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Europeanization in History: An Introduction

*Ulrike v. Hirschhausen and Kiran Klaus Patel**

Europeanization has turned into a 'growth industry'. Now a catchword in political as well as academic realms, the term has enjoyed rapidly increasing usage, driven principally by the growing importance of the European Union. Its predominant connotation stems from the process of Europe's contemporary political integration: since the early 1990s, Europeanization has been most often associated with new forms of European governance and the adaptation of nation-state legal and administrative procedures to the pressures associated with EU membership. Consequently, the term has been used primarily in the fields of law and political science.[1] In recent years, however, a few anthropologists have weighed into the debate and begun to analyse the reconstruction of collective and personal identities brought about by processes of European integration.[2] In these ways, Europeanization has become one of the central concepts by which social scientists conceptualize the accelerating processes of change that have transformed Europe's recent past and present, and that will define its near future. However, all of these variations of literature share the same point of reference: the organizational structure and spatial dimension of the European Union. For historians concerned specifically with the EU's history, this approach might be fruitful – even if few such historians of European integration have so far chosen to enter into this cross-disciplinary debate.[3] At the same time, this whole strand of research restricts and scales down 'Europeanization' to a process closely linked to recent political and institutional developments.

There seems to be a need, therefore, for a broader historical approach to the phenomenon of Europeanization, one seen not in terms of the origins of a present-day reality, but rather as a more flexible analytical tool that seeks to explore to what extent the history of Europe can be conceptualized in terms of processes of Europeanization. This is, however, a task that historians have been slow to undertake. Their apparent reluctance to do so of course reflects the instinctive distrust with which historians tend to regard concepts derived from political science or from contemporary political debates. Fears about such present-mindedness are, perhaps, particularly evident in the case

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of Europeanization. With its resonances of a remorseless and positive process by which Europeans transcended their national frontiers (and thereby their national conflicts), it appears to be unavoidably tainted by its contemporary associations. Moreover, it stands in stark contrast to the emphasis which historians have placed on the murderous and genocidal conflicts that have characterized European history, especially during the first half of the twentieth century. Be it Ernst Nolte's 'European civil war', Mark Mazower's 'dark continent' or Ian Kershaw's 'age of ultra-violence',[4] historians have resolutely focused on the national, ethnic and ideological divisions that made possible the mass violence that cost so many millions of European lives. What one might describe as the 'Sarajevo to Sarajevo' paradigm has many strengths, but it has arguably tended to stand in the way of appreciating more diverse and long-term processes of change. In that respect, it is perhaps significant that, whatever the reluctance of twentieth-century historians to use the term Europeanization, it has been adopted much more readily by historians of earlier centuries.[5]

This volume is therefore intended as a first step towards the application of the idea of Europeanization to the history of twentieth-century Europe. In so doing, we do not wish to abandon the scepticism with which many historians have approached the term. Instead, this volume assumes that Europeanization in the twentieth century is not a fact (and still less a cause), but rather a thesis which needs to be tested against the history of the century. At the same time, however, we do believe that it constitutes a fruitful way of approaching the overly familiar contours of twentieth-century European history. In particular, it provides a means of linking together what are often tacitly regarded as the self-contained sub-periods of the twentieth century (inter-war, post-war, the 1960s, etc.) in order to investigate changes that took place over longer or less defined time periods. In addition, Europeanization has the advantage of bringing together those working on different areas of history: Europeanization may indeed be inherently multi-disciplinary but it also emphatically crosses the boundaries between the fields of political, economic, social and cultural history, suggesting a more integrated approach to processes of historical change.

But what, then, might this broader definition of Europeanization look like? Perhaps unsurprisingly, while definitions of Europeanization have been much debated in other disciplines, there has been relatively little discussion among historians of how the term might be applied to periods of history.[6] Addressing this issue of definition is one of the principal aims of this introduction, and indeed of the volume as a whole. In short, we understand Europeanization as a variety of political, social, economic and cultural processes that promote (or modify) a sustainable strengthening of intra-European connections and similarities through acts of emulation, exchange and entanglement and that have been experienced and labelled as 'European' in the course of history. However, Europeanization is not limited

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to integrative elements such as these, but also encompasses parallel processes of delimitation and 'othering', as well as fragmentation and conflict. It is the sum of these transnational processes that constitutes Europeanization. In this definition of Europeanization it is, in our view, essential to avoid a process of selection – conscious or otherwise – whereby generally peaceful or progressive phenomena are identified as somehow inherently European, while those that are less palatable are dismissed as anti-European. Such value structures impede an historical understanding of Europeanization, which must encompass the ways in which the darker sides of European history also often constituted aspects of Europeanization. Similarly, it is essential that Europeanization is not viewed in teleological terms: Europeanization has not been a process of inexorable development, but rather a dialogical one which, over the course of the century, has also given rise to forms of de-Europeanization.

In order to elaborate on this rather broad definition, this introductory chapter will first develop three characteristics of what Europeanization means for historical research and elucidate the analytical tools that can help to narrate these processes. Then, using these three theses as a basis, the main approaches to studying Europeanization will be explored, and the concomitant opportunities and difficulties highlighted. Finally, we will consider the various forms of Europeanization that can be detected over the course of the twentieth century, and will introduce the ways in which the essays in this volume shed light on these processes.

Three theses on Europeanization

1. *Europeanization is not a uniform, unidirectional and teleological process*. Phases and forms of enhanced intra-European connections have often been followed by periods of abatement or even retreat. Consequently, there has been no steady rise of Europeanization. Before 1914, for example, it was possible to travel from Paris to Bucharest in one train; not only did national boundaries subsequently prevent this, but new modes of transportation – such as aeroplanes – gradually eclipsed older ones. As this example demonstrates, several processes of Europeanization – in this case via different means of transportation – can and often did coexist; they might coalesce, compete, complement or compensate each other. Moreover, very often, processes of intensification had paradoxical side effects or gave way to contradictory movements which subsequently weakened intra-European connections. In this respect, the history of the European constitutional treaty between 2001 and 2005 might serve as an instructive example: intended as a beacon of Europeanization, it failed because of its rejection in French and Dutch referenda in May and June 2005. Thus, a move towards greater political and structural integration prompted reactions that ostensibly articulated an alternative view of

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Europe, but which in practice protected national or regional autonomy. On the other hand, this constitutional crisis also precipitated a surge in Europeanization: in the immediate aftermath of the two 'No' votes, not only were the French and Dutch positions fervently discussed throughout Europe, but so too was the project of European integration more generally. In this way, Europeanization can involve both intensifications and retreats; indeed, at times the two tendencies are deeply intertwined.[7]

This conception of Europeanization as a non-teleological process suggests what Norman Davies has described in a rather different context as a 'tidal Europe', the ebbs and flows of which have varied according to changing historical contexts.[8] Such a metaphor defies any linear development towards greater European integration. Rather, it critically reflects the fact that, although all terms describing processes, including Europeani*zation*, have some teleological element inscribed within them, Europeanization for us denotes a complex, multidirectional and open process of intra-European entanglement, exchange and cooperation that also comprises counter-tendencies to these developments.

2. *Europeanization has no fixed geographical boundaries*. The metaphor of 'tidal Europe' has not only a temporal but also a spatial dimension. Conceptually, while Europeanization can help to overcome the obstinate fixation of modern historiography on national histories, it cannot dispense with territoriality as a major factor in history.[9] Europeanization was (and is) a phenomenon which is most evident on the borders of Europe, and these borders have moved markedly over the course of the twentieth century. Nor are these frontiers only external. Tacitly or explicitly, much of the historical writing on Europe has privileged certain areas of the European continent as more important than others. This is especially true in the case of the latter half of the twentieth century. The Cold War divide has shaped not only the *grands récits* of that specific epoch, but also the historiography of modern Europe in general.[10] Even after the disappearance of the Iron Curtain from Europe's contemporary political reality, it continues to exist in historiography. Very often, the eastern half of Europe's past is shaved off or contained in unconnected, separate narratives implying backwardness and delay in comparison with western Europe.[11] Against this background, Michael Geyer has pleaded for a 'Europeanization of European history' by integrating and interweaving the histories of the entire continent.[12]

This raises a further question: what is meant by the 'continent'? Most historians would agree that, over the course of history there has been no stable or enduring notion of a geographically-defined Europe. The delineation of Europe's eastern frontier as the Ural Mountains was an eighteenth-century invention, intended to bolster Russia's claim to be one of the great European powers.[13] Indeed, the conception of Europe's borders has been contested since antiquity; the continuing debate surrounding the admission of Turkey into the EU illustrates that even in the

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twenty-first century, it is impossible to establish a consensus on the issue. European history – and hence Europeanization – must therefore avoid any essentialist geographical definition. As there is no general, simple solution to the instability and ephemeral quality of Europe, a historical study of Europeanization must acknowledge and incorporate an understanding of the continent's evolving frontiers.

The geographical vagueness of Europe serves to reinforce that, just as there is no 'natural' shape to Europe, so too does easy definition of Europeanization remain elusive. As frontiers have changed, so has the nature of Europeanization. The consequent complexities can appear intimidating: any attempt to 'map' Europeanization in terms of the rise or fall of particular forms of integration is necessarily undermined by the changing nature of the object (Europe) which it seeks to measure. For historians, however, this vagueness – or, more exactly, the changing nature of the object of the study – serves as a challenge. It is only by identifying the ways in which Europe has changed its meaning that we can begin to understand the nature of Europeanization. Or, to put it less modestly, history is not merely another way of looking at Europeanization, but rather is an essential means of doing so.

3. *Europeanization is not just about Europe*. For a long time, the term was primarily used with regard to non-European spaces, to conceptualize the Europeanization of the world, mainly as part of the European processes of expansion which took place from the early modern period onward.[14] This use of the term would appear more straightforward or even commonsensical; but it, too, presents problems of definition. How, for example, should the Europe being exported be defined? Moreover, these particular forms of Europe were, in turn, transformed as part of the process of their appropriation by, or imposition on, non-European societies. The 'exportation of Europe' was therefore anything but a simple process, and one made even more complex when this externally-defined Europe was subsequently refracted back into the history of the continent through, for example, the adoption of 'colonial' practices during the mid-century conquest of areas of central and eastern Europe.[15]

This issue of 'which Europe?' also serves to demonstrate the self-referentiality of the term. The existence (or otherwise) of Europeanization relies heavily on the definition that one chooses to give to Europe. This creates the danger of a circular argument, by which a definition of Europeanization is advanced which determines in advance the answer to the question of its existence. This problem is not, of course, unique to Europeanization; it haunts all attempts to apply ideal-type criteria to the past. It is, however, especially acute in the case of Europeanization because of the absence of a recognizable 'other'. While the Americanization of Europe, for instance, describes the moulding of an entity by a relatively well-defined external force, in the case of the Europeanization of Europe, the 'other' is the same as the object being influenced. Thus, institutions and identities, processes and perceptions which are

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being 'Europeanized' themselves constitute that which supposedly produces them. There is no easy solution to this problem: Europeanization cannot be measured as the rise of one thing at the expense of the other. Instead, it needs to be perceived as a changing historical factor which has taken different shapes at different times.

As the imperial influence well demonstrates, however, this process of Europeanization never occurred in isolation. The frontiers of Europe have never been closed, and this was especially true during the twentieth century. The presence of Muslim populations in Europe or of American popular culture uniting the peoples of the Old World via jazz and jeans exemplifies why Europeanization cannot be analysed adequately without taking the non-European dimension into account. Further, research in imperial history and other fields has demonstrated the extent to which non-European experiences and practices have affected and shaped Europe and its integration. Crucial forces of Europeanization, such as urban planning, bureaucratic routines or modern art, developed in a dialogue with places such as Savannah, Georgia, New Delhi or Papeete, Tahiti. This refers back to 'tidal Europe' and, more importantly, it also reminds us that Europe has not only left its imprint on other parts of the world but that the inverse is often also true. Even if one concentrates on the 'Europeanization of Europe', as we do here, the explanation of factors and motives cannot come to a halt whenever blue water or roughly the 60th degree of longitude are reached.[16]

The conceptual problem of dealing with the boundaries of Europeanization also applies to the internal frontiers of Europe. Dipesh Chakrabarty's plea to 'provincialize Europe' acquires a particular relevance when applied to areas of central or eastern Europe which have often been described as 'backward' in comparison with some implicit or explicit European norm.[17] Traditional categories of Western scholarship, such as modernization and backwardness, therefore not only fall short when explaining structures, processes and experiences in Africa or Asia. They are also far from satisfactory when applied to Romania, Ruthenia, Rioja, or any other place within Europe labelled as the periphery by the dominant, north-western part of the continent. Thus, if studies of Europeanization are to move beyond an oversimplified narrative of pioneers, model pupils and backwardness, much work has to be invested in order to carve out appropriate categories for diverse experiences and for plural paths to modernity.[18]

Taken to their logical conclusions, each of these three theses therefore serves to demonstrate the dangers inherent in any simplistic use of the term Europeanization. Every definition of Europeanization tends to result in a circular argument involving elements that are hard to define and a geographical space with vague borders. As Kevin Featherstone has rightly observed, the term is one that has often been applied as 'a loose epithet' to highly diverse forms of political, economic or cultural convergence.[19] One might therefore think that Europeanization is too elastic to be meaningful; this, however, would be

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unduly pessimistic. 'Europeanization' can be infused with real meaning when it is accepted as a flexible term that has always been plural, and which refers to different processes over the course of European history. Indeed, it is precisely the complexity of the term that serves to illuminate its richness as a historical topic. It is only by examining simultaneously what Europeanization meant in history and what it means when applied to history that the term acquires true significance.

Approaches to Europeanization

A common way of dealing with the dilemmas of Europeanization has been a normative approach. If one works, for example, with strict categories such as the spread of Roman law, human rights, or Christianity, it is possible to analyse and frame processes of Europeanization quite clearly. According to this approach, phenomena thought to be constitutive of Europe are investigated in terms of their emergence and dissemination. The research which has been undertaken on peaceful plans of European integration – from Dante to Kant, from Rousseau to Schmidt-Phiseldek, and from Churchill to Spaak – might serve as another example of such a normative approach. At the core of this narrative very often lies a notion of peace (the transcending of national conflict in the name of a wider European idea) as a key element of Europeanization. As such, this perennial idea, or utopian ideal, has travelled across European societies, from one era to the next, never entirely extinguished and, as one approaches the present, gradually gaining in intellectual and political influence.

However, this normative take has serious drawbacks: the reduction of Europeanization to one abstract concept reduces the multifariousness of the past and marginalizes all those experiences that do not fit into its narrative framework.[20] Furthermore, many such norms were not exclusively European inventions but rather were developed and shared in a global environment. In adopting such a normative approach, there is therefore the danger of repeating, at a European level, notions of national distinctiveness, of a European *Sonderweg* which have too often characterized national narratives within European history.[21] In addition, because such a normative approach is always based upon selection, it must be capable of being challenged. Is, for example, Europeanization really about peace, given that the continent has, over the course of the twentieth century, seen some of the bloodiest wars in history? Or about democracy, in a part of the world deeply divided throughout most of the twentieth century by competing political ideologies and systems? Or about Christianity, during a century when Christianization waned as a formative influence on various parts of Europe? Indeed, such arguments serve only to demonstrate that attempts to define Europeanization in terms of a core set of values present more difficulties than solutions.

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If, on the other hand, one accepts a non-essentialist approach to Europeanization, how then can we carry this forward as a viable project? In our eyes, there is no single master path to achieving this. However, a certain quantum of social constructivism seems unavoidable if one is to bypass the problems of essentialist or normative approaches described above. Building upon the work of Benedict Anderson and others on nationalism and modern nations, one can understand Europe as an 'imagined community' – that is, an artefact of particular cultural and social formations and not as a natural, obvious and perennial entity, neither unchanging nor self-contained.[22] At the same time, it would be incorrect to take this constructivist approach to the extreme. *Imagined communities* are more than mere figments of the mind. Discourses as well as material practices have turned Europe into a *lived community* that also needs to be researched through analysis of economic and political structures as well as cultural discourses. Europeanization has happened at different times for a reason, or more often for plural reasons; the task of the historian is to unravel its various constitutive elements and to trace their interactions. The advantage of such an approach is that it avoids many of the complexities of definition. It enables one to set aside questions such as: What is Europe? What are its constituent norms and what are their boundaries? In this way, we can ignore 'the Turkey in the room' (i.e., contemporary debates about the frontiers of Europe), and instead perceive Europe – and hence Europeanization – as a category of practice which has been projected and performed, experienced and exported, labelled and legitimized, appropriated and emulated in a range of contexts. We thereby understand Europe as a highly malleable concept, which has taken different shapes and acquired different contents in response to the actions of a variety of actors but also to the broader circumstances of the time.[23]

Under this umbrella, three approaches can be differentiated, all of which will be used in the empirical chapters of this volume. First, some scholars have highlighted the discursive side of these processes, that is, what can be summed up as '*Europe Imagined*'. Accordingly, Europeanization can be found wherever people talk, write, sing about or memorialize Europe. Such a cultural history of Europeanization, highlighting the role of language, imagination, visualization and memory, constitutes a distinct and coherent approach to the subject. Research of this kind – most importantly the ground-breaking work of Wolfgang Schmale – has shown that 'Europe' is in fact a relatively modern idea, replacing earlier concepts of Christendom after generations of religious conflict and filling the need for a more neutral designation of a common point of reference and identity. Despite the fact that the term has a history that can be traced back to antiquity, as a driving force of Europeanization in the sense defined above this use of the term 'Europe' has essentially developed since the beginning of the early modern period.[24]

This approach to Europeanization is conceptually convincing and has considerable potential for empirical research. In many respects, it remains

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surprising how little we know about the way in which the term Europe was constructed and employed within European cultural debates from the French Revolution onwards.[25] In future, it could be expanded and gain additional depth through a dialogue with a certain strand of the research on nationalism: expanding on Michael Billig's concept of 'banal nationalism',[26] one could frame this as a form of 'banal Europeanism', whereby figures and maps, tables and statistics as well as other forms of discourse were increasingly structured and presented according to 'European' lines in order to produce a specific vision of Europe. As ethnological research has emphasized, the permanent production of these standards and surveys not only served to shape a specific mode of representing Europe, but also, through 'fixing' Europe in a certain way, had a much wider impact on conceptions of Europe. Analysing such forms of 'banal Europeanism' would have the added advantage of widening cultural representations of Europe beyond the focus on the cultural artefacts of the middle class that have hitherto dominated the literature.[27]

Such a cultural approach, however, can only take one so far. It was not only ideas, representations or visual artefacts which transcended boundaries and strengthened or re-oriented intra-European connections but also more material and social factors. Hence the need for a second approach, which one might term '*Europe Constructed*': Through studying the nexus of pilgrims and paths, jugglers and journals, doctors and diseases within which the cultural representations of Europe emerged, it is possible to identify the diverse forms of social practice which have given rise to spaces of Europeanization. Not only must this material approach encompass a wide range of phenomena which go beyond the sphere of cultural history, but other subfields of history must also be introduced and incorporated. Johan Schot and Thomas Misa, for instance, have focused on the role of technology as a means of Europeanization. They analyse how 'actors design and use technology to constitute and enact European integration (or fragmentation)'. They see technology as a set of Europe-building practices 'in which specific concepts and visions of Europe became embedded in particular designs for artefacts and systems.'[28] Thus, European railway systems, television regulations or engineers' congresses imply specific notions of Europe that time and again have been put into practice. Technology in this context serves as one possible means of comprehending a Europe in action, and through two international research projects, on 'Inventing Europe' and 'Tensions of Europe', Schot and others have demonstrated not only the importance of this approach, but also the potential for its extension to analogous fields.

Thirdly, there is a more pragmatic approach, which combines the analysis of discursive and material practices and which focuses on '*Europe Emergent*'. Implicitly, it is this approach which has shaped most of the work undertaken so far. There are important arguments in favour of this flexible methodology. A purely discursive or material approach often leaves little room for integrating

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the unlabelled and unintentional aspects of Europeanization. Sometimes, actors carried out Europeanization without articulating it as such: from today's perspective, for example, there can be no doubt that Gothic architecture was a Europeanizing factor in European history, even if it did not know its name at the time. The decades between 1850 and 1880, to give another example, were a period when a growing number of transnational networks, both formal and informal, were created.[29] Many of them, such as the Red Cross or the International Statistical Congress, had a strong European focus and can also be seen as drivers of Europeanization – even if they were not referred to as such when they were created.

In many cases, therefore, it did not require a vision of Europe to initiate processes of Europeanization. This unintended facet becomes most obvious if one turns to the dark sides of Europeanization which necessarily constitute an explicit element of research of this kind. Violence and war have been major forces of transnationalism and of Europeanization throughout most of the continent's history.[30] They led to fragmentation as well as to exchange and new connections, as illustrated by the intense and durable cross-boundary experiences of soldiers or nurses, forced labourers or displaced persons during the era of the Second World War. In their memoirs, these actors very often framed their experiences as a period of *European* exchanges and contacts – thus constructing a specific landscape of actions and memories.

Analysis of Europeanization can therefore go beyond the focus on *Europe Imagined* – the deliberate and explicit reference to Europe – and of *Europe Constructed* – the establishment of European political, technological or other institutions.[31] The further one moves into the analysis of a *Europe Emergent,* however, the greater the danger of succumbing to an essentialist, normative and selective view of Europeanization. In the case of an emergent Europe, actors set up structures and initiate processes which subsequently stabilize and sediment. Over time, they may be experienced, labelled and used in different ways, but at some point, they are perceived as specifically *European*. Only then (if one follows the social-constructivist approach that we have adopted) do they enter the realm of Europeanization research because, without this caveat, anachronism, essentialism and teleology cannot be avoided.[32] Therefore, this kind of research is particularly interested in the moments when Europe turns into the denominator of these structures and processes – and of all the changes that follow from them.

Europeanization, however, never occurred in isolation. Discourses on Europe must be viewed in relation to alternative but often overlapping concepts of loyalty and identity – especially national and regional feelings of belonging, but also notions of cosmopolitanism.[33] Technologies, as well as political and economic integration projects, almost always emerged in larger regional settings, often spanning the North Atlantic or

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the Mediterranean, and these connections serve to underscore yet again how Europeanization was often embedded within contexts that were, at the same time, both geographically larger, and emotionally smaller. The degree of interconnection between Europeanization and these other processes varied. Some of the waves and ebbs of 'tidal Europe' have remained quite distinct, whereas in some cases, they have overlapped with other processes – notably those of regionalism, nationalization and globalization. In the twentieth century, for example, the United States of America has been an especially important influence on European history. This does not necessarily mean that Americanization or other such processes were the antithesis of Europeanization, but rather that such processes could develop in tandem. There is therefore no need to construct false dichotomies between Europeanization and these other wide-ranging processes of change. Instead, Europeanization has to be perceived as a multifarious phenomenon which took various forms and which developed in interaction with other forces.

Europeanization in the twentieth century

The three varieties of a social constructivist approach that have been differentiated in this introduction will be taken up in the empirical chapters of this volume. In so doing, all of the contributions focus on twentieth-century history. Obviously, Europeanization is not exclusively a phenomenon of contemporary history; the decision to restrict ourselves to one century was essentially a pragmatic one. At the same time, the twentieth century is a particularly interesting research field for Europeanization because during this 'age of extremes',[34] processes of Europeanization – and their destruction – reached an unprecedented level of intensity, thereby highlighting its ambivalence and complexity.[35] Another consequence of focusing on the twentieth century has been that it has enabled us to emphasize the interconnectedness between processes of Europeanization and larger global ones. As such, although most of the essays have inner-European developments as their primary focus, we have been careful to highlight that Europeanization was never an internal or isolated process: the volume contains essays that look beyond Europe, and which emphasize that those processes of Europeanization 'out there' which formed part of empire-building also contributed to Europeanization 'back here'.

At this stage in the research, it is too early to trace how Europeanization changed over the course of the century; however, a number of general themes can be identified. Obviously, the era preceding the First World War that was characterized by a European sense of superiority over the rest of the world was, in many respects, a period of intense Europeanization. More than in subsequent decades, Europeanization during this time was an imperial endeavour aimed at wielding power over, or even projecting it on to, areas

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of the world perceived to be non-European. In contrast, what one may term the Europeanization of Europe only came to the fore during the second half of the twentieth century. At that time, the relative demise of European power on a global scale, coupled with the economic and political integration of Western Europe (after 1945, and particularly since the 1980s) were driving forces: With 'Europe' increasingly identified with Western Europe, and even more so with the integration process carried out under the auspices of the EEC/EC/EU, actors of all kinds had to reposition themselves – as attendants, allies, alternatives or aspirants to this new reality. The consequent conflicts and clashes over competing notions of Europe and Europeanization which emerged have strengthened rather than weakened the importance of this point of reference. So, the existence of the controversy surrounding the development of the EU, especially since the 1980s, has helped to normalize and stabilize the reference to Europe, and has transformed it from a discrete entity into the basis for both discourse and material practice, as well as for combinations of the two. Against this backdrop, any binary logic of increase and decline seems unduly simplistic. Instead, the manifold forms of Europeanization and their quality of constant change need to be considered and given credence. Rather like blood, what matters are the situations in which these different forms of Europeanization coalesce and clot.

By focusing on Europeanization during the twentieth century, we hope that this volume will contribute to wider inter-disciplinary debates. Given the undeniable political and economic influence of the EU, our work can, we believe, contribute to an understanding of the contemporary shape of Europe. But the deeper value of an historical perspective on Europeanization lies in the way in which historians can re-orientate attention away from an exclusive focus on the post-1989 expanded European Union, and emphasize instead the different configurations of Europe, and meanings of the word 'European', which have flourished over the past century. Thus, although many of the essays in this volume have a contemporary resonance, they are emphatically historical in nature, and include many subjects that have not been hitherto viewed in the context of Europeanization. Rather than seeking to provide an alternative narrative account of the twentieth century, our concern is to emphasize the plurality of forms of Europeanization which have arisen (and in some cases disappeared), as well as warning against overly facile uses of the term.

During the course of developing our approach to Europeanization, the authors of this volume time and again felt that they were entering a *terra incognita*. It should be made clear from the outset that we aim only to provide select case studies that reflect the general ambition of our approach; we do not claim to map comprehensively all aspects of Europeanization in twentieth-century Europe. Hence, the empirical chapters of the book are fundamentally tentative in character. While some areas and issues will be dealt with in more detail than others, any attempt to define our objectives more narrowly would

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have prejudiced the overall goal of the project; consequently, we see our task more in terms of proposing a putative agenda than of providing definite and final empirical answers.

The contributions to the volume reflect this purpose, encompassing disparate periods and areas of twentieth-century European history. In a manner perhaps appropriate to its topic, this book itself is an exercise in Europeanization because it is a product of primarily British–German cooperation (with some American, Irish and Italian outposts). In particular, the four co-authored chapters, co-produced by British and German writers, epitomize our attempt to move not only beyond national history but also beyond national ways of writing history. Furthermore, all of the chapters adopt distinct versions of the three approaches delineated above. To this end, we have chosen to divide the chapters into the three sub-headings outlined above; in doing so, however, we have been conscious that many of the chapters combine two (or even all three) of these approaches, and that their allocation to one of the three sub-groups must therefore be somewhat arbitrary.

A first group of texts is clustered around the idea of *Europe Imagined*. The chapter jointly written by Jessica Wardhaugh, Ruth Leiserowitz and Christian Bailey contends that intellectuals have been important agents of cultural Europeanization in the twentieth century, particularly in their construction of European spaces of imagination, communication and conviviality. Three case studies of Western, Central and Eastern Europe explore the creation of 'dream-Europes' by intellectual dissidents, drawing out their search for moral and social authority and their determination to bridge European division by creating transnational networks. The chapter reveals a close connection between imagined Europe and its physical geography, and suggests the need for a long-term perspective on Europeanization, since its cultural importance in times of political tension often emerges most clearly in retrospect.

The chapter by Jose Harris examines the debates over the past, present and future of Europe which took place during the Second World War in the United Kingdom. Despite Britain's intellectual isolation from the continent for much of the war, and the intense celebration of 'Englishness' apparent in many aspects of wartime culture, interest in the identity and fate of Europe among politicians, economists, social scientists, creative writers and artists was surprisingly widespread. Using three contrasting examples of people who engaged in such discussions, the chapter explores the multifarious views and conceptions of Europe, and demonstrates that it was mainly the perception of a crisis of European civilization that spurred the increased interest of British elites.

This 'Europeanization of the mind' is also evident in the chapter by Veronika Lipphardt, which looks at how concepts of a *Homo Europaeus* have developed in the life sciences. Anthropologists in particular investigated and described the figure of 'European man' as biologically different from 'Non-Europeans' for more than two centuries, albeit with evolving intensity and

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motives. The chapter argues that one can therefore speak of a Europeanization of knowledge production, evident through the scientists' 'willingness' to denote certain objects under study as 'European'. This was not, however, a fixed phenomenon, but rather one which underwent substantial change over the course of the twentieth century.

A second group of chapters deals with *Europe Constructed*. Ulrike von Hirschhausen describes the European Nationality Congress between 1925 and 1945 as a phenomenon revealing moves towards Europeanization as well as towards de-Europeanization. While its founding members tried to safeguard the newly emerging 'minorities' all over Europe, a generational change and its financial dependency on the German government turned the Congress during the 1930s into an instrument of German revisionism. The very process of reinterpreting the – formerly democratic – idea of securing minorities' rights into an argument that legitimized expansive and revisionist policies underlines the ebbs and flows of a 'tidal Europe' in an age of extremes.

The chapter by Patricia Clavin and Kiran Klaus Patel explores the history of two international organizations, the League of Nations and the European Economic Community. Taking the negotiations about agricultural trade and production as an example, they interpret both the League and the EEC/EU as sites of Europeanization. In propitious political, social, and intellectual contexts, these international organizations generated shared causal and normative conceptions of 'Europe', which subsequently provided a resource essential for collective action. The process examined demonstrates how these agencies were both Europeanizing and Europeanized.

In their chapter, Martin Conway and Volker Depkat explore the ways in which non-Communist political elites in Western Europe thought and talked about democracy in the first 15 years following the Second World War. What emerges from their empirical analysis is the substantial convergence which occurred in the ways in which democracy was defined, experienced and practised by leading politicians of France, Germany, the Benelux countries and Italy. As these political elites were increasingly speaking in the same political language, democracy as a set of commonly shared values and a political system developed into a key element of notions of 'Europeanness' and European identity. In this way, political democracy also became a site of Europeanization.

In a somewhat similar vein, Tom Buchanan analyses the history of human rights from the early post-war years to 1975. By focusing on the interaction between different actors – such as states, international organizations and voluntary campaigning bodies – within the context of the Cold War, European integration and decolonization, he demonstrates the incremental process by which this set of values and legal norms developed into a cornerstone of European identity, and thus came to be seen as a conscious attempt to invest Europe with distinctive meaning.

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Guido Thiemeyer's chapter discusses Europeanization in the monetary sector between 1958 and 1999. By focusing on the interplay between economic and social 'forces profondes', including their unintended effects on political behaviour on the one hand and political plans and attempts at monetary integration on the other, he stresses that Europe and Europeanization meant completely different things for the various actors involved. In addition, Thiemeyer emphasizes that integration was accompanied by fragmentation and delimitation, not only vis-à-vis the Eastern bloc, but in this case also with respect to the United States.

A third and final cluster of chapters focuses on *Europe Emergent*. In their chapter, Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski investigate the largely unplanned Europeanizing effects of two violent projects of epic dimensions: European colonialism and the two world wars. Their chapter engages with what one might call the 'dark side' of transnational history in order to promote an ambivalent concept of 'Europeanization' that weaves together histories of extremely violent encounters and border-crossings and those of economic success, democratic reorientation and collective recovery. In doing so, they aim to highlight multiple dynamics and to complicate the 'happy' image of Europeanization that continues to dominate scholarly and political debates.

William Whyte's chapter uses debates about architecture in Nigeria and Ghana between the mid-1940s and the 1990s as a way of exploring Europeanization. Modernism, he argues, was seen as synonymous with modernization, and modernization was equated with Europeanization. For some writers, modernism was necessarily European and therefore bad. For others, it was evidently modern and therefore good. Ironically, of course, these arguments rested upon assumptions which had been articulated by European writers for centuries. Whyte's chapter thus highlights the ambiguous relationship between Europeanization and modernization while also exposing a wider Europeanization of discourse more profound than the architecture that was its ostensible subject.

In contrast, the contribution by John Davis focuses on an even more unexpected and certainly unintentional form of Europeanization. Taking British beat music of the 1960s as a point of reference and departure, he looks at the ways in which European pop musicians emulated English style and language of music; in doing so, they in fact effected a Europeanization of popular music, as opposed to simply perpetuating a derivative of the English model.

The final contribution returns to the dark side of Europeanization. Drawing on examples from East and West Germany, Poland and France, Henning Grunwald examines the impact of Holocaust remembrance on European collective memory and identity. Critically surveying the way in which these concepts are framed in political science, sociology and legal history, the chapter explores the waxing and waning (and waxing again)

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of Holocaust memory as a Europeanizing force. From the earliest, idealistic notions of a European community of suffering and solidarity forged in the camps and embodied in camp memorials via the nationalization and instrumentalization of memory in the Cold War, to the disputed emergence of the Holocaust as a 'European founding myth' after 1989, this chapter eschews teleological accounts for an exploration of Europeanization through violence and its remembrance, a Europeanization *malgré soi*.

As Martin Conway argues in the concluding contribution, the evident heterogeneity of the subject matter and the multifarious processes of Europeanization explored in this volume indicate that the history of Europeanization defies any finite definition. While it can be perceived as 'a thing in itself' – that is, a process (or processes) that *happened* – it also denotes a discourse which, by influencing the way in which actors have seen the world, has had an impact on the shape of the European twentieth century.

Notes

* Apart from the other contributors to this volume, we would like to thank Johan Schot and Cornelius Torp for their helpful remarks on earlier versions of this text. Martin Conway deserves special thanks. Only the two of us know how much we owe to his comments and suggestions on matters large and small.

1. E.g. see Paolo Graziano and Maarten Peter Vink (eds), *Europeanization: New Research Agendas* (New York, 2007); Gunnar Folke Schuppert (ed.), *The Europeanisation of Governance* (Baden-Baden, 2006); Robert Harmsen and Thomas Wilson, 'Introduction: Approaches to Europeanization', *Yearbook of European Studies* XIV (2004), 132–6.
2. E.g. see Irène Bellier and Thomas M. Wilson (eds), *An Anthropology of the European Union* (Oxford, 2000); Cris Shore, *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration* (London/New York, 2000); Marc Abélès, 'La communauté européenne: une perspective anthropologique', *Social Anthropology* IV (1996), 334–5.
3. W. Kaiser, B. Leucht and M. Rasmussen (eds) *The History of the European Union. The Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity* (London, 2008) is a first step towards such a debate.
4. Ernst Nolte, *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg, 1917–1945: Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus* (Frankfurt/Main, 1987); Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London, 1998); Ian Kershaw, 'War and Political Violence in Twentieth-Century Europe', *Contemporary European History* XIV (2005), 1072–3. See also Mark Levene, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State* 2 vols (London, 2005).
5. Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950–1350* (London, 1993); Stuart Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe* (London, 1991).
6. As one of the few exceptions: Hartmut Kaelble, 'Europäisierung', in Matthias Middell (ed.), *Dimensionen der Kultur- und Gesellschaftsgeschichte* (Leipzig, 2007), pp. 738–9.
7. See Maurizio Bach, Christa Lahusen and Georg Vobruba (eds), *Europe in Motion: Social Dynamics and Political Institutions in an Enlarging Europe* (Berlin, 2006).

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8. See for this concept Norman Davies, *Europe: A History* (Oxford, 1996), p. 9; W.H. Parker, *A Historical Geography of Russia* (London, 1968). The metaphor also has its limits: the tidal Europe we envisage is not caused by the forces of the moon or any other single, 'natural' actor.
9. See e.g. Charles S. Maier, 'Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era', in *American Historical Review* CV (2000), 807–31; Kiran Klaus Patel, *Nach der Nationalfixiertheit: Perspektiven einer transnationalen Geschichte* (Berlin, 2004).
10. As attempts to overcome this divide, see e.g.: Bernard Wasserstein, *Barbarism and Civilization: A History of Europe in Our Time* (Oxford, 2007); Mazower, *Continent*; Davies, *Europe*; also see Stuart Woolf, 'Europe and its Historians', *Contemporary European History* XII (2003), 323–38.
11. See Manfred Hildermeier, 'Das Privileg der Rückständigkeit: Anmerkungen zum Wandel einer Interpretationsfigur der Neueren Russischen Geschichte', *Historische Zeitschrift* No. 244 (1987), 557–603.
12. Michael Geyer, 'Historical Fiction of Anatomy and the Europeanization of National History', *Central European History* XXII (1989), 316–42, quote 334.
13. See Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe* (Stanford, 1994); Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York, 1997).
14. See e.g. the entry in the Oxford English Dictionary.
15. See e.g. Williard Sunderland, *Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire on the Russian Steppe* (Ithaca, 2004); Daniel Brower and Edward Lazzerini (eds), *Russia's Orient. Imperial Borderlands and Peoples 1700–1971* (Bloomington, 1997).
16. See e.g. Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper (eds), *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley, 1997).
17. See Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, 2000).
18. See, For example, Ulrike v. Hirschhausen and Jörn Leonhard (eds), *Nationalismen in Europa: West- und Osteuropa im Vergleich* (Göttingen, 2001).
19. Kevin Featherstone 'Introduction: "In the Name of Europe"' in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford, 2003), p. 12.
20. See e.g. Marie-Louise von Plessen (ed.), *Idee Europa: Entwürfe zum 'Ewigen Frieden'* (Berlin, 2003); Heinz Duchhardt, 'Was heisst und zu welchem Ende betreibt man – Europäische Geschichte?', in Heinz Duchhardt and Andreas Kunz (eds), *'Europäische Geschichte' als historiographisches Problem* (Mainz, 1997), pp. 191–202.
21. See notably S. Berger (ed.), *Writing the Nation: A Global Perspective* (Basingstoke, 2007) and S. Berger and C. Lorenz (eds), *The Contested Nation: Ethnicity, Class, Religion and Gender in National Histories* (Basingstoke, 2008).
22. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983).
23. For a similar conceptual approach, though not on Europeanization but on the figure of 'European man': Lorraine Bluche, Veronika Lipphardt and Kiran Klaus Patel (eds), *Der Europäer – ein Konstrukt. Wissensbestände, Diskurse, Praktiken* (Göttingen, 2009).
24. See e.g. Wolfgang Schmale, *Geschichte Europas* (Vienna, 2001); some of the contributions in Bo Stråth (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other* (Brussels, 2000); on memory and Europeanization Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger (eds), *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories* (New York, 2007); from the perspective of anthropology Wolfgang Kaschuba, 'Europäisierung als kulturalistisches Projekt? Ethnologische

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Betrachtungen', in Hans Joas and Friedrich Jaeger (eds), *Europa im Spiegel der Kulturwissenschaften* (Baden-Baden, 2008), pp. 204–25; e.g. on music, Philipp Ther, 'Das Europa der Nationalkulturen. Die Nationalisierung und Europäisierung der Oper im "langen" 19. Jahrhundert', *Journal of Modern European History* v (2007), 39–66.

25. See e.g. Wlodzimierz Borodziej et al. (eds), *Option Europa. Deutsche, polnische und ungarische Europapläne des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*, 3 vols (Göttingen, 2005).
26. Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London, 1995).
27. See e.g. Reinhard Johler, '"Europa in Zahlen". Statistik – Vergleich – Volkskunde – EU', in *Zeitschrift für Volkskunde* xcv (1999), 246–63; Maryon McDonald, '"Unity in Diversity". Some Tensions in the Construction of Europe', *Social Anthropology* iii (1996), 47–60.
28. See Johan Schot and Thomas J. Misa, "Inventing Europe: Technology and the Hidden Integration of Europe", *History and Technology* xxi (2005), 1–19, quotes 8, 9; e.g. also see: Johan Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, 'Internationalism in the Interwar Years. Building Europe on Motorways and Electricity', in: *Journal of Modern European History* vi (2008), 196–217. Schot and Misa use the term 'European integration' but by this they mean basically the same as when we talk about Europeanization.
29. See Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley, 2002).
30. See e.g. Kiran Klaus Patel, 'In Search for a Transnational Historicization. National Socialism and its Place in History' in Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger (eds), *Conflicted Memories*. pp. 96–116.
31. See for this concept Kaelble, *Europäisierung*.
32. For the somewhat analogous case of nationalization, John Breuilly has pointed at the pitfalls of all alternatives: John Breuilly, 'Nationalismustheorien und kritische deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte', in Sven-Oliver Müller and Cornelius Torp (eds), *Das Deutsche Kaiserreich in der Kontroverse: Eine Bilanz* (Göttingen, 2009).
33. See e.g. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, 'Erfahrungen mit Europa. Ansätze zu einer Geschichte Europas im langen 19. Jahrhundert', in Duchhardt and Kunz, *Europäische Geschichte*, pp. 87–104; Achim Trunk, *Europa, ein Ausweg: Politische Eliten und europäische Identität in den 1950er Jahren* (Munich, 2007).
34. See Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes. A History of the World, 1914–1991* (New York, 1994).
35. We do not agree with Wasserstein, *Barbarism*, viii, who argues that Europe, even during the twentieth century, was not even a meaningful category for most of its inhabitants.

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