'There are many troublemakers' in the Midi. Imagining society and politics in nineteenth-century France

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Throughout much of the nineteenth century, many French were concerned with the fundamental societal divisions that would preclude orderly public life and herald the dissolution of society. Travellers and senior officials sent to administer Mediterranean departments were well aware of the regional particularities that characterised the country. Accordingly, descriptions of the public spirit in the Hérault were pervaded with a sense of distinctiveness. This article shows that state officials, inspired by neo-Hippocratic notions and elitist views, construed a stereotype of vivid, impressionable southerners given to political extremism. Their reports shape our understanding of nineteenth-century society and politics as historians commonly consult these rich and irreplaceable documents in archives across France. Officials, for example, were inclined to describe a particular form of royalism known as legitimism that found widespread support from different layers of society as an illustration of the population's innate behavioural dispositions. Their discursive construction of the southerners, in fact, was as much about exogenous identity politics as it contributed to contemporary debates about the moral and social *capacités* required of enfranchised citizens. As they made use of arguments borrowed from a well-established tradition of stereotyping, they stigmatised especially lower-class monarchists as being unworthy for civic participation.

Keywords: France; stereotyping; identity politics; regional identity; civic participation

One does not have to study the people of the south, especially those of the Languedoc and the Provence, for a long time to convince oneself that there are two very distinct peoples and characters in France. The Midi goes much further and moves much faster; that is why it is so important for it to be on the right path. This is with what I particularly and constantly have entrusted myself (. . .). I have succeeded only in as far as nature permits. In the Midi, *the Legislation of the Sun* is the most important of all; calmness in the south quite resembles the rage of the north. [The Hérault] abounds in headstrong people, and there are many troublemakers.

Instructed by the ministry of the Interior to give an account of the public spirit in the Hérault in 1818, prefect Hippolyte Creuzé de Lesser portrayed the population as one hard to be controlled. Inspired by the belief in the primordial influence of climate upon people and society, he emphasised differences between northerners and southerners.[1] Throughout much of the nineteenth century, officials like him would make use of exogenous regional stereotypes as they discussed the esprit public of this Mediterranean department. As the legislative elections of 1869 offered new opportunities for political opponents of the Second Empire, Étienne Garnier, one of Creuzé de Lesser's successors, for example, argued that distinctive characteristics shared by the department's inhabitants had a baneful influence upon their public behaviour: 'The populations of the Midi characterised by their ardour, vivacity and usual fickleness are easily carried away (. . .). [My] insurmountable task consists in holding them back in the quietness, impartiality (. . .) and common sense

the government seeks to prevail'.[2] True, these men may have tried to protect themselves from criticism by their superiors by telling them that they did all that was possible under these difficult circumstances. However, that is not the whole story. Their rhetorical strategy, it will be argued, helped them to select and synthesise the information gathered by themselves and office clerks into elements constitutive of a coherent and consistent as well as informative and readable story line about politics in the world they were sent to administer. Moreover, the stereotype of the quarrelsome southerner made it possible to explain why regimes like the Second Empire enjoyed limited public support, while avoiding, at all costs, even the semblance of legitimacy to political opponents.[3]

Men like Creuzé de Lesser emphasised the particularities of individual regions. In many ways, their description of the nineteenth-century Midi betrayed amazement about the south and its population. Historians who analyse regional society and politics may be tempted to dispose of what seem to have been contemporary prejudices in a few words. Indeed, some reports – in particular those which discuss *l'esprit public* – enjoyed a rather bad reputation, even among those who instructed their bureaucrats to produce them. A former prefect himself, Jean-Pierre Montalivet, minister of the Interior under Napoleon I, claimed that many of these documents were quite useless because the government would 'know nothing of what's happening'.[4] Notwithstanding these reservations, historians of nineteenth-century France continue to make use of administrative reports produced by prefects, public prosecutors and others. In fact, one may argue that these pieces of official writing shape our understanding of the past. Eugen Weber's influential study of how rural 'savages' in 1815 gradually turned into citizens who thought of themselves as members of the one and indivisible Nation by 1914, for example, extensively quotes from these sources that are so easy to locate in archives across the country.[5] Yet, we know surprisingly little about these documents and their pitfalls, as Pierre Karila-Cohen, one of the few to have analysed these sources, argues.[6] A contribution to the study of official reporting, this article, therefore, will focus on two questions in particular: first, what inspired officials as they committed their thoughts about the districts they administered to paper? And, secondly, how did assumptions about the essentialist traits of southerners influence their portrayal of society and politics? As they discursively construed a regional identity, these administrators not only engaged in identity politics but also contributed to debates about civic participation in political life. They substantiated their inclination to deny the popular classes in particular access to formal politics with arguments borrowed from what had become a well-established, indeed popular, tradition of stereotyping. Thus the reports inform us about the manner in which officials, like the educated elite, looked upon the popular element in the Midi and its place in the national community. At the same time, however, what, at first sight, appears to be a story of straightforward (top-down) identity construction was sometimes more complex than expected, as the stereotype of the southerner developed in official reports was, in fact, rather flexible and ambivalent. This circumstance, it will finally be argued, forces us to rethink the relationship between realms which have traditionally been portrayed as being incompatible with one another: the national, on the one hand, and the regional and local, on the other. As such, this article supports Roger Price's claim that these official documents, if properly decoded, indeed constitute extremely valuable sources for research.[7]

I.

It is important to remember that the tradition of attributing regional differences had developed well before. Under the Old Regime, city-dwellers were considered to be

fundamentally different from alleged backward provincials. Moreover, many thought of France as a country divided into parts separated one from the other by an imaginary line drawn between Saint-Malo and Geneva.[8] Some literary works even spoke of regional personalities. Agrippa Théodore d'Aubigné's seventeenth-century picaresque novel *Baron de Faeneste*, for example, presented the figure of a southerner whose life was characterised as much by intellectual poverty as a predisposition for outward ostentation.[9] Under the Enlightenment, the popularity of neo-Hippocratic belief in the impact of natural environment and climatic conditions upon society and mankind, finally, changed the perception of the Midi, a term which had until then referred to a vast area south of the river Loire. Hence, it came to be seen as a region inhabited by people who, subject to the scorching sun, were driven by emotions they could never hope to control. Besides, this stereotype was increasingly influenced by the awareness of differences between civilised and uncivilised societies. As the population of northern France was portrayed as civilised, the inhabitants of the Midi, in contrast, were depicted as less civilised than their more enterprising northern counterparts.[10]

Diversity, Weber deservedly notes, 'had not bothered earlier centuries very much. It seemed part of the nature of things'. From 1789 onwards, however, it came to be perceived as something deeply problematic, 'to be noted and to be remedied'.[11] What had been a rhetorical tool to explain regional particularities before, the image of the Midi, like the one of Brittany or Normandy, henceforth adopted a more political connotation.[12] Analysed by Michel Péronnet, the speeches of deputies often used the word 'Midi'. While the parliamentarians originally referred to the revolutionary army from the South, they identified the term with Federalism in 1793, and, soon thereafter, with a fundamental opposition to revolutionary reforms.[13] Besides, its population would hold on to linguistic particularities. To revolutionaries like Bertrand Barrère and Henri Grégoire, language was more than a means of communication. They saw linguistic homogeneity as a tool to strengthen the Republic. In 1794, Barrère claimed that regional languages were closely connected with religious superstition and counterrevolutionary forces. In his turn, Grégoire argued that the 'unity of the Republic requires the unity of language'; all citizens should speak French, the language of 'virtue, courage and liberty par excellence'.[14] Accordingly, he presented other languages as threats to the nation. As they did not speak French, the southerners whom Grégoire described as 'people who think and express themselves in a lively manner' remained subjugated to aristocrats and clergymen who, in their turn, tried to restore their former power and influence.[15] In this context it should not be forgotten that the 'homogeneity of the nation', as Roger Chartier argues, became 'both desire and design, the condition and hallmark of good policy'. The notion of the one and indivisible nation prescribed what France should be rather than what it actually was. The desirable norm, in other words, allowed observers, both during and after the revolutionary period, to classify individual regions and their populations and to depict any difference from the norm as a problem to be remedied.[16]

Social and political theorists looked on particularities with suspicion, as they would hinder the pursuit of the common good and threaten the sovereign nation. In this context, Pierre Rosanvallon coined the felicitous expression of the 'culture of generality'.[17] The sacrosanct value attributed to *la Nation une et indivisible* made it difficult to conceive of, let alone accept, differences. Neither could observers account for resistance in terms of the official, legal and political, discourse. For revolutionaries to explain why regions rose in rebellion, they distinguished between 'reprehensible and good towns, between a sane countryside and one that was infested'. They suggested that the 'sane' parts cherished homogeneity and unity. In contrast, 'reprehensible' regions held on to their

particularities.[18] Thus the north and the south came to be identified with tranquillity and liveliness respectively, and, as such, turned France into a 'field of perpetual struggle between hot summer days and wintry weather'. As irrationality, passions and violence were ascribed to the Midi, it was in danger of being classified as unfit to be part of 'the real France, land of rationality'.[19] Accordingly, the term 'Midi' came to designate a more restricted, triangular area situated between Toulon, Lyon and Perpignan. This is the part of France to which the historian Colin Lucas referred to as a 'land of political extremes' whose residents – revolutionary patriots and their opponents alike – not only adopted equally extremist positions but also resorted to the use of violence on several occasions in the years 1789–1815. Ever since, its residents whose conflicts produced a lasting 'atmosphere of crisis' were portrayed as being fundamentally different from those who lived elsewhere. Likewise, this is also the sun-baked territory, largely composed of the Lower Languedoc and the Provence, which Creuzé de Lesser spoke of in such troubled terms in 1818.[20] Known for its rebelliousness, the Hérault was an important element of this region; unsurprisingly, public authorities often described the department and its *chef-lieu* in pejorative terms. In the 1790s, one official, for example, argued that 'the inhabitants [of Montpellier] differ from people elsewhere: [they are] untruthful, arrogant and very selfish'.[21] Moreover, administrators embraced the idea that public behaviour could only be explained in terms of essentialist characteristics. By 1791, they claimed that the department was 'a region where men are naturally bellicose'; the population's fanaticism, they noted, resulted from 'the passionate imagination so typical of the Mediterranean peoples'.[22] When the Directoire spoke of 'hot-headed and ardent men who do not know how to hate or love in moderation', it only took yet another small step to describe regional politics as an expression of erratic impulses. Inspired by the postulate that climatic circumstances were of paramount importance for public behaviour, these men thus suggested that the turns in political preference as well as the resistance against revolutionary reforms were determined by the fact that the Hérault was inhabited by unstable, excessive and quarrelsome people who, subject to the Mediterranean climate, could not adopt a more moderate stance.[23]

II.

As officials committed their thoughts to paper, they made use of a set of ideas whose origins could be found in the Old Regime. In the course of the nineteenth century, scholars, travellers and literary authors further elaborated the argument that France was composed of distinct regions each of which had its unalienable characteristics. Statisticians such as Adolphe d'Angeville, Charles Dupin and Konrad Malte-Brun, for example, emphasised the significant differences in schooling, wages or value of industrial and agricultural products that underlined the apparent material superiority of northern France. They thus confirmed the neo-Hippocratic image of a country divided into two spheres one of which seemed to be inimical to social and economic progress.[24] These dissimilarities were as much an object of research as they were part of an established discourse. Indeed, the 'image of the lazy, undisciplined and licentious southerner' could not only be found in the work of professionals but also in the reports written by officials.[25] Prefects in particular elaborated on the extent to which 'their' department lagged behind those in the north. Their discursive strategy was intricately intertwined with a value judgment about which part of France was to be preferred. In this respect, they depicted the region and its population in terms of a disparity from the desired standard and placed the southerners in a 'repertoire of otherness'.[26]

Under the influence of Romanticism, moreover, the educated youth developed an interest to travel from the 1820s onwards. Yet their yearning for an encounter with unfamiliar customs, Daniel Pick writes, 'afforded not only (...) the charming contemplation of pastoral France'. Indeed, the more perspicacious recognised the diversity of their country's languages and habits. Accordingly, an awareness of strangeness pervaded their descriptions.[27] In this respect, the travelogues about the Hérault were no different. According to Renaud de Vilback, its population was 'lively, fickle and prone to cheerfulness'.[28] Similarly, an American found that 'these people are cheerful, agreeable and lovers of pleasure'; yet, he cautioned his readers, 'they have their fair share of that spirit of intolerance, which has so often led to violence and bloodshed'.[29] Similarly, Abel Hugo noted that their vivid imagination in particular provoked 'excesses'.[30] All agreed that fickleness rather than constancy determined the people's character; joy and liveliness could trun into bellicosity at any moment. These features, they suggested, had a negative impact, as they deprived society from a 'social spirit' and stable 'family relations'.[31] Undoubtedly one of the most outspoken chroniclers was Hyppolite-Adolphe Taine who described Montpellier's old centre as follows:

> Manure heaps [and] remains of fruit and vegetables [litter in] the streets [where] dirty children with snouts smeared with grime [play]. Doors to workshops [and] workers' houses are opened wide for fresh air to enter (...). Through the openings, [one observes] a strange darkness. Among the pile of saucepans, vases of all kinds, tools, clothes [and] children's underwear, a woman washes her infant, while another, motionless, watches her. This sight is not French, but Italian. [These people] resemble light-minded and childish Italians. When one listens to them, it is difficult to believe that they can talk seriously. They are kind buffoons, (...) pert, hopping and impertinent dogs, fit to bark, to give pecks, to preen themselves, to fawn on the females, to go around boasting and to enter a cage.

Such a milieu dominated by women and children whose lives knew no distinction between private and public spheres reminded Taine of Italy.[32] In fact, travelogues commonly identified the living conditions in the Midi with those in Italy or Spain. Only just arrived in the Midi, Alexandre Dumas spoke of the region as 'that hot land thirsting for blood'. Though he admitted that the inhabitants were 'unknown' to him, he did not hesitate to describe their character as 'half-Spanish, half-Saracen, which needs to be studied extensively for it to be understood'.[33] Moreover, Taine portrayed Montpellier in terms of decay. The city had enjoyed a good reputation under the Middle Ages. Yet, even then did the inhabitants fail to develop economy and society further. Though defiant and boisterous, the 'pert, hopping and impertinent dogs' were not as dangerous as they seemed to be. The slightest pressure exercised on them by the authorities would make them enter their 'cage'.[34] The visitors also accentuated the unstableness of ideological allegiance. In 1814–1815, southerners changed course several times according to the American Mordecai Noah. With 'ease and gaiety', the lower classes in Perpignan and elsewhere would have substituted 'the fleur-de-lis for the [Napoleonic] Eagle, or the Eagle for the fleur-de-lis, as political events required'.[35] Consequently, many claimed that political loyalties could not be accounted for as the result of a decision arrived at by way of critical reflection. Instead, they should be interpreted as either an illustration of the southerners' innate characteristics or the result of influence exercised upon them by others. The interrelation between the southerners' mentality, on the one hand, and the popularity of extremist positions, on the other, was another recurrent theme. The geographer Malte-Brun emphasises that 'religious and political passions' and 'occult intrigues' had provoked 'troubles' in Montpellier during the 1790s.[36] Noah blamed royalist elites and Catholic priests for spreading their 'power into hidden corners of [the] minds' of lower-class

royalists and exploiting the 'customs of the darker ages'.[37] Likewise, the German-Austrian Moritz Hartmann believed that clergymen could indoctrinate the population, because the latter had only enjoyed a 'limited monastic education'.[38] Yet, their dislike of socialism, he noted, were not the consequence of a 'political password' passed on by the elites alone. To the revolutionary who had to flee his country after the 1848 Revolution, the kind of lower-class monarchism which he witnessed in Montpellier was troubling. He had no sympathy for legitimists whose devotion for count Chambord he failed to understand. He even denied that royalism was a truly political stance. Rather, it constituted

> a religion suitable to the hot South, since it requires the least movement and is in keeping with the pagan imagination which prefers to hang on to an outward symbol rather than to an abstract idea. It is not the result (. . .) of reflection but, on the contrary, a means to abstain from reflection.

In this sense, Hartmann argued as Noah had done before: popular political allegiances in the Midi defied rationality and should be accounted for as the result of forces that exerted an ill-fated spell on the population. Things could only improve, if this spell was broken.[39] In his characteristically contemptuous style, Taine suggested a remedy for this problem: this 'fallen region (. . .) will only get back on its feet again and catch up if in contact with a foreign government or civilisation'. 'Foreign', i.e. French, government and civilisation were needed to turn the lower-class inhabitants of places such as Montpellier into worthy citizens.[40]

III.

The stereotype of the southerner, in other words, provided nineteenth-century observers with the discursive tools which explained difference and suggested a solution of the problem at the same time. As officials then used this ascription of distinctiveness developed by others, they turned it into an element in a discourse of power that aimed to classify and, indeed, disqualify the Midi and its population. They did so for several reasons. First, subsequent governments developed a growing appetite for information. The desire to know and to categorise increased as the state adopted a more interventionist attitude. Consequently, prefects were instructed to inform their superiors about demographic and economic trends on a regular basis. In addition, they reported on political developments and anything that happened out of the ordinary. As governments were dissatisfied with the quality of information they received, they turned to administrators of the ministries of Justice, War and Education to complement the prefectural reports. However, this attempt to improve information gathering turned out to be problematic, as there were many rivalries between the different ministries.[41]

Moreover, senior bureaucrats often had a limited perspective of the social and political reality. Although they made tours of the department and developed a network of informants beyond office clerks and notables in the department's *chef-lieu*, prefects and prosecutors primarily frequented the social elites. They knew little of the needs and aspirations of the common men and women. On the rare occasions of contact, moreover, the popular classes often dissimulated what they thought or did.[42] Besides, the reports were constitutive of a bureaucratic relationship as a result of which their authors took into consideration the fact that the addressee was a superior official or politician. In this respect, officials tried to frame their accounts in the light of what they believed their superiors wanted to read, hoping that this would help advance their careers. Reassuring remarks affirmed the people's allegiance to the government; the obstinate few who remained loyal to the opposition, it was argued, would be too weak to disturb the peace.

Instructed to write monthly or even bi-monthly reports, the officials even turned to commonplaces or copied what they themselves or their predecessors had written before. In addition, they sometimes wrote what Karila-Cohen calls the 'stereotypical forms of administrative prose (. . .): the *rapport sur rien* and the *rapport sur soi*'. While the former added nothing new to what had been written in previous reports or limited itself to reformulating the Ministry's questions into affirmatives, the latter highlighted the officials' convictions and valorised the effect of their measures.[43] Some reports, most particularly the more speculative ones that discussed public opinion, thus said little about the actual state of affairs. Karila-Cohen even suggests that the 'administrative creation of stereotypes' transmitted by these documents especially served to confirm pre-conceived ideas shared by government and officials. As such, many of these reports tell us more about those who wrote them than about those whom they presumably described.[44]

In this respect, it is important to remember that the administrators' description of society and politics in the Hérault was especially inspired by what has been called 'a range of perceptions constructed, at least in part, on the basis of prejudices and misconceptions'. Thus the image of the hot-headed southerner largely determined both the collection and analysis of the data that fused into the official reports.[45] 'The individual or collective ways to observe, the more or less lucid codes of reading and the rhetorical stereotypes', in other words,[46]

> influenced every stage of [the report's] 'making', just as well during the phase of observation by the author as the moment when the several data are received and the final product is written (. . .). It is especially then that the weight of the stereotypes intervened: the neo-Hippocratic theory that related human behaviour to natural environment [and] the regional imagery which, while integrating these neo-Hippocratic analyses, was enriched with historical or social observations.

Indeed, numerous reports were pervaded by the feeling, shared by many officials, of having been sent to 'enemy territory'.[47] Whereas they considered departments in eastern or northern France as 'easy' districts, they saw the Gard or the Hérault as difficult terrains. In 1869 even the minister of the Interior conceded that Nîmes, *chef-lieu* of the Gard, 'is possibly the city where political and religious ardours are the most passionate and dangerous ones in France. This is a city where public order is much easier jeopardised than in any other part of the country'.[48] Undoubtedly, this belief helped officials to explain why their task was so difficult and why they were not always successful in attaining their objectives in Mediterranean departments. Prefect Achille Bégé, for example, heaved a sigh, reminiscent of Grégoire's concern about linguistic diversity, as he elaborated on the reasons why it was so particularly hard to mobilise support for Louis-Philippe in a department known for its allegiance to the former regime: 'In a region where accent, written and spoken usage and even language are more and more distant from the one of the North of France, it is difficult to make progress that quickly'.[49] Others emphasised the baneful impact of the southerners' mentality upon society and politics. 'You have sent me to a land, which does not resemble the rest of France', prosecutor Dessauret informed his superiors; its inhabitants, he expounded, are 'recalcitrant and credulous by nature'.[50] Most would have concurred with Dessauret's predecessor who described his district as a battlefield where a perpetual struggle raged between 'good and bad passions'.[51] His colleague in the prefecture quite agreed: 'cold natures cannot exist; everything is either good or bad around here'. Another noted that the department was 'a land where passions excite easily and where action precedes reflection'.[52] In his turn, a prosecutor wrote that 'hatred, rivalries and covetousness always foment the hearts' in his district.[53] At any moment, the slightest pretence, it was suggested, could rekindle popular frenzy and cause

disorder. Such remarks did not fail to make an impression in Paris. As Abd-el-Kader who had resisted the colonisation of Algeria was to be transferred from internment in Toulon to Pau, the ministry of the Interior cautioned for 'whatever difficulties the transit of about sixty Arabs' could provoke among 'the populations of the Midi who are so impressionable and so quick to be upset'. Accordingly, the prefect was instructed to take all measures necessary to guarantee 'as much as possible' an orderly transfer through the Hérault 'without imprudently arousing public curiosity'.[54] Elections and carnival were portrayed as occasions that could produce blameworthy 'excesses'. It was then when 'fervent populations incapable of self-control allow themselves to be carried away'. If, moreover, 'natural ardour is aroused by political passions', the prosecutor elaborated, the consequences often were catastrophic, without indicating, however, what exactly it was that he referred to . . . [55]

In this sense officials argued that political beliefs were primarily geared to instincts, a notion that was even more emphasised as the popular classes burst on the political arena. Whereas the old-regime southerner had typically been an impetuous yet basically good, aristocratic Gascon, the nineteenth-century stereotype was that of a man from the popular classes who 'does not reflect enough on what he does [and is] guided by passion through abrupt eruptions of sanguinary violence'. The 1830s and 1840s in particular saw a growing anxiety among members of the bourgeoisie about an undifferentiated mass referred to as the labouring classes. The former tended to equate the latter with dangerous, if not barbarous, people whose customs, language and way of life would pose a threat to all principles of moral and social propriety. As a consequence, the labouring classes became an object of enquiry for statisticians as much as a cause for concern to be kept in check by the forces of order at all times.[56] As neo-Hippocratic notions thus intertwined with elitist perspectives on the Social Question, the line of argument that climatic conditions in the Midi were largely responsible for social and political problems offered officials a welcome opportunity to account for the behaviour of what they believed to be particularly excitable and impulsive lower-class southerners. This became especially apparent as the introduction of universal manhood suffrage in 1848 announced the evanescence of elite politics, and confronted prefects and public prosecutors with the 'unfamiliar and inhospitable world of mass politics'.[57] Officials denied rationality to political activities by the recently-enfranchised voters. Instead, they favoured explanations that helped them present popular politics as an expression of immutable and inalienable characteristics. To them, the 'passionate' and 'impressionable' state of mind of popular *Héraultais* inevitably provoked overexcitement. As they described them as being fundamentally distinct, they not only stigmatised them but also tended to deny legitimacy to their public activities.[58] Unable to keep a cool head, such people could not 'adhere to a moderate colour of opinions'. They were 'entirely given over to the intense excitement of red or white leanings' as a result of which the *juste milieu* of dispassionate, orderly men devoted to the government was necessarily small.[59]

IV.

Even those officials who came from the Midi themselves such as Joseph-Marie Pietri, a Second Empire prefect from Corsica, identified with the cause of the centralising state or (perhaps more appropriately) Bonapartism. To them, moderation could only exist under the most favourable circumstances in a place where the people's state of mind would provoke ardour and extremism.[60] Men like Pietri who accentuated the frailty of the *juste milieu* often depicted the Hérault as a department where extremes met: this is 'a region

(. . .) where everything, hatred as well as friendship, is extreme and where passion rather than reason speaks too often'. At the same time, they were keen to emphasise that the regimes which they represented were epitomes of a moderate stance able to 'assuage the antagonisms, reconcile the interests with one another [and] unite the people's minds, by calling upon all who are devoted to the service of the country'.[61] Likewise, Michel Chevalier, president of the Conseil général, praised the regime in his word of welcome for Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte who toured the Midi in 1852 as 'the only one able to make hearts beat, guide ardent impulses and adjust and contain passions'. Undoubtedly, these sources were inspired by the desire to curry favours.[62] Yet there is more to be said about them. In many ways, they illustrate the attempt not only to legitimise the coup of 1851 but also 'to reinforce the authority of the state'. To this avail, the Second Empire increased the number of its officials substantially; besides, it portrayed itself as 'a *régime administratif*'. Though responsible for the harsh persecution of its opponents, it increasingly presented itself as a depoliticised, administrative form of rule. While concerned with the defence of social order, it would not serve any economic interests besides the growth of welfare for all. At the same time, the government did its best to absorb 'the masses into the political process' as it restored universal male suffrage and tried to forge popular loyalty to regime and Emperor.[63] Officials at all levels quickly adapted themselves to the new context. Shortly after the coup, Montpellier's police commissioner Raynaud even claimed that the population was pleased with 'the spirit of concord' that would inspire the municipal council which the prefect had just installed. This fraternity, he elaborated, announced 'the approach of those happy times when political passions and hatred will disappear from our midst and give way to a general feeling of benevolence of all citizens to one another'.[64] Likewise, officials suggested that political parties gradually lost ever more ground. By 1858, an optimistic prosecutor claimed that almost all citizens were ready to join 'the great national family gathered around the Emperor's throne'. Administrators argued that the *Héraultais* would no longer be interested in political affairs; rather, they would solely be concerned with their material well-being. Summary reports on the political situation even suggested that the conflicts that had marked the years 1848–1851 in particular had become a thing of the past as a result of which opposition movements could only play a limited role.[65]

The ideology that underpinned the Second Empire thus provided officials with a set of ideas that allowed them to give an assuring tone to their accounts. According to them, more and more children of royalists who desired to pursue a career in public office rallied to the regime; one prosecutor suggested that 'the legitimist children approaching their working lives abandon the track laid down (. . .) by their fathers'.[66] Confiding in the statesmanship of Napoleon III, people would turn away from the 'obsolete spirits' of the opposition.[67] Officials argued that the inveterate few who remained loyal to the cause of the eldest branch excluded themselves from the 'national family'. Isolated and divested of influence, they only had recourse to 'the very small war of gossip [and] salon secrets, the war of the *ruelle*, the war of women and the elderly'. This discourse placed partisans of opposition parties beyond the confines of the political community. Those who continued to identify with the cause of the eldest branch could therefore not be part of the national family.[68] In this context, officials stated that the calmness of political life in Montpellier during the 1850s and early 1860s heralded the demise of legitimism and socialism. 'Whatever is left of the old parties' is frustrated, the prosecutor informed his superior; parties, he added, 'are hopeless to find the slightest occasion to spoil the serenity'. He predicted that they would disappear since they could no longer exploit the southerners' passions.[69] Herewith, this official resorted to an argument made by his predecessors who

had claimed that 'fatigue' and 'boredom' were anathema to legitimists and socialists. Opposition movements, they had argued, need agitation, because this is what 'creates and sustains parties; calmness wears them out or annoys them'.[70] It was in this context that the use made of the stereotype of southerners actually proved to be more flexible and ambivalent than what one would expect it to have been at first sight. As crucial changes in the external circumstances occurred, official reports sometimes suggested that the population's 'Mediterranean spirit' could well 'pass from one extreme to another' too.[71] As the *Héraultais*, in other words, could be portrayed in a more positive light during the late-1850s and early-1860s, officials did not hesitate to project different value judgements on them. Whereas pejorative valuations of vivacity and impressionability predominated in times of social or political tensions (e.g., Second Republic), the same characteristics produced kind-hearted observations emphasising the people's basically innocent behaviour under more favourable circumstances. In 1864, for example, the prefect discovered a good side to the impressionable and ardent southerners. In an appreciative tone of voice, he described the unfolding of carnival when 'processions of various neighbourhoods made their way towards the Prefecture where makeshift speakers expressed the masses' sentiments for the Emperor with a Mediterranean verve'.[72] This shows that identity marking never was, as Rudolf de Cillia et al. write, 'consistent, stable and immutable'; on the contrary, it often followed a more flexible and ambivalent path.[73]

Nevertheless it was only a rather short period of respite during which a reassuring tone could make its appearance into official reporting, as feelings of uneasiness survived. One prefect, therefore, cautioned his superiors not to rest on their laurels too soon: in 'the burning-hot climate of the Midi, passions are too ardent and spirits are too fickle [for us] to hope that today's satisfactory situation will persist for a long time'. Officials suggested that adventures abroad and domestic turmoil provided the opposition with opportunities to criticise the government. Prosecutor Dessauret even went as far as to blame the liberal reforms of the 1860s for the degradation of the situation – a criticism that brought on his immediate dismissal.[74] By the late-1860s, a prefect noted that the 'enemies of the current regime (. . .) profit from this [deteriorating] frame of mind so as to make the population lose affection' for Napoleon III.[75] One month later, he concluded that the 'circumstances are favourable to those who exploit the bad passions and suffering of the labouring classes'.[76] As they explained the revival of the opposition, officials first resorted to the familiar argument that the southerners' essentialist traits should be held responsible for erratic changes in political convictions.[77] As has been argued before, they coupled this model of explanation together with views that equated the popular classes with the dangerous classes. In doing so, they ascribed political turmoil to a combination of social immaturity and susceptibility to demagogy and an insatiable lust for material pleasures, alleged characteristics of the lower classes in particular. Far more than those who lived in northern France, the common men from the Midi, it was suggested, were prone to envious and credulous behaviour. In this context, the prosecutor did not hesitate to write that the 'passion of luxury' and 'craving for material enjoyment' would hold 'a distressing future in store for our country'.[78] Finally, officials condemned the 'personal and local ambitions' that would exercise a harmful influence upon politics.[79]

V.

These circumstances together, it was argued, rendered the inhabitants of the Hérault accessible to the 'alarmists of enemy parties'.[80] The continual concern with opposition movements such as republicanism and legitimism in particular should not surprise us.

Well into the 1870s, most governments opposed these movements that found much support in Montpellier. Upon the 1833 municipal elections when twenty-one legitimists won a seat in the 36member council, the prefect of the July Monarchy noted that 'more than threefourths of the local population are Carlists'.[81] His successor therefore suggested postponing the election of National Guard commanders since it would inevitably end in a victory of 'the opposition, legitimist or republican'.[82] The voters continued to give much support to both forces under the Second Republic.[83] In the immediate aftermath of the 1851 coup, the prefect still emphasised the strength of the royalist Right and the extreme Left, as 'almost the whole population belongs to the legitimist camp; the other fractions are socialist'.[84] While those who advocated the restoration of the eldest branch of the Bourbons were sometimes referred to as an outdated force in decline, reports of the late-1860s tended to portray the prospects of progressive politics in Montpellier far more positively. The republican victory won during the 1869 legislative elections confirmed their analysis; besides, the defeat of the candidate who had enjoyed support from the authorities seemed to substantiate the image of a rebellious population even more.[85] Foremost among the 'alarmists' who 'obey to the watchword of systematic opposition' in the late-1860s thus ranked 'the Red party'.[86] Its partisans were often described as men beyond salvage: 'germs of hatred and revenge' had forever damned them. The only way society could safeguard itself from their activities was by pursuing a policy of repression.[87]

In contrast, the attitude towards the legitimist movement was more ambivalent between the Restoration and the early-1870s. Prefects and prosecutors sometimes seemed to be less inclined to take some of its partisans all too seriously. They even portrayed them as objects of ridicule.[88] Likewise, one prosecutor voiced his contempt for those 'who want to be feared at all costs'. He and his colleagues suggested that little should be taken at face value as many partisans of the eldest branch had never made a rational choice in favour of the legitimist body of thought.[89] Finally, officials often suggested that propertied royalists could be won over if the government defended social order and repressed those who threatened it. As early as 1833, prefect Bégé already suggested that wealthy legitimists would cooperate with the Orleanist regime which they claimed to despise, if and when the government subdued all threats to social peace. He predicted that they would 'listen to the language of reason', if they were no longer bothered by the 'hotheads of the party'. His arguments would remain representative of what many of his subsequent colleagues thought.[90] Indeed, the history of local legitimism shows that the differences between those who refused a compromise with those in power, on the one hand, and those who preferred the defence of their material interests above a steadfast loyalty to Chambord, on the other, seriously weakened legitimist prospects. Aware of these tensions, the officials tried to attract 'the politically indecisive, orderly persons [and] turn [them] away from Carlism'.[91]

As could be expected, the officials were definitely more concerned with popular legitimism; their distrust of lower-class royalists revealed the impact of the discursive construction of the Midi on the portrayal of regional politics well. In 1817, Creuzé de Lesser had already cautioned that their 'monarchic spirit forms a very remarkable mixture of ideas many of which had been brought forth by the Revolution'. Not only did the prefect, himself a partisan of the eldest branch, express doubts on the Janus-faced popular monarchism, he also felt uneasy with the kind of royalism that 'does not go hand in hand with feelings of respect and loyalty due to King and government'. The alarming spectre of the lower classes dabbling in politics struck terror into those who had to maintain law and order.[92] Accordingly, the authorities described popular royalists by means of a verbiage which they commonly used to disqualify lower-class socialists too. They argued that the

legitimist 'humble folk (...) had everything to gain from disorder'. These popular monarchists constituted a mob that the royalist leadership would not be able to contain in times of crisis.[93] Despite ideological differences between advocates of a hereditary monarchy and those of a Social and Democratic Republic, officials even claimed that the 'legitimist plebs' cooperated with the left-wing 'demagogic plebs'. Moreover, 'passionate legitimists', like socialists, could only be kept in check by a firm government.[94] Like other movements that mobilised ordinary people in the Midi, popular legitimism and its boisterous gatherings in particular were thus presented as illustrations of southern dispositions. The fear of the labouring classes once again did not fail to produce its impact. Loyalty to Chambord as well as unruly political practices constituted too much of an obstacle for popular monarchists to be granted a role in political life. They would have to renounce their monarchism and learn how to subdue their impulses to be considered worthy members of the nation. As such, the solicitude about potential impediments to nation-building and contempt of the labouring classes went hand in hand particularly well. Moreover, officials were convinced that the legitimist leaders exercised 'an occult influence' upon the popular royalists; the latter would be no more than 'instruments or rather victims of the deceitful game played by leaders [who] disturb the peace'.[95] As they 'play Carlists without knowing why', their allegiance to royalism was seen as rather superficial.[96] Finally, officials suggested that lower-class men and women supported monarchism, because their livelihood depended upon whatever notables offered them in terms of work and charity. As such, lower-class royalism was presented as an aspect of a patron-client relationship wherein influential elites determined the behaviour of their 'followers'.[97] Popular royalists could hardly expect to be included among the active citizens, as prefects and other officials were invariably alarmed about lower-class politics itself. Yet, their analysis of the reasons why the lower classes were receptive to legitimism implicitly suggested ways of how to put an end to it: subdue the alleged Mediterranean ardour of popular legitimists, drive a wedge between the popular classes and royalist notables and, finally, mobilise the ordinary people in favour of the government. The reports, in other words, claimed that legitimism could be turned into an irrelevant force by aspiring for a combination of repression and a paternalist policy relative to the lower classes.[98]

VI.

Throughout much of the nineteenth century, reports about the Hérault were inspired by the notion of a close relationship between climatic conditions, on the one hand, and characteristics of southerners, on the other. Officials combined assumptions about moral and political immaturity with neo-Hippocratic ideas, which suggested that the heat of the sun inevitably turned the population into hot-headed persons. As they placed the inhabitants of this department in an ambivalent category of potentially rebellious people, they drew boundaries between reprehensible and acceptable politics and invited 'Paris' to control and contain the Other. Their description, in other words, constituted what could be called – with reference to Edward Said – an 'imaginative geography' presenting the population within a 'dominating framework'.[99] Given the power to describe social reality, officials asserted the 'identity of the dominating group' as the one and only legitimate guiding principle for national identity. In this sense, theirs was a discourse of power, all the more so as they tried to make power relations appear natural. Consequently, the bureaucrats were able to deny the legitimacy of those who did not meet the standards of proper behaviour and could thus exclude them from the community of citizens. To them,

the support given to the forces of opposition was above all determined by essentialist features of impressionable and fiery southerners. In addition, this stereotype of the southerner enabled officials to disqualify any form of popular politics as being fundamentally irrational. The more the prefects and others, finally, accentuated the differences between the Midi and the rest of the country, the more they could present their task as particularly difficult, and thus legitimise what they did in the department they were sent to administer on behalf of their superiors.[100] Stereotyping constituted an essential element in the process of nation-building which officials, representatives of the French centralising state, were expected to secure. In this respect, it should be borne in mind that their discussion of difference helped to define the standards of behaviour which members of the nation should internalise and adhere to. As they committed their impressions to paper, they wrote as much about what constituted, in their view, the southerners as the issue of membership in the nation. Thus they imagined the nation, to use Benedict Anderson's metaphor, in ways similar to what Slavophiles and Westernisers in Russia or political movements in Switzerland did during the nineteenth century. In these countries, every group defined, each in their own way, their version of the nation. Their disputes about national identity and criteria of membership ultimately produced competing claims about who should be given access to formal politics.[101] The officials, in their turn, stigmatised those who did not fulfil the qualifications to be labelled truly French as being unworthy for civic participation. The essentialist traits of the inhabitants of the Hérault, therefore, supplied them 'the pretext for marginalisation (. . .): they are too different to be fully associated with the running of society'. The discussion of behavioural dispositions, in other words, was intertwined with debates about the *capacités* required of enfranchised citizens. Citizenship rights were after all not only grounded in the notion of popular sovereignty, but also implied qualities any citizen should have.[102] Contemporary debates about suffrage rights, however, show that these criteria were an object of disagreement. Indeed, their history illustrates the problematic incorporation of the ordinary people into the nation. In this context, officials argued that unrestrained passions and lust for power rather than socio-economic cleavages enticed self-interested, lower-class southerners to join political parties. The subsequent conflicts between partisans of competing parties would threaten social order. Consequently, this diabolical view of politics ascribed the task of defending law and order to state officials even more.[103]

Nevertheless, the reports do not only inform us about the discursive construction of southerners by powerful outsiders. Seen in a wider perspective, they throw light upon the relationship between the regional and the national. Contemporaries often looked upon what they perceived as southern, essentialist particularities as problems to be remedied. The threat posed to the one and indivisible Nation could therefore be made less if the centre, i.e. Paris, succeeded in making the population less regional or, rather, more national. Indeed, there is much to be found in official reporting that supports this view. As a result, accounts such as the study of Weber who made extensive use of this irreplaceable material sometimes echoed the storyline developed by nineteenth-century officials.[104] However, there were moments when prefects and prosecutors used the stereotype of the southerner in a more flexible manner. In reports about both Hérault and Corsica, for example, vivacity and impressionability were presented in negative terms in times of crisis, while the same features were depicted more positively under favourable circumstances.[105] This flexible use of stereotypes anticipated discursive constructions of the nation as an entity composed of *petites patries* each of which had their distinct characteristics. In this respect, the change in appreciation of what constituted southern mentality illustrated the need to rethink the relationship between territory, state and nation.

The desire to mobilise popular support called for a political culture in which the regional and the local were reconciled with the national. Rather than castigating diversity as a threat as revolutionaries had done, observers would begin to depict difference and uniqueness as constitutive elements of a renewed national unity.[106] This change in the perception of places such as the Hérault curiously enough seems to announce the recent changes in the historiography itself. Historiography traditionally portrayed regions as problematic space where the centralising state exercised its power; in this context, it has been argued, there was no place for regionalism. Recently, this top-down analysis of the region's relationship with the state has given way to a perspective 'from the bottom up'. Celia Applegate, Alon Confino and Anne-Marie Thiesse have shown that local and regional cultures, in fact, made it possible to create national identities in late-nineteenth-century Germany and France. Although citizens' loyalty to the nation remained as important as ever, authorities came to accept, and indeed helped promote, a certain degree of distinctiveness. In this respect, officials acknowledged that there could be, to quote Thiesse, two compatible Frances: the region and the nation.[107]

Notes

1. A[rchives] N[ationales], F1c III Hérault 9, 1 March 1818, prefect.
2. A[rchives] D[épartementales] Hérault, 1 M 822, 4 May 1869, prefect.
3. Karila-Cohen, *L'État des esprits*, 23–40; Caron et al., "La concordance des temps," 141–52; Hincker, "L'ordre bio-graphique," 9–11.
4. Cited by Price, *People and Politics*, 17.
5. Weber, *Peasants*, passim.
6. Karila-Cohen, "Le rapport administratif," 15; Karila-Cohen, *L'État des esprits*, 14–9; Price, *French Second Empire*, 174–7.
7. Price, *People and Politics*, 17; Karila-Cohen, *L'État des esprits*, 15; Wright, "Comment les préfets se voyaient" and Thuillier and Tulard, "Conclusions," 145–7 and 176–7, respectively.
8. Chartier, "La ligne," 739–75; Briquet, "Les territoires imaginaires," 385–401.
9. Gilroy, 'The Theme of "Être" and "Paraître,"' 205–11; Péronnet, "Sud, Midi," 3.
10. Bourguet, *Déchiffrer la France*, 39; Meyer et al., *Médecins, climats et épidémies*, 9–15.
11. Weber, *Peasants*, 9; Gerson, *The Pride of Place*, 1–9 and 279–88.
12. Bertho, "L'invention de la Bretagne," 45–62; Guillet, *Naissance de la Normandie*.
13. Carbonell, "Contribution à l'histoire des deux France," 7–22.
14. Cited by Péronnet, "Le Midi", 76.
15. Ibid., 77; Certeau et al., *Une politique de la langue*.
16. Chartier, *Cultural History*, 195; Briquet, "Les territoires imaginaires," 396.
17. Rosanvallon, *Demands of Liberty*, 4.
18. Ozouf, *L'école de France*, 54.
19. Ibid., 29 and 47, respectively.
20. Lucas, "The Problem," 1 and 19, respectively; Briquet, "Les 'primitifs' de la politique," 32–47. For Creuzé de Lesser's report, see endnote 1.
21. Quoted by Lucas, "The Problem," 23; Weber, *Peasants*, 104–8.
22. *Procès verbaux des séances de l'Assemblée administrative du Département de l'Hérault pendant la Révolution* (Montpellier, 1891), cited by Fournier, "Images du Midi," 91.

23. 21 Germinal Year IV (10 April 1796), cited by Péronnet, "Naissance révolutionnaire d'un Midi," 157; Agulhon, "Le centre et la périphérie," 829–30; Lucas, "The Problem," 2–5, 15–9 and 22–5; Martel, "Quand le Gascon fait la Révolution," 187–207; Péronnet, "Le Midi pendant la Révolution," 69–82.
24. Briquet, "Les territoires imaginaires," 394–9; Chartier, "La ligne," 739–55; Vovelle, "De la découverte de la Provence," 407–35.
25. Cabanis, "Le sudisme," 125.
26. Ibid., 111–2; Briquet, "Les territoires imaginaires," 396; Price, *People and Politics*, 17–19.
27. Pick, *Faces of Degeneration*, 40; Kramer, "Victor Jacquemont," 789–816.
28. Renaud de Vilback, *Voyages*, 275.
29. Cited by Bertier de Sauvigny, *La France*, 341.
30. Hugo, *France pittoresque*, 74.
31. Renaud de Vilback, *Voyages*, 330–1.
32. Taine, *Carnets*, 192–4. On Taine's travel journals, Wright and Clark, "Regionalism," 289.
33. Alexandre Dumas, *Nouvelles impressions de voyage (Midi de la France)* (Brussels, 1841), cited by Martel, "Quand le Gascon fait la Révolution," 204.
34. Taine, *Carnets*, 193; Didier, *Letters from Paris*, 18 and 238.
35. Noah, *Travels*, 196–7.
36. Malte-Brun, *La France illustrée*, 10.
37. Noah, *Travels*, 201; Hartmann, *Tagebuch*, 238–9.
38. Hartmann, *Tagebuch*, 240.
39. Ibid., 235.
40. Taine, *Carnets*, 194; Corbin, "Le XIXe siècle," 153–9; Karila-Cohen, *L'État des esprits*, 50–5; Rosanvallon, *Demands of Liberty*, 95–8.
41. Chauvaud, "La magistrature du parquet," 550–4; Church, *Revolution and Red Tape*, 285–311; Ebel, *Les préfets*, 119–22; Le Yoncourt, *Le préfet*, 94–6; Price, *French Second Empire*, 17 and 81–9.
42. Ebel, *Les préfets*, 122–9.
43. Karila-Cohen, *L'État des esprits*, 310 and , 311–6; "Le rapport administratif," 15–20; Hincker, "L'ordre bio-graphique," 9; Le Clère and Wright, *Les préfets*, 59–60.
44. Karila-Cohen, *L'État des esprits*, 310. Also , 309–53; Price, *People and Politics*, 17 and 174–5.
45. Price, *People and Politics*, 174; Lehning, *Peasant and French*; Rogers, "Good to Think," 56–63.
46. Karila-Cohen, "Le rapport administratif," 18–20.
47. Thuillier and Tulard, "Conclusions," 174; Wright, "Comment les préfets se voyaient," 150.
48. Forcade la Riquette, cited by Huard, *Le mouvement républicain*, 17.
49. AD Hérault, 1 M 815, 26–27 November 1834, prefect.
50. AN, BB30 380, 12 August 1851, and BB30 434, 22 June 1853, respectively, both attorney general.
51. AN, BB30 294, 4 July 1842, attorney general.
52. AN, F1c III Hérault 9, 8 April 1857, prefect; and n.d., prefect respectively.
53. AN, BB 30 380, 7 August 1851, attorney general.
54. AD Hérault, 1 M 926, 20 April 1848, Sûreté Générale, Ministry of the Interior.
55. AN, BB30 380, 13 July 1868, attorney general. Also F1b II Hérault 7, 5 May 1832, prefect.
56. Martel, "Quand le Gascon fait la Révolution," 200. The classic study of this social pathology remains Chevalier, *Classes laborieuses*.
57. Forstenzer, *French Provincial Police*, 101.
58. AN, F1b II Hérault 8, 28 December 1877, prefect. Also F1c III Hérault 14, 20 June 1852; and F1c III Hérault 9, 2 December 1866, both prefect; BB30 380, 5 April 1860, public prosecutor; Guionnet and Le Bart, "Conflit et politisation," 67–90.
59. AN, BB18 1323, 23 August 1831, lieutenant-colonel; and F1c II 99, 10 March 1852, prefect, respectively.
60. AN, F1b II Hérault 8, 28 December 1877, prefect. Also F1c III Hérault 9, 2 December 1866, prefect; BB30 380, 5 April 1860, public prosecutor.
61. AN, F1bI 170/15 (Pietri), 12 February 1861, prefect. Also AD Hérault, 1 M 814, 18 April 1833, prefect; 1 M 815, 26–27 November 1834, prefect; 1 M 537, 14 October 1852, prefect.
62. AD Hérault, 1 M 537, 14 October 1852, prefect.

63. Price, *French Second Empire*, 79 and 260, respectively.
64. AD Hérault, 1 M 997, 20 August 1852, chief of police.
65. AN, BB30 380, 29 January 1858, public prosecutor. Also AD Hérault, 1 M 839, 15 January 1862, sub-prefect (Béziers) and summary monthly reports of 1866, 1867 and 1868, all in AD Hérault, 1 M 822.
66. AN, BB30 380, 5 July 1858, public prosecutor.
67. AN, F1c III Hérault 9, 12 April 1856, prefect.
68. AN, BB30 380, 8 July 1853, public prosecutor.
69. , 13 January 1862, public prosecutor; 13 January 1853; 5 July 1858; 8 January 1859, all public prosecutor.
70. AN, BB30 366, 18 July 1850, public prosecutor.
71. AD Hérault, 1 M 839, 14 May 1862, sub-prefect (Béziers).
72. AN, F1c III Hérault 15, 10 February 1864, prefect.
73. De Cillia et al., "The discursive construction," 153–4.
74. AN, F1c Hérault 9, 8 October 1859, prefect. Also BB18 1789, 14 May 1869, public prosecutor.
75. AN, F1c IIII Hérault 9, 5 April 1868, prefect.
76. Ibid., 5 May 1868, prefect; Price, *French Second Empire*, 124–8 and 278–80.
77. AD Hérault, 1 M 839, 14 May 1862, sub-prefect (Béziers).
78. AN, BB30 380, 8 April 1859, public prosecutor. Also Chevalier, *Classes laborieuses*.
79. AD Hérault, 1 M 839, 29 May 1862, sub-prefect (Béziers); Rulof, "Popular Culture," 299–324.
80. AN, BB30 380, 7 July 1864, public prosecutor. Also F1c III Hérault 9, 5 April 1868, prefect.
81. AN, F1b II Hérault 15, 18 April 1833, prefect. Officials spoke of 'Carlism' and 'Carlists' when they referred to the most radical fraction of legitimism and its partisans.
82. AN, F1b II Hérault 7, 29 February 1840, prefect.
83. AN, BB 30 380, 12 August 1851, public prosecutor.
84. AN, F1b II Hérault 25, 6 April 1852, prefect.
85. For example, AN, BB30 380, 14 April and 12 October 1866 as well as BB18 1789, 5 and 25 May 1869, all public prosecutor.
86. AN, F1c III Hérault 9, 7 January 1868, prefect.
87. AN, BB30 380, 14 April 1867, public prosecutor.
88. For example, AN, BB18 1461, 1 August 1848, public prosecutor.
89. AN, BB30 380, 8 July 1862, public prosecutor. Also F1c III Hérault 9, 15 October 1858, prefect.
90. AN, F1b II Hérault 25, [1834], prefect. Also BB30 380, 30 June 1853, public prosecutor.
91. AN, F1b II Hérault 15, 18 April 1833, prefect. Also F1b II Hérault 7, 15 April 1833, prefect.
92. AN, F1c III Hérault 14, 25 October 1817, prefect.
93. AN, BB30 380, 30 June 1857, attorney general. Also F1c III Hérault 9, 5 March 1854; prefect.
94. AN, BB30 380, 8 December 1852, 8 July 1853, 30 June 1857 and 6 October 1863; BB18 1789, 29 May 1869, all public prosecutor; F1c III Hérault 9, 1 May and 3 August 1867, both prefect.
95. AD Hérault, 1 M 814, 5 September 1833, prefect and 1 M 923, 19 July 1841, chief of police respectively.
96. AD Hérault, 1 M 814, 5 September 1833, prefect and 1 M 923, 19 July 1841, chief of police respectively, 1 M 898, 7 November 1831, gendarme.
97. AD Hérault, 1 M 814, 5 September 1833, prefect and 1 M 923, 19 July 1841, chief of police respectively, 3 M 1150, 11 July 1857, prefect; Price, *French Second Empire*, 278–80.
98. AN, F1c III Hérault 9, 8 January 1853 and 8 April 1857, both prefect.
99. Said, *Orientalism*, 57 and 40, respectively.
100. Cuche, *La notion de culture*, 89; Bourdieu, "L'identité," 63–72; Briquet, "Les territoires imaginaires," 393–5; Briquet, "Les 'primitifs,'" 32–7 and 47.
101. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Malinova, "Creating Meanings," 41–54; Zimmer, *Contested Nation*.
102. Cuche, *La notion*, 89. On contemporary debates about representative politics, see Rosanvallon, *Le peuple introuvable*; La *démocratie inachevée* and *Le sacre du citoyen*.
103. On the 'diabolical representation of politics,' Chauvaud, "La magistrature," 551–5.
104. Laven and Baycroft, "Border regions," 255–62.

105. AN, F1c III Hérault 15, 10 February 1864, prefect. For the ambiguous use of stereotypes in reports about Corisca, Briquet, "Les 'primitifs,'," 33–4; Gerson, *Pride of Place*, 4.
106. Gerson, *Pride of Place*, 9. A similar argument is made by Thiesse, *Ils apprenaient la France* and Confino, *Nation*.
107. Laven and Baycroft, "Border regions," 262. See Applegate, *Nation*; Confino, *Nation*; Thiesse, "Les deux identités."

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