

ALSO BY ERIC HOBSBAWM

Labouring Men
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Revolutionaries
Worlds of Labour

Nations and Nationalism Since 1780

The Age of Revolution 1789–1848

The Age of Capital 1848–1875

The Age of Empire 1875–1914

Age of Extremes 1914–1991

ON HISTORY

Eric Hobsbawm



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The Curious History of Europe

This is the English version of a lecture on Europe and its history given in German, under the auspices of the Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, which launched its new series Europäische Geschichte on the occasion of the annual congress of German historians (Munich, 1996). A version of the German lecture was published by Die Zeit on 4 October 1996. The (longer) English version is published here for the first time.

Can continents have a history as continents? Let us not confuse politics, history and geography, especially not in the case of these shapes on the page of atlases, which are not natural geographical units, but merely human names for parts of the global land-mass. Moreover, it has been clear from the beginning, that is to say ever since antiquity when the continents of the Old World were first baptized, that these names were intended to have more than a mere geographical significance.

Consider Asia. Since 1980, if I am not mistaken, the census of the USA has granted its inhabitants the option of describing themselves as 'Asian-Americans', a classification presumably by analogy with 'African-Americans', the term by which black Americans currently prefer to be described. Presumably an Asian-American is an American born in Asia or descended from Asians. But what is the sense in classifying immigrants from Turkey under the same heading as those from Cambodia, Korea, the Philippines or Pakistan, not to mention the unquestionably Asian territory of Israel, though its inhabitants do not like to be reminded of this geographical fact? In practice these groups have nothing in common.

If we look more closely at the category 'Asian', it tells us more about us than about maps. For instance, it throws some light on the American, or more generally 'Western', attitudes towards those parts of humanity originating in the regions once known as the 'East' or the 'Orient'. Western observers, and later conquerors, rulers, settlers

and entrepreneurs, looked for a common denominator for populations which were plainly unable to stand up to them, but equally plainly belonged to established, ancient cultures and political entities worthy of respect, or at least serious consideration by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century standards. They were not, in the then current terms, 'savages', or 'barbarians', but belonged in a different category, namely that of 'Orientals', whose characteristics as such accounted, among other things, for their inferiority to the West. The influential book *Orientalism* by the Palestinian Edward Said has excellently caught the typical tone of European arrogance about the 'Orient', even though it rather underestimates the complexity of Western attitudes in this field.¹

On the other hand 'Asian' today has a second and geographically more restricted meaning. When Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore announces an 'Asian way' and an 'Asian economic model', a theme happily taken up by Western management experts and ideologists, we are not concerned with Asia as a whole, but with the economic effects of the geographically localized heritage of Confucius. In short, we are continuing the old debate, launched by Marx and developed by Max Weber, on the influence of particular religions and ideologies on economic development. It used to be Protestantism which fuelled the engine of capitalism. Today Calvin is out and Confucius is in, both because the Protestant virtues are not very traceable in Western capitalism and because the economic triumphs of East Asia have occurred in countries marked by the Confucian heritage – China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam – or carried by a Chinese entrepreneurial diaspora. As it happens, Asia today contains the headquarters of all the major world faiths with the exception of Christianity, including what remains of communism, but the non-Confucian culture-regions of the continent are irrelevant to the current fashion in the Weberian debate. They do not belong in *this* Asia.

Nor, of course, does the Western prolongation of Asia known as Europe. Geographically, as everyone knows, it has no eastern borders, and the continent therefore exists *exclusively* as an intellectual construct. Even the cartographic dividing-line of the traditional school atlases – Ural Mountains, Ural river, Caspian Sea, Caucasus, so much more easily remembered in the German mnemonic than in other languages – is based on a political decision. As Bronislaw Geremek has recently reminded us² when V. Tatishchev in the eighteenth century nominated the Ural Mountains as the divider between Europe

and Asia, he consciously wished to break with the stereotype which assigned the Moscow state and its heirs to Asia. 'It required the decision of a geographer and historian, and the acceptance of a convention.' Of course, whatever the role of the Urals, the original frontier between Europe (that is the Hellenes) and the peoples defined as 'barbarians' by the Hellenes had run through the steppes north of the Black Sea. Southern Russia has been part of Europe far longer than many regions now automatically included in Europe, but about whose geographic classification geographers argued even in the late nineteenth century, for example Iceland and Spitsbergen.

That Europe is a construct does not, of course, mean that it did not or does not exist. There has always been a Europe, since the ancient Greeks gave it a name. Only, it is a shifting, divisible and flexible concept, though perhaps not quite so elastic as 'Mitteleuropa', the classic example of political programmes disguised as geography. No part of Europe except the area of the present Czech Republic and its adjoining regions appears on *all* maps of central Europe; but some of these reach across the entire continent except for the Iberian peninsula. However, the elasticity of the concept 'Europe' is not so much geographical – for practical purposes all atlases accept the Ural line – as political and ideological. During the Cold War the field 'European history' in the USA covered mainly western Europe. Since 1989 it has extended to central and eastern Europe as 'the political and economic geography of Europe is changing'.³

The original concept of Europe rested on a double confrontation: the military defence of the Greeks against the advance of an eastern empire in the Persian wars, and the encounter of Greek 'civilization' and the Scythian 'barbarians' on the steppes of South Russia. We see this, in the light of subsequent history, as a process of confrontation and differentiation, but it would be quite as easy to read into it symbiosis and syncretism. Indeed, as Neal Ascherson reminds us in his beautiful *Black Sea*,⁴ following Rostovtzeff's *Iranians and Greeks in Southern Russia*, it generated 'mixed civilizations, very curious and very interesting', in this region of intersection between Asian, Greek and Western influences moving downstream along the Danube.

It would be equally logical to see the entire Mediterranean civilization of classical antiquity as syncretic. After all, it imported its script, as later its imperial ideology and state religion, from the Near and Middle East. Indeed the present division between Europe, Asia and Africa had no meaning – at least no meaning corresponding to the present – in a region in which the Greeks lived and flourished

equally in all three continents. (Not until our tragic century have they finally been expelled from Egypt, Asia Minor and the Pontic region.) What meaning could it have had in the heyday of the undivided Roman Empire, happily tricontinental and ready to assimilate anything useful that came from anywhere?

Migrations and invasions from the regions of barbarian peoples were not new. All empires in the belt of civilization that ran from East Asia westwards into the Mediterranean faced them. However, the collapse of the Roman Empire left the Western Mediterranean, and rather later the Eastern Mediterranean, without any empires and rulers capable of dealing with them. From that point on it becomes possible for us to see the history of the region between the Caucasus and Gibraltar as a millennium of struggle against conquerors from east, north and south – from Attila to Suleiman the Magnificent, or even to the second siege of Vienna in 1683.

It is not surprising that the ideology which has formed the core of the 'European idea' from Napoleon via the Pan-European movement of the 1920s and Goebbels to the European Economic Community – that is to say a concept of Europe which deliberately *excludes* parts of the geographical continent – likes to appeal to Charlemagne. That Great Charles ruled over the only part of the European continent which, at least since the rise of Islam, had *not* been reached by the invaders, and could therefore claim to be 'vanguard and saviour of the West' against the Orient – to quote the words of the Austrian President Karl Renner in 1946, in praise of his own country's alleged 'historic mission'.⁵ Since Charlemagne was himself a conqueror who advanced his borders against Saracens and eastern barbarians, he might even be seen, to use the jargon of the Cold War, to advance from 'containment' to 'roll-back'.

True, in those centuries nobody outside a tiny circle of classically educated clergymen thought in terms of 'Europe'. The first genuine counter-offensive of the West against Saracens and barbarians was conducted not in the name of the 'regnum Europaeum' of the Carolingian panegyrist, but in the name of (Roman) Christianity: as south-eastern and south-western crusades against Islam, north-eastern crusades against the heathens of the Baltic. Even when Europeans began their real conquest of the globe in the sixteenth century, the crusading ideology of the Spanish *reconquista* is easily recognizable in that of the *conquistadores* of the New World. Not before the seventeenth century did Europeans recognize themselves as a continent rather than a faith. By the time they were able to

challenge the might of the major Eastern empires at the end of that century, the conversion of unbelievers to the true faith could no longer compete ideologically with double-entry book-keeping. Economic and military superiority now reinforced the belief that Europeans were superior to all others not as carriers of a civilization of modernity, but collectively as a human type.

'Europe' had been on the defensive for a millennium. Now, for half a millennium, it conquered the world. Both observations make it impossible to sever European history from world history. What has long been obvious to economic historians, archaeologists and other enquirers into the past fabric of everyday life (*Alltagsgeschichte*) should now be generally accepted. Even the very idea of a cartographically defined history of Europe became possible only with the rise of Islam, which permanently divorced the southern and eastern coasts of the Mediterranean from its northern shores. What historian of classical antiquity would insist on writing the history only of the North Mediterranean provinces of the Roman Empire, except out of caprice or ideology?

However, separating Europe from the rest of the world is less dangerous than the practice of excluding parts of the geographic continent from some ideological concept of 'Europe'. The last fifty years should have taught us that such redefinitions of the continent belong not to history but to politics and ideology. Until the end of the Cold War this was perfectly obvious. After the Second World War Europe, for Americans, meant 'the eastern frontier of what came to be called "western civilization"'.⁶ 'Europe' stopped at the borders of the region controlled by the USSR, and was defined by the non-communism, or anti-communism, of its governments. Naturally the attempt was made to give a positive content to this rump, for example by describing it as the zone of democracy and freedom. However, this seemed implausible even to the European Economic Community before the middle 1970s, when the patently authoritarian regimes of southern Europe disappeared – Spain, Portugal, the Greek colonels – and Britain, unquestionably democratic but doubtfully 'European', finally entered it. Today it is even more obvious that programmatic definitions of Europe won't work. The USSR, whose existence cemented 'Europe' together, no longer exists, while the variety of regimes between Gibraltar and Vladivostok is not concealed by the fact that all, without exception, declare their allegiance to democracy and the free market.

Seeking for a single programmatic 'Europe' thus leads only to

endless debates about the hitherto unsolved, and perhaps insoluble, problems of how to extend the European Union, that is how to turn a continent that has been, throughout its history, economically, politically and culturally heterogeneous into a single more or less homogeneous entity. There has never been a *single* Europe. Difference cannot be eliminated from our history. This has always been so, even when ideology preferred to dress 'Europe' in religious rather than geographical costume. True, Europe was the specific continent of Christianity, at least between the rise of Islam and the conquest of the New World. However, barely had the last pagans been converted when it became evident that at least two far from brotherly varieties of Christianity faced one another on the territory of Europe, and the sixteenth century Reformation added several others. For some (admittedly more often than not from Poland and Croatia) the border between Roman and Orthodox Christianity is 'even today, one of the most permanent cultural divides of the globe'.⁷ Even today Northern Ireland demonstrates that the old tradition of bloody intra-European religious war is not dead. Christianity is an ineradicable part of European history, but it has no more been a unifying force for our continent than other even more typically European concepts, for instance the 'nation' and 'socialism'.

The tradition which regards Europe not as a continent but as a club, whose membership is open only to candidates certified as suitable by the club committee, is almost as old as the name 'Europe'. Where 'Europe' ends naturally depends on one's position. As everyone knows, for Metternich 'Asia' began at the eastern exit from Vienna, a view still echoed at the end of the nineteenth century in a series of articles directed against the 'barbarian-asiatic' Hungarians in the Vienna *Reichspost*. For the inhabitants of Budapest, the border of true Europe clearly ran between Hungarians and Croats, for President Tudjman it runs equally plainly between Croats and Serbs. No doubt proud Rumanians see themselves as essential Europeans and spiritual Parisians exiled among backward Slavs, even though Gregor von Rezzori, the Austrian writer born in the Bukowina, described them in his books as 'Maghrebians', that is 'Africans'.

The true distinction is thus not one of geography; but neither is it necessarily one of ideology. It demarcates felt superiority from imputed inferiority, as defined by those who see themselves as 'better', that is to say usually belonging to a higher intellectual, cultural or even biological class than their neighbours. The distinction is not necessarily ethnic. In Europe as elsewhere the most universally acknow-

ledged border between civilization and barbarism ran between the rich and the poor, that is to say between those with access to luxuries, education and the world outside, and the rest. Consequently the most obvious division of this sort ran across and not between societies, that is primarily between city and countryside. Peasants were unquestionably European – who was more indigenous than they? – but how often did the educated romantics, folklorists and social scientists of the nineteenth century, even as they often admired or even idealized their archaic system of values, treat them as a ‘survival’ of some earlier, and consequently more primitive, stage of culture, preserved into the present by virtue of their backwardness and isolation? Not city folk but country people belonged in the new ethnographic museums which the educated opened in several cities of eastern Europe between 1888 and 1905 (as in Warsaw, Sarajevo, Helsinki, Prague, Lemberg/Lwów, Belgrade, St Petersburg and Cracow).

Nevertheless, only too often the line ran between peoples and states. In every country of Europe there were those who looked down across some frontier on barbarian neighbours, or at least on technically or intellectually lagging populations. The usual cultural-economic slope on our continent descends eastwards or towards the south-east from the Ile de France and Champagne, thus making it easier to classify undesirable neighbours as ‘Asiatic’, notably the Russians. However, let us not forget the slope from north to south, which told the Spaniards they ‘really’ belonged to Africa more than to Europe, a view shared by the inhabitants of northern Italy as they look down on their fellow-citizens south of Rome. Only the barbarians of the north, who ravaged Europe in the tenth and eleventh centuries, with nothing but Arctic ice behind them, could be assigned to no other continent. In any case, they have turned into the rich and peaceful Scandinavians, and their barbarism survives only in the bloodthirsty mythology of Wagner and German nationalism.

And yet the peaks of European civilization from which the slopes led down to other continents could not have been discovered until Europe as a whole had ceased to belong to the realm of barbarism. For even in the late fourteenth century scholars from the region of high culture like the great Ibn Khaldun had shown little interest in Christian Europe. ‘God knows what goes on there,’ he observed, two centuries after Sa’id ibn Akhmad, *cadi* of Toledo, who was convinced that nothing was to be learned from the northern barbarians. They were more like beasts than men.⁸ In those centuries the cultural slope evidently ran in the opposite direction.

But here precisely lies the paradox of European history. These very historical U-turns or interruptions are its specific characteristic. Throughout its long history the belt of high cultures that stretched from East Asia to Egypt experienced no lasting relapses into barbarism, in spite of all invasions, conquests and upheavals. Ibn Khaldun saw history as an eternal duel between the pastoral nomads and settled civilization – but in this eternal conflict the nomads, though sometimes victorious, remained the challengers and not the victors. China under Mongols and Manchus, Persia, overrun by whatever conquering invaders from central Asia, remained beacons of high culture in their regions. So did Egypt and Mesopotamia, whether under Pharaohs and Babylonians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs or Turks. Invaded for a millennium by the peoples from steppe and desert, all the great empires of the old world survived with one exception. Only the Roman Empire was permanently destroyed.

Without such a collapse of cultural continuity, which made itself felt even at the modest level of gardening and flower-culture,⁹ a 'Renaissance' – that is an attempted return, after a thousand years, to a forgotten, but supposedly superior, cultural and technical heritage – would have been neither necessary nor conceivable. Who, in China, needed to return to classics which every candidate had to memorize for the state examinations, held without a break annually since long before the Christian era? The erroneous conviction of Western philosophers, not excluding Marx, that a dynamic of historical development could be discovered only in Europe, but not in Asia or Africa, is due, at least in part, to this difference between the continuity of the other literate and urban cultures and the discontinuity in the history of the West.

But only in part. For from the end of the fifteenth century world history unquestionably became Eurocentric, and remained so until the twentieth century. *Everything* that distinguishes the world of today from the world of the Ming and Mughal emperors and the Mamelukes originated in Europe – whether in science and technology, in the economy, in ideology and politics, or in the institutions and practices of public and private life. Even the concept of the 'world' as a system of human communications embracing the entire globe could not exist before the European conquest of the western hemisphere and the emergence of a capitalist world economy. This is what fixes the situation of Europe in world history, what defines the problems of European history, and indeed what makes a specific history of Europe necessary.

But this is also what makes the history of Europe so peculiar. Its subject is not a geographical space or a human collective, but a process. If Europe had not transformed itself and thereby transformed the world, there would be no such thing as a single, coherent history of Europe, for 'Europe' would no more have existed than 'South-east Asia' as concept and history existed (at least before the era of European empires). And indeed a 'Europe' conscious of itself as such, and more or less coinciding with the geographical continent, emerges only in the epoch of modern history. It could emerge only when Europe could no longer be defensively defined as 'Christianity' against the Turks and, conversely, when the religious conflicts between Christian faiths retreated before the secularization of state policy and the culture of modern science and scholarship. Hence, from some time in the seventeenth century, the new and self-conscious 'Europe' appears in three forms.

First, it emerged as an international state system, in which state foreign policies were supposed to be determined by permanent 'interests', defined as such by a 'reason of state' which kept aloof from religious faith. In the course of the eighteenth century Europe actually acquired its modern cartographic definition, as the system took the form of a *de facto* oligarchy of what later came to be called the 'powers', of which Russia was an integral part. Europe was defined by the relations between the 'great powers' which, until the twentieth century, were exclusively European. But this state system has ceased to exist.

Second, 'Europe' consisted of a now possible community of scholars or intellectuals engaged, across geographical borders, languages, state loyalties, obligations or personal faiths in the construction of a collective edifice, namely that modern *Wissenschaft* which embraces the whole range of intellectual activity, science and scholarship. 'Science' in this sense emerged in the region of European culture and, until the beginning of our century, remained virtually confined to the geographical area between Kazan and Dublin – admittedly with gaps in south-eastern and south-western parts of the continent. What has become the 'global village' in which we live today, or at least pass some of our lives, was then the 'European village'. But today the global village has swallowed the European.

Third, 'Europe', especially in the course of the nineteenth century, emerged as a largely urban model of education, culture and ideology, though from the start the model was seen as exportable to overseas communities of European settlers. Any world map of the universities,

opera houses and publicly accessible museums and libraries existing in the nineteenth century will rapidly establish the point. But so will a map showing the distribution of the nineteenth-century ideologies of European origin. Social democracy as a political and (since the First World War) a state-sustaining movement was and remains almost wholly European, as did the Second (Marxist-social democratic) International – but not the Marxist communism of the Third International after 1917. Nineteenth-century nationalism, especially in its linguistic forms, is hard to find outside Europe even today, although varieties with a primarily confessional or racial colouring unfortunately appear to be penetrating into other parts of the Old World in recent decades. These ideas may be traced back to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Here, if at all, we find the most lasting and specifically European intellectual heritage.

However, all these are not primary but secondary characteristics of European history. There is no historically homogeneous Europe, and those who look for it are on the wrong track. However we define 'Europe', its diversity, the rise and fall, the coexistence, the dialectical interaction of its components, is fundamental to its existence. Without it, it is impossible to understand and explain the developments which led to the creation and control of the modern world by processes which came to maturity in Europe and nowhere else. To ask how the Occident broke loose from the Orient, how and why capitalism and modern society came to develop fully only in Europe, is to ask the fundamental questions of European history. Without them, there would be no need for the history of this continent as distinct from the rest.

But just these questions take us back into the no-man's land between history and ideology or, more precisely, between history and cultural bias. For historians must give up the old habit of looking for specific factors, to be found only in Europe, which made our culture qualitatively different from, and therefore superior to, others – for instance, the unique rationality of European thinking, Christian tradition, this or that specific item inherited from classical antiquity, such as Roman property law. First, we are no longer superior, as we seemed to be when even all the world champions of the unquestionably Oriental game of chess were, without exception. Westerners. Second, we now know that there is nothing specifically 'European' or 'Western' about the *modus operandi* which, in Europe, led to capitalism, to the revolutions in science and technology, and the rest. Thirdly, we now know that we must avoid the temptations of *post*

hoc, propter hoc. When Japan was the only non-Western industrial society, historians scoured Japanese history for similarities with Europe – for example in the structure of Japanese feudalism – which might explain the uniqueness of Japan's development. Now that there are plenty of other successful non-Western industrial economies, the inadequacy of such explanations leaps to the eye.

Yet the history of Europe remains unique. As Marx observed, the history of humanity is one of its growing control over the nature in which and by which we live. If we think of this history as a curve, it will be a curve with two sharp upward turns. The first is the late V. Gordon Childe's 'neolithic revolution' which brought agriculture, metallurgy, cities, classes and writing. The second is the revolution which brought modern science, technology and economy. Probably the first occurred independently, in varying degrees, in different parts of the world. The second occurred only in Europe and hence, for a few centuries, made Europe into the centre of the world and a few European states into the lords of the globe.

This era, 'The Age of Vasco de Gama', in the phrase of the Indian diplomat and historian Sardar Panikkar, is now at an end. We no longer know exactly what to do about European history in a world that is no longer Eurocentric. 'Europe' – to cite John Gillis again – 'has lost its spatial and temporal centrality'.¹⁰ Some try, mistakenly and vainly, to deny the special role played by European history in world history. Others barricade themselves behind 'the "Fortress Europe" mentality that seems to be emerging', and is so much more readily recognizable on the other side of the Atlantic than here. What is to be the direction of European history? At the end of the first post-European century since Columbus, we, as historians, need to rethink its future both as regional history and as part of the history of the globe.

- Stephen R. Graubard (eds), *Historical Studies Today* (New York, 1972), p. 340.
14. Clifford Geertz, 'Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cock-Fight', in his *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York, 1973).
 15. Carlo Ginzburg, *Il formaggio ed i vermi* (Turin, 1976); Carlo Ginzburg, *I benandanti: ricerche sulla stregoneria e sui culti agrari tra Cinquecento e Seicento* (Turin, 1966).
 16. Maurice Agulhon, *La République au village* (Paris, 1970).
 17. Le Roy Ladurie, *Les Paysans du Languedoc; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Montaillou, village occitan de 1294 à 1324* (Paris, 1976), trans. B. Bray as *Montaillou: Cathars and Catholics in a French Village, 1294–1324* (London, 1978); Georges Duby, *Le dimanche de Bouvines, 27 juillet 1214* (Paris, 1973); E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1963); E. P. Thompson, *Whigs and Hunters* (London, 1975).
 18. Stone, 'Revival', p. 23.
 19. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

CHAPTER 15: POSTMODERNISM IN THE FOREST

1. Miguel Barnet (ed.), *The Autobiography of a Runaway Slave* (New York, 1968). The title of the original was *Cimarrón* (Havana, 1967).
2. Richard Price (ed.), *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas* (Baltimore, 1979); Eugene D. Genovese, *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World* (Baton Rouge, 1979).
3. Richard Price, *First Time: The Historical Vision of an Afro-American People* (Baltimore, 1983).
4. Price, *Maroon Societies*, p. 12n.
5. The quotations are from a breast-beating session of postmoderns, 'Critique and Reflexivity in Anthropology', *Critique of Anthropology* 9/3 (Winter 1989), pp. 82, 86.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
7. George E. Marcus, 'Imagining the Whole: Ethnography's Contemporary Efforts to Situate Itself', *Critique of Anthropology* 9/3 (Winter 1989), p. 7.
8. However, the author is to be congratulated for deliberately avoiding references to Barthes, Bakhtin, Derrida, Foucault *et al.*

CHAPTER 17: THE CURIOUS HISTORY OF EUROPE

1. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London, 1978).
2. Bronislaw Geremek, in *Europa-aber wo liegen seine Grenzen?*, 104th Berge-dorfer Gesprächskreis, 10 and 11 July 1995 (Hamburg, 1996), p. 9.

3. John R. Gillis, 'The Future of European History', *Perspectives: American Historical Association Newsletter* 34/4 (April 1996), p. 4.
4. Neil Ascherson, *Black Sea* (London, 1995).
5. Cited in Gernot Heiss and Konrad Paul Liessmann (eds), *Das Millennium: Essays zu Tausend Jahren Österreich* (Vienna, 1996), p. 14.
6. Gillis, 'Future of European History', p. 5.
7. Geremek, *Europa*, p. 9.
8. M. E. Yapp, 'Europe in the Turkish Mirror', *Past and Present* 137 (November 1992), p. 139.
9. Jack Goody, *The Culture of Flowers* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 73–4.
10. Gillis, 'Future of European History', p. 5.

CHAPTER 19: CAN WE WRITE THE HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION?

1. Fred Halliday, *From Potsdam to Perestroika: Conversations with Cold Warriors* (London, 1995).
2. As shown, for example, in Jochen Hellbeck (ed.), *Tagebuch aus Moskau 1931–39* (Munich, 1996), a valuable example of the unofficial records of ordinary Russians – private diaries and so on – which have become available since Gorbachev.
3. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Collected Works* (London, 1976), vol. 24, p. 581.
4. See Richard Gott's account of 'Guevara in the Congo', *New Left Review* 220 (December 1996), pp. 3–35.
5. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes* (London, 1994), p. 64.
6. Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution 1891–1924* (London, 1996).

CHAPTER 20: BARBARISM: A USER'S GUIDE

1. Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (London, 1993), pp. 140–1.
2. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld, *Sozialprotest, Gewalt, Terror* (Stuttgart, 1982), p. 56.
3. Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (London, 1977), p. 374.
4. Amnesty International, *Report on Torture* (London, 1975).
5. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
6. Laqueur, *Guerrilla*, p. 377.

CHAPTER 21: IDENTITY HISTORY IS NOT ENOUGH

1. G. Monod and G. Fagniez, 'Avant-propos', in *Revue Historique* 1/1 (1876), p. 4.

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Born in 1917, Eric Hobsbawm was educated in Vienna, Berlin, London, and Cambridge. A fellow of the British Academy and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, with honorary degrees from universities in several countries, he teaches at the New School for Social Research in New York. His books include *The Age of Revolution*, *The Age of Capital*, *The Age of Empire*, and *Age of Extremes*. He divides his time between New York and London.

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