those with whom they habitually interact for a conception of 'reality'. Hostility towards other individuals and groups is reinforced by shared frames of reference derived from the subject's own group membership. These have to do with perceived status relationships, power differentials, and expectations of the others' intentions based on stereotypes. Fixed perceptions and the frames of reference that sustain them are maintained by barriers to communication with the object of hostility. Hostility is likely to be reduced only when institutionalized barriers to communication with others are removed and when there is shared support from the subject's own group (Newcomb and Hartley 1947; Richmond 1954:4-7). Even then, it requires more than a cognitive effort. A degree of empathy and an appreciation of where the other is 'coming from' is also required. Violence is the negation of such empathy. 'Language is the soul of our lives together. Today we must work to restore language, to speak where violence puts an end to speech' (O'Neill 1972:67).

Communication may be sensual (as in music), verbal, written, symbolic, or transmitted electronically as encoded signals. Linguistic analysts have focused on texts as the medium of cultural discourse, but, in contemporary societies, electronic communications have assumed growing importance as means for the storage, retrieval, and transmission of information. This creates a new domain of language experience that is neither speech nor writing. Together with the images conveyed by television, it is a powerful new tool in the hands of those who aim to manipulate behaviour or influence consciousness. This has given rise to a 'mode of information' parallel to the 'mode of production' and the 'mode of distribution' in the ordering of social systems.

where

In the mode of information the subject is no longer located in a point in absolute time/space, enjoying a physical, fixed vantage point from which

rationally to calculate its options. Instead it is multiplied by databases, dispensed by computer messaging and conferencing, decontextualized and reidentified by TV ads, dissolved and materialized continuously in the electronic transmission of symbols (Poster 1990:15).

Giddens uses the concept of 'time-space distanciation' to describe the effects that improved communications have on social system integration and the distribution of administrative power (Giddens 1985; Urry 1991:160-75). From the development of timetables to the use of various forms of segregation and sequestration of minorities and deviants, time, space, and information have been linked as agents of social control. That control now extends worldwide as states determine who may cross borders and what rights and privileges (if any) that citizens and non-citizens may enjoy. The importance of postmodern communication networks in the contemporary world system and their impact on international migration, 'race', and ethnic relations is the topic of the next chapter.

Note

¹The term 'reflexive' in this context does not mean a knee-jerk reaction. It implies reflection and intention. 'Reflexive self-regulation' involves information feedback as a means of control and system reproduction (Giddens 1984:376). It does not follow that all behaviour is rational, or that there is anything automatic or cybernetic about the way systems perpetuate themselves. In some situations, the feedback process may be self-destructive.

chapter two

Postindustrialism, postmodernism, and ethnic conflict

The terms 'postindustrial' and 'postmodern' are sometimes used synonymously, but it is more appropriate to confine the former to the technological and economic developments that have occurred in the second half of the twentieth century, and the latter to the social and cultural changes that have taken place. It is debatable whether the postindustrial revolution (consequent upon the use of advanced technologies such as nuclear energy, jet propulsion, computers, automation, and telecommunication) is a radical departure from the changes initiated by the earlier Industrial Revolution or simply a logical continuation of trends that were already evident in the nineteenth century (Kumar 1978). In either case, it is clear that there has been a tremendous acceleration in the rate of change, consequent upon these technological advances. By the same token, it is arguable that contemporary societies that are part of the global capitalist system, as well as those in the less developed world, are in a transitional phase. Whether moving from traditional to modern or from modern to late modern, there is a potential for conflict arising from competing interests and values.

Edward Tiryakian, discussing the global crisis in the mid-1980s, showed that there has been a geographic shift in the centre of modernization from North America to East Asia. He noted that the deindustrialization of large zones within advanced Western societies was matched by the relocation of manufacturing investment in Third World countries and that the information processing revolution led to new modes of production: 'the global crisis

is one not only of decline and deconstruction but also one of underlying currents of 'restructuring' (Tiryakian 1984:125). The last decade (1981-90) has been one of those critical epochs that has profound implications for international migration, now and in the future.

Although interdependent, the global *ecological* system is analytically distinct from the *global state* system, the *military* order, the *information* system and *world capitalism* (Giddens 1985; Robertson 1990a). There has always been a global system of commerce extending from the Mediterranean to the far north and from Ireland to the far east. What is new is the emergence of a global system of *production*, as well as commerce and communications. This is now truly universal. In its present form, this world system originated with the Eurocentred mercantile adventures of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Their exploits linked the New World with the Old, and led to the agrarian and industrial revolutions in western Europe. This paved the way for imperialist expansion and the beginnings of modern capitalism (Wallerstein 1974). Today, however, the global economy is multicentred and dominated by what has been called the *ILE* (i.e., the interlinked economies of the United States, Europe, and Japan, together with rapidly expanding economies such as those of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore). The interdependence of these economies is such that, as in chaos theory, a small movement anywhere can trigger a recession, a stock-market crash, or a massive movement of capital and foreign exchange from one country to another. One of the major contradictions inherent in the current process of global change is that, notwithstanding residual protectionism (particularly in the agricultural sphere), money, goods, and information flow relatively freely across borders, but *people do not*. While economists examine the consequences of lowering barriers to trade, removing protectionism, and seeking ways of promoting prosperity through greater sensitivity to consumer preferences, sociologists and political scientists draw attention to the closing of doors to immigrants and refugees, and what Alan Dowty calls 'the contemporary assault on freedom of movement' between one country or continent and another (Dowty 1987).

Industrialism and postindustrialism

Pre-industrial societies were typically small, closely-knit, and territorially-bounded communities based upon kinship. Tonnies [1887] (1957) used the term *Gemeinschaft* to describe such a system of social relations. Relatively undifferentiated in terms of social position, such communities exhibited only an elementary division of labour based on age and gender. Status and political power were ascribed by birth and descent. There was little geographic or social mobility. Governed by orally transmitted traditions, such societies were slow to change. Beginning gradually with the iron and bronze ages and accelerating with the application of steam-generated power to transportation and manufacturing, the impact of industrialization trans-

formed such communities into more complex social systems based upon association or *Gesellschaft*.

These new forms of social organization were superimposed on the old, transforming them without always eliminating them altogether. Family, kinship, neighbourhood, and a sense of community based on shared language, religion, and loyalty to traditional customs persisted, even when the effects of urbanization and industrialization introduced different ways and created new demands. Formal organizations, bureaucratic systems of government, and economic associations with complex systems of production and distribution created new classes with both cooperative and antagonistic interests. Simple barter and economic exchange gave way to complex markets facilitated by the development of money as a currency and a measure of the price, not only of goods and services but of labour itself. Through saving and investment, money became a source of power. When contracts were enforceable by law, the state became the agency through which property was protected. Inherited title to land and property survived the feudal system in which it originated, but a new bourgeois class of business persons, merchants, and entrepreneurs grew in size and importance. In the nineteenth century, the creation of the limited liability company with multiple investors brought industrial capitalism as we know it today. It became the dominant form of economic organization. Again, earlier forms persisted, particularly in the less developed regions of the world still dependent on subsistence agriculture. Meanwhile, the political and economic expansion of industrial capitalist societies seeking abundant supplies of energy, raw materials, and cheap labour led to the imperial domination and colonization of whole continents.

Although the concept was used by earlier writers, the term 'postindustrial' entered the sociological lexicon in the 1960s and was popularized in the writings of David Riesman (1958), Daniel Bell (1973), Amitai Etzioni (1968), Alan Touraine (1969), 1971 and Alvin Toffler (1970). As well as recognizing the impact of advanced technologies, these writers anticipated significant social changes, not all of which have been realized in the form that they expected. For example, Riesman expected that the increased industrial productivity resulting from new inventions would give rise to a leisure-oriented society, liberating people from the more arduous tasks associated with earlier phases of industrialism. Similar utopian visions were projected by others who were inclined to attribute benign consequences to technological innovation (Frankel 1987). In reality, the second half of the twentieth century has been characterized by higher labour force participation rates (particularly by women), cyclical economic fluctuations, and chronically high unemployment rates in most late capitalist societies. In other words, the 'leisure' anticipated by Riesman has been unevenly distributed and largely involuntary.

Daniel Bell (1973) forecast a shift from employment in primary and secondary industries into the tertiary and quaternary sectors of the econ-

omy.' In this respect, a distinction between service occupations and service industries is important. As Kumar (1978) pointed out, service occupations were widely held in the nineteenth century, particularly by women in domestic service. Many of the occupations currently filled by women are simply the same jobs transferred to a new site, as in mass food processing and distribution, office cleaning, and hotel services. However, there has also been a growth in industries that are more closely linked to the technological innovations of postindustrialism. They include financial and management services, information processing, telecommunications and media, together with the education and health industries. All of these industries have a range of occupations requiring different levels of skill. As well as a professional and technocratic élite, there are also more routinized jobs (such as data entry and keypunching), although these may still require a level of education that traditional service occupations did not. Altogether service sector jobs in advanced industrial societies have doubled in the period 1960-90, while the share of manufacturing jobs has fallen to only one fifth of all occupations. Agricultural employment is now only 4 per cent of all jobs (Akyeampong and Winters 1993). Contemporary labour markets have become global in extent. They are also highly stratified and segmented. Not only is there a hierarchy in terms of status and rewards, but skills have become less transferable. Prolonged periods of education and training are a prerequisite for employment in specialized fields. Furthermore, labour unions and professional organizations are protective of their privileged access to employment. Credentialism governs hiring and there are barriers to the employment of those who lack the appropriate qualification or local experience.

A theme common to a number of writers concerning postindustrialism is the importance of applied science and technology and the emergence of a knowledge-based system. This, in turn, creates a class of information managers, technocrats, and decision makers with exceptional power to influence opinion and determine policies, leading to a 'technology of knowledge' and a 'programmed society' (Etzioni 1968; Touraine [1969] 1971). Peter Drucker (1993:19-47) described 'post-capitalist' society as one that has become a 'knowledge society'. While it is probably premature to speak of the end of capitalism, it is true that applied science and the application of knowledge to knowledge has generated profound economic, political, and social changes. Among them are transformations in the characteristic forms of social organization.

The impact of structural change is most evident in transportation, communication, and the transmission of information and images. Beginning with the invention of printing and the spread of mass literacy, on the one hand, and the building of railways, steamships, and, in due course, the airplane, on the other, transportation and communications have been revolutionized. Marshall McLuhan was one of the first to recognize the importance of these developments, pointing out that 'when information moves at

the speed of signals in the central nervous system, man is confronted with the obsolescence of all earlier forms of acceleration, such as road and rail. What emerges is a total field of inclusive awareness. The patterns of psychic and social adjustment become irrelevant' (McLuhan 1964:103).

I have argued elsewhere (Richmond 1969, 1988c) that these postindustrial developments have important consequences for education, migration, and ethnic relations. Automation makes paid learning, experimentation, and programming the principal sources of increased productivity. All aspects of production, consumption, and recreation are rendered incidental to communication and the electronic feedback of information. Higher education and technical training, once the privilege of a minority, became prerequisites for all but the most menial forms of employment. International (and internal) migration becomes a multiway process of exchange based upon ease of access to information and transportation, in which net gains and losses of population in particular localities are a small proportion of the gross movements involved in labour migration, business, and tourism. The concept of transient migration, originally limited to the highly qualified professional and managerial strata, is now applicable to a much wider range of movers whose permanence in any one locality is neither necessary nor expected, given the ease with which return and remigration can occur. The predominant mode of cooptation of migrants in postindustrial societies is active mobilization, i.e., a 'dynamic interaction between mobile individuals and collectivities giving rise to information flow and feed-back effecting greater control over material and human resources' (Richmond 1969:281).

The instantaneous communication made possible through telephones, fax machines, satellite links, videotapes, etc., means that the maintenance of ethnic identity is no longer dependent on a territorial community (*Gemeinschaft*) or on formal organizations (*Gesellschaft*) but on networks (*Verbindungsnetzschaff*). Ethnic links are maintained with others of similar language and cultural background throughout the world (Richmond 1988c:167-82). The political, economic, and social consequences of globalization are central features of both the postindustrial and postmodern revolution.

Globalization

The geography of labour migration is related to globalization and structural changes that are changing the international division of labour:

The globalization of international labor migration is manifest in two ways. Firstly, all countries now engage in migration systems growing in size and complexity and producing an increasing diversity of flows. Second, many of the processes that create and drive these systems operate on a worldwide basis, the consequence of economic globalization, capital mobility, the activities of international business corporations, and the widespread realization by govern-

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
ments that human resources can be traded for profit like any other resource (Salt 1992: 1080).

Remittance from overseas workers are an important source of foreign currency for many developing countries. These transfers contribute to material development of the countries concerned, contributing to education, welfare, improving the status of women, and contributing to infrastructure building. They also facilitate debt repayment (Stahl 1988).

In terms of trade and commerce, transnational exchanges of goods have always occurred. Beginning in the Mediterranean and Asia Minor, the world system gradually spread to the rest of the globe with the incorporation of the New World into a system of exploitation and colonization (Wallerstein 1974). Money as a medium of exchange was universalized, first through the adoption of a gold standard, later through international banking and money markets, and, by 1980, through the electronic linkage of capital, stock exchanges, and commodity markets into a single system operating twenty-four hours a day. The so-called 'big bang' symbolized the economic integration of a world system (Dezalay 1990). There remained internal conflicts and contradictions between the proponents of free trade and those who continue to seek protection for agricultural and manufacturing industries in particular countries and regions. An international division of labour, with substantial inequalities in the distribution of wealth and in the level of technological and economic development, persists despite the relative integration of the world economic system. In turn, this gives rise to mass migrations of labour from the less to the more developed regions (Apleyard 1988).

The movement of people is also as old as history itself. From nomadic hunters and pastoralists to the inhabitants of space stations, human migration is a universal experience. Early traders, military invaders, explorers, religious evangelists (of many different faiths), pilgrims, travelling entertainers, pirates, and highway robbers have carried languages and cultures around the globe. In more recent times, immigrants, refugees, guest workers, tourists, drug peddlers, journalists, students, and scientists have been added to the growing body of mobile individuals and groups. The revolution in transportation and communication that began with the railway and the steamship, accelerated with the automobile, the airplane, and the telegraph, became a dominant factor in the contemporary world system with the spread of radio, TV, telecommunications, satellites, and spacecraft. These new technologies not only convey people and information, they are also the vehicles through which political ideologies, alternative lifestyles, oppositional values, and social movements are spread. Appadurai (1990: 295-310) calls these various dimensions of the globalization process ethnoscape, technoscape, finanscape, mediascape, and ideoscape. He emphasizes that these are social constructs 'inflected very much by the historical, linguistic and political situatedness of different sorts of actors.'

Figure 2.1 Global networks



actors nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, as well as sub-national groupings and movements... (1990: 296). One could add to this 'list' mediscapes as the universal consequences of the AIDS epidemic unfold. Thus the global health system is only the promissory side of a world disease system. Each generates the other. Here, once again, there is a potential for a rebarbarization of the global order through quarantine orders, immunization control and racism—witness the construction of *Afro-AIDS* (O'Neill 1990: 338).

Metaphorically, the global system can be understood as an immense spider's web of interlinked networks, without a spider in the middle! It would be tempting to consider the position of secretary-general of the United Nations as the spider at the centre of the web, but this is clearly not the case. In the absence of a system of world government, there is no central direction. States operate with a significant degree of autonomy, even though there is clearly a structure of dominance resulting from unequal economic, political, and military power. Nevertheless, there are many cross-cutting ties and the influence of the UN has increased considerably in recent years. The web of interlinked networks has many sectors (see Figure 2.1). They include the interlinked economies of various countries, their political systems and diplomatic corps, as well as a variety of other networks, together with those of non-governmental and non-economic organizations representing various interests, ranging from religious faiths and humanitarian agencies to subversive political groups and terrorist organi-

zations.² Superimposed on all of these are the interpersonal networks based on kinship, friendship, ethno-religious affiliation, and shared interests. The ability to maintain these links across long distances has been greatly assisted by modern communications technology.

Beginning with the postal system, telegraph, and ham radio, global interpersonal and interorganizational networks have been facilitated by telephone, fax, satellite links, camcorders and VCRs. The cross-cutting flows of goods, services, money, people, diseases, symbols, and information leads to deterritorialization. Whether in terms of economic interests, corporate organization, political affiliation, preventive medicine, or cultural activity, the state is no longer the only or primary frame of reference. Borders have become permeable as never before. This is particularly true of the flow of capital for investment. As a leading Japanese management consultant explains, 'the global economy follows its own logic and develops its own webs of interest, which rarely duplicate the historical borders between nations' (Ohmae 1990:183).

The borderless world is not yet a complete reality and there is clearly resistance to its implications. Lip-service is paid to free trade while economic protectionism persists, despite regional integration. Passports may not be needed by people moving within the European community, or across the US-Canada border, but stringent controls are being imposed on foreign entry to these regions. The flow of cultural products—from films and television programs to newspapers, magazines, and popular music—is resisted by those who are concerned about American cultural imperialism. Cross-border movements of Islamic fundamentalism, Chinese communism, pornographic literature, hard drugs, contagious diseases, terrorism, end, borders are patrolled by customs agents, health officials, immigration officers, coastguards, and quasi-military agencies using the latest surveillance and deterrence devices. Immigrants and refugees are caught in this countervailing effort to combat the onslaught of a global system on the sovereignty of states.

Notwithstanding the trend towards globalization, states remain the units upon which the world system is based. The principle of self-determination is at the core of the United Nations and its organizations. However, a common error among social scientists is to conflate 'nation' and 'state', combining them in the single designation 'nation-state'. This is an ideological formulation, reflecting the interests of dominant groups in the era of industrialism and imperialism, imposing a single language and identity on subordinate peoples. In reality, states are frequently multinational and nations are often polyethnic (Richmond 1988c:143). In Britain, the Celtic minorities (themselves heterogeneous in terms of religion and language) have been suppressed under the hegemonic influence of anglophone elites. Basques in Spain and the Languedoc and Bretons in France experienced a similar fate, as did other linguistic and religious minorities in various parts

of Europe and the former Soviet Union. Asian and African states recognized by the United Nations almost all exhibit substantial heterogeneity in ethnocultural characteristics. Many also face internal conflicts arising from the nationalist aspirations of these minorities. The North and South American states are no exception, particularly where indigenous peoples resisting the consequences of colonization claim never to have relinquished their sovereignty and/or seek to reassert their claims to independence and self-government.

It is often suggested that states have a monopoly in the legitimate use of violence. The accuracy of this assertion depends on the interpretation given to the term 'legitimate'. Clearly, states do not have a monopoly on violence, or even the use of weapons of mass destruction. Violence begins at the interpersonal level in the relations between parents and children, spouses and peers. Weapons ranging from knives and handguns to highly sophisticated automatic weapons are readily available. Attempts to control their manufacture and distribution have been thwarted by the gun lobby, particularly in the United States. Terrorist organizations are able to obtain high explosives, and civil wars are conducted with the most up-to-date weaponry available in a global arms bazaar, in which states themselves are active promoters of the arms trade. Before the demise of the Soviet empire, as Giddens (1985:293) notes:

The industrialization of war conjoined science to technological research in such a way to concentrate weapons development in the more economically advanced states. This initially reinforced the position of these states in the world at large, and today places the USA and the Soviet Union at the centre of the weapons development globally, as well as in chronic competition with one another militarily. But while virtually all military research and development takes place in the advanced industrialized countries, the world-wide distribution of armed forces and weaponry does not correspond directly to the conventional global divisions.

Giddens (1985:255, 293) identifies four major subdivisions of the current world system: 1) a global information system reflecting symbolic orders and modes of discourse; 2) a system of relations between states involving political institutions and a growing number of international agencies; 3) the world capitalist economy and related economic institutions; and 4) a world military order enforcing law and imposing sanctions. He rejects the view that globalization necessarily leads to a complete loss of sovereignty. 'Since states exist in an environment of other states, "power politics" have inevitably been a fundamental element of the geo-political make-up of the state system' (1985:292).

Numerous commentators have drawn attention to the dangers of the military-industrial complex endemic in twentieth-century states, capitalist and socialist, imperial and ex-colonial, developed and developing. President Eisenhower warned against its propensity to dominate the American

economy. C. Wright Mills observed the integration of political, economic, and military power elites and, more recently, Soviet analyst Georgy Arbov drew attention to the role of the military in the USSR in opposing *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and independence movements in the Baltic states and elsewhere (Kondrashov 1991; Mills 1956). The international ramifications and dangers of arms manufacture and distribution were noted by the Berne in 1899, by Bernard Shaw in *Major Barbara* (1905), by the British Admiralty in 1919, a British Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms (1935-6), and by the UN on many occasions since (Gleditsch and Njolstad 1990; Krause 1992; Myrdal 1976; Samson 1977). Firms such as Krupp in Germany and Vickers-Armstrong in Britain supplied arms to both sides in the 1914-18 war and since then, a worldwide armaments industry has developed in which Third World countries are heavily involved. The role that Western countries and the Soviet Union played in arming Iraq has been highlighted. An estimated \$50 billion worth of weapons and advanced technology (plus the components for biochemical warfare) were sold to Iraq. This is only one segment of the international arms trade (Smolowe 1991).

The worldwide arms bazaar may not have been the beginning of the global economic system as we know it today, but it remains a significant component of it. Since the end of the cold war, there has been some reduction in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons, but vast quantities of these and so-called 'conventional' weapons remain in the hands of countries whose internal stability and relations with their neighbours raise serious doubts about the legitimacy of any ensuing violence. The situation is further complicated by the role the United States and the UN have assumed as self-designated peacekeepers and peacemakers in various parts of the world. It is questionable whether armed intervention will ever achieve the objective of reconciling hostile communities or pacifying warlords as long as the latter have access to the means for prolonging the armed conflicts. Precise estimates of world military spending are hard to obtain because much defence expenditure is covert and secret or subsumed under other budget categories. In the 1990s, annual expenditures in the region of US \$975 billion, or more than 5 per cent of world average GNP, were officially confirmed. NATO countries spent an estimated US \$316 billion in 1992. The United States spent approximately \$300 billion annually and Canada over \$13 billion (see Table 7). Sales to other countries, including those in the Third World, were approximately US \$41 billion globally, the United States and Russia being the largest suppliers. Canada's arms exports were over \$1 billion, of which an estimated \$253.4 million went to Third World countries in 1992 and 1993. This was largely due to a huge increase in exports to Saudi Arabia, notwithstanding the latter's poor human rights record (Regehr 1993:9). (See Table 8.) Ironically, maintaining and boosting

arms sales abroad have been defended on the ground that such activity creates employment and combats economic recession.

In 'mapping the global condition', Robertson (1990a:27) suggests that the period since 1960 has been a 'phase of uncertainty'. This phase of globalization has brought inherent contradictions arising from the inclusion of Third World countries in the global system, the increase in global institutions and media influence, problems of multiculturalism and polyethnicity, concern with humankind as a 'species community', and interest in world civil society and world citizenship. The resolution of these contradictions and their consequent conflicts will determine whether an integrated global economy, polity, and society can become a reality. Post-industrialism, globalization, the communications revolution, and a resurgence of nationalism are related phenomena. In turn, they are connected to the political, social, and cultural movement that has been labelled 'post-modern'.

Postmodernism

The terms 'industrial' and 'postindustrial' refer to technological and economic developments. 'Traditional', 'modern', 'late modern', and 'post-modern' describe the social and cultural changes that are concomitant with the economic and technological ones, although they are not necessarily predetermined by them in any absolute way. There is scope for considerable selectivity and variation in the ways in which particular individuals and groups respond to the challenges presented by globalization. Post-modernism is a philosophical and cultural movement. It is a reaction against previous forms of expression in art, architecture, literature, music, and theatre. It emphasizes the uniqueness of particular cultures and the relativity of aesthetic and value judgements. Its ideas have also been influential in the social sciences, giving rise to considerable controversy concerning the validity of theories and methods that claim 'scientific' or universal applicability. Some writers continue to defend the positivist view that there can be a 'natural science of society', but even they agree that contemporary sociology does not claim such a status (Turner 1992:156-76).

In reviewing the literature on postmodernism, Margaret Rose (1991) distinguishes deconstructionist theories from double-coded and alternative theories. The former focus on textual analysis and emphasize the break with modernism. They highlight latent meanings and reject the metanarratives supposedly inherent in earlier writings, notably those that claim universality for the ideas originating in Europe since the eighteenth century. Double-coded theories reflect the cultural diversity of postmodern societies and, particularly in art and architecture, reject functionalism, rationalism, and holism in favour of pluralism, activism, participation, and hybridism (Rose 1991:40-149). A leading exponent of postmodernism suggests that

'in the last ten years post-modernism has become more than a social condition and cultural movement. It has become a world view. But its exact nature is strongly contested ...' (Jencks 1992:10).

(Giddens (1990:149-73) identifies some of the differences between post-modernity and what he prefers to call 'late modernity' or, in its projected futuristic form, 'radicalized modernity'. He rejects the view that contemporary trends must necessarily lead to fragmentation, dislocation, relativity, and powerlessness. Instead, he emphasizes the reflexive nature of human behaviour, the trend towards global integration, and the potential for empowerment—particularly for women and minorities who, in pre-modern and modern societies, were largely excluded from the decision-making process. He emphasizes the role of radical social movements and 'utopian realism' in achieving positive change in spheres such as political representation, the status of women and minorities, labour conditions, peace, and the protection of the environment.

One characteristic of the postmodern perspective is the recognition of the role of irony in the vocabulary of philosophy and sociology. This involves the conjunction of opposites, the recognition of unintended consequences, and a questioning of once taken-for-granted assumptions. Specifically, it casts doubt upon the view that modernity is the necessary and inevitable outcome of forces that must carry other countries and continents in the same direction as Europe and America. The legitimating discourses of the rationality, secularization, and the values of the 'Enlightenment' are seen as having devastating consequences that other societies (as well as our own) may wish to avoid by rejecting their underlying premises. For example, J.R. Saul (1992) decries the 'dictatorship of reason in the west' and attributes such phenomena as the Jewish Holocaust in Nazi Germany, the development of the atomic bomb and the proliferation of the arms race, the degradation of the environment, and other disasters to the application of science and technology in the service of the state. He regards the most common characteristic of power elites as 'cynicism, rhetoric, and the worship of both ambition and power' (1992:580). However, care must be taken not to confuse postmodernism with anti-modernism. The former looks forward, whereas the latter is a romantic nostalgia for an often mythical past and is a reaction against trends characteristic of postindustrial and late modern societies (Turner 1990).

Postmodernism rejects the view that postindustrialism and globalization must lead to cultural homogenization through the spread of capitalism and mass markets. Although the instrumental forms of advanced technology may become universal, their expressive and symbolic meanings are used selectively, transformed, and adapted to the needs and interests of local communities. 'Indigenous cultural values shape the transformations that external forces engender and the ironies and resistances they generate' (Coombe 1991:198). If this is true of non-Western societies, it may also apply to the cultural minorities within Western societies whose voices are

being heard and responded to as never before. Frederic Jameson (1991:17) makes this point when he states that 'if the ideas of a ruling class were once the dominant (or hegemonic) ideology of bourgeois society, the advanced capitalist countries today are now a field of stylistic and discursive heterogeneity without a norm.' The micropolitics of gender, ethnicity, race and religion—that is, the politics of difference—ensure that new social and linguistic codes are more freely expressed. In turn, this raises the question whether 'anything goes'.

Taken to extremes, postmodernism leans towards nihilism and the rejection of all claims to knowledge as 'truth'. Objective truths are replaced by benignly true truths, which are entirely subjective and relative to the point of view of the interpreter. This argument fails to distinguish between instrumental and expressive knowledge. As Gellner suggests, scientific knowledge 'has proved so overwhelmingly powerful, economically, militarily, administratively, that all societies have to make their peace with it and adopt it' (Gellner 1992:61). However, this still leaves fundamental questions concerning human rights and political organization in dispute. Issues such as private property ownership, territorial claims, torture and the death penalty, the status of women, the rights of minorities, the preservation of lifestyles, the survival of languages, the practice of religion, and freedom of expression are caught in the paradox of universalism versus particularism. Whose values are to prevail? What if the values in question are themselves contradictory? How does one respond to the claims of fundamentalists (of whatever religious or political persuasion) who insist upon imposing their particular ideas and practices on others, by force if necessary, or of eliminating, through expulsion or genocide, those who are different? Such ideological fanaticism is one of the contributory factors in the spread of ethnic conflict today.

Ethnic conflict

Ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious heterogeneity by themselves are not a sufficient cause of conflict. In fact, I have argued that 'the complex communication networks of postindustrial societies will create the possibility of a new type of society, free of both religious and ethnic intolerance, by permitting great diversity within the structure of a supra-national state' (Richmond 1988c:181-2). However, I went on to say that such a transition would not come about without conflict, and that there would be reactionary movements reasserting national sovereignty and seeking to impose ethnic and cultural uniformity. Fishman (1989:18) makes the same point when he states that 'a characteristic of postmodern ethnicity is the stance of simultaneously transcending ethnicity as a complete, self-contained system, but of retaining it as a selectively preferred, evolving, participatory system.' Fishman then identifies some of the factors that hinder the emergence of such benign forms of ethnic identification. They include the

communication barriers induced by language and the persistence of nationalism and its manipulation by power elites. Also important are the rapid changes induced by modernization make towards the generation of civil strife. He concludes that 'linguistic homogeneity/heterogeneity cannot be considered an important independent predictor of civil strife when an extensive panoply of deprivational, modernizational and non-ideological authoritarianism predictors are also considered' (Fishman 1989:623). In other words, a multivariate model of ethnic conflict is required in which the role of underlying conditions, intervening variables, precipitating events, and interacting feedback effects of policy responses by local and international agencies are taken into account (Richmond 1988c:3-10).

Ethnic conflict takes several different forms and sometimes combines different elements. Firstly, there are the state-supported systems of domination and exploitation of minorities that may lead eventually to the extermination of a people or their relegation to the geographic and social margins of the society. This was the typical fate of indigenous populations in the colonial era and continues in varying degrees today. Neocolonialism is often more economic than political in form, but does not preclude the state's complicity in the activities of national and transnational corporations exploiting natural and human resources. Secondly, there are the conflicts that result from the emancipatory efforts of such minorities endeavouring to reclaim territory and reassert human rights, with or without the support of outside agencies such as the UN, churches, and other minorities joining in the common cause. Thirdly, there are interstate conflicts in which questions of language, religion, and irredentist aspirations are involved. Fourthly, intrastate conflict (sometimes leading to civil war) may occur when interethnic antagonisms, competition for scarce resources, political power struggles, and ideological disputes fail to be resolved by other means, such as negotiation, conciliation, and the peace-keeping efforts of outside bodies. Fifthly, various manifestations of ethnic nationalism give rise to overt conflict when other constraining factors are removed. The lifting of imperialist rule or the end of a totalitarian system of government may precipitate latent conflicts that have been held in check by the superior military power and ruthlessly suppressive measures used by the previously governing parties. Sectarian violence, communal conflict, civil wars, and independence movements may assert themselves under these conditions. Finally, there are the conflicts that arise as a consequence of past and present migrations, particularly the movements from the movements of slaves and indentured labourers, and continuing to the present day with migrant workers and asylum applicants, such migrations have left substantial ethnocultural minorities in Europe, North America,

and elsewhere. Originally sought after for their contribution to the labour force or welcomed as political refugees, such minorities may face severe opposition and demands for their repatriation during times of economic recession.

In 1992-3, there were more than sixty-five ethnic conflicts raging, with varying degrees of severity in different parts of the world (see Chapter Eleven). Two-thirds of these were ongoing armed conflicts, responsible for a thousand or more combat-related deaths. Others were of a lesser degree of severity, but were potentially as dangerous. They included interstate wars, civil wars, and terrorist activities. Many involved ethnic or national identity issues and more than a third had secessionist goals (Regehr 1992). In examining the role of ethnicity in contemporary international politics, Daniel Moynihan (1993:24) chose to describe it as promoting pandemonium. He cited the IRA bombings in Britain and the riots in Los Angeles, as well as the ethnic conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Europe as evidence that we have so far failed 'to make the world safe for and from ethnicity' (1993:173). He chided social scientists for having paid insufficient attention to its significance. It is a mistake to equate the revival of ethnicity in the late twentieth century with 'tribalism'. The latter term refers to relationships within a territorially bounded community or *Gemeinschaft*. Contemporary manifestations of ethnicity transcend geographic limits. They involve global networks and connections that facilitate the mobilization of resources and the exercise of power beyond the limits of states and societies as previously understood by anthropologists and sociologists.

Anthony Smith (1991, 1992) examined some of the factors associated with the survival of ethnic groups and the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in the context of global movements of ethnic mobilization. He noted the importance of political elites, the emergence of a literary high culture, and the creation of invented traditions, which turn a passive *ethnie* into an active political community determined to relive past glories. Old myths of ethnic election as a 'chosen people' are revived, and fuel neonationalist movements. He agreed that this renewal fits my previously argued thesis that the communication networks of postindustrial societies facilitate the proliferation of linguistic and ethnic nationalisms, and provoke the revival of majority nationalism as well. Examples include the revival of ethnic nationalism among Serbs, Czechs, Germans, Poles, and Russians. Pan-nationalist movements and attempts at regional integration may also revive specific ethnic nationalisms among majorities and minorities alike. The effect of immigration, guest workers, and waves of refugees on hitherto relatively homogeneous societies can induce reactionary forms of nationalism that threaten democratic values. It may also induce a revival of interethnic tension and fascist movements in countries of immigration (Richmond 1988c:167-82; Smith 1991:143-77). This leads to the question of multiculturalism and its implications for postmodern societies.

Multiculturalism

It is necessary to distinguish the descriptive and the prescriptive aspects of multiculturalism. Contemporary societies, whether in a premodern, modern, or late modern stage of development (and most countries have sectors in all three stages simultaneously), are generally pluralistic in terms of their ethnic composition. Some have indigenous minorities that have retained their distinctive languages and cultures despite the pressures towards assimilation that accompanied industrialization and colonization. Others have experienced substantial migrations (inward and outward), leading to a spread of languages, religions, and cultures throughout the world. In demographic and statistical terms, the degree of heterogeneity of a population may vary, but nowhere can the reality of ethnic pluralism be denied altogether. The degree to which majority groups accept and encourage this diversity also varies. Multiculturalism as a policy has been adopted in a number of countries, although the intent and purposes of these policies vary, and their degree of success in containing the potential for conflict is a matter of debate.

There are certain key areas in which multicultural policies have been applied. They include the treatment of indigenous minorities, the integration of immigrants, the development of educational curricula and (in some cases) separate school systems, support for linguistic and cultural diversity in the arts, employment equity or affirmative action in the labour force, and representation in political institutions. Such policies range from legislative measures and direct government funding to voluntary grass roots movements that have the tacit approval of mainstream political parties and economic elites. Included are measures designed to combat racism and diminish ethno-religious discrimination and more actively promote minority interests and power. In some cases, multicultural programs have been linked with those endeavouring to advance the status of women. In others, there have been ideological disputes and a conflict of interest between the two. Black women (sometimes referring to themselves as 'women of colour') do not necessarily share the same feminist agenda as 'White', liberal, middle-class women (Stasiulis 1990).

Racism and antiracism

Although it is generally recognized that 'race' is a social construct, there remain deeply felt prejudices and systemic discrimination based on categories defined in terms of physical appearance. Often these are rationalized and justified in terms of perceived cultural differences that are linked to ethnicity and nationality. Majority 'White' interests and the survival of traditional national characteristics in Britain, France, and Germany (as well as traditional immigration countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States) are thought to be threatened by the claims of immigrants

and their children. Neoconservative philosophers and politicians rally to defend immigration controls, the expulsion of foreigners, and the preservation of traditional Christian and family values, simultaneously denying that they are racist. In education, multiculturalism tends to be identified with such phenomena as Black studies and other liberal attempts to broaden the curriculum. At the same time, antiracism assumes a more radical stance, opposing the patronizing attitude of teachers and the discrimination embedded in institutions, ranging from the police and the judicial system to municipal and national politics. Antiracist discourse becomes more vehement and intolerant itself, sometimes resulting in violent clashes with neo-Nazi and other right-wing groups. Furthermore, racism and ethnocentrism are not confined to 'White' groups. 'Visible minorities' can be intolerant of other minorities, stereotyping them, while denying that 'Blacks' can be racist. Some activists are hostile towards anyone considered insufficiently militant. Ali Rattansi (1992:37) asked how various forms of racism, ethnocentrism, and nationalism interact with discourses and practices in official policy programs and popular culture around 'Asian women' or 'Black youth'. He criticized what he calls 'cultural essentialism' and the tendency to subsume the experience of all minorities under a single rubric such as 'the Black struggle'. He noted the emergence of new syncretic cultures, particularly among second-generation youth in Britain, and argued that multiculturalists must abandon their 'additive models' of cultural diversity and confront issues of cultural difference (1992:39). One of the consequences of multicultural policies, which deliberately highlight and celebrate cultural differences, is a renewed trend towards separation. This manifests itself in education, the arts, and recreation. Ethnocultural and religious minorities sometimes insist that they must have their own schools and that there should be government funding to assist them. A proprietary attitude may enter into art, music, and literary expression, where there is resentment of the expropriation of such modes of expression by persons of different ethnic or 'racial' origin.

This raises a question of the politics of recognition in a multicultural society. Charles Taylor (1992) proposes that the key criterion for recognizing minority claims should be their 'authenticity'. The latter is understood as being 'true to oneself', but, at the same time, recognizing that the self is not a monologic outcome of introspection but a dialogic result of interaction with others. From a sociological perspective, Giddens (1987:47) also emphasizes the importance of dialogue in the formulation of social research, applied sociology, and social policy. He recognizes the importance of close communication between researchers, policy makers, and those whose behaviour is the subject of study and action.

There remain some inherent contradictions and dilemmas in the pursuit of the multicultural ideal and the politics of difference. Ethnic identity is not the only basis on which individuals may claim recognition. Gender, age, nationality, citizenship, property ownership, and tax-paying status

add it to models

proprietary

expropriation

Rattansi

may impose conflicting claims on the body politic and confuse issues concerning human rights. In responding to Taylor's argument concerning the politics of recognition, Steven Rockefeller (1992:88) notes that 'our universal identity as human beings is our primary identity and is more fundamental than any particular identity, whether it be a matter of citizenship, gender, race, or ethnic origin.' Policies that promote particular identities and the interests associated with them may lead to intolerance, separatism, and rivalry. This is particularly true when the resources available are in short supply, whether they are government grants, jobs during a recession, or places in institutions of higher education.

There is an inevitable tension between the pursuit of multicultural policies and the promotion of a sense of a national unity and commitment, particularly in those countries that have experienced substantial immigration. Australia is a good example of a country that has tried to balance a recognition of its growing ethnic diversity and the need for special services for immigrants without abandoning the concept of a 'dinkum Aussie' or loyal Australian. The government's own *Agenda for Multicultural Australia* (Commonwealth of Australia, Office of Multicultural Affairs 1989) stated that everyone must accept the basic structures and principles of Australian society, including the principles of the Constitution and English as the national language. The emphasis was on multiculturalism for all Australians, irrespective of birthplace or ethnic origin. 'For the essence of this vision is priority of the wholeness and welfare of the entire society engaged in developing a new nationhood, a new Australian identity' (Zubrzycki 1991:136). It is the absence of such a sense of national identity (or the possible threat to it) that worries many North American critics of multicultural ideologies. Schlesinger (1992) examined the growing influence of multiculturalism in the United States, particularly as reflected in what he called the 'battle of the schools' over curriculum and the teaching of history. He deplored the 'disuniting of America' and affirmed that the ideas that defined American nationality were 'individual freedom, political democracy and human rights'. 'The question America confronts as a pluralistic society is how to vindicate cherished cultures and traditions without breaking the bonds of cohesion' (Schlesinger 1992:138). Similar concerns have been expressed in Canada, where the secessionist pressures of francophone Quebecois and some Aboriginal communities combine with the multicultural claims of immigrant minorities and their descendants to generate what Reginald Bibby (1990) called 'mosaic madness'. He is critical of excessive individualism and the pursuit of sectional interests at the expense of society as a whole.

The idea of society as a whole is precisely what postmodernist critics are sceptical of. Who determines what constitutes the whole society and whose voices will be heard in a system that is structured in dominance and that is hierarchical, patriarchal, competitive, and motivated by profit? Drawing on Derrida, Foucault, and poststructuralist writers, Radhakrishnan (1990)

relates questions of ethnic identity to questions of difference and the politics of heterogeneity. He uses the example of Jesse Jackson's candidacy for the leadership of the Democratic party in the United States, the so-called 'rainbow coalition' that tried to bring together a wide spectrum of minority groups. Jackson was seen as representing special interests whereas, Radhakrishnan claimed, 'Corporate, military, business, male, "White," "non-ethnic interests" were regarded as "natural," "general," "representative," ideologically neutral and value-free' (1990:66).

In Canada there are similar tensions and conflicts between particular minorities competing for power, status, and recognition, as well as between these minorities and the dominant or founding anglophone and francophone majorities. The failure of several decades of effort to achieve constitutional reform in Canada (as in Australia) is evidence of the difficulty of reconciling competing interests. It is also evidence of globalization as both countries restrict immigration, adopt concepts such as 'multiculturalism', endeavour to accommodate Aboriginal concerns, and come to terms with the realities of a global economy (Russell 1993:41-61). There are inherent contradictions between the emphasis on individual rights, including those relating to property, which stem from the Western liberal philosophy and the recognition of collective rights. Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa defended his use of the 'Notwithstanding' clause in the Canadian Charter of Rights on the grounds that he had a special responsibility to defend French language and culture in North America. Similar arguments have been used by Aboriginal representatives, who consider that the cultural traditions of some Aboriginal communities place more emphasis upon the communal sharing of land than upon individualistic ideas about property rights (Hiebert 1993; Turpel 1990).

The combined effects of postindustrialism, postmodernism, and globalization have generated a crisis of integration in contemporary societies (McLellan and Richmond 1994). There are systemic contradictions between homogeneity and universalism, on the one hand, and heterogeneity and particularism, on the other. In extreme circumstances, other countries could follow the example of Yugoslavia and disintegrate into warring factions, acting out historic animosities and seeking revenge for past and present atrocities. All forms of collectivism (ethnicism, nationalism, statism, regionalism, and globalism) are in dialectical contradiction to the thesis of individualism. It remains to be seen whether a new synthesis will take the form of humanism. Ernest Gellner rejects both postmodernism and fundamentalist positions when he makes a case for 'enlightened rationalism' (Gellner 1992). He rightly points out that societies are systems of real constraints and not just systems of 'meanings', as hermeneutics would suggest. Unfortunately, however enlightened it may be, rationalism does not carry with it the emotional appeal—the gut reaction—that ethnic nationalism provides.

As mentioned earlier, Anthony Giddens (1990:151-73) prefers the idea of

'utopian realism' as expressed in emancipatory social movements, such as those concerned with economic equality, participatory democracy, human rights, demilitarization, and the protection of the environment. In the face of high-consequence risks, we (i.e., humanity as a whole) must 'harness the juggernaut' in order to minimize the dangers of a 'runaway world'. Among those dangers are the growth of racism, the revival of Nazi movements in Europe and elsewhere, the perceived threat of mass migration and refugee flows, and the consequent imposition of forms of global apartheid.

Notes

¹Industrial classifications are not the same as occupations that may range from low to high status and income in any industry. Primary industries include agriculture, horticulture, animal farming, forestry, fishing, mining, and all forms of natural resource exploitation.

Secondary industries include all craft, manufacturing, and construction activities. Tertiary industries include wholesale and retail distribution, domestic and professional services, including health, banking, and insurance.

Quaternary industries are those that have grown fastest as a result of the post-industrial revolution. They are mostly information-based and include education, telecommunications, mass media, and computer-based technologies.

²Special examples of international networks include the International Postal Union, Interpol, World Health Organization, International Civil Aviation Authority, World Council of Churches, YMCA/YWCA, and numerous other governmental and non-governmental agencies that have proliferated in the late twentieth century as 'communication' networks were extended and facilitated by new information technologies.

chapter three

*Proactive and reactive migration*¹

Sociological theories of international migration should be capable of explaining the scale, direction, and composition of population movements that cross state boundaries; the factors that determine the decision to move and the choice of destination; the characteristic modes of social integration in the receiving country; and the eventual outcome, including remigration and return movements. Studies of international migration have not attempted such an ambitious agenda. Research has generally focused on specific aspects, such as the demographic characteristics of immigrants, migration decision making, economic and social adaptation in receiving countries, the policies of sending and receiving countries, or global trends in population movement. Empirical studies have been conducted on an *ad hoc* basis, largely uninformed by developments in general sociological theory.

Typologies

Early writers utilized simple typologies to classify migratory movements. Fairchild (1913) distinguished invasion, conquest, and colonization from immigration as such. He classified societies as 'peaceful or warlike' and 'low or high culture'. He endeavoured to show that the types of migration and their consequences were influenced by this distinction. Later writers emphasized the difference between voluntary and involuntary movements. Included in the former were seasonal, nomadic, and other temporary