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Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and the Bifurcation of Israel

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Abstract Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are the two large and important cities of Israel.[1] Jerusalem, situated on the crest of the Judea mountains is the religiously sanctified and official capital of the state of Israel. Tel Aviv, situated on the shore of the Mediterranean, is the business and social metropolitan hub of Israeli society. The two cities are perceived in Israeli culture as representing two opposing political–cultural principles: Jerusalem is historical and holy—a probable prescription for cultural intolerance and political violence; Tel Aviv is contemporaneous and profane—a possible recipe for a thriving and hedonistic civil society. Such a perception will inform the first part of the essay. In its second part, a critical look at this perception will be offered. Critics contest the common depiction of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv as two antidotal poles and consider it disingenuous if not deceiving. They contend that the two cities are more alike than the common perception would lead one to believe, and that they form in fact a common Israeli system, with just a slight division of labor among them. The third part of the essay will expand beyond Jerusalem and Tel Aviv as such and will consider the larger context of Israeli political culture and especially the bifurcation between post-Zionism and neo-Zionism. The fourth part will offer concluding reflections on the role of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv as two perspectives or orientations in contemporary Israel.

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Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: The Polarity

Let us start the discussion in one of the most critical and emotional junctions in Israel's recent history—the elections of 1996, in the wake of the assassination of prime-minister Yizhak Rabin. In this election, Benyamin Netanyahu, one of Rabin's vehement opponents, was elected as prime-minister. Tel Aviv reacted with shock; Jerusalem with jubilation. Daniel Ben Simon, a senior publicist, provides a succinct depiction of how this moment was felt in Tel Aviv and in Jerusalem:

> [I am driving] in the way out of Tel Aviv. The Military Radio Station [a well known voice of the young secular culture in Israel, U.R.] broadcasts moaning tunes. Does it reflect the new sad actuality that came to pass over the most extravagant and hedonist city in Israel [reference to Netanyahu's victory, U.R.]? This morning, the streets of Tel Aviv are half-empty and its people are dispirited, as if their life bliss was robbed from them. In the gates of Jerusalem, a local radio station broadcasts rhythmic songs of a Hassidic musician....The Hassidic announcer is excited to tears, getting out his way... he utters congratulations, in heavy American accent, 'to our Lord father and our rabbi who brought happiness to all of Israel....This great Jewish triumph, this holy triumph, is a sign from above that the messiah is approaching us in Eretz Israel'....Two cities close to each other, but it seems so distant. Jerusalem celebrates this morning the triumph of [Benjamin] Netanyahu [Likud party] with a loud blow; Tel Aviv moans the loss of [Shimon] Peres [Labor party] (Ben Simon 1997: 14 and 15).

In a likewise vein, Shlomo Ben Ami, a leading historian and former minister in a Labor government, described the results of the same elections as a metaphoric victory of Jerusalem over Tel Aviv:

> This schism [between the cities, U.R.] today converges inside it all the schisms in Israel. 'Tel Aviv' is the manifestation of an update 'Israeliness', one that does not hold the Uzi [shotgun] anymore, and does not follow the plough, but believes in the state of Israel as a judicial entity and central axis of secular national identity. This is no more a mobilized society. It substituted the pioneering ethos with an urge to '[economic] growth', a belief in all sorts of 'information highways' and the fascination of the 'global village', in which there is a room for Madonna and McDonald's. This is Israel who is eager for peace and ready to pay high price for it....This yearning of 'Tel Avivian' Israeliness for 'normalcy' at all cost, is regarded by the other Israel, the 'Jerusalemite' Israel, as a shallow yearning, devoid of historical depth and liberated from the burden of Jewish memory and history....The 'Jerusalemite' Israeliness is the yearning for Jewish roots, is the manifestation of almost perennial fear from the Arab and a deeply rooted distrust in non-Jews. The peace that the labor party reached for, held within it not only the threat of returning of the [Palestinian] territories, but also the threat of the 'returning' of history itself, the forgetfulness of Jewish memory and the decline of Jewish identity. The 'Tel Avivian' peace was considered as an attack on the Jewish tradition and roots, and in fact on the Jewishness of the state....(Ben Ami 1998: pp. 336–337)

These depictions by Ben Simon and Ben Ami are not mere subjective interpretations of the contrasting identities of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The images that they portray of "Jerusalem" and of "Tel Aviv" reflect an exceptional sharp moment in 1996 that brought to stark relief the contrast, but they may serve as a vignette to the deep political-cultural undercurrents which define the collective political identities of the two cities in general and which bifurcate Israel at least since the 1990s.

In common parlance in Israel, Jerusalem signifies the old traditional Jewish identity, orthodoxy, fundamentalism and ethnocentrism; Tel Aviv signifies the modern Hebrew Israeli identity, secularism, liberalism, and pluralism (see in Vinizky-Sarusi 2000: 20–23). The literary critic Dan Miron considers the competition between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem as a struggle over the symbolic locus of the political culture in Israel, which started already in the early stages of Zionism:

> At least since the beginning of 2nd Aliya [in 1904] the two cities stood one against the other: the mountainous–rocky holy city and the coastal city of sea and sand (first Yaffo and later Tel Aviv) and demanded centrality in the political and cultural self-consciousness of the Jewish community: Jerusalem in the name of its historical symbolism and the institutes of government and science located in it; and Yaffo–Tel Aviv in the name of the dynamics of renewal, which is associated with the lightness of the historical burden of it, and with the social, artistic, and economic life in it. The Zionist rhetoric often leaned towards Jerusalem, but the common cultural understanding often leans towards Tel Aviv. (Miron 1987: 228; see also Govrin 1989).

Related to the same momentous event mentioned above, the assassination of Rabin, sociologist Vered Vinisky-Sarusi found that the two cities display contrasting patterns of memory: Tel Aviv became in fact the national center for the commemoration of Rabin, and with this for the cause for which he was assassinated, the cause of Israeli–Palestinian peace. Jerusalem, on the other hand, in which Rabin was buried, was reluctant to attach itself to the Rabin memory or to his peace heritage or to make them a noticeable facet of its public arena. It did not contribute to Rabin's commemoration more than was required by the protocol. In fact, her research concludes that Tel Aviv, in which Rabin lived and which he was assassinated, emerged from this traumatic experience as an "alternative capital" for secular liberal Israel (Vinizky-Sarusi 2000).

Such typifications of Jerusalem versus Tel Aviv need not be confined to qualitative assessments only, nor only to the symbolic level. There are noticeable demographic, sociological, and political differences between the two cities, and these are well indicated by their divergent electoral behavior (see also Alfasi and Fenster 2005).

In the elections of 2003, for instance, the right wing parties in Israel (which include the center-right Likud, small extreme nationalistic parties and religious and orthodox parties) won a total of 53.8% of the votes in Israel (see Table 1). Yet in Jerusalem, the right-wing coalition won 72.9% of the vote, compared to only 43% in Tel Aviv. The center-left parties won 37.8% of the national vote, yet in Tel Aviv they gained 51.6% of the vote, while in Jerusalem they gained only 22.2% of the vote. Hence the contention that Jerusalem is a hothouse of chauvinism, and that Tel Aviv is, as against it, a hothouse of liberalism, is not merely a matter of an "image." It is due to such differences that Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are referred to—in an "ideal-type" manner—as both actual sites and symbolic icons that stand for two contrasting political cultures or two types of nationalism in Israel.

Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: The Similarity

During the 1990s, the struggle in Israel between the liberal pole of identity and the fundamentalist pole of identity had reached a high tide, and within this context the

Table 1 Results of elections for the 16th Knesset (January 2003) in Israel, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv–Yafo.

Voters in % (party)	Israel	Jerusalem	Tel-Aviv–Yafo
Total[a]	100	100	100
Center-right parties			
Likud	29.4	27.9	28.4
Ichud Ha-Leumi	5.5	5.7	2.6
Yisrael Be-Aliya	2.2	2.0	0.8
Total	37.1	35.6	31.8
Religious parties			
Shas	8.2	12.6	7.2
Tora & Shabbat Judaism	4.3	18.2	1.4
Mafdal	4.2	6.5	2.6
Total	16.7	37.3	11.2
Total of Center-right parties + religious party	53.8	72.9	43
Center-left parties			
Labor	14.5	9.0	22.7
Shinui	12.3	7.0	15.5
Meretz	5.2	4.9	11.2
Hadash	3.0	0.4	0.8
Am Ehad	2.8	0.9	1.4
Total	37.8	22.2	51.6
Balad	2.3	0.3	0.5
United Arab List	2.1	0.1	0.7
Others	1.2	4.5	4.2

[a] Valid votes

Based on: Central Bureau of Statistics, State of Israel, 2004: Table XVII/19—Results of Elections for 16th Knesset (pp. 346–347); Municipality of Jerusalem 2004: Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem No. 20-2002/2003

identification of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem as foci of these two opposing trends, respectively, received an augmented sense. Simultaneously, however, was also augmented a critique on this perception of bifurcation. One sphere in which this controversy was expressed was that of architecture. In a process that started in the 1980s, Tel Aviv has acquired the image and template of a "White City." The "whiteness" of Tel Aviv was expressed in contrast to the "blackness" of Jerusalem. The "whiteness" of Tel Aviv referred to the color of the cement painted walls of its buildings, while the "blackness" of Jerusalem referred to the color of the coats and hats that Orthodox Jews wear. In architectural and landscape terms the "white" cement walls of Tel Aviv were compared to the ivory color of the stone walls of Jerusalem's buildings. In a second layer of connotations, the whiteness of Tel Aviv refers to the sands of its sea-shore, Israel's open gate to the "West," and the ivoryness of Jerusalem refers to its mountainous area—Israel's closed border in the "East."

The whiteness of Tel Aviv was "discovered," as said, in the 1980s. It was during that time that the color white was imputed to be the typical or dominant color of Tel Aviv and a common symbol to the functional modernist style of its architecture (it must be commented that Tel Aviv is actually more unclean-gray than white). In fact, in the 1980s and 1990s Tel Aviv's short cultural past became a cause for celebration. Between the two world wars, Tel Aviv had been a locus of Bauhaus trained architects, Jewish immigrants from Germany, and, as a result, it had become a reservoir of that style of architectural style. In 2004 Tel Aviv's down-town area, which is replete with Bauhaus designed buildings, was declared by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site. This recognition had been widely celebrated in Tel Aviv.

Critics were quick to capture the wide symbolism of the white-black contrast. They were aggravated by the "whitening" of Tel Aviv, and they maintained that it amounted in fact to a "white-washing" of the city, which has a cultural and social meaning well beyond the celebration of a particular architectural school. The "whitening" of Tel Aviv meant for them the symbolic attempt of Tel Aviv to cut itself off from the rest of the country, from Zionism, and from its own history, or, in a word, from Jerusalem. They interpreted whitening as an attempt to create a safe cosmopolitan heaven for the new middle classes who aspire to escape (mentally, if not literally) from the old Middle-East.

Alona Nitzan-Shiftan regards the "white city" celebrations as: "a quest for pause, for beauty, for making news with modernist urbanism and enlightened preservation, instead of occupation and terror." (Nitzan-Shiftan 2004: 134). Thus, in the view of critics, Tel Aviv's self-radiated image of liberalism functions as naïve escapism in the best case, and as cynical ruse in the worst case. In this view, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem are not that different as their conventional public images would have made them appear; both Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are implicated by Israel's colonial practices. Tel Aviv stands for an attempt to camouflage the colonial practices by its very newness and by its leisurely manners, to which the "light" whiteness also refers.

In other words, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem are essentially equivalents. The new "Israeliness" of Tel Aviv is just the flip-side—not the opposite—of the old "Jewishness" of Jerusalem. As Nitzan-Shiftan puts it: "If the Frencheness of the French is embodied in Paris, or the Englishness of the English in London, then the White City celebrations suggest that true Israeliness is located in Tel Aviv. Thus, as with greater colonial powers, the original culture of Israeliness retreats to Tel Aviv, leaving the colonies of Israel and Palestine to fight over their own lost territories" (Nitzan-Shiftan 2004: 139). This attempt at inventing a "white" identity to Tel Aviv and to "white wash" its history is, in the critics view, doomed to futility (and see Nitzan-Shiftan 2000).

Moreover, some argue, to the extent that Tel Aviv does differ from Jerusalem, it is only for the worst. True, Jerusalem is haunted by its inter-national, inter-religious and inter-ethnic rivalries, while Tel Aviv seems to be relatively relieved from them, and therefore more "open," "liberal," and "democratic." But this relative peacefulness has been achieved at a cost, argue critics: Tel Aviv has been in fact more brutal and more successful in excluding "others" from its boundaries and in obliterating "otherness" from its historical narrative.

The "white city" narrative, argues Sharon Rotbard, is a late invention that disguises the "black city"—the Palestinian city of Jaffa, out of which Tel Aviv in fact developed, and the southern "grey" neighborhoods of the city. All these "non-white" areas had been actually demolished and their tens of thousands of dwellers dispossessed and expelled. This was the case of Jaffa since the 1948 Jewish War of Independence. Later in the 1990s, some parts of old Jaffa were re-constructed in an opulent style and matching prices and passed gentrification (Monterescu and Fabian 2003). Or, some of the Jewish neighborhoods, first populated by lower-class Mizrahi Jews, and later, since the 1990s by 'foreign laborers,' were simply left out of the canonic history of Tel Aviv, and had been left to deterioration and depreciation (Rotbard 2005; see also Berger 1998).

In this view, Tel Aviv became homogenized by cutting itself off from various dimensions of Israeli society and by defining these dimensions as the "others" of itself, i.e., of "white" Israeli identity: "As an Hebrew city it [Tel Aviv] is a cut-off from the Arabism of Jaffa; as an Israeli city it is cut-off from the Jewishness of Diaspora; as a modern city it is a cut-off from the historicity of Europe and the Middle-East. And in the spirit of being cut-off, Tel Aviv defines itself as an opposite anything outside it" (Rotbard 2005: 112).

Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: The Dialectic

It is obvious by now that discussing Jerusalem and discussing Tel Aviv, and drawing a comparison between the two cities, can only be done within the context of the structure and dynamics of the wide political culture in Israel.

Let us, then, draw a simplified map of the current political cultures or types of nationalism in Israel. This map will elucidate why Jerusalem and Tel Aviv came to symbolize two antagonistic principles, even though they belong to the same overarching national and colonial structure.

The conceptual map of Israeli political culture which is drawn here, is anchored in a new paradigm for the analysis of Israeli society, namely the globalization paradigm (new, in application to Israel). The comparison between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv is thus re-framed here in terms of this new paradigm. At the core of this conceptual map is a contention between two new alternative poles of identity (ideal typically speaking): a globalist post-Zionist pole versus a localist neo-Zionist pole, or to put it in Benjamin Barber's seminal terminology—a McWorld pole versus a Jihad pole (Barber 1995; a framework elaborated in length in my recent book *The Globalization of Israel: McWorld in Tel Aviv, Jihad in Jerusalem*, Ram 2007).

In the last two decades the grounds of Israeli political culture has undergone a seismic shift. While the classical national ideology of Israel—Zionism—is certainly still supreme on a formal as well as a popular level, in terms of impetus, this nation-state ideology is passing an eclipse, and it is being overshadowed by patches of the two new alternative foci of identity mentioned above, which are antagonistic to each other, and which struggle over the future trajectory of Israel.

To render a complex situation simple, one may delineate the following three ideal-type foci of identity:

- Zionism; the project of establishing of a Jewish nation-state, which is self-portrayed as Jewish and democratic;
- Post-Zionism; a cosmopolitan and liberal orientation;
- Neo-Zionism; a nationalist ethno-religious orientation.

Though almost the entire population of Jewish descent in Israel confesses allegiance to Zionism, the boundaries of Zionist discourse have been significantly transgressed in the last two decades by neo-Zionism and post-Zionism. Both neo-Zionism and post-Zionism split from classical Zionism in its mature and declining phase, and each bequeaths from it certain traits.

At the core of Zionism there is an ambiguity and tension between its particularistic national principle and its universalistic liberal (and formerly also socialist) principle. Neo-Zionism and post-Zionism share a distaste for this ambiguity and seek for a more coherent identity. Thus while classical Zionism portrays itself as Jewish and democratic, neo- and post-Zionism make a decisive choice between either Judaism or democracy, under the assumption that such dissonance cannot endure much longer.

The differences between them, when portrayed in black and white contrast rather then a gray scale, engulf the major dimensions of identity: the temporal, the spatial, the authoritarial, and the sociological.

- In temporal terms, neo-Zionism is committed to a lengthy historical narrative stretching backward to the presumed ancient origins of the nation in the time of its "ancestors"; and forwards, until the anticipated messianic redemption in the future.

Post-Zionism, by contrast, sustains a short range view of history in the core of which is the present time, which basically covers the life time of a person and his relatives. "History" begins with David Ben Gurion, rather than with King David, and the "future of the children" is deemed of more importance than the "graves of our forefathers."

- In spatial terms, neo-Zionism and post-Zionism maintain different territorial frameworks: the former regards as supreme the greater Land of Israel, conceived as the Biblical homeland of the nation, while the latter regards as supreme the sovereign state of Israel, its democratically elected institutions, and its formal internationally recognized boundaries. Obviously the former approach relates to a place, and for that matter a "holy land," while the latter relates to a space, a territorial site of a republic.
- Behind these divisions of preferences in the temporal and the spatial dimensions, there is an even more fundamental question of authority: neo-Zionism attributes authority to Biblical and Halachic sacred national texts, which represent the "spirit" of the ostensible "Jewish people," not to the actually living individuals and their current preferences. Post-Zionism attributes authority to the republican institutions of the Israeli state, which represent the sum total of individual citizens of Israel. This difference finds its expression in the divergent political preferences of post-Zionists and neo-Zionists, especially in electoral terms: post-Zionists tend to vote from the center leftwards (a liberal vote); neo-Zionists tend to vote from the center rightwards (a conservative vote).
- On top of these ideological and cultural differences, neo-Zionism and post-Zionism differ, of course, sociologically. The constituency of neo-Zionism consists largely of the Jewish settlers in the territories and in the city of Jerusalem, and their many supporters in the so called "national camp," both secular and religious. It is represented by a variety of extreme right-wing parties, including core parts of the national-religious party (Mafdal) and the Likud party. Post-Zionist constituency is composed, by contrast, mainly of the extensive secular "new" middle classes, typically concentrated in the country's coastal area, the strip between the city of Tel Aviv in the center and its vicinities, where a quarter of the population resides, and the city of Haifa in the north. Moreover, neo-Zionists and post-Zionist tend to affiliate with different social strata: neo-Zionists tend to be of lower classes and lower education, and, in large proportion, of Mizrachi descent, while post-Zionists tend to be well-off in both wealth and education, and, in large proportion, of Ashkenazi descent.

Giving this deep division in Israeli political culture, a division which characterizes Israel in its post-national, globalizing stage, it becomes clearer why Jerusalem and Tel Aviv came to be portrayed as the two rivaling capitals of neo-Zionism and post-Zionism respectively. Even though these political categories are relatively new, the functional and symbolic differences between the two cities emerged and developed, as we noticed, right from the beginning of Zionist immigration to Palestine and settlement in it.

With the development of the Jewish society in Palestine, and later the state of Israel, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv have emerged as the most important urban nodes of the new society. Jerusalem acquired the status of a religious and national capital of the nation while Tel Aviv acquired the status of the secular and civic center of society. Even though both cities own their current constitution to Zionism, and share a past and a present of colonization of the land and of a dispossession of its Palestinian population, each does point to a very different prospect. Jerusalem points to a past of conquest and worship; Tel Aviv points to a future of liberal consumerism. Civic democracy is yet another option, which neither Jerusalem nor Tel Aviv can originate without a deep change in the country's political culture, and the seeds of such change are planted—despite all—in "Tel Aviv." Let us focus now on the post-Zionist perspective. What is it? What may explain its emergence? How are we to conceive of its meaning?

Jerusalem or Tel Aviv? Four Perspectives

During the last decade of the twentieth-century and the first decade of the twenty-first-century, post-Zionism has become a pivotal term in the scholarly and public discussions about the possible transition of Israel from a colonizing military society into a globalized capitalist society, or in our current terms, from a "Jerusalem"-centered into a "Tel Aviv"-centered society (cf. Peled and Ophir 2001; Yishai 2003; Ram 2007). The events of the beginning of the twenty-first century—especially the second Palestinian Intifada and the outbreak of "clash of civilizations" between radical Islam and America—caused some set-backs in these developments, yet structural changes have their long duration pace.

The development of the "Tel Aviv option," or as we call it here post-Zionism, may be considered from four different angles: post-ideological, post-modernist, post-colonial, and post-Marxist. Let us consider these angles one by one:

The Post-Ideological Perspective In the post-ideological perspective, post-Zionism is a process of cultural "normalization" that comes naturally after the successful accomplishment of the basic ends of Zionism, i.e., Jewish "ascendance" (aliya) to Israel and the establishment and consolidation of a Jewish state. Zionism is considered here as a scaffold, which turns redundant after the building is accomplished, or as author A. B. Yehoshua put it in his famous essay "In Praise of Normalcy," a "climber" is no longer a "climber" once he reaches the peak of the mountain (Yehoshua 1984; see also Brinker 1986).

This may be described as the most Zionist approach to post-Zionism, or even as a Ben-Gurionian approach to it, as it resembles the attitude of the state's first prime-minister to the Jewish Agency, when he argued that with the establishment of the state the latter's role had expired. The "post" prefix represents then, in this case, the distinction between "becoming" (the Zionist stage) and "being" (the post-Zionist stage).

Sociologist Erik Cohen has presented the Durkheimean–Weberian version of the post-ideological approach to post-Zionism. Zionism was a charismatic movement of radical transformation; in the course of time it underwent routinization, and left behind it an anemic vacuum. Post-Zionism—the Tel Avivian state of affairs—is thus an anxiety arising out of the absence of a generally accepted system of legitimization (Cohen 1995). This perspective is congruent with the latest views of sociologist S. N. Eisenstadt on the breakdown of the "original mold" designed by the dominant elite, and the subsequent proliferation of alternative discourses, including the post-Zionist one, but without the emergence of a substitute which will unify society (Eisenstadt 1996). In the terms of political scientist Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don Yehiya, the "Tel Aviv" perspective may be considered a situation of a "state without vision" (or a "service state"), in distinction from a "visionary state," which is what we call here the "Jerusalem" perspective (Liebman and Don Yehiya 1983).

Put in these terms, the Tel Avivian post-ideological approach is in fact a late Israeli version of the "end of ideology" thesis (Bell 1960). It is an evolutionary "historical stages" approach, according to which Israeli society is experiencing a normal transition from a nation-building phase into an institutionalized phase, or from a "stormy nationalism" to "banal nationalism," as befits a mature liberal state (Billing 1995).

The Post-Modernist Perspective The post-modernist approach does not consider the Tel Avivian post-Zionist option as signifying the maturation of Zionism, but, on the contrary, as signifying its demise. Jerusalemite Nationalism is not considered simply the conventional expression of peoplehood, but rather as a framework forced upon fluctuating identities. "Jerusalem" is thus a form of oppression; "Tel Aviv" a form of liberation. The ambition of nationalism to "melt" various identities into a cohesive universal identity, and to exclude differing identities, is replaced in post-modern times by a discourse of otherness, differences, and multiculturalism—and the umbrella expression of this trend in Israel is post-Zionism (Azoulay and Ophir 1998).

From this perspective the "Tel Aviv option" is not a new historical phase, but rather a new point of view, a new epistemology, which subverts and undermines the linear and essentialist point of view of Jerusalemite nationalism. Tel Aviv's post-Zionism is the exposition of the multifarious, repressed identities under the national banner, and an expression of the heterogeneity which Zionism attempted to homogenize. Lawrence Silberstein, author of the most comprehensive text on post-Zionism to date, defined the relations between post-modernism and post-Zionism as a complex web which has nodes of joint and disjoint (Silberstein 1999). The most significant node of joint is the deconstruction of the "regime of truth" or the power/knowledge network, and the attention given to different voices and new narratives.

From the post-modern approach, Tel Aviv offers a subversion of Zionism and a deconstruction of it into components and narratives it used to deny or marginalize. While the above is a Foucauldian, identity-oriented, version of the post-modern Tel Avivian approach, there is also a Habermasian, citizenship-oriented, approach to post-Zionism. This approach refers to the distinction between ethnic-nationalism and territorial-nationalism (Brubaker 1994). In this view, post-Zionism—the "Tel Aviv perspective"—represents a post-national concept of Israeli citizenship, or of Israeli constitutional nationalism, de-linked from the Jewish (or any other) communal belonging.

The Tel Aviv type of nationalism, based on a present common framework of life rather than on past myth as does the Jerusalem type of nationalism, may overcome the unresolved tension between the Jewish component in Israeli identity, which may turn into a matter of private or sub-communal affiliation, and the democratic component of Israeli identity, which must turn into a constitutional basis. In this view, to become fully democratic, Israel should become a state of its citizens, rather than a state of the Jewish ethnos (Ram 1999, 2001; Yiftachel 1999).

The most thorough analysis from this perspective is offered by Shafir and Peled (2002). In their view, three distinct citizenship regimes (or incorporation regimes) obtain in Israel: an ethno-nationalist regime, which ensures the primacy of Jews; a liberal regime, which ensures equal rights to individual citizens; and a republican regime, which allocates ranks and privileges on the basis of "civic virtue" and practically means contribution to the common dominant causes. While the contradictory ethnic and liberal regimes were able to dwell together under the legitimization provided by the republican regime, republicanism is now receding and the conflict between the ethnic and the liberal regimes is coming to the fore.

The Post-Colonialist Perspective The post-colonialist approach to post-Zionism is a particular case of the post-modern perspective. It shares the latter's challenge to modernity, but superimposes on the self-other dichotomy the West–East dichotomy. Zionism is thus rendered as Western and post-Zionism receives an Eastern tilt—ideally conjoining both

Arab–Palestinian and Jewish–Oriental identities, as in Yehuda Shenhav's book about "Jewish-Arabs" (Shenhav 2003a, b). This approach draws heavily on the Orientalism perspective of critics like Edward Said (1978), as well as on the hybrid version of it by critics like Bhabha (1990) (Shenhav 2004).

The post-colonial discourse composes new narratives that give voice to subaltern sectors of the population and (re-)creates old–new hyphenated identities, which defy the simplicity of the nationalist boundaries. When this perspective is applied to Israel, post-Zionism obtains the meaning of the empowerment of the "internal other" of Zionism, i.e., Oriental Jews, and concomitantly of the transgression of the internal–external national boundaries, which are substituted in part with the Occidental–Oriental distinction. In other words, Zionism is conceived as a European–Ashkenazi–White-Colonial movement, which victimized both the internal Orientals and the external Arabs (Shohat 1989, 2001). Post-colonial post-Zionism deconstructs the tissue of the national "us" of the Jerusalem perspective into its distinct hierarchical layers, subverts the concept of a pre-given "nation," and proposes alternative notions, or at the least complementary ones, of collective identity.

Whereas the post-colonial approach to post-Zionism aims to speak in the name of the Orient—Jewish and Arab combined—it remains in fact mostly an internal Jewish affair. The Palestinian Arabs, being excluded from Israeli society and identity and being the ultimate "others" in the country, find it more difficult to perform the delicate post-colonial dance on the inside–outside boundary; in a "Jewish state," democratic or not, they are mostly "outsiders," even when they are full citizens. Thus while for post-Zionism the question of status and conditions of the Palestinian citizens in Israel is absolutely central (Yiftachel 1999; Ozacky-Lazar et al. 1999; Shafir and Peled 2002; Rabinowitz 2001), Palestinians in Israel usually speak from a national point of view, rather than from a post-national one (Ghanem 2003). The view from Tel Aviv is still a privilege that not everybody shares.

The Post-Marxist Perspective The post-Marxist approach differs from the three approaches mentioned above in considering economic and social changes as major factors in the shaping of the political and cultural transformations associated with post-Zionism. In this regards, Tel Aviv signifies the development of post-Fordist capitalism in Israel, with all its social, cultural, and political implications. This approach to post-Zionism is post-*Marxist* in that it relates post-modernism to the recent transformation of the capitalist mode of regulation, namely the emergence of post-Fordism, and to the subsequent transformation in the balance of power between the classes, namely the decline of organized labour and the rise of the private corporations. It is the only approach cognizant of the affinities between the economic and social changes and the political–cultural changes, thus locating the Jerusalem–Tel Aviv distinction on a socio-economic spectrum. This approach is a *post*-Marxist perspective, nevertheless, in that it shares some aspects of post-modern thought, such as non-deterministic and non-linear analysis, and also in that it recognizes the post-modern dimensions of contemporary culture.

Post-Fordist capitalism differs from Fordist capitalism in the following aspects: a transition from hierarchical bureaucratic firm to a flexible entrepreneurial network; a transition from Keynesian interventionism in the economy and production-side developmentalism to neo-liberal and consumption-side economics; a transition from labor market collective regulation to non-organized labor market and "new forms" of employment; a transition from a universal welfare state (the European model) to a safety network welfarism (the American model); and a transition from a national economy to a global economy (Aglietta 2001; Jessop 2003). Overall, this transition disrupts the balance of power between capital, labor, and state, which prevailed in the corporatist (Fordist) state, and it ushers in an unbalanced power structure under capital's tutelage. Two "non-economic" results of this major shift of the social regime are the rise of inequality in the distribution of income and a trend of fragmentation of the population into identity groups. How does all this relate to post-Zionism?

The "traditional" Israeli social regime had been collectivist because this was imperative to the success of the early settlement and conquest phase of Zionism in Palestine, a region which was unattractive to capital and labor alike. The national project could take-off only on the basis of labor enclaves and exclusion of Arab laborers, based on the injunction of Jewish capital. The combination of "public" finance and privileged labor made the strategy of the Labor Movement triumphant (Shafir 1996; Shalev 1992). In the early state era, during the 1950s and 1960s, the national project was bequeathed to the state administration, which was manifested in the "mamlachtiyut" etatist (statist) ideology of the era. In the 1970s, especially since the rise of the Likud in 1977, a liberal change began, but until the mid-1980s, the new economy floundered because of failed management, which caused three-digit inflation. Only since the new economic program of the mid-1980s, in conjunction with the hi-tech revolution of the 1990s, has the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism in Israel finally materialized.

By this time, the veteran elites have already turned their preference from military mobility to entrepreneurial accumulation, and from national adherence to post-nationalist aspirations (Levy 2003; Shafir and Peled 2000). The state and the Histadrut labor federation privatized their large corporations and together with the new influx of international investment (in the early 1990s, encouraged by the peace process), the ideology of the business sector—of which Tel Aviv is the capital—has become dominant in Israel. The inter-class pact was disbanded and inequality increased. As a reaction to this, the lower classes, a category which in large part overlaps with Oriental descent, low education, and traditionalist culture, turned in mass to populist propaganda and chauvinist politics for consolation for the loss of identity and compensation for the loss of status (Filc 2006). Thus emerged inside Israel a local version of the global dialectics of "McWorld versus Jihad," of Tel Aviv versus Jerusalem (Jewish Jihad, for sure; Barber 1995; Ram 2006, 2007).

Hence, the change from Fordism to post-Fordism is associated with the change from a nation and class coalition into a clash between local neo-Zionist ethno-fundamentalism, the Jerusalem-oriented option, and a global post-Zionist civic-liberalism (and unequal capitalism), the Tel-Aviv oriented option.

Jerusalem versus Tel Aviv: Concluding Reflections

Despite retreats and set-backs in the development of post-Zionism in Israel in the last five years, what one may term the Tel-Aviv-oriented option of Israel, these are long-term structural developments that have stricken roots and are not likely to disappear.

We have presented four approaches to these developments. The post-nationalist approach considers the emergence of the Tel Aviv orientation as a process of "normalization"; the post-modernist approach considers this option a shaking-off of the oppressive modernist nationalist grand-narrative, the Jerusalem-oriented perspective on Israel; the post-colonial approach considers the new post-national perspective a Mizrahi counter-hegemonic politics of identity; and the post-Marxist approach considers the rise of the Tel Aviv perspective as a political–cultural counterpart of the post-Fordist restructuring of the inter-class balance of power.

Taken together, these four approaches highlight the various dimensions of the evolving post-national prospect in Israel: the retreat of nationalism; the rise of individualism; the spread of pluralism; and the overarching hegemony of capitalism—all centered actually and symbolically in Tel Aviv rather than in Jerusalem. All the while, the neo-Zionist nationalist, ethno-centric, and fundamentalist backlash—an orientation centered in and on Jerusalem—is also on the rise. Critics are right to argue that Jerusalem and Tel Aviv belong to the same system, and despite their blatant antagonism, they belong to same Zionist colonialist project. Yet despite this commonality between the cities, each of them indicates a distinct potential. It is the role of critical sociology to nurture this difference rather then to gloss it over. The fate of Israel identity and regime depends on the question what political culture will win over in the long run: the neo-Zionism that Jerusalem explicitly stands for, or the post-Zionism which Tel Aviv implicitly signifies.

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