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To cite this article: Cherine Hussein (2015) The single-state alternative in Palestine/Israel, Conflict, Security & Development, 15:5, 521-547, DOI: [10.1080/14678802.2015.1100014](https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2015.1100014)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2015.1100014>



Published online: 23 Dec 2015.



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Analysis

The single-state alternative in Palestine/Israel

Cherine Hussein

Since the Oslo Accords, the two-state solution has dominated, and frustrated, the official search for peace in Palestine/Israel. In parallel to it, an alternative struggle of resistance—centred upon the single-state idea as a more liberating pathway towards justice to the conflict—has re-emerged against the hegemony of Zionism and the demise of a viable two-state solution in Palestine/Israel. This paper inquires into the nature of this phenomenon as a movement of resistance. To this end, it reconstructs the re-emergence of the single-state solution intellectually and organisationally from within a Gramscian-inspired lens—while specifically focusing upon the centrality of the anti-Oslo writings of Edward

Said and the consequent role of the Diaspora within this alternative. This it does from within a de-colonial approach to the politics of resistance which centres the political practices of the oppressed themselves in its analysis. Thus, it analyses the potential of the single-state alternative as a Gramscian ‘philosophical movement’ from within its own self-understandings, strategies and maps to power. In doing so, it aims to shed light upon a largely silenced pathway of resistance to the current peace process, to question its location between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’, and to take its possibility as a more just alternative to the status quo seriously.

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Gramsci and the politics of resistance: an introduction

The single-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict re-emerged within this present historical conjunction largely as an academic debate, centred upon a critique of Oslo, and driven by a number of prominent Palestinian and Israeli intellectuals. Painted and dismissed by many as a utopian academic exercise, my work sought to take a different pathway of inquiry—inquiring into the nature of the single-state alternative as a movement of resistance. This I did by exploring it through the analysis of diverse primary sourced materials—reconstructing its re-emergence intellectually and organisationally since the signing of the Oslo Accords from within its own strategies, self-understanding and maps to power. In doing so, I discovered that the decentralisation and diverse groups and personalities with uncoordinated actions involved in the broader picture of the single-state project make it difficult to decipher as a phenomenon that resembles any traditional view of what a movement looks like. Instead, I found that a more accurate reflection of the dynamics, shifts and strategies of this movement emerged when viewing it through a Gramscian-inspired lens—one that centres on the revolutionary power of philosophy, and the inherent link between thought and action in building a new, unified, collective historical force against a particular status quo. For Gramsci, it was this form of empowerment—activated by the organic intellectual—that he famously argued held the key to the transformation of the oppressed into a collective ‘historical force’ of liberating political change.

In view of this, the article presents this reconstruction in terms of what Gramsci defined as a ‘philosophical movement’¹—one that begins its struggle of resistance within the realm of ideas. As such, I argue that the single-state alternative represents a movement that is centred upon the launching of a project of critical pedagogy by organic intellectuals within their own communities in order to transcend the common sense ideas linking them to the status quo—in a process of mutual transformation and empowerment. This process itself is argued to revolutionise political possibilities on the ground—and is reflected in Ilan Pappé’s assertion that while the current two-state solution needs politicians, the single-state solution needs educators,² and involves the launching of a long-term process of resistance aimed at decolonisation, liberation and empowerment. For Gramsci, this was the central meaning behind his claim that the

creation of a new, liberating worldview was not only based on the triggering of a process of critical and historical self-understanding—but on the creation and consolidation of a new form of civil and political society.

The highlighting of the centrality of common sense within the framing of my work also seeks to emphasise that interlinked with the fact that Gramsci's conception of civil society is the sphere of hegemony (and hence the arena from within which counter-hegemony is waged) is the fact that it is not only 'an integral part of the state', but simultaneously the state's 'most resilient and constitutive element'.³ As such, Gramsci's political struggle was aimed at waging a territorial 'war of position'—or revolutionary strategy, 'that would be employed in the arena of civil society with the aim of disabling the coercive apparatus of the state, gaining access to power and creating a consensual society where no group is reduced to subaltern status'.⁴ Thus, part of the struggle against common sense involves an active effort by organic intellectuals to widen the scope of dissent and create spaces of resistance where none had existed before. Hence, it is a potent strategy involving the geographical and intellectual conquest of diverse interlinked civil societies—one that aims at turning enough of their institutions and associations into interlinked social forces that support a more just social and political reality. It is therefore also an educative, gradual process, and not necessarily one that starts from a terrain within which it has many followers. As such, while it could be argued that the fact that the majority of Jewish-Israelis oppose a single-state solution today presents a significant obstacle to the present single-state movement, for Gramsci specifically, this is not an insurmountable obstacle. For, as many single-state intellectuals point out, this struggle represents first and foremost a process of resistance that must be built within the strategy of a war of position. Thus, the central issue revolves around where to uncover the spaces, from within which organic intellectuals can launch their counterhegemonic movement and create new constituencies and possibilities on the ground—and not how large or small their pool of supporters happens to be within the present moment.

In parallel to the above, the choice to centre the political practices of the oppressed themselves—and of exploring where the potential for meaningful social transformation is seen to be located when it is analysed from within this different point of beginning—arose out of a Gramscian desire to always begin with the messiness and territorial geography of 'life' itself.⁵ Thus, I seek to neither privilege International Relations (IR)

as such, nor debates within IR surrounding Gramsci himself—but to activate Gramsci's philosophy of praxis in order to inquire into how situated practices of resistance may inform our understandings of international relations, and illuminate new pathways of liberation for those who struggle on the ground today.⁶ For, it is with this powerfully enabling impulse that critical theory first entered the discipline, highlighting the need to begin from within the secular world in order to revolutionise selves, realities and political possibilities, while proclaiming that another world is possible. Emphasising the centrality and political nature of both knowledge, and its producers, in building, maintaining and dismantling status quos—it is from within this empowering space that this article also begins.

Edward Said and the re-emergence of the single-state idea

As alluded to in the introduction, the single-state idea itself is of course not new, and has historical precedents and formulations within both Jewish and Palestinian histories. Perhaps less known is the fact that while the Oslo Accords were largely perceived to have launched a peace process that would lead to a two-state solution by the 'international community'⁷—and were represented in that way within their civil societies—in reality they represented a process based upon the principle of separation and limited Palestinian autonomy for the Israeli side,⁸ and the potential of launching a territorial war of position towards the formation of a viable two-state solution for the Palestinian side. Thus, as Edward Said has argued, it was a particular formulation of Zionist hegemony that is contended to have prevailed in Oslo's vision and processes—one that took the form of a 'modified Allon Plan',⁹ and has transformed Palestinian and Israeli lives and territory along the lines of this vision and its imperatives. As such, it could be argued that what has existed in Palestine/Israel has in fact always represented diverse formulations of a single state—one which took the form of a single apartheid, Bantustan state in the aftermath of the processes of Oslo and after.

It is the masking of these oppressive territorial and economic realities—through the production of an abstracted dominant common sense discourse that reflects the power dynamics on the ground—that Gramsci argued keeps oppressive conceptions of the world hegemonic, making them seem inevitable and impossible to change. And since

it is within the countering of these common sense notions that Gramscian counter-hegemony begins, it is my contention that the present single-state idea re-emerged as an alternative pathway to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from within a collective critique of the paradigms and transformations of the Oslo peace process. This platform of emergence—based upon a highlighting of the processes of separation and Zionist expansion that the Oslo Accords both embraced and worsened on the ground—is one of the main unifying elements of the single-state movement’s alternative worldview today. Similarly, it is also from within this critique that single-state intellectuals articulated their visions and strategies of resistance for social transformation against the peace process, and continue to do so as of this writing. Centred upon a critical process of historical self-understanding and empowerment, this form of transformation is one that is based upon overcoming oppression altogether—liberating both the coloniser and the colonised.

In triggering this moment of becoming, and launching this call for a resistance movement embodying a liberating form of decolonisation based upon the desire for mutual coexistence and the recognition of mutual humanity, I argue that the anti-Oslo writings of Edward Said are central.¹⁰ Thus, the momentum of the transformation of the resurgent one-state idea into a collectively endorsed vision can arguably be traced back to Said’s writing of an article entitled, ‘The One-State Solution’ for *The New York Times* in 1999. Interestingly, this same article was run in the Egyptian *Al-Ahram Weekly*, under the different title of ‘Truth and Reconciliation’—mirroring two key principles that are argued to underlie the single-state’s conception of the world. To many of those involved in this struggle against the common sense of the peace process, this highlighting of the complex, intermingled truth on the ground that is based upon a desire for justice, decolonisation and reconciliation, reflects what lies at the core of their counterhegemonic project of liberation both theoretically and politically. This core premise is mirrored in Said’s words:

*It is my view that the peace process has in fact put off the real reconciliation that must occur if the 100-year war between Zionism and the Palestinian people is to end. Oslo set the stage for separation, but real peace can come only with a binational Israeli-Palestinian state [...] I see no other way than to begin now to speak about sharing the land that has thrust us together, sharing it in a truly democratic way, with equal rights for each citizen.*¹¹

Said argues that while Israel's 'raison d'être as a state has always been that there should be a separate country, a refuge, exclusively for Jews',¹² and that this principle of separation was the basis upon which Oslo's vision and processes lay, the fact remains that the lives of Israeli-Jews and Palestinians continue to be inextricably intermingled. This intertwining was further exacerbated by the fact that this Israeli urge for separation was paradoxically linked to that of a desire for territorial expansion in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), which necessarily entailed the annexation of more and more communities of Palestinians. This increase, of course, is in addition to the Palestinian-Israelis within Israel proper who make up 20 per cent of the population. And while the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements within the oPt has been accompanied by the building of 'a whole network of connecting roads reserved for Israeli citizens only and, most recently, the Separation (in Afrikaans, *apartheid*) Wall',¹³ Said underlines the fact that this has only made separation within the small land of historical Palestine even more unviable. Thus, he writes:

*Palestinian self-determination in a separate state is unworkable, just as unworkable as the principle of separation between a demographically mixed, irreversibly connected Arab population without sovereignty and a Jewish population with it. The question is not how to devise means for persisting in trying to separate them but to see whether it is possible for them to live together.*¹⁴

In many ways, Said's article represented a call to action to do just that—to counter the dominant idea of separation as being the only solution to the conflict with a new conception of the world that is based upon the desire to coexist, reconcile and share the land. This stemmed from a desire to highlight the messiness of life itself, and to reinsert the overlapping territorial and human realities back into the accepted notion that an abstract, clinical separation remains both possible, and the only route to peace. Similarly, it is rooted within the argument that partition itself as a solution has historically rarely worked.¹⁵

Perhaps even more crucially for Said, this attack upon separation is a reflection of his rejection of the essentialist, binary identities and histories that underpin much of the common sense understandings and depictions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—while concealing the fluidity of the overlapping interconnectedness of people, histories and spaces of coexistence that exist and have historically existed upon the land. Hence,

*Palestine is and always has been a land of many histories; it is a radical simplification to think of it as principally, or exclusively Jewish or Arab[...] [there is a need for] an innovative, daring and theoretical willingness to get beyond the arid stalemate of assertion and rejection.*¹⁶

In this vein, Said calls upon both Israelis and Palestinians ‘to undertake political initiatives that hold Jews and Arabs to the same general principles of civil equality while avoiding the pitfalls of us-versus-them’.¹⁷ In parallel, he calls upon Palestinian intellectuals to ‘express their case directly to Israelis in public forums, universities, and the media’¹⁸ and to actively mount a challenge ‘within civil society, which long has been subordinate to a nationalism that has developed into an obstacle to reconciliation’¹⁹ in the name of peaceful coexistence and a more liberating worldview for both people. However, Said simultaneously highlights the fact that if this more inclusive worldview is to emerge as an effective force, it is imperative that injustice is jointly countered by both Israelis and Palestinians who seek an alternative pathway to real self-determination for all. In other words, the call was for a movement that must both be one of active resistance to the worldview of the present status quo—and, as Ilan Pappé would state years later, ‘the very composition of the movement (should) be a model for the future’.²⁰

It is within this context that Said is often cited as one of the central inspirations behind the resurgence of the single-state idea in its present form, as well as the intellectual to whom many of the current single-state advocates dedicate their struggle both theoretically and politically. Thus, the inauguration of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) conference in 2007 on ‘A Single State in Palestine/Israel’ begins with a tribute to Said, and a quote from this very same article:

*The beginning is to develop something entirely missing from both Israeli and Palestinian realities today: the idea and practice of citizenship, not of ethnic or racial community, as the main vehicle of coexistence.*²¹

It is crucial to emphasise that this point of beginning set the stage for what would become the single-state idea’s second unifying platform—which is that of its articulation as an attack on the ideology and practices of a separatist, essentialist, settler-colonial political Zionism.

While elaborating upon the details of this unifying anti-Zionist platform is beyond the scope of this article,²² it should be noted that the single-state movement was

primarily conceived of as a de-colonial counterhegemonic resistance struggle that is based upon the political desire to de-Zionise Palestine/Israel. This is rooted in the fact that it is political Zionism itself that is perceived by single-state intellectuals to stand in the way of coexistence, justice, equal citizenship and the liberation of both people's common humanity from oppression. The centrality of this premise is reflected in Omar Barghouti's statement that, 'We are organizing for self-determination (for all) and the ethical de-Zionisation of Palestine'.²³ Similarly, it is echoed by Ilan Pappé, who argues that:

*A movement for a one-state solution disseminates a new discourse about the past, about Zionism as colonialism [...] about the magnitude of the Israeli destruction of the land of Palestine, [and] about the future which [can be] different from the present.*²⁴

It is within this unifying platform of anti-Zionism that the struggle for a single-state solution in Palestine/Israel represents not only a struggle of Palestinian resistance and liberation—which, of course, it primarily is—but one of Jewish-Israeli liberation as well. This platform of unity is also a reflection of the single-state movement's critique of the common sense of Oslo itself—and as such is rooted within it in an effort to transcend it, and revolutionise political possibilities on the ground.

Critiquing the common sense of the Oslo Accords and after

In November 2007, the Annapolis Conference was applauded for creating history by being the first conference between Israel and the Palestinians (within the framework of the American sponsored peace process) to directly endorse a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Aimed at demonstrating international support for the two-state solution at a time when US State Secretary Condoleezza Rice warned that the window for the creation of a viable two-state solution was closing,²⁵ the conference's joint declaration was strongly supported by the Middle East Quartet. Made up of the United States, the European Union, the Russian Federation, as well as the UN, the Quartet also, 'took note of the broad international support for the Annapolis Conference' and 'affirmed its commitment to seize this opportunity to mobilize international

support to achieve meaningful progress towards a just and lasting negotiated settlement to this conflict'.²⁶

In parallel to Annapolis though, a different group of Israelis and Palestinians came together in a self-financed conference hosted at SOAS in London, entitled, 'Challenging the Boundaries: A Single State in Palestine/Israel'. This conference was put together by students of the newly created London One State Group and the SOAS Palestine Society. Organised as a follow-up to the Madrid Conference in July of that same year, it aimed at creating 'a platform for a broad debate on democratic alternatives to the two-state paradigm, and mak[ing] those ideas more accessible to the general public'.²⁷ Bringing together many of the prominent Israeli and Palestinian academics and activists who have spoken out and written against the peace process since Oslo, the conference aimed at highlighting the fact that the two-state solution had failed to bring about peace and justice for the Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish people.

Instead, these intellectuals argued that the two-state solution served to distract from the territorial and political realities on the ground; to distract from the fact that the processes unleashed by Oslo 'entrench[ed] and formalise[d] a policy of unequal separation on a land that has become ever more integrated territorially and economically';²⁸ and to distract from the fact that an independent Palestinian state was no longer viable on the ground. Moreover, they argued that the process of the solution is based upon a false premise of equality in terms of both power and morality between 'a colonized and occupied people on the one hand and a colonizing state and military occupier on the other'.²⁹ Furthermore, the process' historical point of beginning and terms are set within 'the unjust premise that peace can be achieved by granting limited national rights to Palestinians living in the areas occupied in 1967, while denying the rights of Palestinians inside the 1948 borders and in the Diaspora'.³⁰ In view of this, these intellectuals argued that a just, liberating alternative must be found to counter this paradigm of peacemaking and its deflection from the continuing processes of separation and colonisation on the ground.

To this end—after two days of debate—the conference culminated with the drafting of 'The One State Declaration'.³¹ This declaration set out the principles upon which all of the participants of both Madrid and London agreed an alternative democratic single-state solution should be founded, mobilised for and created. These principles included the fact that any process of justice must historically begin in 1948, and affirm

the fact that the land of Palestine historically belongs ‘to all who live in it and to those who were expelled or exiled from it since 1948, regardless of religion, ethnicity, national origin or current citizenship status’;³² that any system of government must be based upon the principle of equality in all of its diverse arenas; that the Palestinian right of return must be implemented; that any form of state must be non-sectarian; that a process of justice and reconciliation must be launched; and significantly, that the segments of the Palestinian collective that have been historically silenced by Oslo—the Palestinian Diaspora, the Palestinian refugees and the Palestinians inside Israel—must be centrally involved in the articulation of the outlines and contents of such a solution.³³ As shall be elaborated upon below, it is these principles that remain the basis of unity within the vision, strategies and initiatives of this group of organic intellectuals and activists—despite their divisions, lack of centralised coordination and, at times, shifts in emphasis or direction. In parallel to this, these principles also reflect what these organic intellectuals perceive to be, and articulate as, the oppressive common sense of the peace process since Oslo. It is this ‘labour of intellectual criticism’ that represents their unified platform of emergence as a potential alternative force. In the conference’s closing session, the London One State Group stated, ‘The two days of discussions in London proved that there’s a growing movement among Palestinians and Israelis that calls for thinking about their common future in terms of equality and integration, rather than separation and exclusion’.³⁴

The main arguments of the resurgent single-state idea’s critique of the common sense of Oslo—and hence the location from within which their counterhegemonic struggle emanates in order to transcend the hegemony of the peace process and Zionist separation—can be mapped into three main threads. Presented as they are perceived and struggled against by single-state intellectuals, the first of these common sense notions revolves around the accepted idea that Oslo represents the launching of a process of peace. Thus, it is important to underline that for single-state intellectuals, the peace process since Oslo does not reflect the launching of a comprehensive process for peace based upon the desire for justice and reconciliation—but a process of separation and fragmentation. The reason for this is rooted in the Accords’ choice of historical point of beginning. Hence, single-state intellectuals argue that beginning the peace process in 1967 results in the erasure of the Palestinian Nakba, in absolving Israel of any responsibility for the ethnic cleansing of 1948, and as such in closing a significant

door for justice and reconciliation between the two people. Moreover, beginning the peace process in 1967 also denies Palestinian history and rights to self-determination by setting the occupied Palestinian territory as the only territorial part of historical Palestine on which negotiations can be held. Thus, the peace process involved negotiations that would lead to further territorial concessions and fragmentation within the West Bank and Gaza Strip from its start. Furthermore, by erasing 1948, it was also based on the fragmentation of the Palestinian collective from its beginning—excluding both the Palestinians inside Israel, and the Palestinian refugees from the negotiating table. As such, the single-state movement is an effort to relocate the search for peace and justice between Israelis and Palestinians in 1948. Crucially, it also represents a force that seeks to reunify the Palestinian collective, as previously stated by Palestinian intellectual Ali Abunimah, ‘around an idea that serves the rights and the agenda and aspirations of us all’.³⁵

In parallel to this, single-state intellectuals argue that it is only by beginning in 1948, that true processes of justice and reconciliation can be launched between the two people. Thus, Israeli activist and founder of Zochrot,³⁶ Eitan Bronstein argues:

*One state is the only arrangement that will permit Palestinian refugees to realise their right to return. The implementation of this right is both moral and a necessary step towards ending the conflict and reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. It also gives the Israelis the opportunity to be true inhabitants of this land rather than settlers or colonisers.*³⁷

As such, the One State Declaration stipulates that any process of peace must begin in 1948, and involve all of the inhabitants of Mandate Palestine, regardless of ethnicity, religion and current citizenship status.

The second common sense idea struggled against by the single-state movement revolves around the accepted notion that Oslo marks the beginning of a process towards a two-state solution to the conflict. Thus, while Oslo was applauded by the international community as the beginning of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, single-state intellectuals argue that it represented the launching and exacerbation of Zionist processes of separation and colonisation. While these processes themselves are beyond the scope of this paper,³⁸ it is important to note that single-state intellectuals view the fact that the peace process is officially accepted as one that will lead to a two-state solution as both a ‘misnaming’ of the two-state

solution itself, and as a deflection from the realities on the ground within Palestine/Israel that have made a two-state solution territorially and economically unviable. In parallel to this, single-state intellectuals view the concessions made by Arafat—in order to be able to return to the oPt and launch a war of position from within it—as the beginning of the emergence of a Palestinian Authority (PA) that was placed in an inevitable position of collaboration with Israeli occupation and colonisation, while simultaneously having sidelined Palestinian popular resistance. Hence, the single-state movement is an attempt at reigniting non-violent Palestinian mass resistance to the continuing processes of separation and colonisation, as well as a call for both reformulating the PA and re-democratising the PLO into an organisation that represents, empowers and reunifies the whole Palestinian collective. It is also due to this position on the two-state solution that single-state intellectuals do not see their battle as one that is against supporters of the two-state solution itself. Rather, they view their struggle as one that is against the processes of Zionism, and against those who collaborate with its processes.

The third hegemonic idea the single-state alternative takes issue with is the accepted notion that the Palestinian Authority represents the Palestinian people. For, they argue, it was only Arafat and his small entourage in Tunis who were involved in the acceptance of the terms of the Oslo Accords on behalf of the PLO—which resulted in a crisis of representation within the Palestinian national collective, as well as a questioning of the legitimacy of a leadership that viewed the internationally recognised rights of its collective as bargaining chips that could be compromised. Thus, at the SOAS One State conference, Joseph Massad famously stated:

*To date, no Diaspora Palestinian has proposed to Israel that if Israel grant the Diaspora a right of return, in exchange, it could deny West Bank and Gaza Palestinians their right to self-determination, and continue to colonize their land. Why then does the leadership of the West Bank believe that it can compromise the rights of Palestinians it does not even represent?*³⁹

In accepting the terms of Oslo and after, the PLO officially accepted the fragmentation of the Palestinian collective and the erasure of the rights of the Palestinian Diaspora and refugees and Palestinian-Israelis. Therefore, single-state intellectuals argue that the view that the PA represents the Palestinian people today is one that only holds if the only people recognised as Palestinians are Palestinians who are native to the West

Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGs)—and not the Palestinian refugees currently present within the WBGs. In this vein then, only native WBGs Palestinians would be set to benefit from the peace process. However, single-state intellectuals point out that even these Palestinians' lives have been made significantly worse by the processes of Oslo, with the 'only hope awaiting them being an apartheid Bantustan solution'.⁴⁰ It is from within this context that single-state intellectuals seek to throw the PA into the 'dustbin of history',⁴¹ and to re-democratise the PLO. More significantly, it is also from within this context that the single-state movement can be seen as one initially launched as a war of position of the Palestinian Diaspora, Palestinian refugees and Palestinian-Israelis. As reflected in the One State Declaration, it is those who have been historically silenced by Oslo who must now become central agents in the articulation, mobilisation and creation of a more just alternative to the status quo.

The Palestinian Diaspora and questions of territoriality

It is important to underline that the single-state alternative emerged from within an explicit political desire to highlight the territorial facts on the ground that have been silenced by an abstracted peace process since the Oslo Accords. Thus, single-state intellectuals seek to push the oppressive common sense notions of the peace process 'back into the human struggles from which they emerge',⁴² and to re-insert the 'gross physical evidence of human activity'⁴³—in all of their messy complexities—back into the discussion of the promotion of peace and justice in Palestine/Israel. Hence, their political project of counterhegemony represents the exact opposite of what many two-state solution supporters accuse them of—namely, that they are engaged in a dangerous exercise of promoting an impossible utopian alternative to a conflict that requires an urgent solution more than ever before. Thus, Eyal Sivan argues:

It might be a professional deformation, or just a refusal of notions like utopia—but I have a problem in speaking about a one state solution [...] as a future idea. I deal with documentary cinema and documentary cinema deals with what exists. One state [...] is the accurate juridical definition of what is today the ruling power over Palestine, or Eretz Israel. [This] is not [about] a revolutionary position that requires us to think about how we can

*create this one state. What I'm talking about is more modest, more concrete —the transformation of the existing one state into a democratic state.*⁴⁴

It is also within this context of dealing with what exists that Virginia Tilley's book, *The One State Solution*, sought to ignite a debate highlighting what she termed the 'immovable obstacles on the ground' that rendered a two-state solution unviable—the most important among them being the expanding illegal Israeli settlements in the oPt. Thus, she stresses that her book sought to illustrate:

*The geographic realities of the settlement grid—that huge and deliberately sprawling network of stone and concrete cities, suburbs, industrial zones and highways that has already dissected the West Bank into cantons—as well as the social, political and economic grids that underpin them.*⁴⁵

This settlement grid itself is designed to form blocks, which grow outwards and towards each other in order to remain territorially continuous—and enclose Palestinian areas into fragmented cantons.⁴⁶ Significantly, part of this illegal settlement design also aims at annexing Jerusalem to Israel and disconnecting it from the West Bank.⁴⁷

Similarly, in a much publicised debate with two-state supporter Uri Avnery, Ilan Pappé echoes the irreversibility of the settlements on the ground of the oPt, stressing that it is the two-state solution that has become utopian and divorced from reality:

*If this unrealistic two state formula—that says that settlements can be dismantled—is realizable, who is going to dismantle Gilo? Who is going to dismantle Ma'ale Adumim? The real two state formula is the one being implemented in front of our eyes. It means fifty percent of the West Bank annexed to Israel, and the other fifty percent as a Bantustan surrounded by walls and fences, but with a Palestinian flag.*⁴⁸

Moreover, in this context of being painted as disconnected dreamers by those who oppose them, it is perhaps also important to note that many among today's single-state activists and intellectuals had been two-state solution supporters themselves. As such, it is this collision with 'the facts on the ground' that prompted them to reorient their struggle for the re-emergence of a single-state solution as an alternative. Furthermore, as Pappé emphasises, this conclusion that the two-state solution had collapsed

was reached by diverse groups of people within this historical conjuncture—and it is within this convergence that the alternative idea's resurgent power lies.⁴⁹

While Palestinian-Israelis were originally acknowledged to be the central energy behind the re-emergence of the single-state idea, it is Diaspora Palestinians who are its fastest growing force. Thus, at a single-state conference Ghada Karmi states, the 'constituency where the one state has got the most currency [...] is the Palestinian Diaspora'.⁵⁰ This is illustrated by the fact that they visibly reflect the largest constituency of single-state organic intellectuals present at publicly organised single-state events—such as the fast growing network of conferences aimed at expanding the single-state movement.⁵¹ While this visibility could be linked to their geographical locations and mobility, this rapid expansion is also reflected in the growing number of single-state initiatives and networks within which the Diaspora are involved.

Among these was the forming of what became known as the Palestine Strategy Group—whose members met for a series of intensive workshops, after which they released a document entitled, *Regaining the Initiative: Palestinian Strategic Options to end the Israeli Occupation*.⁵² The report's main aim was to create a unified platform, leadership and voice for all Palestinians. In it, the group called for the rejection of what they termed the 'peacemaking'⁵³ and 'state-building'⁵⁴ discourses as ones based on fabricated realities and entities—such as a Palestinian state—that do not exist. Thus, as Abunimah writes, the report 'calls on Palestinians to reject and expose the deceptive language of "peacemaking" and "state-building" that have been used to conceal and perpetuate a lived reality of expulsion, domination and occupation at Israel's hands'.⁵⁵ Instead, the report advocated that these discourses be replaced with one that is centred around decolonisation, liberation and self-determination—since such a discourse accurately reflects the lived realities and social, political and territorial transformations on the ground. Importantly, the stress for these authors was upon the need for the international community to embrace this discourse of decolonisation and to stop concealing the gravity of these realities by collaborating in the perpetuation of the 'peacemaking' and 'state-building' discourses.

Additionally, the report was an embrace of Palestinian agency, and conveyed an empowering message to the Palestinian community by underlining the fact that they have the power to become an active force in shaping where the peace process goes from here, and that they need to seize control of their own destiny. Thus, they wrote:

‘The central proposal in this report is that Israel’s strategic calculations are wrong. Israeli strategic planners overestimate their own strength and underestimate the strategic opportunities open to Palestinians’.⁵⁶ These ‘strategic opportunities’ include ‘the definitive closing down of the 1988 negotiation option’,⁵⁷ as well as the reformulation of the Palestinian Authority from an entity that serves Israeli interest and legitimises occupation, to one that becomes a ‘Palestinian Resistance Authority’;⁵⁸ the reconstitution of the PLO as an organisation of national unity and resistance; and significantly, ‘the shift from a two state outcome to a [binational or unitary democratic] single-state outcome as Palestinians’ preferred strategic goal’.⁵⁹

Following this report, another important initiative by this group of intellectuals was represented in the launching of Al-Shabaka: ‘The first independent strategy and policy-related think tank for Palestinians and by Palestinians. A think tank without borders or walls, Al-Shabaka draws on and benefits from the diverse experiences of Palestinians from around the world’.⁶⁰ Significantly, Al-Shabaka’s principles and visions are ‘guided by Palestinian civil society’s 2005 Call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS)’ against Israel, until it complies with international law.⁶¹ The BDS call makes three main demands: that Israel dismantles the wall and ends its occupation of the oPt; that it recognises the right of Palestinian-Israelis to full and equal citizenship; and that it implements the Palestinian right of return.⁶² Moreover, many of its original 35 policy advisors are prominent single-state supporters, the work of the network is fully funded by its members and its Palestinian supporters, and its self-expressed mission is to ‘educate and foster public debate on Palestinian human rights and self-determination within the framework of international law’.⁶³

Many Diaspora Palestinians also engage with the idea of incorporating elements of Hamas to their cause,⁶⁴ or engaging them within the dialogues of the single-state idea. Viewing the movement as one that remains largely uncorrupted by politics, and represents a symbol of resistance on the ground, these intellectuals are open to, and often argue for, the need to engage with Hamas’s leadership.⁶⁵ Moreover, they argue that Hamas remains uncorrupted by the Oslo peace process, and that its leadership has shown itself to be capable of much pragmatism in both accepting a two-state solution, as well as being open to a single-state solution. Thus, Joseph Massad voices his dismay at what he perceives to be an orientalist, secular bias among those who seek to dismiss Hamas on principle:

*The elephant in the room of course is Hamas. The Hamas leadership has shown much flexibility on many questions. The attempt to depict Hamas through an Orientalist Zionist or even secular chauvinist lens as some unchanging Islamist chauvinist group is not only untrue, but anti-Islamist. Hamas remains a leadership that has remained uncorrupt, and also open to all kinds of issues, and therefore, I think we can influence the Hamas leadership in some ways on the question of the one state solution. Many of the top leaders of Hamas have shown much openness about the idea of one country. To dismiss them apriori is a big mistake.*⁶⁶

Among the Palestinian Diaspora, this desire for engagement is more pronounced in relation to elements within the cadres of Fatah—who themselves have become critical of the corruption and collaboration of the PA's leaders with Zionism and are searching for alternatives to the current reality. As Leila Farsakh has highlighted, this disillusionment is taking place in the context of a generational struggle within Fatah between its old cadres and its younger ones. While Farsakh underlines that it remains too early to analyse in which direction these younger elements may shift Fatah's political positions, '[w]hat has been noted is that the young Fatah cadres in the West Bank at least have started an internal debate on whether or not to adopt the one-state solution as a political project'.⁶⁷ This, added to the existence of support for the idea among some cadres who view it as reformulating Fatah's own single-state idea, provides some hopeful signs for single-state intellectuals seeking to enlarge constituencies on the ground. However, no representative within Fatah has embraced the present single-state solution as a political position yet. Moreover, as Farsakh emphasises, '[b]oth young and old [Fatah] cadres cannot yet envisage a political struggle for citizenship and equal rights before first obtaining their own Palestinian state'.⁶⁸ In a similar vein, on this dilemma of lack of official representation within the oPt despite the existence of support for the single-state idea, Ali Abunimah underlines that:

Right now the main split among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories is between supporters of resistance and effectively...collaborating with Israel. It's not an even split. There is a class and a segment that are benefiting from the status quo and want it to continue. On the other hand, there is support. All the polls show that a solid fifth to a quarter sometimes as high as a third are interested in a one state solution, or see it as possible and

*desirable on the basis of equal citizenship. But they're not represented. There aren't political parties or movements that represent the 20 percent of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories who want a one state solution.*⁶⁹

Hence, for Diaspora intellectuals the question of official leadership remains an open one at present—one that is centred within calls for the need to revitalise the PLO around a political programme that reunifies all three segments of the Palestinian people.

However, it should also be mentioned that for the majority of these intellectuals, the movement's lack of a concrete organised structure or leadership at this point in time does not represent a central concern. In this vein, Abunimah argues that:

*You have tremendously committed people. Palestinians second and third generation, who have clear politics, who are more committed than their parents, and they didn't need any centralized leadership to bring them to that. I do think that there is something [about the internet] [...] Things aren't done by centralised organizations [anymore].*⁷⁰

Paralleling this view, many single-state networks, groups and alternative media forums have been created on the Internet—the most famous among them being Abunimah's *Electronic Intifada* (EI), which he himself describes as 'a major forum for discussing the One State Solution',⁷¹ and as the sort of alternative forum that is essential for any marginalised movement to create. As such he states: 'I do see things as EI as absolutely necessary because you cannot rely on the mainstream media, which are generally committed to the hegemonic consensus'.⁷² This strategy is used by the single-state movement in order to disseminate its critiques, worldview and actions to as wide an audience as possible—as well as in an effort to create new constituencies, and stage interventions that would not be accepted within the mainstream media and its institutions. Moreover, there are many intellectuals who target popular mainstream media outlets, and use their academic standing and writing skills in order to infiltrate public discourse.⁷³ Constantly in fear of, and on guard against, co-optation by parties, politicians, factions (or funding) linked to particular states or to the status quo, it is this form of decentralised organisation that these intellectuals find themselves most comfortable with at present.

It might follow from the above then that it is the centrality of the role and involvement of Diaspora Palestinians within the present resurgence of the single-state idea

that lies at the root of its emphasis upon equal rights and citizenship for all—as well as that of international law—as opposed to that of establishing a Palestinian nation-state within a framework of national self-determination. This particular worldview can be argued to stem from both the predominantly North American location of these intellectuals, as well as the marked influence of the writings of Edward Said upon them and their debates. Hence, the engagement of these intellectuals with debates on citizenship, civil rights, equality, identity and democracy within a North American setting—coupled with the influence of the kind of movements they encountered within it—make ideas linked to Palestinian nationalism seem one-dimensional and claustrophobic. Thus, Abunimah states:

*To many Diaspora Palestinians, the whole idea of nationalism [...] has lost its luster [...] What Palestinians do want and need, is freedom of movement and expression, education, and equal access to the benefits of democratic society.*⁷⁴

It is from within this context of fluidity, transience and multiplicity that there is anxiety towards ideas linked to binationalism among Diaspora Palestinians—ideas that they argue are rooted in the need to define communities into reified, static national identities. As such, due to their more universalised perceptions of identity, their more eclectic ideological orientations, and perhaps the more pronounced visibility of women amongst them, Diaspora Palestinians overwhelmingly support a secular, democratic state solution. Elaborating on this impulse of openness and inclusion Yasmin Abulaban states:

*The way I would articulate it is not around binationalism, partly because [...] when you start talking about nation and national communities, it can sound very closed. So what does that mean when you say there are two national communities? Who's included in that? I would favour the idea of a secular democratic state.*⁷⁵

Similarly, on the link between the realisation of the three demands reunifying all segments of the Palestinians and the inclusionary character of the secular democratic solution, Omar Barghouti states:

The democratic solution lays out the clearest mechanism for ending the three tiered regime of Israeli Zionist oppression—the occupation and

*colonization of the 1967 territory; the system of racial discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel, which is the Zionist form of apartheid; and the total denial of refugee rights, particularly the right to return home and to reparations.*⁷⁶

This preference is further emphasised by the self-perception of many Diaspora Palestinians as ‘secular humanists’, as well as their more fluid and universal experience of identity and place. Thus, on where he would locate himself within the Palestinian collective, George Bisharat states:

*I consider myself Palestinian-American. My father was Palestinian, from Jerusalem, and my mother is American. I have lived most of my life in the US, although I have spent extended periods of time in Palestine, and elsewhere in the Middle East, including Cairo. I consider myself first and foremost a humanist and an activist for justice and human rights worldwide.*⁷⁷

It may be useful at this point to highlight that the single-state movement is organised in a manner in which each bloc of intellectuals works within the communities and geographies to which they are organically linked.⁷⁸ This stems from the fact that most single-state intellectuals feel that they can only represent, or speak from within, the collectives of Palestinians and Israelis to which they belong—with the recognition that this sense of belonging is more straightforward for some than others. Interlinked with this is a conviction that the emphasis on action and resistance has to reside primarily within the local, contextualised settings in which they live, even if it targets a wider audience geographically. Hence, Jewish-Israeli intellectuals work within their communities, Palestinian-Israelis within theirs, and so on—while those who live outside of Palestine/Israel come together within their local communities in exile to promote single-state initiatives, and give exposure to the idea among the diverse groups, media outlets and institutions they are affiliated with therein. This form of grassroots mobilising aims at conquering public spaces and creating new constituencies in diverse, interlinked geographic theatres—in the hopes of building enough momentum to eventually create a ‘reconstructive moment’.

In a similar vein, while an integral part of the single-state movement—especially among its Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli blocs—is to create alliances with communities and movements in Israel who would be open to a single democratic state, the movement remains geopolitically focused upon mobilising resistance within ‘a

Palestinian pillar, an Arab pillar and an international pillar'.⁷⁹ To return to the prominent role of Diaspora Palestinians, to their insistence upon emphasising the power of re-centring international law within their battles, to their territorial locations within the West, and their more universalised self-perceptions as humanists engaged in inter-linked global struggles within this arena, it is within the international pillar that the single-state movement has been most active in promoting its struggle, and it is also within this arena that it has made the most powerful and rapidly expanding gains.

This success is largely due to the launching of the global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement against the state of Israel. While the BDS movement itself is beyond the scope of this paper,⁸⁰ it is important to stress that it is intimately intertwined with the single-state movement's strategy of 'South-Africanising' the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hence, in parallel to the flurry of single-state conferences from around 2003 to 2010, single-state advocates began to draw parallels between Israeli apartheid and South African apartheid, and to call for 'South-Africanising' the Israeli-Palestinian conflict instead of continuing to use the occupation-liberation paradigm. Thus, for example, in 2003 Uri Davis published his critically acclaimed book *Apartheid Israel* detailing Zionism's specific form of apartheid.⁸¹ That same year, Mark Hand noted in *Press Action* that there is a movement growing in favour of binationalism in Israel/Palestine, which is causing 'advocates of apartheid Israel' much concern.⁸² A few years later, Omar Barghouti renamed the two-state solution, 'the apartheid solution', and detailed Israel's form of apartheid as a 'three-tiered' form of apartheid, consisting of:

*The occupation and colonisation of the 1967 territory; the system of racial discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel, which is the Zionist form of apartheid; and the total denial of refugee rights, particularly the right to return home and to reparations.*⁸³

In this context, it should be noted that an essential driving force behind this strategy revolves around the reunification of the fragmented Palestinian national collective. For, as previously underlined, by centring the struggle around Zionism and its multiple forms of apartheid—the rights and aspirations of all three segments of the Palestinians are taken into account, and the struggle for Palestinian liberation is realigned as one that is mutually inclusive and hence more powerful.

The move to the apartheid paradigm itself was advocated by scholars in the post-Oslo period—and especially by scholars who believed that this paradigm shift was the only avenue left from within which Palestinians could hope to break through the intransigent wall of US elite support for Israel and their inaccurate reflection, and hence popular understanding, of the occupation-liberation paradigm within this specific conflict. More importantly, as single-state intellectuals point out, it is also the most accurate reflection of the obscured reality in Palestine/Israel today. On this paradigm shift, George Bisharat states:

*One of the reasons that the anti-apartheid movement in the US reached such heights was because it resonated with the American civil rights movement [...] Unfortunately, that's not the way Israel/Palestine reads to Americans [...] if you talk to Americans about settlers or settlements some of them actually have a positive connotation of that, because it reminds them of the American west and pioneering settlers—it's not a bad term. Apartheid however, they all know that apartheid is bad. They all respond to it. So, yes, I think that analogy [...] is a valuable tool. And it's not just a valuable tool—it's accurate.*⁸⁴

Similarly, Barghouti underlines the importance this paradigm shift represents in terms of the moral and legal power it contains for Palestinians within the realm of the established legal conventions of the international community:

*The significance to the Palestinian struggle for self-determination of the fact that international law considers apartheid a crime against humanity that therefore invites sanctions [...] cannot be overemphasised. The UN and the international community know full well...how to deal with apartheid; all Palestinians and defenders of justice have to do is prove [...] how Israel's [...] [regime] constitute[s] apartheid.*⁸⁵

The space this reformulation opened up for the launching of the anti-apartheid BDS campaign for the rights of all three segments of the Palestinians proved to both resonate with these wider publics and civil society institutions, and to contain much potential of expansive power.

Conclusion

It was at a single-state conference that Omar Barghouti described the resistance movement in which he is involved as one that is organisationally based upon the dialectical link between thought and action:

*Organising for self-determination and ethical de-Zionisation of Palestine, must proceed in two simultaneous, dialectically related processes—reflection and action [...] Without vision and reflection our struggle would become like a ship without a skipper. Without resistance, our vision would amount to no more than armchair intellectualism.*⁸⁶

Hence, while the single-state movement largely emerged as a reformulated intellectual idea triggering an academic debate—it has been my contention in this article that it simultaneously attempted to activate Gramsci's philosophy of praxis, fusing intellectual vision with the resisting of oppression as a practice. Similarly, I have striven to show that it is a resistance movement that both sets its point of beginning and operates within the Gramscian premise that social transformation begins with the potential within people's thoughts to challenge the limits of the possible, triggering critical processes of historical self-understanding and empowerment that eventually transform them into a unified historical force. Hence, I attempted to illustrate the central role of single-state intellectuals in triggering this project of critical pedagogy within their own communities, with a particular emphasis upon the interlinked influence of both the anti-Oslo writings of Edward Said and the role, worldviews, strategies and territorial locations of the Palestinian Diaspora today.

In doing so, I sought to highlight single-state intellectuals' own self-understandings as educators energising an alternative anti-Zionist worldview from within which a practice of equal citizenship and coexistence can begin to be embraced on the ground. In parallel to this, I tried to emphasise the inherent interlinkage between this alternative anti-Zionist worldview—and its critique of the common sense notions bolstering an oppressive status quo that still champions the notion of separation as the only solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict today. Through this emphasis, I endeavoured to underline Gramsci's argument that it is only when a philosophical movement begins from within the common sense notions prevalent in civil societies that it contains within it the power to transcend them in the name of an alternative, liberating vision.

For, it is within this interlinkage that the activation of Gramsci's philosophy of praxis lays, along with the potential for building a transformative process of counterhegemony.

Acknowledgements

To the inspiring intellectuals who generously gave me their time and insights, and made this research possible, I owe much gratitude. Thank you to Mandy Turner for making this special issue possible, and to the anonymous peer reviewers—who gave me much food for thought for future theoretical directions. Thank you also to Benno Teschke for his engagement with my Saidian images of Gramsci while supervising my PhD journey.

Endnotes

1. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 330.
2. Pappé and Avnery, 'Two States or One State'.
3. Buttigieg, 'Gramsci on Civil Society', 4.
4. Buttigieg, 'Gramsci on Civil Society', 7.
5. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 330.
6. Similarly, my choice to begin with counterhegemony emerged from a need to counter the disempowering, abstracted, all-encompassing global form of hegemony that seems to largely dominate the discipline of IR. For, when one begins from within the contextualised, territorial practices of resistance, it becomes more possible to limit the nature and existence of hegemony to specific interlinked forms in the context of specific struggles and specific national/local settings. Arguably, this form of hegemony that maintains its location with the national and territorial could be both more useful, as well as more Gramscian.
7. The first time the two-state solution itself was directly addressed and articulated as the mutually agreed upon solution to the conflict by both sides was in Annapolis in 2007, under the mediation of US President George Bush. One of the aims of the conference was to 'demonstrate international support for the commencement of negotiations on the realisation of peace between two peoples'. At the conference itself, Bush stated: 'We've come together this week because we share a common goal: two democratic states—Israel and Palestine—living side by side in peace and security'. The Middle East Quartet strongly supported this initiative, as did the UN. For more details on this, as well as the text of the Joint Understanding on Negotiations, see: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern+History/His-toric+Events/The+Annapolis+Conference+27-Nov-2007.htm>.
8. In the words of Amnon Raz-Krakotzin on the motivation behind Yitzhak Rabin's recognition of the PLO at the time: 'Rabin was a follower of Yigal Allon, who after the 1967 war outlined a plan according to which the district of Jerusalem, as well as parts of the Hebron district and the Jordan Valley, would be kept under Israeli sovereignty. The remaining territory [...] would become an autonomous Palestinian area, with a link to Jordan. Rabin considered the Oslo framework to be one which would enable him to achieve, via different tactics, the policy he had always favored'. Raz-Krakotzin, 'A Peace without Arabs', 61.
9. Said, 'The Morning After', 3.
10. Abunimah, *One Country*, 169. For more on the influence of the writings of Gramsci on Said's work, as well as on Said himself as organic intellectual, see chapter one in Hussein, *The Re-Emergence of the Single State Solution*.
11. Said, 'Truth and Reconciliation'.
12. Ibid.
13. Peled, 'Zionist Realities'.
14. Said, 'Truth and Reconciliation'.
15. Said, 'An Interview with'.
16. Said, 'Truth and Reconciliation'.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Pappé, 'Proposal for a New Israeli Political Organization'.
21. The London One State Group, *Challenging the Boundaries*.

22. For an analysis of this platform of unity, both intellectually and organisationally, see Chapters 3 and 4 in Hussein, *The Re-Emergence of the Single State Solution*.
23. Barghouti, 'Organizing for Self Determination'.
24. Pappé, 'Proposal for a New Israeli Political Organization'.
25. Macleod, 'Rice's Fear'.
26. The Quartet, 'Middle East Quartet Expresses Support'.
27. The London One State Group, *Challenging the Boundaries*.
28. Abunimah, 'The One State Declaration'.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. The One-State Declaration is available at: <http://electronicintifada.net/content/one-state-declaration/793>
32. Abunimah, 'The One State Declaration'.
33. Ibid.
34. The London One State Group, *Challenging the Boundaries*.
35. Abunimah, 'The State of the One-State Idea'.
36. Zochrot, or 'Remembering', was founded by Eitan Bronstein in Tel Aviv in 2002, and is made up of a group of Israeli citizens dedicated to raising the awareness of the Jewish-Israeli public about the Palestinian Nakba of 1948—as a fundamental first step towards peace and reconciliation. Zochrot does this through hosting conferences, panels and research initiatives—as well as through direct action initiatives that involve the conquering of Jewish-Israeli public spaces in order to showcase that the land upon which every Israeli lives simultaneously tells the story of Palestinian ethnic cleansing and dispossession. Zochrot supports the Palestinian Right of Return. For more information on Zochrot, see: <http://zochrot.org>
37. Sivan and Bronstein, 'One State from Within'.
38. For detailed expositions of these processes, see for example, Hilal, *Where Now for Palestine?*.
39. Massad, 'A Matter of Immediate Urgency'.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Said, 'Vico on the Discipline of Bodies', 86.
43. Ibid.
44. Sivan and Bronstein, 'One State from Within'.
45. Tilley, 'The Secular Solution'.
46. Powell and Isaac, 'The Transformation of the Palestinian Environment'.
47. Peled, 'Zionist Realities'.
48. Pappé and Avnery, 'Two States or One State'.
49. Interview with I. Pappé, Brighton, 16 September 2009.
50. Karmi, 'Building an International Movement'.
51. It is important to note that besides being instrumental in drafting the One State Declaration itself, this network of conferences was instrumental in revealing a platform from within which anti-Zionist activists, academics, organisations, students and individuals involved in Palestine/Israel could locate each other, share stories, find common ground and create what some have termed to be an almost cathartic single-state 'grassroots network'. The conferences also triggered a flurry of debates that broke through the taboo on critically discussing the nature of Zionism in the West, and are a central arena within which both academics and activists meet to fuse theory and practice in the elaboration of their strategies and political programmes.
52. The full report is available at: <http://www.palestinesstrategygroup.ps/>
53. The report defines the peacemaking discourse as one that 'assumes that the problem is one of "making peace" between two equal partners, both of whom have symmetric interests, needs, values and beliefs. This is the wrong discourse because there are not two equal conflict parties. There is an occupying power and a suppressed and physically scattered people not allowed even to have its own identity legally recognized'. Palestine Strategy Study Group, *Regaining the Initiative*.
54. The report defines the state-building discourse as one 'which assumes that the problem is one of "building a state" along the lines attempted in Cambodia or El Salvador or Mozambique - or even to a certain extent in Afghanistan. This is the wrong discourse because there is no Palestinian state'. Palestine Strategy Study Group, *Regaining the Initiative*.
55. Abunimah, 'A New Palestinian Strategy'.
56. Palestine Strategy Study Group, *Regaining the Initiative*.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Al-Shabaka, 'Press Release'.
61. Al-Shabaka, 'Press Release'. It should be noted that the BDS call represented the first unified Palestinian national call to unite all segments of the Palestinian people within it, and call for the achievement of the rights of all three segments of the Palestinian collective. Significantly, these goals also mirror those of the single-state's conception of the world.
62. Palestinian Civil Society, 'Operative Extract'.

63. Al-Shabaka, 'Press Release'.
64. It should be noted that as of this writing, Hamas remains excluded from within the single-state movement for a variety of different reasons—one of which is the existence of significant opposition to engaging with it within the movement at large.
65. Interview with G. Bisharat, Toronto, 24 June 2009.
66. Massad, 'A Matter of Immediate Urgency'.
67. Farsakh, 'The One-State Solution', 65.
68. Ibid.
69. Interview with A. Abunimah, Toronto, 23 June 2009.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Interview with G. Bisharat, Toronto, 24 June 2009.
74. Abunimah, *One Country*, 170.
75. Interview with Y. Abulaban, Toronto, 21 June 2009.
76. Barghouti, 'Organizing for Self Determination'.
77. Interview with G. Bisharat, Toronto, 24 June 2009.
78. Interview with K. Ziada, London, 18 May 2008.
79. Barghouti, 'Organizing for Self Determination'.
80. For a detailed analysis of the BDS tactic as an integral part of the single-state movement's anti-Zionist strategy and war of position, under the umbrella of an expansive global anti-apartheid movement, see Chapters 3–5 in Hussein, *The Re-Emergence of the Single State Solution*.
81. Davis, *Apartheid Israel*.
82. Hand, 'Israeli Apartheid Supporters Resist'.
83. Barghouti, 'Organizing for Self Determination'.
84. Interview with G. Bisharat, Toronto, 24 June 2009.
85. Barghouti, *Boycott Divestment and Sanctions*, 63–64.
86. Barghouti, 'Organizing for Self Determination'.
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