

## An Anthropologist among the Soldiers

Notes from the Field

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Much is written about the Human Terrain System (HTS), but none of it seems particularly informed by what Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) actually do in Iraq and Afghanistan. After reading an article about the militarization of anthropology in *Anthropology Today* in the summer of 2007, I wrote the editor with the suggestion that I could provide a “notes from the field” essay sometime in the spring of 2008. That offer was politely declined on the grounds that the editorial board could not ensure that the information I wrote about was collected in an ethical manner. I shelved writing formally about the work until such time as I felt I had done enough of it to have something say (I kept a blog for six months, but this was really just to stay in touch with my students). At the time of this writing, I have worked with three different units for a total of thirteen months in Iraq, in addition to five months of training at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. What follows is a sampling of what I tried to accomplish in those months and how the work came to be. My intention for this essay is to encourage informed discussion of the use of social science in stability operations by illustrating how I used it.

Taking the concept of operations (CONOP) and putting it into practice within a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) that has little experience with an HTT is no small task. Figuring out how to work

within the BCT in addition to learning exactly what a BCT is as a war fighting organization and how it functions consumed much of my time initially. What follows is a description of how I tried to operationalize the CONOP for the two BCTs I served during my deployment. I am currently serving a Marine division as I write this (I Marine Expeditionary Force Forward) but will reserve lessons learned from this unit for a different essay.

### Human Terrain System Mission and Capabilities

The HTS provides Brigade and Regimental Combat Team Commanders and their staffs with dedicated, embedded, and area-specific research to reduce or prevent threats while deployed. Understanding local cultural, political, social, and economic factors is crucial to successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations conducted in stability and reconstruction operations environments. The ability of commanders to make operational decisions based on relevant social and cultural information will enable them to increase indigenous support of the elected government while reducing indigenous support to insurgents. Sounds good. “Game on,” as they say. But how?

I deployed to northwest Baghdad in August 2007 with three other personnel on my team: an E-6 research manager, an O1 human terrain analyst, and a retired E-8 civilian team leader. Shortly after arriving, the team leader assumed the duties of a research manager, while team leadership functions shifted to me. The O1 returned to the United States for personal reasons. As a team of three and me doing double duty as the team leader and social scientist, we tried to figure out how to serve the BCT. With the assistance of staff officers who went out of their way to help us integrate, we came up with a series of reporting requirements. Every Thursday evening a weekly report was due to the task force to which we were assigned. Every Saturday morning a report was due to the BCT commander providing an overview of the past seven days and a projection of activities for the next seven days. Each month a report was due again to the BCT commander covering the last thirty days and projecting the next thirty days pending his guidance. In addition to these reports, regular analytical reports on specific activities or events as they happened were submitted. I also got together with the task force commander (who was also the BCT’s deputy commanding officer) once a week for coffee or dinner to discuss casually what needed to be done. Finally, we participated in the weekly schedule of task force meetings and provided briefing materials for each. We had the reporting schema worked out, but what to report on was now the trick. By paying attention to the information needs of the unit, I was able to get the team on track and doing the work.

The general guidance the BCT commander gave us was to “figure out Shia politics.” There were Shia militia and political parties fighting each other, not Sunni antagonists, and the infiltration of Iraqi security forces by these militias was compromising the ability of the government to provide security to its people. I thought long and hard about “figure out Shia politics” and decided that one way to get at it would be to study the cultural basis for leadership and followership. A second and related effort was to study the social bonds created and maintained through reciprocity.

At the small Forward Operating Base (FOB) I worked on, I had access to a great number of Iraqis. I was not interested in probability sampling at this point, and felt that haphazardly meeting and talking with whomever I could was sufficient. Naturally, I looked into the demographics of the people I spoke with, but that was not my initial interest. There were sixty or more local national interpreters working on the FOB and two dozen Iraqi vendors catering to the service needs of soldiers: selling pirated DVDs and cheap electronics from China, cutting hair, repairing uniforms and tailoring clothes, and selling tourist-trap knickknacks. I started the long process of making myself known among these men. The interpreters knew English of course, and most of the vendors spoke a smattering of English. I was fortunate enough to be provided an interpreter by the task force, and he quickly became my assistant and provided me with needed credibility among the veteran interpreters. Together we sat with people in their shops or outside offices and talked about how men lead men, and I listened to stories of how people did things for each other, sharing food, favors, and consideration. Sometimes I was told parables taught in grade school. From these discussions I tried to get a feel for underlying expectations regarding social control, obligation, and its roots in the Qur'an.

This worked well with the first BCT that we members of the HTT served, but that first BCT redeployed three months after we got there. The reporting procedure we had developed fell apart, and we started all over from scratch. Every organization has its own way of doing things, and the task force went away as did most of the interpreters. After a month of uncertainty, we ended up with largely individual efforts among the three of us HTT members with me working at the BCT headquarters at Camp Liberty by myself and apart from the others. Fieldwork is never what you hope it is going to be, so I simply adapted to the new situation and with the help of several staff officers, I struggled to find ways to contribute on my own until I had a coherent team once again with additional personnel located with me at headquarters. This crucible helped me to think through what can be done and what should be done and how. What follows are several undertakings that eventually led me to finally

answering for myself with confidence the nagging question of: “What is it that you do here?” We

1. Provide descriptions and analyses of civil considerations (community profiles and studies) for each *hays* (neighborhood), district, and area of operations (AO).
2. Maintain an understanding of local leadership, how they interact with each other, and what their interests and concerns are.
3. Provide specialized assistance to BCT and battalion (BN) projects to facilitate completion, efficiency, and social impact.
4. Provide guidance to soldiers regarding how to collect human terrain information to improve their Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and reporting efforts.
5. Respond to requests for information from BCT and BN.

### The Work Itself

Because the military divides up physical terrain into AO that are assigned to specific units from high headquarters run by general officers all the way down to individual platoons led by first lieutenants, I had to figure out a way to depict the human terrain in some useful fashion. The challenge was to come up with a means of describing and analyzing human terrain in a way that was meaningful to me as an anthropologist yet also meaningful to soldiers. Otherwise the insight would never be used and I might as well go home. There was no mistaking that army subcultures and dialects had to be learned and mastered if I was to be understood or even given the time of day.

Prior to relocating from an FOB to the BCT headquarters on Camp Liberty, one of my research managers found a hardcopy of the COIN manual *FM 3-24* for me. I had read through it while in training at Fort Leavenworth, but it was not particularly meaningful to me at the time. While in the midst of daily operations in Baghdad, however, I discovered a potential means of creating the human terrain depiction I wanted. I was not satisfied with it, but it was a good starting point. I have recently expanded it, but the new version is untested and outside the scope of this essay.

According to the COIN manual, human terrain is called “civil considerations” and is characterized with the acronym, ASCOPE. This stands for areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events and is broken down as follows. I and others on my team, not to mention many soldiers throughout the BCT, sought out the content for each category:

## ASCOPE

### Areas

Key civilian areas are localities or aspects of the terrain within an AO that have significance to the local populace.

1. Indicators
2. Areas defined by political boundaries such as districts, municipalities, and provinces
3. Areas of high economic value such as industrial centers and farming regions
4. Centers of government and politics
5. Culturally important areas
6. Social, ethnic, tribal, political, religious, criminal, or other important enclaves
7. Trade routes and smuggling routes
8. Possible sites for temporary settlement of dislocated civilians or other civil functions

### Structures

Civilian and military: focus on location, functions, and capabilities to support operations

1. Headquarters and bases for security forces
2. Police stations, courthouses, and jails
3. Communications and media infrastructure
  - a. Radio towers
  - b. Television stations
  - c. Cellular towers
  - d. Newspaper offices
  - e. Printing presses
4. Roads and bridges
5. Ports of entry
6. Dams
7. Electrical power stations and substations
8. Refineries and other sources of fuel
9. Potable water sources
10. Sewage systems
11. Clinics and hospitals
12. Schools and universities
13. Places of religious worship

### Capabilities

These capabilities are to save, sustain, and enhance the life of the citizenry.

1. Public administration
2. Public safety—security forces
3. Emergency services—fire and ambulance
4. Public health—clinics and hospitals
5. Food
6. Water
7. Sanitation

### Organizations

1. Religious organizations
2. Political parties
3. Patriotic or service organizations
4. Labor unions
5. Criminal organizations
6. Community organizations
7. Multinational corporations
8. International governmental organizations (that is, the United Nations' World Food Programme)—consider activities, capabilities, limitations
9. Nongovernmental organizations (that is, Red Crescent)—consider activities, capabilities, limitations

### People

People in this category are limited to nonmilitary

1. Population support overlay
2. Religion, race, and ethnicity overlay
3. Perception assessment matrix

### Events

1. National and religious holidays
2. Agricultural crop, livestock, and market cycles
3. Elections
4. Civil disturbances
5. Celebrations
6. Disasters (natural and manmade)

To populate the categories in ASCOPE, I went out to Joint Security Stations (JSSs) and stayed several days at a time going on foot patrols with platoons into the surrounding community, talking with local residents, visiting schools

and markets, and discussing what I saw with the soldiers. JSSs and Combat Outposts (COPs) were one of General Petraeus's strategies for getting soldiers among the population to protect the population from sectarian violence and militia abuse. When company commanders initially asked what I wanted to do, all I had to do was refer to ASCOPE and they had something operationally familiar to reference my otherwise odd willingness and interest in going on patrols. This familiarity was sufficiently persuasive such that one company commander would completely redo his patrol schedule whenever I came around. One of my research managers also went on patrols in another district, and the company commander of that area quickly saw the value of the effort and tasked his unit with continuing the effort in the physical absence of HTT. We could see the progress company commanders achieved and we could provide input from afar because we all had access to an intranet mapping program called TIGR, a program I encouraged commanders to use as a means of recording ASCOPE data as well as visually showing patterns in that data. Because of the inherently operational nature of this effort and the mapping system the ASCOPE depiction relied upon, the results are classified secret to ensure enemy combatants cannot exploit patterns of movement and analysis in order to ambush and kill soldiers. Unfortunately sharing examples of ASCOPE work here could potentially get people hurt or killed, whether American or Iraqi. Nonetheless, creating community profiles through ASCOPE to inform stability operations was an enduring effort of my team.

### The Outdoor Classroom: Walking the Walk

Being out at JSSs allowed me to try other ways of providing input at the tactical level (among the population) beyond fostering ASCOPE profiles. The most obvious was to explain what I was seeing and what it meant to me as we walked the streets. Because I had some experience with archaeology and my father, also an anthropologist, had made sure I was exposed to each of anthropology's subdisciplines, I looked for material indicators of community well-being that could be used as talking points for platoon leaders and others on patrol. This would help patrolling soldiers ask different types of questions from the usual ones, e.g., how many hours of electricity residents were getting, what items were missing from their food ration that month, and whether or not they got their cooking fuel ration and, if so, how much of it was pilfered from the canister.

What to look for can be subtle or it can be obvious. A rundown and poorly maintained house is an obvious sign of joblessness and little confidence in the future or indicates the occupant is a squatter displaced owing to threats of

sectarian violence. Subtle indicators require greater observation skills and an attitude that always questions why something is the way it appears. The process is not that different from looking for crush wire or oddly placed concrete blocks on the street indicating a hidden roadside bomb. A person just has to be continuously observant and constantly asking, “Why is that like that? What is the meaning of this?”

One day I was walking the streets with a platoon in the district of Ghazaliya. The company commander was along with me, as he usually was whenever I walked the streets in his AO, so we had a platoon-plus-sized security element, about twenty-six men. We were stopping at random houses along the street and talking with residents about employment, asking if they were seeing strangers coming around, and encouraging them to call either the security station or the local police. I would ask questions about early childhood illness or underemployment or marriage prospects, depending on the age and gender of folks I encountered. Car bombs had been a problem lately so the soldiers always asked about abandoned or unfamiliar vehicles in empty lots or parked on side streets. At one particular house while the company commander was asking these questions, I walked around the side yard with another soldier simply to see what I could see. I was trying to use what I knew of contemporary archaeology and often looked at material culture to tell me something about the family’s situation. I usually looked at the surface scatter of trash piles in empty lots, although I had to be careful of that practice because improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are sometimes hidden in trash.

In this person’s side yard, however, I gravitated toward the cylindrical, concrete, rubbish-burning container. The ashes were simply that: ashes with a bit of burnt plastic mixed in. On top of the container, however, was a metal sheet that had a darkened smudge in a circular pattern. I puzzled over what was causing the discoloration, roughly the size of a medium-sized pizza. Then it dawned on me. I recalled a patrol the previous day, one where the platoon was investigating abandoned homes for weapons caches. A woman had sent a child running after us in our humvees with several round pieces of freshly made flat bread called *khubz*. Sitting behind the driver, I watched her through thick bulletproof glass as she cooked over a cylindrical concrete oven, laying the pieces of dough on the hot metal sheet and then flipping them over. Standing in the side yard, I realized that it was not an outdoor oven, it was a trash incinerator. And that is why, as I remarked over the vehicle radio headset that previous day, the bread had an odd tang to it. I make bread, and there was something wrong with that bread. We ate it anyway, but now I knew what was wrong with the bread. The off flavor was due to burning trash contaminants. In an urban environment with little wood for cooking fires and sporadic fuel for gas



ovens, people here were using trash to cook over! I explained all of this to the soldier I was with, which then led to new sets of questions regarding cooking bread over trash fires and prevalence of illness. The soldiers now had a means of discerning how pervasive cooking fuel shortages were; they could look for signs of recent use of trash incinerators to cook bread eaten daily. This observation of material culture and its surrounding context also seemed to lead to a greater appreciation by soldiers for how challenging daily life was behind the boring statistic previously collected about cooking fuel. This also got some of the soldiers working in Civil Military Operations thinking about what kinds of alternative fuels might be introduced in the worst neighborhoods.

Another “outdoor classroom” activity was going to the local open market and looking carefully at what was sold, its quality, availability, and origin. Again, instead of simply looking at people in a market selling things, we started with questioning why food was the way it was, which led to other insights and an increase in rapport between soldiers and community members. For example, at some times tomatoes would be of high quality with few if any bruises and cucumbers were firm with no wrinkled ends and no mold. At other times and places, these same staple vegetables would be in rough shape, have black spots and rotten sections, and be available in rather small quantities. Talking to vendors about these differences led to an insight regarding illegal militia or gang-led checkpoints extorting money from transporters. Other causes were parts of the city being off limits to Sunni vendors owing to a sudden risk in the area in which wholesale distribution points existed. Other factors were specific road conditions and traffic delays. Choke points in the distribution chain became clearer and suggested further investigation by either coalition forces or Iraqi security forces. The ability to notice changes in food availability and ask pointed questions seemed to indicate to vendors and community members that these particular soldiers actually cared about how things were going in their community. After all, these soldiers from the JSSs and COPs were a part of the community. Based on several trips to markets and a bit of research into food distribution and quality, I came up with the following guide to assist soldiers in assessing community well-being and using that assessment to develop talking points when engaging local residents. The guide was not meant to be definitive but to get soldiers started and allow them to adapt and improvise once they got going. The outdoor classroom, the mentoring that resulted from seeing their surroundings in an anthropological light, was meant to teach them to fish, and then we were to step back and simply let them fish. Our soldiers are quite intelligent, despite stereotypes to the contrary, and I wanted to leave room for their creativity and insight to flourish in implementing the guide. The following is what I ended up with and gave to the BCT commander, who

then passed it on to the rest of the organization with his guidance to use the indicators to improve reporting on markets by subordinate units.

**Indicators of Well-Being: Measuring the Economics  
Line of Effort (LOE), Human Terrain System, 2/101  
Airborne Division (Air Assault), April 2008**

**Purpose**

This guide is meant to help company commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders systematically track population well-being in their specific AO. These indicators may be used to assist in satisfying Division (DIV), BCT, and BN assessment reporting requirements regarding the economics (LOE). There are many other indicators possible than those listed here, and users should feel free to add or subtract according to their needs but should keep the following in mind:

- Using a large number of indicators runs the risk of becoming too time-consuming to be of utility at the tactical level.
- All of the indicators may be used as talking points during population engagements.
- The indicators are not foolproof and are prone to error. However, by combining observation of the indicators with conversations about them in regard to well-being of families will minimize error and maximize insight.

**Problem**

Patrols and the organizations to which they provide information are in need of valid indicators of economic well-being for local societies not accurately represented by polling data or national/regional economic statistics. Indicators of supply-chain economics fill this need and serve as the basis for talking points with the local community in order to explore reasons for fluctuations in well-being. Keeping track of the availability, quality, quantity, and pricing of several items listed below will enable a company commander or platoon leader to know (1) the baseline well-being of the specific local community surrounding the market and (2) changes in that well-being over time.

**Fragile and Quickly Perishable Foods**

The following items need speed of delivery, refrigeration, and/or electricity to maintain quality and minimize loss (Table 14.1).

Table 14.1 Quality Measures

Item	Poor	Fair	Good
Cucumbers	Wrinkled ends; portions soft to thumb press; may be fat and yellowing/overripe	Firm but color not vibrant	Firm to hard, sap residue may exist on one end, strong or glossy green color
Tomatoes	Black spots/portions rotted, deformed to crushed flesh, skin may be wrinkled	Soft flesh, dull color, only slight stem rot if at all	Firm flesh, strong tomato smell, vibrant red coloring, no black spots and stem is greenish
Bananas	Green and hard or yellow with many brown spots, flesh is very soft to mushy	Yellow with few brown spots, skin easily pushed in with thumb	Yellow skin with no brown spots, firm and not easily damaged by thumb
Fish	Strong unpleasant odor, eyes are cloudy, scales may be dry	Flesh is firm but may be dry or sticky, eyes are dull, smell has no particular odor	Clear and glossy eyes, flesh is firm, scales are wet with protective slime. Smells of fresh or salt water. Excellent fish will still be alive (usually carp and catfish)
Eggs	Shell is thin and almost translucent when held to light, some eggs in tray cracked	Shell is firm, egg floats in bowl of water	Shell is firm, egg sinks in bowl of water, shell may be brown, rich to taste when eaten after boiling
Bread	Stale, brittle	Soft to stiff, no strong aroma	Soft, pliable, with rich aroma
Dairy	Nonexistent	Shelf-stable dairy products	Fresh milk and cheese

Better quality items tend to cost more, but the purchase of an item may not always be in keeping with its higher quality (that is, buying soft tomatoes for cooking instead of firm tomatoes for eating raw).

### Living Area

These indicators shed light on long-term economic condition and feelings about future well-being (Table 14.2).

Table 14.2 Living Area Quality Measures

	Stressed	Not stressed	Doing well
Housing	Disrepair	Actively being renovated or repaired	Good condition with glass or stained glass windows
Front yard	Neglected	Has grass and small trees	Roses, ornamental shrubbery, healthy citrus and date trees
Rugs	Threadbare, thin, or nonexistent	Imported, machine loomed, synthetic materials	Made locally, hand-woven, natural fiber thread and vegetable dyes

The basic premise underlying these measures is that people will not invest significant money in their living area if losing it is too great a risk. In assessing aspects of a family's living area, attitudes about quality of products need to be carefully considered in order to not be influenced by American values and standards.

Meat: Fish, Lamb, Chicken, Goat, Beef

Observe the availability, abundance, price and quality of meats. Query the three most common quantities in kilos a person tends to purchase at one time. Observe people that purchase organ meat and fat versus leg, loin, or neck and speak with them.

Luxury/Preferred Foods

Observe availability, quality, quantity, origin and pricing of the following items:

- Honey (instead of sugar or date syrup)
- Saffron and diverse herbs and spices (instead of salt or common herbs)
- Iraqi rice (instead of American or Asian rice)
- Soda pop abundant (instead of water)
- Imported juice (instead of water)

These items satisfy wants rather than needs and indicate that economic stress is not an issue.

## Electronics

Observe latest stereo equipment/iPods/ flat panel screens and pricing. Are there satellite dishes on rooftops? Consumer electronics are a good measure of disposable income and exposure to global popular culture. However, people may hide their electronics and other displays of wealth out of fear that they will be confiscated or other people will demand more of them.

## Cosmopolitan Goods

Observe the availability of beer, perfume and cosmetics, fashion clothes, leather shoes, and cosmetics. The presence or absence of these items indicates tolerance for moderate political and religious views as well as participation in a global/cosmopolitan lifestyle characterized by consumption of imported commodities.

## Origin, Availability, Quantity, and Quality of Stock

Observe whether stock comes from any of the following areas:

- China
- Saudi Arabia/Syria/Jordan/Turkey
- Europe
- United States
- Korea/Taiwan
- India

The origin of goods available for purchase indicates the degree to which the local community is tied into trade networks out of the country or region. Network disruption is usually felt as a loss and provides talking points to explore local grievances, expectations, and aspirations.

## Other Kinds of Work in Brief

There were other kinds of work that I engaged in when not out in the streets with soldiers. Because I primarily worked at the BCT headquarters, I attended a great many meetings and when appropriate contributed to them. Occasionally someone on the staff would want to know something about a given topic and ask me to provide a brief report. Other times I would notice a need for better understanding of the sociocultural context of current events and put

together a short report on my own and send that to the commander. Most of the time I listened more than I spoke and then spoke not so much in a meeting as with the appropriate officer who might benefit from my take on things. That way he could use the insight in a manner he saw best for his staff or bring it to the attention of the commander in his own reporting.

Early in 2008, the BCT was thinking of sweeping through a troublesome neighborhood given that it was a stronghold for criminal gangs that had splintered off from a sectarian militia. IED cells were using that neighborhood as a safe haven and exporting their violence into another district, blowing up Iraqi police and army commanders, local advisory councilmen and women, and U.S. Army personnel as they drove past the hidden roadside bombs. While there was rent extortion taking place in that neighborhood, word on the street was that local residents did not want U.S. forces coming through or even driving around on patrols because that stirred up even further trouble. Many new residents had been brought in from the underprivileged neighborhoods of Sadr City by militias, and they were loyal to those militias rather than to the existing government. They had little to do with long-standing residents as well. The BCT staff got together to discuss the feasibility of clearing the neighborhood of criminal elements and extremists. I participated in those meetings, and while I do not recall everything I may have contributed to the planning, I do recall reinforcing the commander's interpreter's argument that the timing for the mission was really bad owing to a cultural consideration.

We were approaching *Eid Al Adha*, or the Feast of the Sacrifice, and not long after that *Ashura*. *Ashura* is particularly important symbolically to Shia Muslims (at least those in our parts of Baghdad). During this time, people recall the martyrdom of Hussein and his betrayal by the Caliph. So *Ashura* highlights a desire for retribution for wrongs committed and liberation from oppression and encourages getting in touch with the suffering of Hussein as emblematic of what it means to be Shia in the face of Sunni domination. I put together a short brief on *Ashura* and *Eid Al Adha* and passed that on to the staff. I could imagine the second- and third-order effects of clearing this neighborhood during *Ashura* would be impassioned rejection of U.S. forces presence, particularly by newly migrated and disenfranchised Shia residents living in the nice homes of Sunni families either displaced or killed for being Sunni. If anything, the clearing operation needed to wait until after *Ashura*. Otherwise many people would likely get hurt and killed in the effort to bring the neighborhood under government control. In the end, the operation did not take place, but I think it had more to do with logistics and the point of view of the BN commander who was responsible for the neighborhood than anything I had to say in a few meetings and a couple of brief culture reports.

BCT staff exist solely to provide information for the commander to base his decisions on and then to carry out his orders. Attributing reduction in violence to one staff element, such as myself, is next to impossible in this case or any other case in which I was involved. But what is important is that the commander had the information at hand to make his decision and that he was provided needed sociocultural information among other types of information to make his decision. There are people likely alive and uninjured today that otherwise would not be had the commander made a different decision based, perhaps, on less information.

## Conclusion

The work I have done to use the anthropological perspective is not glamorous or heroic. The work is simply based on basic modes of inquiry with an effort to remain open to the insight each of anthropology's subdisciplines may provide. I illustrated three of the five objectives I came up with in an effort to make operational the mission capabilities briefing given to commanders and policy makers at the start of my tour of duty in 2007. The HTS program continues to grow and develop an ability to deliver on its core competence: providing social and cultural information to commanders conducting stability operations in their AO. The program was required to expand very quickly, and as with any rapid growth there are attendant growing pains. These will be worked out in time. I hope that this essay will encourage readers to help find solutions to the conflict in Iraq (and elsewhere), rather than treating HTS as some kind of whipping child for their anxiety about U.S. forces being in Iraq and U.S. foreign policy in general. Iraq is a truly wonderful place with wonderful people so deserving of freedom and a chance at prosperity. In my experience, the U.S. Army's HTS is directly helping to resolve conflict and create a space for prosperity and freedom to take hold in Iraq.

