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Abstract

Think tanks—non-governmental policy institutes engaged in both research and advocacy—occupy a position at the intersection of different societal fields. This interstitial position determines how they operate and what language they use. Their claim to expertise hinges upon their successful presentation as independent actors. In this endeavour, an apolitical image is crucial. This article studies the role of language in legitimising the position of think tanks. How do think tanks negotiate their apolitical image? What organisational and historical reasons sustain their claim to be apolitical? These questions will be addressed here, through original empirical material based on semi-structured interviews with Polish think tank leaders.

IN THE FACE OF THE EVER MORE COMPLICATED AND TECHNOCRATIC nature of contemporary politics, think tanks and policy experts have become important, yet still relatively understudied, players. Think tanks are usually defined as non-governmental policy institutes, often non-profit, engaged in both research and advocacy. They attempt to influence policy in a variety of ways—by producing analysis, lobbying and shaping public opinion. Scholars often point out that think tanks are an amorphous entity evading strict definitions. Their relationship with civil society is also ambiguous—from one perspective, they have an obvious place in the civil society landscape, sharing civil society's non-governmental status and forming a civil society elite of a sort; from another, think tanks are more akin to political actors, being part of the lobbying machine and therefore rather distanced from regular citizens. Their 'assertion of a voice in the policy-making process is based on their claim to expertise rather than as a vox populi' (Weaver & McGann 2000, p. 17). What guarantees their distinct position is their navigation between different fields, carving out an 'interstitial field' for themselves and employing different types of capital: academic, economic and media (Medvetz 2012a, 2012b). Seen this way, think tanks operate in a porous space between politics, market, academia and civil society, forming 'boundary organisations', whose distinguishing characteristic and main strength is the work of mediation. They engage with all these fields to secure a niche for themselves. Their success rests on their ability to keep a relatively equal distance from the adjacent fields. They necessarily perform the work of balancing and negotiating contradictory

demands, aims and resources (for example, academic credentials, political power, media presence, economic assets) to secure their claim of independence. Independent expertise is crucial to think tank credibility, and promoting an 'apolitical' and 'non-ideological' image is pivotal in this endeavour.

To be sure, the studied organisations are not apolitical in the sense of being free from contestation and power or deliberation (the main markers of politics in democratic theory): they are also definitely part of the political system in the classic sense—by exercising influence on the policy process, their *raison d'être*.[1] This article focuses on think tanks' presentation of themselves as apolitical and non-ideological, studying the reasons behind such self-presentation. On a more abstract note, it aims to research the role of language in legitimising the position of these actors. How do think tanks negotiate their apolitical image? What organisational and historical reasons sustain their apolitical claim? Thus, the aim is not to discuss to what extent the studied organisations are (a)political, or how they conceal their real political profile. Rather, the focus is on the discursive level of the organisation's self-presentation as apolitical and non-ideological. The ambition is to contribute to a better understanding of the 'civil symbolic space' (Alexander 2006), untangling some of the symbolic codes think tanks invoke.

The current study takes inspiration from two, both rather small, bodies of literature. The already mentioned perspective on think tanks as boundary organisations (Medvetz 2012a, 2012b; Shaw *et al*. 2015) will be employed to provide insight into what constitutes this specific type of organisation and activity. In this approach, think tanks are viewed as members of an interstitial field, a 'semi-structured network of organizations that traverses, links, and overlaps the more established spheres of academic, political, business, and media production' (Medvetz 2012b, p. 25). Hence, Medvetz locates think tanks at the crossroads of these four spheres. This article will take the relational approach, focusing on how think tankers negotiate their relations with the academic and political spheres, and adding another sphere on which think tanks are dependent at the same time as they mark their distance to it, namely civil society. I track the 'negotiation game' that think tanks engage in because of their intermediary position at the intersection of the three chosen fields through the lens of one particular notion that is frequently used in the self-presentation of think tanks—their claim to being 'apolitical'.

The other source of inspiration is taken from Campbell and Pedersen (2011, 2014), whose concept of 'knowledge regimes' stresses the intersection between ideas and institutions in the production of policy-relevant knowledge: 'knowledge regimes are sets of actors, organizations, and institutions that produce and disseminate policy ideas that affect how policy-making and production regimes are organized and operate' (Campbell & Pedersen 2011, p. 167). The main observation taken from this particular strand of literature is that think tanks ought to be analysed contextually, because local history translates into specific political, economic and cultural conditions, which define the constraints and possibilities of think tanks in a given context, resulting in persistent national differences in how policy ideas are produced. To provide this contextual picture of the opportunity structures shaping the action sphere of think tanks, I will refer to the broader category of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), to which think tanks often belong formally, and their representation as apolitical.

My empirical focus in this article is directed to think tanks in Poland. This choice is motivated both empirically and theoretically. The literature on think tanks is generally biased

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[1]Hess (2013b) calls think tank activities 'parapolitical', given that their explicit aim is to provide expert advice to policymakers.

towards English-speaking countries, dominated by studies of US think tanks, sometimes with a comparative angle (Denham & Garnett 1998; Weaver & McGann 2000; Abelson 2009; Medvetz 2012b). This calls for closer examination of think tanks in other parts of the world, as Campbell and Petersen (2011, 2014) give us reasons to believe that specific economic and political environments create different opportunity structures for think tanks, resulting in diverse locally conditioned populations and types of think tanks. This implies that the US model of a vibrant and highly competitive think tank culture is comparatively rather exceptional (Abelson 2009) and more of a local product; also, that we should expect different models in other parts of the world. Hence, studies of US policy institutes are not applicable to all think tanks: it is important to study local versions of think tank organisations, paying careful attention to idiosyncratic opportunity structures.

This article focuses on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and Polish think tanks specifically, researching the way they negotiate their intermediary position. By situating think tanks in the broader context of the non-governmental sector, the analysis takes into account the specific transformation conditions shaping the position of think tanks in CEE. Poland is often pointed to as the regional leader of transition processes, also with regard to the development and sustainability of its NGO sector.[2] The country boasts a significant think tank community, according to different measures numbering around 40 institutions (McGann 2015).[3] Think tanks in Poland are certainly not as influential as those in the United States but they remain undoubtedly visible players on the political scene. If Campbell and Pedersen's (2011) prediction is right, Poland should be among the countries in which think tanks will gain in influence. They hypothesise that think tanks will be more prevalent in democratic systems, which lack a tight network of state sponsored experts: in the absence of experts within the administration, there is a need for external advice on policy issues. The special focus of this article is on the language of legitimisation in Polish think tanks' claim to expertise—how do they negotiate their independent, apolitical position?

The analysis is based on 14 semi-structured qualitative interviews with directors or project leaders of major Polish think tanks.[4] The interviews were conducted during spring and autumn 2013 in Poland. The interview questions covered themes related to the position of think tanks in Poland and their relation to other sectors of society. Although the study is interpretive and will not make any straightforward generalisation, its ambition is to include a diverse population of think tanks, reflecting different types of organisations. More on the empirical

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[2]According to 'The 2014 CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia' conducted since 1997 under the auspices of USAID and including 29 countries, Poland scores second highest after Estonia (USAID 2015).

[3]In Central and Eastern Europe, only Russia, Ukraine and Romania have more policy institutes than Poland.

[4]The interviews conducted while researching this article were in Polish; all translations are my own. I would like to thank Magdalena Wójcik for the help with transcriptions. The interviewed organisations were: Batory Foundation (*Fundacja Batorego*), Civic Institute (*Instytut Obywatelski*), Civil Development Forum (*Forum Obywatelskiego Rozwoju*), Ferdinand Lassalle Centre for Social Thought (*Ośrodek Myśli Społecznej im. F. Lassalle'a*), Political Critique (*Krytyka Polityczna*), Sobieski Institute (*Instytut Sobieskiego*), The Institute of Public Affairs (*Instytut Spraw Publicznych*) and The Unit for Social Innovation and Research—Shipyard (*Pracownia Badań i Innowacji Społecznych 'Stocznia'*). To this list of think tanks, one major intermediary organisation, an umbrella organisation for the third sector in Poland, was added—National Federation of Polish NGOs (*Ogólnopolska Federacja Organizacji Pozarządowych*). When quoting from the interviews, I mention the name of the organisation the interviewee worked for at the time and the exact date of the interview. In cases where I interviewed more than one employee, I also specify the position of the interviewee quoted. For more details on the interviews, see the Appendix.

material and method can be found in Jezierska (2015). The interview material was cross-referenced with secondary literature and media reporting on Polish think tanks and NGOs.

The argument will unfold as follows. After a brief section reviewing the literature on policy institutes, the interview material as well as secondary literature on think tanks in Poland is analysed to capture their apolitical presentation and its possible meanings. First, organisation-specific motivations are considered, followed by an analysis of context-specific conditions, which are sought in the development pattern of the NGO sector in Poland. It is argued that the broader category of NGOs has strong incentives to present themselves as apolitical. I conclude by arguing that these two interlinked perspectives, organisational and contextual, offer us a comprehensive insight into how Polish think tanks negotiate their claim for independent expertise.

What we know about think tanks

The history of think tanks is usually traced back to the post-war United States, where the RAND Corporation emerged as the first recognised think tank (Weaver 1989; Rich 2004; McGann 2007). Although some scholars argue that proto-think tanks were already operating in the United States at the end of the eighteenth century (Abelson 2009; Medvetz 2012b), the name 'think tank' came into broader use and this type of organisation began to flourish only in the 1970s. Think tanks became integral to the US political system; policy institutes were also exported, often with the help of public and private funding, as part of the US ambition to promote democratisation. Today think tanks can be found practically in every country in the world (McGann 2015)[5] and, after the 1989 regime shift in Central and Eastern Europe, they also became conspicuous players in the newly founded democracies.

Scholarship on think tanks reflects this historical trajectory as well as the numerical representation of policy institutes. Out of the world's 6,618 estimated think tanks, 1,830 operate in the United States (McGann 2015). As mentioned above, the literature is predominantly focused on the English-speaking world, mostly US and British organisations, sometimes complemented with a comparative or cross-national perspective. A recognised contribution of this scholarship targeted the success of US and British think tanks of the 'New Right' in forging the 1970s paradigm shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism (Stone 1996; Rich 2004; Medvetz 2012b). Generally, the literature can be divided between proponents of elitist theory, who focus on think tanks as part of a closed power network deployed strategically in the service of a ruling class, and pluralists, who picture think tanks as one of many actors competing to shape public policy, contributing to pluralisation of the 'market of ideas' (Pautz 2011). As Medvetz (2012b) compellingly showed, both classic approaches to think tanks have serious shortcomings, occluding some basic aspects of think tank activities. The elitist perspective becomes too functionalist, as it enables the tracing of connections to power elites but is not helpful in highlighting the way think tanks influence policy-making and is blind to policy institutes opposing ruling class interests. The pluralists, for their part, while careful not to ascribe any essential role to think tanks, focus exclusively on the open political struggle, overlooking the hidden dimensions of power, including these institutions' ambition

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[5]McGann lists only ten countries where his team could not identify any think tanks (2015, p. 54, fn. 137).

of agenda-setting, a crucial aspect of how think tanks operate. The relational approach to think tanks developed by Medvetz (2012a, 2012b) helps overcome these problems, allowing for a more open inquiry into the properties and purposes of think tanks. This article will contribute to a critical perspective on how think tanks frame their work (Shaw *et al*. 2015), relying on the relational concept of think tanks amended with the contextual conditions of the NGO sector in Poland and think tanks' negotiations of proximity and distance to that sector.

Being a relatively new phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe (most Polish think tanks were founded in the 1990s or the early 2000s),[6] this region's think tanks have not yet attracted much scholarly attention. Except for some reports, mostly of inventorial character—mapping the phenomenon in CEE, accounting for the number and types of think tanks operating in the region, as well as the constraints they face—there is not much in-depth analysis to be consulted (Struyk 1999; Kimball 2000; Krastev 2000; Schneider 2002; Sandle 2004). Local literature on Polish think tanks is also rather scarce (Ziętara 2010; Zbieranek 2011; Bąkowski & Szlachetko 2012; Czaputowicz & Stasiak 2012; Hess 2013a, 2013b).

While Medvetz's (2012b) findings are based on a study of US think tanks, Campbell and Pedersen (2011, 2014) ground their conclusions on a comparative study design, with cases from the United States, France, Germany and Denmark. Inspired by the perspective on think tanks as boundary organisations, the article gives an account of Polish think tanks' mediatory practice, providing a deeper understanding of the language think tanks employ and the conditions in which they operate. The additional perspective adopted here puts think tanks in the context of their organisational structure, the so-called third or NGO sector, which is part in turn of the broader civil society. I argue that think tanks are best understood as a specific type of NGO, closer to politics and academia than most other non-governmental organisations. Hence, after discussing the apolitical representation of Polish think tanks, the scope of analysis is broadened to the apolitical representation of NGOs in Poland, its roots and effects.

Think tanks negotiating independence

As stated above, the public credibility of think tanks hinges upon their capability to demonstrate their impartiality. The interviewed think tanks were keen to stress their independent and nonpartisan character. In the absence of legal regulations for party think tanks, there is only one such institution, the Civic Institute, which is directly linked and exclusively funded by the liberal party Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*). Nevertheless, this policy institute claimed independence, mostly in terms of intellectual freedom. In the words of its director: 'it is really interesting, I'm not a person from the Civic Platform, I'm not engaged. What is more, back in the days, I wrote quite critical comments on the Civic Platform, and this also proves that the party wants to create a relatively independent institute'.[7] Of the studied organisations, three stressed alignment to an ideological orientation: Political Critique and the Ferdinand Lassalle Centre for Social Thought both declared leftist agendas, whereas the Sobieski Institute

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[6]One exception is The Polish Institute of International Affairs (*Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych*—PISM) founded in 1947. After several structural transformations, PISM is today integrated in the government structure, working closely with the Polish foreign and defence ministries, and funded primarily from the Polish national budget.

[7]Interview with the director, Civic Institute, male, 23 May 2013.

affirmed conservative, sarmatist views.[8] However, even though the Sobieski Institute stressed its economic independence, a significant amount of its funding comes from the Law and Justice party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*). All of the three insisted on their independence from formal politics, at the same time as trying to influence politics, either through the parties closest to their profile—'we're independent from political parties but generally we try to influence the Democratic Left Alliance'[9]—or in accordance with their general agenda and outlook. The remaining organisations that participated in the study were reluctant to articulate a clear political position and often announced an unspecified 'pro-democratic' and 'pro-European' orientation. Although some were clearly linked to publicly recognised former politicians and public figures with liberal views (such as the Batory Foundation[10] and Civil Development Forum[11]), they nevertheless insisted on a neutral, non-ideological image.

The credibility of think tanks is grounded in their image as 'independent experts' and 'their presentation of themselves as legitimate and trustworthy sources of value-free advice to decision makers' (Shaw *et al*. 2015, p. 73). In this respect, insisting on political and ideological neutrality is crucial. As one think tanker, deliberating about the role of policy institutes in Central and Eastern Europe, stressed: 'objectivity and neutrality require independence from government and political and financial groups, otherwise, an institute's intellectual integrity may be compromised' (Cornell 1996, p. 4). My respondents were quick to emphasise that their organisations were not political and lacked ideological affiliations. One of the think tank leaders interviewed for this study shrugged at my question about the role of ideology in their work:

> We never had any meta-discussions about ideology. … It was a tactical decision not to engage in moral and worldview issues. … We left it out, consciously, not only to discourage those who could potentially support us, but also to honour the will of our founder [Leszek Balcerowicz]—the aim of being more serious, more professor-like. … We never had any big ideological disputes about what our ideology is, we're rather pragmatic.[12]

The interviewee stressed that their focus was on being 'professor-like' and 'pragmatic'. According to the commonplace perception of academia, 'professor-like' implies being free from political and ideological influences[13] and objective. The ambition of being target-oriented

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[8]Sarmatism refers to the dominant lifestyle, culture and ideology of the Polish nobility in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century.

[9]Interview, Ferdinand Lassalle Centre for Social Thought, male, 6 June 2013.

[10]The Batory Foundation was established in 1988 by George Soros and a group of Polish democratic opposition leaders. Among its current or former council and board members, there are plenty of politicians stemming from several liberal parties (mainly Democratic Union—*Unia Demokratyczna*) and former government members. For the current board and council, see: http://www.batory.org.pl/en/about_the_foundation/council_and_board, accessed 10 September 2015; the composition of previous boards and councils can be retrieved from the organisation's annual reports, available at: http://www.batory.org.pl/en/about_the_foundation/annual_reports, accessed 10 September 2015.

[11]The Civil Development Forum was founded by Leszek Balcerowicz, who still chairs its council. Balcerowicz is famous for implementing the neoliberal 'shock therapy', also known as the Balcerowicz Plan, which radically transformed the Polish economy after 1989. He was Minister of Finance in 1989–1991 and 1997–2000 and was chairman of the liberal party Freedom Union (*Unia Wolności*) 1995–2000.

[12]Interview with Civil Development Forum, male, 2 July 2013.

[13]The myth of a value-free science is sometimes upheld by scientists themselves, referring to the classic Weberian postulation of keeping facts and values apart.

was also repeatedly emphasised. Ideology was presented as corrupting both the professional image and the pragmatic target-orientation of completing projects and collaborating with others to reach the set goals.

The declaration of programmatic detachment from any political institutions can also be found on the organisations' websites. Aside from the most common ambiguous formulation of being 'independent', which could as well refer to financial independence but is sometimes specified as being 'independent of any state or political institutions',[14] some organisations elaborate further: 'Our actions are guided by the principles of transparency, political non-involvement, good quality and are non-profit-oriented'.[15] Here, being apolitical is treated as a principle securing quality, on a par with transparency.

Other scholars focusing on the Polish think tank landscape corroborate this view: 'there are few think tanks that openly declare their political preferences; rather it is more common to subscribe to a certain set of values' (Czaputowicz & Stasiak 2012, p. 182). Additionally, Ilona Iłowiecka-Tańska's (2011) study of 'intermediate organisations' (of which think tanks are a sub-category) showed that the organisations she interviewed did not affirm any political view and declined any ideological position. As one of the leaders of the Batory Foundation told her: 'we were actually never ideological …. It was never linked to any ideology' (Iłowiecka-Tańska 2011, p. 58).[16] It has been observed that alluding to the political profile of other organisations is a means to discrediting them: 'some of them do not hesitate to attach political labels to other think-tanks while playing down their own affiliations as non-relevant as for their credibility and integrity' (Schneider 2002). Seen in this way, the language of being 'political/apolitical' and 'ideological/non-ideological' serves the purpose of discrediting other organisations and securing one's own independent position—a camouflaging technique. In the words of one of my interviewees, 'Lack of ideological positioning blurs an organisation's dependence'.[17]

At the same time, another interviewee stressed their close relations with and direct channels to formal party politics, highlighting that this specific context offers them influence and impact on policy-making.

> … we're close to politics. It's also good for research—without access to politics, there is no real discussion. I know the leaders of the main parties, and I can talk to them, just like that. And you have the sense that it is applied science, that I can quarrel with them saying that what they claim is good for political reasons has nothing to do with what is proved [scientifically]; the data contradicts it. And honestly, this kind of science is most appealing to me.[18]

Such apolitical and non-ideological representation, carving out their position as independent experts, is a crucial element in the work think tanks perform. However, they also claim

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[14]The formulation is taken from the Polish version of the Batory Foundation website (the English version is abbreviated), available at: http://www.batory.org.pl/o_fundacji, accessed 20 September 2015.

[15]This quote comes from the 'About Us' description on the website of Civil Development Forum, available at: http://www.for.org.pl/pl/o-nas, accessed 20 September 2015.

[16]The publications referred to above mention the apolitical image of these organisations only in passing. However, they demonstrate that the findings of this article are not isolated. All quotes from Polish secondary literature were translated by the author.

[17]Interview, National Federation of Polish NGOs, male, 1 July 2013.

[18]Interview, Sobieski Institute, male, 21 May 2013.

closeness to politics. What is needed is a proper balance, at once closeness, but also detachment from the political realm.

In a joint article, two prominent Polish think tankers—Adam Bodnar, the then secretary of the board of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, a '*nonpartisan* institute involved in human rights education and monitoring'[19] and Jacek Kucharczyk, the chair of the board of The Institute of Public Affairs, a think tank also interviewed for this study—argued for the need for apolitical, specialised NGOs:

> We understand being apolitical as an indispensable distance from political parties and independence from the government. It does not mean that we dissociate ourselves from the influence on the politics of public authorities. But we try to do so from independent and expert positions that result from the values—political values as well—related to the mission of our organisations …. In political terms NGOs can be understood as leaning on democratic values (pluralism, liberty, European integration), rather than any specific party or its programme. (Bodnar & Kucharczyk 2010)

They clearly defined their organisations as apolitical in the sense of non-party political, while nevertheless retaining the ambition of influencing politics. The apolitical, nonpartisan image is, again, pictured as a necessary element of being professional and independent. Listing several fields where such independent expertise is needed, the authors asked: 'does anyone in Poland professionally, *without ideological bias*, deal with bioethics?' (Bodnar & Kucharczyk 2010; emphasis added). Ideology is presented here as a distorting element that skews professional knowledge and undermines the image of expertise valued by think tanks. At the same time, Bodnar and Kucharczyk stressed that NGOs do represent 'political' positions, by which they mean alignment to democratic values. Such a nebulous notion of politics indicates the difficult position NGOs and think tanks occupy, with contradictory expectations and ambitions. Think tanks as well as other NGOs perform this balancing act, at once distancing themselves from and engaging in politics.

Referring to the notion of 'apolitical' helps think tanks maintain the necessary distance from the field of politics as well as aligning them with the field of academia with its ideal of disinterested, independent scholarship. As one of my interviewees stressed: 'I've always wanted to work at the edge of politics and academic practice, and think tank is exactly this form of activity'.[20] Think tanks are pictured as institutions in which 'politics meets the academic world'.[21] Think tanks usually design their organisations to mirror academic institutions, calling their departments 'research units', their employees 'researchers' or 'fellows', their publications 'research reports' and the meetings they organise 'seminars'. Aside from the fact that many of their workers and collaborators hold doctoral degrees, some have parallel affiliations with universities and continue publishing in academic journals. One of the studied organisations, Political Critique, has its own 'research and education institute'—the Institute for Advanced Studies—with teaching programmes targeting undergraduate students. The mimicking of academic structures and jargon has the unwanted effect of erasing the differences between universities and think tanks in public perceptions. One of the interviewees noted that,

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[19]The quote comes from the 'About the Foundation' section on the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights' website, available at: http://www.hfhr.pl/en/fundacja/o-fundacji/, accessed 21 September 2015, emphasis added. In 2015 Adam Bodnar was appointed Commissioner for Human Rights.
[20]Interview, Ferdinand Lassalle Centre for Social Thought, male, 6 June 2013.
[21]Interview with the director, Civic Institute, male, 23 May 2013.

The intention is, at least in our Institute, that we should be broader, and rooted in the third sector, so that we are seen as being part of civil society, rather than as a para-academic organisation, as some think tanks are—a pseudo-academic institution. When I was elected leader and we were deliberating on how to change the image of the institute, we even conducted a survey among journalists, and it turned out that some see us as part of the University of Warsaw, also those who frequently quoted us! I was quite surprised.[22]

While serving as a role model, to the point of conflation, academia also constitutes an ambiguous reference point. In the words of one of the think tankers asked to reflect upon the position of a think tank:

It's a kind of institution, which tries to live with the academic world, but on the other hand is also quite sceptical towards it. And the young people working here, they want to dethrone the institutional scholarship, the knowledge of all those professors ….[23]

The interviewees scorned the ivory-tower character of academic research and stressed the distinctiveness of their work, mostly as it related to more direct opportunities to influence policy-making as a think tanker: 'I don't want to write nice texts; I want to make change happen. For me, this is the bottom line of being a think tank'.[24] One of the studied organisations, The Unit for Social Innovation and Research—Shipyard, has the explicit aim of the 'reinforcement of cooperation between two environments: researchers-scientists and civic activists working also in non-governmental organisations'.[25] To this effect, the organisation offers a PhD fellowship, called the 'PhDo', to stress the activist component. This ambition to have a more tangible impact on politics and the possibility to combine research with civic engagement makes think tanks a compelling alternative for those who consider working at the universities. Asked why he chose a career as a think tanker, one of my interviewees explained: 'back then it seemed that Polish academia was awfully old-school and this was an attractive perspective at the moment'.[26] Another stressed that:

because the situation at the Polish universities is so bad, here you can basically do almost the same as at the universities, have unrestricted thematic freedom … and also, you can earn your living.[27]

Hence, think tanks are pictured as alternatives to Poland's rigid academic system, offering more freedom to their 'researchers' and better economic conditions.

When discussing their institutional distance from both politics and academia, think tankers repeatedly stressed their ambition to change social reality, a fundamental civil society aspiration. Think tanks are part of the third sector, which is usually defined as the formalised part of civil society, a set of NGOs. In Poland, think tanks fall into the same legal category, and

[22]Interview, Institute of Public Affairs, male, 12 June 2013.
[23]Interview, The Unit for Social Innovation and Research—Shipyard, male, 11 June 2013.
[24]Interview, Civil Development Forum, male, 2 July 2013.
[25]The 'About Us' section of the webpage, available at: http://stocznia.org.pl/about-us/, accessed 21 September 2015.
[26]Interview, Institute of Public Affairs, male, 14 June 2013.
[27]Interview, Sobieski Institute, male, 21 May 2013.

like other NGOs, they register as either associations or foundations.[28] Some of my respondents recognised their place among civil society organisations, even objecting to classification as a think tank:

> Our aim was basically to combine the intellectual dimension with a social movement, which is absent in think tanks. That is, think tanks are by definition experts—male experts (*panowie eksperci*), because it's most often men, who meet with other experts and deliberate. And this is the main action formula for think tanks.[29]

This ambition to bring about change situates the studied organisations close to other NGOs:

> [We] engage in social campaigning, realised in partnership with other organisations, which are NGOs but not think tanks. We … feel part of this community. We don't want to be the smarty, who sits on the side and tells other people what to do.[30]

Countering the perception of think tanks as distanced expert institutions that deliver recommendations for action, respondents also stressed the ambition of active engagement, along with other NGOs, in the implementation of ideas. At the same time, the distance of think tanks from the third sector and their distinctiveness was also highlighted, as explained by another interviewee:

> It wasn't obvious to me that I would work in the third sector. Think tank was actually something slightly different. Obviously, from the legal perspective it is a foundation, that is, one of the two main forms NGOs take in Poland. But it wasn't so obvious to me.[31]

The interviewed think tankers revealed an ambiguous relationship with civil society and the third sector, stressing the distinguishing intellectual ambition and research component of their activity as well as the drive to have an impact on policy-making. This mixed identity was reflected in some interviews by the discussion of their hybrid nature. Think-and-do tanks—which also engage in grassroots activities and projects—are invoked as a new way of creating room for more direct civic engagement.

> The hybrids emerge, like Shipyard and Political Critique [both interviewed for this study], for all that they distance themselves from think tanks, they actually do, from time to time, put on the think tank hat. They also deal with policy issues, they aren't not think tanks. It's apparent that this clear-cut distinction is being erased.[32]

The interviewee argued that the distinction between think tanks and other NGOs is sometimes hardly discernible. The think tanks under study, including his own organisation—the Institute

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[28]The basic difference between foundations and associations is that the former mostly function on the basis of human capital, that is, a requirement of a minimum of seven members. Foundations are based on the economic capital, with no minimally required amount specified. Although formally these two organisational types differ significantly, their differences are in practice attenuated, and their activities ultimately very similar.
[29]Interview, Political Critique, female, 28 May 2013.
[30]Interview, Institute of Public Affairs, male, 12 June 2013.
[31]Interview, Institute of Public Affairs, female, 27 May 2013.
[32]Interview, Institute of Public Affairs, male, 12 June 2013.

of Public Affairs—which is usually listed as one of the classic and leading think tanks, have mixed identities and ambitions. They aspire to inform and influence the policy-making process, but also to participate in the actual implementation or testing of their ideas, that is, direct engagement.

This section has focused on the organisational reasons for the apolitical self-representation of think tanks. Being a certain type of organisation, and in order to meet the demand for 'professionalisation', think tanks resort to apolitical and non-ideological language that stakes out their necessary distance from politics and desired affinity to academic expertise. The interviewed think tankers portray the ambiguous position their organisations occupy with respect to political, academic and civil society spheres, and the apolitical image helps capture this intersection. The balancing between the different logics and demands of different spheres is very clearly visible and quite consciously reflected upon. In the following section, I analyse some additional, contextual conditions, revealing why NGOs more broadly present themselves as apolitical and non-ideological. Taken together, these organisational and historical-contextual explanations reinforce the fact that an apolitical image is a fundamental component of think tank identity.

NGOs seeking legitimacy

Beyond the more universal patterns of think tank rationale, there are some complimentary local factors prompting think tanks and NGOs to adopt an apolitical image. Analysing the Central and Eastern European context, it may be difficult to overlook the shift that 1989 constituted. It was a clear rupture not only for the party system and the economic organisation of society, but also for the construction of a new pluralistic public sphere. Although, contrary to common perceptions (Iłowiecka-Tańska 2011, p. 40), 1989 was not a 'zero point' from which all civic life had to be organised anew—there had been an 'incomplete' and later also 'dissident', civil society prior to 1989, the Solidarity movement being just one prominent example (Buchowski 1996; Ekiert & Kubik 2014)—the post-1989 period offered substantially changed conditions and possibilities for civic action.[33] The rupture is clearly visible in NGO identity construction. The scattered but plentiful civil initiatives prior to 1989 were predominantly treated as private or individual enterprises (Iłowiecka-Tańska 2011). After 1989, a collective, common and public sphere of action needed to be designed and a new form of organisation emerged: the professionalised non-governmental organisation, which took the legal form of either foundation or association. The mushrooming of these organisations added up to an 'associational revolution' (Ekiert & Kubik 2014), accompanied by the creation of a specific language (NGO jargon) and narrative (often strong identification with the post-1989 changes). We could say that the third sector—that is, a legally recognised, institutionalised and professionalised set of associations and foundations—was a new phenomenon, while wider civil society and civic engagement had a longer tradition, going back not only to the years before 1989 but to the pre-war period also (Bartkowski 2004; Frączak 2013).

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[33]According to the classification of state–civil society relations proposed by Chambers and Kopstein (2009), even though there were citizen associations before 1989, the state socialist context did not allow for the existence of the liberal notion of 'civil society apart from the state', with constitutional guarantees of freedom of association and legally defined boundaries of state intervention.

> Somehow the concept of the third sector was constructed. It wasn't a coincidence. These are the moments [in history] when you settle the linguistic or narrative code. … I remember this moment— what kind of nomenclature will we choose? And we chose the notion of NGO, because it was the best fit, the basis of these institutions being non-governmental. Back then, there was a need to stress this. Now it's more complicated, and those attributes—'non-governmental' or 'non-profit'—are rather problematic for the sector, because the sectors start mixing. The negative, residual definitions have their limits: we need to explain that we might have contact with the government or even make a profit.[34]

The third or NGO sector as a new construct was in need of justification and legitimisation within the broader society. Prominent NGO activists and leaders were preoccupied with defining the sector's *raison d'être*: they wanted to avoid internal disputes and divisions that were so disastrous for party politics and had led to the loss of power by the post-Solidarity bloc in 1993.[35] This pursuit of unity could be one explanation for the emphasis by the third sector on its non-ideological character.[36] NGO leaders believed that non-division was a way of guaranteeing the strength of the sector. They had to reinvent a set of codes of meanings that would resonate with the wide diversity of individuals and groups involved, gather them in their struggle for recognition. The most compelling strategy seemed to be a unifying code—an apolitical, non-ideological and nonpartisan frame of reference. In the specific post-socialist context, the image of an apolitical third sector created handy binaries, structuring the public sphere and giving legitimacy to the sector.[37] NGOs were pictured as being all that the state was not. While the negative connotations were on the state's side, the positive ones were reserved for the emerging third sector: 'ideology versus programmatic anti-ideology; political temporariness versus anti-political long endurance; distance of politics versus closeness of collective practical action' (Iłowiecka-Tańska 2011, p. 59). It was believed that ideological positioning would lead to internal divisions within the sector, which would in turn contribute to a more dispersed and less prominent sector.

> In the 1990s, and later, maybe even more now, we had a huge problem that might be tagged 'erasing of the individual identity'. There was a common endeavour to build a feeling that ok, irrespective if you're a foundation from nowhere [*z Pcimia Dolnego*] or the Batory Foundation, if you're this or that association—we are all NGOs. In 1990s it was absolutely justifiable—the building of a common identity, both outwards and inwards. The people also had a sense that they had something in common. But later, consolidating this was a mistake. Because differences, which had to emerge, were erased.[38]

Unity was required until politicians and the wider public accepted NGOs as a permanent component of the Polish socio-political landscape. It served the role of internal mobilisation and identity-building—the ideological and political ambiguity contributed to a clearer sense

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[34]Interview, The Unit for Social Innovation and Research—Shipyard, male, 11 June 2013.

[35]Polish civil society, and political culture more generally, is strongly linked to charismatic leaders. On this topic see, for example, Jacobsson (2016).

[36]It could be argued that much has changed in this respect since the early 1990s. Indeed, some NGOs in Poland undeniably take on ideological struggles. The organisations campaigning for and against abortion rights are a good example of clearly politicised and ideological NGOs. Nevertheless, most NGOs still attempt to distance themselves from politics and any overt ideological stance.

[37]On the role of binaries in conceptualising contemporary civil society discourse and social scientific understanding at large, see Alexander (2006).

[38]Interview, Institute of Public Affairs, male, 12 June 2013.

of community, of a shared identity and common problems, potentially helpful in creating the 'third sector' as a joint force. It should also be put in the context of the wider political discourse, which was also in need of unifying codes. After the first free elections in 1991, the political space was divided along the post-communist/anti-communist cleavage, and irrespective of individual conflicts on the right of the spectrum, ideological differentiation was avoided.[39] The direction of desired change and the vision of the new order were reduced to general claims of being pro-democratic and pro-European. The unproductive binary logic of democracy versus authoritarianism and liberalism versus communism was employed, leaving no room for debates about the actual direction of reforms and different options. Here, the director of the Institute of Public Affairs draws on this logic, in his meandering answer about the political orientation of his organisation:

> It [the Institute] is apolitical but more post-Solidarity than post-communist. So, *de facto*, our being apolitical was directed at defending the reforms defined as free market, democracy in general, but referring to the tradition of the democratic opposition, post-Solidarity rather than post-communism. It was apolitical, but with a defined mission to modernise the country.[40]

As one conservative sociologist observes,[41] after the regime shift, there was a lack of debate about the course of changes.

> After the fall of communism, there was a significant—and rather unexpected—shift in the political language, consisting in rejection of political philosophy developed by the former opposition. There was no substantial discussion about different understandings of democracy; usually the reference was to the elementary opposition between totalitarianism and democracy, authoritarianism and liberalism, and the like. This was probably because it was believed that the new regime did not require debate, as there was one ready, unquestionable template, which simply needed to be applied. (Krasnodębski 2005, p. 19)

After its transition to democracy, Poland enthusiastically and almost univocally embraced the neoliberal 'template' in politics and economy. Scholars (Ost 2000; Shields 2007, 2015; Stenning *et al*. 2010; Woś 2014) have described the so-called neoliberal consensus that gained ground in Poland after 1989. Many of the introduced reforms, policies and programmes were driven by neoliberal ideas that were promoted by a variety of actors, including 'local think tanks, policy makers, political parties and trade unions' (Stenning *et al*. 2010, p. 39). Think tanks and NGOs became spokes in the neoliberal wheels, enabling the smooth working of the machinery.[42] In effect, 'lack of alternative thinking and clear ideological divisions is what characterises the non-governmental sector in Poland' (Frączak 2012, p. 24). The apolitical and non-ideological image of Polish think tanks and NGOs has worked for the benefit of this consensus, blurring its hegemonic position, which can only be questioned from political, ideologically defined counter-positions.

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[39]If we take a look at the party political scene, which has been analysed extensively, by Kitschelt (1995) and Markowski (1997) among others, in the early 1990s the post-communist/anti-communist distinction is used to explain party positioning in the early 1990s.

[40]Interview, Institute of Public Affairs, male, 12 June 2013.

[41]As of 2014, Zdzisław Krasnodębski has also been a Member of the European Parliament for the Law and Justice party, and since 2018 he is also the Vice-President of the European Parliament.

[42]See also Jezierska (2015), Załęski (2012).

Paired with the drive to discursively stress unity, this apolitical and non-ideological image was also reinforced by the foreign donors' impact on the early transition period—a pressure to professionalise and compartmentalise the activity of single organisations into projects, a new way of acting. One interviewee decried these processes, which, according to him, has resulted in the short-sightedness of the NGO sector at large: 'the [third] sector is oriented towards "how", not "what"'.[43] In this view, NGOs, think tanks included, working on a project basis pay excessive attention to performance in concrete projects at the expense of long-term goals and discussions about the ideological profile of their organisations. In effect, distinctions and status among think tanks and NGOs are not based on ideological profiling and political arguments but on success in obtaining funding. It has led some commentators in Poland (Socha 2011) to accuse NGOs of 'grant fever' or 'grantosis' (*grantoza*), that is, opportunistic adjustment of their activities to ensure their eligibility for current calls for grant applications.[44]

> The biggest problem is that they are mission-free. This ecosystem created a mechanism, in which according to the nature of these systems, the ability to adapt is most favoured. So, not the best organisations, or the fairest [*uczciwe*] ones, or those faithful to their mission will survive in that system. Ironically, there is no normative valorisation. Those who excel in survival will endure. These are organisations that know how to tap into the money, and [how to] write applications.[45]

However, analyses by the Polish 'internal statistical bureau' of the third sector—the Association Klon/Jawor, an NGO that conducts systematic analyses of the sector since 2000—reveal that this phenomenon is exaggerated. According to these data, only a limited number of organisations choose their field of activity on the basis of the funding possibilities available (Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor 2012). Nevertheless, apolitical and non-ideological representation does broaden opportunities for NGOs seeking funding. Especially in smaller communes, after shifts in power, such an image is helpful in obtaining local funding. Additionally, being 'apolitical' increases the opportunities for collaboration between different organisations around single issues: 'This lack of divisions enables undertaking actions that are apolitical from the ideological sense. They are not divisive ideologically but oriented at solutions'.[46] The view of ideology as a hurdle for collaboration is corroborated by other interviews, in which organisation leaders, claiming pragmatism, declared their readiness to cooperate with all possible partners in concrete projects.

The discussion of 'grantosis' ought to be seen in the wider context of 'NGOisation'. In 2010, Agnieszka Graff, a Polish scholar and feminist activist, wrote a widely disseminated article in the main Polish daily *Gazeta Wyborcza*, initiating a debate about the risks of the NGOisation of Polish civil society. NGOisation is usually seen as the process of the institutionalisation of civil society, stemming from the legal and financial opportunity structures (Alvarez 2009). The incentives prompting civic initiatives to formalise into NGOs are as follows: most grant calls are directed to NGOs; only NGOs are entitled to take part in formal collaboration with the local

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[43]Interview, National Federation of Polish NGOs, male, 1 July 2013.
[44]'Społeczeństwo obywatelskie: mity i rzeczywistość', Debate with contributions by D. Gawin, A. Giza-Poleszczuk, A. Graff, I. Krzemiński, A. Rychard, led by A. Smolar and organised by the Batory Foundation, 8 February 2010, available at: http://www.batory.org.pl/programy_operacyjne/debaty/2010/spoleczenstwo_obywatelskie_mity_i_rzeczywistosc, accessed 26 May 2014.
[45]Interview, The Unit for Social Innovation and Research—Shipyard, male, 11 June 2013.
[46]Interview, National Federation of Polish NGOs, male, 1 July 2013.

government and only NGOs are eligible for the status of a public benefit organisation making them eligible for 1% individual tax donations (Jacobsson & Korolczuk 2016b). NGOisation not only refers to the broader transformation of civil society, it also captures the processes described above—short-term action planning, adapted to the grant application schedule—thus informing the way NGOs act and think.

> Organisations emerged around certain political visions, but the process of institutionalisation made them avoid thinking in ideological terms. They take over the language of technocrats, resigning from the language of values. Instead of justice, they speak of efficiency. Instead of repeating that equality is the basis of a democratic order, they argue that 'equality is profitable'. Old idealists have learned to use the language of grants, projects and reports—boring and stiff, because it is devoid of dreams and emotions. (Graff 2010)

In Graff's interpretation, such a 'political capitulation' was the cost of professionalisation required by foreign donors in exchange for funding. Graff's journalistic reflections on the condition of the third sector in Poland, explaining the apolitical image of Polish NGOs by economic incentives, mirror arguments in the academic literature. For example, Patrice McMahon (2001) discusses an even more direct de-politicisation effect, that of foreign donations on women's organisations. She emphasises that US NGOs supporting local organisations in Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary and Russia) were circumscribed by US tax law, which banned them from investing resources in organisations with political aims. 'Women's groups were either aware of these official stipulations or felt that they would be punished if they adopted an agenda that was deemed too political.' This made 'women's groups that received funding from abroad … less likely to work with political parties as a means to achieve their goals' (McMahon 2001, p. 56). Compared to women's organisations not funded from abroad, these organisations were also less likely to engage in influencing domestic politics through lobbying. Another effect is that the organisations supported by Western donors had little incentive to develop closer linkages with their constituencies while their main responsibility was directly to the donors. This strong emphasis on donors' accountability resulted in the 'unintended consequence of removing incentives to mobilize new members' (Mendelson & Glenn 2002, p. 14). Taken together, these factors were compelling reasons for local NGOs to foster an apolitical image. They were under pressure to distance themselves from formal politics and, as an effect of the funding structures, were discouraged from wider civic engagement.

Graff (2010) concludes that 'being apolitical resulted in paralysis and caused auto-marginalisation [of the NGOs]'. There is probably no direct causal relation between the apolitical image of NGOs and low engagement in formalised civic activism by Poles; however, it would be wrong to treat them as not linked at all.[47] Statistical data concerning the social embeddedness of NGOs reveal that NGOs are placed second-lowest with respect to other

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[47]It should be noted that some recent publications (for example, Jacobsson & Korolczuk (2016a)) point out that the low engagement of Poles in the third sector, measured most often by membership in organisations, is not matched by lack of engagement in other forms of civic activism, including neighbourhood initiatives, food cooperatives, and so forth. Reliance on membership data alone thus leads to false conclusions about the weakness of Polish civil society.

institutions and groups with which Poles identify. Only 8.3% of respondents in a 2008 survey declared a strong or very strong attachment to NGOs; only political parties scored lower (CBOS 2008). Mistrust towards NGOs remains high: according to a more recent study, conducted by Association Klon/Jawor (2015), only 35% of Poles believe that NGOs solve important social problems in their neighbourhood, and 48% are convinced that NGOs are characterised by corruption and private interests.[48] The low level of trust in NGOs is paralleled by a very high distrust of politicians and parties: in a 2012 survey by the Polish Public Opinion Research Center, political parties received the lowest score of all institutions listed in the survey (65% distrust *vs* 20% trust) (CBOS 2012). In light of these statistics, the fear of being associated with anything partisan is understandable. NGOs are also poorly recognised by citizens and local communities. Apart from individual organisations with high media profiles,[49] Poles do not know much about NGOs and their activities (Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor 2009, 2015). It seems that NGOs invest more effort in their relationships with and accountability towards donors than in their own constituency.[50]

This section sought contextual explanations for the apolitical image presented by NGOs and think tanks in Poland. Although still influential to varying degrees, the processes described above all took place in the early 1990s, the founding years of the Polish third sector. Due to their particular history—the pressing need to demarcate their place in the Polish society and the incentive structure of foreign donors—Polish NGOs, think tanks included, have been drawn to apolitical and non-ideological representation. This locally conditioned rationale adds to the reasons specific to think tanks, which were discussed in the previous section.

Conclusion

Most broadly, this article focused on the role that language plays in framing the position of think tanks in the Polish social system. It examined how and why particular language (such as 'independent', 'apolitical', 'non-ideological') is employed by think tanks. The article offered substantial insight into the self-understanding of these organisations through analysing their presentation as apolitical and non-ideological. Such statements situate think tanks as working in a neutral and independent space, free from political agendas ('non-party') and partiality ('evidence-based'). This distancing manoeuvre is necessary to establish the credibility of think tanks. The explanation for this representation is twofold. First, this distancing is best understood against the conceptualisation of think tanks as boundary organisations, negotiating their intermediary position between other fields. In this article, special attention was given to the proximity to and distance from politics, academia and the third sector, three main reference points for establishing think tanks' claim to independent expertise. Although their

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[48]Recent data show slight improvement of both knowledge of and trust in Poland's third sector (Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor & Gumkowska 2017).

[49]Here The Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity Foundation (*Wielka Orkiestra Świątecznej Pomocy*) is an example in its own league, annually organising huge charity events and receiving a lot of media attention.

[50]Donor accountability does not only relate to foreign donors. Although foreign funding is an important source of funding for NGOs, they have implemented diversification strategies, obtaining funding from a variety of sources. In 2014, the most significant entries in the budgets of NGOs, and the summative budget of the sector, were for national and foreign public funding (including local and national government funding and EU funds). A total of 25% of NGO income came from foreign funds (Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor 2016, p. 20).

main aim is to influence the policy process, and direct links with politicians are publicised for reputational capital, think tanks consistently disassociate themselves from politics. They also mark simultaneous belonging to and detachment from civil society: while sharing a third sector identity with other NGOs, they stress their own distinctiveness. Finally, while imitating the academic organisational blueprint and aspiring to the rigour of academic research, think tanks scorn the 'ivory tower' character of universities and stress their ability to make a real impact. Think tanks have to balance detachment from and closeness to other fields, sometimes adjusting to their logics. At the same time, carving out an identity as independent, non-ideological and apolitical agents, they try to shield themselves from both cooptation by either the political or academic sphere, and colonisation by the logic of politics or academe.[51]

To highlight the specific Central European contextual conditions shaping the position of think tanks, the article furthermore investigated the historical background of the third sector in Poland. Being part of the broader category of the NGO sector, think tanks share many of its possibilities and constraints. The argument here is that Polish NGOs employ apolitical language as a result of their recent history and the need to legitimise their existence as a new kind of civic formation. In striving for a shared third sector identity, political and ideological divisions were set aside. This apolitical image has been further consolidated by incentives from grant-providers, prompting think tanks to signal openness to potential funders and collaboration partners. The combination of specific organisational reasons (think tanks as boundary organisations) and the historical ones shared with other Polish NGOs resulted in a powerful motivation for think tanks to create and uphold an apolitical and non-ideological image. This image contributes to masking the hegemonic position of the neoliberal consensus, as well as discouraging NGOs from seeking wider civic engagement.

This study's limited empirical basis confines the conclusions to the field of Polish think tanks and NGOs. Further research drawing on this article's observations about think tank and NGO 'performative impartiality' might consider the same empirical context but other types of organisations (broader civil society in Poland) or other empirical contexts and the same type of organisations (think tanks and NGOs in other countries). Shaw *et al.*'s recent study (2015) maps out a similar balancing act by health policy think tanks in Britain. Their study shows that think tanks actively create an image of independence, at once engaging with and distancing themselves from the political process. By putting think tanks in the broader context of Poland's third sector, the additional historical conditions stemming from transformation are identified as reinforcing these apolitical tendencies.

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[51]Agnieszka Rymsza (2013) discusses similar risks in terms of 'commercialisation' (*komercjalizacja*)—the cooptation of NGOs by the market—and 'governmentalisation' (*governmentalizacja*)—their cooptation by the government and political institutions. The latter term is unfortunate, since in her use, Rymsza disregards the Foucauldian tradition of governmentalisation studies.

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Appendix.   List of interviews

The majority of the interviews conducted while researching this article involved think tank directors. These interviews were occasionally complemented with additional conversations with project leaders working in the same organisation.

Batory Foundation (*Fundacja Batorego*), male, 1 July 2013.

Batory Foundation (*Fundacja Batorego*), female, 2 July 2013.

Batory Foundation (*Fundacja Batorego*), male, 16 October 2013.

Civic Institute (*Instytut Obywatelski*), male, 23 May 2013.

Civil Development Forum (*Forum Obywatelskiego Rozwoju*), male, 2 July 2013.

Ferdinand Lassalle Centre for Social Thought (*Ośrodek Myśli Społecznej im. F. Lassalle'a*), male, 6 June 2013.

National Federation of Polish NGOs (*Ogólnopolska Federacja Organizacji Pozarządowych*), male, 1 July 2013.

Political Critique (*Krytyka Polityczna*), female, 28 May 2013.

Political Critique (*Krytyka Polityczna*), male, 16 October 2013.

Sobieski Institute (*Instytut Sobieskiego*), male, 21 May 2013.

The Institute of Public Affairs (*Instytut Spraw Publicznych*), female, 27 May 2013.

The Institute of Public Affairs (*Instytut Spraw Publicznych*), male, 12 June 2013.

The Institute of Public Affairs (*Instytut Spraw Publicznych*), male, 14 June 2013.

The Unit for Social Innovation and Research—Shipyard (*Pracownia Badań i Innowacji Społecznych 'Stocznia'*), male, 11 June 2013.