THE WEAKNESS OF POSTCOMMUNIST CIVIL SOCIETY

Marc Morjé Howard

Marc Morjé Howard *is assistant professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland, College Park. This article draws on his forthcoming book,* The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe *(Cambridge University Press, 2002).*

Civil society continues to thrive as an object of study in postcommunist Europe, as in most other regions of the world. Much of the literature on postcommunist civil society, however, stresses its relative *weakness,* whether compared to other regions or to the high expectations of 1989–91.[1] This emphasis on weakness is especially notable given that, only a decade ago, so many observers expected postcommunist civil society to be unusually strong and vibrant. Indeed, although specialists on Latin America and Southern Europe were also beginning to take the concept seriously in the 1980s, most scholars agree that the rapid revival of civil society as a major object of study resulted largely from developments surrounding the collapse of communism.

The weakness of postcommunist civil society leads to a host of important questions. Yet is it actually correct to assert that postcommunist civil society is particularly weak? It seems clear that, when compared to the idealistic hopes of 1989–91, the current political, economic, and social realities have fallen short. When compared to other regions, however, the conclusion that postcommunist civil society is distinctively weak needs further substantiation.

Such evidence is provided by the World Values Survey, which shows that in a wider crossregional perspective—compared against both older democracies and postauthoritarian countries—postcommunist countries do have relatively lower levels of organizational membership. This finding suggests that, even though there is some variation among the countries of postcommunist Europe, on the whole they still appear to form a coherent group.

These empirical findings may affect the prospects for democracy and

democratic stability in the region. While the weakness of civil society does not necessarily mean that postcommunist democracy is in danger of collapse or breakdown, it does hamper the development of the "civic skills" that are important for supporting and consolidating a democratic system, and it also ensures that many postcommunist citizens lack the institutional representation and political "leverage" that could be provided by active voluntary organizations.

Finally, although this trend of nonparticipation is unlikely to change rapidly or decisively—given the powerful and lasting legacy of the communist experience and the relative failure of neoliberal institutional "crafting"—there are two possible mechanisms for improvement: generational change and a more active and supportive role on the part of the state. Overall, however, barring unforeseen improvements in the way new institutions and policies are implemented, we are unlikely to see dramatic changes in the pattern of nonparticipation throughout postcommunist Europe.

Weighing the Evidence

The scholarship on postcommunist Europe has increasingly concluded that there are wide differences among the countries in the region. Jacques Rupnik has even claimed that "the word 'postcommunism' has lost its relevance," and he has added that "it is striking how vastly different the outcomes of the democratic transitions have been in Central and Eastern Europe."[2] In terms of empirical data, the most authoritative comparative studies have been conducted by Richard Rose and his colleagues in the New Europe Barometer Surveys (NEBS). While still stressing the analytical and substantive importance of postcommunism as a category, they tend to confirm that there is fairly wide variation among the countries of the postcommunist region.[3] The NEBS question on civil society asks respondents to describe their levels of trust in 15 different civil and political institutions; the results show somewhat lower levels of trust in the countries of the former Soviet Union than in Central Europe, but the levels of trust are remarkably low throughout the region. The NEBS question on trust in civil society has its limitations, however, since it refers to the attitudes, rather than the actual behavior, of respondents, thus measuring *trust* in civil society organizations rather than *membership* in them.

The World Values Survey (WVS), on the other hand, is a large-scale comparative survey project that includes a wider range of countries and a battery of questions on membership in voluntary organizations. The fact that the WVS was conducted in more than 50 different societies in 1995–97 provides a remarkable, and still largely untapped, resource by means of which to compare levels of participation across countries and regions. The pertinent question asks respondents whether or not they are members of any of nine different types of groups: 1) church or religious organiza-

FIGURE 1—AVERAGE NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERSHIPS PER PERSON, BY COUNTRY


Source: 1995–97 World Values Survey.

tions; 2) sports or recreational clubs; 3) educational, cultural, or artistic organizations; 4) labor unions; 5) political parties or movements; 6) environmental organizations; 7) professional associations; 8) charitable organizations; and 9) any other voluntary organizations. While this list is by no means comprehensive or exhaustive, it does capture a wide enough range of civil society organizations, both traditional and contemporary, to allow an investigation of comparative levels of participation across countries.

In order to present a wider comparative perspective with respect to organizational membership, I divide the 31 democratic and democratizing countries from the WVS into three groups based on their prior regime type:[4] 1) Australia, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States, and the former West Germany, which I classify as the "older democracies"; 2) Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Uruguay, and Venezuela, which I label the "postauthoritarian" countries; and 3) Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the former East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine, which constitute the "postcommunist" category. (Poland had to be omitted because of incomplete data.)

Whereas democratic regimes encourage and even support organizational activity and authoritarian regimes tolerate membership in many groups,

FIGURE 2—MEMBERSHIP IN NINE TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS, BY PRIOR REGIME TYPE

Source: 1995–97 World Values Survey.

communist regimes not only sought to repress all forms of autonomous nonstate activity but also supplanted and subverted such activity by forcing their citizens to join and participate in mandatory, state-controlled organizations. Differences between authoritarian and communist regimes also have a lasting effect in the postauthoritarian and postcommunist period, as communist countries have "*legacies* to overcome that are not found in an authoritarian regime."[5] This line of thinking suggests that the older democracies will have the highest levels of organizational activity, followed relatively closely by the postauthoritarian countries, and that the postcommunist countries will lag considerably behind.

Figure 1 on the previous page presents the average levels of organizational membership in each of the 31 aforementioned countries from the 1995–97 WVS. The results show that postcommunist countries do indeed have consistently lower levels of organizational membership. The postcommunist mean of 0.91 organizational memberships per person is exactly half of the postauthoritarian average of 1.82, and well under the older-democracies mean of 2.39. Moreover, even when controlling for a series of country-level and individual-level factors in a multiple-regression analysis, the prior regime type is by far the most powerful and statistically significant factor.[6]

Figure 2 above displays, for each regime type, the average level of membership in the nine categories of voluntary organizations. The results show very clearly that for all types of organizations except labor unions, the postcommunist mean is much lower than the means of the other two groups, and the difference between the older democracies and postauthoritarian

averages is relatively small when compared to the large gap between postauthoritarian and postcommunist countries.

Overall, therefore, the category of "postcommunism," far from having "lost its relevance," seems to remain a crucial factor for explaining cross-regional variation in participation in civil society organizations, even when controlling for a host of other important factors. In other words, there is something about the prior communist experience that, a decade after communism's collapse, makes its citizens—from Sofia to Berlin, and from Prague to Moscow—much less likely to join organizations than citizens of countries with different prior regime types. What are the key elements of that communist experience, and how and why do they have such a lasting and similar impact on an otherwise increasingly differentiated group of societies?

Postcommunist Commonalities

In seeking to explain this distinctive postcommunist pattern, I conducted extensive field research on two countries, the former East Germany and Russia, involving both in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens and a representative survey. Russia and the former East Germany can be viewed as the two "most different" cases within contemporary postcommunist Europe, diverging greatly on most factors—economic, political, "civiliza-tional"—that could explain variation in levels of participation in voluntary organizations.

The consistently low levels of participation in civil society organizations in contemporary postcommunist Europe can best be understood by taking into account the common elements of the communist experience, as well as the events of the last decade. In particular, three important factors are common to the wide array of societies in postcommunist Europe: 1) the legacy of mistrust of communist organizations; 2) the persistence of friend-ship networks; and 3) postcommunist disappointment. Taken together, these three factors help to explain the lasting weakness of civil society in the region.

1) Mistrust of communist organizations. One of the central features that distinguished communism from authoritarianism was the former's extensive repression of autonomous pluralism. Unlike authoritarian regimes, which tolerated nonstate activities as long as they did not threaten the state or the military, communist regimes not only attempted to eliminate any form of independent group activity but also *supplanted* it with an intricately organized system of state-controlled organizations, in which participation was often mandatory. Due to this essentially negative experience with state-run organizations during the communist period, large majorities of citizens throughout postcommunist Europe continue to have a common sense of mistrust of organizations today.

Two quotations from interview respondents—one an East German, one a Russian—help to illustrate how this legacy of mistrust discourages participation today. The first comes from a 46-year-old East German female secretary:

> Well, I have a really hard time explaining it. If I say I have no time, then it sounds like a banal excuse. I have to say that in GDR times, we were forced to join many of these kinds of organizations. And after the *Wende* [the "turn," or unification], I said to myself, I'm not joining anything ever again. I'm somehow frightened about joining, or I simply have no more desire for it. At least that's what's happened to me, and also in my family, I have to say, many others feel that way too. Very simply, because there was a certain pressure back then, and people had to do a lot of things that they didn't want to do, and now it's swung in the opposite direction, and they say, no, not again.

The second quotation comes from a 45-year-old Russian man who works for a company that provides cultural publications about the city of St. Petersburg:

> Well, really, I don't have time, and I'm not interested. But the most important is that, well, the Soviet system, it instilled an antipathy or aversion, because any experience with organizations was unpleasant. That is, an organization is seen as that which imposes an obligation. And obligations under socialism were so rigid that now I just don't want to participate. Maybe organizations are completely different now, but I just don't want to.

Although these are just two examples, the similarity between them—from citizens in two otherwise very different countries—indicates the deep, lasting, and negative effect of people's mistrust of communist organizations on their organizational membership today.

2) The persistence of friendship networks. A second reason that helps to explain the societal similarities within postcommunist Europe has to do with the vibrant private networks that developed under communism. As a result of the high politicization of the public sphere, many people could express themselves openly only within close circles of trusted friends and family. Moreover, in a shortage economy, with few available goods to buy, connections played an essential role, whether it was to acquire spare parts for fixing a car, or to find products that were rarely available in stores.

Today, a decade after the collapse of the system that created and sustained this vibrant private sphere, networks of close friends and family remain important throughout postcommunist Europe. Most of my respondents, while claiming that relations in society overall had become much worse and much colder than they used to be, insist that *their own* close friendships remain intact, that they still spend their private time as they used to, and that little has changed in their own private circles. The usefulness of private economic connections, however, has declined to varying degress across

postcommunist countries, since the market economy tends to reduce the need to acquire goods and services through informal channels.

Unlike in many Western societies—where voluntary organizations have become a central part of the social and political culture, and where people join organizations in order to meet new people and to expand their horizons through public activities—in postcommunist societies, many people are still invested in their own private circles, and they simply feel no need, much less desire, to join and participate in civil society organizations.

3) Postcommunist disappointment. The third reason that helps to explain the particularly low levels of public participation in postcommunist Europe is the widespread disappointment, and for some even disillusionment, with political and economic developments since the collapse of the state-socialist system. Although most pronounced among activists who were personally involved in the prodemocracy movements, this third factor applies to the wider population as well.

For most people throughout the former Soviet bloc, the years 1989–91 represent a unique, momentous, and fascinating time in their lives, when their world was changing rapidly and dramatically. Although they had many fears and uncertainties about where the changes would lead them, most people experienced at least a brief moment of genuine excitement, hope, and idealism during those times of rapid transformation. Moreover, they shared the belief that the end of communist rule, the emergence of new democratic and market institutions, and the right at long last to speak freely, associate openly with others, and travel to the West would change their lives for the better. In the years since those dramatic times, however, many postcommunist citizens feel that they have been let down, even cheated, by the new system that quickly replaced the old one. This disappointment has only increased the demobilization and withdrawal from public activities in the years since the collapse of communism.

Implications for Democracy

The consistently low level of participation in civil society organizations throughout postcommunist Europe yields a host of different—and often emotionally charged—interpretations about the prospects for democracy in the region. On the one hand, the lack of engagement and participation by ordinary citizens can be viewed as indicative of the hollow, procedural, and formalistic character of postcommunist democracy. Does democracy still mean "rule by the people" if the people choose not to participate in ruling? One could even argue that, with civic organizations lacking the active support of the population, such a hollow democracy will remain at risk of being toppled by hostile forces, whether based on nondemocratic historical traditions or a new antidemocratic ideology.

On the other hand, a more optimistic interpretation would suggest that

the absence of a vibrant civil society poses no obstacle to democracy and democratic stability. Indeed, political participation and trust in government are supposedly in decline throughout much of the world, as people withdraw from public activities in increasingly large numbers. Perhaps the postcommunist present, having skipped or bypassed the "stage" of an active participatory democracy, actually resembles the democratic future in the rest of the world. Moreover, in terms of democratic stability, some argue that a strong and vibrant civil society can actually contribute to the *breakdown* of democracy; if this is true, democracy in postcommunist Europe may actually be enhanced by the absence of citizen participation in voluntary organizations.[7]

My own view of postcommunist democracy differs from both these interpretations. Even if participation in voluntary organizations is declining in the older democracies, this does not mean that levels of organizational membership around the world are converging. More importantly, in terms of the breakdown or survival of democracy, I do not view postcommunist democracy as doomed to collapse or fail, nor do I believe that the weakness of civil society is a good sign for a healthy democracy. Instead, the weakness of civil society constitutes a distinctive element of postcommunist democracy, a pattern that points to a qualitatively different relationship between citizens and the state, and one that may well persist throughout the region for at least several decades.

Does this mean that democracy cannot collapse, that the region is safe from authoritarian rule? Certainly not. As has already happened in Belarus, and could happen in Russia or elsewhere in the next decade, antidemocratic leaders and forces may well succeed in connecting with voters' frustrations and usher in a new authoritarian regime—particularly in the countries that experienced 70 years of Soviet rule, and where economic difficulties are most extreme today. While the behavior of individual leaders is impossible to predict, the findings of this article suggest that any potential followers will be difficult to activate and engage. Indeed, the reluctance of so many postcommunist citizens to participate in voluntary organizations today means that *antidemocratic* organizations and movements will also have problems organizing and mobilizing, and their efforts will be hindered by the same legacy of mistrust. In other words, while postcommunist democracy may remain relatively hollow or stagnant, with a disconnect between rulers and ruled, the overthrow of existing democratic regimes by movements with broad-based and active popular support seems very unlikely.

Nonetheless, there are two important reasons why the weakness of civil society has a negative impact on the quality of postcommunist democracy. The first is derived from the arguments of Robert Putnam and other "social capitalists," who demonstrate the ways in which voluntary organizations "instill in their members habits of cooperation and public-spiritedness, as well as the practical skills necessary to partake in public life."[8] By choosing not to join or participate in voluntary organizations, postcommunist citizens

forsake the opportunity to develop those democratic habits and skills. Although this decision is completely understandable in the context of communist and postcommunist experiences, the larger consequence is that the new democratic institutions are neither rooted in, nor actively supported by, the larger population.[9]

The second reason why civil society is important for democracy has to do with the direct influence of voluntary organizations as what Theda Skocpol calls "a source of considerable popular leverage" on the political process.[10] According to this historical institutional argument, civil society organizations, which represent the aggregate opinions, interests, and preferences of their members, can protect citizens from potentially unjust laws and policies and promote legislation that their members favor. Therefore, not only are postcommunist citizens deprived of the opportunities for developing greater "civic skills" through participation in voluntary organizations, but their voices and views are hardly represented in the political decision-making process.

In short, although often exciting and sometimes dramatic, postcommunist democracy is neither thriving nor on the verge of collapse. Instead, it is likely to continue to "muddle through," with elites and institutions that vary widely in their style and performance and a citizenry that remains disengaged from the public sphere. The distinguishing element of postcommunist democracy is—and probably will continue to be for several more decades and generations—the troubling but not fatal weakness of its civil society.

Prospects for Change

What should we expect to find ten years from now? Will levels of membership and participation gradually increase, at least in some countries, and if so, how?

For the countries with the very lowest levels of participation—such as Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine—which generally have weak and unsupportive states and unstable economies, it is unlikely that participation in voluntary organizations will increase significantly. Barring any miraculous turnarounds, these structural impediments—as well as the factors specific to the communist and postcommunist experience—will serve to keep organizational membership very low.

On the other hand, in those postcommunist countries with higher levels of participation in voluntary organizations—such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, the former East Germany, Slovakia, and Romania—it is possible, and in some cases even likely, that the state and economy will become stronger over the next decade. Will this lead to an increase in organizational membership and participation substantial enough to make these countries resemble postauthoritarian countries and older democracies? In my view, such a development, although it could happen in one or two individual countries, is unlikely to occur across postcommunist Europe.

Despite this bleak assessment, it is worth considering how, if at all, an increase in organizational membership and participation could come about in the future, and in particular how states and international organizations might be able to contribute to it. Although there are certainly no miraculous formulas or quick solutions, broadly speaking, there are two ways in which such a trend could develop.

The first and most obvious potential mechanism is generational change, as younger postcommunist citizens less influenced by the experience of life in a communist system come of age. A group of people of roughly the same age can be shaped not only by their common age or geography but also by "significant social events" such as war or economic depression.[11] Piotr Sztompka argues that "as long as the majority of the population consists of the people whose young, formative years, and therefore crucial socializing experiences fall under the rule of the communist regime—one can expect the continuing vitality of the bloc culture." He adds, however, that this will change over time, as "new demographic cohorts replace the older generations at the central positions in a society."[12] The expectation therefore is that those people who dislike and avoid voluntary organizations will eventually die off, replaced by younger generations that might be more sympathetic to such activities.

The expectation that generational change will bring about a steady increase in organizational membership is certainly plausible (although not particularly encouraging, since even in the best conditions, it will take many decades for the process to run its course), and it reaffirms the importance of the communist experience in explaining the low levels of postcommunist organizational membership. Yet such a development may be far from assured, and it is difficult to predict whether or not generational change will contribute to an increase in participation in civil society, even in the long run. After all, socialization comes both from the current institutional setting and from one's parents, teachers, and peers, all of whom can contribute to reproducing the same patterns of attitudes and behavior, even if the original institutional environment is long gone.

Many more studies should be conducted across different countries over the next decades, particularly as the first genuinely postcommunist generation reaches adulthood, in order to measure and test generational change. Until then, we are likely to see continuing low levels of organizational membership. Over the long run, however, generational change remains one of the main prospects for gradually achieving lasting societal change in the region.

The second mechanism by which postcommunist citizens could conceivably become more active participants in civil society is more difficult, but it is also more heartening, because it allows for the possibility of new policies positively influencing current and future developments. This approach involves encouraging postcommunist citizens to acquire familiarity, comfort, and a new positive association with voluntary

organizations—not an easy feat, given the obstacles to participation described above.

Civil society organizations have been steadily increasing in number since the collapse of communism, but many of them have been created by Western organizations and to varying degrees are dependent upon Western funds. As a result, much of their organizational initiative comes from foreign sources with little understanding of communism and postcommunism. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that their appeals for members often come across as empty or unfamiliar at best, or foolish and misguided at worst. Moreover, the realities of fundraising in conditions of economic uncertainty are such that local leaders and activists are often more beholden to their funders than to the people they are trying to engage and inspire.[13]

Perhaps even more importantly, many of the new organizations that are supported by Western sources contain an underlying anticommunist theme, one that implies that the way people lived under communism was wrong, unethical, or unsuitable for a democratic and capitalist society. Such a message might seem to be justified by the role played by the persistent communist-era private networks in discouraging membership in civil society organizations—in other words, since these networks are an impediment, perhaps they should simply be wiped away. While the denunciation of the communist *system* may be necessary to convince people to start anew, however, the explicit or implicit condemnation of people's lifestyles and personal histories has the opposite effect, leading to even more misunderstanding, resignation, and disengagement. Until these new organizations make the distinction between evaluating the communist system and criticizing people's own lives, and until their leaders learn to value and appreciate what so many postcommunist citizens view as the positive aspects of life in a communist system, attempts to mobilize people to participate in voluntary organizations will continue to backfire, or at least fall on skeptical ears.

Prosperity, the State, and Participation

What can be done to help encourage more postcommunist citizens to take part in public organizational activities? While such a daunting project is unlikely to see rapid results, there are some steps that can be taken. One obvious effort would be to improve economic conditions, particularly in those countries in which many citizens face near-catastrophic economic obstacles. This entails not simply promoting the development of a wealthy business elite or enhacing aggregate economic growth, but raising the actual standards of living of most ordinary people, so that they might have the economic means to be able to devote some time and energy to voluntary organizations, and possibly to contribute a donation or membership fee.

In addition to broad improvements in the overall economy, a second step for strengthening postcommunist civil society involves a reappraisal

of the role of the state and its relation to voluntary organizations. A convincing body of research has demonstrated that, in the older democracies, the state has played a crucial role in enabling, facilitating, and encouraging the existence and flourishing of civil society organizations.[14] Although obviously it cannot force its citizens to join organizations, the state can pass legislation that protects the rights of organizations, as well as provide tax or other institutional incentives that encourage them to organize and recruit members.

Although many attempts at strengthening civil society have not worked, this does not mean that these efforts should be stopped, or their funds cut. On the contrary, both domestic governments and international donors should intensify their efforts to strengthen local groups and organizations, but they need to refocus their energies in a way that will encourage and reward groups for expanding their activities, memberships, and constituencies rather than for simply providing a well-written mission statement and a nicely-designed internet site. Such a strategy would certainly require more complicated (and costly) techniques for evaluating organizations and how they make use of their funds, but the payoff in terms of stronger connections with local populations—both improving people's relationships with organizations and representing their interests socially or politically—would be well worth the investment.

Until there is more careful consideration of the specific personal and societal experiences of postcommunist citizens and how these experiences have shaped citizens' approaches to society and politics today, institutional and policy changes will have only marginal effects on people's social patterns, and they may actually serve to reinforce attitudes and habits developed during the communist era. For these reasons, although change is certainly possible through the two mechanisms I have outlined, the pattern of a weak postcommunist civil society is likely to persist long into the future.

NOTES

1. See, for example, Bronisław Geremek, "Problems of Postcommunism: Civil Society Then and Now," *Journal of Democracy* 3 (April 1992): 3–12; Aleksander Smolar, "Civil Society After Communism: From Opposition to Atomization," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (January 1996): 24–38; M. Steven Fish, "Russia's Fourth Transition," *Journal of Democracy* 5 (July 1994): 31–42; Bill Lomax, "The Strange Death of Civil Society in Post-Communist Hungary," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 13 (March 1997): 41–63. Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik have developed a very different perspective that emphasizes the *strength* of postcommunist civil society, but their analysis addresses the case of Poland—long considered to be "exceptional" within the postcommunist region—and they focus primarily on protest rather than more typical forms of participation. See Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, *Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989–1993* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

2. Jacques Rupnik, "Eastern Europe a Decade Later: The Postcommunist Divide," *Journal of Democracy* 10 (January 1999): 57. Also see Charles King, "Post-Postcommunism: Transition, Comparison, and the End of 'Eastern Europe,'" *World Politics* 53 (October 2000): 143–72.

3. Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Richard Rose, "Public Opinion in New Democracies: Where Are Postcommunist Countries Going?" *Journal of Democracy* 8 (July 1997): 92–108; Richard Rose, "How People View Democracy: A Diverging Europe," *Journal of Democracy* 12 (January 2001): 93–106.

4. For the discussion of regime types on which these groups are based, see Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000 [1975]).

5. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 55–56 (italics in original).

6. Variables tested include country-level GDP per capita, political rights and civil liberties, "civilization," individual-level income, education, age, gender, city size, trust in others, television watching, and "postmaterialism." See Marc Morjé Howard, *The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chs. 4 and 5.

7. See, for example, Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," *World Politics* 49 (April 1997): 401–29; Stephen E. Hanson and Jeffrey S. Kopstein, "The Weimar/Russia Comparison," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 13 (August 1997): 252–83.

8. Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 338.

9. For an evocative description of this problem, see Richard Rose, "Russia as an Hour-Glass Society: A Constitution Without Citizens," *East European Constitutional Review* 4 (Summer 1995): 34–42.

10. Theda Skocpol, "How Americans Became Civic," in Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, eds., *Civic Engagement in American Democracy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press and the Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), 70.

11. Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," in *Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952 [1928]). Interestingly, some demographers have used the analogy of war or depression to characterize the devastating demographic effects of the collapse of communism and the difficulties of postcommunist transition. See Nicholas Eberstadt, "Demographic Disaster: The Soviet Legacy," *The National Interest* 36 (Summer 1994): 53–57; Nicholas Eberstadt, "Demographic Shocks after Communism: Eastern Germany, 1989–93," *Population and Development Review* 20 (March 1994): 137–52.

12. Piotr Sztompka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 29 (June 1996): 126–27.

13. See, for example, Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); and Marina Ottaway and Theresa Chung, "Debating Democracy Assistance: Toward a New Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy* 10 (October 1999): 99–113.

14. See, for example, Theda Skocpol, "How Americans Became Civic"; Jonah D. Levy, *Tocqueville's Revenge: State, Society, and Economy in Contemporary France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Stephen Padgett, *Organizing Democracy in Eastern Germany: Interest Groups in Post-Communist Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Peter A. Hall, "Social Capital in Britain," *British Journal of Political Science* 29 (July 1999): 417–61.