Article

From discourse to *dispositif*: States and terrorism between Marseille and 9/11

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Abstract

This article is a historical study of how states have articulated statements about terrorism since the 1930s; under what conditions these statements have been articulated; and what effects the discourses made up of these statements have had on global politics. This includes the constitutive role of the present discourse on what is posited as a terrorism *dispositif*. The inquiry is inspired by Foucault's historical method, and comprises the descriptive archaeological analytic focused on the order of the discourse (including basic discourses in which the terrorist subject is constituted) and the genealogical power analysis of external conditions of emergence and variation of discursive series, whose treatment benefits also from Carl Schmitt's concept of the *nomos*.

Introduction

This article is a historical study of how states have articulated statements about terrorism since the 1930s; under what conditions such statements have been articulated; and what effects the discourses made up of these statements have had on global politics. This includes the constitutive role of the present discourse on what is posited as a terrorism *dispositif*. The article's exposition of the discourses that followed the 'terrorist' events of Marseille, Munich and 9/11 relies on extensive empirical material, including a mass of primary documents retrieved by archival research in Geneva and New York. The analysis of this material is inspired by Foucault's historical method. Its central aim is a proper historicization of terrorism as opposed to a backward projection of the concept typical of many standard histories of terrorism – a projection that would endow it with a certain essential substance mutable only in accidental properties (see Lacqueur, 2001; Hoffman, 2006; Rapoport, 2006; Chaliand and Blin, 2007).

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Discourse is understood here as a specific collection of statements for which certain conditions of existence can be defined, and a system of their formation determining what can be said and how, as well as where the boundaries that delimit the marginalized and excluded lie (Foucault, 1966, 1970, 1997). The discourse analysis employed here draws on both the archaeological descriptive analytic and the idea of genealogy. The former inquires into the internal rules of the discourse among states (assuming that states are in a privileged position to collectively produce authoritative claims about legitimate violence). The latter, conceived here as a *method* (rather than a mere instrument of liberation; see Vucetic, 2011), is focused on the 'external' power relations governing the emergences and orders of discourse where subjectivity is constituted – that is, on historicizing the present by showing that things have no essential origins or necessary evolution, and are instead products of complex and historically contingent processes of violent (re)interpretation (Foucault, 1977, 1979, 2000; see also Nietzsche, 2005; Bartelson, 1995).

The descriptive section seeks to identify the internal rules ('law of rarity') in three chosen discursive series, both in general terms and as 'basic discourses' (see Hansen, 2006), specific sets of rules for linking and differentiating practices of constituting the terrorist subject and the complementary selves. The choice of the series is not arbitrary. The 1930s witnessed the emergence of the discourse of terrorism among states; the 1970s was a period when the discourse was revived with considerable force; the third discursive series forms a part of 'the present'. This is not to suggest that no change occurred in between those particular series, which serve as probes – or cases of what Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 8) call 'piercing a moment in time'. The archives comprise statements articulated by states in two international organizations – the League of Nations in the 1930s and the United Nations in the 1970s and 2000s. These institutional frameworks provide convenient boundaries, as these organizations have been or continue to be the privileged forums for the discussion of (international) security issues and the almost universal participation of states.[1]

The genealogical section complements this structural analysis with a discussion of the power perspective. Drawing on Foucault's (1998) understanding of power as the multiplicity of relations of force immanent in a certain domain – and as productive, subjectless, relational, decentred, strategic (i.e. tactically polyvalent but with an overall strategic cohesion) and immanent in other social relations (see Kelly, 2009) – it inquires into 'constellations' as structures in which global power relations are actualized. The claims about these constellations are made in terms of conditions of possibility – historically contingent limits on the discourse that in turn transmits and reinforces the multiplicity of force – and their discussion benefits from a consideration of Carl Schmitt's narrative of the erosion of the *nomos* (a concrete territorial order) and the advent of a global civil war (Schmitt, 2003; see also Odysseos and Petito, 2007). The Schmittian perspective provides the genealogical narrative with a dynamic background for the emergence of the (global) terrorism discourse and its variations. Neither Schmitt's idealization of the *jus publicum Europeanum* – which is performed, as Koskenniemi (2004) argues, on political theological grounds rather than on historiographical grounds – nor his idealized (but in this case dystopian) rendering of the current state need be embraced. What is important is a movement between constellations in a certain direction. This movement is moreover not, *contra* Schmitt, seen as linear. A case is made that the Cold War was in fact a *nomos* in its own right, a point that serves to account for the (re)politicization of the states' discourse of terrorism in the 1970s.

Expositions

1930s

On 9 October 1934, less than an hour after he arrived at Marseille aboard the cruiser *Dubrovnik* for a government visit, King Alexander I of Yugoslavia was assassinated, together with French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou. While Belgrade immediately sent troops to the Italian and Hungarian borders to 'avert invasion',[2] significantly not doubting for an instant that those states were behind the assassination that would become a founding act of 'international terrorism' in the 1930s, the situation calmed eventually. Marseille was not to be a new Sarajevo. The event did, however, provoke a debate about terrorism in the Council of the League of Nations (instigated by the Little Entente – comprising Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania – and France), which eventually culminated in a diplomatic conference (for a more extensive account, see Zlataric, 1975; Saul, 2006).

It would be sensational and historically inaccurate to claim that this discursive emergence was the very first time that 'terrorism' appeared in international debate. While the anarchist conferences at the turn of the 20th century (see Bach Jensen, 2009) dealt with the kind of political violence that would only later be generally termed terrorism, there had indeed been several earlier attempts to establish terrorism in the discourse of states – from political and expert debates on transnational cooperation in combating crime (see Deflem, 2002; Jäger, 2006; Härter, 2013); to the possibility, contemplated by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War, of establishing a concept of 'systematic terrorism' in the war context following World War I; or those occasions during which some states were accused by others of supporting terrorism.[3] However, it was only after Marseille that these dispersed statements were succeeded by a robust discourse with an identifiable order (internal rules), including those that bore on the constitution of the terrorist subject.

However imprecise and disputed the notion may have been in this discourse, there was a broad consensus that a certain type of political violence could and should be identified as (international) 'terrorism'. This terrorism was constituted as fundamentally reprehensible ('frightful scourge' was an often used figure)[4] and unprecedented (it was something 'entirely new in European public law').[5] Among the reasons given for its definition as a major threat to the existing international order were its systemic characteristic of growing interdependence[6] and progress – the advancement of knowledge that could be abused or improved communications – which increased the threat to the personal security of citizens.[7] But, the most important reason was that terrorism was now transforming into an instrument of state policy.[8] The state was thus not the ultimate guarantor of the political order threatened by (non-state) terrorist violence, but may have actually been (in the case of revisionist states) actively undermining this order by supporting terrorism – for example, by providing terrorists with false passports, material assistance and territory.[9] The terrorist moved freely from one state to another, for example aboard trains,[10] which then still represented a symbol of unprecedented global interdependence and speed that negated distance. However, like the terrorist networks of today, the terrorists of the 1930s also needed a territorial base. The difference was that in the 1930s such a base could only have been provided by the state. The possibility that the terrorist could prey upon the weakness of the state was apparently not contemplated at that time.

From the viewpoint of those articulating the statements, the paradigmatic terrorist camp/safe haven for the terrorists of the 1930s was not located in some faraway and culturally strange territory. It was found in Central Europe – in Hungary, only a few miles from the Yugoslav border, in the small farmstead of Janka Puszta. This farmstead (according to statements by the Little Entente) was the site of an authoritarian (and hence deviant) political order, a society that made no secret of

its existence, ran its own press (to spread propaganda), issued regular uniforms and even coinage, and served as a 'school'[11] and occasionally also as a 'depot' from where terrorists (including the regicides of Marseille) were shipped abroad.[12] It was also a place that 'could not exist in an organised country without the consent and assistance of authorities'.[13]

Turning to terrorism as a discursive construct, we see that its scope would, in an eventually established rule, be tautologically defined through reference to activity (or intent) to create a state of terror,[14] though there had been some debate about whether the Marseille attentat as the founding act of international terrorism had actually created a state of terror or not. More specifically, an accidental unity emerged early on (in the French proposal to the Council immediately after Marseille), in which terrorism was constituted by two different actions: assassination of 'protected persons' and mass explosion.[15] Attempts were made to widen the scope of what was viewed as terrorist activity, since terrorists, it was alleged, caused terror also by causing floods or spreading infectious diseases (no examples were given).[16] But, in the final enumerative definition of terrorist acts in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937) produced by the diplomatic conference, the unity was preserved.

The terrorist as a subject was constituted in three basic discourses of association and dissociation: *civilization/barbarism, order/chaos* and *political/criminal*. The terrorist was a scourge of human civilization,[17] committing a crime against it by effecting a return to international relations of 'odious barbarity or vandalism'[18] (the latter with a peculiar association with property). The international action against terrorism was meant to unite the whole 'civilised world' against this menace to civilization and peace, whose future was now at stake.[19] In two ways, however, the terrorist that emerged from the statements made by states was different from the barbarian. He could strike anywhere within the order at any time and not simply materialize at its outskirts; and marrying primitivism (disrespect for civilized norms of violence) with progress (use of sophisticated technology), he was a monster born out of modernity who knew how to reap its fruits but at the same time remained, in some peculiar way, imprisoned in the past.

The terrorist subject undermined the existing order and brought about anarchy in Europe (and possibly elsewhere). This order to be secured was rendered as rather fragile ('for, after all, what European country is at present contented?'),[20] and a response became urgent, for if states were allowed to support elements subversive of other states, 'organised government [would] become impossible'.[21] Particularly in accusations made against Hungary by the Little Entente and its allies, a recurrent juxtaposition would emerge between the king slain in Marseille, depicted as a 'great unifier' and a guarantor of peace in the Balkans, and the revisionist regime in Hungary, which, like the terrorist it sponsored, resisted the 'irresistible natural forces' of civilizational progress towards (national) justice.[22]

In the third basic discourse, the terrorist was depoliticized into the 'enemy of the human race',[23] to whom no protection should be provided abroad if he were to commit a 'political crime' (including assassination). There seems to have existed some discursive variation on this issue, since while it was, for example, initially stated in the debate in the Council that terrorism never had any political sense,[24] the need to ensure repression of 'political crimes of international character' was also stressed in the French proposal.[25] Eventually, however, the depoliticized character of the perpetrators of terrorist acts as professional assassins, criminals, malefactors, common murderers, thieves, incendiaries and paid agents carrying out certain instructions (presumably given by the revisionist state) would become a dominant pattern of subjectification.[26]

The discursive order was not free of tensions. Nonetheless, it can be described as close to total, with only marginal statements challenging the general alarmism (and hence the need for collective action)[27] or being sensitized to the contingency of power and its origin in violence.[28] It mobilized

states to face the crisis of the international order and established the possibility of concrete practices of communication, surveillance, punishment and prevention (discipline). Since terrorism was sponsored by a (renegade) state, this was a utopian vision: the link that made international terrorism an unprecedented threat had to be severed so that the community of states could emerge in its (re)established unity.

1970s

When the discourse of terrorism re-emerged among states with a new intensity in the 1970s, it could be seen as organized by a duality in terms of laws of rarity and basic discourses, with the composite parts being analytically labelled here as First and Third World discourse.[29] The Second World, while not silent, articulated statements based on conditions of those discrete orders without formulating a distinct order of its own. Interestingly, despite the Second World's ideological affinity with and actual support for national liberation movements, it was discursively positioned more as a status quo than a revolutionary entity. The spark this time was the Munich massacre, the sequence of events that started with the storming of the dormitory of the Israeli team at the 20th Olympic Games by a Black September commando unit on 5 September 1972.[30]

The First World discourse showed a substantial degree of continuity with the discourse in the 1930s. Alarmism ruled in this order, with statements being articulated about the (once again) exceptional and unprecedented threat and the increasing gravity and frequency of terror spreading throughout the world,[31] which was 'making our own world impossible to live in'[32] and bereaved rational men and states of their reason through fear.[33] The main threat of this exclusively non-state terrorism was its revolutionary character, which challenged the fundaments of the international order – it not only undermined the order's institutions and the means that cemented it together (such as international traffic) – as in the 1930s series – but also divided the (illusionary) community of states. Its *modus operandi* continued to be predominantly conditioned on the assistance of the state, for the terrorist bases 'were not on the moon'.[34] In contrast to the 1930s, however, the renegade state that undermined the existing order was the new, postcolonial state rather than an old revisionist one (which could have been confined to the 'past' not only owing to the barbarous means of its policy but also owing to its political aims). In terms of the substance of the terrorist act, the unity of assassination and mass bombing remained, but it was compounded by the new activities of hijacking ('air piracy') and hostage taking. This extension of the catalogue of terrorist acts was as accidental as the unity constructed in the 1930s.

To check this new and unprecedented threat, immediate collective action had to be taken. This 'discourse of action' was challenged by the Third World discourse's statements about the need to first study terrorism's underlying causes.[35] Such statements curiously reflected the principles of First World liberal science, insofar as they contained the claim that with a scientifically sound method for finding the root causes, the problem of terrorism could be resolved. At the same time, the Third World discourse comprised a mass of statements that positively identified several underlying causes of terrorism (misery, frustration, grievance or despair)[36] even before any such study had been initiated. The methodological argument thus seems to be a subversion, creating possibilities for refocusing the debate on other issues.

The 'discourse of underlying causes' constituted the major challenge to the First World discourse series of statements about non-state terrorism, particularly those that identified it with particular 'national liberation movements'. The statements about underlying causes and ultimately any statements about non-state terrorism in the Third World discourse were made possible

by internal rules that can be labelled as 'two logics of exception'. In the statements articulated according to the first of these, no activity by national liberation movements could ever be considered terrorism because (1) the cause is just insofar as it is defensive/restitutive,[37] and (2) suffering was previously imposed on those who take part in national liberation movement activity. The second logic conditioned Third World discourse statements about non-state terrorism. It was characterized by an effective agreement with the First World discourse's rules on the essence of non-state terrorism. Yet, because as a political phenomenon non-state terrorism was the ultimate reaction to the excess of power (state terrorism) – the last resort of the 'desperate, colonised, persecuted and underprivileged'[38] – this terrorism was legitimate.[39] Furthermore, in a small number of statements legitimizing terrorism, an argument was made about all states originating from violence.[40] (Saudi Arabia, for example, claimed that George Washington was a terrorist, to which the United States objected that he was a 'rebel', since he never hijacked a boat or killed 'innocent civilians'.)[41]

Third World discourse statements about the underlying causes established a causal relationship (conditioned on the second logic of exception) between state and non-state terrorism. In those statements, state terrorism is 'the most dangerous brand of violence, the most often practised at the most comprehensive scale', and it employs the most modern means.[42] It involves physical repression, denial of political participation, colonial domination, foreign occupation, sustaining poverty, foreign exploitation of natural resources, systematic destruction of flora and fauna, and/or any war in violation of international law.[43] It is the instrument both of individual colonial and capitalist regimes and of the entire global capitalist order.[44]

The most vocal responses articulated in the First World discourse against this discursive challenge can be analytically assembled together in a 'discourse of limits'. Here, the underlying causes of terrorism are rendered effectively irrelevant, since non-state terrorism is reprehensible for the simple fact that it transgresses conventional limits of violence. No possible cause could render such transgressions legitimate, because they represent violence outside of institutions that constitute 'the very nature of our civilisation'.[45] In the corresponding counter-discourse included in the Third World discourse, the methods of transgression could be advocated, under the second logic of exception, either because it is just for the powerless not to adhere to the ethic sustained by those with sophisticated means of control at their disposal[46] or because any means are legitimate for attempts to overthrow foreign domination.[47]

The basic duality of the discursive order was reflected, in an important discontinuation from the 1930s series, in the double subjectification of the terrorist as a revolutionary/state. The terrorist as revolutionary (First World discourse) was a masked anarchist, elusive and stateless. The terrorist as state (Third World discourse) was a regime or machinery that terrorized the (illegitimately) subjected population and sustained the existing unjust international economic and political order. The subjectifications in each discursive order would be challenged in the other, either entirely (the first logic of exception) or in their distinct qualities (under the second logic of exception, the terrorist is not an insane and cold-blooded criminal, but a deprived and desperate victim looking for redress for the wrongs inflicted by the state). Despite this duality, two common basic discourses can be identified. In both the First World discourse and the Third World discourse, the terrorist would be associated with barbarism and dissociated from civilization, transgressing the established norms limiting the use of violence (First World discourse) or the norms of civilized government (Third World discourse); and he would be one who harms the 'innocent'. However, the 'innocents' were identified differently in each order – either as the uninvolved (First World discourse) or as the powerless (Third World discourse).[48] In the first case, the innocent were located outside the

political dispute, which, as in the 1930s, ought to be contained within its place of origin;[49] in the second, they stood at its very midst.

In the First World discourse, the basic discourse of *order/chaos* can be identified as being continuous with the 1930s series: 'Mankind … came to be dominated by armed men who roamed the world, trafficked in drugs, stole, attacked trains, aircraft, ships and banks, and sacrificed innocent human lives.'[50] The terrorist waged a war; yet, it was not a traditional war, but a deviant war, a new kind of warfare without limits and spatial constraints.[51] '[He] walks every day the entire geography of our planet.'[52] Part and parcel of the discourse of *order/chaos* was a new subjectification of the terrorist as a pirate, the traditional *hostis humani generis*, through the association of terrorism with 'air piracy'. Finally, the discourse was supported by the construction of terrorism as a contagious disease of the (international) body politic that would imperil both the latter's survival and its sanity.[53]

In the Third World discourse, the state terrorist was subjectified in a way that differentiated it from the (idealized) postcolonial self. The state terrorist subject would commonly be represented as faceless machinery, inhuman, barbaric and 'criminal'.[54] It would be a(n) (inhuman) *regime* that terrorizes *people*, both inside and outside of the legal boundaries of its power. It might not have a face, but it would have a name. The archetypical terrorist state in this discourse was Israel, while the United States, Portugal and South Africa were also often claimed to practice systematic and mass terrorism.

Because of the existing divide, no 'coalition against terrorism' (1930s) or 'war against terrorism' (2000s) could emerge, despite the many agitated calls for unity and universal action with the aim of facing the 'universal' problem in the First World discourse. The universal convention that would establish a general regime of combating terrorism similar to that of the 1930s proved impossible to negotiate. Instead, in the First World discourse a gradual turn towards a focus on sectoral treaties (particular regimes establishing acts associated with terrorism as offences in the general discourse and instituting relevant extradition procedures) took place.[55] However, it is important to note that only in the Sectoral Convention on the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism (1999) was 'terrorism' explicitly mentioned, and in the same convention, in a backward construction, various sectoral offences that had been identified as such in the preceding conventions were now identified as 'acts of terrorism'.[56] At the same time, the autonomizing Third World, while successfully intervening and even making the UN General Assembly adopt Resolution 3034/1972, which condemned (exclusively) terrorist acts by 'colonial, racist and alien regimes', was unable to institute other practices against the terrorist as a state.

2000s

There was no sudden (re)emergence of the discourse of terrorism in the UN after 9/11, since it had been a matter of constant debate since the 1970s. Moreover, the changing power constellation discussed in the next section started to impact the discourse's transformation at the end of the 1980s at the latest. A series of resolutions was passed annually that pertained to measures to prevent and later (from 1991) 'eliminate' international terrorism, or to human rights and terrorism. The definition of terrorist acts was then given in Resolution 49/60 (1994) as 'criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes'. Such acts were moreover declared unjustifiable 'whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature [may be]'.[57] These two statements recurred in a number of resolutions, declarations, conventions

and debates that followed. A new Ad Hoc Committee was created in 1996, and since then it has negotiated three sectoral conventions, while the negotiations regarding the fourth, 'comprehensive' convention are still ongoing. Finally, the Security Council also began to articulate statements in regard to terrorism (crucially linking terrorism to threats to international peace and security)[58] years before 9/11.[59] What did change after the tragic events of 9/11 was that the discourse of terrorism grew to unprecedented proportions in terms of its size and has been characterized by hyperbole and excess in the articulated statements of the (once more) unprecedented threat that could only be countered by robust responses.[60]

In terms of the law of rarity delimiting the enunciative possibilities, the discourse's fundamentals have been the universal condemnation of terrorism as a threat to peace and stability that could be justified by no imaginable cause, and the effective suppression of statements about state (systemic) terrorism. Statements about the latter and national liberation movements, while important from the legal standpoint since they bear on the negotiations of the comprehensive convention on terrorism, are now marginal – all but limited to the activities of Israel's armed forces, while largely ignoring the systemic patterns of repression and exploitation. Terrorism has been successfully depoliticized by the near-exclusive focus on means rather than ends, which can be traced back to previous First World discourse, and also through the transformation of 'root causes', once a discourse of resistance, into a progressivist yet not revolutionary discourse of development and poverty eradication,[61] based on the normalizing premise that there is no place for terrorism in the 'developed' world.

The dialectic of an unprecedented threat and the corresponding need for dramatic action has been played out once again. 9/11 was the 'worst terrorist assault in the history of the world', and, like Marseille years earlier, it 'shocked the conscience of the entire world'.[62] Terrorism is therefore constituted as 'the greatest of new dangers'[63] owing to the absence of spatial limits (terrorism knows no boundaries)[64] and moral constraints. No country is immune to terrorism,[65] which is rendered, as in the previous First World discourse, as a contagious disease (a plague) or a metastasis (a cancer),[66] and related to madness or at least a psychological disorder. Hence, 9/11 not only showed the 'extreme vulnerability'[67] of the international body politic but also wounded 'our collective psyche'.[68] As in both of the previous discursive series, here a tension exists in the subjectification of the terrorist. He is reversing the forces of progress and is hence counterposed to the 'modern self', while at the same time he preys on advances of human science and globalization, which make him ever more elusive and his actions ever more lethal.[69]

As in the 1930s, the terrorist threat requires a unanimous and harmonious response by the international community as a whole. Furthermore, as in the 1930s, terrorists must be prevented from undermining that community's (discursively constituted) unity.[70] The response includes denying terrorists safe havens and not lending them support in any way.[71] However, an important difference from the 1930s and the 1970s (First World discourse) is found here: terrorism does not seem to require a link to the state to thrive any more. Indeed, 'outlaw regimes' (Bush, 2002a) may be associated with global terrorism in an effort to advocate interventionist policies against them. Yet, terrorism is not a state policy (thus, to borrow once more from a delegitimizing narrative at the state level, the constructed relationship between Iraq and terrorism seems to have been rather one of 'alliance', allowing the former to 'attack America without leaving any fingerprints'; see Bush, 2002b). Therefore, preventing state support for terrorism does not seem a sufficient condition for its eradication.

Despite the recurrent definitional statements mentioned above, no agreement has emerged on a universal legal definition of terrorist acts owing to the ongoing negotiations of the comprehensive

convention. Yet, the absence of a universally agreed legal definition has not stood in the way of the recurring universal condemnation of terrorism in 'all its forms and manifestations'. In other words, 'we could debate how to define it, but we all understand that no cause, however legitimate, justifies the use of indiscriminate violence against innocent civilians in order to coerce societies and governments'.[72]

Two familiar basic discourses, *order/chaos* and *civilization/barbarism*, can again be identified here. A third, *humanity/inhumanity*, also can be detected, and its roots can be traced back to the 1970s. Through these discourses, the terrorist is constituted as dissociated from the collective self ('the evil of terrorism has caused us to rally together',[73] and the 'common war on terrorism unites us all'),[74] which is identified with order, civilization and humanity.

As in the previous discursive series, this idealized community is threatened by a barbarian enemy 'among us',[75] elusive and ever prepared to strike. Its morphology is that of a network – one that is omnipresent and constituted by cells that, in an extension of the medical discourse of disease, must be 'surgically removed'.[76] This network's strategy is not 'just to kill. It is, by terror, to cause chaos and instability and to divide and confuse us.'[77] The terrorist wants to make the world ungovernable, a 'hopeless battleground'.[78] The mind that can even conceive such a plan needs to be irrational, mindless or insane, and hence decisively beyond the realm of politics. Terrorists wander around with ticking bombs attached to their bodies, 'small bands of criminals [who] seek to undermine civilisation itself'.[79] The difference between civilization and barbarism is underlined through the contrast of light and darkness, the juxtaposition of democracy or a free society and totalitarianism, and the characterization of victims of terrorism as civilian and innocent.[80] Another way of differentiating the terrorist subject is in the basic discourse of *humanity/inhumanity*: he is essentially inhuman,[81] declaring a war against all of humankind.[82] In a discontinuity with the First World discourse of the 1970s, however, the identification of the terrorist as *hostis humani generis* does not rely on his identification with a(n) (air) pirate as the terrorist act of (air) piracy seems to have become all but forgotten.

A genealogy

The structural analysis suggested that as the robust discourse of terrorism among states emerged in the 1930s, a basic unity in terms of the object and the subjectificating discourses was constructed. In the 1970s series, another configuration was discovered, featuring a duality of discursive orders. The 2000s series can then be descriptively defined as an enclosure featuring a number of continuities with the 1930s, but with more extreme forms of dehumanization and depoliticization of the terrorist. It is the purpose of this section to suggest, through a genealogical analysis, the conditions of possibility for these discursive (re)emergences and variances.

There was nothing inevitable about the Little Entente's success in charging Hungary with sponsoring terrorism in the Council of the League of Nations, along with the debate that followed and its rules. A newspaper content analysis for the decades preceding the Marseille attentat conducted for the purposes of this article suggests an extensive catalogue of variety for statements about terrorism:[83] terrorism is both violent and nonviolent (e.g. the *boycott* in Ireland); it sustains the state or undermines it; and it may cover not just political assassinations, but also military activities in breach of the rules of conventional warfare, a local government's reticence in enforcing the rule of law, electoral intimidation, industrial action, revolutionary violence, violence carried out by extremist groups in Germany, Austria's imperial politics as seen from one of its provinces (e.g. Bohemia), or organized crime activities in Italy or the United States. Terrorism had not been

established as a category of violence that could be readily and unproblematically used to endow what happened after the *Dubrovnik* landed in Marseille with a stable meaning. Instead, the meaning of terrorism was a product of *Entstehung*, a violent and narrowing reinterpretation, rather than an emanation of any essential and historically inevitable *Ursprung*.

When we deploy the *nomos* perspective, what emerges as the key condition of possibility for this *Entstehung* is the change in the political constellation that took place as the legal and spatial order was dissolving into 'general universality' (Schmitt, 2003: 227) and, at the same time, enmity was absolutized, since the parties increasingly usurped the universalist concept of humanity for themselves (Schmitt, 2003: 246). Against this background, the historically contingent *emergence* of the discourse of terrorism among states may be seen as a strategic response to the *emergency* of preserving the (fictional) community of states by means of a collective normalizing action. International terrorism was therefore constructed as a clandestine state action against a new political order and subjected to a universalist action that aimed to suppress it. There lies the paradox of the 1930s *counter*-terrorism: both the universalizing discursive practices and the envisioned new mode of governance (filling a 'gap in international organisation')[84] to combat terrorism were intended to contain the crisis. However, they were based on the same principles that made the crisis possible. The escalation of this crisis ultimately prevented the emergence of what could be seen as a strategically oriented assemblage of practices, even if some of them, such as transnational surveillance in the conditions of what was seen as unprecedented circulation, would find reflections in the present.

The (re)emergence of the discourse of terrorism in the early 1970s was yet another strategic attempt to prevent the continuing erosion of the status quo as political struggles failed to remain contained to their territorial loci. The constellation was now characterized by a temporary reconstitution of the *nomos* and a new challenge to it. This, then, conditioned the discourse of terrorism's politicization. Such a claim departs from Schmitt's own analysis of this period as a global civil war due to the long lost unity of the world, first because of bipolarization and later because of a multipolarization (predicated on the superpower contest and decolonization). Yet, diplomacy and nuclear weapons 'bracketed' the warfare between the First and the Second World, despite the persistent inflammatory rhetoric used by both parties to discipline their domestic realms and sustain the national security state. The northern powers' contest was projected onto the Third World, where conflicts remained possible and, in fact, also unbracketed, because elementary norms of international law (non-intervention) and limited ('civilized') warfare, while purportedly universalist in nature, would not apply there in practice. But, this last *Großraum* was the site of war that often was a total colonial war, since the Third World, unlike the earlier New World, was autonomizing and subjectivating itself. This subjectivation conditioned not only the colonial war waged between the national liberation movements and the imperialist metropolises in the North. Once some of the former colonies gained independence, it also conditioned the (ultimately unsuccessful) discursive challenge of the limits of legitimate violence in the discourse about terrorism, the character of which was therefore once more constituted through a relationship with a historically contingent power constellation.

The power constellation changed once more with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of its spatial order. This change would influence modalities in which violence would be distributed in world politics through both exceptional responses against unprecedented threats such as terrorism and policing to promote 'universal' ideals of human rights; and in which political alternatives, both global and local, would be suppressed. The argument here is not a straightforward (neo) Schmittian critique of cosmopolitan humanitarian intervention, total war and spaceless

universalism (for a review and a deconstruction of this critique, see Teschke, 2011). It is rather a case in favour of the argument that this power constellation has been a key historical condition of possibility for the new discourse of terrorism in which the concept is generally depoliticized, in particular after 9/11. Today, unlike in the 1930s, this discourse has become part and parcel of what I posit is a fully developed global terrorism *dispositif* – Foucault's concept standing for a heterogenous assemblage of practices that strategically orient the multiplicity of forces in a given domain while being related to different formations of power, such as law and coercion, surveillance and discipline, government and biopolitics (Foucault, 1980, 1998, 2007; see also Bussolini, 2010; Deleuze, 1992; Agamben, 2009). Many of these practices have been critically inquired into separately: the 'exceptional' practices of war, curing rogue states through 'regime change', immunizing others through 'statebuilding' procedures and reducing the terrorist to 'bare life' – practices that suggest not a diminishing but rather a reinforcing of sovereignty through hybridization of authority (see Amoore and De Goede, 2005: 150; Amoore, 2006; Butler, 2006); preemptive risk-management techniques for governing mobilities in the neoliberal economy through the emergence of the biometric state (which often play on our desires for fast and unimpeded movement) and its cultural performances, or the 'algorithmic war' (Amoore, 2006, 2009; Aradau and Van Munster, 2007; Muller, 2008; De Goede, 2008); everyday securitization practices negating the traditional internal/external dichotomy (see Campbell, 2005); practices that grow from the interplay of geopolitics and biopolitics (Dillon, 2007; on biopolitics in the 'war on terror', see Kiersey and Stokes, 2010) or combine surveillance and discipline in ways unforeseen by Foucault (Bigo, 2008; see also Lyon, 2003; Levi and Wall, 2004). The argument here is that these practices, whether they bear on states, populations or bodies (the citizen's or the terrorist's), may be assumed to be strategically oriented through the concept of terrorism and rationalized with reference to the catastrophic possibility of a future terror event (see Aradau and Van Munster, 2011).

While this genealogical account is organized around power constellations, at least a few remarks should finally be made about constitutive knowledges as discursive formations in which relevant truth claims are formulated. At the most general level of *savoir/pouvoir*, the basic discourses of *order/chaos* (with the irrationality of the terrorist stressed particularly in the latter two series) and *civilization/barbarism* across the series or the discourse of (mental) disease seem to relate closely to the practices of modern constitution of sovereign reason, which recognizes itself by excluding madness and chaos from the realm of 'civilization' and domesticating men in particular territorial sovereignties (Ashley, 1984). The basic discourses of *civilization/barbarism* and *humanity/inhumanity* have precursors in a number of other association and dissociation practices in state discourses (Schmitt, 2003; see also Salter, 2002; Walker, 2006), while the genealogical relation between civilization and policing the international in the 'war on terror' has been recently pointed out by Neocleous (2011). Linkages with formations such as law, crime science and terrorism studies also suggest themselves. Regarding law, of particular interest is the legal positivism paradigm defined by universality, progressivism, rationalism and liberalism, which conditions the 'progressive codification of international law', including criminal law (1930s), and later legal theoretical claims that a state of nature obtains in the international order or that international law is 'shattering' because of terrorism, reifying the construction of global chaos and legitimizing extreme and violent responses (2000s; for an overview of this discourse, see Ward, 2009: 10n). Regarding crime science, the subjectification of a new criminal as a mobile professional in the conditions of increased transnational circulation (see Jäger, 2006; Härter, 2013) may be assumed to have been constitutive of the subjectification of the terrorist in the discourse among states. The emergence in the 1970s of the field of terrorism studies and its inflation following 9/11 (with the extension of

production of truth claims to the burgeoning field of think-tanks or consultancies) are significant events in their own right. Moreover, while alternatives have recently organized themselves, notably in the critical studies on terrorism research programme (see Jackson et al., 2009; Jarvis, 2009), the field continues to be dominated by a *Polizeiwissenschaft* ethos, making it ever ready to enter the services of power or lend legitimacy to government policies (see George, 1991; Gunning, 2007; Silke, 2004; Jackson, 2009). Interestingly, much of the knowledge constitutive of the Third World discourse in the 1970s (the statements about the exploitative character of colonialism and imperialism, their driving forces and their relations to capitalism and revolution) may be traced to the First and Second Worlds – to Marxism, Leninism or Freudian psychoanalysis (see Fanon, 1963), but also to nationalism, since emancipation here seems to be identified first and foremost with national emancipation and by extension a regional new order (constituted by nation-states).

Conclusion

With no totalizing ambition, the analysis presented in this article leaves space for more detailed or altogether different maps. What it asserts in principle, however, is the importance of the kind of historicizing scholarship it exemplifies, alongside the existing and numerous political and ethical inquiries, when it comes to better understanding the present condition and the dialectic of power and resistance in contemporary global politics. By 'forgetting' the object of terrorism to make visible the enabling discursive structures that make other practices possible, such scholarship can expand the space of dissent to power practices in the dominant structures of knowledge and thus challenge the limiting effects of the terrorism *dispositif* on the political. The aim of such criticism, understood as 'making facile gestures difficult' (Foucault, 1988: 155), is not liberation as a nirvana end state. It is rather the continuous process of *liberating* – not *The Doors'* 'break on through to the other side', but a continuous breaking on through to the other side, never content with the pleasures and treasures found on this one.

Funding

Notes

1. The sources from the League of Nations period include minutes from the Council meetings and the Assembly's First Committee, reports of the Ad Hoc Committee and from the diplomatic conference, drafts and final versions of resolutions and conventions, states' individual communications and auxiliary documents. The archives of documents from the 1970s consist of the minutes of the UN General Assembly and its Sixth Committee, drafts (submitted by member-states) and final versions of General Assembly resolutions, reports of the Ad Hoc Committee, sectoral treaties and states' individual communications. (The UN Security Council remained almost completely outside the debate on terrorism at this time.) In the 2000s series, the catalogue of researched materials comprises minutes of the General Assembly and documents of its First, Third and Sixth Committees, reports of the Ad Hoc Commitee, and conventions and resolutions of the General Assembly, as well as of the Security Council and the Commission on Human Rights/Human Rights Council. It ought to be stressed that references made below to support descriptive claims concerning the discursive orders are not intended to capture the totality of the discourse. They are rather illustrative examples serving to show how statements were articulated in accordance with the given rules.
2. *New York Times*, 10 October 1934.
3. See the correspondence between Yugoslavia and Hungary (1930–1934), reprinted in Doc. C.518.M.234.1934.VII (annex 1523e), appendices 1–48.

4. League of Nations, Official Journal, vol. 18, no. 5–6 (May 1937), Council minutes; see also League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Special Supplement no. 156 (1936), Minutes of the First Committee.

5. League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Special Supplement no. 156 (1936), Minutes of the First Committee, Haiti.

6. Doc. Conf.R.T./P.V.3 (1937), Minutes of the Diplomatic Conference, Haiti.

7. Doc. Conf.R.T./P.V.1 (1937), Minutes of the Diplomatic Conference.

8. Doc. C.506.M.225.1934.VII.

9. The original formulation of this concept of a 'complicit' state is found in Yugoslavia's memorandum after the Marseille attentat, Doc. C.518.M.234.1934.VII.

10. Doc. C.518.M.234.1934.VII.

11. Doc. C.589.M.246.1934.VII; Doc. C.518.M.234.1934.VII, Yugoslavia.

12. Doc. C.589.M.246.1934.VII.

13. League of Nations, Official Journal, vol. 15, no. 11 (December 1934).

14. Doc. C.546.M.383.1937.V.

15. Doc. C.542.M.249.1934.VII.

16. Doc. C.R.T.1 (1935), Committee for the Repression of Terrorism, Responses of Governments.

17. Doc. C.R.T.1 (1935), Committee for the Repression of Terrorism, Responses of Governments; Doc. Conf.R.T./P.V.3 (1937), Minutes of the Diplomatic Conference.

18. Doc. C.R.T.1 (1935), Committee for the Repression of Terrorism, Responses of Governments; League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Special Supplement no. 156 (1936), Minutes of the First Committee.

19. League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Special Supplement no. 156 (1936), Minutes of the First Committee.

20. League of Nations, Official Journal, vol. 15, no. 11 (Dec. 1934), Council Minutes.

21. Doc. C.506.M.225.1934.VII.

22. Doc. C.506.M.225.1934.VII.

23. Doc. Conf.R.T./P.V.18 (1937), Minutes of the Diplomatic Conference.

24. League of Nations, Official Journal, vol. 15, no. 11 (Dec. 1934), Council Minutes, Soviet Union.

25. Doc. C.542.M.249.1934.VII.

26. League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Special Supplement no. 156 (1936), Minutes of the First Committee.

27. See League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Special Supplement no. 156 (1936), Minutes of the First Committee, Switzerland.

28. League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Special Supplement no. 156 (Minutes of the First Committee), Belgium.

29. These labels should not be read as reflecting political geographical categories. A number of states in what was commonly considered the 'Third World' would articulate statements according to First World discourse, for example, and as a consequence Third World discourse comprised statements of what could more properly be termed the 'autonomizing Third World', characterized by its challenge to the established international status quo.

30. In Europe, the discourse seems to have emerged already in the late 1960s owing to local incidents, and it was constitutive of regionally specific means of transnational cooperation (see Dahlke, 2011). Terrorism had also been previously marginally discussed in the UN General Assembly during preparations of the declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention (Resolution 2131/1965) and the declaration concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states (2625/1970), where instigating acts of terrorism was given as a case of intervention and the exclusion of national liberation movements was established at the same time, prefiguring the later logics of exception (see below).

31. Doc. A/RES/3034 (1972); Doc. A/AC.160/1 (1973), observations by states; Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, Fiji, etc.

32. Doc. A/PV.2125 (1973), Minutes of the General Assembly, Paraguay.

33. Doc. A/PV.2129 (1973), Minutes of the General Assembly, El Salvador; Doc. A/34/37 (1979), Report of the Ad Hoc Committee.
34. Doc. A/34/PV.12; see also Docs A/AC.160/1, Turkey; A/C.6/SR.1359, Uruguay; or A/C.6/SR.1365, Belgium.
35. See Doc. A/C.6/L.867 (1972), a compilation of states' views presented to the Sixth Committee.
36. Doc. A/L.673 (1972), Saudi Arabia; see also Resolution A/30/34 (1972).
37. See Docs A/C.6/SR.1657 (1972); A/PV.2037 (1972); A/AC.138/L.22 (1978); A/9028 (1973), Report of the Ad Hoc Committee.
38. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1362 (1972), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Guinea.
39. See Docs A/AC.160/L.3 (1973); A/C.6/SR.1365 (1973); A/AC.160/L.3 (1973), Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Committee; A/AC.160/L.3/Add.2 (1973), Algeria.
40. See Docs A/PV.2037 (1972), Minutes of the General Assembly, Kuwait; A/C.6/SR.1356 (1972), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Sri Lanka.
41. Docs A/C.6/SR.1355 and A/C.6/SR.1357 (1972).
42. Docs A/AC.160/1 (1973), debate in the Ad Hoc Committee, Syria; A/9028 (1973), Report of the Ad Hoc Committee.
43. Docs A/9028 (1973), Report of the Ad Hoc Committee; A/AC.160/L.3 (1973); A/AC.160/L.3/Add.2 (1973); A/C.6/L.867 (1972).
44. See Docs A/C.6/SR.1367 (1972), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Algeria; A/34/37 (1979), Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, working paper by the Subcommittee for Underlying Causes.
45. Doc. A/AC.160.1 (1972), Austria; see also Docs A/C.6/SR.1359 (1972), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Denmark; A/PV.2045 (1972), Minutes of the General Assembly, Israel.
46. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1368 (1972), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Indonesia; see also Docs A/C.6/SR.1367 (1972), Oman; A/C.6/SR.1365 (1972), Cuba.
47. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1369 (1972), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Kuwait.
48. See Doc. A/C.6/SR.1362 (1972), Minutes of the Sixth Committee.
49. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1355 (1972), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, United States.
50. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1366 (1972), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Costa Rica.
51. Docs A/PV.2037 (1972), Minutes of the General Assembly, Colombia; A/C.6/SR.1361 (1972), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Israel; A/PV.2142 (1973), Minutes of the General Assembly, Austria.
52. Doc. A/PV.2035 (1972), Minutes of the General Assembly, Paraguay.
53. Docs A/C.6/SR.1357 (1972), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, United States; A/C.6/SR.1359 (1972), Senegal; A/C.6/SR.1369, United Arab Emirates; A/AC.160/SR.5 (1977); A/AC.160/1 (1973), Iran; A/C.6/SR.1358 (1972), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Iran. For a rare occurrence of an identification of terrorism with a contagion in the 1930s series, see Doc. Conf.R.T./P.V.1(1937), Minutes of the Diplomatic Conference.
54. See Doc. A/C.6/SR.1367 (1972), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Algeria.
55. See Doc. A/AC.160/WG/R.2 (1979), a working paper by the United Kingdom for the Ad Hoc Committee.
56. Doc. A/RES/54/109.
57. Following the 1937 convention (but breaking from its emphasis on the state as an object of terror), terrorist acts are defined here as 'criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes'. The recurrence of this definition has led Cassese (2001: 246) to claim, in the international legal debate on terrorism, that it testifies to the existence of a customary offence of terrorism.
58. See Res. S/748/1992.
59. Docs S/RES/1189 (1998), S/RES/1193 (1998), S/RES/1214 (1998), S/RES/1267 (1999) and S/RES/1333 (2000).
60. Having noted the broader tranformation in terms of rules and loci for enunciation of statements, the choice to focus on the post-9/11 discourse is predicated on the 'probe' approach (aiming to capture continuities and discontinuities across chosen series rather than to give a full 'evolutionary' account) and on the pragmatic concern for limiting the archives subjected to detailed analysis.

61. See Docs A/56/PV.12, Minutes of the General Assembly, Belgium (EU), Norway, Algeria; A/56/PV.13, Chile.
62. Docs A/56/PV.1 (2001), A/56/PV.12 (2001).
63. Doc. A/56/PV.7 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Russia.
64. Docs A/56/PV.9 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Bhutan; A/56/PV.12 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Ukraine; A/56/PV.18 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, United Kingdom; A/56/PV.14 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Pakistan; A/56/PV.14 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Yemen; A/56/PV.15 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Oman; A/56/PV.4 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Russia.
65. Docs A/56/PV.12 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly; A/56/PV.20 (2001), Myanmar; A/56/PV.21 (2001), Nauru; A/C.6/64/SR.9 (2009), Minutes of the Sixth Committee, Trinidad and Tobago; S/PV.4370 (2001), Minutes of Security Council, Mauritius; A/56/PV.17, Minutes of General Assembly, Nicaragua.
66. See Docs A/56/PV.12 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, United States; A/56/PV.18 (2001), Tanzania; S/PV.6128 (2009), Minutes of Security Council, United States.
67. Doc. A/56/PV.3 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, France.
68. Doc. A/56/PV.18 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Ghana.
69. See Docs A/56/PV.9 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Brasil; A/56/PV.7 (2001), Russia; A/56/PV.12 (2001), Algeria and Croatia; A/56/PV.18 (2001), Namibia; A/C.6/56/SR.26 (2001), Minutes of the Sixth Committee; A/62/PV.120 (2007), Minutes of General Assembly, Thailand; S/RES/1456 (2003).
70. Docs A/56/PV.12 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly; A/56/PV.13 (2001).
71. See Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001) and other Security Council resolutions, or the General Assembly resolutions in the series Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.
72. Doc. A/62/PV.112 (2007), Minutes of General Assembly, Guatemala.
73. Doc. A/58/PV.12 (2003), Minutes of General Assembly, Armenia.
74. Doc. A/59/PV.4 (2004), Minutes of General Assembly, Georgia.
75. Doc. A/56/PV.15 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Uruguay.
76. Doc. A/56/PV.13 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Singapore. The network metaphor was prominent already in the 1980s discourse on terrorism in the United States, for example (see Jackson, 2006), where, however, it was linked to the 'Moscow center' and associated with the concept of 'state terrorism'.
77. Doc. S/PV.5261 (2005), Minutes of Security Council, United Kingdom.
78. Doc. A/63/PV.7 (2008), Minutes of General Assembly, Israel.
79. Doc. A/56/PV.12 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, President of General Assembly (South Korea).
80. Docs A/56/PV.13 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Chile; A/56/PV.9 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Slovakia.
81. Docs. A/56/PV.13 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Tunisia; A/56/PV.15 (2001), Austria.
82. Doc. A/56/PV.12 (2001), Minutes of General Assembly, Algeria.
83. It covered the *New York Times*, the *Times* and *Le Figaro* since their first publication until the 1930s.
84. League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Special Supplement no. 156 (1936), Minutes of the First Committee.

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