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Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative perspective

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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that the national populisms of Northern and Western Europe form a distinctive cluster within the wider north Atlantic and pan-European populist conjuncture. They are distinctive in construing the opposition between self and other not in narrowly national but in broader civilizational terms. This partial shift from nationalism to “civilizationism” has been driven by the notion of a civilizational threat from Islam. This has given rise to an identitarian “Christianism”, a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech. The paper highlights the distinctiveness of this configuration by briefly comparing the national populisms of Northern and Western Europe to the Trump campaign and to the national populisms of East Central Europe. It concludes by specifying two ways in which the joining of identitarian Christianism with secularist and liberal rhetoric challenges prevailing understandings of European national populism.

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The last few years have witnessed an extraordinary pan-European (and trans-Atlantic) populist conjuncture. The populist moment has been defined most spectacularly by the stunning upsets of Brexit and Trump. But the broader moment also includes the surge in support for the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Dutch Party for Freedom, and other populist challengers in Northern and Western Europe; the consolidation of overtly illiberal, increasingly authoritarian national-populist regimes in Hungary and Poland; and the emergence of major new populist forces in Germany (on the right), in Spain and Greece (on the left), and in Italy (in a fluctuating and indeterminate region of political space).1

The present conjuncture is not simply populist; it is (with a few exceptions) national-populist. I follow Pierre-André Taguieff (1995, 32–35) in defining

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national populism by the polarized opposition between “us” and “them” in both vertical and horizontal dimensions.\(^2\) In the vertical dimension, constitutive of populism as such, the opposition is between “the people” and “the elite”. “The people” – that is, “ordinary” people, the “forgotten men and women of our country”, as Trump styled them – are seen as virtuous, struggling, hard-working, plain-spoken, and endowed with common sense, while “the elite” is seen as corrupt, self-serving, paralysed by political correctness, and, above all, out of touch with or indifferent to the concerns and problems of ordinary people. Like populists everywhere, Trump and Europopulists of all stripes claim to speak in the name of “the people”: “I am your voice”, said Trump at the culminating moment of his acceptance speech at the Republican convention. That they may be career politicians like Geert Wilders or Viktor Orbán or billionaires like Trump or Silvio Berlusconi does not make them any less populist. What matters is a successful performance of the opposition between “the people” and “the elite”.\(^3\)

In the horizontal dimension, the opposition is between insiders and outsiders: between “people like us”, those who share our way of life, and those on the outside who are said to threaten our way of life. This includes “internal outsiders”: those living in our midst who, even when they are citizens of the state, are not seen as belonging to the nation. The “outside” also includes impersonal forces or institutions that are seen as threatening our way of life or our security: globalization, unfettered trade, the European Union, radical Islam, and so on.

Trumpism and European national populism bring the vertical and horizontal registers together by characterizing “the elite” – political, cultural, or economic – as “outside” as well as “on top”: not only as insensitive to the economic struggles of ordinary people, but also as indifferent or condescending towards their way of life. The elite are seen as not only economically insulated but also culturally deracinated: in effect, as rootless cosmopolitans, even if that older anti-semitic populist language is not used. They are represented as being concerned with the rights and welfare of distant others but indifferent to the struggles of proximate brothers and sisters, and as favouring a world without borders, regardless of its destructive effects on the bounded solidarities of nation and community. They are criticized for welcoming immigrants and refugees; for favouring mixing and multiculturalism; for speaking for minorities rather than the majority; and for condescendingly denouncing ordinary people as racist and Islamophobic, as Hilary Clinton did when she characterized Trump supporters as “a basket of deplorables”.

This two-dimensional perspective makes it possible to speak of a national-populist moment in the singular. But it also provides a framework for thinking about populisms in the plural. The valorization of “the people” vis-à-vis “the elite” and threatening outside forces marks a family resemblance among contemporary populisms. But the horizontal and vertical dimensions also define a
space of variation in ways of constructing the oppositions between “the people” and “the elite” and between inside and outside.

Within this space of variation, the national populisms of Northern and Western Europe – especially those of the Netherlands, France, Scandinavia, Belgium, Austria, and Switzerland – constitute a distinctive cluster. They are distinctive, I shall argue, in construing the opposition between self and other not in narrowly national but in broader civilizational terms. This partial shift from nationalism to what I will call “civilizationism” has been driven by a striking convergence in the last fifteen years around the notion of a civilizational threat from Islam. The preoccupation with Islam has given rise to an identitarian “Christianism”, a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech. It is this novel and distinctive configuration and the paradoxes associated with it – notably the illiberal invocations of liberalism, the increasing salience of a “Christian” identity in the most secularized region of the world, and the adoption of liberal rhetoric by parties often characterized as “extreme right” – that I seek to describe and explain.4

Britain and Germany, I should note, fall outside the scope of my argument. Brexit and the UK Independence Party must obviously figure centrally in any overall account of the national-populist moment in Europe. But they do not belong to the cluster of “civilizationist” national populisms, founded on the notion of a civilizational threat from Islam, on which I focus. UKIP has been much less rhetorically preoccupied with Islam than Continental national populists, and the Brexit campaign turned fundamentally on other issues as well.

The meteoric rise of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is likewise central to the European national-populist configuration. Founded in 2013 as a party opposing Germany’s stance of trying to save the eurozone, the AfD veered sharply to the national-populist right and adopted a strongly anti-Islam profile in 2015. The new line has been quite successful, especially in the former East German states; it faces its first test in national elections in fall 2017. Yet notwithstanding its increasingly salient anti-Muslimism, the AfD does not belong to the cluster of civilizationist national populisms that are the focus of my analysis. The party remains more unsettled and internally divided than the parties I consider, so any overall characterization must be tentative. But so far, the AfD has not sought consistently to frame its anti-Muslimism in “liberal” terms, and indeed one of its leading, if most controversial, figures has criticized the central place of the Holocaust in Germany’s memory culture and attacked “gender mainstreaming” – the principle of incorporating gender equality into policy-making in all domains – as an “insanity”.

I begin with a discussion of the Netherlands, where this configuration first emerged and where it remains most clearly visible. I then trace the contours of a broader shift in which national-populist parties have been highlighting the
Christian identity of Europe yet embracing secularism, rejecting anti-Semitism, and presenting themselves as champions of gender equality, supporters of at least a minimal set of gay rights, and defenders of freedom of expression. I show how all the elements of this self-presentation follow from the increasingly salient concern with Islam. Christianity is embraced not as a religion but as a civilizational identity understood in antithetical opposition to Islam. Secularism is embraced as a way of minimizing the visibility of Islam in the public sphere. Liberalism – specifically, philo-Semitism, gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech – is selectively embraced as a characterization of “our” way of life in constitutive opposition to the illiberalism that is represented as inherent in Islam. I highlight the distinctiveness of the national populisms of Northern and Western Europe by comparing them briefly to the Trump campaign, on the one hand, and the national populisms of East Central Europe, on the other hand. I conclude by specifying two ways in which the joining of identitarian Christianism with secularist and liberal rhetoric challenges prevailing understandings of European national populism.

The Pim Fortuyn moment

The distinctive Northern and Western European form of national populism crystallized first and most strikingly in the Netherlands. It was pioneered by Pim Fortuyn, a stylish, flamboyant, openly gay ex-Marxist sociologist-turned-public intellectual, pundit, and, in the last year of his life, politician. In mere nine months, Fortuyn went from complete political novice to founder and head of a hugely popular insurgent party and even potential Prime Minister. But nine days before the Dutch general election of 2002, Fortuyn was assassinated by an animal rights activist.

As Ian Buruma has shown in his nuanced and sharply observed Murder in Amsterdam, Fortuyn succeeded in turning his outsiderhood – not just political but social, stylistic, and sexual – into his greatest asset, as he railed against the Dutch model of dull, grey, consensual politics. It was especially the then-prevailing reluctance of the Dutch establishment to politicize immigration that enabled Fortuyn – whose motto was “I say what I think and I do what I say” – to present himself as an authentic voice of the people, even if, as the quintessential outsider, he functioned at the same time as a kind of “political jester” or “trickster” (Buruma 2006, 48–62). His murder aroused mass emotions that commentators compared to those triggered by the death of Princess Diana (Margry 2003).

Fortuyn entered electoral politics as a candidate for the newly formed anti-establishment Livable Netherlands party, and in November 2001, he was chosen to head its slate in the upcoming elections, dramatically boosting the party’s popularity. But after characterizing Islam as a “backward” culture in a February interview with a leading Dutch newspaper and adding that if
it were legally possible, he would ensure that “not a single additional Muslim” would enter the Netherlands (Fortuyn 2002), he was removed from this position and founded a party of his own, the List Pim Fortuyn. Meanwhile, Fortuyn remained head of the Livable Rotterdam list, which triumphed in municipal elections in March, winning a third of the vote and ousting the Labor Party, which had dominated local politics for half a century. Two months later, the List Pim Fortuyn won 17 per cent of the vote in national elections, finishing second, besting all three parties of the previous coalition government, and joining the new coalition government. The party soon dissolved in disarray, but Fortuyn’s legacy has been enduring.

For the last three months of his life, Fortuyn was continuously at the centre of public attention, appearing on an endless series of interviews, talk shows, and debates. His theatricality, quotability, and mastery of television – he was a captivating performer – enabled him to thrive in the media limelight (Buruma 2006, 58–60). The increasingly harsh attacks on Fortuyn by the panicked political establishment only increased his visibility and, arguably, his popularity. Despite all the differences, he was in these respects a harbinger of Trump (Beauchamp 2016).

Fortuyn appealed to the kinds of concerns highlighted by anti-immigrant populist parties elsewhere: crime, urban disorder, and the growing number of asylum-seekers. But he vehemently rejected any comparison with figures such as Jean Marie Le Pen or Jörg Haider: “Le Pen is a petit bourgeois nationalist”, he told the Wall Street Journal; “I am a citizen of the world” (Kaminski 2002). Fortuyn’s repudiation of the label “extreme right” was understandable: his anti-Islamic civilizational rhetoric was joined with impeccably liberal positions on gender equality, drug policy, physician-assisted suicide, and especially gay rights. As he put it, “I have no desire to start over again with the emancipation of women and gays” (Fortuyn 2002).

Fortuyn’s blend of anti-Islamic rhetoric and sociocultural liberalism played out above all on the terrain of sexual morality. In the early 1990s, the windows of one of his favourite gay bars in Rotterdam had been broken, and the clientele threatened, by immigrant youth. The sense of vulnerability created by this and other incidents, widely discussed in Dutch gay circles, left a lasting impression (Buruma 2006, 56). In a country celebrated as the vanguard of sexual emancipation, Fortuyn found it “scandalous” that “many gay high school teachers do not dare to come out because of the Turkish and Moroccan youth in their classes” (Fortuyn 2002).

Fortuyn’s libertarian anti-Islamism gained traction in a context shaped by the distinctively progressive views of “native” Dutch people on gender and sexual morality, by anxiety in gay circles about anti-gay harassment and violence attributed to Muslim youth, and by the public uproar over the condemnation of homosexuality on a Dutch national news programme by a Rotterdam-based Moroccan imam. The Imam’s characterization of
homosexuality as a sin and a contagious disease dramatically counterposed “Muslim” and “Dutch” understandings of homosexuality and encouraged the attribution of “backward”, anti-gay attitudes to Muslims in general and of “modern”, pro-gay attitudes to Dutch. Of course, the prevailing, self-consciously progressive “Dutch” understanding of homosexuality – and the Dutch culture of sexual liberation more generally – was as sharply opposed to the strict sexual morality of the Netherlands’ not so distant Calvinist past as it was to Islam. In this context, Fortuyn “embodied (sexual) liberation from a past that the Dutch felt they had left behind” (Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens 2010, 968), while Muslim immigrants and their descendants stood for the “theft of enjoyment” (Van der Veer 2006, 119).

Fortuyn expressly embraced civilizational rhetoric; he called himself the “Samuel Huntington of Dutch politics” (Kaminski 2002). “What we are witnessing now is a clash of civilisations, not just between states but within them”, he told a BBC interviewer. Already in a 1995 book, he had argued that “problems concerning integration and mutual acceptance are centered on the relation between the dominant Judeo-Christian humanistic culture on the one hand and Islamic culture on the other” (Fortuyn 1995, 183); he elaborated the argument in a short 1997 book entitled Against the Islamization of our Culture. These books, with their warmed-over Huntingtonian arguments, were not original, and they received little attention when first published.

It was Fortuyn’s entry into electoral politics in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and his talent for self-dramatization that enabled him to turn a semi-academic cliché into a captivating public performance. Fortuyn embodied and enacted a certain “Western” version of individualism, secularism, freedom of speech, and gender and sexual liberation, just as El-Moumni embodied and enacted a certain “Islamic” version of religious orthodoxy and gender and sexual conservativism. Fortuyn’s political genius was to demonstrate the “performative power” of discourses of gender equality, freedom of speech, and especially sexual freedom, all of which offered “a rich grammar to represent and reinforce an imaginary of Dutch ‘liberated’ modernity versus Muslim oppressed tradition” (Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens 2010, 970; cf. Puar 2013).

Two years after Fortuyn’s death, a second political murder shook the Netherlands: the filmmaker Theo van Gogh – a friend of Fortuyn and, like him, a provocateur who delighted in challenging the pieties of the political class – was killed by a Dutch-Moroccan Islamist radical. Working with the ex-Muslim Dutch politician (and outspoken critic of Islam) Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Van Gogh had recently completed the short film “Submission” (the literal meaning of “Islam”), a none-too-subtle critique of the oppression of Muslim women, featuring a veiled actress whose body, visible through a transparent chador, was painted with verses from the Quran. Both Van Gogh and Hirsi Ali had received death threats after the film was released. This augmented the
polarizing performative power of the freedom of speech/blasphemy interpretive grid, dramatized earlier in the Rushdie affair, and later in the Danish Cartoons and Charlie Hebdo affairs.

The two murders gave further impetus both to a distinctive kind of nationalist rhetoric – in which gender equality, sexual freedom, gay rights, and freedom of speech were elevated to defining characteristics of “Dutch culture” – and to civilizational contrasts between the (post-) Christian (or Judeo-Christian) West and Islam. Gender, sexuality, and free speech connected the nationalist with the civilizationist rhetoric: Dutch culture was characterized not in narrowly national but in broader civilizational terms, as distinctively modern, progressive, and liberal, and as threatened by a backwards, regressive, and illiberal Islam.

The mantle of Pim Fortuyn was assumed after his death by Geert Wilders, who has given the populist anti-Islamic civilizational rhetoric an even cruder and harsher cast, though he too has rejected the “extreme right” label (De Jong 2015; Vossen 2017). He has asserted that “our Judeo-Christian culture is far superior to Islam and we should not be afraid to say so”.12 Wilders has characterized Islam as “the greatest threat to the survival of our civilization”;13 proposed banning the Quran as a “fascist book” that incites hatred and killing;14 and called for “de-Islamizing” Europe and refusing entry to Europe for all Muslim immigrants. “We have imported a monster, and this monster is called Islam”, he tweeted after the 2016 suicide bombing in a Bavarian town.15 He professes to have no antipathy towards Muslims, just towards Islam.16 In a 2016 article, he called on Muslims to “opt for freedom” by abandoning Islam and becoming “Christians or atheists or whatever”:

The more Muslims freeing themselves from Islam and the yoke of Muhammad, the better. “Apostates” are … people who choose freedom; they deserve encouragement. Because the more Islamic apostates there are, the less misogyny, the less hatred of gays, the less anti-Semitism, the less oppression, the less terror and violence, and the more freedom there will be.17

Since the fall of 2015, in the run-up to parliamentary elections scheduled for March 2017, polls have consistently shown Wilders’ Party for Freedom in the lead in the fragmented Dutch party landscape, poised to win between 17 per cent and 28 per cent of the seats.18

A broader populist trend

In broader European perspective, the contours of Dutch national populism are distinctive. Nowhere else are the themes of gender equality and especially sexual liberation and gay rights so central and so consistently developed. Yet there are nonetheless striking similarities between the Dutch case and national-populist rhetoric elsewhere in Northern and Western Europe.
Throughout the region, national-populist parties have been repositioning themselves in the last 15 years.\textsuperscript{19} As they have come to emphasize the civilizational threat from Islam, they have at the same time emphasized Christianity as a cultural and civilizational identity. As they have become more concerned about the public visibility of Muslim symbols and practices, they have come to stress their secularism. As they have highlighted the threat posed by “Islamization” to Jews, women, gays, and free speech, they have emphasized their own philosemitism and their commitment to gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of expression (though there are strong tensions between the liberal rhetoric and more conservative policy positions). The following sections take up in turn the themes of Christianism, secularism, and liberalism, showing how each follows from the civilizational preoccupation with Islam.

\textbf{Christianism}

References to Christianity have become increasingly central to national-populist rhetoric in the last decade or so (Zúquete 2008, 324–327; Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy 2016). These have not always been so central. Indeed, paganist ideas and symbols were influential in the 1980s and 1990s French National Front and the Italian Northern League.\textsuperscript{20} The accenting of Christianity represents a shift away from these paganist currents – and away from the anticlerical stance that had been foundational for the Austrian Freedom Party.

A few examples can serve to illustrate the increasingly common rhetorical references to Christianity. In the 2017 Presidential campaign, Marine Le Pen has emphasized the “Christian roots” of France (while at the same time noting that those roots were “secularized” [laicisé] by the Enlightenment);\textsuperscript{21} so have François Fillon and (before his defeat) Nicolas Sarkozy. The Swiss People’s Party’s programme proclaims its commitment to “upholding Switzerland’s Western, Christian culture” (Mazzoleni 2016, 50). The Italian Lega Nord committed itself to “the defense of the Christian roots of Europe”, while one of its leading figures – previously associated with pagan movement – garnered attention for appearing on television in a T-shirt reading “proud to be Christian” (McDonnell 2016, 21). And in the lead-up to the rerun of the Austrian Presidential election of December 2016, the FPÖ candidate Norbert Hofer included the words “so help me God” on his campaign posters, a gesture intended, according to his campaign manager, to signal his “deep embeddedness in the value system of Christian-Western culture”.\textsuperscript{22} The party had earlier campaigned in European elections on the slogan “Abendland in Christenhand” (“the West in Christian hands”); and party head Heinz-Christian Strache – breaking with the party’s own long-standing anticlerical traditions – had appeared holding a cross during a demonstration against the construction of an Islamic cultural centre in Vienna.\textsuperscript{23}
The timing of the increasing references to Christianity might seem puzzling. Northern and Western Europe, after all, is the most secularized region on earth. Religious practice declined earlier and more precipitously in mainly Protestant countries, where only about 5 per cent of the nominally or sociologically Christian population regularly attend church. More recently, church attendance has been declining sharply in Catholic countries as well and is approaching similarly low levels (Kaufmann, Goujon, and Skirbekk 2012). For this part of Europe, classical secularization theory not only describes a drastic and unparalleled decline in religious practice. As José Casanova (2006, 66) has emphasized, it also informs the self-understanding of many Europeans, who equate modernity with secularity and see religiosity per se as backward.

From a substantively Christian point of view, this distinctive trajectory of secularization can be seen as constituting a religious and civilizational crisis. For Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, for example, speaking in 2005, just before he became Pope Benedict XVI, contemporary European culture represented

the absolutely most radical contradiction not only of Christianity, but of the religious and moral traditions of humanity . . . The attempt, carried to the extreme, to manage human affairs disdaining God completely leads us increasingly to the edge of the abyss, to man’s ever greater isolation from reality.

The real “clash of cultures” is not between religions or civilizations; it is “between the radical emancipation of man from God” on the one hand and the “great religious cultures” on the other hand (Ratzinger 2005). As Pope, Benedict established an office dedicated to fostering a “new evangelization”, focused specifically on historically Christian areas that have “almost completely abandoned the Christian religion”.24

The Christianity invoked by the national populists of Northern and Western Europe, however, is not a substantive Christianity; it is a “secularized Christianity-as-culture” (Mouritsen 2006, 77), a civilizational and identitarian “Christianism”.25 It is a matter of belonging rather than believing, a way of defining “us” in relation to “them” (Roy 2016b).26 Crudely put, if “they” are Muslim, then “we” must, in some sense, be Christian. But that does not mean that “we” must be religious.27 It is precisely the ongoing erosion of Christianity as doctrine, organization, and ritual that makes it easy to invoke Christianity as a cultural and civilizational identity, characterized by putatively shared values that have little or nothing to do with religious belief or practice.28 As Europe becomes more secular, paradoxically, it is more easily represented as (culturally and civilizationally) Christian (Beckford 1994, 167).29

National populists are concerned with symbols of belonging, not with practices of worship.30 They are exercised by challenges to the public presence of Christian symbols and by the growing public visibility of Islamic symbols. The Northern League, for example, vociferously opposed legal efforts to remove
the crucifix from Italian classrooms or other public spaces (Ozzano and Giorgi 2013, 263–264).31 And national populists have taken the lead in mobilizing opposition to the visible public presence of Islam, whether in the form of minarets, mosques, special menus, or pious dress.32

The culturalization of religion is doubly convenient from a nationalist-populist point of view. On the one hand, it allows Christianity to be privileged as culture in a way that it cannot be so easily privileged as religion, given the liberal state’s commitment to neutrality in religious matters (Joppke 2013, 606). In this way, for example, the display of the cross in classrooms or other public settings can be defended as a symbol of European culture and identity (Mancini 2009, 2632–2636). On the other hand, it allows Muslim religious practices, redefined as cultural, to be restricted in a way that would not otherwise be possible, given the liberal state’s commitment to religious freedom (Mancini 2009, 2631). The most striking example of this is the French legislation banning the full face veil in public (Joppke and Torpey 2013, 25–26).

The identitarian Christianism of the national populists is thus a precipitate of their civilizational preoccupation with Islam. That preoccupation – which has become utterly central in the last fifteen years, to the point of constituting a new “master-frame” of European national-populist discourse (Vossen 2011) – is intrinsically relational and comparative. The definition of the constitutive other in civilizational terms invites a characterization of the self in the same register: the preoccupation with Islam calls forth a corresponding – and increasingly explicit – concern with Christianity, understood not as a religion, but as a civilization, as coextensive with “the West”, or with what used to be called “Christendom”.

This civilizational perspective rearticulates, of course, the orientalism analysed by Edward Said (1978) nearly forty years ago.33 The distinction between Christianity and Islam is located in developmental time and in political and cultural as well as geographic space.34 It is mapped onto a series of normatively charged oppositions: between liberal and illiberal, individualist and collectivist, democratic and authoritarian, West and East, modern and backward, and secular and religious.35 “Christianity” can thus be invoked by the national populists of Northern and Western Europe not in opposition to secularism but as its civilizational ground.36 In this civilizational perspective, secularism is not a tendency to be combatted; it is a value to be defended – and one that has grown precisely on Christian soil. If “they” are religious (in suspect ways) because they are Muslim, “we” are secular because we are (post-) Christian.37

**Secularism**

Historically, secularism in Europe was directed against the institutional power, political influence, and cultural authority of the Church, and it was generally
an ideology of the left. Today, secularist rhetoric in Northern and Western Europe is directed against Muslim immigrants and their descendants, whose religiosity is seen as threatening despite the fact that Islam has little institutional power, political influence, or cultural authority in the wider society.\textsuperscript{38} And as its target has shifted, so has its location on the political spectrum. Secularism is increasingly, though by no means exclusively, an ideology of the right, while the multiculturalist left – along with leading political theorists and philosophers – has become more open to accommodating religious symbols, beliefs, and practices in the public sphere (Bader\textsuperscript{2007}).\textsuperscript{39} The populist right has appropriated secularist rhetoric precisely when a small academic industry has developed around the notion of post-secularism.\textsuperscript{40}

To note that secularism has become an ideology of the national-populist right, and that the national-populist right has become increasingly secularist, is, of course, an oversimplification. There are assertively secularist currents of the left – especially in France, but also among some feminists in various countries (Fekete\textsuperscript{2006}) – that are resolutely hostile to the accommodation of religious difference in the public sphere. And there are important currents on the right that are strongly opposed to secularism and that seek to re-moralize public life by bringing substantively Christian perspectives to bear on the politics of family, gender, and sexuality. A network of Catholic associations and conservative groups, for example, succeeded in bringing several hundred thousand people into the streets to protest against the legalization of gay marriage in France in 2013 – though it is worth noting that Marine Le Pen pointedly declined to join in this protest (Roy\textsuperscript{2016a}). Yet while the national-populist right has not become consistently secularist in Northern and Western Europe, the secularist strand of national-populist discourse has become increasingly important in the last 15 years.

The secularism of the national-populist right is most striking in France. Given the distinctive French tradition of \textit{laïcité} (or secularity), this might seem unsurprising. But the embrace of \textit{laïcité} by the \textit{Front National} under Marline Le Pen is new.\textsuperscript{41} This shift was driven by the preoccupation with Islam.\textsuperscript{42} Le Pen infamously compared Friday prayers by Muslims in the streets of certain parts of Paris to the German occupation, and she made the spread of Halal food a central campaign theme in the last presidential election.\textsuperscript{43} In the current campaign, she has called for banning the headscarf – along with the kippa and, for an appearance of equality, “large crosses” – in all public settings, including stores, streets, workplaces, and public transportation.\textsuperscript{44} Parts of the mainstream right have adopted a similarly assertive secularist posture. In the name of \textit{laïcité}, for example, the mayors of several towns controlled by Sarkozy’s party announced last year that pork-free menu options – previously made available to accommodate Muslim and Jewish students – would no longer be offered in public schools.\textsuperscript{45}
The populist adoption of a neo-secularist stance is not limited to France. It is manifested – though in less consistent and fully articulated form – in Dutch, Danish, and Swiss populists’ talk of a “secular way of life” or a secular public sphere as values endangered by the public presence of Islam. It is manifested in vocal opposition to halal food in public institutions in various countries. It is manifested in the actual or proposed banning of ritual slaughter, without prior stunning, in a number of countries, and in growing opposition to infant circumcision. And it is manifested in the new wave of restrictions on Muslim women’s clothing, including not only the much-ridiculed burkini ban introduced by some French municipalities last summer but also the niqab bans proposed or enacted in several countries. In most of these contexts, secularism is not a deep or principled public philosophy; it is a transparently anti-Muslim populist stance. It is not religious symbols, arguments, or practices that are challenged; it is Muslim symbols, arguments, and practices.

**Liberalism**

The civilizational preoccupation with Islam has led national populists not only to (selectively) embrace secularism but also to (selectively) adopt liberal positions – or at least liberal rhetoric – on several issues. In striking contrast to the Christianist populisms of Hungary and Poland, the populist parties of Northern and Western Europe have broken with older anti-semitic discourses and underscored their philosemitism. They have made a substantial effort to represent themselves as committed to gender equality and women’s rights. They have underscored – albeit more tentatively – their support for at least some forms of gay rights. And they have presented themselves as champions of freedom of speech. They have done so to varying degrees and in varying ways in specific national contexts; and the rhetorical overtures towards liberal positions stand in more or less strong tension with more conservative rhetorical stances and policy positions. Yet fragmentary though it is, this repositioning is a striking phenomenon that upsets conventional analytical rubrics such as “radical right” and “extreme right” (Akkerman 2005; Göle 2011).

For parties like the French Front National (Askolovitch 2016) and the Austrian FPÖ (Bunzl 2005, 502–503) with roots in an older, openly anti-Semitic extreme Right, the new philosemitism marks a sharp break. Newer populist parties like the Belgian Vlaams Belang under Filip Dewinter (Wildman 2007) have also adopted a philosemitic stance. The philosemitic turn follows directly from the populist preoccupation with Islam. In the narrowly nationalist perspective of the traditional extreme right, Jews represented a threat to the ethnocultural homogeneity of the nation. But in the broader comparative civilizational perspective of the new populism, Jews are redefined as fellow Europeans and as exemplary victims of the threat from Islam. In the
context of attacks on Jews by Muslims in Belgium, Denmark, and especially in France, Jews are courted as newly vulnerable minorities that populist parties are well positioned to protect.

The embrace of gender equality is even more striking. Throughout Northern and Western Europe, national-populist parties have “nationalized” gender equality; they have claimed it as a characteristic national value (and as a fait accompli that needs no further political attention). But the civilizational register is equally important. Gender equality is not claimed as a unique national value. It is claimed as a European value with roots in the Christian tradition, while gender inequality and oppression are represented as inherent in Islam. The civilizational register externalizes gender inequality, redefining it as “their” problem, not “ours” – or as “our” problem only because of “their” disruptive presence in our midst. Muslim women are represented as victims of enforced covering, forced marriages, spousal violence, polygamy, genital cutting, and honour killings, while Western women are represented as threatened by conversion as well as by sexual assault from Muslim men.

The endorsement of gay rights has been much more tentative. Outside the Netherlands, most populist parties continue to endorse traditional paradigms of the family even as they denounce Islam as homophobic (Akkerman 2015). Yet here too there has been a striking discursive shift towards the acceptance of homosexuality and support for at least a minimal set of gay rights, and the Front National and other populist parties have discreetly sought to cultivate support from gays.

Philosemitism, gender equality, and support for gay rights occupy a structurally equivalent place in the anti-Islamic civilizational discourse. All three issues highlight “their” backwardness in relation to “our” modernity. Anti-semitism, the oppression of women, and homophobia are projected onto the immigrant and civilizational other, while the West – along with the individual nations of Northern and Western Europe – is represented as tolerant, liberal, and inclusive. The ironies of an intolerant, illiberal, and exclusionary celebration of one’s own tolerance, liberalism, and inclusiveness will be lost on nobody.

The embrace of Jews, women, and homosexuals is not only a discursive strategy, a way of claiming a liberal and progressive warrant for an anti-Islamic stance. It is also an electoral strategy, designed to reach out to new constituencies as part of an effort to gain mainstream acceptance (and, for some parties, to break through the cordon sanitaire that has excluded them from participation in coalition governments). The argument is that Jews, women, and gays are all threatened – physically as well as culturally – by the “Islamization” of Western societies; that mainstream parties, fearful of being censored as “Islamophobic”, remain silent about this threat; that Jews, women, and gays with leftist or multicultural sympathies therefore suffer from a kind of false consciousness; and that their interests are in fact best represented by populist parties, who are unafraid to “tell it like it is”.

ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES

13
Freedom of speech, too – like secularism – has been championed increasingly by the right, while the multiculturalist left has supported measures criminalizing “hate speech” that are in place in many European countries.56 But national populists’ embrace of freedom of speech has been as selective as their defence of secularism. In response to dramatic events like the Rushdie affair, the Van Gogh murder, the Danish cartoon controversy, and the Charlie Hebdo massacre, they have defended freedom of artistic expression against claims to protect the sensibilities of Muslim minorities.57 National populists have also defended freedom of political expression in response to prosecutions of populist leaders like Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen for “hate speech”.58 And, more generally, they have defended freedom of speech against what they claim is a dictatorship of political correctness. But they are not interested in defending speech in general; they are especially interested in defending speech that is critical of Islam and Muslims. They are certainly not opposed to the intensified surveillance, policing, and prosecution of the speech of Muslims in connection with counter-extremism campaigns, which proceeds by means of nebulous categories such as “glorification of terrorism” (Mchangama 2016).

The seemingly contradictory joining of Christianism, secularism, and liberalism by the national-populist right, in short, is explained by the overarching preoccupation with Islam as an alien and threatening civilization. Christianity is selectively embraced not as a religion but as a civilizational identity, a matter of belonging rather than believing. Secularism is selectively embraced as a way of minimizing the visibility of Islam in the public sphere – but also as a way of excluding or delegitimizing substantively Christian arguments for openness towards or solidarity with migrants and refugees. Liberalism, finally, is selectively embraced as a characterization of “our” way of life in constitutive opposition to the putatively essential illiberalism of Islam.

Of course, not all populists who invoke Christianity do so in support of secularism and liberalism. The thoroughgoing secularization and ascendant social liberalism of Northern and Western Europe invite the use of Christianity as a marker of a secular and liberal civilizational identity in constitutive opposition to Islam. But some populists, equally opposed to Islam, reject secularism and liberalism. The Christianity they invoke is not a mere identity; it is a substantive religious message, intended to shore up the crumbling moral foundations of social order, and especially to defend family, community, and traditional values against the corrosive effects of unbridled individualism and a hyper-permissive culture of self-expression. The irony, of course, is that the substantively Christianist critique of relativistic liberalism parallels in many respects the Islamist critique of the moral decay and corruption of the Western social order.

The tension between the embrace of liberalism and the challenge to liberalism – between civilizational self-celebration and civilizational self-critique –
defines not so much a dimension of differentiation between populist parties as an important axis of contention within them. I have focused selectively on one side of this argument: on the joining of liberalism, secularism, and identitarian Christianism. But liberalism and secularism remain important terrains of contestation on the populist right, even as an anti-Islamic stance has become hegemonic.

A comparative glance

I began by situating the national populisms of Northern and Western Europe in the context of the broader trans-Atlantic and pan-European populist conjuncture. Central to the broader populist moment, I suggested, is a twofold opposition between “us” and “them”: a vertical opposition between “the people” and a corrupt, self-serving, out-of-touch political, economic, or cultural “elite”; and a horizontal opposition between “the nation” and groups, institutions, or forces that are stigmatized as non-national or characterized as threatening the nation from within or from without. Both Trumpism and European national populisms, east and west, join the horizontal and vertical oppositions by characterizing “the elite” as “outside” the moral community of the people as well as “on top”: not only as failing to represent the interests of ordinary people, but also as failing to protect or even to share their national identity.

On a certain level of abstraction, then, one can fruitfully treat Trumpism and European national populisms as a single phenomenon. And transatlantic populisms are not just similar; they are interconnected by discursive and organizational networks and by processes of learning and imitation. European national populists have been energized by Brexit and the Trump victory, and they hope to profit from this momentum. Even though Norbert Hofer fell short in the Austrian presidential election in December 2016, elections in 2017 in the Netherlands, France, the Czech Republic, Norway, and Germany (and in 2018 at the latest in Italy, Austria, and Sweden) present new opportunities for populists.

Yet these populisms are, of course, also highly differentiated. They have arisen in different economic, political, and cultural contexts; they draw their support from different segments of the population; they include challengers and incumbents, calls for radical change and calls for order and stability, upstart movements and long-established parties, neoliberal and protectionist or welfarist stances, family-values conservatism and lifestyle libertarianism.

A sustained comparative analysis of contemporary national populisms would be far beyond the scope of this paper. But I want to briefly highlight the distinctiveness of the Northern and Western European (NWE) populisms I have been discussing by considering them first in relation to the Trump
campaign and then in relation to East Central European (ECE) populisms. Many differences could, of course, be highlighted. But to keep the discussion manageable, I focus on differences that bear most closely on the themes of this paper. In a nutshell: while the Trump campaign and ECE populisms share with NWE populisms an identitarian Christianism and a crude anti-Muslim rhetoric, they do not present themselves as secularist or liberal, they are more nationalist than civilizationist, and their anti-Muslimism is more securitarian than identitairan.

**The Trump campaign**

The Trump campaign’s Christianism – epitomized by references in campaign speeches in the final months of the campaign to “one people, under one God, saluting one American flag” – was entirely secular. Like the Christianism of NWE populisms, it signified belonging rather than believing: it functioned as a “litmus test of national belonging” while being stripped of any “ethical content [or] transcendental reference” (Gorski 2016).

Yet while Trump’s Christianism was entirely secular, it was not in the least secularist. Given the much higher levels of religious belief and practice in the United States, this is not surprising. There is no American equivalent of the prevailing Western European tendency to equate modernity with secularity and to see religiosity per se as backwards. Religiosity – or at least some show of religiosity – is widely understood not only as normal and desirable but even, for a presidential candidate, as obligatory.

Secularism is seen on the American religious right – indeed, on the American right more generally – not as threatened, but as threatening: as a political project of the left that threatens to limit “religious freedom”. Trump cultivated the religious right not only by promising to appoint pro-life judges, but also by endorsing its “religious freedom” agenda (Clarkson 2016). He promised notably to sign the so-called First Amendment Defense Act, which was proposed by Republicans in Congress in response to the Supreme Court decision of 2015 that legalized gay marriage. In the name of religious freedom, this legislation would expressly protect individuals or businesses who act “in accordance with a religious belief or moral conviction that: (1) marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one woman, or (2) that sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage”. In effect, this would legalize a wide range of discriminatory action based on religious beliefs or moral convictions about marriage and sexuality.

While NWE populists embraced ostensibly liberal values, Trump relished affronting liberal values and sensibilities. Liberalism, like secularism, is a dirty word on the American right. It is understood not as a threatened value that must be defended, but as a threatening force that must be defeated. The liberalism that has long been demonized on the American
right, to be sure, differs from the liberalism to which European national populists, however hollowly, profess their allegiance. It is in the first instance a liberalism of “government intervention”, not a liberalism of dignity, equality, autonomy, and human rights. But unlike his Republican predecessors, Trump did not target big-government liberalism. Indeed, his proposals for massive new infrastructure spending have alarmed Republican small-government deficit hawks. Instead, in his comments about Mexicans, Muslims, and women, and in his cultivation of white racial resentment, Trump repeatedly affronted precisely the liberal values that Northern and Western European populists claim to stand for.

Anti-Muslimism figured in an ugly way in Trump’s campaign, but it was much less salient for Trump than for NWE populists. For the latter, Islam is the constitutive other, but Trump’s campaign devoted as much or more attention to other others. For NWE populists, moreover, Islam is construed as an internal as well as an external threat, and as a matter of identity as well as security; hence the obsession with “Islamization”. For Trump, Islam is an external threat, a matter of security rather than identity.

NWE populisms, finally, are civilizationist as much as they are nationalist: the opposition between self and other is drawn in broad civilizational terms, not in narrowly national terms. But Trumpism is entirely nationalist. Trump promised to restore American “greatness” through a consistent America-firstism, indeed by proposing that America go it alone and extricate itself from encumbering international entanglements and alliances. Of course, Eurosceptic NWE populists seek disengagement as well; Marine Le Pen, for example, has promised a referendum on the EU within 6 months if she wins the French presidency. But even as Euroskeptic populists challenge or reject the Eurozone, Schengen, or the European Union itself, they remain culturally as Europeanist as they are nationalist. Indeed, one of their chief complaints against Brussels is that it has failed to keep Europe European.

Trump’s nationalism is not culturally embedded in a broader civilizationism; it is almost entirely US-focused.64 As Gorski (2016) has argued – in an essay seeking to explain why many evangelical Christians supported Trump – Trumpism can be understood as a secularized form of American religious nationalism, which has always rested on strong forms of American exceptionalism. Trump employed apocalyptic and blood-drenched rhetoric and portrayed himself as a secularized saviour, claiming in his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention that “I alone” can redress America’s ills and “make America great again”.

**East Central European national populism**

Since the post-1989 change of regime, national populism has appeared in various forms and contexts throughout East Central Europe (Učeň 2007;
limit my consideration here to Viktor Orbán’s national populist, and increasingly authoritarian, Fidesz regime in Hungary (which has served as a model for Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice regime in Poland), on the one hand, and the broader populist response to the 2015 refugee crisis, on the other hand.65

To an even greater extent than NWE national populisms, the Orbán regime has wrapped itself in references to Christianity and to the “Christian-national” idea. The preamble to the new Fidesz-imposed Constitution, for example, “recognize[s] the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood”, and Orbán has said “Hungary will be Christian, or it will cease to exist” (Balogh 2015b; Orbán 2015b). Like the (less pronounced) Christianism of Trump and NWE national populism, Orbán’s Christianism is entirely secular; it functions as a marker of identity rather than as a sign of religious practice or belief (Ádám and Bozóki 2016).66 Yet the identity work done by appeals to Christianity is quite different in Hungary (and East Central Europe) than in NWE.

The growing civilizational preoccupation with Islam in NWE populism has profoundly transformed the political semantics of self and other: the collective self is increasingly defined in broadly civilizational, not narrowly national terms. The civilizational-level semantics of self and other have internalized liberalism – along with secularism, philosemitism, gender equality, gay rights, and free speech – as an identity marker of the Christian West vis-à-vis a putatively intrinsically illiberal Islam.

In Hungary (and in East Central Europe more generally), the prevailing political semantics of self and other remain fundamentally nationalist. In the context of post-communist transition, the nationalist semantics of self and other externalize liberalism, construing it as a non-national and even anti-national project that subordinates the interests of the nation to foreign capital, on the one hand, and to foreign models of multiculturalism, Roma rights, LGBT rights, and refugee protection, on the other hand.67 The long-standing nationalist trope of resistance to “centuries of foreign rule” – in the context of the distinctive geopolitical vulnerability of the small states of East Central Europe – allows liberalism to be seen as the latest in a long series of projects of foreign domination undertaken by powerful neighbouring states and empires, by international communism, and today by dictates from Brussels and grants from the Open Society Foundation.68 That liberalism is associated implicitly – and in the rhetoric of the radical-right Hungarian Jobbik party, explicitly – with the Jewish intelligentsia rather than the “Christian middle classes” only reinforces its coding as non-national or anti-national. And Orbán has taken the lead in articulating an explicit critique of liberalism and liberal democracy.

Until the last few years, Islam had been essentially irrelevant to national populism in East Central Europe, except in parts of the Balkans with long-settled Muslim populations. The refugee crisis of 2015, however, catapulted
Muslims to the forefront of national-populist rhetoric throughout the region. As hundreds of thousands fleeing mainly from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq made their way north from Greece, hoping to reach Germany or Sweden, they passed through East Central Europe, offering an irresistible political opportunity to national populists. Orbán took the lead, constructing a razor-wire fence along Hungary’s southern border with Serbia and Croatia and castigating EU leaders for failing to defend Europe’s external borders and thereby endangering Europe’s Christian identity (Orbán 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). Others were quick to follow. In the run-up to the Polish parliamentary elections of October 2015, Law and Justice party leader Jarosław Kaczyński warned of a (non-existent) deal to bring 100,000 Muslims to Poland and characterized refugees as vectors of disease, bringing “various types of parasites, protozoas, which aren’t dangerous in the organisms of these people, but which could be dangerous here”. The nominally social democratic Prime Minister of Slovakia, Robert Fico, vowed that the country would not accept “a single Muslim”. And Czech President Milos Zeman characterized the European migration crisis as an “organized invasion” masterminded by the Muslim Brotherhood in order to “gain control of Europe”.

NWE anti-Muslimism had developed gradually over a quarter of a century, gaining momentum since 9/11. ECE anti-Muslimism crystallized much more abruptly, in an atmosphere of moral panic. Given the miniscule number of Muslims in the region (outside the Balkans), the panic has concerned Muslims “at the gates” rather than – as in NWE – the large and for the most part long-settled internal Muslim populations. Like Trump’s anti-Muslimism, ECE anti-Muslimism has been primarily securitarian, with its rhetoric of an “invasion” and its focus on crime, disease, and terrorism.

ECE anti-Muslimism, to be sure, has an identitarian and civilizational dimension that was absent from the Trump campaign. It draws on the historical trope of “antemurale Christianitatis” – the idea, central to nationalist historiography and myth throughout the region, of ECE nations as “bulwarks of Christianity” against Islam. Yet unlike its NWE counterpart, ECE anti-Muslimism – notwithstanding scattered references to the status of women and gays in the Muslim world – does not highlight and celebrate the liberalism of the West against the illiberalism of Islam. Under Orbán’s leadership, ECE national populists directly challenge the “suicidal liberalism” of the West. For Orbán, only the reconstruction of polities on (identitarian) Christian and national rather than bankrupt liberal principles can “keep Europe Christian” and save Europe from itself.

ECE anti-Muslimism is more superficial and conjunctural than its NWE counterpart. It has been opportunistically exploited – and milked for maximum effect – during the refugee crisis. But for Orbán, at least, who is playing a long game (even as he has sought to make the most of the refugee crisis), anti-Muslimism is of secondary importance. Orban denied
that those arriving in Hungary – even those fleeing Syria – were genuine refugees, since they had passed through other safe countries en route to Hungary and points north. He defined them as economic migrants seeking a better life, and he sought to reframe the refugee crisis as the tip of an iceberg: as the premonitory symptom of a much larger-scale south–north mass migration that threatens to overwhelm not just Hungary but Europe.75 “The truly serious threat”, said Orbán in a major 2015 speech, “comes not from war zones, but from the depths of Africa”.76 Faced with this great migration wave, Orbán has repeatedly warned that Hungary must “defend its ethnic and cultural composition” (Orbán 2015b). At stake, Orbán argued, is the very “survival of European values and European nations”, threatened with “disappearance, or with being transformed into something unrecognizable”.77

Conclusion

The shift to a secularist and ostensibly liberal yet Christianist stance by national populists in Northern and Western Europe is partial and fragmentary. It is also strikingly contradictory. Its liberalism is deeply illiberal,78 and its identitarian Christianism is devoid of religious content. The contradictions are not surprising: bound by no stable substantive ideological or programmatic commitments, populism is distinctively and chronically eclectic, given to instrumentalizing whatever issues seem exploitable at the moment.79

Still, the joining of identitarian Christianism with secularist and liberal rhetoric challenges prevailing understandings of national populism. In the first place, it challenges easy recourse to labels like “extreme right”.80 Neither “extreme” nor “right” is an unproblematic characterization. In an older literature, “extreme right” parties were those that rejected the basic foundations of the constitutional order. These parties were “extreme” in their anti-system orientation. The populist parties of Northern and Western Europe are not extreme in this sense (though Hungary’s Fidesz regime, while not an anti-system party, has nonetheless substantially eroded the foundations of the liberal democratic constitutional order). Some populists – most notoriously Geert Wilders – are certainly extreme in their anti-Muslim rhetoric, though others, including Marine Le Pen, are much more cautious and indeed mainstream in their rhetoric. But even Wilders, whose anti-Muslim rhetoric is astonishingly crude and harsh, does not fit the profile of the extreme right in other respects, both because of the party’s liberalism on social questions, and because of its sharp turn from neoliberalism to an emphatic defence of the welfare state in recent years (De Jong 2015). Other national-populist parties, having similarly shifted from a neoliberal to a protectionist and pro-welfare state stance, are likewise difficult to place on a one-dimensional left–right axis. The categories left and right, after all, have been scrambled in recent decades as the axes of political contention have multiplied, and populism
has contributed to that scrambling. One may therefore doubt the analytical usefulness of the label “extreme right” as a catch-all term for national-populist parties, even if one appreciates the political work done by such characterizations in demarcating, for example, acceptable from unacceptable coalition partners.

The joining of identitarian Christianism with secularist and liberal rhetoric also challenges prevailing understandings of populist xenophobia as fundamentally nationalist. The populist parties I have been discussing are, of course, nationalist. But they are at the same time civilizationalist.

In the aftermath of Brexit, and at a moment when the break-up of Britain, Spain, or Belgium is a real possibility, one needs no reminder that classic territorial forms of nationalism are alive and well in Europe. But elsewhere in Northern and Western Europe, where the “national question” in its classic territorial form is not on the agenda, the civilizational overlay of nationalist rhetoric is increasingly pronounced, and the semantics of self and other are rearticulated in broadly civilizational rather than narrowly national terms.

This raises the paradoxical possibility that the ostensibly and even demonstratively nationalist populisms of Northern and Western Europe may not be all that substantively national or nationalist. Talk of “the nation” is not disappearing, but “the nation” is being re-characterized in civilizational terms. Less emphasis is placed on national differences (notably language and specifically national cultural particularities and traditions), more emphasis on civilizational differences (notably religious traditions and their secular legacies). And when religious differences are highlighted, it is not the intra-Christian confessional differences that have historically been closely aligned with national identities in Europe; it is the supra-confessional civilizational divide between (Judeo-) Christianity and Islam.

Nationalism, like populism, is a supremely flexible and adaptable discourse. One might therefore think that civilizationism is better understood as a new articulation of nationalism than as an alternative to it. Yet I would argue that it is both. Insofar as the content of national culture or national identity is specified in civilizational language, civilizationism can be understood as a form of nationalism, a way of talking about “the nation”. But insofar as the boundaries of belonging and the semantics of self and other are reconceptualized in civilizational terms, then one can speak of an alternative to nationalism. In this sense, civilizational discourse refers to a different kind of imagined community, located at a different level of cultural and political space, than national discourse. As an alternative principle of vision and division of the world, civilizationism does not supersede nationalism; it combines with nationalism. But it is not simply reducible to a form of nationalism.

The story I have sketched is laced with ironies and reversals. Secularism is criticized by the left and reclaimed by the right. The national-populist right
proclaims its liberalism and its commitment to philosemitism, gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech. As Europe becomes more secular, it is increasingly represented as (Judeo-) Christian, in constitutive opposition to Islam. Christianity is celebrated as the matrix of liberalism, secularity, and gender equality. Seemingly nationalist projects and parties may be less nationalist than civilizationist. And even as the European project falters – with the eurozone, Schengen, and the EU itself in deep crisis – a European identity, defined in religio-civilizational terms, has come to figure more centrally in political rhetoric.

Notes

1. The populist moment, of course, is not confined to Europe and the United States: during this same period, Narendra Modi was elected Prime Minister of India, and Rodrigo Duterte President of the Philippines. On the other hand, populism is not globally synchronized: the wave of Latin American left populisms of the preceding decade has been receding.

2. On horizontal and vertical dimensions, see also Biorcio 2003, 72–73; Jansen 2011, 84. Among more recent theoretical discussions of populism, see also, from a large literature, Mudde (2004); Canovan (2004); Laclau (2005); Priester (2012); Urbinati (2013, 2015); Kaltwasser (2014); Müller (2016). For a broad survey of European radical right populism, see Mudde (2007); a briefer and more recent historical survey of populism in the United States and Europe is provided by Judis (2016).

3. On the performative dimension of populism, see Moffitt and Tormey (2014).

4. Other important aspects of these populisms – notably their Euroskepticism and their shift from neoliberal to protectionist and pro-welfare state stances – fall outside the scope of this discussion. On Euroskepticism, see the overview in Vasilopoulou (2013). For the shift from neoliberalism to welfarism, see Edgar (2016).


7. Since the programme was devoted to exploring the issue of anti-gay violence, Khalil El-Moumni’s remarks were seen as particularly inflammatory, especially since the editors did not include the imam’s remarks opposing anti-gay violence (Hekma 2002). Subsequent press reports revealed that El-Moumni had previously characterized Europeans as “lower than dogs and pigs” for permitting gay marriage (which had just been legalized in the Netherlands, the first country to do so). See http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/5009/Archief/article/detail/2500894/2001/06/15/Van-Boxtel-Imam-heeft-gelogen.dhtml. The imam was summoned to meet the Minister of Urban Affairs, and the Prime Minister
instructed Dutch Muslims at length about respecting Dutch tolerance of homosexuality (Hekma 2002, 241–242). El-Moumni was prosecuted under hate speech and anti-discrimination laws but acquitted on the ground of religious freedom (Kugle 2013, 119–121).

8. Muslim immigrants and their descendants do indeed have more conservative attitudes in matters of sexual morality than the population at large in the Netherlands and other European countries of immigration (Röder 2015). And they are overrepresented in Dutch police records of anti-gay violence (Buijs, Hekma, and Duyvendak 2011, 634). But there is no evidence that El-Moumni’s specific views – representing the very conservative sexual morality of orthodox religious milieux – were representative of those of Dutch Muslims at large (Mepschen 2009). And there is ample evidence that “native” Dutch continue to harbour a great deal of ambivalence about homosexuality (Buijs Hekma, and Duyvendak 2011), even as they express the highest levels of support in Europe for non-discrimination and equal rights (Gerhards 2010).

9. This, as Van der Veer (2006) has argued, is the context for the centrality of “enjoyment” in the Dutch politics of culture vis-à-vis Islam. Van der Veer uses the notion of “enjoyment” in a much more straightforward sense than Žižek (1993, 201–205), for whom “enjoyment” and the “theft of enjoyment” were central to nationalism.


11. After 9/11, the 1997 book was republished with a slightly different title, a new piece reflecting on 9/11, a critical response by a Dutch imam, Abdullah Haselhoef, and a cover photo of Fortuyn facing Haselhoef, their “western” and “eastern” clothes indexing the “clash of civilizations” described in the book. To add to the piquancy of the face-off between the two men, Haselhöf, who had a reputation as a liberal imam, gained notoriety in the fall of 2001 by arguing that anal sex should be punishable by death if witnessed by four reliable men (Eyerman 2008, 103; Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens 2010, 968). In this context, the book received more attention.


15. http://www.nltimes.nl/2016/07/25/wilders-renews-call-de-islamize-attacks-germany/. These and other proposals can also be found on Wilders’ twitter feed, which has 700,000 followers.


19. One of the first to identify this repositioning was Zúquete (2008). Others who have commented on it include Göle (2011) and Roy (2016b).

20. On the paganism of the “nouvelle droite” in the last two decades of the twentieth century, see François (2005); on anti-Christianism as a structuring element of new right paganism, see François (2005, 184ff). On paganist currents


25. The term “Christianism” was introduced by Andrew Sullivan (2003, 2006) to designate the ideology and agenda of the Christian right in the United States. As a specifically religious political programme of “Godly governance”, Christianism in this sense takes secularism (or “secular humanism”) as its chief enemy. But the Christianism espoused by Northern and Western European national populists – like the Christianism of the Trump campaign (Gorski 2016) – is not substantively religious but identitarian. I follow Gorski in using “Christianism” in this identitarian sense.

26. The theme of “belonging without believing” (Riis 1996, 119ff), like its counterpart “believing without belonging” (Davie 1994), has been central to the sociology of religion in contemporary Europe. Its connection to populist invocations of Christian identity is highlighted by the contributions to Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy (2016); see especially Roy (2016b), 193ff.

27. Nor does it imply an alignment between national populist parties and Christian churches. On the ambivalent and often antagonistic relations between populist parties and churches, see the essays in Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy (2016).


29. In mainstream political discourse, to be sure, one finds fewer explicit references to Christianity as a central aspect of cultural or civilizational identity. As Weiler (2004) has argued, Christianity-talk continues to be widely seen, at least in liberal circles, as politically embarrassing or at least inopportune and as out of place in official public representations of European identity. In certain contexts, however, Christianity has emerged from the background and become the focus of broader public discussion. These include the high-profile Lautsi case at the European Court of Human Rights, concerning the display of the crucifix in Italian classrooms (Ozzano and Giorgi 2013; Joppke 2013), debates about a possible reference to Christianity in the Preamble to the European Constitution (Weiler 2004), and, above all, discussions of Turkey’s possible accession to the European Union (Hurd 2006; Minkenberg 2012; Minkenberg et al. 2012).

30. They are concerned with practices of worship only insofar as they come to be seen as symbols of belonging, as in the case of Marine Le Pen’s opposition to Muslim prayers in the street, which I discuss in the next section.

31. The issue wound up at the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled initially against the display of the crucifix in schools. This provoked so strong a wave of public protest – not only on the part of national populists – that the court’s Grand Chamber reversed the initial ruling on appeal (Joppke 2013).
32. On the Swiss referendum banning minarets, see Mazzoleni (2016, 52–56); on campaigns against Mosques, see Marzouki, McDonnell, and Roy (2016); on opposition to special menus and restrictions on pious dress, see the next section.

33. See also Massad’s sweeping analysis of how liberalism has “constitute[d] Islam in constituting itself” (2015, 12).

34. On the temporal mapping invoked in civilizational representations of Islam in the realm of gender and sexual politics, see Butler (2008).

35. With the signs reversed, of course, equally sweeping civilizational contrasts mapped onto a series of normatively charged oppositions are deployed in “occidentalist” critiques of the West by Muslim intellectuals. See the discussion of “religious occidentalism” in Buruma and Margalit (2005), 101–136.

36. In this comparative civilizational frame, Christianity is thus constructed as the unique civilizational fount of secularism and secular democratic politics. As Elizabeth Hurd (2006, 409) notes, following Olivier Roy (1999, 10), this claim to a (Judeo-) Christian monopoly of the civilizational sources of secularism has been one source of opposition to Turkey’s accession to the EU. In some contexts, to be sure, it is not (Western) Christianity per se but specific forms of Christianity that are seen as the matrix of secularism and liberalism; on claims made about Lutheranism in Denmark, see Mouritsen (2006, 78–81).

37. For a serious scholarly argument, in a very different register, characterizing Christianity as a “religion to exit from religion”, see Gauchet (1997). On the Christian origins of the category “secular” and the longue durée developments within Christianity that have shaped the emergence and consolidation of understandings and practices we now think of as secular, including, crucially, the practice of distinguishing between “religious” and “secular” matters and the understanding of “religion” as a phenomenon of interior faith or belief that can and should be confined to the private realm, along with the correlative understanding of a “secular” public sphere, see illustratively Asad (2003); Taylor (2007); Calhoun (2010).

38. Secular visions of national identity continue to be articulated against the institutional power of majoritarian and historically dominant forms of religion in countries (such as Poland) in which the dominant religion still has considerable institutional power, political influence, and cultural authority. (On the conflict between ethno-religious and civic-secular visions of nationhood in Poland, see Zubrzycki 2006.) In the US, too, what Gorski (2017) has called “radical secularism” is directed against the continued robust presence of Christianity in American public life. But in highly secularized Northern and Western Europe, secular visions of national (or civilizational) identity are articulated in very different way, against minoritarian but putatively threatening forms of religiosity.

39. This is one aspect of a broader process of “ideological inversion” (Friedman 2016, 216; see also Buruma 2006, 30).

40. On post-secularism, see Habermas (2008). For Habermas, “post-secular” does not refer to an increase in religious belief or practice. It refers to a “change in consciousness” that “undermines the secularistic belief in the foreseeable disappearance of religion and robs the secular understanding of the world of any triumphal zest”. Habermas accepts the consensual characterization of Europe as a uniquely secularized region. A post-secular understanding, on his view, relativizes Europeans’ self-understanding by seeing the European case in global perspective as the exception rather than the norm. A post-secular self-understanding is also open to appreciating the relevance of religious traditions.
— even in largely secular Europe — as “communities of interpretation” capable of providing valuable insights and arguments on political issues defined by conflicts of values; Habermas mentions as examples euthanasia, abortion, reproductive medicine, animal rights, and climate change.


42. The Islam-driven rightward shift of secularism is also strikingly illustrated by Riposte Laïque (Secular Response), an openly anti-Islamic initiative that, since 2007, has produced an online journal, published numerous books, and organized demonstrations and meetings against “Islamization”, including a public “apéro saucisson pinard” to protest Friday prayers in the streets of the Goutte d’Or district of Paris by drinking wine and eating sausage. The prefecture of police, citing concerns about public order, denied permission for the event in the Goutte d’Or, so it was held on the Champs Elysees instead. This served as the model for other proposed public sausage and wine events. See, for example, http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/07/11/apéritif-saucisson-vin-rouge-la-droite-populaire-se-divise_1547547_823448.html. On the discourse of Riposte Laïque, see Nilsson (2015).


46. The defence of a secular public sphere is also as a way of excluding or delegitimizing substantively Christian arguments for openness towards or solidarity with migrants and refugees; see Mazzoleni (2016, 52, 58) on the Swiss case.

47. Principled opposition to halal (and kosher) slaughter without prior stunning and to infant circumcision does not single out Muslims, and it is driven by concerns to protect animal rights or (in the case of circumcision) the right to bodily integrity. However, anti-Islamic populists have often opportunistically joined opponents of these practices.

48. On Polish populism, see Stanley (2016); on Hungary, see the next section.

49. On the structural shift from nationalist anti-semitism to civilizational Islamophobia, see Bunzl (2005). On the figuring of Jews as exemplary victims of the threat from Islam, see Zúquete (2008, 328). Significantly, even Guillaume Faye, an influential intellectual of the extreme right who complains about the “soft genocide”
being carried out against the “autochthonous” populations of Europe by “their own ethnomasochist and xenophilic elites” (Faye 2016), has denounced antisemitism (Faye 2007) and highlighted the threats European Jews face from Islam (Faye 2015).

50. Akkerman and Hagelund (2007); Betz and Meret (2009, 322–323); Andreassen 2012. Akkerman (2015) cautions that the liberal rhetoric coexists (except in the case of the Dutch Party for Freedom) with relatively conservative family policies. As Akkerman notes, however, the qualification “relatively” is important: as conservatives in prevailing liberal contexts, these parties formulate their conservatism in liberal terms and avoid campaigning against liberal policies or public opinion (2015, 56–57).


52. See, for example, the charter statement of the transnational populist initiative “Women against Islamization”, founded by the Belgian Vlaams Belang, which characterizes women as the “first and foremost victims of Islamization”. http://www.vrouwen tegen islamisering.be/21-2/?lang=en. Vlaams Belang head Filip Dewinter seized the occasion of the Cologne aggressions of New Year’s Eve 2015 to speak in the Belgian parliament about the alleged dangers posed to women by Muslim men: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6xChMxoKGSs. Marine Le Pen, similarly, used the Cologne aggressions and incidents elsewhere to castigate the silence of the French left “faced with these fundamental attacks on the rights of women” http://www.lopinion.fr/edition/politique/marine- pen-referendum-sortir-crise-migratoire-94568.

53. On the Front National’s cultivation of support from gays, see Lestrade (2012, chapter 2). Roy (2016a, 89) notes that while it does not endorse gay marriage, the Front National pointedly declined to join the Catholic Church’s major mobilization against gay marriage. Even the Flemish Vlaams Belang, known for its conservative views on family and sexuality, and the only party to oppose gay marriage when it was legalized in Belgium in 2003, has gestured towards support for gay rights (Coffé and Dewulf 2014, 161).

54. As Massad (2015) shows, the discursive construction of Islam as the antithesis of Western liberalism has a long history. Massad does not focus on populist discourse in contemporary Europe as such but traces the broader discursive processes through which “despotism, intolerance, misogyny, and homophobia” were “projected onto Islam”, as a result of which Europe could emerge as “democratic, tolerant, philogynist and homophilic” (12).

55. On the mainstreaming efforts of populist parties, see Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn (2016).

56. In principle, EU member states are required to adopt such measures by the 2008 EU “Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia”, but compliance has been uneven. Needless to say, the broad prohibitions on hate speech found in the EU could not exist in the United States, where an expansive First Amendment jurisprudence protects offensive speech.

57. This insistence on freedom of expression vis-à-vis sacred symbols has served (like the embrace of philosemitism, gender equality, and gay rights) to highlight “their” backwardness in relation to “our” modernity. As Mahmood (2009, 843–845) has argued, it presents “them” as immaturely objecting to mere words or images and failing to recognize them as arbitrary signs. This view, she argues, drawing on the work of Keane (2007), reflects a distinctive Western “semiotic
ideology” that makes it impossible to understand why many Muslims felt so deeply offended by the Danish cartoons.

58. Le Pen had been charged with “inciting hatred” for her 2010 remarks, mentioned above, comparing Friday prayers by Muslims in the streets of certain parts of Paris to the German occupation; she was acquitted in 2015. Wilders had been acquitted in 2011 for remarks characterizing Islam as a “fascist religion,” but he was convicted in 2016 (without any punishment being imposed) of “inciting discrimination” for remarks made to his political supporters in 2014, asking if they wanted to have fewer or more Moroccans in the country, and responding, after the crowd chanted “fewer”, “we’ll take care of that”. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/09/geert-wilders-found-guilty-in-hate-speech-trial-but-no-sentence-imposed. As the trial got underway, Wilders characterized it as a “travesty”: “If speaking about this is punishable, then the Netherlands is no longer a free country but a dictatorship.” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/28/dutch-far-right-mp-geert-wilders-says-race-hate-trial-is-travesty.

59. On the tension within the Front National, see Roy (2016a, 84–85 and 92–93); on the tension within the Austrian Freedom Party, see Hadj-Abdou (2016, 43).

60. Although the so-called “nones” – people with no religious affiliation – now constitute nearly a quarter of the population, atheists remain a small minority, only about 7 per cent. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/13/a-closer-look-at-americas-rapidly-growing-religious-nones/.

61. This was a potential problem for Trump, who was obliged to declare the Bible his favourite book.


63. Some NWE populists, of course, have likewise deliberately offended liberal sensibilities, competing to be the most politically incorrect. But they have done so in the name of liberal values, including freedom of speech, said to be endangered by Islam.

64. The notion of a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West, to be sure, is central to the discourse of Steve Bannon, Trump’s chief strategist. But Bannon is a fierce critic of secularism and liberalism, not a defender of secularism and liberalism vis-à-vis a putatively intrinsically illiberal Islam.

65. On the populism of the Fidesz regime, see Bozóki (2015) and Enyedi (2016). The populism of incumbents obviously differs from that of challengers. On the one hand, incumbents are evidently limited in their ability to attack the government for failing to represent the interests or protect the identity of “the people”, but that does not prevent incumbents from appealing to the people against “the elite”. This may be a cultural or economic elite or even a political or legal elite ensconced in institutions (such as constitutional courts or parliaments) that are held to be unrepresentative of “the people”. On the other hand, incumbents control a wide range of resources – symbolic and material – that allow them to represent themselves as promoting the interests of “the people” (understood in the vertical dimension as “ordinary people”) vis-à-vis “the elite” and as protecting the identity of “the people” (understood in the horizontal dimension as “the nation”) vis-à-vis forces within or without that are said to threaten it.

66. Hungary (unlike Poland) is as secular as the countries of NWE, with only 12 per cent claiming to attend religious services at least once a week (2004

67. For Orbán’s critique of liberalism, see Orbán (2014, 2015b).

68. As Orbán put it already in 2011, “We did not tolerate being dictated to from Vienna in 1848 nor from Moscow in 1956 and 1990. Now we’re not going to allow ourselves to be dictated to by anyone from Brussels or anywhere else.” http://www.irishtimes.com/news/brussels-will-not-dictate-to-hungary-says-pm-1.574344.

69. For a detailed analysis of the sudden development of anti-Muslimism in Hungary, see Pall and Sayfo (2016).


75. Significantly, Orbán has repeatedly used the term népvándorlás to designate this mass migration. Népvándorlás is the Hungarian equivalent of the German Völkerverwanderung or “migration of peoples”, the term used to describe the mass migrations (or from the point of view of Rome, the barbarian invasions – of late antiquity. On Orbán’s redefinition of the refugee crisis, see Balogh (2015a).


77. Ibid.


79. On populism as a “thin-centered ideology” – one that does not provide answers to many major social and political questions addressed by more comprehensive political ideologies – see Mudde (2004), drawing on Freeden’s (1998) characterization of the ideological structure of nationalism.

80. For debates about terminology, see Mudde (2007).

81. Earlier forms of populism, too, were often ideological hybrids, combining characteristically “left” and “right” elements; see Taguieff (1995, 14).

82. The increasing salience of religio-civilizational categories in political discourse is part of a broader shift in which religion has replaced language as the cutting edge of the politics of difference (Brubaker 2013).

83. For an overview of the complex relation between Christianity and national identity in twentieth-century Europe, see Wood (2016); on religion and national identity in the context of European integration, see Spohn Koenig, and Knöbl (2015).
84. On the plasticity and adaptability of nationalism, see Anderson (1983); Freeden (1998); Malešević (2006); and Brubaker (2004, 2015).
85. I thank Siniša Malešević for this formulation.
86. As Zúquete (2008, 329–332) observes, the “post-national” concern of the European extreme right to defend Western values against Islam both complements and competes with nationalist discourse.

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