Performative States

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> The body is never only what we think it is....Illusive, always on the move, the body is at best *like* something, but it never *is* that something.[1]

An advertisement for a popular US magazine recently ran in the Business Section of the *New York Times*. The two column, full-length ad featured a photograph of RuPaul, who the ad described as 'recording artist, entertainer, cross-dresser'. The African-American RuPaul is wearing a pair of fishnet tights and a zippered-front, two-tone leotard with white stripes and trim and white stars around its collar. While the black and white of the ad makes it impossible to tell what colour RuPaul's outfit is, everything about it suggests that it is red, white, and blue—the colours of the US flag. Standing in an open-leg position, RuPaul—donning a shinny blonde wig, earrings, and full makeup—looks seductively into the camera, his gloved left hand raised above his head. Across his legs, just below his crotch, is the caption 'Articles for a Clothes Horse', under which appear titles of articles from past issues including 'Boxers or Briefs?', 'Habits you Picked up from Your Dad', and 'The New Definition of Manhood'. At the bottom of the ad in large, black letters is the name of the magazine—'Men's Health'—and beneath that in white letters boxed in black is the magazine's trademarked slogan, 'Tons of useful stuff for regular guys'.[2]

It is, at first, difficult to grasp how this image of a cross-dressed, racially-marginalised male as an ideal of healthy—even patriotic—American manhood would be enticing enough to the readership of the *New York Times* Business Section to sell issues of 'Men's Health'.[3] There seems to be little that the upwardly mobile,

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1. Susan Leigh Foster, 'Choreographing History', in Susan Leigh Foster (ed.), *Choreographing History* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 4, emphasis in original.

2. *New York Times*, 1 April 1996, p. C7.

3. RuPaul is also openly gay, something a reader of this ad may or may not know. While this information is not necessary for a performative interpretation of this ad, it bears mentioning for two reasons. First, in the United States there is still an often-made assumption that cross-dressers are homosexuals, when statistically we are told that this is not the case. Therefore, a US reader of this ad may make this assumption, thereby introducing sexuality as another category which is performatively expressed in this ad. Second, RuPaul has become such a popular culture icon in the United States that his openness about his sexuality may be common knowledge by now to a US readership. Again, the point is that the figure of RuPaul introduces not just the categories of sex and gender into the realm of performativity but

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predominantly white, heterosexual, male readership of the Business Section has in common with RuPaul. If, as the publishers of 'Men's Health' claim, their magazine is 'modern man's best friend', what is it in RuPaul's image that appeals to this selection of modern men?[4]

Consumed by the stereotypical businessman on the level of contrast, the image of masculinity RuPaul presents in this ad may strengthen the businessman's own sense of hegemonic masculinity, a masculinity that is buttressed by racial, class, and gender privilege. However, ads rarely function on the level of contrast. Instead, they attempt to negotiate an identification between the reader of the ad and the product being sold. I would suggest that this is precisely how the 'Men's Health' ad works. What is there in this ad that an archetypal reader of the Business Section might identify with? In most cases, it is probably not RuPaul *per se*. Readers are unlikely to think that 'I want to be the next RuPaul, and reading 'Men's Health' makes me feel closer to my goal'. However, a reader may very well think, 'I want to be *like* RuPaul' or even 'I *am like* RuPaul'. In this case, the reader identifies not with RuPaul the person but with what RuPaul represents. And, as Ru himself puts it, 'RuPaul is an icon that says something more than just 'man in drag'.[5] What more does RuPaul as an icon say? In this ad, RuPaul offers a performative notion of subjectivity—and particularly of masculinity—which a businessman might want to buy. Read through the notion of performativity, every businessman is 'like' RuPaul. Indeed, all subjects are 'like' RuPaul.

In this article, I link the notion of performativity to the subject of the sovereign nation-state. I suggest, as have so many others, that sovereign nation-states are not pre-given subjects but subjects in process and that all subjects in process (be they individual or collective) are the ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted.[6] I build upon this, now familiar, argument using the work of Judith Butler on performativity. Butler's argument—generated from her analysis of sex and gender—allows me to consider the sovereign nation-state not only as a performative body, but also as a sexed and gendered body.[7]

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sexuality as well.

4. Bodybuilding and Fitness Magazines, *http://www.getbig.com/magazine/magazine.htm?*, p. 4.

5. 'RuPaul Explains it all', interview with Douglas Root, 'Orange Coast Outline', *http:// www.rupaul.net*.

6. Richard Ashley, 'Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* (Vol. 10, No. 2, 1988), pp. 227-62; David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Cynthia Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

7. One other International Relations theorist—David Campbell—has explicitly turned to Butler's writings on performativity, albeit with different implications for IR theory. Campbell's use of Butler's work neglects to theorise the implications of Butler's challenge to the sex/gender dichotomy and, more importantly, to Butler's argument that homosexuality participates in the constitution of heterosexuality.

Tons of Useful Stuff for Regular States

Subjectivity is about impersonation—whether one is impersonating someone of another sex or gender, someone of the same sex or gender, or even oneself. 'Being' a subject, then—especially a 'regular' subject—entails a lot of hard work, both because it is impossible to simply 'be' an identity and because what counts as 'regular' is always changing. It is not even possible to stabilise claims to identity through recourse to some biological foundation because the division between the natural and the cultural is forever contested. Rather than understanding subjects as having natural identities, subjects and their various identities might instead be thought of as the effects of citational processes. Performativity concerns 'the ways that identities are constructed iteratively through complex citational processes'.[8] Butler introduced this understanding of performativity in her work on sex and gender.

Butler takes on the common-sense knowledge that sex is to nature as gender is to culture. Sex and gender, she claims, are both discursive constructs. Sex is not the natural, pre-discursive, pre-cultural realm of subjectivity opposed to gender as the cultural, social, discursive realm of subjectivity. 'This production of sex *as* the prediscursive ought to be understood as the effect of the apparatus of cultural construction designated by *gender*'.[9] If we follow Butler on this point, we are forced to transform the way we think about sex and gender, and their relationship to one another. Instead of thinking of them as separate terms whose relationship can be expressed dichotomously—as sex/gender, nature/culture, pre-discursive/discursive—gender and sex should be thought of as co-constitutive and inseparable. Gender should be thought of as 'the discursive/cultural *means* by which "sexed nature" or "a natural sex" is produced and established as "prediscursive", prior to culture, a politically neutral surface *on which* culture acts'.[10] How can we think about sex and gender in terms which account for gender as participating in 'the discursive construction of sex'?[11] Butler's answer is to think about gender performatively.

The unintended effect of Campbell's use of Butler is to performatively underplay and/or exclude sex, gender, and sexuality from International Relations investigations of sovereign nation-states as performative effects of discourse. My turn to Butler's work, in contrast, is primarily an attempt to recover these 'forgotten' aspects of sex, gender, and sexuality and to theorise their implications for the state and sovereignty. See Campbell, *op. cit.*, in note 6.

8. Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, 'Introduction: Performativity and Performance', in Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (eds.), *Performativity and Performance* (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 2.

9. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 7, emphasis in original.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 7, the first emphasis added.

11. Butler asks this question, albeit in a more complicated style. Her question is '[h]ow, then, does gender need to be reformulated to encompass the power relations that produce the effect of a prediscursive sex and so conceal the very operation of discursive production?' *Ibid.*, p. 7.

While for Butler sex is as culturally constituted as gender, sex appears as a '*substance*...as self-identical being' because of 'a performative twist of language and/or discourse that conceals the fact that "being" a sex or a gender is fundamentally impossible'.[12] This performative twist refers to the common-sense understanding of sex and gender. If sex is pre-discursive and gender is simply the cultural, discursive collection of referents which naturally refers back to specific codings of sex, then the naturalness of sex and its relationship to gender are not questioned. This linguistic link between sex and gender forever leaves sex critically unexamined. But if, as Butler suggests, we instead think of gender in terms of parody and imitation—as 'a kind of persistent impersonation that passes as the real'—then this changes the way we think about sex because the real to which gender supposedly refers—sex—is itself exposed as an impersonation.[13] 'The notion of gender parody...does not assume that there is an original which such parodic identities imitate. Indeed, the parody is *of* the very notion of an original'.[14]

To make sense of how this works, it is instructive to examine examples which all would recognise as performative expressions of sex and gender. One such example is drag performances.[15] Drag performances self-consciously parody 'natural' expressions of sex and gender. Drag enactments of gender and sex confront the artificiality of not only the categories of male/female and masculine/feminine but also of the categories of sex and gender. This is not because drag performances are 'false' in that they stray from original meanings of sex and gender. Rather, what drag performances do is expose the fact that there are no 'original' meanings of sex and gender because both sex and gender are always already culturally prescribed and performed. 'In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself—as well as its contingency'.[16]

It is important to recognise what Butler is *not* saying and, at the same time, to address two familiar criticisms of Butler's work. First, she is not saying that there is no materiality to the body. Put differently, she is not denying the physical reality of human existence. Rather, she is saying that the identity of any body, the ways we *understand* the materiality of the body, does not pre-exist all manners of performative expressions of sex and gender. Her point is not that bodies only exist in discourse as citational processes. Rather, her point is that it is through discursive performances—repeated, yet, varied citational processes— that our understandings of

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
13. *Ibid.*, p. viii.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
15. It is important to remember that drag is but an example of performativity for Butler. It is not paradigmatic because, as I will go on to illustrate, drag can be read through both performance and performativity, two inflections of drag that (as I will explain) have very different relationships to norms. For Butler's views on this point, see Judith Butler, 'Gender as Performance', in Peter Osborne (ed.), *A Critical Sense: Interviews with Intellectuals* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 111.
16. Butler, *op. cit.*, note 9, p. 137.

material bodies are mediated. In this sense, Butler is concerned with 'the notion of matter, not as site or surface, but as *a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface*'.[17] Her position 'is not a repudiation of the subject, but, rather a way of interrogating its construction as a pregiven or foundationalist premise'.[18]

Second, Butler is *not* saying that gender is a performance, nor—as the 'Men's Health' ad implies—that clothes make the man (or woman). For, as Butler notes, if gender were understood merely as a performance 'that could mean that I thought that one woke in the morning, perused the closet or some more open space for the gender of choice, donned that gender for the day, and then restored the garment to its place at night.'[19] With this in mind, she argues that '[t]he reduction of performativity to performance would be a mistake'.[20] Instead of referring to 'a singular or deliberate 'act' as performance does, performativity should be understood 'as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names'.[21]

Key to understanding the difference between performance and performativity is their connection to normativity, understood as the ongoing citational processes whereby 'regular subjects' and 'standards of normality' are discursively co-constituted to give the effect that both are natural rather than cultural constructs. The 'Men's Health' ad explicitly makes this point. Read as an instance of performance, the image of RuPaul as a healthy, patriotic, cross-dressed African-American male is consumed on its own. What one sees is a man in drag, a man intentionally acting out a part in the clothes of a woman for the specific purpose of selling magazines. When the photo-shoot is finished, so is RuPaul's drag performance. He simply goes back to his closet and dresses 'normally', as a man. Read through the notion of performance, then, RuPaul's drag performance has a definite beginning and end. It begins when RuPaul the 'man' dresses in women's clothes and, thus, deviates from the pre-given norm of Western male dress. It ends when RuPaul dresses as he 'should', as a man.

However, a performative reading of this ad interprets the image of RuPaul and its relationship to normativity differently. For what is interesting about the ad is not just RuPaul's performance as a cross-dressed male, but how RuPaul's image works with the magazine's slogan, 'Tons of Useful Stuff for Regular Guys'. A 'regular' guy is one who abides by, as well as participates in, the constitution of specific norms—of

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17. Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 9, emphasis in original.

18. Judith Butler, 'Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of "Postmodernism"', in Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (eds.), *Feminists Theorize the Political* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 9.

19. Butler, *op. cit.*, in note 17, p. x. A third criticism of Butler's work arises in her attempt to broaden the discussion of sex, gender, and sexuality to include race. While this is an important and necessary move, how Butler includes race—by positing an ahistorical superego—is in stark contrast to her historically flexible understanding of sex, gender, and sexuality. See Butler, *op. cit.*, in note 17, pp. 167-85.

20. Butler, *op. cit.*, in note 18, p. 234.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

masculinity, of dress, of sexuality, *etc.*—and what it means to be a 'regular guy' is constructed *within the text and context of the ad.* If normativity is also constructed within the ad, then it is not the case—as a performance interpretation of the ad suggests—that RuPaul is in drag only during the photo-shoot. Rather, a performative reading suggests that RuPaul is in drag before, during, and after the photoshoot, whether he 'means' to be or not. RuPaul's 'performance' cannot be contained within the ad. It spills over into his everyday life.

What is true for RuPaul as a 'regular guy' is true for the 'regular guys' who are reading this ad. The ad suggests that 'regular guys' are the effects of performative acts. Normativity, 'being a regular guy', is always bound up with performativity—in this case, wearing a particular outfit. It is not an apparent deviation from the norm which informs us that a performance is taking place. Rather, norms are constructed through repeated but varied performative acts, through citational processes that are always citations in relation to and of normative codes, that always produce the effects that they name: regular guys. In this respect, the 'Men's Health' ad blurs the distinction between 'acting' and 'being'. It invites us to critically assess why some acts are deemed to be performances, while others—everyday activities—are not. In this sense, performativity takes up a critical position in relation to 'normativity', investigating how 'the social code...designates only those things it can control as performances'.[22]

For Butler, then, gender is a sort of repeated, yet, not necessarily intentional portrayal of some gender identity, and a sexed and gendered body is its effect. '[G]ender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist the deed'.[23] On this point, she quotes Friedrich Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*. '[T]here is no "being" behind doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer" is merely a fiction added to the deed—the deed is everything'.[24] Butler transcribes this as '[t]here is no gender identity behind the expression of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very "expressions" that are said to be its results'.[25]

Butler's discussion of sex and gender through performativity effectively dismantles the nature/culture dichotomy through which we so often think about these terms. In this respect, what Butler has to say about sex and gender is equally relevant for understandings of states and sovereignty. For how is the state coded in much international relations theory and practice except as the pre-discursive, natural realm of international politics to which the discursive, socially constructed, cultural referent of sovereignty refers. Certainly, particular states have histories, as does the concept

22. Sue-Ellen Case, Philip Brett, and Susan Leigh Foster (eds.), *Cruising the Performative: Interventions into the Representation of Ethnicity, Nationality, and Sexuality* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. vii.

23. Butler, *op. cit.*, in note 9, p. 25.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 25, and Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York, NY: Vintage, 1969), p. 45.

25. Butler, *op. cit.*, in note 9, p. 25.

of the state.[26] However, the iterative practices surrounding sovereign nation-states all too often abide by a nature/culture dichotomy that sets nation-states off from critical examination. Much of the recent interest in sovereignty has contributed to this. For, while it is now becoming generally accepted to regard sovereignty as a social construct, many definitions of sovereignty begin by positing the state as some natural domain to which sovereignty in the modern historical era naturally refers.[27] In the following section, I discuss some discursive traps that naturalise the state and/or sovereignty.

Habits You Picked up From Your IR Dads

When E.H. Carr wrote in the 1940s that the concept of sovereignty 'is likely to become in the future even more blurred and indistinct than it is at present', he anticipated the debates of the 1980s and 1990s.[28] These debates surrounding sovereignty are in large part reactions against classical realist and neorealist treatments of the state and sovereignty. Whether resisting Hans Morgenthau's realist reification of the state and his equation of sovereignty with a legal principle or Kenneth Waltz's neorealist theory, which places the state and sovereignty within an ahistorical structure of international anarchy, theorists of varied epistemological and methodological allegiances have attempted to complicate sovereignty within the context of the state.[29]

Often, the impulse to clarify sovereignty overtakes the impulse to complicate it. As a result, there is no shortage of competing definitions of sovereignty from which to

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26. Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978).

27. My own work is not an exception. In *Simulating Sovereignty* I attempted to offer a performative notion of sovereignty. I argue that 'while the word sovereignty denotes a state of being—an ontological status—sovereignty in fact expresses a characteristic way in which being or sovereign statehood may be inferred from doing or practice. It is not possible to talk about the state as an ontological being—as a political identity—without engaging in the political practice of constituting the state'. Weber, *op. cit.*, in note 6, p. 3. As such, I eschew definitions of the state and sovereignty in favour of examining how the sovereignty/intervention boundary discursively constructs the state, as well as the meanings of sovereignty and intervention. However, in a group project on state sovereignty as a social construct, the group found it impossible to do without definitions of the state and sovereignty, thus making no attempt (at least initially) to deconstruct the nature/culture divide. The group simply posited the state in the realm of the physical/natural, defining the territorial state as 'a geographically-contained structure whose agents claim ultimate political authority within their domain' and sovereignty in the realm of the cultural, defining it as 'a political entity's externally recognized right to exercise final authority over its affairs'. Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 2.

28. E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939* (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 230.

29. Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Fifth Edition (New York, NY: Knopf, 1978), and Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (London: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

choose.[30] Alternatively, there is another strain of work in the discipline that seems to recognise that the historical complexity of sovereignty suggests that its meaning cannot be stabilised definitionally.[31] While recent contributions to the sovereignty debate defy simple classification, three types of arguments may illustrate how sovereignty is being reconceptualised. These arguments treat sovereignty either as an institution, a constitutive principle, or a parergon.

My purpose in briefly discussing these treatments of sovereignty is both to explain how each theory positions itself in relation to normativity and to critique each theory through the notion of performativity. Specifically, I suggest that each of these approaches theorises the relationship between nature and culture/states and sovereignty differently, which has implications for how each approach understands normativity. An institutionalist approach naturalises both states and sovereignty. While it recognises that norms are cultural constructs, it has no way of accounting for their ongoing social construction. Rule-based approaches which posit sovereignty as a constitutive principle of state identity abide by the nature/culture divide. However, as in structurationism, what is natural and what is cultural change. Either states or sovereignty must be designated as natural, albeit temporarily, so that the constitution of the cultural can be investigated. Finally, a parergonal notion of sovereignty argues that sovereignty is neither natural nor cultural. It is the very condition of ontology, what makes something appear to be natural and something else appear to be cultural. As such, this approach is interested in how the nature/culture dichotomy is constituted. But it cannot cope with moments that do not abide by dichotomous logics, moments in which something is both nature and culture, sex and gender, male and female, masculine and feminine.

Steven Krasner proposed an institutional approach to the study of state sovereignty in the late 1980s.[32] While his specific formulation of institutionalism has been

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30. For example, F.H. Hinsley defines sovereignty as 'the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community' and that '*no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere*'. F.H. Hinsley, *Sovereignty*, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 26, emphasis in original; Alan James, who understands sovereignty in terms of the authority a state derives from its constitution, suggests that '[s]overeignty, meaning the condition which fits a state for international life, is a matter of law and not of stature. It expresses a legal and not a physical reality'. Alan James, *Sovereign Statehood: The basis of International Society* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), p 40. Finally, Thomas Biersteker and I report the consensus definition of sovereignty suggested by the contributors to our co-edited volume. Biersteker and Weber, *op. cit.*, in note 27, p. 2.

31. R.B.J. Walker writes that 'the very attempt to treat sovereignty as a matter of definition and legal principle encourages a certain amnesia about its historical and culturally specific character'. Walker, *op. cit.*, in note 6, p. 166. Jens Bartelson, following Nietzsche, argues that only something that has no history can be defined. Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 13.

32. Stephen D. Krasner, 'Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective', in James A. Caporaso (ed.), *The Elusive State: International and Comparative Perspectives* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), pp. 69-96. See also G.M. Thomas, J.M. Meyers, F.O. Ramirez, and J. Boli, *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987), and Janice E. Thomson, *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Buliding and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton,

modified over the years, Krasner's original argument represents and remains an important strand of theorising about the state and sovereignty. For Krasner, '[a]n institutionalist perspective regards enduring institutional structures as the building blocks of social and political life'.[33] While Krasner concedes that there is 'no commonly agreed definition of what an institutional structure is', 'there are two interrelated characteristics that are central to an institutionalist perspective: the derivative character of individuals and the persistence of something—behavioral patterns, roles, rules, organizational charts, ceremonies—over time'.[34]

Among the most persuasive arguments for adopting an institutionalist perspective is that it insists upon a focus on norms in international relations. Individual behaviour, it suggests, must be understood in relation to institutions because internalised, consensual norms are a mediating variable between actors and institutions. Krasner writes that:

> [b]ehavior cannot be understood by examining atomized individuals. At the very least, individuals are confronted with a limited repertoire of social roles and values from which to choose. A particular role or enduring pattern of behavior can only be adequately comprehended as part of a larger social structure.[35]

Institutions are such social structures. 'The preferences, capabilities, and basic self-identities of individuals are conditioned by these institutional structures'.[36] One cannot arrive at ontological understandings without contextualising ontologies within institutions.

With respect to international politics, institutionalism requires theorists to decide upon a specific meaning for state sovereignty and for alternatives to it. It posits state sovereignty as *the* norm organising modern global life. As Krasner writes:

> the sovereign state is the only universally recognized way of organizing political life in the contemporary international system. It is now difficult to conceive of alternatives. The historical legacy of the development of the state system has left a powerful institutional structure, one that will not be easily dislodged regardless of changed circumstances in the material environment.[37]

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). These positions are more critical than is Krasner's. As Thomson argues, '[t]here is an important distinction between behavioral and critical or sociological conceptions of institutions. For behavioralists, institutions are rules and norms that regulate actors' behavior, while for critical theorists, institutions also define and constitute the actors themselves...I adopt the critical perspective'. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

33. Krasner, *op. cit.*, in note 32, p. 70.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

Against this naturalised norm of state sovereignty, institutionalism then describes, in extremely narrow terms, what a non-sovereign international order might look like. 'The alternative to sovereignty', Krasner argues, 'is either a world in which there are no clear boundaries or a world in which there is no final authority within a given territory'.[38]

Locating alternatives to state sovereignty is made all the more difficult by the way institutionalism theorises history and change. 'Historical developments are path dependent. Once certain choices are made, they constrain future possibilities'.[39] 'The basic characteristic of an institutionalist argument is that prior institutional choices limit available future options'.[40] Choosing sovereignty at one point means it is difficult to choose a different institutional arrangement in the future. Furthermore, it is only catastrophic change that counts for an institutionalist.

> Changes, from an institutionalist perspective, can never be easy, fluid, or continuous and are more likely to occur at the level of the whole population of organizations, as some types are selected out, than as a result of individual adaptation. While an institutionalist argument does not maintain that such rapid change never occurs, it does imply that such episodes are infrequent and are followed by long periods of either relative stasis or path-dependent change.[41]

Rather than unpacking the notion of state sovereignty, as Krasner argues must be done, his essay instead packs sovereignty with so much institutional power that it is virtually impossible to challenge.[42] Krasner continuously slips between state, sovereignty, and state sovereignty in his article, thereby not abiding by the nature/culture dichotomy of state/sovereignty which many social constructivists fall into. Instead, Krasner's essay simply naturalises both sides of the state/sovereignty dichotomy. Both, he acknowledges, have histories, but because of the path-dependent nature of history, both are here to stay.[43] In this sense, there is little social interplay between states and sovereignty. States could not be more asocial in Krasner's estimation, for he reduces their identities to governmental arrangements, capabilities, and preferences.[44] And while he does allow that preferences are the outcomes of norms, describing norms as internalised and consensual does not make them social. They, too, are naturalised. At the end of the day, an institutionalist perspective is no

38. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
43. Stephen D. Krasner, 'Westphalia and All That', in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (London: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 235-64.
44. Krasner, *op. cit.*, in note 32, pp. 74-75.

more useful to understanding the social construction of states and sovereignty than is neorealism, for everything becomes a natural ontology.

Rule-based approaches like structurationism might be seen as an attempt to overcome some of the ontological difficulties which haunt institutionalism. The work of Alexander Wendt is a good example. If for Wendt, the problem is 'that we lack a self-evident way to conceptualize' agents and structures, then '[s]tructuration theory is a relational solution to the agent-structure problem'.[45] Structurationism gives equal ontological status to both structures and agents.[46] For Wendt, sovereignty is one such structure. Structurationism defines structures 'in generative terms as a set of internally related elements. The elements of a social structure could be agents, practices, technologies, territories—whatever can be seen as occupying a position within a social organization'.[47]

Applied to international relations, 'a structurationist approach to the state system would see states in relational terms as generated or constituted by internal relations of individuation (sovereignty) and, perhaps, penetration (spheres of influence). In other words, states are not even conceivable as states apart from their position in a global structure of individuated and penetrated political authorities'.[48] He goes on to further codify sovereignty as an 'organizing principle of the interstate system' as well as 'the rules of the game...within which states interact'.[49]

The difficulty for Wendt is to fulfil the promises of structurationism—'to rethink the fundamental properties of (state) agents and system structures' and 'to explain some of the key properties of each as effects of the other, to see agents and structures as "co-determined" or "mutually constituted" entities'.[50] Unfortunately for Wendt, he is unable to make good on the promise of structurationism in a single argument, for making an argument about changes in agents requires him to 'bracket' or hold constant structures and *vice versa*.[51] For example, he ends up positing a static notion of sovereignty as the constitutive rules of the international system whenever he wishes to investigate how state interests and identities are constituted.[52] In effect, then,

45. Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', *International Organization* (Vol. 43, No. 3, 1987), pp. 338 and 350.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 339.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 357.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*, p. 358.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 339.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 364.
52. David Dessler makes a similar argument. See David Dessler, 'What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?', *International Organization* (Vol. 45, No. 3, 1989), pp. 441-73. Wendt's own position is somewhat modified in his later essay 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* (Vol. 46, No. 2, 1992), pp. 391-425. Here he characterises his work as more broadly constructivist than explicitly structurationist (thereby 'bracketing' epistemological differences among so-called constructivists), and he refers to sovereignty not as a constitutive principle but as an institution. But at this point, his analysis incurs some of the very ontological problems of institutionalism which I read his earlier work as attempting to avoid. Furthermore, Wendt continues to

Wendtian structurationism implicitly accepts a nature/culture dichotomy, even in its attempts to dislodge it. This may be because, as Wendt believes, 'all social science theories embody an at least implicit solution to the "agent-structure problem"'.[53] However, defining relationships as problems and then offering solutions to them effectively confines them within the very boundaries from which Wendt's work hopes to free them.

Among the problems of rule-based theories—as well as institutional theory—is how they conceptualise sovereignty as a role of the state.[54] If sovereignty is nothing but a role, this implies that it is something exogenous to the state. It is an act or a part that is not integral to the ontology of the state. In this sense, rule-based theories offer a performance notion of sovereignty. States might, to paraphrase Butler, peruse their closets for their choice of identity, don that identity for the day, and then restore the identity/garment to its place at night. Roles, then, imply 'singular and deliberate "acts" as performance does' with clear beginnings and endings.[55]

Furthermore, the notion of role as a performance accepts that there is a distance between normativity and performance. In the case of structuration theory, norms understood as 'the rules of the game' are the effects of the practices of agents and these rules, in turn, affect some type of agency. But structurationism, like performance theory, has no way to account for the simultaneous, mutual constitution of agents and structures, of ontologies and norms. Structurationism always brackets one thing by making it natural while it investigates something else as cultural.

In an attempt to theorise sovereignty in terms of its function rather than its content, Jens Bartelson puts forward an understanding of sovereignty as a 'parergon'. In so doing, Bartelson escapes the ontological traps that institutionalist and structurationist approaches fall into. This is because a parergon has no ontology. Rather, it is the condition of ontology. It is 'a frame, a line of demarcation, an ontological divide' that 'is neither inside, nor outside, yet it is the condition of possibility of both'.[56] 'A *parergon* does not exist in the same sense as that which it helps to constitute; there is a ceaseless activity of *framing*, but the frame itself is never present, since it is itself unframed'.[57] Sovereignty is a parergon because it 'has as its prime function to frame objects of inquiry by telling us what they are not'—by telling us, in other words, where the realms of the domestic and the international or the natural and the cultural begin

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explain agency in terms of role theory. Thus, as I argue below, a performance interpretation of Wendt's work still holds.

53. Wendt, *op. cit.*, in note 45, p. 337.

54. Nicholas Greenwood Onuf offers other examples of rule-based arguments. See Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), and Friedrich Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

55. Butler, *op. cit.*, in note 17, p. 2.

56. Bartelson, *op. cit.*, in note 31, p. 51.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 51, emphasis in original.

and end.[58] As a parergon, '[t]here is a discursive practice of sovereignty, but sovereignty itself is not amenable to empirical political research'. The 'function [of sovereignty] in political discourse can only be properly understood if we detach the concept of sovereignty from the implicit ontological concern of contemporary knowledge, and, so to speak, move it to a non-place'.[59]

A parergonal notion of sovereignty comes the closest to a performative notion of sovereignty and ontology. It destabilises sovereignty and the state by making sovereignty a fluid condition of state ontology which is forever framed and reframed. Sovereignty, then, can be understood as the discursive means by which states appear to be. As such, a parergonal notion of sovereignty does not attempt theoretically to weigh down the notion of sovereignty with the ontology of a norm. Sovereignty is not a norm, on this reading, for it is impossible to stabilise the content of sovereignty long enough to inscribe it as a norm. Rather, the function of sovereignty is to participate in the construction of normativity.

Yet, the way that Bartelson uses the notion of parergonality in his discussion of sovereignty does deviate from a performative understanding of sovereignty in one important respect. Bartelson is limited to a conceptualisation of sovereignty within the strict parameters of representation, whereas performativity jams the very dichotomies upon which representation depends. Bartelson's preoccupation with representations of sovereignty precludes his thinking about sovereignty when it ceases to function in a representational logic, when its parergonal qualities no longer sustain domestic/international, inside/outside boundaries. When, for example, Bartelson senses representation is in crisis, he concludes that sovereignty itself is in crisis. This leads him to raise the question of whether sovereignty is at its end. Bartelson suggests that:

> we got stuck with our parergonal notion of sovereignty and the dualities it entails within our political understandings, not as the result of any immanent logical necessity in history or in the development of political thought, but as the result of the cumulate consequences of random mutations in the conditions of knowledge.[60]

Because Bartelson seems to equate parergonality with representation, his explanation of how we 'got stuck' with parergonality implies that we are also stuck with representation. And he laments, '[p]recisely this loss of parergonality is the destructive upshot of critical international political theory today'.[61] Thus, while critical theory helps us to recognise the limitations of parergonality, 'it does not tell us where

58. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 52. Others make similar arguments. See, for example, Ashley, *op. cit.*, in note 6.
60. Bartelson, *op. cit.*, in note 31, p. 246.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 248.

to go from here'.[62] Yet, I would argue that this is the case only if we follow Bartelson's advice that epistemic change 'involves the political responsibility of deciding upon sovereignty, a decision we for the moment seem unfit to make'.[63] Instead, we might accept the undecidability of sovereignty and remain attentive to where that takes us.[64] Where it takes us is to a notion of sovereignty understood through performativity.

New Definitions of Masculine Statehood

One difficulty many international relations theorists are encountering is to find a way to speak and write about sovereign nation-states so as not to deny their materiality while not reifying them prior to discourse. Escaping from strictly representational logics is helpful in this respect because representation always relies upon some prediscursive foundation from which meaning is generated and to which disputes about truth are referred. Foundations include intersubjective communities such as domestic or international communities (states or international institutions, for example) as well as 'constitutive principles', 'rules of the game', and 'norms' that some theorists label sovereignty.

Butler's notion of performativity seems to be a way out of this dilemma. Butler's dismantling of the sex/gender, nature/culture dichotomies performatively upsets representational logics because representation requires such dichotomisations to function. For, in the absence of dichotomies, how can one cordon off something—the state or sovereignty, for example—as natural and prediscursive if the cultural or discursive aspect which refers to it is also a part of it? In this sense, performativity disseminates and decentres meanings so that all meanings are ultimately undecidable. A performative understanding of state sovereignty suggests that sovereignty is undecidable because its meaning cannot be fixed, for whenever the meaning of sovereignty is stabilised one finds that the meaning of sovereignty has already moved on to something else. States and sovereignty, like sex and gender for Butler, are forever in the realm of discourse and cultural, not in the realm of the natural.

If we accept that—like sex and gender—states and sovereignty are both discursive effects of performative practices, then it follows (transcribing Butler's transcription of Nietzsche) that there is no sovereign or state identity behind expressions of state sovereignty. The identity of the state is performatively constituted by the very expressions that are said to be its result. One of these expressions is sovereignty, and

62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*
64. This paragraph and the previous paragraph are slight reworkings of two paragraphs which appear in my review of Bartelson's book. See Cynthia Weber, 'A Genealogy of Sovereignty by Jens Bartelson', *American Political Science Review* (Vol. 9, No.1, 1997), pp. 228-29.

state sovereignty gets performatively enacted through various sex, sexuality, and gender codings.[65]

The 'Men's Health' ad is but one performative enactment which mixes state sovereignty and sex, sexuality, and gender. For it pictures a cross-dressed, homosexual man with cross-over heterosexual appeal—RuPaul—wearing an American flag of sorts. Here sex, sexuality, gender, and state sovereignty are unstabilisable. It is not possible to fix the identity of RuPaul with reference to any one of these categories because they all both cancel and accentuate one another. The figure of RuPaul in this ad occupies 'the space of excess and contradiction that the role, the lack of fit, the disjuncture, the *difference* between characters and roles makes apparent in each of them, the space in which that difference configures a...subject-position'.[66] The RuPaul ad appeals to an in-between space, not parergonally by making it possible to distinguish between self and other but as a 'cultural jamming' of representation itself. Terms like self and other cannot be ascribed to a place within this ad. As such, the ad displaces the space between self and other and renders self and other undecidable.[67]

The state is also often regarded as an in-between space.[68] It is no coincidence, then, that RuPaul is clothed in a flag. But, while the state often functions in this in-between space to restabilise meanings of self and other, the RuPaul ad functions to destabilise them. Crossing RuPaul with the state effectively crosses the state, cancelling out its stabilising function at least momentarily in this specific text. The various elements of this ad mutually effect a subjectivity for RuPaul as a 'regular' American guy and for America as a subjectivity that is as crossed as that of a queer drag queen. As such, American's sovereign subjectivity cannot be represented for it crosses every boundary—sexual, racial, gendered—which attempts to enclose it. American's sovereign subjectivity can only be performatively enacted for it has no foundational ontology.

While it may be all well and good to put forward performativity as an interpretative technique for reading an advertisement, where does this leave most of the 'regular guys' working on international relations theory? How, for example, might

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65. Terms like sex, gender, and sexuality are sites where meanings proliferate and as such cannot be pinned down with precise definitions. Butler's rejection of the sex/gender boundary illustrates this, as do the various ways sex, gender, and sexuality get performed. For example, 'sex' is not just male and female but hermaphrodite as well. 'Gender' is not just masculine and feminine, but also butch and femme. And the term 'sexuality' is often simplified to mean homosexuality, heterosexuality, or bisexuality. Yet, what is more interesting is the complicated way this term works in discourses of sex and desire. Joseph Bristow suggests that 'sexuality occupies a place where sexed bodies (in all their shapes and sizes) and sexual desires (in all their multifariousness) intersect only to separate'. For an introduction to sexuality, see Joseph Bristow, *Sexuality* (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 10.

66. Teresa de Lauretis, 'Film and the Visible', in Bad Object Choices (ed.), *How Do I Look? Queer Film and Video* (Seattle WA: Bay Press, 1991), p. 252, emphasis in original.

67. I would like to thank François Debrix for this point.

68. Ashley, *op. cit.*, note 6.

international relations theorists apply these insights to understandings of state sovereignty in their day to day practices? One suggestion is to read IR theory performatively. A performative reading of IR theory would suggest that the discourse of IR theory affects both the subjectivity of the state and the normativity of sovereignty as prediscursive. However, neither sovereignty nor states are prediscursive. Rather, to paraphrase Butler yet again, sovereignty should be understood as the discursive/cultural *means* by which a 'natural state' is produced and established as 'prediscursive'.[69] For example, the traditional IR definition of sovereignty—absolute authority over a territory occupied by a relatively fixed population and recognised as sovereign by other sovereign states—renders the state prediscursive. Each of the four components of state sovereignty—authority, territory, population, and recognition —presupposes a state that needs no analytical interrogation. This definition of sovereignty naturalises authority of the *state*, the territory of a *state*, a population within a *state*, and recognition of the *state* by other *states*. The state appears as a '*substance*...as self-identical being' because of 'a performative twist of language and/or discourse that conceals the fact that "being"' a state and/or sovereignty 'is fundamentally impossible'.[70] This does not mean that there is no materiality to the state. Rather, it means that the identity of the state—the ways we understand this materiality of people, territory, government, *etc.*—does not pre-exist performative expression of the state, including sovereignty.

By analysing state sovereignty performatively, analysis moves beyond traditional definitions of sovereignty (*e.g.*, sovereignty is status or sovereignty is like a basket in which various attributes and corresponding rights and duties are collected) to analysis of two important issues. First, how do definitions like these participate in the constitution of not just the state and sovereignty but their relationship? This is an issue that cannot be addressed until the meaning of the state and its relationship to sovereignty are 'denaturalised'. Second, what must a state 'do' in order to 'be' sovereign? If, for example, one considers sovereignty to be status, a performative understanding of state sovereignty allows one to investigate how sovereign practices confer sovereign status onto states without reifying the state or sovereignty.[71]

Foreign policy speeches, cables, press conferences, *etc.*, may also be analysed as performative enactments of a state's sovereignty. Because foreign policy pronouncements are often moments when states traumatically confront the impossibility of 'being' sovereign and thus insist upon their sovereign subjectivity all the more, foreign policy discourse can be viewed as one place in which a 'persistent impersonation that passes as the real' occurs, as the proliferation of performances at

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69. Butler, *op. cit.*, in note 9, p. 7.

70. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.

71. For a discussion of sovereignty as a basket and as status, see Michael Ross Fowler and Julie Marie Bunck, *Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and Application of the Concept of Sovereignty* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

the very moments when representation seems to fail.[72] Moments of international military intervention illustrate this. Virtually without exception, modern nation-states justify their interventions into target states on behalf of the sovereign peoples within the target state who—because of some political crisis—lack the political and symbolic resources to represent themselves as sovereign. This act of intervention not only announces the sovereignty of some segment within the target state. More importantly, it performatively enacts the sovereignty of the intervening state, a state that *is* sovereign because it performs the act of recognition of the repressed sovereign faction within the target state.[73]

Butler's performative understanding of subjectivity takes all this into account. It recognises that subjectivity is an illusory effect of representational crises or, as the title of her book puts it, representational 'trouble'. For Butler, sex, sexuality, gender and subjectivity more generally are 'defined by a constitutive "trouble," a traumatic deadlock, and...every perfomative formation is nothing but an endeavor to patch up this trauma'.[74] The same can be said of foreign policy discourse and sovereign states. Foreign policy is a response to a fundamental 'trouble' or crisis of representation, and sovereign states are discursive effects of 'foreign policy trouble'.

These foreign policy performative moments that affect sovereign states are themselves hopelessly crossed with sex, sexuality, and gender performances. Sex, sexuality, and gender are not roles that a state takes on in its foreign policy discourse. Sex, gender, and sexuality participate in affecting states as sovereign. To illustrate this point, it is useful to recall the now traditional gender codings of sovereign nation-states and to contrast these to other sex, gender, and sexuality readings of states and sovereignty that are opened up through performative analyses.

Gendered readings of IR commonly posit the state as doubly sexed and gendered. The state is said to be female and feminine domestically and male and masculine internationally.[75] It is the presumed heterosexual projection of masculine authority into the internal (female/feminine) affairs of other states or territories, or into the masculine realm of international politics (an anarchical war of every man against every man) that is the stuff of IR theory and practice. An application of Butler's performative reading of sex, gender, and sexuality would not accept these universal internal/external, female/male, feminine/masculine codings of the sex and gender of sovereign nation-states. Instead, it would investigate how various, particular, historically-bounded sex and gender codings participate in affecting the state and sovereignty. Furthermore, it would not take the heterosexually configured context of

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72. Butler, *op. cit.*, in note 9, p. viii. Timothy Luke's reading of the United Nations in relation to state sovereignty is a nice illustration of state sovereignty as parody. See Timothy Luke, 'Discourses of Disintegration, Texts of Transformation: Re-Reading Realism in the New World Order', *Alternatives* (Vol. 18, No. 2, 1993), pp. 229-58.

73. Weber, *op. cit.*, in note 6.

74. Slavo Zizek, *Tarrying with the Negative* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), p. 265.

75. Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Women and War* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1987).

international politics as given. Rather, how homosexual and/or queer practices participate in the constitution of a presumptively heterosexual context of IR would be investigated.[76]

A good example is US relations in the Caribbean. The ability of the male sexed US body politic to project its masculinely-engendered authority into the femininely-engendered Caribbean region has gone without saying at least since 1898. Indeed, as many traditional IR/Caribbean scholars have argued, the US hegemonic identity finds its ground in its Caribbean policy, whether that is in the form of a 'good neighbour' or as an 'international police officer'. However, this unquestioned masculinity of the supposedly male US body politic has caused 'trouble' for the United States in its most recent interventions in the Caribbean because, as the story goes, the United States is so strong regionally that any regional intervention makes the United States appear to be a bully rather than a good neighbour.[77] This has led the US body politic (through the Bush and Clinton administrations) to performatively enact US sovereign masculinity in the Caribbean in similar ways to those of RuPaul in the 'Men's Health' ad—using a symbolic strategy of male crossdressing. It was this 'new' definition of masculine/sovereign statehood that the United States performatively enacted in the US-led 'intervasion' (*i.e.*, crossed 'intervention/invasion') of Haiti. So as not to appear to be a regional bully, the United States symbolically cloaked itself in feminine garb and enacted a queer interventionary strategy, a strategy that defied dichotomous codes of sex (was the US body politic male or female?) and gender (was it masculine or feminine?). The success of this symbolic drag moment had real, material effects on US domestic and foreign policy—allowing the United States to 'solve' its Haitian immigration problem under the sign of humanitarian intervention. It was not until the US body politic crossed/cross-dressed/queered its foreign policy strategy toward Haiti that it 'solved' its immigration problem without forfeiting its masculinely engendered hegemony. Ironically, it was through a queer performative strategy that the United States secured its supposedly straight, hegemonic regional masculinity. In this instance at least, queer codings of sexuality paradoxically 'naturalised' US sexual identity as straight.[78] As this example suggests, those international relations theorists

76. Alexander Doty defines queerness as 'any expression that can be marked as contra-, non-, or anti-straigh'. Alexander Doty, *Making Things Perfectly Queer* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. xv. For a more general discussion of queer theory, including the limitations of definitions that capture it, see Annamarie Jagose, *Queer Theory: An Introduction* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1996).

77. While I do think that sovereignty is always in part an effect of sex, sexuality, and gender codings, I do not think that sovereignty is necessarily always coded as masculine. Arguments about sex, sexuality, and gender codings of a specific sovereign nation-state in a specific historical episode cannot be generalised to other states or even other performative activities of the state in question.

78. It is impossible to do this argument justice in this short space. For elaborations of this argument and for additional examples of queer US performative moves in the Caribbean, see Cynthia Weber, 'Something's Missing: Male Hysteria and the US Invasion of Panama', *Genders* (No. 19, 1994), pp. 171-94, reprinted in Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart (eds.), *The Man Question in International Relations*

who still consider feminist and gender studies to be appendages to the discipline of international relations rather than constitutive of it and of the very identities it investigates, such as sovereign nation-states, are wrong.

One final comment. It is interesting to note that the 'Men's Health' ad ran on April 1, which in the United States is April Fool's Day. This information invites a reading of this ad as a spoof or a joke of sorts. But who is the joke on? Is it on effeminate men or men in drag as women, or is it on masculine men or men in drag as men? In the US these days, the answer is unfortunately still the former but more and more the latter as well. In this sense, RuPaul's image turns the question of drag and performativity back onto the businessman, disrupting any security he may derive from an understanding of himself as naturally masculine. He too—and every 'regular guy'—is in drag. As RuPaul himself wrote, 'when I go to work, it's no different than a businessman wearing his three-piece suit on Wall Street'.[79]

The RuPaul ad, read as a performative parody of 'being' a sex or a gender, boldly announces that there is no essential subjectivity—whether that is understood as male or female, masculine or feminine, or heterosexual or homosexual. And, because RuPaul is dressed in the American flag, the ad turns the notion of drag and the parody of 'being' a subject back onto the sovereign nation-state. A state's sovereign subjectivity is, to recall the quote which opened this article, '[i]llusive, always on the move'.[80] It is 'at best *like* something, but it never *is* that something'.[81]

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(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998), pp. 150-68; Cynthia Weber, 'Masquerading and the US "Intervasion" on Haiti' Jenny Edkins, Nalini Persram, and Veronique Pin-Fat (eds.), *Sovereignty and Subjectivity* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, forthcoming 1998); and Cynthia Weber, *Faking It: US Hegemony in a 'Post-Phallic' Era* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming 1999).

79. RuPaul, *Lettin It All Hang Out* (London: Warner Books, 1995), pp. xii-xiii.

80. Foster, *op. cit.*, in note 1, p. 4.

81. *Ibid.*