Engaging Foucault: Discourse, Liberal Governance and the Limits of Foucauldian IR

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Abstract

This article provides a critical survey of the appropriation of the work of Michel Foucault within poststructuralist IR. Foucault has thus far been employed within poststructuralist IR in three ways: to support deconstructions of realist international theory; to analyse modern discourses and practices of international politics; and to develop novel accounts of the contemporary global liberal order. I argue that the first and the third of these usages are especially problematic. Utilised for the critique of realism, Foucault's main emphases have consistently been overlooked or misrepresented. By contrast, when 'scaled up' to inform analyses of world order, Foucault's work has ended up supporting essentially liberal accounts of international politics. There are, I argue, clear limits to the use of Foucault in theorising international and world politics, and given this I conclude that if Foucault is to be used more effectively within IR, his work needs to be situated within a framework – I suggest a Marxist one – which is cognisant both of the structural dimensions of power, and of the specificity and irreducibility of the international.

Keywords: *bio-politics, discourse, Foucault, governance, governmentality, Marxism, poststructuralism*

Introduction[1]

> Foucault: What I desire . . . is not so much the defalsification and restitution of a true Marx, but the unburdening and liberation of Marx in relation to party dogma, which has constrained it, touted it and brandished it for so long . . .

> Interviewer: But does this . . . mean that, in a certain way, Marx is at work in your own methodology?

> Foucault: Yes, absolutely. You see, given the period in which I wrote these books, it was good form (in order to be viewed favourably by the institutional Left) to cite Marx in the footnotes. So I was careful to steer clear of that.[2]

In their 1998 article, 'Engaging Gramsci', Randall Germain and Michael Kenny developed an evaluation of the uptake of Antonio Gramsci's work within the new 'Italian School' of international relations, arguing that the work of the new Gramscians failed to acknowledge the ambiguities inherent within Gramsci's writings, as well as the difficulties associated with applying his concepts to the international arena.[3] This exemplary article highlighted a recurring problem within recent international

relations theory, namely its tendency to selectively appropriate (or misappropriate) social theoretical resources, and apply them a little too unreflectively to the theorisation of world politics. Thus within constructivist IR we find a mishmash of Durkheim, Weber, Wittgenstein, Mead and others being bracketed together for the study of culture and identity in international politics;[4] while within critical IR theory we find Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas being thoroughly de-materialised and de-historicised in the service of what is effectively an updated liberal idealism.[5] Social theorists with quite distinctive approaches have repeatedly been squeezed, within IR, into scholarly boxes where they do not easily belong. And this, in my view, can be readily seen in the reception and use of Michel Foucault's work within international relations.

While Foucault, unlike Gramsci, has not inspired the emergence of a distinct 'school' of international relations, his thinking is nonetheless usually thought of as having been one of the major influences (and perhaps *the* single major influence) on the development of 'postmodern' or 'poststructuralist' IR. He is usually given pride of place in overviews of poststructuralism and IR, and, more significantly, is regularly cited by poststructuralist international theorists themselves as a (or *the*) major inspiration behind their thinking and work.[6] Admittedly, Foucault is normally employed alongside a raft of other, mostly francophone, authors – Derrida, Lacan, Barthes, Baudrillard, Virilio, Deleuze, and so on – such that poststructuralist IR theorists have often not developed specifically Foucauldian readings of international politics. But this is at least part of the problem. For the consistent use of Foucault as one of a number of poststructuralist influences has led, I think, to an elision of the specificity of Foucault's positions, as well as to an underestimation of the interesting parallels and convergences between Foucauldian and non-poststructuralist theoretical formulations.

Certainly, outside of IR Foucault has also regularly been employed alongside Derrida, Lacan et al., as one of a collective of postmodern social theorists. But outside IR one has also tended to see a greater sensitivity to the specificity of Foucault's work, as well as a more wide-ranging collection of uses of it. Within sociology and social theory, Foucauldian formulations have, for instance, often been used alongside Marxist ones – in ways that find little parallel within international relations.[7] That Foucault has been employed so narrowly within IR is perhaps testimony to the theoretical greenness of a discipline which only during the 1980s discovered the joys of social theory. But that, I think, is only part of the story. The more telling reasons for IR's narrow engagement with Foucault derive, as in the case of Gramsci, from the distinctive problems of 'internationalising' a theorist whose focus was primarily on the 'domestic' social arena.

Within IR, Foucault has been applied and employed in three distinct ways: to support critiques and deconstructions of realist international theory; to analyse discrete discourses and practices of modern international politics; and to develop novel accounts of our contemporary global liberal order. My argument below is that the first and the third of these usages are especially problematic. Pressed into service against IR realism, Foucault's main emphases, insights and concerns have

consistently been overlooked – or, worse, misrepresented. No less problematic, when translated and 'scaled up' to inform analyses of the current world order, Foucault's work becomes less an interrogation of liberalism than a prop to reworked liberal accounts of the international arena. This is not to deny that interesting and insightful things have been said using Foucauldian perspectives about the discourses and practices of modern international politics. It is rather to argue that there are limits to the use of Foucault in theorising international and world politics; and, as a corollary to this, that if Foucault is to be used effectively within IR, then his insights need to be situated within a framework – I suggest a Marxist one – which is cognisant of the structural dimensions of power, as well as the specificity and irreducibility of the international.

    With these arguments in mind, we proceed through five stages: first, through an analysis of Foucauldian-inspired critiques of realist international theory; second, by briefly considering Foucault as employed to interrogate discrete discourses and practices of international politics; third, by examining the limitations of Foucault as a theorist of world politics; fourth, by attempting to tease out and clarify my position on the specificity and irreducibility of the international; and, in conclusion, by sketching how Foucauldian insights might be usefully employed within a Marxist framework. I should stress at the outset that my primary aim herein is not to advocate a particular interpretation of Foucault, still less to critically interrogate his work, or to explore the strengths and weaknesses of poststructuralism or poststructuralist IR; my concern, to the contrary, is IR's use of Foucault, and the problems inherent in translating Foucault into the discipline of IR and the practical field of international politics. That said, the arguments below are inevitably premised upon certain theoretical assumptions about the nature of international relations, as well as upon a particular interpretation of Foucault's work. The main such premises can be summarised briefly. With regard to the field of international politics, I argue and assume that there is an ontological specificity and irreducibility to the international, which poses distinctive analytical problems and demands distinctive theoretical tools. And with regard to Foucault, I emphasise three main points: first, that he was not a textual idealist or determinist; more substantively, that he was above all an interrogator of modern liberal capitalist societies; and, finally, that the parallels and complementarities between Foucault and the Marxist tradition are much greater than is generally recognised within IR. These positions are developed at greater length during the course of what follows.

The critique of IR realism

Foucault is perhaps best known in IR as one of the key influences behind the post-structuralist critique of realism. R. B. J. Walker, Richard Ashley, Jim George, Jens Bartelson and Cynthia Weber, for instance, have all turned to Foucault (amongst an ensemble of other poststructuralist luminaries) to argue that the realist notions of 'sovereignty', 'anarchy', 'state' and 'national interest' are discursive constructs, which function not so much to represent as to constitute the world of international politics.

Thus Walker argues, with Foucault as a 'main inspiration', that realist discourse reifies and reproduces a uniquely modern social ontology, the very distinction between sovereign 'inside' and anarchic 'outside' being a historically specific resolution to the problem of self and other, itself founded on the centrality of space within the modern imaginary.[8] Ashley, through a series of articles that make repeated allusions to Foucauldian notions of 'genealogy', 'discipline' and 'resistance', seeks to radically challenge realist international relations as epistemologically, politically and aesthetically impoverished.[9] And George, with Foucault at the top of his list of influences, contends that positivism/realism is a 'scantily clad . . . discursive Emperor', a 'framing regime' which 'directs policy/analytical/military responses', and from which US foreign policy, for example, is 'derivative'.[10] Each of these authors in their individual ways uses Foucault as a springboard for critiquing realist IR theory as a disciplinary orthodoxy which is both productive of, and a constraint upon, international political practice, and is deeply ethico-politically regressive.

Such arguments are powerfully made, and it is not the intention of this article to question their importance. Yet whatever the merits of such arguments, they do not, it seems to me, owe a great deal directly to Foucault. Foucault did, of course, analyse the power effects of discourse; and he did see theory less as a representation and translation of social practices than as a form of practice itself. But 'discourse', for him, referred (in certain formulations) to the overall unity of social practices and institutions in a given field; or (as he had it elsewhere) to textual and epistemic claims that had to be analysed in relation to 'non-discursive domains (institutions, political events, economic practices and processes)'.[11] And the recognition that theory is practice – so often alluded to within poststructuralist IR theory[12] – was not an assertion of the determining role of theory in the production and reproduction of social and power relations, but instead a claim about the importance of analysing theory as one of a number of constitutive elements within discourse and society. Foucault was not a philosophical or theoretical determinist.

Moreover, viewing Foucault's work in its broad sweep, it becomes evident that he was not even a textual determinist either. To the contrary, the consistent line running through most of his major works – *Madness and Civilisation*,[13] *The Birth of the Clinic*,[14] *Discipline and Punish*,[15] the three volumes of *History of Sexuality*,[16] his essays on governmentality,[17] and the best-known English-language collection of his essays and interviews, *Power/Knowledge*[18] – is that of historical enquiry, not so much into texts as into the mutually constitutive *relations between* texts, the human sciences, practices, institutions, bodies and subjectivities. There are other works of Foucault's where his concerns are primarily philosophical – most notably *The Archaeology or Knowledge*[19] – or where he concentrates on analysing representations and texts – *The Order of Things*[20] and *This is Not a Pipe*[21] being clear examples. But across Foucault's *oeuvre* as a whole, the latter are the exception rather than the rule. Indeed much of Foucault's work has a strongly materialist edge.

Consider for a moment how far Foucault's positions diverged from those of Derrida. Where Derrida was starkly philosophy-centric, analysing Western thought as a series of replays of Greek metaphysics, Foucault was resolutely practical in

emphasis, seeing figures such as the architect, the penal reformist and the psycho-analyst as key to understanding changing modalities of discipline and social control. Foucault was interested in Bentham, for instance, not so much as a liberal philosopher, but as one who also designed the Panopticon – a paradigmatic means of surveying and disciplining bodies in an age of liberalism.[22] Where Derrida's philosophy-centric bent inspired an incredulity towards the empirical and towards representation as a whole ('representation is bad', he declared in one of his more pithy moments), Foucault claimed to the contrary that he was 'an empiricist'.[23] And where Derrida famously averred that 'there is nothing outside of the text', and thus concentrated on meanings, ruptures and inconsistencies internal to texts, at the heart of Foucault's analyses are extra-discursive bodies, procedures and institutions, and the analysis of discourses within their quite specific social and historical contexts.[24] Foucault was also much more attentive than Derrida to the question of power, going so far as to say that, in the analysis of texts:

> one's point of reference should not be to the great model of language [*langue*] and signs, but to that of war and battle. The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning.[25]

Foucault, indeed, was extremely hostile towards what he saw as Derrida's 'reduction of discursive practices to textual traces'.[26] As he said, for instance, of Derrida's interpretation of Descartes:

> This 'textualization' of discursive practices . . . is a historically determined little pedagogy. A pedagogy that teaches the pupil there is nothing outside the text, but that in it, in its gaps, its blanks and its silences, there reigns the reserve of the origin; that it is therefore unnecessary to search elsewhere, but that here, not in the words, certainly, but in the words under erasure, in their *grid*, the 'sense of being' is said. A pedagogy that gives conversely to the master's voice the limitless sovereignty that allows it to restate the text indefinitely.[27]

Such criticisms do not exactly suggest that Foucault and Derrida sit perfectly comfortably together. More to the point here, in their predominant focus on the grand theorists of realism (from Machiavelli and Hobbes to Waltz and Gilpin), Walker, Ashley and George display a concern with the textual and especially philosophical constitution of the social world that is characteristically Derridean. Like so much poststructuralist IR theory – witness the title of the first collection of poststructuralist writings on the subject, *International/Intertextual Relations*[28] – they owe much more to Derrida and his fellow textual idealists than they do to Foucault.

To be fair, Walker in particular does to some degree overcome this narrow textualism through his insistence on the spatial distinctiveness of modern politics. 'Space', said Foucault, 'is fundamental to any exercise of power',[29] and in turn Walker interprets modern politics as premised upon a sharp spatial dichotomy between

'inside' and 'outside', with the modern sovereign state as the institutional expression of this distinction, and realist IR and political theory as its chief ideologues. As with Foucault, we see here a concern with the relations between knowledge, institutions and also indirectly subjects – who are constituted as the political subjects of the sovereign state as a result of this specifically modern configuration of discourse and space. But this simply raises another problem. For what is distinctive about Foucault's concern with space is his focus on spatial technologies and procedures at the micro-level, and his concomitant refusal of analyses that focus primarily on the state and state sovereignty. As he himself put it:

> I would say that we should direct our researches on the nature of power not towards the juridical edifice of sovereignty, the State apparatuses and the ideologies which accompany them, but towards domination and the material operators of power, towards forms of subjection and the inflections and utilisations of their localised systems, and towards strategic apparatuses. We must eschew the model of the Leviathan in the study of power. We must escape from the limited field of juridical sovereignty and State institutions, and instead base our analysis of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination.[30]

Foucault thus centred his analyses on asylums, prisons, hospitals and other local sites of social discipline, regulation and normalisation; as well as on those administrative mechanisms (mechanisms of 'bio-power' and 'governmentality') through which populations are governed as formally free subjects, and constituted 'at a distance'.[31] Seen in this light, Walker's conviction that the principle of state sovereignty is 'the key feature of modern political life' seems resolutely anti-Foucauldian.[32] Where Foucault urges us to 'cut off the King's head',[33] Walker effectively argues along much more conventional[34] and statist lines that the sovereign continues to be the defining figure not just of modern political thought, but also of modern political practice. Derridean in its privileging of philosophical texts, the poststructuralist critique of realism also appears less than Foucauldian when it turns to the question of space.

Now all of this would be slightly beside the point if these problems were not replicated elsewhere, but quite evidently they are – and in works which claim Foucault as much more than one of a number of influences. Jens Bartelson's *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* and Cynthia Weber's *Simulating Sovereignty* are clear cases in point.[35] Both turn to Foucault, albeit in very different ways, to analyse and historicise the concept of sovereignty. Employing the Nietzschean–Foucauldian concept of 'genealogy', Bartelson seeks to trace structural, epochal variations in the meaning and use of the notion of 'sovereignty' since the Renaissance. In this work we find a sensitive historical analysis of epistemic shifts and a keen recognition of the importance of conflicts and struggles over language and meaning, both of which are central to Foucault but are marginalised within Walker's, Ashley's and George's critiques of realism.[36] In other respects, though, Bartelson's analysis holds a great deal in common with the aforementioned critiques: as with these, his 'primary object

of analysis is *text*'; his discussion of texts is limited to philosophical treatises; and he barely discusses Foucault's sceptical attitude towards the discourse of sovereignty, or Foucault's alternative characterisation of power and politics in modern disciplinary societies.[37] As in so much poststructuralist IR, the sharp differences between Foucault and Derrida get elided; and as in Walker's work, Bartelson ends up depicting sovereignty as, yes, historically contingent, but nonetheless still the central motif of modern politics – 'constitutive of what modern politics *is*, and what modern political science is all *about*'.[38]

As for Weber's *Simulating Sovereignty*, this owes – whatever the text might imply – but the merest and most superficial of traces to Foucault. The book itself analyses discourses of 'sovereignty', 'intervention' and 'the state' surrounding a number of nineteenth- and twentieth-century military actions (in the 1820s, 1910s and 1980s), and argues that the meaning of these words varies across these three decades in a fashion that corresponds to the three different 'modalities of punishment' identified by Foucault in *Discipline and Punish*.[39] On the strength of this argument, Weber contends that the notion of 'sovereignty' is historically variable, and in turn that the modern state has become no less than a discursive simulation, 'a sign without a referent'.[40] The problem here is that – quite apart from the plausibility of these claims – there is a wide gap between Weber's emphases and those of Foucault.[41] Weber wholly neglects the material: she states, for instance, that 'if one wants to break with scientific behavioural and traditional analyses of sovereignty and intervention in a way that enriches analyses of the state, one must analyze how foundations and boundaries are drawn – how states are written'.[42] Her analysis is insensitive to the practical, rhetorical and war-like dimensions of language use: she argues that the meaning of sovereignty during particular eras 'grounds' US policy, ignoring the ways in which the notion of sovereignty can be simultaneously employed in very different ways to suit specific strategic and interested purposes.[43] And she also assumes that sovereignty is the central axis of the modern state. Furthermore, there are no meaningful parallels between the three eras of intervention discourse identified by Weber, and the three modalities of punishment identified by Foucault: Weber uses Foucault's terms for these modalities, but not at all the meanings that he applies to them. It would seem that *Simulating Sovereignty* presents nothing less than a dissimulated application of Foucault.

To summarise: across this whole range of critiques of realism, Foucault is consistently cited as a (or *the*) leading influence, but, equally consistently, finds many of his major insights, emphases and concepts ignored or misrepresented. This is not to imply that these critiques of realism are without foundation – the issue of the strengths and weaknesses of these critiques is a different matter altogether – merely to stress that they owe very little to Foucault. Foucault in this work seems above all to be an abstract epistemologist of the relations between texts, truth and power, rather than an empirically grounded theorist of historical shifts in the relations between knowledge, institutions and the constitution of subjects. Foucault might well have inspired a particular attitude or ethic towards IR's disciplinary orthodoxy – celebrating instability, dissidence and transgression, and writing, as Ashley and Walker put it, in

a 'register of freedom'[44] – but, within the critique of realism, the uptake of Foucault's substantive concerns has been much more limited than is usually recognised.

Foucault and the liberal practices of international relations

The reasons for this, it seems to me, lie not so much in the lack of theoretical rigour as in the inherent difficulty of internationalising Foucault. For as Kimberley Hutchings observed in an earlier review of Foucault's impact within IR, the 'traditional concerns of international relations theory (war, interstate relations, foreign policy, diplomacy, security) seem a long way from Foucault's preoccupation with the micro-politics of power relations and the constitution and limits of subjectivity'.[45] Not just *seem*, I would add, but *are*. Foucault was more than anything else a historian/theorist of those mechanisms of social control and power, and those forms of knowledge, practice and institution, that accompanied the rise of bourgeois, liberal societies. He was a critic of the progressivism inherent within liberal 'Whig histories' – a critic, for instance, of those liberal reformist narratives which view the rise of modern penal systems as a matter of the progressive replacement of barbarism and torture by humane treatment and rehabilitation;[46] and a critic, equally, of those orthodox narratives of twentieth-century sexuality which depict it as liberated from repressive Victorian strictures.[47] He emphasised the ontological primacy of those 'micro-physical' architectures, techniques and procedures invented by liberal scholars such as Bentham, over that macro-level power called 'the State'.[48] And he was an analyst of mechanisms and rationalities of governance and self-governance under conditions of formal freedom – that is, of the historically specific procedures of social control that are characteristic of liberal (as against totalitarian, feudal or slave) societies.[49] It is this specific concern with liberal societies which in my view explains why Foucault paid such scant attention to what Giorgio Agamben has argued is the exemplary form of modern bio-political governance, the concentration camp: Foucault was much less interested in situations of coercive and totalitarian control, than in power relations which operated within the context of, and through, freedom.[50] Indeed, the very distinction that Foucault drew between 'power' on the one hand, and 'violence' or 'force' on the other suggests that Foucault's very definition of power was intimately bound up, in his view, with freedom, liberty and liberalism. Whereas a 'relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things', he said, the 'exercise of power consists in guiding . . . conduct';[51] a 'man who is chained up and beaten is subject to force being exerted over him. Not power . . . there is no power without potential refusal or revolt.'[52] To be sure, Foucault did also explore at some length the discourses, practices and institutions of pre-modern societies, whether the means of exclusion of the insane, or the forms of public torture in medieval Europe,[53] or the practices of sexuality in ancient Greece.[54] But in each case, Foucault's lengthy historical investigations functioned primarily as 'histories of the present' – that is, as means of highlighting the historical novelty of, and of problematising and posing ethical questions about, modern liberal bourgeois capitalist societies.[55]

The pertinence of this here is that, if indeed Foucault was primarily an interrogator of liberal capitalist societies, then this poses quite distinctive problems in applying his insights and emphases to the study of international politics. For Foucault himself said very little about international relations as a discipline, or about the practical field of international politics (the exception being his brief discussions of the role of war in the shaping of modern societies, especially through the emergence of bio-politics).[56] More crucially, the international has traditionally been figured as diverging in almost every respect from the liberal society that Foucault devoted himself to critiquing – being represented, at least in orthodox IR accounts, as a realm of 'recurrence and repetition' rather than progress; as in essence untouched by changes in the domestic realm (including the rise of liberal societies); and as dominated by the power, interests and agency of that macro-scale structure called the state, rather than by a plurality of social relations.[57] If the domestic and international arenas really are as contrary and antithetical as orthodox accounts suppose, and if Foucault was indeed overwhelmingly concerned with the domestic arena of liberal societies, then this hardly renders Foucault's work self-evidently amenable to the study of international politics. If indeed there is an ontological gulf between the domestic and international arenas – a subject to which I return at greater length below – perhaps this explains why Foucault's work has been so heavily bowdlerised within the poststructuralist critique of realist IR.

None of the above is not to deny, however, that Foucault cannot be, or has not been, usefully employed in a second and very different way in international relations – namely, in analysing, and bringing to the fore, the diverse liberal discourses, practices and techniques of international politics. Here Foucault has been applied for much more empirical purposes, to investigate local sites, strategies and technologies of power pertaining to the international. The results have often been fascinating and have generally been much closer in their concerns to those of Foucault than have the meta-theoretical critiques of IR developed by Walker or Ashley. There remains in some of this work, as in so much poststructuralist IR, a tendency to concentrate to an inordinate degree on texts;[58] but elsewhere in this work we find wide-ranging analyses of intricate, historically shifting relations between knowledge, practices, institutions and subjectification. Thus James Der Derian, in his genealogy of modern diplomacy, depicts the practices of diplomacy, and modern diplomacy as an institution, as entangled with normative truths about how diplomacy should be practised, as well as with a progressivist narrative of the 'development' of modern diplomacy out of its pre-modern 'origins' – this progressivist narrative being one that Der Derian's counter-history seeks to critique and undercut.[59] Equally, James Keeley, in an analysis of regime theory, has sought to use Foucauldian insights to undermine the standard liberal account of international regimes, arguing that they are founded less on inter-subjective consensuses than on (inevitably transitory) resolutions of power/knowledge conflicts over the true, the normal and the legitimate.[60] And most insistently of all, a host of writers on the borderlands between IR and postcolonial studies have sought to employ Foucault to analyse the discourses and practices of development and development assistance, contending that Western development discourse and its

associated practices have constituted the 'Third World' as 'underdeveloped' – and thus in need of continual surveillance, discipline and an ever-changing menu of self-improvement programmes.[61]

These various studies – and this list is only indicative: there are many more such studies that one could mention – are all eminently Foucauldian. They all focus on distinct empirical sites and technologies of political and social control, and they all analyse truth and power not just in abstract epistemological terms, but also as they are implicated practically in the constitution and self-constitution of institutions and subjects. Moreover, they all involve critical interrogations of liberal progressivism – whether of the progressive character of transformations in diplomatic practice, of the benefits wrought by international consensuses and regimes, or of the teleological attempt to lift the Third World out of its 'immature' condition of 'underdevelopment'. Such issues and themes have proven immensely fertile territory for Foucauldian analyses of those forms of knowledge, practice, institution and subject that are the corollaries of modern liberal social orders. These issues and themes, to be sure, are in no way unimportant. To the contrary, in an era characterised by the rapid extension and deepening of liberal capitalist economic and social relations, by the continuing ascendancy of neo-liberal doctrines and procedures, and by the ever-increasing importance of highly intrusive international institutions, these liberal mechanics are an increasingly important face of world politics. But they are not the only face. Indeed, as suggested above and argued at greater length below, it is in large part because the contemporary world order has not been fully domesticated or liberalised that there are such limits to the wholesale internationalisation of Foucault within IR theory.

Foucault and global order

In his later work, Foucault increasingly came to characterise modern forms and practices of power under the rubrics of 'bio-power' and 'governmentality'. The former, for him, denoted a mode of power where the central focus is the administration, orchestration, production and reproduction of populations and life – where the promotion of life, rather than the power to kill, becomes the central object and purpose of power.[62] As Mitchell Dean puts it with characteristic clarity:

> Biopower is concerned with matters of life and death, with birth and propagation, with health and illness, both physical and mental, and with the processes that sustain or retard the optimization of the life of a population. Biopolitics must then also concern the social, cultural, environmental, economic and geographic conditions under which humans live, procreate, become ill, maintain health or become healthy, and die. From this perspective, bio-politics is concerned with the family, with housing, living and working conditions, with what we call 'lifestyle', with public health issues, patterns of migration, levels of economic growth and standards of living. It is concerned with the bio-sphere in which humans dwell.[63]

'Governmentality', not dissimilarly, refers to the historical emergence of techniques and tactics of 'government at a distance', and a 'governmentalisation of the State', where the state becomes oriented primarily to managing and regulating populations.[64] In Foucault's view, the practices of discipline and sovereignty that so dominated previous ages have in contemporary societies generally been replaced by – even if they continue to supplement[65] – the administrative tasks of governing from a distance the life, welfare and productive efficiency of populations.

These arguments of Foucault's were limited, of course, to the domestic arenas of modern 'governmentalised' societies. But in recent years a number of authors have sought to argue that contemporary international politics and world order are increasingly displaying the same features. Thus, for Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, the hitherto centralised and territorialised modern international order (which they label an 'imperialist' order) has been replaced by a decentralised and de-territorialised world order (which they call 'Empire'). And Empire, they write – taking their cue directly from Foucault – is a 'globalized biopolitical machine'.[66] Though they use slightly different terminology, Michael Dillon and Julian Reid largely agree, depicting 'global liberal governance as a form of global biopolitics'; as Dillon puts it, 'global liberal governance is a Foucauldian system of power/knowledge that depends upon the strategic orchestration of the self-regulating freedoms of populations'.[67] We are now living, as one recent edited collection suggests, in an era of 'global governmentality'.[68] Right across this range of work, Foucault's writings provide tools not simply for analysing discrete techniques and practices of liberal governance, but instead, and much more ambitiously, for developing a newly Foucauldian picture of contemporary world order. Within this work, Foucauldian emphases are effectively 'scaled up' from the domestic social arena, furnishing novel analyses of world order and international relations under the reign of global liberal bio-politics.

Powerful as these claims undoubtedly are, their translation and 'scaling up' of Foucault onto a global plane is problematic in at least two regards. First, the internationalisation and globalisation of Foucault's model of power is necessarily both premised on, and productive of, a paradigmatically liberal internationalist understanding of world order. Effectively, international political relations are subjected within this literature to a 'double reading': they are read first as liberal and, on the strength of this, these global liberal realities are analysed as the products of disciplinary and bio-political power. Without such an effective 'double reading', a characterisation of contemporary world politics as 'globalised bio-politics' would be impossible. The result is that Foucault ends up being used less to interrogate liberalism, than to support what are in essence reworked and reworded liberal accounts of international politics.

Take some of Hardt and Negri's claims in *Empire*. 'An idea of peace is at the basis of the development and expansion of Empire', they assert.[69] 'Peace, equilibrium, and the cessation of conflict are the values towards which everything is directed.'[70] International military deployments now 'take the form of police actions', the distinction between domestic and international policing having been erased; the 'United States

is now the peace police'.[71] This even applies to major military and geo-strategic operations like the 1990–1 Gulf War:

> The war was an operation . . . of very little interest from the point of view of the objectives, the regional interests, and the political ideologies involved . . . Iraq was accused of having broken international law, and it thus had to be judged and punished. The importance of the Gulf War derives rather from the fact that it presented the US as the only power able to manage international justice, *not as a function of its own national motives, but in the name of global right* . . . The US world police acts not in imperialist interest, but in imperial interest. In this sense the Gulf War did indeed, as George Bush claimed, announce the birth of a new world order.[72]

Or as Hardt and Negri put it in their preface, the '*United States does not, and indeed no nation-state can today, form the center of an imperialist project*'.[73] The US, like every other state in the world today, is subject to and constituted by the global operations of bio-politics.

Now these assertions from Hardt and Negri about international peace and the Gulf War are for the most part synonymous with straightforwardly liberal internationalist ones. Consider how differently realist (or indeed most Marxist) analysts would tend to characterise the 1990–1 intervention: as motivated by a desire to secure vital oil reserves for the world market; as prompted by an interest in maintaining a balance of power in the Middle East; as enabling the US state to consolidate its permanent military presence in the Gulf; or as allowing it to demonstrate its new military technologies, prowess and sole-superpower status (whilst getting others to pay for the whole exercise). In offering an account of the contemporary world order and the place of the US within it, Hardt and Negri inevitably enter an orthodox IR terrain that has long been dominated by two rival perspectives – one, liberal internationalist, which lays stress on the (actual or hoped-for) international diffusion of power, and on the significance of law, values and rights; the other, a realist tradition, which instead perceives enduring concentrations of power in the hands of states, and the primacy of state power and interests over law, value and right. Not only do Hardt and Negri enter into this terrain, but in their emphasis on 'values', 'law' and the waning of inter-state 'imperialism', they take clear sides within it. However misleading the stylised distinction between liberal and realist 'traditions' can sometimes be (I return to this issue below), the affinities between Hardt and Negri's and liberal internationalists' models of world order and international politics are striking.[74]

Nor does this apply to Hardt and Negri alone. Dillon and Reid are undoubtedly more cautious in their liberalism, insisting that global liberal governance has a distinctly 'martial face', but they too 'do not dispute the importance of the powerful desire among liberal states and societies to establish global norms of intervention . . . on the grounds of humanitarian liberal values'.[75] What is more, Dillon is clearly of the view that, under global liberal governance, the search for profit and security is

subordinate to the operations of bio-power: 'global liberal governance', he says, 'is a Foucauldian system of power/knowledge that . . . operate[s] through the strategic manipulation of different generative principles of formation: profit, scarcity, security and so on'.[76] Just as bio-power is the overarching mode of power within this world order, so the primary 'object of power' within this order is the ordering of life and the welfare of populations.[77] Implicitly, but never directly stated, the central feature and determinant of the current world order is not the maximisation of state power and security, or US primacy (as realists would tend to emphasise), or even class conflict and the accumulation of capital (as would Marxists), but instead the general welfare. Dillon and Reid, like Hardt and Negri, are of course far from liberal in many of their assumptions about politics and society. But in relation to international politics, where the most abiding opposition is between broadly liberal and realist perspectives, the globalisation of a Foucauldian model of power ends up inspiring a quintessentially liberal, rather than realist, reading of international politics.

This is not the place to launch into a lengthy critique of the liberal assumptions underlying Hardt and Negri's, or Dillon and Reid's, models of bio-political world order. Suffice to say here that the emphasis they place on 'values', 'norms', 'law', 'knowledge', the promotion of 'life' and the diffusion of 'imperialist' power as the constitutive features and causal drivers of world order, strike me as misleading in the extreme. Differential state objectives, powers and rivalries – not autonomous from society, but grounded in social, including class, structures and struggles – continue to be the central axis of modern international politics. As Hardt and Negri themselves came to recognise in the wake of 9/11 and the subsequent US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, inter-state 'imperialist' relations have not died away.[78]

A second and related problem with using Foucault to furnish accounts of world order is that the 'scaling up' of Foucault necessarily generates accounts which over-state its unity, evenness and indivisibility. Thus, for Hardt and Negri, the emerging logic of Empire 'effectively encompasses the spatial totality' of the world, 'No territorial boundaries limit its reign.'[79] It is a 'seamless web', a 'widely inclusive net' of bio-political production, whose 'connective fabric' constitutes subjects across the planet.[80] And while there are of course 'police actions' against the underdeveloped, or against those engaged in resistance, these actions are within the 'interstices' of Empire rather than against a (no-longer existent) outside. What is significant here is that, for all the delicate spatial metaphors, no sense is given of just how variable across the world bio-political administrative systems really are (or how much the practices of government and the constitution of subjects differ between, say, New York and New Guinea), or, even more important, of why these vast differences exist. Equally, within Dillon and Reid's work we find wide-ranging accounts of the changing practices of global bio-politics, as it evolves in the face of scientific and organisational developments (the growing importance of networked forms of organisation, the emergence of digital and molecular technologies, and so on), but only a marginal acknowledgement of the uneven distribution of these evolving changes, and no analysis at all of why they happen to be so unevenly distributed.

None of this would be problematic if the aim was merely to identify the tactics and techniques of global liberal governance; but as a theorisation of the postmodern world order, or of the logic of power under a regime of global liberal governance, it is far from satisfactory. Foucauldian tools can be used to theorise the 'how of power', as Foucault put it,[81] but they cannot help us in understanding the 'when', the 'where' or (most significantly) the 'why' of power. The notion of 'governmentality', for example, while it can shed light on how populations are administered and subjects are constituted in, say, modern Turkey, or can point us towards the novel mechanisms by which the New Partnership for African Development is attempting to self-discipline African states into 'good governance', cannot itself be used to explain why the Turkish state is more governmentalised than the Syrian one, why there is so much 'bad governance' in Africa specifically, or indeed what the purposes and objectives of governmentality are. Equally, while Foucauldian perspectives can be used to illuminate how new techniques of surveillance and organisation are transforming the practices of liberal warfare, they cannot tell us why the US state re-invaded Iraq in 2003, or why the British state participated in that invasion but the French state did not. Yet these are the sorts of phenomena, amongst others, that a theorisation of global power relations would need to provide resources to explain. Foucault, standing alone, cannot be convincingly internationalised to provide a theoretical account of the contemporary world order.

The specificity of the international

One important counter to the various arguments above would be to stress that the very dichotomies invoked here – between rival liberal and realist 'traditions', and between spatially distinct domestic and international 'spheres' – are themselves deeply problematic, the idealised narrative building blocks of the conservative orthodoxy of IR. Would not a 'good Foucauldian', one might well ask, insist quite properly on problematising and deconstructing the very terms of this historically specific yet reified and naturalised discourse? And if indeed the liberal–realist and inside–outside dyads are ideological constructions, then do the proclaimed difficulties inherent in 'internationalising' a theorist of 'liberal' social order not dissolve into thin air? Is the argument above not vitiated, in sum, by its failure to interrogate these conceptual distinctions as uniquely modern social constructions?

These are serious objections for, to be sure, the orthodox depiction of the international as a realm of 'recurrence and repetition' diverging absolutely from the domestic arena of sovereignty, law and progress is tenuous in the extreme. It is idealised, because it imagines the domestic–international divide as a timeless universal, rather than as a distinctly modern 'truth'.[82] It is reductionist, because it characterises the international as an asocial realm defined by its one property of anarchy, ignoring and obscuring the densely structured webs of social relations that span international borders (relations of knowledge, discourse and emulation, of tourism and migration, of political economic power, hegemony and imperialism, etc.).[83]

And it is ideological because, through its gaps and silences, it serves certain interests and has profoundly conservative effects. Thus, on the one hand, the realist narrative of unchanging inter-state enmity stretching back to the days of Thucydides not only idealises the past, it also maps out the future as an incontestable and endless return of geopolitical rivalries and conflicts.[84] And, on the other, the orthodox depiction of international politics as ordered around sovereign nation-states systemically ignores and obscures those structured relations of imperialism through which the global North continues to dominate the global South.[85] In all of these respects, the drawing of absolute conceptual oppositions between liberalism and realism, and between inside and outside, is to partake in 'illusions of the epoch'.[86]

However, the critique or deconstruction of ideological categories need not rule out all analysis of structural socio-historical specificities – and it is in this sense that there exists an ontological specificity and irreducibility to the international. This is so in at least four regards. First, precisely by virtue of the power effects of the discourses of 'nation-state', 'sovereignty', 'anarchy' and so on that accompanied the rise of capitalist modernity, a distinctive arena of 'international politics' does exist, both formally and to some extent in actuality.[87] Second, the actualisation and consolidation of the distinction between 'inside' and 'outside' has been aided and abetted by the (admittedly uneven) extension of modern state power vis-à-vis the internal population and territory – by the expansion, that is, of governmental, surveillance, consent-creating and coercive machineries – this in turn having the effect of reaffirming the 'between-ness' of the international. Third, while the international arena is, as noted above, a densely structured social space inhabited by all manner of discursive, bodily and material relations, it is nonetheless one in which these relations are in large part between powerful political and economic structures – whether states, international institutions, or large corporate actors – and where power thus tends to be more concentrated and centralised than within the domestic social arena. Finally, and as a function of these concentrations of power, the modern international arena is one in which liberal techniques and liberal reason of the sort that Foucault explores are much less developed, and face far stiffer structural challenges, than they do internally within modern liberal societies. While international politics is not a timeless realm of 'recurrence and repetition', neither is the modern international arena coextensive with, or indistinguishable from, the domestic realm of modern states and societies. And it is for this reason that the translation and scaling up of Foucault from the domestic liberal arena, onto a global plane where realist dynamics remain strong, is so problematic.

Conclusions: Foucault and Marx

There are, I would suggest, three main problems with how Foucault has thus far been employed within IR. There is, as just discussed, the problem of *translation*, of how to translate Foucault, primarily a historian/theorist of the domestic realm of liberal capitalist societies, into the international or global arena, into a realm which, while

no doubt a social and historical construct, has certain quite specific, enduring and irreducible qualities. Foucault himself largely confined his analyses to the domestic arenas of European societies, where the techniques of discipline and practices of government were disseminated by diverse institutions across the entirety of the social body. In the international arena, by contrast, such techniques and practices are much more unevenly distributed; and what is more, the bio-political aim of maximising the welfare of populations is to a much greater degree subordinated to economic and strategic interests. The international is not, of course, an asocial realm where abstract balances and purely political forces hold sway; it is a dense social space that is filled and constituted by all manner of cultural, political and economic flows. However, it is also a space where power tends to be much more concentrated and centralised than it is within the domestic social arena. Unless these specificities are acknowledged and allowed for, it is very difficult to see how Foucault can be coherently 'scaled up' into the international arena.

A second and quite different problem in IR's appropriation and use of Foucault is that of *representation*, of accounts which, however insightful and productive they may be, often owe much less to Foucault than they claim, or than at first appears. Within poststructuralist critiques of realist IR, in particular, Foucault has consistently been cited as a leading influence – but equally consistently has found many of his major emphases and concerns ignored. Whether used to critique realism or to interrogate liberal world order, poststructuralist IR's use of Foucault has been equally problematic.

Finally, and most importantly, is a problem of *over-consistency*: namely that within IR Foucault has almost always been used within a poststructuralist framework while being generally ignored or critiqued by those of other theoretical persuasions, this being despite there being huge tensions, and even contradictions, between Foucauldian and other poststructuralist (e.g. Derridean) perspectives. In emphasising this, it is not my intention to argue for some 'pure' reading or application of Foucault, freed perhaps from Derridean metaphysics. Rather my aim is to simply ask why it is, if the theoretical disjuncture between Foucault and Derrida is as wide as I believe it to be, that in international relations Foucault is so often employed alongside Derrida and so infrequently alongside, say, Marx.

None of the above is to claim that Foucault cannot be coherently or fruitfully applied to the international arena, but merely to suggest that there are clear limits to doing so. Foucault, as emphasised above, directed his critiques primarily against liberalism, focusing above all on the 'how' rather than the 'why' of modern power, and he thus provided only limited tools for analysing core features of international politics: its inter-societal 'between-ness', its concentrations of power, the centrality of state interests and rivalries, and its marked unevenness. And it follows from this that if Foucault's insights about the practices of liberal and modern power are to be convincingly applied to the international arena, then these need to be situated within a theoretical framework that allows equally for analysis of the 'why' of power – for analyses of economic and political concentrations of power, and of economic and

political interests, strategies and decisions, as well as of the means by which subjects are disciplined, governed and constituted.

In his work on diplomacy Der Derian seems to recognise this, exploring the practices of diplomacy and challenging the realist state-centrism of traditional accounts of it 'without denying the centrality of power politics in international relations'; here, Foucault is effectively used alongside realism.[88] But there are good reasons why we should look to the Marxist tradition, rather than to realism, for an account of the 'why' of power that is potentially consonant with Foucault. There are of course some keen points of disagreement between Foucault and the Marxist tradition, especially on philosophical matters of truth, human nature, justice and universalism, where for the most part Foucault's Nietzschean hostility to the Enlightenment project of progress through reason places him sharply at odds with the Marxist commitment to universal emancipation.[89] But putting these philosophical differences to one side – and without wanting to deny or downplay their significance – there are also powerful parallels and convergences between Foucauldian and Marxist thought.

First of all, both the Marxist tradition and Foucault share a sensitivity to historical disjunctures and transformations, and a corollary hostility to ahistorical and positivist modes of analysis, which set them apart from orthodox IR and its erroneous universalisation of modern politics. Second, both Marx and Foucault were interrogators of bourgeois capitalist society, and of liberal doctrines of the sovereignty and freedom of the individual, with Marx analysing how juridical equality before the law was undercut by the brute realities of economic polarisation, and Foucault concentrating on the mechanisms of social control and self-monitoring on which the formal freedom of liberal individuals was actually premised. Third, both Marx and Foucault outlined (equally underdeveloped) non-statist models of the state: for Marx the material productive life of society and social classes was the real basis of the state and state power, while for Foucault the state was 'superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth'.[90] Moreover Foucault, to a degree often overlooked in poststructuralist accounts of his work, regularly noted the links between the modern practices of power, and capitalist economic and social relations: 'disciplinary power', as he said for example, 'has been a fundamental instrument in the constitution of industrial capitalism and of the type of society that is its accompaniment'.[91] As the exchange with which this article began surely intimates, the affinities between Foucault and Marx are much deeper than is usually allowed for, or than Foucault himself was generally prepared to admit.

In addition to the above parallels, other differences between Foucault and the Marxist tradition can be approached as complementary rather than antagonistic. For one, while Foucault was an analyst of the 'how' of power, Marxist theory focuses above all on the central 'why' of power within capitalist systems: the ceaseless accumulation of capital, and attendant conflicts amongst capitalists, classes and states. Second, whereas Foucault, despite his recognition of the importance of the state, had a preference for 'ascending' analyses of the micro-physics of power and thus failed to take seriously enough the existence of the state as a social structure,

the Marxist tradition provides tools for analysing how power also 'descends' from the state in the form of interests, strategies and decisions.[92] Viewed through the lens of such differences, Foucauldian and Marxist emphases can be interpreted not just as complementary, but also mutually enriching. Approached thus, as Richard Marsden argues, there are productive convergences between a Marxist tradition which helps us in analysing competitive struggles for profit, and Foucault's own work which examined how labour is, in practice, organised and disciplined within the workplace.[93] Similarly, though in a very different setting, while the Marxist tradition can help us analyse the 'why' of Israeli water policy (in relation to the political economy of colonisation, class conflict, state formation and development within Israeli society), Foucauldian tools provide useful resources for investigating 'how' this policy is put into practice and made possible through diverse arrays of pipelines, water meters, bodies and truths.[94] While they are no doubt antithetical in certain respects, in others Marxist and Foucauldian thought are readily congruent.

Outside of IR, such parallels and convergences between Foucault and the Marxist tradition have been widely explored by, amongst others, Nicos Poulantzas,[95] Bob Jessop,[96] Barry Smart,[97] Tony Woodiwiss,[98] Richard Marsden,[99] Jonathan Joseph[100] and Nancy Fraser.[101] In a recent article Fraser goes so far as to argue in Marxist vein that 'Michel Foucault was the great theorist of the fordist mode of social regulation.'[102] This is, I think, too narrow a reading,[103] but that is slightly besides the point; more pertinent in the present context is the fact that such explorations of the links between Foucauldian and Marxist thought have been relatively commonplace outside IR, but barely considered within it. Only within international political economy – that is, at the margins of IR as usually defined – has there been work which systematically employs Foucault within a Marxist framework.[104] This is especially unfortunate given that the limitations of Foucauldian thought and tools are so apparent when applied to the international arena. As it is, within IR, Foucault is still usually placed within a poststructuralist pigeonhole, and employed alongside Derrida rather than alongside Marx. Without wishing to place Foucault simply into an alternative and no less restrictive theoretical category, it would in my view be intellectually productive and progressive if this situation were to change.

Notes

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2 Michel Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977–1984*, ed. Lawrence Kritzman (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 45–6.

3 Randall Germain and Michael Kenny, 'Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians', *Review of International Studies*, 24, 1998, pp. 3–21.

4 Ronen Palan, 'A World of their Making: An Evaluation of the Constructivist Critique in International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, 26(4), 2000, pp. 575–98.

5 Beatte Jahn, 'One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Critical Theory as the Latest Edition of Liberal Idealism', *Millennium*, 27(3), 1998, pp. 613–41.

6   Overviews stressing the influence of Foucault include Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 'Alternative Approaches to International Theory', in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 271–93; Richard Devetak, 'Postmodernism', in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds), *Theories of International Relations*, 2nd edn (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 181–208; James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1989); Jenny Edkins, *Post-structuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Kimberley Hutchings, *International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era* (London: Sage, 1999); and Richard Ashley, 'The Achievements of Post-structuralism', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 240–53.

7   See footnotes 94–101 below.

8   R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 23.

9   Richard Ashley, 'The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Politics', *Alternatives*, 12(4), 1987, pp. 403–34; Richard Ashley, 'Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique', *Millennium*, 17(2), 1990, pp. 227–62; Richard Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, 'Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly*, 34(3), 1990, pp. 376–416; Ashley, 'The Achievements of Post-structuralism'.

10   Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 191, 224, 104, 207.

11   Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 162.

12   See, for example, David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 19; and Jenny Edkins, *Whose Hunger? Concepts of Hunger, Practices of Aid* (Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota University Press, 2000), p. xix.

13   Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (London: Tavistock, 1967).

14   Michel Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception* (London: Tavistock, 1973).

15   Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).

16   Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1: *An Introduction* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978); vol. II: *The Use of Pleasure* (Harmondsworth: Viking, 1986); vol. III: *The Care of the Self* (Harmondsworth: Viking, 1988).

17   Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality', *I & C*, 6, 1979, pp. 5–21.

18   Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (Brighton: Harvester, 1980).

19   Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*.

20   Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London: Tavistock, 1974).

21   Michel Foucault, *This is Not a Pipe* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983).

22   Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 195–228.

23   Jacques Derrida, 'Sending: On Representation', *Social Research*, 49, 1982, p. 304; Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, p. 106.

24   Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 158.

25   Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 114.

26   Michel Foucault, *Essential Works*, vol. 2: *Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology*, ed. James Faubion (London: Penguin, 1998), p. 416.

27   Foucault, *Essential Works*, p. 416.

28   James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics* (Lexington, MA: Lexington, 1989).

29   Michel Foucault, 'Space, Knowledge and Power', in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), p. 252.

30   Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 102.

31   Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, pt. 5; and Foucault, 'Governmentality'.

32 Walker, *Inside/Outside*, p. 25.
33 Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 121.
34 As Walker tacitly recognises: *Inside/Outside*, p. 25.
35 Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Cynthia Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
36 Bartelson, *Genealogy*, p. 18.
37 Bartelson, *Genealogy*, p. 8.
38 Bartelson, *Genealogy*, p. 12.
39 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 130; Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty*, p. 33.
40 Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty*, p. 123.
41 For an extended critique see Jan Selby, 'Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East: An International Theoretical Analysis of the Palestinian Water Crisis' (PhD thesis, Lancaster University, 2000), chapter 1.
42 Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty*, p. 29.
43 Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty*, p. 80.
44 Ashley and Walker, 'Reading Dissidence', p. 381.
45 Kimberley Hutchings, 'Foucault and International Relations Theory', in Moya Lloyd and Andrew Thacker (eds), *The Impact of Michel Foucault in the Social Sciences and Humanities* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 102.
46 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.
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48 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 26, 139.
49 Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Andrew Barry, Thomas Osbourne and Nicolas Rose (eds), *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government* (London: UCL Press, 1996).
50 Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 4.
51 Michel Foucault, 'Afterword: The Subject and Power', in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), pp. 220–1.
52 Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, p. 83.
53 Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation*; Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*.
54 Foucault, *History of Sexuality*, vols. II and III.
55 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 31.
56 Foucault, *History of Sexuality*; Michel Foucault, 'Society Must Be Defended', in *Essential Works, vol. 1: Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1997), pp. 59–65. Foucault did of course use the language of 'war' frequently in his analyses, reflecting his Nietzschean understanding of conflict and power struggles as lying at the heart of the social process. But this is quite distinct from a focus on war understood as physical coercion in its classic military, inter-state (or even civil) sense, on which Foucault said very little.
57 See, classically, Martin Wight, 'Why Is There No International Theory?' in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds), *Diplomatic Investigations* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 17–34.
58 David Campbell's work provides a good example of this, since, while he claims to be inspired by Foucault above all (*Writing Security*, p. viii), his analyses, illuminating as they often are, concentrate exclusively on 'narratives' and the 'writing' of foreign policy. As Mark Laffey writes in critique, Campbell gives undue privilege to 'the social logic of signification', and neglects to analyse the ways in which signifying practices become materialised and sedimented within 'a landscape of institutions, apparatuses, and social relations': Mark Laffey, 'Locating Identity: Performativity, Foreign Policy and State Action', *Review of International Studies*, 26, 2000, pp. 444, 441.
59 James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Blackwell: 1987).
60 James Keeley, 'Toward a Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes', *International Organization*, 44, 1990, pp. 83–105.
61 See, for instance, Arturo Escobar, 'Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of his Work to the Third World', *Alternatives*, 10(3), 1984, pp. 377–400; Arturo Escobar,

Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Marc DuBois, 'The Governance of the Third World: A Foucauldian Perspective on Power Relations in Development', *Alternatives*, 16, 1991, pp. 1–30; Morgan Brigg, 'Post-development, Foucault and the Colonisation Metaphor', *Third World Quarterly*, 23(3), 2002, pp. 421–36; James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', Depoliticisation, and Bureaucratic State Power in Lesotho* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Edkins, *Whose Hunger?*

62   Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, pt. 5.
63   Mitchell Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* (London: Sage, 1999), p. 99.
64   Foucault, 'Governmentality', p. 20.
65   Foucault, 'Governmentality', p. 19.
66   Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 40; see also pp. 22–3.
67   Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, 'Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, Security and War', *Millennium*, 30(1), 2001, pp. 41–65; Michael Dillon, 'Global Liberal Governance: Networks, Resistance and War', in Feargal Cochrane, Rosaleen Duffy and Jan Selby (eds), *Global Governance, Conflict and Resistance* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), pp. 25–6. See also Michael Dillon, 'Sovereignty and Governmentality: From the Problematics of the "New World Order" to the Ethical Problematic of World Order', *Alternatives*, 20(3), 1995, pp. 323–68; Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, 'Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency', *Alternatives*, 25(1), 2000, pp. 117–43; Michael Dillon, 'Culture, Governance and Global Biopolitics', in F. Debrix and C. Weber (eds), *Rituals of Mediation* (Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota University Press, 2003).
68   Wendy Larner and William Walters (eds), *Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces* (London: Routledge, 2004).
69   Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 167.
70   Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 14.
71   Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, pp. 39, 181.
72   Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. 180.
73   Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, pp. xiii–xiv.
74   A similar point is made by Alex Callinicos, 'Marxism and Global Governance', in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds), *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), pp. 249–66.
75   Dillon and Reid, 'Global Liberal Governance', pp. 44–5.
76   Dillon, 'Networks, Resistance and War', pp. 25–6.
77   Dillon, 'Networks', p. 26.
78   Michael Hardt, 'Folly of our Masters of the Universe', *The Guardian*, 18 December 2002.
79   Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, p. xiv.
80   Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, pp. 20, 31.
81   Michel Foucault, 'Afterword: The Subject and Power', in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1982), pp. 216–17.
82   For Marxist critiques of this idealisation, see especially Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations* (London: Verso, 1994); and Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1948: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations* (London: Verso, 2003).
83   Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, 'Retrieving the Imperial: *Empire* and International Relations', *Millennium*, 31(1), 2002, pp. 109–27.
84   Robert Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium*, 10(2), 1981, pp. 126–55.
85   Julian Saurin, 'International Relations as the Imperial Illusion; or, The Need to Decolonise IR', in Branwen Gruffyd Jones, *Decolonizing International Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), pp. 23–42.
86   Karl Marx, *The German Ideology* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968), p. 64; Saurin, 'International Relations as the Imperial Illusion', p. 30.
87   Walker, *Inside/Outside*; Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society*.
88   Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, p. 83.

89 I say Foucault is 'for the most part' Nietzschean in emphasis because his work can also be inter-
    preted as a radicalisation of the Kantian Enlightenment tradition. Foucault himself interprets
    his work this way in 'What is Enlightenment?' in *The Foucault Reader*. Moreover, his claim
    that 'if I had been familiar with the Frankfurt School . . . I would not have said a number of the
    stupid things that I did say' also points to the convergences between Foucault and the radical
    Enlightenment, and specifically Marxist traditions: Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, p. 26.
    I explore Foucault's Nietzscheanism in relation to the work of Edward Said in Jan Selby, 'Edward
    Said: Justice, Truth and Nationalism', *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies*,
    8(1), 2006, pp. 40–55.
90 Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 122.
91 Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 105.
92 Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, p. 99.
93 Richard Marsden, *The Nature of Capital: Marx after Foucault* (London: Routledge, 1999).
94 Jan Selby, *Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East: The Other Israeli–Palestinian Conflict*
    (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003).
95 Nicos Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism* (London: New Left, 1978).
96 Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990).
97 Barry Smart, *Foucault, Marxism and Critique* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983).
98 Tony Woodiwiss, *Social Theory after Postmodernism: Rethinking Production, Law and Class*
    (London: Pluto, 1990); Tony Woodiwiss, *The Visual in Social Theory* (London: Athlone, 2001).
99 Marsden, *The Nature of Capital*.
100 Jonathan Joseph, 'Foucault and Reality', *Capital and Class*, 82, 2004, pp. 143–60.
101 Nancy Fraser, 'Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions', *Praxis
    International*, 1(3), 1981, pp. 272–87.
102 Nancy Fraser, 'From Discipline to Flexibilization? Rereading Foucault in the Shadow of
    Globalization', *Constellations*, 10(2), 2003, p. 166.
103 As Thomas Lenke argues in an excellent reply to Fraser: 'Comment on Nancy Fraser: Rereading
    Foucault in the Shadow of Globalization', *Constellations*, 10(2), June 2003, pp. 172–9.
104 See, for instance, Stephen Gill, 'Globalisation, Market Civilisation, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism',
    Millennium, 24(3), 1995, pp. 399–423; Stephen Gill, 'The Global Panopticon? The Neoliberal
    State, Economic Life, and Democratic Surveillance', *Alternatives*, 20(1), 1995, pp. 1–49.