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Contemporary Western Historians on Stalin’s Russia in the 1930s
(A Critique of the “Revisionist” Approach)

Western scholars have traditionally shown great interest in the Stalinist period of Russian history. At a time when the number of works falsifying (consciously or unconsciously) our national history was increasing every year in the Soviet Union, Western historians produced much useful work as they attempted to thread their way through the intricacies of Soviet reality. This interest was prompted not only by the Soviet Union’s status as the West’s main adversary in the “cold war” but also by the presence in the USSR of a classic example of “actual socialism”—something that reached its logical culmination during the Stalinist period.

Research on totalitarianism began in the West in the 1940s and the early 1950s, and for many years provided the methodological base for studying Soviet history. Friedrich Hayek’s classic study *The Road to Serfdom* came out in 1944, and Hannah Arendt’s *The Origins of Totalitarianism* was published in 1951. This line of research was continued in studies by Karl Wittfogel, Leonard Schapiro, C.J. Friedrich, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and others.¹

The real boom in such foreign research followed the [1956] publication of N.S. Khrushchev’s Secret Speech to the Twentieth Party Congress in the


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Western Sovietologists now had at their disposal not only Khrushchev’s speech but also the by-then-numerous memoirs of Soviet citizens who had emigrated to the West. Because they did not have access to Soviet [state and party] archives, historians made extensive use of the documents of the Smolensk Archive, which had been seized by Nazi forces [during World War II]. As a result, a considerable literature on Soviet Russia appeared in the 1950s and the 1960s, including works by such authoritative Western Sovietologists as Isaac Deutscher, Robert Daniels, E.H. Carr, Robert Conquest, Moshe Lewin, Richard Pipes, Robert Tucker, Merle Fainsod, Adam Ulam, and Leonard Schapiro. Their works explored the concept of totalitarianism, and for this reason their main focus was on the politics of state power.2

The authors who adopted this approach to the study of Soviet reality took as their starting point, more or less, the interpretation of totalitarianism developed by C.J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski that is now generally familiar not only to Western specialists but also to Russian political scientists. Specifically, [totalitarianism is:] (1) an official ideology that completely rejects the past and endeavors to unite all citizens in the building of a new world; (2) a single mass party led by one man (a dictator), organized according to the oligarchic principle and closely integrated with the state bureaucracy; (3) the use of terror to control not only “enemies” of the regime but also anyone singled out by the party leadership; (4) party control of the mass media; (5) similar control of the armed forces; and (6) the centralized bureaucratic management of the economy.3

Also affecting Western Sovietology at this time was the liberalization of the communist regime under Khrushchev, something that gave rise to efforts to revise this understanding of totalitarianism. This revisionism affected all fields, including history, and its first impact was to portray the events of October 1917 not as a coup d’état but as a genuine proletarian revolution. The Bolshevik Party was viewed not as a monolith governed from above but as an open, “democratic” organization driven by radical impulses “from below.” Another natural outgrowth of this, according to the well-known American historian Martin Malia, was a transformation of the overall view of the Soviet system. According to these neo-Mensheviks, as Malia has called the revisionists:

Bolshevism, for all its excesses, represented a genuine workers’ movement, and therefore the Soviet state was truly a socialist state, even though its
quality was ultimately distorted by Stalin’s atrocities. As a result, the Soviet system had the ability to reform itself and thus to create what the Czechs and the Slovaks in 1968 called “socialism with a human face.” Given this view, which was not usually declared openly but was always implied, we can say that for the most part Western history on Soviet Russia, despite all its empirical metatheses, actually supported the idea that communism would eventually evolve into a certain type of social democracy.4

If we are to get a clearer sense of what was going on in Western Sovietology in the 1960s and the 1970s, we must supplement Malia’s assessment with several additional characterizations found in the writings of Western historians. To quote Peter Kenez, this new generation of historians reached its intellectual maturity during the civil rights struggle and the movement against the Vietnam War. These people, who were hostile toward their own society, believed that it was blatant hypocrisy to talk about the “Free World,” democracy, and equal opportunity in the West. A dominant feature of the younger generation of Western historians was their rejection of the so-called totalitarian model. The understanding of totalitarianism shared chiefly by the older generation of historians, who were formed in the 1940s and 1950s, emphasized the similarity between fascism and communism, which they contrasted to the liberal, pluralistic Western democracy. The younger historians considered this motif self-serving and reacted to it like a bull to a red flag. Being disillusioned with American democracy, they felt compelled to take a more benign view of a society that seemed at the time to be a great “friend.” Because official America was hostile toward the Soviet Union, they took this as evidence that the Soviet Union could not be that bad. This attitude prompted a more benign assessment of the Revolution.

Almost all works on Soviet history were being written by people who, one by one, to their own satisfaction, were demolishing the “totalitarian model.” Never before had a single view been “demolished” so eagerly and so often. . . . Younger historians were reproached for the extreme ferocity with which they criticized the works of their older colleagues. Rarely did they acknowledge that the older generation had never spoken with one voice. In addition, some of the best works, which are still timely today—for example, those by E.H. Carr or Isaac Deutscher—moved beyond the framework of the totalitarian model.5

According to Michal Reiman, the emergence of this new generation of historians was “to a certain extent a reaction to the fact that by the
1950s and the 1960s the potential for progress in the study of Soviet political history and the history of social thought based on the materials that were accessible was exhausted. Historians ran into a barrier raised by the secrecy surrounding the main sources on Soviet history and by the censorship that prevailed in the USSR. It was necessary to discover new topics and to pose questions in a new way, based on the available documents, and to work out a methodology that would make it possible to extract information from disciplines related to history.\(^\text{16}\) Another point of no lesser importance was the spread of the ideas of the French *Annales* school and the overall priority being given to social history.

Until now, only a few Russian historians have paid any attention to the research of the revisionists. For example, there are Iu.I. Igritskii’s articles on the historians of totalitarianism and those of Western historians—William Rosenberg, Peter Kenez, Michal Reiman, Martin Malia, and Edward Acton—that have been published in Russian in recent years.\(^\text{7}\) Attention to particular periods of Soviet history has also been uneven. Because the revisionists’ views of the events of 1917 were the first to be reflected in specialized studies, it is only natural that they were also the first to evoke a reaction from their Russian colleagues.\(^\text{8}\) So far, only O.V. Khlevniuk has reviewed the work of the revisionists on the Stalinist period in print.\(^\text{9}\)

The present article critiques the Western historians’ revisionist approach to the study of Stalinist Russia in the 1930s, the period when the Stalinist “socialist” system was formed. Certain patterns can be discerned in the development of these revisionist views on the different periods of Soviet history. Thus, the reassessment of the revolutionary events of 1917 in Russia began with Leopold Haimson’s 1964 article,\(^\text{10}\) and by the middle of the 1980s this reevaluation had basically been completed. After that, as Acton has pointed out, there were some signs of a return to the traditional approach, which became even more apparent after the collapse of the USSR, the political domination of the right in the West, and postmodernist trends in the historical field.\(^\text{11}\)

Active attempts to revise the totalitarian approach began later among Western historians specializing in Stalinism. Initially, there was a shift of research priorities from political history to social history, even though the actions of the ruling authorities remained the chief focus of attention. Historians who began their careers in the late 1960s and the early 1970s (Robert Tucker, Stephen Cohen, Moshe Lewin, and others) concentrated on the inability of the general concept of “totalitarianism” to
explain all the specific characteristics of Soviet history.12 In 1975 Robert Tucker organized a conference in Bellagio, [Italy,] that was explicitly devoted to “Stalinism” rather than “totalitarianism.”13 Discussions at this conference addressed not only topics directly connected with Stalinism but also the relationship between Stalinism and the Leninist and prerevolutionary periods of Russian history. The historians also tried to break down the artificial barrier between Russian and Soviet history. They were convinced that Russian history did not end in October 1917 but rather took on a new quality. In addition, they studied alternatives to Stalinism—for example, the Bukharin alternative. The collection of conference papers edited by Robert Tucker included a noteworthy article by Stephen Cohen, “Bolshevism and Stalinism,” which was published in the USSR twelve years later.14

Cohen’s attempts to differentiate Lenin from Stalin, as well as his obvious sympathy for Nikolai Bukharin (whom Cohen saw as an alternative to Stalinism) caused some Western historians to accuse him of sympathizing with the [Old] Bolsheviks and to regard historians who shared his views as a Western continuation of the Soviet de-Stalinization campaign of the 1960s.15 In contemporary terms, these historians were, on the whole, attempting to use a “cultural studies” approach in their works, so it was quite natural that they should focus not only on political rule but also on social history. As time went on, the first generation of Western revisionists were increasingly called “traditionalists.”

One of the first indications that there was a difference of opinion between these historians and the second generation of revisionists was a debate that took place in Slavic Review in 1983. It began in response to an article by J. [Arch] Getty, “Party and Purge in Smolensk: 1933–37,” written on the basis of materials from the Smolensk Archive. Getty’s article already revealed a distinguishing feature of this future cohort of revisionists—the priority that they gave to archival documents—something that led these historians to attribute absolute worth to the official documents of the Stalinist period and [in turn] ultimately led them to draw conclusions on the “spirit and letter” of the documents. When Arch Getty reintroduced the Stalinist term Ezhovshchina [to refer to the purges that occurred under NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) chief N.I. Ezhov—Trans.] as a replacement for the term “Great Terror” previously used by scholars to characterize the purges of 1936–38, that in itself said a great deal. Niels E. Rosenfeldt and Robert Tucker, who took part in the debate, criticized Arch Getty’s main thesis that [archival]
documents, the Soviet press, and published sources, as well as detailed analysis of statements by the top Soviet leaders, could provide the “key” to understanding the complex structure of the Soviet system in the 1930s. They correctly pointed out that the main difficulty of working with Soviet documents was that of how to interpret them, insofar as official documents—even the most secret ones—did not reveal the motives behind particular decisions or the real meaning of events.¹⁶

In the second half of the 1980s, a second generation of revisionists came to the fore in the study of Stalinist Russia in the 1930s. It is perfectly natural that their endeavors were based on the accomplishments of their older colleagues, some of whom were the teachers of the younger revisionists. For example, David Shearer dedicated his book *Industry, State, and Society in Stalin’s Russia, 1926–1934* to his teacher Moshe Lewin. The intellectual inspiration for these historians was the well-known historian Sheila Fitzpatrick, who had by that time completed much productive work on social history, especially cultural history. Active work along these lines was also begun by Arch Getty, Gábor Rittersporn and younger colleagues such as Lynne Viola, Hiroaki Kuromiya, Roberta Manning, and Robert Thurston.¹⁷

In 1986[–87] *The Russian Review* published an extensive series of essays, essentially a debate of sorts, between advocates of the totalitarian and the revisionist approaches to the study of Soviet history. In fact, it was a debate between two generations of revisionists.

The debate opened with Sheila Fitzpatrick’s “New Perspectives on Stalinism,” a revised version of a paper she had given at the Third World Congress of Slavic Studies in Washington, [DC.,] in November 1985. Fitzpatrick presented her paper as a manifesto for a group of historians who, unlike Sovietologists of the older generation, had renounced the use of the totalitarian model in examining the history of Soviet society. Instead, they proclaimed the main focus of their attention to be social history.¹⁸ According to the revisionists, the totalitarian approach to Soviet history, and especially to the Stalinist period, had paid attention only to the Party and the state, treating society largely as a passive object of state power. Moreover, the society had been studied through categories that were not only Marxist but Stalinist–Marxist—the “working class,” the “peasantry,” and the “intelligentsia.” In Fitzpatrick’s opinion, such an approach badly underestimated the diversity and the complexity of the structure of Stalinist society, which was distinguished by an extraordinary level of social mobility.
In this way, the revisionists proposed to move away from examining Russian history in the 1930s as a “revolution from above” and began to focus on it as a “revolution from below.” Their preliminary explanation of the situation during this period can be summarized as follows: the regime had less control over society than it claimed; its actions were more improvisation than calculated plan; and its radical decisions often conflicted with the intentions of local leaders and had many unplanned social consequences. The extreme statement of this view, according to Fitzpatrick, was by Rittersporn, who believed that political decisions during that period came in response to pressure “from below” and that “the masses exerted pressure on Stalin.” In Rittersporn’s opinion, “the struggles of 1936–1938 were unleashed by popular discontent with the arbitrariness, corruption, and inefficiency of the ruling strata.”

As William Rosenberg, who has summarized the discussion in an article, correctly noted, none of Fitzpatrick’s opponents had any quarrel with the importance and necessity of studying social history, but each in his own way made the argument that politics determines the essence of history. Social history, if divorced from politics, will be at least as distorted (if more) than if politics were studied as if in a social vacuum. The Stalinist terror, as Stephen Cohen remarked, “must be a central feature of the social history of Stalinism not because it was more important than anything else, but because it was an essential part of almost everything else.” It is no accident that the title of Cohen’s contribution to the discussion was “Stalin’s Terror as Social History.” The same argument was made by Geoff Eley, who reproached Fitzpatrick for having a narrow rather than a holistic interpretation of the “social” and for ignoring how the regime interpolated itself into social relations and processes.

The discussion was conducted on an emotional level not characteristic of Western historians, with distortions and verbal tricks on both sides. In Peter Kenez’s view, terror was present in every phenomenon of Soviet life, both in the 1930s and later, so that no matter which topic historians might examine relating to this period, the conclusion would be obvious: “Those were murderous times and Stalinism was a murderous system.” Kenez criticized Arch Getty because in *The Origins of the Great Purges* (Cambridge, 1985), Getty devoted more space to the exchange of Party cards in 1935 than to mass murder. Kenez compared this to writing the history of a shoe factory at Auschwitz. He also dismissed as both absurd and wrong Roberta Manning’s statement that the
Soviet regime’s governing of the countryside was “dependent ultimately, like all governments, on the consent of the governed.” Robert Thurston’s comment that there was no fear in the USSR at the end of the 1930s drew a harsh rejoinder from Daniel Brower.24

We must note that the reproaches leveled against the second generation of revisionists—that they ignored the terror—were not entirely objective, because in fact the terror was the chief research topic among these historians. They insisted vigorously that the Great Terror be acknowledged, although it is true that they were mostly concerned with the social factors that precipitated it. Arch Getty objected that Kenez was biased and tried to show that none of the revisionist works denied the “importance of state intervention into the life of society” and that, on the contrary, the relationship between the state and society was their primary focus.25

This discussion coincided with the beginning of perestroika in the Soviet Union and the declassification of the Soviet archives. From then on, the so-called second generation of revisionists, who welcomed what was happening with unfeigned enthusiasm, had the opportunity to check their preliminary conclusions against factual materials. They did not delay in taking advantage of this and did active work not only in central but also in local archives (David Shearer in Novosibirsk, Jeffrey Rossman in Ivanovo, Sarah Davies in St. Petersburg, Hiroaki Kuromiya in Donetsk, etc.).


In these works, based on documents from the Russian archives, the revisionists’ views became more polished. At present, their conclusions can be summarized as follows.

(1) The Stalinist regime was weak. “This was a weak state, not a strong one . . . Strong, secure regimes do not need mass violence to rule”; “the Soviet state was simply a creation of society.”26

(2) The Stalinist terror was unplanned. “We still do not know what he
[Stalin—I.P.] decided and when,“ Getty says. He says this even though he knows about the 2 July 1937 Politburo Decree on Anti-Soviet Elements; the NKVD ruling “On Operations to Punish Former Kulaks, Criminals, and Other Anti-Soviet Elements,” approved by the Politburo on 31 July; and other decisions that gave the NKVD carte blanche to carry out mass repressions (which were to be broken down into categories [those subject to immediate execution and those subject to eight-to-ten-years imprisonment] and into quotas set according to oblast, krai, and republic).

Standing behind their conclusions regardless of the documents that Trud first published on 4 June 1992, Getty and Manning repeatedly insist in the introduction to Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives that they do not want to “minimize the role of Stalin.” “None of the authors have ever argued for a completely spontaneous terror that originated from below over opposition from higher up, or even for the autonomy of social processes in the USSR of Stalin’s time.” At the same time, in discussing the absence of a plan for terror, the revisionists insist that the purges of 1937–38 were the result of the general chaos, the petty tyranny of local authorities, and mass pressure “from below” that demanded that the authorities take repressive measures. “The chaos of those years became the basis for the regime’s new totalitarian endeavors and the mass repressions that followed them. . . . The state’s war against crime contained the social, institutional, and ideological bases of mass repression.”

(3) In general, the revisionists are convinced that the scale of the Great Terror was previously exaggerated by Robert Conquest, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and other writers. This point is emphasized in Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives by Fitzpatrick, who analyzed the effect of the purges on the Soviet elite on the basis of telephone books from 1936 to 1938; by Thurston, who studied the link between the Stakhanovite movement and the purges; by Nove in his “Victims of Stalinism: How Many?”; by S. Wheattcroft in “More Light on the Scale of Repressions and the Mortality Rate in the Soviet Union in the 1930s”; and by others. Here, they acknowledge the reliability not only of the information on the scale of repression in the Soviet Union published by the historian V.N. Zemskov but also the veracity of official KGB figures that agree with Zemskov’s: that in 1937–38, 1,344,923 persons were punished, of whom 681,692 were shot. The revisionists contend that the terror primarily affected Soviet political, economic, and military leaders, especially those who held high posts. Other social groups were less affected.
The revisionists advance the idea that the masses took an active part in the purges, talking of “a revolutionary component of the terror” (Fitzpatrick) and saying that the ambitions of the authorities and the people were in accord (S. Davies). According to Thurston, “in fact, people were not just victims of the state, they were participants in repression.” Getty proposes that, as a general position, there was no pervasive fear during this period.

The shift of scholarly focus onto social history, which revisionist Western historians are actively implementing, is in and of itself a positive development. It is evidence of the emergence of a more comprehensive vision of the Soviet Union in the 1930s and, in general, of the whole twentieth century—a time in which the masses came onto the stage of history as active participants in events. These historians pose many new questions: about the chaos and disorder that reigned in literally all spheres of Soviet society in the 1930s, the petty tyranny of local authorities, the masses’ complicity in the purges, the harmony between certain actions of the regime and popular desires during the Great Terror, and the everyday life of people in the cities and the countryside during this period.

At the same time, we should not forget that the revisionists had worthy predecessors. Thus, one of the critics, R.W. Davies, who can be placed within the first generation of revisionists, did not agree with Fitzpatrick that the revisionists should be considered the first [Soviet] social historians, instead citing Merle Fainsod’s classic work *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule.* This book, first published in the United States in 1958, was reissued in 1989, and then published in Russian in Smolensk in 1995. Nonetheless, there is no question that this group of historians was first to deal specifically with the social history of Stalinist Russia in the 1930s using archival materials. The tasks of these historians were expressed, in particular, by David Hoffmann, who says that “new perspectives and understandings of the Great Terror are possible based on archival material now becoming available.”

Although they are guided by the best of intentions—the desire to reconstruct an objective history of Stalinist Russia in the 1930s—the revisionists’ conclusions have, paradoxically, hurled us back several decades. First, the attribution of such importance to the participation of Soviet society [in the era] objectively leads to a depreciation of the responsibility that top echelons of the Party bear [for the events that transpired]. [This is a step backward because it was] during Stalin’s lifetime
that many people believed that the leader was unaware of all the lawlessness—that it was all the work of local bosses and NKVD organs that had supposedly escaped Party control and taken on an independent social role. Second, the minimizing of the scale of the terror and the conclusion that it started with Kirov’s assassination and chiefly affected Party and state officials is something very similar to the view promulgated by Khrushchev in his efforts to expose Stalin’s Cult of Personality.

Thus, contemporary Western historians who criticize the totalitarian model of Stalinist history and argue that Stalin’s rule was weak have in fact turned into apologists for the regime. This is best exemplified by Shearer, who describes the Stalinist regime as “a state under siege,” a state that had no choice but to introduce repression if it was to restore order to society.

Why did this happen? Where are the “reefs” that contemporary Western revisionists have failed to notice as they were drawing such conclusions about the nature of the Stalinist regime and Soviet society in the 1930s? Let us try to sort this out.

Western historians have approached the study of Soviet society in the 1930s using the yardstick of Western civilization and an understanding of relations between state and society that prevails in the West. It must be noted that Robert Conquest warned the revisionists of the necessity of taking into account the specific features of a different culture, especially Russian culture, during the [Russian Review] discussion. Conquest put it as follows (although he was admittedly discussing a different topic): “Nonetheless, to understand this history, it is necessary not only to study it but also to have a deep feel for it.”

The problem with studying specifically Russian history is that so far historians have no appropriate interpretations (social, economic, and political) to describe the uniquely Russian historical process. As a result, both Russian and Western historians have been forced to use a conceptual apparatus developed for European culture, occasionally noting its specific features. However, neither Russian nor Western historians have recognized—fundamentally, wholly, and meaningfully—that the central methodological problem in the study of Russian history is the use of conceptual approaches based on alien cultures.

Since 1917 the course of Russian history has diverged so radically from European history that it has come to demand its own terminology. Instead, the [available] terminology—which includes “War Communism,” “NEP” [the New Economic Policy], “collectivization,” and so
on—is a combination of European terminology and such Russian terms as *prisposoblenets* [opportunist], *poputchik* [fellow traveler], *lishenets* [disenfranchised person], *podkulachnik* [rich peasant sympathizer], and the like. As such, it functions as a set of words that take the place of concepts rather than as concepts themselves. By their nature these are pseudo-terms, which differ from proper terms in that their meanings are unreflective: they do not add up to a system and cannot be made to do so, insofar as their lack of a system is coupled with their alien cultural and philosophical semantics (or total lack thereof). Their choice of words is intuitive and mundane [rather than meaningful]. One exceptionally powerful example of research into Soviet terminology is Jacques Rossi’s *GULAG Directory* (Moscow, 1991).

Lacking the ability to create their own conceptual system (which is a task beyond the powers of individual scholars and collectives, insofar as [true] conceptual systems take generations to evolve past the level of mere metaphor), scholars of Soviet history must either define each meaningful word usage, make use of “scare quotes,” or resort to the language of the documents and thus reproduce the meanings and sense of the compilers of the documents. The last case is a classic example of the saying “the dead have a hold on the living.” What happens, then, is that historians of Stalinist Russia in the 1930s find themselves shackled by the semiotic situation imposed on them by the official documentation, and either they have to break loose from it with each word they write, making use of all the knowledge of hermeneutics that they have, or they have to follow the masters who dictate what the words mean.

Thus a trap was laid for the Western historians before they even set out on the path. The word *vlast*’ [“state power,” sometimes translated as “government” or “the regime”—Ed.] has different meanings in Europe and in Russia, and the same is true of the word for “state” [*gosudarstvo*, derived from *gosudar*’ (master)—Ed.]. Note, for instance, that Aristotle defined the state as a political community of citizens; in that sense, there has never been a state in Russia, especially during the communist period.

What distinguishes Russian history is the special sociocultural role played by state power. Many Russian and foreign scholars now agree on this fundamental philosophical and historical thesis. Soviet-era historians also characterized it in this way, insofar as they endorsed the fundamental postulate of the leading role of the Communist Party in the development of Soviet society. This theory is represented in the works of prerevolutionary historians of the state school, such as S.M. Solov’ev,

The main force driving Russian development has not been revolutions and reforms, growing and ripening within society (as in the West), but rather the agency of state power, which acts in order to change society. All the so-called reforms in Russia were initiated “from above,” by state power, which also brought them to a close, thus launching an era of counter-reform. In Russia the economy did not determine policy but rather the reverse: policy determined the development not only of the economy but of all public life as well. The only explanation for Getty’s assertion that the purges of 1933, 1935, and 1936 were merely organizational and administrative measures and not political ones is that he did not understand this basic fact.

The unique Russian system of state power gave society a fundamentally different character than it had the West, making society’s relationship to state power different as well. Russia has never had a civil society. The rudimentary beginnings of one had just begun to appear at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, but this process was interrupted by the October coup and the subsequent change in the direction of Russian historical development.

A civil society requires the existence of horizontal structures—associations that are created not by state power but by the society itself—so that there are independent mechanisms for bringing pressure to bear on the authorities. In the West, the masses could put “pressure” on the state and influenced the direction of state policy, but Russian society never had similar means to influence state power. The letters and complaints that Western historians cite never played such a role. State power either ignored them (as during the collectivization drive, when M.I. Kalinin, chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, received about a hundred thousand peasant complaints about various types of arbitrary behavior) or made ostentatious use of a particular letter to justify its decisions.

Russian society has been and remains a structure in which change can be initiated by even a small push from outside, by state power. Scholars have yet to formulate a concept to characterize such a society; thus far, there are only purely intuitive depictions. For example, there is the
well-known image of society as a “sack of potatoes,” which we find in Karl Marx, or M. Mamardashvili’s similar description of “a gelatinous society.” We also find descriptions such as a “pile of sand.” There is V.O. Kliuchevskii’s definition of the Russian community as “sluggish, spiritually crumbling, and socially uncoordinated, used to marching in place.”

All the writers who have tried to define this type of society propose the presence of an external factor, an outside force that stands above society and cements it into a unified whole. That force is state power. For this reason, “such a society, deprived of a ruler, will, like a castle made of dry sand, crumble in an instant,” as V. Lipnevich has aptly remarked.

That is exactly what happened when the Russian autocracy fell [in 1917]. “Rus’ faded in two days,” V.V. Rozanov wrote, “three at the most. . . . It is astonishing how Russia fell apart all at once into little pieces. Never before had there been such an upheaval, even during the ‘Great Migration of Peoples.’ ”

After the October coup the new state—regardless of the Bolsheviks’ assertions—immediately and inexorably adopted a course that has been traditional for Russian states: the centralization of state power and the subordination of local regions to its authority. Signs of the steady conversion of the rigidly centralized Bolshevik Party into an institution of power were immediately visible, although the process took several years. In the years right after the October coup there was a certain duality in the political system that consisted of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. The beginning of the twentieth century marked a new stage in the centralization of Russian statehood, the emergence of the Party state. In the end, it was much more ubiquitous and all-pervasive than the autocracy had been. In it, the worst Russian traditions were revived and perfected—traditions that hurled the country back politically to the time of oprichnina [terror] of Ivan the Terrible and, above all, to mass murder by the state.

State power became the main means of influencing society beginning at the end of the 1920s and continuing throughout the 1930s. This was a period of political and socioeconomic transformation, a period known in history as “the building of socialism in one country.” This forceful remaking of society was carried out in the traditional Russian way—“from above”—by means of coercion. The Stalinist purges constituted the chief method of transforming Russian society. Through its use of such methods, the regime was able to accomplish the tasks it set for itself. The chief task was not the modernization of Russia (even
through barbaric methods), as many Western historians think, but the building of socialism. For Stalin this was primarily a matter of politics and not economics. In December 1926 Stalin stated this quite unequivocally in his speech “Once More on Social-Democratic Deviations in Our Party,” given at the Seventh Expanded Plenum of the Comintern Executive Committee: “if we translate this issue [the building of the economic base of socialism—I.P.] into the language of class, it takes on the following form: can we defeat our own Soviet bourgeoisie with our own resources?” Such a plan entailed “the creation, ultimately, of conditions of production and distribution that will lead directly and immediately to the liquidation of all classes.”

Of course, Stalin did not speak bluntly about the use of force and did not try to substantiate the special role of coercion in remaking society (political frankness, after all, was not one of his characteristics). But in his speech at the Sixteenth Party Congress he elaborated somewhat on his idea of what constituted the building of socialism. In this sense his speech is quite remarkable. According to Stalin, “organizing the advance of socialism on all fronts” required “an offensive against capitalist elements on all fronts.” In this way the two concepts, “the building of socialism” and “repression,” turned out to be organically linked. Given the nature of the Stalinist regime, repression was the most rapid and effective way to transform the economy and society. Repression also served as the chief method of mobilizing society to take action and of disciplining that society; repression was the main incentive that motivated the overwhelming majority of the population to work. By making full use of repression as a means of bringing pressure to bear on society, state power was able each time, as Stalin put it, to “drive” the country on.

If we look at the purges as the state’s reaction to chaos, disorder, and crime—as the Western historians do (based on official documents of the 1930s)—the end result is the same conclusion ultimately drawn by Stalin. Voluntarily, and without even acknowledging it, the revisionists end up agreeing with Stalin.

It was state power that initiated forced collectivization, which was not actually collectivization but the nationalization of agriculture and the reinstatement of serfdom in the countryside. This made it possible for the state to confiscate the maximum amount of grain for the least expense, at prices that were one-tenth to one-twelfth of market prices, until 1953. The industrialization that was carried out with the labor of deported specialists, prisoners, and millions of former peasants who had
fled hunger and collectivization for the cities was actually industrialization only in the most technical of senses. In a social sense it was quasi-industrialization, which led to the creation of an industrial infrastructure chiefly oriented toward the militarization of the country rather than social development. In this context the “Cultural Revolution” played a utilitarian role by laying the foundations for the universal ideologization of the people and oriented them toward supporting and serving the interests of state power. The state power that could carry out such grandiose changes, the state power that “displaced” tens of millions of people and forced them to change their traditional way of life, the state power that dictated not only the style but also the meaning of life cannot be considered weak.

In their research, Western historians focus on disorder, crime, mass thievery, and lawlessness. For anyone brought up in Western civilization, such factors indicate that the regime is not able to establish order in society and solve urgent social problems. But for the Stalinist regime all these manifestations of disorder were just “the chips that fly when you’re chopping wood.” First, this disorder was provoked by state power itself; and second, it took a lenient view of it as an unavoidable byproduct of its policies. Stalin even tried to use the situation for his own ends. There is evidence that he told Kaganovich:

“See to it that Gudok, Industriia, and the other newspapers print as much as possible about our sloppiness, deficiencies, glitches, shoddy work, and so on. . . . We don’t want those dopes abroad to see the forest for the trees. Our real figures and achievements are to be kept secret, while our petty problems—of which we have plenty, of course—should be glaringly apparent. ‘Soviet chaos,’ ‘transportation in ruins,’ ‘abominable industrial output,’ the works.”

“With photographs?”

“Well, why not? In our position a subtle policy is needed. You can’t win if you don’t cheat.”

It is true that chaos and disorder did hamper the communist regime, but they were an immeasurably lesser evil than well-ordered [popular] resistance would have been, so they just had to be kept within certain bounds. Keeping disorder within those bounds, again through the use of repression, was a demonstration of state power’s strength and Stalin’s strategy and tactics of political rule. [In essence,] the social energy of the masses was to be dissipated in the everyday struggle for survival and
put down by means of repression. Moreover, chaos and disorder not only provided political camouflage for Stalin’s policies, but they have continued to play the same role in a historical sense as well. The effectiveness of this method of political and historical camouflage is demonstrated by contemporary historical works. The chaos and disorder that fill the official documents of the 1930s to overflowing still deflect scholars’ attention and blind them to the basic meaning behind the behavior of Stalin’s regime.

It would be wrong to say that state power paid no attention to the side effects of building socialism in one country. Its attentions were devoted to sending the purges in one direction, then in another, using them in particular to reinforce discipline. But Stalin never concerned himself with the organization of normal public life. His priorities were, first, to strengthen his own power and, second, to create a defense industry that would make it possible for him to dictate his own terms in the international arena. Stalin’s regime channeled all available resources into the accomplishment of these specific tasks. When it came to the lives of millions of people, Stalin’s regime turned the responsibility over to local bosses, to appointees at various levels. State power demanded that the local authorities carry out its directives without question, and in return it gave them the right to do as they pleased. Under these conditions, the directives of superiors could hardly have been disobeyed, [but they were limited in nature]. This is what has deluded Western historians who, on the basis of numerous cases of arbitrary local tyranny, have concluded that the local leaders disobeyed the higher authorities and did not carry out their orders, even resisting them at times.46

Western historians have also been confused by state power’s rallying of the masses’ active involvement, and especially the latter’s complicity in the purges. Historians view this complicity as an independent factor and have concluded that the masses—unhappy with the disorder, the tyranny of local authorities, the crime, and so on—brought “pressure” to bear on state power, demanding that it impose order.

However, relations between the Stalinist regime and society were fundamentally different from those in the West. The masses did not bring “pressure” to bear on state power; rather, the authorities “pressured” the “masses”—manipulating them; taking advantage of their moods and their lack of even a rudimentary sense of law—and used this to its own advantage, channeling their unhappiness against local bosses, “wreckers,” and “enemies of the people” and formulating their own actions in
the name of the toiling masses. A characteristic turn of phrase encountered in documents from the 1930s is “the Party’s orientation toward organizing the fury of the masses.” All of this is an indication not of state power’s weakness but of its strength, of its reliance on the worst traits of the people and its encouragement of them.

At the Sixteenth Party Congress Stalin declared that all the actions imposed “from above” by the state—such as “collectivization, the struggle against the kulaks, the struggle against wreckers, anti-religious propaganda, and so on”—constituted “the inalienable right of the workers and peasants of the USSR, backed up by our Constitution.” Just as Lenin had rallied the masses behind him in 1917 by hurling the slogan “Rob the robbers!” Stalin in the 1930s gave carte blanche to any initiative “from below” that would unmask and liquidate “enemies of the people,” linking such actions in the public mind to the building of socialism. The launching of such an initiative inevitably expanded the already large circle of candidates for repression, which could include almost anyone as a result of the slipperiness of the very term “enemy of the people.” Such Stalinist slogans as “if you chop wood, the chips fly,” “if the criticism is even 5–10 percent true, then that criticism ought to be welcomed,” and so on made it possible on all levels to settle personal scores with one’s opponents or with people who were simply inconvenient.

During the Great Terror, when the ax of Stalin’s repressions came down on Party and state cadres, state power’s intentions and the masses’ mood were in full accord. Stalin deliberately “scapegoated” these people for all the so-called glitches in the building of socialism’s magnificent edifice. The toiling masses became accomplices in the mass slaughter instigated by the regime. Many sincerely supported the conviction and execution of their former bosses, seeing it as the triumph of justice. However, by focusing special attention on the so-called revolutionary component of Stalin’s terror, Western historians have glossed over the essence of the Great Terror, which consisted of society’s final “cleansing” of any anti-Soviet elements, which in reality meant the liquidation of any and all potentially active and independent-minded people in the country.

The failure of the Western historians to grasp Russian reality can be illustrated with a specific example. Fitzpatrick cites the rural show trials of 1937 as an example of the “revolutionary component” of Stalin’s terror. They reminded her of the carnival described by M.M. Bakhtin: “Without a doubt it was political theater, but the kind of theater in which
all the participants, the spectators and the audience, enjoyed seeing their former bosses brought down. It recalled an eighteenth-century woodcut depicting the funeral of a huge cat tied up by a pack of mice cavorting with glee.”48 But the analogy in this case is not so straightforward. First, these trials were organized by higher authorities (through coded telegrams dated 3 August, signed by Stalin, and 2 October 1937, signed by Stalin and Molotov)49 and their deputies; they were certainly not the masses’ reaction to “signals” that Fitzpatrick has discerned in “several articles about the abuse of power by local officials and comments on them in Pravda.”50 Coded telegrams from the center were not “signals”; they were direct orders to hold the show trials. After the order was carried out, the lower authorities had to submit reports to their superiors.

Thus, in accordance with a coded telegram from Moscow on 15 August 1937, the bureau of the West Siberian Krai Committee passed the following decree: “Barkov and Mal’tsev [the local procurator and deputy chief of the UNKVD (Administration of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs)—I.P.] are ordered within four or five days to submit to the krai committee a proposal as to the raions in which court trials of enemies of the people are to be organized among, say, wreckers of agriculture and, in particular, to prepare materials for the Severnyi and Kur’inskii raions to organize public show trials there. The trials have to be carefully prepared, collective-farm members invited, and broad publicity assured in the press.”51 Such a trial was held in Severnyi Raion on 18–20 September, and R.I. Eikhe, first secretary of the West Siberian Krai Committee, reported to Stalin the results of the show trials in Severnyi Raion and other raions in the krai in a letter dated 2 October 1937.52

Moreover, we must also bear in mind that these show trials, which were organized on orders from the regime, served as a cover for mass murders that were carried out in secret and could only be whispered about with people one could trust.

So this was not a carnival of the type that took place in the medieval West. On the contrary, “what we see here is a carnival turned ‘upside down,’ converted from popular culture to the culture of the ruling echelons, in which healthy if crude laughter is replaced by truly sadistic humor, by pathology.”53 The victims of this carnival of reprisal, which is what the show trials of 1937 really were in the countryside, were not just local bosses but also the collective-farm members who took part in the trials. That the authorities’ actions were in accord with popular discontent in this “carnival” does not obscure the fact that the carnival soon
turned into a bloody mystery play, into which not only the defendants but also the judges, the witnesses, and the invited public were all drawn as extras in a production that had been thought up and conducted on orders from above. In describing the situation in the Russian countryside in 1937, it is wrong to talk about “authentic, fearless self-awareness” expressed in carnival laughter, as M.M. Bakhtin described it.

The Western historians, [in sum,] have been literally carried away by the elemental force of the documents. In relating the social history of the 1930s, they follow the documents exactly, conveying not only the spirit but also the letter of them, using the very terms that the official state organs employed. In line with the Procuracy and the NKVD, these historians write about speculation, banditry, and crime, without determining what was meant by these terms. How is it even possible to talk about speculation in Stalinist Russia, where the biggest speculator was the state itself, which stripped the people down to their last thread? Having crushed society socially and politically, the regime had nothing to offer it in return except propaganda. A typical complaint in the documents of those years is: “There is nothing in the local stores.” The people used all the skill they had to survive. Only the regime could call their behavior “speculation.”

The Western historians’ gullibility regarding the official documents of the Stalinist era is especially clear in their treatment of the assassination of [Leningrad Party boss Sergei M.] Kirov. According to Getty, if there are no documents confirming that Stalin took part in organizing Kirov’s assassination, then he did not take part.54 This is exactly the attitude that Stalin was counting on when he advised his confederates “not to leave any trace” and to “safeguard the truth with a battalion of lies.” The conspiratorial system of Stalin’s regime, which did not even entrust its most closely held secrets to a “special file,” depended on this. Here the verbal testimony that has become available, which Getty prefers not to believe, is particularly valuable. Among Western scholars, Robert Tucker and Robert Davies have commented on Arch Getty’s selective approach to memoirs of the Stalinist era. He refuses to accept the testimony of victims of the regime, but he is willing to take on faith any statements that back up the official version of the events. One example of this is his treatment of A. Svetlanin’s memoirs, *The Far East Plot* [Dal’nevostochnyi zagovor] (Frankfurt-on-Main: Posev, 1953), which alleged that Tukhachevskii, Gamarnik, and others really were planning an anti-Stalin military conspiracy. These memoirs were later revealed to
be an NKVD forgery. Getty made the same mistake with the 1930s Politburo minutes that were discovered in the German archives; these turned out to be falsified, as was shown by comparing them with the real minutes.

In addition, these historians willingly accept the official figures about the number of victims of Stalin’s terror, ignoring the figures made public in the Khrushchev era and discussed by A.I. Mikoyan: from 1 January 1935 through 22 June 1941 nineteen million people were punished, and seven million were executed. Additional proof that the official figure on the victims of Stalin’s repression from 1930 through 1953—the 3,778,254 people cited in 1990 by former KGB Chairman Vladimir Kriuchkov—is not final is the total given by A.N. Yakovlev in 1997: 4.8 million people.

We cannot say that the Western historians have ignored all criticism of Stalinist documents based on source study. Even Getty writes that “we need to maintain a healthy suspicion of sources from the 1930s,” but he adds that “on the basis of suspicion alone, without any evidence, it would be rash to decide a priori that an archival document has been falsified.” So he concludes that until independent historians and experts have evaluated all these documents regarding form and content, scholars cannot validate their reliability. This conclusion seems strange, at the very least. Whom does Getty have in mind when he speaks of independent historians and experts? How can they accomplish this task? In any case, he does not place in this category the historians who published documents from the Stalinist period in the 1960s and the 1980s, because he is convinced that they were ruled by “a desire to show Stalin’s connection with the repressed.”

In working with Stalinist documents, traditional source criticism (both internal and external) is insufficient. We must strip off the layers of official falsehood and see the real meaning of events that lies behind the façade. We must not just accept a document and restate what it says; instead, each time we have to determine what stands behind it. If historians simply accept the official documents as written, whether they want to or not, they cannot help taking the side of the Stalinist state and looking at events through the “eyes” of its functionaries. This is exactly what has happened with the revisionists, who can hardly be accused of deliberate complicity. At the same time, it is difficult to rid oneself of this impression, which is overwhelming in examining these historians’ works.

(3) Today’s Western historians are also, in a certain sense, victims of
a selective approach to the study of Soviet reality in the 1930s. Their desire to make a comprehensive study of a specific collection of archival materials has led them—based on their knowledge of the history, for example, of Belyi Raion in Smolensk Oblast (Manning) or the Donbass (Kuromiya)—to allow their preconceptions about the weakness of the Stalinist regime to be reflected in their [empirical] findings. In this way, these historians resemble their Soviet colleagues, whose case studies “proved” the official views that were handed down “from above,” confirming and sanctifying them. Such an approach inevitably “dissipates” the reality being studied: most Soviet historians had no concept of their own history apart from the official version. The same is true for Western historians, although their views, which have been distorted by the elemental force of the documents, do not serve as some official ideology but instead contribute to a set of preconceptions about Stalinist Russia in the 1930s.

The Western historians’ keen focus on Russian social history confirms the necessity of a comprehensive study of Russian reality, which cannot be examined without considering the actions of the authorities. Tucker warned the second generation of revisionists about this during the 1986 discussion. Geoff Eley issued a similar warning at the same time, based on the experience of his colleagues who studied German society under Hitler.60

The experience of today’s Western historians studying Stalinist Russia in the 1930s, which is oriented toward bringing down the so-called totalitarian model, confirms the necessity of formulating appropriate terms to describe what really happened in Stalinist Russia. At present, however, we have at our disposal only the official terms of the Short Course on the History of the Communist Party—“collectivization,” “industrialization,” “cultural revolution,” the “Stakhanovite movement,” “revolution from above,” “revolution from below,” and so on. Above all, we do not know how to define Soviet society and its relationship with the state. Malia has remarked, quite rightly, that “there is no such thing as socialism, but the Soviet Union built it.” Finding an appropriate definition of Soviet society is complicated by the fact that, even after the collapse of the communist regime, Russia has not been able to rid itself of its past, and unlike such historians as Malia, it did not know that this was its tragedy.61 Malia, too, is mistaken, however, when he says that the “surrealism” of Soviet life has simply vanished, and that Russia has become a “normal country” once more.62 This further highlights the urgency of formulating terms and concepts with which we can explain not
only the Soviet past but also contemporary Russian reality, which is inseparably linked to that past.

“Totalitarianism” is still the only term available today that accurately describes Stalinist reality, paradoxical as this may seem (considering the criticism leveled at that term in the West and, more recently, in Russia as well). So it is still too early, in my opinion, to bury the totalitarian model, as was done, for example, by R. Burrowes, who subjected Hannah Arendt’s book to withering criticism.63 “Totalitarianism” is not “an attempt to translate reality into unreality,” but it is the most suitable model available for the study of the phantasmagorical reality that characterized life in Stalinist Russia in the 1930s. The totalitarian model offers coordinated, if primitive, conclusions about that reality, because any historian who employs it is, so to speak, implicitly contrasting the semantics of Soviet reality to that of Europe. Today’s Western historians, by rejecting the use of the totalitarian model, find themselves in a different type of inconsistency: they are applying a European mentality to the study of Russian semantic contrasts. Meaningful consistency is unattainable until a Russian historical conceptual system has been worked out.

It would be too much to hope that Western scholars could supply a proper understanding of Russian history, as history itself has shown. That said, it is nonetheless surprising that they have drifted toward being apologists for Stalinism, because the historians who have been caught in the “nets” of Stalinism are not bound by any ideology, nor are they burdened with the ideological legacy that still binds some Russian historians. Even so, their experience in studying Soviet reality not only prompts us to consider many of the social history issues that they have raised, but it also serves as a warning that knowledge of archival documents in itself is not enough to understand, much less explain, the history of Stalinist Russia.

P.S. In conclusion, I should like to express my gratitude to the historian and philosopher V.L. Doroshenko, who, while we were discussing this article, helped me formulate the basic postulates of my critique of the theoretical mistakes of today’s Western Sovietologists.

Notes


19. Ibid., pp. 368–72.
22. Ibid., pp. 385–94.
28. Ibid., pp. 14, 15.
29. D.R. Shearer, Transcript of paper presented to the Institute of History, Siberian Section, Russian Academy of Sciences, on 5 March 1997, in the author’s personal files.
30. V.V. Zemskov, “K voprosu o mashtabakh repressii v SSSR,” Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, 1995, no. 9, p. 123.
32. Stalinist Terror, p. 143.
36. Shearer, Transcript.
41. As quoted in Voprosy filosofii, 1992, no. 11, p. 55.
42. For more detail, see I.V. Pavlova, Stalinizm: stanovlenie mekhanizma vlasti (Novosibirsk, 1993).
44. Ibid., vol. 12, p. 305.
45. This statement by Stalin, like a number of his other statements, was not written down but has been retold by his contemporaries. Quoted in Boris Solonevich, Zagovor krasnogo Bonaparta. Marshal Tukhachevskii. Dokumentirovannyi roman (Buenos Aires, 1958), pp. 133–34.
51. GA NO (State Archives of Novosibirsk Oblast), f. P–3, op. 2, d. 861, l. 7.
52. Ibid., op. 11, d. 29, ll. 14–18.
53. This remark, admittedly on a different subject, was made by V. Vakhrushev in “Bakhtinovedenie—osobyi tip gumanitarnogo znaniia?” Voprosy literatury, 1997, no. 1, p. 300.
57. Ibid., p. 70.
58. Argumenty i fakty, 1997, no. 27.
From the editors [of Otechestvennaia istoriia]: I.V. Pavlova’s article continues our series on Western Sovietology. This topic affords broad scope for scholars of various viewpoints. While the editors do not always agree with any particular author, they do not consider it feasible to correct their materials in any significant way. We will continue to hold to this principle. The journal intends to continue publishing historical surveys of this kind.