served to shift what was considered acceptable behaviour in relation to the refugees.

The existence of these moral panics, and their subsequent repercussions, demonstrate the *coexistence* of hidden and public transcripts, as well as the coexistence and continuum of practices of benevolence and practices of violence. This hysteria did not come out of the blue, and was only enabled by the much wider social and political forces that underpinned it, forces that re-inscribe Sweden and Swedish people as morally exceptional, and all the baggage that this entails. With one in four votes in the village, including those of the volunteers, going to the anti-immigration party they had once deemed "frightening," it is clear that not only governments, political parties, or even the media deem certain groups as a societal threat. As we have seen, individuals, groups, and communities are seemingly just as capable of acting as so-called authorized speakers in the name of their security, even when it goes completely against the grain of what it means to be decent.

The word "limits" in the title of this chapter refers to the contestation of a certain way of thinking and the hatching of something new. The strength of the taboo whereby nobody decent criticizes asylum policy within polite company is now undermined. This is how the hidden transcript becomes public and the whole notion of righteousness is changed, not by evolution or a gradual development, but by the capacity that each element within this particular framework is now read differently, through a different mode of thinking. What emerges, therefore, is something new. Not an alternative meta-narrative, one that rejects Sweden's moral superpowerfulness, but simply microphysics, these tiny practices of conduct and counter-conduct that carve out new terrain of acceptable behaviour. The next chapter discusses these broader theoretical issues, opening up a dialogue between anthropology and problematizations of security, and putting forward the concepts of reflexivity, metis, and solidarity (and its appropriations) as major interventions toward an anthropological rethinking of CSS.

5

Anthropological Rethinking of Critical Security Studies

Reflexivity, Metis, and Solidarity

The previous two chapters discussed the way in which a small, rural Swedish community housing over one hundred refugees ultimately took the matter of security into their own hands. While seemingly going against more official national discourses of solidarity, they simultaneously kept all notions of decency firmly intact. As opposed to a moment of exception (Wæver 1993; Agamben 1998), or even a governmentality of unease (Bigo 2002), and moving beyond the biopolitical hierarchization spoken about by many within the anthropology of humanitarianism in terms of the hatching of a new way of thinking (Agier 2002, 2011; Pandolfi 2003, 2008; Fassin 2010, 2012), I have described how these practices of marginalization were undertaken by actors operating in what I have labelled a governmentality of righteousness. This set of relations is built on nationalist narratives connecting Sweden's decision to grant asylum to all Syrians arriving at the border with a cherished myth linked to a particular historical period tied to the formation of the modern nation state.

The purpose of this final chapter is to reflect upon the more conceptual questions brought to the fore and to examine the three main ways this book aims to rethink CSS along more anthropological lines. Firstly, I argue that the role of reflexivity is crucial in this project of shifting ontological primacy and generating a meaningful dialogue between the two disciplines of IR and anthropology. The book proposes a Scott-based approach to examining the appropriation of humanitarianism, generosity, and solidarity as a form of security, based on his conceptions of both public and hidden transcripts and practices of metis. Absolutely crucial regarding the use of such an

anthropological framework is that the focus is not on ethnography as a method, as discussed in chapter 1. I argue that it is in focusing on the reciprocal positioning of the hidden and public transcripts, and on my relation to my objects of study and the effect of my presence on what we label practices of metis, that brings the importance of reflexivity to the forefront of any possible dialogue between IR and anthropology. I argue that reflecting on the configuring of my own role and power position within my research was absolutely crucial in how I have told the story of the people of Öreby and the resettled refugees. The ways in which my role as a British translator and volunteer shaped the narrative was critical in the writing of my anthropology. Therefore, instead of attempting to build some kind of overarching, meta-narrative, an anthropological approach to studying security practices should attempt to build traces and connections, which are themselves written into the story.

Metis is then the focus of the second section of the chapter, wherein I argue that any study of processes of (in)securitization must not simply be a study of security as top-down coercion. As well as destabilizing Copenhagen's insistence on security as speech acts and examining the far right solely through party politics and spokespersons, a focus on metis is also argued as being the most productive manner through which IR and anthropology can open a dialogue on problematizing security.

Thirdly, and relatedly, the chapter looks at the role the idea of solidarity played in generating security practices. How was it possible that what appeared as the contrary of security could, nonetheless, be appropriated as a form of security? This final section argues that the re-utilization of solidarity was absolutely central for enabling the refugees to be deemed undeserving, undesirable, and dangerous. The conduct and counter-conduct, the microphysics of outrage, and the dramatic, seemingly exceptional moral panics could be conceptualized as part of the baggage that re-implants solidarity as a moral obligation. Far from a rational solidarity, as within the Swedish national myth, we have a very local understanding of a *free gift* of sorts. The section reflects on the anthropological literature on humanitarianism that has discussed the way in which humanitarian practices can actually serve to biopolitically hierarchize human life, and argues that, in light of my project's findings, this type of managing and hierarchization should simply be seen as the concealed base of the iceberg, the tip of which sees the sacrifice of an unwanted group in the name of protection.

REFLEXIVITY

The story of the refugees in Öreby presented here is the story that I chose to tell. Its narrative and the connections that I made are some of many that I could have chosen, but decided not to. Altogether, I spent nineteen months in Öreby working with the grassroots NGO, the Friends of Syria, and with the refugees. These nineteen months were some of the happiest I had experienced in recent times, especially at the beginning. I formed close friendships with some of the group – Åsa, Monnika, and especially Bodil. I also became very fond of some of the Syrians living in Öreby – Nivine, Omar, and, of course, Adnan. I had lived in Damascus in 2008 and 2009, studying Arabic in the university and hanging out, night after night, in trendy restaurants and drinking haunts of the Christian Quarter in the Old Town. In 2008, the city was awarded "Arab City of Culture," with regular concerts in the citadel and spontaneous gatherings and singsongs on the streets of *Bab Touma*, where young people gathered with a *shwarma* and a beer and strummed guitars and tapped on drums to the latest rock songs. That summer also saw one of the country's most ferocious heat waves, with temperatures soaring into the low-fifties Celsius; several friendships were forged when local Damascenes approached me, the pasty, fair-haired northern European woman, to ask how I was coping with the extreme weather. That was also the year that I came to adore Damascus and the people living there. In my memories, the place was entwined with being young, free, and happy, without responsibilities or worries.

Therefore, the arrival of Syrian refugees in Sweden reignited this spark of pleasant recollections, however naive, simplistic, and orientalist. Syrian people in Sweden, how wonderful! The Swedes should recognize their privilege in hosting such charming and cultured people. If the refugees settled in Öreby were from elsewhere, I am quite certain that, though I would have been sympathetic to their plight, I perhaps wouldn't have cared quite as much. Maybe I would have been more understanding of the villagers' initial complaints. Who knows? But in my mind, Syrian people were like me and, as such, deserved a very warm welcome. To be sure, I wanted the Syrian refugees to succeed in Sweden simply by virtue of them being Syrian. It was only after several months when I got to know refugees from Iran, Georgia, and Uganda who had been placed in Öreby that I felt the same kind of empathy with them.

There are many ways of narrating the story of the Syrians in Öreby. Like the Swedish news report that decided to portray everyday life in Öreby in terms of the hard-working and underappreciated volunteers, doing all they could in the face of the worst refugee crisis since the Balkan War, or the foreign newspaper that chose to give a voice to Rifat to speak about his depression and boredom in small town Sweden. None of these narrations could be seen as any less true than an alternative telling.

Crucial to the anthropological approach that I adopted, therefore, was the importance placed on the notion of reflexivity. It was absolutely essential for me to constantly question my own position – with regard to the volunteers and the refugees, the effect of my presence, my Britishness, my very close friendship with Bodil, my ability to find common ground with many of the younger people from Damascus and Aleppo – a position that was never static and manifested itself differently in every situation. And certainly, the uncritical importing of ethnographic methods into IR has failed to pay sufficient attention to recent debates in critical anthropology regarding the role of the researcher. However, placing the notion of reflexivity at the forefront of any analysis permits an incorporation of the hierarchies of power and disparate power relations between the people being studied, and crucially between the research subjects and myself as a researcher, and accounts for these relations in interpretations of the way in which people behave.

Understanding that different people would approach the situation in Öreby, or the wider issue of the situation of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe, differently is to also understand that the very way in which any research question on the issue could be structured and framed would also vary considerably. As Yanow (2006, 78) forcefully argued, knowing and understanding are intersubjective processes and a presumed isolated independence of an individual response ignores how all analyses are contextualized, formed, and constrained by different characteristics of academic practice. Thus, as the meaning of acts can only be understood through interpretation, the first step to being "scientific" would be to realize my own commitments and prejudices.

As my experiences were naturally a direct result of the disparate power relations between myself and the other members of the group, the residents of the village, and the refugees, recognizing the power dynamics or different situations and reflecting on how my presence

altered people's behaviour brought strength to my research question and collection of data. Though from a similar social class, ethnicity, and background as the volunteers in the Friends of Syria group, I was of course seen as a foreigner, with constant references invoked regarding refugee relations "in my country." Acting as a translator between the tiny, makeshift organization, the other villagers, and the refugees shrouded me in a little bit of mystique as few of the refugees spoke fluent English and no village residents or members of the organization spoke any Arabic. To deny the oppressive effect on others of this kind of professional "knowledge" would be at best naive. For sure, many people thought of me as some sort of expert on refugee integration, though I presented myself as nothing of the sort.

In utilizing an anthropological framework and viewing the governmentality of righteousness as an ethnographic object, one becomes acutely aware of how these power relations play a role in the production of knowledge. At the beginning of my fieldwork, I became instantly conscious that I was, to some extent, part of a sort of machinery of governance whereby the residents felt obliged in many instances to perform the role of the good, welcoming Swede toward the new Syrian residents, or to demonstrate their tolerance more generally, for my approval. As a foreigner from the United Kingdom, this was expressly articulated to me on several occasions, as already mentioned. Therefore, in many respects, my ethnography acted as a situated intervention between governing and resistance, strategies and tactics, and conduct and counter-conduct. Though in many regards, as a researcher, I could access a hidden transcript or that which would not have been openly said around, for example, the other members of the grassroots social organization, the villagers, or the refugees themselves, I was conscious that a great deal of the performance of publicly welcoming the Syrians was at least in part played out for my benefit as well as for the benefit of fellow residents.

Of course, one could have viewed the villagers and the Friends of Syria as insincere and hypocritical from the outset. One could argue that the organization of the grassroots group was simply self-indulgent, a way in which the relatively middle-class, well-educated folk could relieve their guilt by treating the refugees as some sort of "pets," a way for the volunteers and wider community to give meaning to their lives without recognizing the refugees as fellow humans with all the same rights and responsibilities. For me, however, this would not only be a complete misreading and misunderstanding of the dynamics

at play in Öreby but would also render meaningless the refugees' own interpretations of the actions of the Friends of Syria and Öreby-dwellers. We remember that the group was very much appreciated and respected by the Syrian refugees in general, and the people of Öreby were viewed as very kind and good people. Bodil was held in extremely high regard, being labelled a gift from God and a guardian angel by some of the Syrians who were first to arrive in the village.

There is no meta-narrative or overarching theory as to how the Syrians in Öreby came to be seen as undesirable and dispensable. The manner in which they came to be conceived of as threatening, requiring that some sort of action be taken to protect the Öreby-dwellers, was very much a process and a journey. And as I was a key player in the development of that journey, problematizing my position at every node and juncture is essential if we are to have an honest discussion.

BEING IN BETWEEN: BUILDING TRACES INSTEAD OF META-NARRATIVES

To reiterate briefly from an earlier chapter: I initially placed myself in the role of "in between" – I was first and foremost a translator and interpreter in Öreby. I conveyed grumbles and complaints between the villagers and the Syrians, but also passed on the grievances of the Syrian refugees to the Friends of Syria group. I was good friends with the women in the NGO but also formed bonds with some of the refugees – Nivine, Adnan, Sandra, and Tariq especially. As a British person, from a country whose political discourse is much more openly hostile toward refugees, the volunteers saw me as a "safe" person to whom they could confess. I was sympathetic to their workload. I was interested in what they were doing. For example, I was privy to Bodil's admission that she had started to write for the far-right anti-immigration blog. All of the volunteers also confessed to me first, before confiding in each other, that they had voted for the Sweden Democrats. I was seen, for whatever reason, as somebody who would be more understanding and less judgmental. And perhaps I was less disapproving. I had witnessed all the hard work they had taken upon themselves and was sympathetic to the fact that they had much less time to spend with their husbands and children because of the sheer numbers of refugees who had been placed in Öreby, with very little in the way of official support.

As someone who had lived in Syria, albeit briefly, I was also seen as a friendly ear by some of the refugees. My time in Damascus meant that it was easy for me to find common ground with some of the refugees. During the first half of 2013 relatively few Syrians were arriving on Sweden's border, nothing like the numbers seen during the so-called refugee crisis of subsequent years. Those who had made the journey at that time were also much more likely to be highly educated, middle class, and quite young, meaning that it was very easy to strike up conversations and relatively likely that there would be some common interests. Nivine and Omar, for example, were not hesitant to complain to me about how slow paced and quiet they found life in Öreby to be, an observation they were far too polite to relay to any of the other volunteers. Similarly, Rifat, Ahmed, and Tariq felt comfortable enough around me to pass comment on how they had felt about villagers' remarks or actions, which they would not be so rude as to report to any other members of the Friends of Syria.

I also had the benefit of being able to leave my fieldwork for periods of time. Unlike everybody else, I did not live in Öreby but instead was about a twenty-minute bus journey away. I also travelled back home to the UK fairly frequently or attended conferences and seminars in different parts of Europe or North America. It was only when I was away from Öreby that I was able to examine what was going on there with a fresh eye and conceive of my own role in the events.

As my fieldwork progressed, however, many friends and colleagues outside of Sweden commented that I had moved further and further away from this role of in between, which was reflected in the narration of the story of Öreby in the previous two chapters. I became bound up with the work of the volunteer group and their practices. As friendships with the volunteers became increasingly stronger, what I had access to also increased over the course of my fieldwork. I thus started to see the Friends of Syria and the villagers as my objects of study. And this caused many of the Syrian voices to be marginalized somewhat. "But what of the hidden transcript of the Syrian people?" I would frequently be asked. "What are the Syrians feelings about the Swedish self-perceptions of righteousness?"

As I set out in chapter 1, it would be disingenuous to claim that I had the same kind of access to the Syrian people as I did to the members of the Friends of Syria. Though I strove to place myself in between and managed to build good relationships, I am quite sure that I was never privy to the darkest depths of the hidden transcript

of some of the Syrian refugees. Indeed, for the Syrians there was much more at stake in forming an open friendship with me and discussing their feelings about life in Sweden. Though some people complained of being bored, the Syrians were there to make a new life for themselves, so most people remained very polite and perhaps somewhat guarded. This was not the case for my relationships with members of the Friends of Syria. As intermediaries between the refugees and the villagers, they positioned themselves as having nothing to hide and were thus much more forthcoming about their feelings toward the refugees.

Not having an anthropology background, I was also perhaps ill-prepared for the emotional exhaustion that fieldwork would bring and the moral ambiguity of many of the situations I found myself in, as well as the continuous questioning on my own standpoint (see also Eckl 2008). As I became good friends with the members of the Friends of Syria, I became much more sympathetic to how they viewed the situation in Öreby, and felt sorry for the workload they had taken upon themselves. When chatting about the group to other Swedish friends or family, or back home in the UK, I found myself defending the behaviour of some members of the group – the disciplining of Omar and Nivine's brashness, the desire for some kind of gratitude from the refugees, and even the echoing of the Sweden Democrats' rhetoric that the Syrians would be better helped in the overseas refugee camps instead of being encouraged to come to Sweden. I cared very much for my new friends in Öreby, and wanted them to be happy and fulfilled again in their volunteer work. I wanted them to be appreciated by the refugees and to be reassured that they were good, kind people. "They're just so nice!" I would find myself explaining to friends and colleagues. Perhaps they were right and Sweden can't shoulder such a burden, practically single-handedly, I would rationalize. If they felt that the Sweden Democrats were the only ones speaking up for them in a climate where nobody felt they could criticize Sweden's asylum policy, then who was I to say that they were wrong? Sometimes the moral ambiguity I found myself in was suffocating, stressful, and completely destabilizing.

As described in the previous chapter, only after the complete breakdown of social relations in the village; after the various moral panics that saw a TV crew being invited to film the "real" goings on in Öreby and some of the group members writing what they regarded as the "truth" about the Syrian refugees in Sweden; and ultimately, after

the volunteers (and 27 per cent of the residents of Öreby) decided to vote for the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats in the general election, did the extent of the disdain of many of the Syrian people for both the volunteers and the villagers become obvious. To wit: Samira's articulation that we "are not a human fucking zoo," Adnan's anger at the police shooting in Jämtland, and Faisal's disgust at the increasing popularity of the far-right party in Oreby. In these instances, the hidden transcript became public.[1] Within these various ruptures, a line of separation was drawn between the volunteers and me. I was reminded that I was a foreigner, that I did not understand the pressure that Sweden was under. As Britain had taken so few of the refugees, I was naive about how cunning, manipulative, and unscrupulous the refugees could actually be. For me, though the atmosphere was often rather tense in Öreby, the various moral panics and the complete disbanding of social relations came as somewhat of a shock. I was never in any doubt as to the motivations of the Friends of Syria. I never regarded them as self-satisfied or smug.

I was thus too embedded in the day-to-day goings-on in Öreby. My presence undoubtedly changed certain dynamics and altered the turn of events. Everybody in Öreby – the volunteers, the refugees, and the wider village community – knew that I was there to loosely research the issue of the Syrian people in Öreby. Everybody knew that they were being watched and written about, and adjusted their behaviour accordingly.

The telling of the story of the Syrians in Öreby in not supposed to be an objective, fly-on-the-wall account of what happened in the village between February 2013 and September 2014, and I have not tried to portray it as such. Hence, an ethnographic approach, treating governmentality as an anthropological object and using the work of Scott to explore the wiggle room for actors operating within this governmentality, is best placed to capture the messiness of the everyday practices on Öreby, the reciprocal positioning of the hidden and public transcripts, and my relation as a researcher to the processes and practices that eventually came to render the Syrian people undesirable.

Though Scott has traditionally been charged with "attempting to produce an innocent knowledge outside the constraints of theory" (Vrasti 2013), the use of Scott's framework not only encourages creativity and flexibility in the process of data gathering but also enables the systematic "writing in" of the researcher to all stages of

the research process and enables reflexivity at each point. Going further than analyzing everyday life and its links to political practices or official discourses, this Scott-inspired ethnography, by drawing on the way in which my engagement as researcher shapes my data, very much strengthens the research question and problematization.

Building on this argument by Yanow (2006) and, therefore, what is necessary for an interdisciplinary dialogue between political anthropology and IR on security, is to write in a way that captures the messiness of the security landscape, while still remaining convincing. More important than attempting to build a grand, overarching narrative is to build traces, where the story of how I make various connections becomes part of the story itself (cf. Levi-Strauss 1965).

Therefore, in turning to metis in the following section, it is important to bear in mind that these practices of metis are not simply what I observed during my fieldwork. Metis is also the relation that I have to my objects of study, my embeddedness in the day-to-day happenings, and the tiny acts of (counter) conduct that occurred as a result of my being there. For this reason I argue that the most meaningful dialogue between IR and anthropology on questions of security comes through the concrete study of the everyday practices of actors, these tiny acts of metis, which destabilizes both the idea of a pre-defined, demarcated security terrain or apparatus and the notion of security as decisionist politics and audiences. Putting metis at the forefront of my study not only disrupts Copenhagen's insistence on the speech act as the securitization process but also offers a more damning critique of the "critical anthropology of security" school of thought and those that uncritically use ethnography as a method through which to study pre-defined "securityscapes" (Albro 2011; Gusterson 2004). Against these authors, I argue that the most important offering anthropology can give to IR on studies of security is not a tradition of holism (cf. Albro 2011), but one of relationism. Against holism, even the most traditional anthropological context, that of the village, can be seen not as an object to be explained but as an explicitly partial and always "contingent window into complexity" (Candea 2007, 167). Nicholas De Genova (2005, 1, emphasis added) captures it best when he speaks of anthropology not of examining a "thing called society," but instead looking at "how social life comes to appear so "***thinglike***," and "how people immersed in those processes seek to make sense of them." Mick Dillon and Julian Reid (1999, 9), who authored the term "relationism," mean by it "that

nothing is without being in relation, and that everything is – in the ways that it is – in terms and in virtue of relationality."

Therefore, instead of aiming for some sort of synthesis, the use of metis allows for the positioning of myself in a situated intervention between the Swedish people and the Syrians, between conduct and counter-conduct, and between the hidden and public transcripts. Central to this intervention is accounting for the irregular, constantly shifting dynamics at play and, of course, the fundamentally contested nature of the terrain depending on one's angle of vision.

METIS

> There is no doubt that *mētis* is a type of intelligence and of thought, a way of knowing; it implies a complex but very coherent body of mental attitudes and intellectual behaviour which combine flair, wisdom, forethought, subtlety of mind, deception, resourcefulness, vigilance, opportunism, various skills, and experience acquired over the years. It is applied to situations which are transient, shifting, disconcerting and ambiguous, situations which do not lend themselves to precise measurement, exact calculation or rigorous logic.
>
> Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant 1991

Chapter 4 saw us discuss the limits to the governmentality of righteousness and examine everyday practices of counter-conduct by the villagers of Öreby, which completely destabilized and thus liberated and reconceptualized what it meant to be a decent or righteous citizen. Fuelled and accelerated by various moral panics, this very mundane counter-conduct generated something new and innovative: a shift in what was now deemed acceptable behaviour toward the refugees. As we saw, this shift was not due to a sudden rupture or an abrupt, open manifestation of collective resistance by the Öreby-dwellers against the newly arrived refugees. This new terrain of acceptable behaviour, though seemingly exceptional, was carved out through tiny, subtle everyday practices that went only ever so slightly against the grain of decency, but added up to a social change.

In September 2014, we also saw how one in four people in Öreby, including most of the volunteers with the Friends of Syria, voted for the far-right party they themselves once considered abhorrent. Two members of the group even began writing posts, on the real stories behind the Syrian refugees in Sweden, for an anti-immigration blog

aligned with the party. As I wrote at the end of the previous chapter, these people did not suddenly come to identify themselves as anti-immigration, let alone nationalists, racists, or neo-Nazis. They did not abruptly come to see themselves as having something in common with the much-demonized residents in Sjobo, 100 kilometres away – the "ignorant farmers" and "skinheads" – who, only a year and a half earlier, were still the subject of much condemnation and ridicule, a crucial folk devil used to keep the public transcript of complete solidarity intact. In fact, in Öreby, the complete opposite was the case. The villagers and the members of the Friends of Syria who voted for the far right maintained that they were not at all aligned with the far right. Some of the Friends of Syria still maintained that they found the party repugnant, despite voting for it. Unlike the imagined uneducated rural men of Sjobo who were filled with hatred and ignorance, the Öreby-dwellers were utterly convinced of their decency. Their practices, though pushing at the very boundaries, were still subsumed by a governmentality of righteousness – a type of counter-conduct, certainly, but never an action from outside, or diametrically against, what they conceived of as being righteous. Their actions were simply one of the many axes of practices available to the good citizen in their position, very much a tactic instead of a strategy.

For the Friends of Syria, voting for the far-right party was justified as the most noble action to take. They thought of themselves as protecting the well-being of the Syrians who had already arrived in Sweden against the hordes of imagined racists, who were sure to mobilize if Sweden continued on this so-called dangerous route of allowing so many refugees to settle. Bodil, for example, justified her act in terms of gatekeeping; in voting for the far-right party, she was shielding the refugees who were already settled in the village from the menace that her fellow Öreby-dwellers posed if the village were obliged to accept even more refugees. "We just cannot cope with the strain here in Öreby anymore," she would often tell me. "It is a suicidal policy on behalf of the government and I'm seriously worried about what's going to happen in the future for these people if Sweden just carries on like this." A new way of being good was thus brought into being. And done so through practical operations, which never "makes its nature explicit or justifies its procedures" (Detienne and Vernant 1991).

So, with an anthropological rethinking of security, the importance of metis comes into play in the construction of a group as

dangerous and undesirable. Though originally conceptualized by Detienne and Vernant, anthropologist Michel de Certeau refers to the ancient Greek term "*mētis*" to illustrate a type of behaviour where the aim is "to obtain the maximum number of effects from the minimum force" (de Certeau, cited in Neumann, 2002, 633). James C. Scott also utilizes the concept of metis to talk about "a wide array of practical skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly changing natural and human environment" (Scott, cited in Neumann, 2002, 634). The second way I propose to rethink CSS concerns this notion of metis. Here, I argue that any study of processes of (in)securitization should not be a study of top-down coercion, spokespersons, and audiences. I put forward the argument that the most productive dialogue between IR and anthropology on questions of security can take place, firstly and most importantly, through Scott and metis.

Metis as the Most Sophisticated Dialogue between IR and Anthropology on Questions of Security

In chapter 3, we reconceptualized Tilly's idea of the Swedish standard story of moral exceptionalism as a type of governmentality that I labelled a governmentality of righteousness. In using Tilly's notion of the standard story as a point of departure, we discussed how moral exceptionalism could not be seen as an elite narrative or ideology imposed on a passive population that uncritically reproduces the narrative. Through utilizing the Foucauldian notion of governmentality in relation to Tilly, the standard story is not only one that is actively performed by and embraced by members of the public but also one that has come to shape and normalize how citizens come to view themselves and others as moral beings. The decent citizen is brought into being by the governmentality of righteousness. As opposed to treating governmentality as a Weberian ideal type, I proposed viewing governmentality as an anthropological object. Instead of being viewed as an abstract concept, the governmentality of righteousness cannot be conceptualized outside of its concrete manifestations on the ground, through micropractices and microphysics.

The first and most important lesson in anthropologically rethinking CSS is to see the space and place where practices of security take place as not being predetermined or pre-defined; instead attention is paid to their emergence and contingency. This suggests a much more

profound role for anthropology in the current debate by placing ontological primacy on ethnography as a way of knowing. As my project has shown, the day-to-day practices of metis within a small village in Sweden served to enact a security scene through the utilization and evasion of, and the wiggle room incorporated within, what I labelled a governmentality of righteousness. In stressing the roles of a collective, shared, though largely hidden, transcript, similar to what Appadurai points to when he discusses the processes of collective imagination in the construction of a –scape, my project points to a much more important role for anthropology regarding security questions. In asking what we mean by the "everyday," my project has emphasized the need to always examine questions of security and security terrains and apparatuses as relational. As Scott's idea of the hidden and public transcripts has shown, the examination of day-to-day practices only makes sense when one accepts their reciprocal positioning. We can then abandon questions of levels of analysis or brush off criticism that carrying out such in-depth, ethnographic fieldwork is not proper IR.

In mobilizing the work of James C. Scott and the idea of metis, my case study of a Swedish village in chapters 3 and 4 has shown the importance of the idea of appropriation and collective imagination in the construction of a group as threatening, in a very local context, both utilizing and evading grander nationalist and international myths. I then went on to demonstrate that the appropriation of discourses of not only humanitarianism or hospitality but also solidarity can construct the terrain of the security landscape, quite devoid of any official security discourses or practices. The exact importance played by solidarity is discussed later in this chapter. Important thus far, however, is that a critical anthropology of security has articulated its desire to show notions of security to be "contingent, contested and always cultural, ***even within security apparatuses***" (Maguire, Frois, and Zurawski 2014, emphasis added). Again, anthropology here, despite all contestations to the contrary, has taken these technologies of security as given. In fact, this critical anthropology of security, in its insistence on demystifying security and moving beyond the nation state ends up mirroring a great deal of work already taking place in IR and CSS, what Diana Fox (2010) has called the "bread and butter" of many IR departments.

In arguing that security terrains or apparatuses should not be viewed as grand narratives, my case study has not only stressed the

intersections between discourses of solidarity, humanitarianism, and security, which I discuss further in the final section, but also emphasized the importance of these everyday acts of appropriation, translation, and evasion. As Didier Bigo (2014a, 191) has so eloquently stated when discussing the importance of a critical anthropology of security, "processes of managing (in)security can transform everyday politics into a security scene." Therefore, in reflecting back on my first intervention, a far more important role is conceived for an anthropological way of knowing within CSS than many have envisaged. By not taking security scenes as a given – an a priori definition in the fields of IR, political science, or even criminology – and simply importing ethnographic methods into the mix, my project has demonstrated the way in which political anthropology is best suited to exploring the contradictions and continuities of how communities can constitute their security in a horizontal fashion and take the matter of security into their own hands.

Metis and Everyday Theories of (In)securitization

As chapter 1 noted, traditional scholarship on securitization of migration traditionally conceives of a securitizing act as an elitist phenomenon, situated within the professionals of politics, enabling a type of exceptional or panic politics. This type of framework, including some of the more sociological offshoots (cf. Balzacq 2016), which place far more significance on the role of the audience within these securitizing acts, resonates with much of the established literature on the far right, viewing the demonization of migration, for the most part, in terms of ideology. In this sense, power is conceived as top-down, restraining and shaping the behaviour of individuals. Within these explanations of the construction of migration as a threat are several assumptions. Firstly, those who come to accept that migrants and migration are a danger to their culture or values are usually somewhat quiescent. They are largely passive consumers of the speech act, or at the very least, as in Balzacq's more sociological re-conceptualization of ST, they are influenced by the speech act to the same extent that the enunciator is shaped by public opinion.

Secondly, the group is also largely conceived of as somehow disadvantaged. They are to some extent disenfranchized, or view themselves as disenfranchized, due in part to the uncertainties brought

about by globalization or free-market capitalism. This is certainly the case in Sweden, as we saw in chapter 2, which looks at how various counter-insurgency practices and official rhetoric around radicalization and fundamentalism have beckoned the end of Swedish exceptionalism and moved Swedish citizens toward accepting the narrative about the need for the generation of a "New Sweden" (see, for example, Dahlstedt 2005; Dahlstedt 2008; Schierup and Ålund 2010). Beyond Sweden, the traditional tabloid narratives of the marginalized white working classes, under threat from not only immigrants, committing more crime and claiming welfare while simultaneously stealing jobs and undercutting wages, but also from a metropolitan, urban, liberal elite intent on destroying their way of life, is a familiar narrative. Lastly, these type of theories assume that the group in question is not directly coerced into accepting the status quo. There is an element of conditioning at play.

In the more IPS-inspired frameworks for (in)securitization through the routine or the everyday, scholarship moved away from what Vaughan-Williams and Stevens (2016) have called these "elitist" sites of exceptional security to take into account the cultural milieus in which (in)securitization moves take place. This has led to a much more sophisticated and robust conceptualization of security and everyday practices than simply speaking of audiences, as in Balzacq's (2016) approach. Huysmans (2014) recognizes the "double analytical status" of the realm of the everyday whereby we are able to capture *both* (in)securitizing practices as well as the negotiation and appropriation of these moves by certain groups. In this way, we can no longer say that far right is nothing to do with us – something external, objective, and "over there," neatly demarcated. We are instead obliged to acknowledge the subtle practices of normalization of this seemingly exceptional politics and how rather nice people, even people a bit like us, can own this type of politics.

A turn to metis pushes this theorization of the everyday even further by taking these tiny micropractices as our specific ontological point of departure, opening up the possibility to move *beyond* the dualisms of seeing the everyday in terms of just reproduction or contestation of pre-defined (in)security practices. An ethnographic way of knowing and of knowledge takes "everyday" to mean these very situated lived experiences of people and the various spins they put on things – the sets of relations in which they are embedded that make them, at certain points, feel insecure or threatened.

In conceiving of the everyday in terms of acts of metis, and placing ontological priority on these micropractices and all their complexities, a political anthropological reconfiguration of studying security has demonstrated that (in)securitization processes can not only be extremely far from top-down manipulation from political entrepreneurs claiming an easy fix to a complex problem, or even a distinct doxa that emerges within fields of professionals, but also be something very different. The story of Oreby has shown danger and threat constructed at a very local level through tiny practices – what Scott would perhaps label "resistance" – but where all images of decency are kept intact. What appears as the opposite of security – hospitality, humanitarianism, and solidarity – nevertheless looks like a form of security. Here, security is also about protection and welfare. Righteousness, in this instance, is a form of security. Through local forms of knowledge, embedded in local experiences, a security scene is created from something appearing traditionally at odds.

The final section examines the role played by solidarity within Swedish discourse in the generation of this security scene, not by looking at what the concept of solidarity *is* but instead what solidarity *does*. The manner in which solidarity is translated and appropriated in everyday practice and the way in which local forms of knowledge, through the described practices of metis, carves out a new terrain of acceptable behaviour in which the Syrian refugees are able to be legitimately articulated as a threat.

SOLIDARITY

In the foreword to her translation of Marcel Mauss's *The Gift* (*Essai sur le don*), Mary Douglas proposes the thesis that the theory of the gift is in fact a theory of human solidarity (Mary Douglas 1990, xv). With this tension and overlap between the idea of the gift and that of solidarity in mind, this section explores the much broader question of how solidarity, a concept that appears to be at polar opposites to any idea of security, actually came to look, to all intents and purposes, like security practices when played out in everyday life. It argues that the notion of solidarity within Swedish popular discourse becomes an empty signifier of sorts. Therefore, more important than what solidarity means is what solidarity does: the everyday practices it mobilizes and enables. Though conceived within Swedish political discourse in completely rational-choice terms, with the citizen

perceived as being completely free from the bonds of moral obligation, solidarity in terms of relations with refugees in fact mobilizes a very specific type of gift economy. The position of Sweden as morally exceptional regarding refugee and asylum policy and the generation of the Swedish governable subject and righteous citizen enables notions of humanitarianism, generosity, and charity to be brought into being. Therefore, from a Weberian perspective, we have an instrumental "associative" style of solidarity based on individual choice, masking the expectations associated with more communal types of solidarity based on gratitude and obligations. It is this tension and overlap that enables the tiny practices of metis spoken about above to go ever so slightly against the grain of solidarity while maintaining all notions of decency and righteousness.

Because of Sweden's 2013 decision to grant permanent residency to all Syrians arriving in the country, as well as the strict interpretation of the term "solidarity" in the TFEU by Swedish political elites with regard to refugee policy, which prioritized resettlement from third countries over relocation of refugees within the EU (as a "burden sharing exercise"), I argue that a supposedly "pure," rationalist notion of solidarity stands in contradiction to the idea of Sweden as moral exemplar and to the functioning of the governmentality of righteousness. In its appropriation at an everyday level, therefore, the functioning of the governmentality of righteousness *requires* this element of moral supremacy. Instead of solidarity in its strictest sense, a gift economy is brought into being.

Day-to-day life in Oreby, as discussed in chapter 3, permitted open articulation of the expectations of the refugees to be worthy guests to some extent in polite company, something that was very much in keeping with the conduct of conduct of the decent citizen. Nevertheless, the decent citizen was one who never openly complained about Swedish asylum policy, thus generating a public and hidden transcript of behaviour: what is and is not acceptable to be voiced in polite company. As discussed in chapter 4, solidarity thus takes on a somewhat *ironic* element: it becomes about convincing oneself of one's generosity, decency, and righteousness. As long as the refugees play by all the rules of being a worthy guest, this performance is maintained. However, any perceived deviation from this role is deemed an affront to the good nature of the Swedish people and is heavily sanctioned. As we saw in the previous chapter, the arena of acceptable conduct toward the refugees is broadened, until

they are legitimately able to be labelled a threat with all perceptions of decency on the part of the Swedish hosts able to be kept intact.

Moral Obligation or Rational Egoism? The Messiness of Solidarity in the Swedish Story

First to the abstract concept of solidarity: "As to the question which gave rise to this work, it is that of the relations between the individual personality and social solidarity. What explains the fact that, while becoming more autonomous, the individual becomes more closely dependent on society? How can he simultaneously be more personally developed and more socially dependent? For it is undeniable that these two developments, however contradictory they may seem, are equally in evidence. That is the problem which we have set ourselves. What has seemed to us to resolve this apparent antinomy is a transformation of social solidarity due to the steadily growing development of the division of labour" (Durkheim [1893] 1964, 37–8).

Emile Durkheim famously saw solidarity and the nature of social ties as the central problematique of the field of sociology. Departing from the thinking of his predecessors, such as Tönnies's distinction between pre-industrial so-called organic societies and more contemporary societies that are said to be characterized by a more instrumentalized and individualized type of "mechanical" solidarity, Durkheim instead reverses the concepts. For the scholar, "organic solidarity" is seen instead as a more accurate term through which to describe the types of bonds that characterize modern types of communities, grounded in individual difference instead of collectivized and shared norms and rooted in the division of labour of the nineteenth century. A relatively small-scale solidarity rooted in codes of conduct that are often based in religion and repressive law is replaced by mutual dependency and the conception of a completely rational individual who holds abstract, secular, and universal norms (Durkheim [1893] 1964). Weber too distinguishes between different types of solidarity and social relation: "communal" social relationships, often grounded in tradition and based on a general "feeling" of togetherness, and a much more instrumentalized "associative" relationship, based, for example, on market exchange. In the latter case, solidarity is tantamount to the pursuit of the collective interest of atomized, mutually dependent individuals (Weber [1922] 1947).

That said, these classical theorists, the founding fathers of social theory, both stress that, in reality, these different types of solidarity very much overlap and coexist in variable combinations. Organic solidarity does not exclude mechanical solidarity, in the same way that communal social relationships are not completely distinct from associative relationships. This pluralism of solidarity is a crucial observation for us in the telling of the Swedish story. Chapter 2 discussed the manner in which the oft-cited solidarity served as a defining feature of Sweden's national myth. This interpretation of solidarity is very much in keeping with more modern, rational-choice interpretations of the concept. We discussed how solidarity, in this instance, can be seen as "the humanitarian claim *par excellence* ... (The) imperative to act towards vulnerable others without the anticipation of reciprocation" (Chouliaraki 2011, 364, emphasis in original). As a value, solidarity here is thus supposed to transcend the hierarchical power relations and aspires instead to "a vision of a technocratic Enlightenment Universalism ... populated by orderly, rational, co-operative, moral individuals" (Tomlinson 2011). Solidarity as a concept, especially in the Swedish sense, thus operates outside the principles of quid pro quo, not requiring some kind of payback or counterbalance.

Since the inception of the discipline, anthropology too has provided illuminating insights into solidarity, but more along the lines of the idea of the gift and gratitude, their purpose in forming social bonds and relationships, and ideas of moral obligation and reciprocity. Malinowski, Mauss, and Levi-Strauss all provide visions and understandings of the notion of a "gift economy," a tradition that has spawned a great deal of scholarship, especially with regard to the notion of humanitarianism and charity, as we touched upon in chapter 2. Malinowski ([1922] 1950), in some of the most groundbreaking insights into gift-giving, proposed the importance of the capacity of a gift to "move," in that a fundamental characteristic of any gift is that it should be given and later reciprocated. In his pioneering work *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, he talks in detail about the Kula, the ceremonial exchange of gifts by the inhabitants of the Trobriand Islands off the coast of New Guinea. Articles of exchange travel in opposite directions around the ring of islands in a closed circuit. Necklaces made from red shells travel clockwise, from person to person, while bracelets made from white shells simultaneously travel anticlockwise. What is crucial is that the gift continues

to be kept in motion. Indeed, a person who held an item for what was deemed too long a time would earn a bad reputation. Therefore, it was the principle of give and take, not the objects themselves, that Malinowski saw as important.

Similarly, the work of Mauss ([1923] 1990) talks about the idea of the gift in terms of a cycle. In his study of the practices of the Maori, he sheds light on the notion of *hau*, the spirit of the gift. Within this cycle, the forest hunters offer some of their hunted game to the priests, who cook the birds upon a sacred fire. The priests, after eating part of the bird, then return their bones to the forest as the embodiment of the hau, with the hope that the forest would then produce a new profusion of birds to be hunted once again. For both Malinowski and Mauss, the principle of the gift cannot be separated from an expectation of reciprocation, or *do ut des* (I give for you to give in return). For Mauss especially, there is famously no such thing as a free gift; "generosity and self-interest are linked in giving" ([1923] 1990, 68). Writing some years later, Levi-Strauss builds on these insights to examine the notion of reciprocity in Western societies: for example, the giving of gifts at Christmas. As opposed to being an impartial object, gifts are "vehicles and instruments for realities of another order: influence, power, sympathy, status, emotion; and the skilful game of exchange consists of a complex totality of manoeuvres, conscious or unconscious, in order to gain security and to fortify one's self against risks incurred through alliances and rivalry" (Levi-Strauss 1965, 68).

The core tenet of much of the scholarship of those in the anthropology of humanitarianism has drawn attention to this great line of thinkers, this darker side of communal relations configured along the lines of a gift, or as Fassin (2012, 133) labels it, this "ambivalent hospitality." Drawing on Derrida (who in turn is critiquing Mauss), he traces linguistically the connection in Latin between guest, *hospes*, and enemy, *hostis*, both of which derive from the word meaning "stranger." As the author points out, however, *hostis* has not always had this negative connotation; initially it referred to a contractual relationship establishing reciprocity, which implied moral obligations and systems of exchange (Fassin 2012, 135). This confusion between hospitality and hostility, Fassin argues, is absolutely critical to any reflection on "foreignness" today. Within contemporary humanitarian governance, it is the very condition of the relation between the two parties, the giver and the receiver, that generates this profoundly

unequal power relation. The goodwill of the agents is irrelevant as the sentiment of compassion generates the need for a counter-gift. The problem is not ethical, but purely sociological (Fassin 2012, 3).

The power relations in the humanitarian versus the assistance-receiver association results in the fundamentally unequal ordering of human lives between those who are granted full "biolegitimacy," in Fassin's words – the recognition of a biographical life in which individuals can themselves give meaning to their own existences – and those whose victimhood is reified and are defined merely by their biological lives (Fassin 2012, 254). As Pandolfi has observed, in labelling somebody a refugee or trauma victim, "past experiences and individual and collective histories are erased by new categories in which human beings are catalogued" (2008, 169). Therefore, humanitarianism as a "politics of life" has a "triple problematic" (Fassin 2007, 519). Firstly, it acts to "distinguish lives that can be risked," i.e., those of the humanitarian workers, and "lives that can be sacrificed," the populations whom these agents work amongst (Fassin 2007, 519). Secondly, it separates lives into those with higher value, the expatriate workers, from those who are granted only limited protection, the national staff. Instead of being limited to NGOs and interventions abroad (cf. Fassin and Pandolfi 2010), this type of humanitarian reason is now a general mode of governing populations ***within*** states, whereby it has now become part of "our making" of modern politics (Fassin 2010).

The Swedish narrative is testament to the murkiness of solidarity and requirements for a counter-gift. As sociologist Alvin W. Gouldner famously argued, "there is no gift that brings a higher return than the free gift ... For that which is truly given freely moves men deeply and makes them most indebted to their benefactors" (1973, 277). In the Swedish instance, as demonstrated in chapter 4, solidarity in terms of refugees and asylum seekers within the national myth – with demands made on the refugees to show visible suffering, to mend their ways, and to be constantly grateful – is certainly seen by the decent citizen as the embodiment of the free gift. This is especially the case since the unusual intertwining of solidarity as a national myth with the added relational element of the superlative – being ranked ***the best*** at solidarity – enables an ever more profoundly unequal exchange between the givers and the recipients.

In the case of the refugees in Sweden, it is the messiness and overlapping of these two ways of constructing social ties – solidarity as

rational and egoist, and solidarity as reciprocity and exchange – that ultimately forms the basis of the moves toward the (in)securitization of the refugees. An understanding of this abnormalization of solidarity is crucial in illuminating how the sphere of conduct and counter-conduct, the practices of metis that pushed ever so slightly against the grain of decency, was able to be stretched and shaped to form the base of the iceberg, with the tip embodying the various moral panics that legitimately disbanded relations between the village and the refugees. As put forward in the third hypothesis of this book – that within the axes of practices subsumed within the governmentality of righteousness, within the wiggle room and metis of this specific conduct of conduct, solidarity is re-appropriated and re-implanted as humanitarianism, hospitality, and generosity, with all the baggage this embodies – this re-utilization of solidarity is absolutely central to everything that followed. The conduct and counter-conduct, the microphysics of outrage, and the dramatic, seemingly exceptional moral panics could all be conceptualized as part of this baggage, a result of the need for reciprocation and a counter-gift.

Solidarity Paradoxes in Swedish Political Discourse: The Impetus for Reciprocation

We recall that in chapter 2 Swedish historians Trägårdh and Berggren (2015) made a controversial, though seemingly popular, intervention into the Swedish solidarity narrative by putting forward the hypothesis that the supposedly socialist- and consensus-orientated Swedes are in fact hyper-individualists, pursuing personal autonomy to a much greater extent than even citizens of the US. Based on data from the World Values Survey, which positions Sweden as the most secular-rational country in the world, as well as the nation that places the highest value on self-expression, the authors argue that the conjunction of the ideals of social solidarity with independence and economic equality have been institutionalized in what they call a "radical alliance" between the Swedish state and the individual, what they label "statist individualism." This has served to balance the "deep existential desire" for personal freedom and, simultaneously, social cohesion, "liberating" the individual from what they call unequal and patriarchal forms of community, such as the bonds to family, churches, and charities. The authors go further, placing at the heart of their model a deeply rooted conception

they label a Swedish "theory of love," wherein authentic love is only possible between people who are truly independent and equal. Since Swedes fulfil these criteria, the authors hold relationships in Sweden to be more meaningful and more loving than those in other nations.

Though Trägårdh and Berggren base their argument on the social contract theory of Rousseau and make no explicit references to any sociological or anthropological theories of solidarity or gift-giving – neither Durkheim or Weber, nor Mauss and Levi-Strauss – the authors are clear that for them, within the Swedish story, solidarity is entirely removed from the moral economy of gift-giving. Hence, the authors conceive of Swedish solidarity as a purely rational and egoist form of solidarity. This formula of Swedish solidarity, according to the two authors, even goes so far as to speak of love in rational terms, invoking Lacan's ([1950] 1992, 248) well-known definition of love as "giving what you don't have." By its very nature, the act of giving or making love to someone must exist outside any notion of reciprocity or payback, with any expectation of reimbursement from either of the parties automatically annulling the meaning of love, and cementing it instead within a system of exchange. To love a person, by its very definition, cannot conceive of the act as a type of gift, something the recipient must be grateful for and indebted to the giver for.

Even within Swedish asylum and refugee policy, however, this notion of a completely rational notion of solidarity is disturbed somewhat, especially in relation to other European states. In chapter 2, we discussed the precise way that solidarity has been conceived within Swedish governmental discourse regarding an EU common asylum policy. Sweden interpreted solidarity within the external element of the EU's asylum policy in terms of resettlement of refugees from third countries in conjunction with the UNHCR. Sweden was one of the few member states to regularly resettle a quota of refugees within Sweden directly from camps in the neighbouring states of conflict zones, as opposed to other member states that conceived of solidarity in terms of intra-EU relocation. Of the other twelve states that offered some kind of resettlement program, many were accused of using earmarked quota spaces for refugees relocated from other EU member states as part of a burden-sharing exercise. As we saw, Sweden thus fashioned itself as a de facto spokesperson for resettlement over intra-EU relocation as the most effective means through which to protect some of the most vulnerable refugees, aiming to

convince the member states that did not offer any type of resettlement program with the UNHCR to adopt one, and encouraging those states that did participate in the quota system to increase numbers (see Regeringen 2013).

This interpretation of solidarity, I argue, went some way in enabling the concept to be appropriated as generosity, hospitality, and humanitarianism, both within political discourse[2] and within the realm of everyday practices toward refugees. By interpreting solidarity in the manner that is seen as most effective in protecting vulnerable refugees – i.e., adopting the largest quota in conjunction with the UNHCR and reserving these spaces for refugees directly from third countries and not other EU member states – Sweden positioned itself as best at doing solidarity. Solidarity was thus defined only in terms of solidarity with refugees and third countries rather than in terms of the relationship with other member states, which deemed themselves overly burdened. Instead of transcending the type of hierarchies talked about in the Maussian-inspired studies of hospitality and humanitarianism discussed above, a mentality of ranking was produced. If Sweden was best at showing solidarity with refugees and did not petition for any sort of intra-EU burden-sharing mechanism to relieve the numbers of people being resettled in Sweden, then a relation of power is introduced: the impetus for reciprocation comes into being. This is evident in relation to other EU member states, wherein Sweden required recognition for being the "odd" country that was actually campaigning for more refugees (chapter 2), as well as in relation to the refugees themselves, who are required to be grateful that Sweden is best at performing solidarity. In light of the Swedish government announcing that it has been "obliged" to change this policy as a result of the refugee crisis of 2015 and asking the European Commission for refugees to be relocated from Sweden, this mentality of ranking was able to be maintained in the face of this apparent U-turn by rationalizing that Sweden had reached its limit while other European member states had not. The concluding chapter further discusses the implications of these developments.

This rationalization could also be seen to be the case with Sweden's unilateral offer granting all Syrian refugees arriving at the border permanent residency and the right to family reunification as of September 2013. Though Swedish political elites did not articulate this policy in any sort of humanitarian terms nor attempt

to position Sweden as more generous than other EU member states, instead simply stating that the country was fulfilling its legal obligations, the fact that only Sweden made such an offer rendered the concept of solidarity somewhat murky in everyday practice. Similarly, the supposed reversal in this policy, with most Syrian refugees as of January 2016 being granted only temporary permits, could be seen as the logical conclusion of interpreting solidarity in the manner described. Other member states failed to do their part; they failed to show solidarity; therefore, Sweden was obliged to rescind its previous policy. Though it was considered a shame, it was seen as largely outside of their control. This logic is also discussed in the concluding chapter.

The whole notion of solidarity thus becomes self-contradictory in the context of Swedish refugee policy. The failure of other member states to interpret solidarity in the same manner as Sweden destabilizes the meaning of the concept. If other member states are deemed to not be pulling their weight in terms of obligations toward refugees, then they are not acting in proper solidarity with the refugees, third countries, or, indeed, Sweden, which is deemed to be shouldering a disproportionate level of responsibility. As discussed in chapter 4, the positioning of Sweden as moral exemplar in this regard is absolutely crucial for the functioning of the governmentality of righteousness. Returning to the first hypothesis of this book – that the Swedish national myth of moral exceptionalism, especially regarding Sweden's refugee and asylum policy, generates a particular type of subjectivity and plays a major part in the construction of governable subjects – we see that such a governmentality would not function as well if all the other EU member states adopted similar policies toward the Syrian refugees or interpreted solidarity in the same way. A question such as "Why is it only Sweden that is doing the right thing?" quickly enters popular imagination and is essential for the maintenance of a certain subjectivity. The notion of an element of ranking or hierarchy regarding morality is absolutely essential in this regard. In chapter 2, we saw how the notion of Sweden as morally exceptional was able to function as a national myth and standard story when contrasted to the idea of Denmark a morally inferior. If Denmark were to suddenly adopt similar policies to Sweden, likewise pressing other EU members to resettle larger quotas of refugees, the functioning of the governmentality of righteousness would be completely disrupted.[3]

Everyday Solidarity in Öreby: Gratitude and Raising Stakes

Returning to my fieldwork in Öreby, we recall that gratitude was a crucial expectation that the villagers and, to some extent, the volunteers with the Friends of Syria had of the refugees. Although it was never expressly articulated that the Syrian people should be grateful for being granted refugee status and permanent residency in Sweden – any such articulation would have gone very much against the accepted conduct of conduct within the village – the everyday practices and behaviour around the refugees conveyed this expectation and, as such, demands for the refugees to be worthy guests fit very much into how the polite person could be seen to act. The Syrians, as discussed in chapter 3, were expected to accept their lot, and it was deemed in very bad taste to complain about circumstances in Öreby, or even act in a way that gave the impression that life in the village was somehow not enough (as we saw from the reactions of the volunteers when Nivine and Omar bought the so-called flashy car or when Rifat gave an interview to the foreign press).

The re-appropriation of solidarity as a gift economy was most prominent in events that appeared to raise the stakes for the villagers, of which there were a number. We remember, for example, September 2013, when Sweden took the unilateral decision to grant permanent asylum to all Syrians arriving at its border (a move that, at the time of writing, no other EU member state has followed). By this time, refugees had been settled in Öreby for about seven months and many had already been granted five-year permits to stay.

Therefore, for the Friends of Syria, the granting of permanent asylum to all Syrians was somewhat hypothetical, largely an academic point far removed from the day-to-day goings-on in Öreby. It did not mean that a greater number of Syrians would be resettled in the village nor did it mean that those already there would remain for a longer period of time. After the Syrians had been officially granted residency and received their *personummer*, official guidelines obliged them to be removed from the care of Migrationsverket and placed under the welfare of *Arbetsförmedlingen*.[4]

Despite being largely theoretical, the move by the Swedish government nonetheless provoked a reaction among the volunteers. There was a palpable sense that the stakes had now changed. As discussed in chapter 2, this move suddenly propelled Sweden from a nation acting more or less like any other EU member state to one acting

from a position of moral superpowerfulness. A much more conscious and considerate reawakening of the national myth emerged, with Sweden once again being hailed as the saviour of refugees, a position that, despite the nation receiving much greater numbers of refugees per capita that the majority of the other EU member states in the recent past, had not been a dominant narrative in the media since the days of the war in the former Yugoslavia, which saw Sweden take a record number of refugees.

With this changing of the stakes, the idea of the good person was more strongly re-implanted as a good Swedish citizen. The decision created a unifying move among the imagined good Swedes within the public transcript, with tolerance and benevolence no longer defined in terms of being a village or being against Migrationsverket's cold bureaucracy. Nor were there references to racists in other parts of the country. Instead, Sweden was vindicated by the volunteers as a beacon of progressiveness once again. It was now the UK and Denmark that needed to up their game and match the generous example Sweden had set.

Sweden's unilateral move, though articulated largely through a legalistic terminology of rational solidarity by political elites and not in terms of humanitarianism, was nonetheless interpreted by the volunteers as a generous move on the part of Sweden. As discussed in the previous chapter, the obligation of refugees to mend their ways around issues of gender equality and parenting became even more forceful. The Syrians were told to behave if they did not wish to be harmed by the Swedish police, or accused of milking the Swedish system for its generous benefits. It became far more acceptable to use Adnan, with his progress in the Swedish for Immigrants program and determination to study in Lund, as a poster child through which to pester the other Syrian refugees.

The move, however, as discussed in the previous chapter, formed a crucial part of the base of the microphysics of outrage that led to the moral panics and complete disbanding of social relations within the village. The Friends of Syria, armed with the knowledge that Sweden was now single-handedly saving the Syrians, became even more certain of their rightness and decency. This was articulated both to me, as a foreign researcher from a country with an appalling record on treatment of asylum seekers and refugees, and more notably to the refugees themselves, who were more forcefully obliged to play by all the rules of being a worthy guest.

As also discussed in the previous chapter, the stakes regarding the resettling of the Syrians in Öreby appeared to change as well after the Somali man was shot dead by police in Jämtland. Again, this changing of stakes was largely academic on the part of the villagers; the refugee who wielded the knife did so hundreds of miles away from Öreby. Nevertheless, the villagers, including the Friends of Syria, positioned themselves as now being at increased risk of violence thanks to their good nature. This allowed the broadening of the acceptable area of conduct toward the refugees. These incidents that supposedly raised the stakes thus enabled an even stronger hierarchization between those who were deemed desirable and those deemed less desirable. The decision to grant permanent asylum to all Syrians acted as a catalyst in the sorting of the good refugees – who attempted to mend their ways, be grateful to Sweden for its kindness, and perform the correct role of suffering while at the same time demonstrating stoicism and resilience – from the less willing refugees, who could be made an example of. At the same time, pity and sympathy could more forcefully be demonstrated toward the refugees of nationalities other than Syrian. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Georgian family were deemed completely just in complaining that the Swedish authorities viewed their lives as lesser than Syrian lives. Very quickly, the Syrians moved from being an object of care and assistance to being undesirable, threatening, and able to be "sacrificed in the name of protection" (Balzacq et al. 2010, 10).

A Solidarity-In(s)ecurity Iceberg: From Unworthy Guests to Folk Devils

The making of the refugees from deferent insiders to outsiders and threats moves one step beyond what many of the authors in the anthropology of humanitarianism have drawn attention to by accounting for the way in which the relations of power between the good Swedes and the refugees not only create a hierarchy, reify victimhood, and categorize human lives but also mark a shift in what is deemed acceptable conduct toward the refugees. For scholars from the field of anthropology writing on humanitarianism, the effects of these operations aimed at protecting civilians are somewhat multifarious. In highlighting the "aporia of humanitarian governmentality" (Fassin 2010), they bring forward the manifold of ways in which humanitarianism is inextricably linked to biopolitical categorization

(cf. Pandolfi 2003; Redfield 2013; Ticktin 2006). For Ticktin (2006, 34), the effects are somewhat subtle, with the illness clause in France, obliging asylum seekers to employ ill health as a means of acquiring legal residency, constituting a form of "minimalist humanity." Similarly, for Fassin (2010), who focuses not on war or camps but on nearby suffering such as the poor and asylum seekers in France, biopolitics places more emphasis on decisions about the *type* of life people may or may not lead rather than simply the normalization of these lives along biological lines. For Pandolfi (2008, 170), however, the effects of this biopolitical-humanitarian intertwining are much more brutal and profound in that the "the person classified under one of these international categories [victim, refugee, trafficked woman, trauma victim] is an exportable, irrelevant entity."

It is the shifting dynamics between the refugee as a fellow human, however minimally this is construed, and the refugee as an "exportable, irrelevant entity" that this book has brought to light. We saw how the refugees in my case were not conceived of in a minimally biopolitical way but were, instead, provided with all the necessities for a seemingly decent life. More importantly, though they were ranked and hierarchized, sorted into worthy and unworthy, and marginalized through the many tiny biopolitical practices discussed in the previous two chapters, this marginalization was not the final story. Through what followed in Öreby, we saw how these tiny practices broadened the acceptable area of conduct toward the refugees. They enabled a public transcript of socially acceptable behaviour, but also a hidden transcript of practices taking place behind closed doors and away from polite company. In the same vein, an area of counter-conduct also developed, pushing at the very limits of what it meant to be a good citizen while simultaneously generating multiple new ways of being "good." The various moral panics spoken of in the previous chapter positioned the Syrian refugees as folk devils (Cohen 1980). As well as being undeserving and dispensable, the Syrians now saw their identity as refugees deemed public property, with their presence used to show society exactly "which roles should be avoided" (Cohen 1980, 3). Thus, a line could legitimately be drawn between those worthy of solidarity and those not. A new way of thinking was brought into being – albeit one whereby solidarity as a value need not be rejected given that an ironic reading of solidarity (cf. Chouliaraki 2011, 2013) ensured that the actors operating within this righteous governmentality could still feel good about

themselves. They were honourable in their intentions, and thus righteous in their moves to turn against the undeserving refugees, (in) securitizing them as a folk devil and a problem to be dealt with.

At the end of my story, the people of Öreby no longer wanted the Syrians in their midst. Over a quarter of them voted for the anti-immigration party they had once vilified. The Friends of Syria group fizzled out; the activity centre closed; social relations between the villagers and the refugees completely disbanded. This is what solidarity did, in this case. So the move from solidarity to security is not as big as one might first imagine. The shift from victim to threat happening in the space of only nineteen months should no longer be seen as the result of seemingly spectacular or exceptional events, carried out by a minority of racist thugs divorced from the majority of social interactions around refugees in Sweden. These various moral panics should be conceived of as the tip of the iceberg, with the concealed base reaching down to the depths of solidarity in the Swedish story, its appropriations and re-appropriations.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has put forward the three propositions to ontologically and epistemologically rethink CSS along anthropological lines. Firstly, it has stressed the importance of reflexivity. I did not attempt to portray the interactions between the Swedes and refugees in Öreby with some sort of unchallenged authority. As stated in chapter 1, my project was not an attempt to garner attitudes toward refugees in Sweden or put forward some sort of policy recommendations to the Swedish government. Rather, I wanted to tell a story of how a new paradigm was brought into being; about how being good was reconfigured over time through various mechanisms and how the far right came to represent people who would never conceive of themselves as far right. In telling this story, I was careful to write myself in to each turn in the narrative. Central, too, were the temporalities of subject formations, whereby both the villagers and the Syrians constructed themselves differently at different points of time. This is the strength of a political-anthropological approach to theories of (in)security, realizing and recognizing one's own commitments in telling the story and being open and honest about them.

Secondly, my project put forward the importance of metis in reconfiguring theories of critical security along more political-anthropological

lines. A focus on metis, appropriation, and local knowledge completely destabilizes political science's focus on speech acts and the spokesperson. By viewing the far right only in terms of ideology and audience, mainstream political science approaches provide an impoverished understanding of the far right and are unable to conceptualize the way it can come to represent good and decent people. Such an understanding is increasingly relevant in an era where anti-immigration parties are rising to prominence all over Europe, as I discuss in chapter 6. Furthermore, a focus on metis has provided a more profound voice for political anthropology in its dialogue with IR on questions of security than other anthropological approaches that uncritically allow political science to define the terms of engagement, thus ending up with analyses of security simply as pre-defined and already-enshrined security technologies.

Lastly, my project has built on the scholarship conducted within the anthropology of humanitarianism by examining the functioning of the humanitarian claim par excellence, that of complete solidarity. In highlighting how such a notion of solidarity with refugees jars with the mentality of ranking at play within the governmentality of righteousness, this book demonstrates the huge amount of wiggle room within which the good citizen can operate. By appropriating solidarity as a free gift, good citizens can carve out new social and political forces whereby the desire for reciprocity is inherently linked to the legitimate articulation of the Syrians as undeserving. My project has conceived of the (in)securitization of the refugees as an iceberg, the tip being the various moral panics that cast the refugees as disposable and the base extending all the way down to the tiny, snatched micropractices of hierarchization and obligation on the part of the Syrian refugees.

6

Conclusion

The Devil in the Anthropological Detail

"The E.U. is becoming more and more ungovernable," said Mark Leonard, director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a research institute. "The stakes internationally are higher and higher, but politics is becoming more and more parochial." The scale of the trouble facing the European Union is hard to overstate. Across the Continent, populist, nationalist and far-right movements are upending traditional politics and promoting anti-Brussels sentiment. The effects of last year's huge wave of migration continue to roil Germany and many other countries. The bloc is struggling to maintain stability in the single currency zone. Most of all, Britain's vote in June to leave the European Union hangs over the entire European project, a reminder that decades of work in knitting together disparate nations can be reversed in a relative instant.

Kanter and Castle, *New York Times*, 20 October 2016

The idea of Europe in crisis – the rise in populism and xenophobia, and the surge in popularity of far-right parties – has risen to prominence since I finished my fieldwork. The above quote from the *New York Times* paints a grim picture of politics across Europe from an outsider's viewpoint, describing the biggest upsurge in nationalist politics since before the Second World War. Writing in the wake of the 2016 US presidential election, an election also characterized by the eventual victor courting the far-right vote and intensifying xenophobic rhetoric, the authors are some of many commentators warning of dark times ahead. I began my research in February 2013, less than two years after the beginning of the Syrian Civil War and when far fewer Syrians were arriving in Europe than nineteen months later toward the end of my fieldwork or in the subsequent few years