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Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited

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REVIEW ESSAY

Proliferation Optimism and Pessimism Revisited

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Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, **India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia.** *New York: Columbia University Press*, 2010. Pp.152. $21.50/£15.00, HB. ISBN 978–0–231–14374–5.

S. Paul Kapur, **Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia**. *Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press*, 2007. Pp.280. $24.95/£22.50, PB. ISBN 780–804–7–555–04.

Peter R. Lavoy, ed., **Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict**. *New York: Cambridge University Press*, 2009. Pp.426. $102.00/£55.00, HB. ISBN 978–0–521–76721–7.

Scott D. Sagan, ed., **Inside Nuclear South Asia**. *Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,* 2009. $27.95/£24.95, PB. ISBN 978–0–804–76239–7.

The scholarly debate about nuclear proliferation that flowered in the mid-1990s featured two broad schools of thought – ‘optimism’ and ‘pessimism’ – that provided competing assessments on the likely hazards of spreading nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War world. Believing that the new nuclear powers would quickly settle into mutual deterrence with their rivals, optimists held generally reassuring views of the effects of proliferation on regional stability. Pessimists, in contrast, worried that technical, organizational, and doctrinal problems would

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plague deterrence stability between new nuclear powers.[1] The discussion had a particular focal point on South Asia, a region that President Bill Clinton famously described as the 'most dangerous place in the world'.[2] The debate explored issues of great theoretical interest and policy relevance, such as the dangers of preventative war, crisis instability and inadvertent conflict. But as lively and consequential as the exchange was, it quickly approached the point of diminishing returns. As long as India and Pakistan maintained opaque nuclear programs, the empirical base necessary to assay strenuously the deductive arguments made by each side was lacking. This evidentiary constraint began to loosen once both countries openly crossed the nuclear threshold in 1998. The years since have yielded a rich, but also contradictory, historical record, allowing for a more substantive examination of the contending views advanced by scholars more than a decade ago.

Because of the singular intensity of the India–Pakistan strategic rivalry – contiguous but bitterly contested territory, sharp historical animosities, internal frailties vulnerable to outside exploitation, and conflicting national identities make for a monstrous security dilemma – the subcontinent poses an especially stern test for nuclear deterrence theory. Many of the events that followed the 1998 nuclear tests have

[1]Representative works include Peter D. Feaver, 'Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations', in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel (eds), *The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (and What Results)*, special issue of *Security Studies* 2/3-4 (Spring/Summer 1993), 159–91; Scott D. Sagan, 'The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons', *International Security* 18/4 (Spring 1994), 66–107; Feaver, 'Optimists, Pessimists, and Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management,' *Security Studies* 4/4 (Summer 1995), 754–72; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (New York: W.W. Norton 1995); Devin T. Hagerty, 'Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis', *International Security* 20/3 (Winter 1995–96), 79–114; David J. Karl, 'Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers,' *International Security* 21/3 (Winter 1996–97), 87–119; and Jordan Seng, 'Less is More: Command and Control Advantages of Minor Nuclear States', and Feaver, 'Neooptimists and Proliferation's Enduring Problems,' both in *Security Studies* 6/4 (Summer 1997), 50–92, 93–125. A good overview of the debate is provided in Jeffrey W. Knopf, 'Recasting the Optimism-Pessimism Debate' *Security Studies* 12/1 (Autumn 2002), 41–96.

[2]Apocalyptic assessments of the state of nuclear stability in the region were a common refrain within the Clinton administration. See the comments of R. James Woolsey, then director of the US Central Intelligence Agency, in David Albright, 'India and Pakistan's Nuclear Arms Race: Out of the Closet But Not in the Street', *Arms Control Today* 23/5 (June 1993), 12; and of Robert L. Gallucci, then Assistant Secretary of State for Political and Military Affairs, in 'Non-proliferation and National Security' *Arms Control Today* 24/3 (April 1994), 14.

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provided ample substantiation to the critics of Waltzian optimism. In short succession, New Delhi and Islamabad became embroiled in two serious military confrontations – the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001–02 'Twin Peaks' crisis – in which general hostilities seemed nigh and the possibility of nuclear weapons use appeared ominous. Although the outbreak of all-out war was avoided in both episodes, Indian and Pakistani actions stirred continuing fears about whether each country has fully absorbed the lessons of the nuclear revolution. In the Indian case, discussion focuses on whether the 'Cold Start' military doctrine – which emphasizes the threat of large-scale but calibrated punitive actions in order to deter Pakistani adventurism – signifies New Delhi's belief that it can conduct major conventional operations against Pakistan without triggering a nuclear counterblow. In the Pakistani example, debate centers on whether the 'stability-instability paradox' – the notion that nuclear weapons provide the strategic cover under which limited conflict can be waged – has stoked revisionist ambitions and fostered increased belligerency.

Worries also have arisen that South Asia is on the verge of a nuclear arms race that, according to US intelligence experts, 'has begun to take on the pace and diversity, although not the size, of US–Soviet nuclear competition during the Cold War'.[3] Islamabad in particular has expanded its nuclear arsenal in dramatic fashion over the past few years and is reportedly on a path to overtake the United Kingdom as the world's fifth largest nuclear weapons power.[4] Widespread concerns also exist about the infirmities of Pakistani state institutions, the integrity of its strategic arsenal, and the potential for freebooting jihadis to trigger inadvertent regional conflict.[5] Such anxieties are

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[3]R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, 'Nuclear aims by Pakistan, India prompt US concern,' *Washington Post*, 28 May 2009. Also see Rajat Pandit, 'In a year, India will have nuclear triad: Navy chief', *Times of India*, 3 Dec. 2010.

[4]See David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, 'Pakistani nuclear arms pose challenge to US policy, *New York Times*, 31 Jan. 2011; Karen DeYoung, 'New estimates put Pakistan's nuclear arsenal at more than 100', *Washington Post*, 31 Jan. 2011; David Albright and Paul Brannan, 'Pakistan Appears to be Building Fourth Military Reactor at the Khushab Nuclear Site' (Washington DC: Institute for Science and International Security 9 Feb. 2011); and Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*, Report RL34248 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service 7 Oct. 2010).

[5]The final report of the bipartisan US Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism characterizes Pakistan as 'the intersection of nuclear weapons and terrorism', *World At Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism* (New York: Vintage Books Dec. 2008). On the security of Pakistan's arsenal, see Joby Warrick, 'Pakistan nuclear security questioned', *Washington Post*, 11 Nov. 2007;

amply illustrated in recently released US diplomatic cables. A 2008 US intelligence assessment noted, for example, that 'despite pending economic catastrophe, Pakistan is producing nuclear weapons at a faster rate than any other country in the world', while a November 2009 report from the US embassy in Islamabad underscored Pakistani efforts 'to transform its arsenal to smaller, tactical weapons that could be used on the battlefield'. An Obama administration official has justified efforts to shore up the Pakistani government by arguing that 'we cannot afford a country with 80 to 100 nuclear weapons becoming the Congo'.[6]

Finally, there is much evidence that a key article of faith in the optimist canon – that the revolutionary character of nuclear weapons renders territorial conquest much more difficult – has not made much of an imprint on Pakistani security thinking. According to optimists' view, even a modest nuclear force generates outsized deterrence benefits, thus ensuring to an unprecedented degree the external security of even a small, relatively weak country like Pakistan. Yet Pakistani security officials continue to be preoccupied, almost to an excessive extent, with the conventional military balance vis-à-vis India. The Pakistani military establishment's desire to maintain its praetorian role no doubt helps explain this 'India-centric' posture, as General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the current Army Chief of Staff, recently described it.[7] But it is striking that even high-ranking civilian leaders in Islamabad, who presumably wish to reallocate scarce economic resources to other daunting priorities the nation urgently confronts, seem to hold this view too.[8]

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David E. Sanger, 'Obama's worst Pakistan nightmare,' *New York Times Magazine*, 8 Jan. 2009; Sanger, 'Strife in Pakistan raises US doubts over nuclear arms', *New York Times*, 4 May 2009; Bruce Riedel, 'Pakistan and the bomb', *Wall Street Journal*, 30 May 2009; Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, 'Nuclear Security in Pakistan: Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism', *Arms Control Today* 39/6 (July/Aug. 2009), 6–11; and Matthew Bunn, *Securing the Bomb 2010* (Cambridge, MA, and Washington DC: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard Univ., and Nuclear Threat Initiative April 2010). On the possibility of Pakistani state collapse, see Riedel, 'Armageddon in Islamabad', *The National Interest*, No. 102 (July-Aug. 2009), 9–18. On the possibility of terrorist groups triggering inadvertent conflict, consult Craig Whitlock, 'Gates: Al-Qaeda has assembled a "syndicate" of terror groups', *Washington Post*, 21 Jan. 2010.

[6]See David Leigh, 'WikiLeaks cables expose Pakistan nuclear fears', *The Guardian*, 1 Dec. 2010; and Karen DeYoung and Greg Miller, 'WikiLeaks cables show US focus on Pakistan's military, nuclear material' *Washington Post*, 1 Dec. 2010.

[7]'Pakistani Army will remain India-centric: Kayani', *Economic Times*, 5 Feb. 2010.

[8]See, for example, the comments by President Asif Ali Zardari in Seymour M. Hersh, 'Defending the Arsenal,' *New Yorker*, 16 Nov. 2009.

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Yet events over the past decade also lend credence to the optimists' side of the debate. First, despite the severity of the Kargil and Twin Peaks crises, peace nonetheless continued to hold, however uneasily and in circumstances that in the past would almost certainly have led to general war.

Second, despite the deep mutual mistrust both crises created, India and Pakistan undertook an intensive back-channel peace process in 2004–07 that may have come tantalizingly close to fruition. Even more extraordinary is that General Pervez Musharraf, the very man regarded as the instigator of the Kargil crisis, was the prime mover behind the diplomatic negotiations that reportedly were on the verge of defusing the perennially inflamed dispute over Kashmir.[9] It is unclear what role, if any, the security confidence created by nuclear deterrence played in motivating Islamabad's involvement in the dialogue, but the process serves as a significant counterpoint to arguments that the nuclearization process in South Asia has only served to foment greater tension and conflict.

Third, contrary to pessimists' predictions that the region's conflictual strategic milieu would impel India and Pakistan to adopt time-urgent force postures, they continue to refrain from deploying fully assembled nuclear weapons.

Finally, given the preceding two previous crises, there were several large dogs that surprisingly remained silent. Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based militant group formed in close association with that country's security establishment, carried out twin terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India's largest city and premier economic hub – the first in July 2006 that killed over 200 and the second in November 2008 that resulted in more than 160 fatalities – that were more horrific and brazen than the one that triggered the Twin Peaks crisis. Yet instead of a new military confrontation or the retaliatory offensives envisioned in the Cold Start doctrine, New Delhi reacted with remarkable quiescence in each case, a development that some attribute to wariness caused by the specter of nuclear escalation.

The four books under review here approach this jumbled evidentiary record in different ways and draw contrary lessons for the future. *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb* is a concise and accessible exposition of the disagreements dividing optimists and pessimists, structured as a

[9]'Significant progress on Kashmir was made on backchannels, says Kasuri,' *The Hindu*, 21 Feb. 2009; Steve Coll, 'The back channel,' *New Yorker*, 2 March 2009; and Ranjan Roy, 'Kashmir pact was just a signature away,' *Times of India*, 24 April 2010. Musharraf has confirmed the substance of these reports and New Delhi has not denied their accuracy.

dialogue between Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, two prominent scholars of South Asian security affairs.

Inside Nuclear South Asia, edited by Scott D. Sagan, articulates pessimistic concerns that organizational, doctrinal and force posture dysfunctions threaten the breakdown of regional nuclear stability. It offers a particularly bleak appraisal of the ability of New Delhi and Islamabad to avoid dangerous escalatory actions or constrain the risk of a nuclear arms race.

Kapur's *Dangerous Deterrent* is a detailed inquiry into the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation on Indo-Pakistani security interactions and a noteworthy effort at combining theory-building and empirical analysis. Taking issue with optimistic perspectives, he argues that proliferation has contributed to greater volatility by creating significant incentives for aggressive Pakistani behavior, which in turn has led India to adopt increasingly forceful counteractions.[10]

Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia, edited by Peter R. Lavoy and featuring a long multinational roster of contributors, is a broad, comprehensive examination of the origins, conduct, trajectory and ramifications of the Kargil crisis. An impressive work of scholarship, the volume is the most authoritative study of the crisis to emerge to date, and its findings compel both optimists and pessimists to rethink their understanding of the episode's much-debated nuclear dynamics.

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Crisis Illumination

The Kargil and Twin Peaks crises are key Rorschach moments in the proliferation debate. Optimists view the absence of general hostilities, as well as the evident signs of Indian restraint in both episodes, as compelling evidence that the caution-inducing properties of nuclear deterrence simply overwhelm the surfeit of powerful and interlocking factors that have generated military conflict between India and Pakistan in the past. Pessimists, on the other hand, regard Pakistan's role in sparking the confrontations as exemplifying the crisis-stability fragilities emanating from the spread of nuclear weapons and worry that war was only averted by factors outside the nuclear realm.

The Kargil crisis, which some term as the fourth Indo-Pakistani war and whose seriousness has been likened to that of the Cuban missile crisis, is history's most serious military conflict between nuclear-armed

[10]Kapur contributed a chapter to *Inside Nuclear South Asia* that recapitulates many of the arguments made in *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb* and *Dangerous Deterrent*. Unless otherwise specified, quotations in this review are drawn from *Dangerous Deterrent*.

belligerents.[11] Named for a small town in the mountainous reaches of northern Kashmir, the crisis began in early 1999 when a sizeable Pakistani force (numbering at least 1,500–2,000 and perhaps more) of lightly-armed mountain infantry troops infiltrated across the Line of Control (LoC), the volatile ceasefire line that separates the Indian and Pakistani parts of Kashmir, and seized large swaths of rugged territory that had been vacated by Indian forces during the winter. By the time the intruders were discovered in May, they had occupied over 500 square miles of Indian territory and were in a position to interdict a strategic highway linking the disputed Siachen Glacier area to the rest of Kashmir.[12] In response, New Delhi launched a fierce and sustained counterattack. The ensuing two-month battle featured intense ground fighting, heavy artillery barrages and the first combat sorties undertaken by the Indian Air Force since the 1971 India–Pakistan war over Bangladesh. India also placed its entire military establishment on high alert and deployed mechanized forces to the international border with Pakistan. Although New Delhi took pains to keep its combat response confided to the immediate front – including restricting military operations to its side of the LoC – there were widespread fears that broader hostilities would break out and even escalate to the nuclear level. At the time, the Indian government was led by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), known for its hawkish views about Pakistan and also facing looming parliamentary elections. Indeed, as Pakistani intruders were being detected at Kargil, media reports appeared that the BJP government was ready to launch 'deep strikes' into the Pakistani part of Kashmir in order to stop Islamabad's use of jihadi proxies in the Indian zone.[13] With Pakistani forces – which Islamabad publicly insisted were insurgents over whom it had little

[11]The literature on the Kargil crisis is voluminous. Among the works to be consulted are Kargil Review Committee, *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report* (New Delhi: Sage 2000); Ashok Krishna and P.R. Chari (eds), *Kargil: The Tables Turned* (New Delhi: Manohar 2001); Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair and Jamison Jo Medby, *Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2001); V.P. Malik, *Kargil: From Surprise to Victory* (New Delhi: HarperCollins 2006); and P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, *Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2007), 118–48.

[12]On the Siachen conflict, a bitter contestation in a nondemarcated region of northern Kashmir that is largely unknown outside of South Asia, see V.R. Raghavan, *Siachen: Conflict without End* (New Delhi: Viking 2002); and Myra MacDonald, *Heights of Madness: One Woman's Journey in Pursuit of a Secret War* (New Delhi: Rupa & Co. 2007).

[13]George Iype, 'Advani wants troops to strike across LoC to quell proxy war in Kashmir', *Rediff News*, 25 May 1998.

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control – putting up a stubborn defense and inflicting heavy casualties on Indian troops, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in mid-June 1999 warned President Clinton that New Delhi might have to open up a new front across the LoC or even attack into Pakistan proper if the intruders did not withdraw immediately. Washington also picked up signals that both sides were mobilizing their nuclear assets.[14] The crisis was finally defused by a combination of Indian battlefield successes and US diplomatic intervention, including a dramatic White House visit by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in early July. Although exact combat losses are not known, India suffered nearly 500 battle deaths, with Pakistani losses estimated at 400–700 fatalities.

Less than three years later, both countries once again seemed on the precipice of military hostilities. The extended Twin Peaks crisis, so named due to its undulating sense of tension, was the first nuclear crisis of the twenty-first century.[15] It was triggered by an egregious assault upon the Indian parliament while it was in session by Pakistan-based jihadi groups in December 2001. Prime Minister Vajpayee's government came under tremendous domestic political pressure to take action. A similar attack two months earlier on the Kashmir state assembly had caused him to warn the United States that India would be forced to take matters into its own hands if Washington could not convince Islamabad to keep in check terrorist groups operating out of Pakistan. He termed the December attack 'the most dangerous challenge so far to India's national security' and vowed that 'we will fight a decisive battle to the

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[14]Bruce Riedel, 'American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House' (Philadelphia: Center for the Advanced Study of India 2002); and Strobe Talbott, *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2004). Also see Alan Sipress and Thomas Ricks, 'Report: India, Pakistan were near nuclear war in '99', *Washington Post*, 15 May 2002; and Raj Chengappa, *Weapons of Peace: Secret Story of India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power* (New Delhi: HarperCollins 2000), 437.

[15]See *Four Crises and a Peace Process*, 149–83; V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney *Operation Parakram: The War Unfinished* (New Delhi: Sage Publications 2003); Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, 'The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy', *Security Studies* 14/3 (Winter 2004–05), 290–324; Rajesh M. Basrur, 'Coercive Diplomacy in a Nuclear Environment: The December 13 Crisis', in Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen (eds), *Prospects for Peace in South Asia* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford UP 2005), 301–25; Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, 'US Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis' (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center Sept. 2006); and Praveen Swami, 'A War to End a War: The Causes and Outcomes of the 2001–02 India-Pakistan Crisis', and Kanti Bajpai, 'To War or Not to War: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2001–02', both in Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur (eds), *Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behavior and the Bomb* (New York: Routledge 2009), 144–82.

end', while influential Home Minister L.K. Advani called it 'the most audacious and most alarming act of terrorism in the history of two decades of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in India'.[16] To back up its demands that Islamabad crack down on the militants, India went on a vast war footing, including deploying three strike corps along the border with Pakistan, which reacted with a massive counter-mobilization. In short order, some one million soldiers were arrayed in combat readiness posts on both sides of the border. Following US diplomatic intervention, the standoff seemed to be winding down when a terrorist attack on an Indian army base in Kashmir in May 2002 re-inflamed passions. Home Minister Advani announced that India 'would go ahead and win the proxy war like we did in 1971', while Prime Minister Vajpayee traveled to the LoC in Kashmir where he chillingly instructed Indian troops 'to be ready for sacrifice. Your goal should be victory. It's time to fight a decisive battle. We'll write a new chapter of victory'.[17] As in the Kargil episode, signals emerged that both sides were unsheathing their nuclear weapon capabilities. Concerned that tensions were reaching a boiling point, Washington and London evacuated their embassies in New Delhi. Yet following renewed US diplomatic intervention, tensions abated significantly by the summer months, and the crisis concluded anticlimactically by October 2002.

Interpreting the dynamics of each crisis is a major point of contention in the debate between optimists and pessimists. The two schools go separate ways about whether Pakistan's nuclear capacity posed a major inhibitory effect on Indian actions. Despite this difference, however, both perspectives agree that nuclear weapons – via the workings of the stability-instability paradox – facilitated Pakistan's aggressive behavior that sparked the crises. Representative of many optimists, Ganguly argues that 'absent nuclear weapons, Pakistan probably would not have undertaken the Kargil misadventure in the first place'.[18] Kapur in *Dangerous Deterrent* takes a similar line, contending that the Kargil operation was fundamentally guided by 'Pakistani decision makers' beliefs regarding the strategic and diplomatic leverage that their

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[16]Quotations in Nayak and Krepon, 'US Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis', 15.

[17]Ibid., 18; Sarah Left, 'Indian PM calls for "decisive battle" in Kashmir', *The Guardian*, 23 May 2002; and Barry Bearak, 'Indian leader's threat of war rattles Pakistan and the US', *New York Times*, 23 May 2002.

[18]Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty, *Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press 2005), 191. Also see David J. Karl, 'Lessons for Proliferation Scholarship in South Asia: The Buddha Smiles Again', *Asian Survey* 41/6 (Nov./Dec. 2001), 1002–22.

country had gained with the overt acquisition of nuclear weapons. At the strategic level, Pakistani leaders were encouraged to risk taking territory in Kargil by the belief that Pakistan's new status would prevent India from launching an all-out conventional war in retaliation' (p. 124).[19]

Pointing to the risk-taking propensities embedded in military establishments and the lack of effective civilian oversight in Pakistan, Sagan in *Inside Nuclear South Asia* likewise alleges that the country's 'leaders believe that they are protected from all-out war by Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, leaving open the option of using conventional military forces or irregular forces to conduct offensive campaigns or destabilize the rival government in India' (p. 15).

Leading strategic analysts in India advance the same narrative. New Delhi's official inquiry into the Kargil conflict deduced that Pakistan's use of proxy jihadi forces in Kashmir in the 1990s and its Kargil venture were rooted in a belief that its nuclear arsenal negated India's advantage in the conventional balance of power. 'Otherwise', the inquiry argued, 'it is inconceivable that [Pakistan] could sustain its proxy war against India, inflicting thousands of casualties, without being unduly concerned about India's "conventional superiority"'. General V.P. Malik, India's army chief during the Kargil crisis, avers that nuclear weapons 'played an important role in shaping Pakistan's military strategy for the Kargil episode....The Pakistani military believed then, as it still does, that it could safely conduct a low-intensity conflict or a limited war in Jammu and Kashmir and that its nuclear capability would prevent a conventional Indian attack'.[20]

Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia provides a significant challenge to these claims, however. Drawing on in-depth interviews with the planners of the Kargil operation, the volume's contributors marshal substantial evidence that there was little causal connection between Islamabad's attainment of an overt nuclear posture in 1998 and its actions along the LoC less than a year later. As Lavoy puts it (p. 205):

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[19]It should be noted that Kapur in *Dangerous Deterrent* makes an extended argument that because scholars have misapplied the concept of the stability-instability paradox to South Asia, it has little analytical value in explaining Indo-Pakistani security behavior. Nonetheless, his own analysis of the origins of the Kargil and Twin Peaks crises echoes the widely-held view that Pakistani behavior sprang from a calculation that its newly overt nuclear capacity provided strategic cover to indulge in major anti-Indian provocations.

[20]Kargil Review Committee, *From Surprise to Reckoning*, 241; and Malik, *From Surprise to Victory*, 272.

> Pakistani army planners did not launch the Kargil incursion with the stability-instability paradox in mind. The post-1998 nuclear reality did not make Pakistan change its strategy. The reality is quite the opposite: the architects of the Kargil land grab utterly failed to think through the implications of nuclear weapons on the behavior of both their adversary and the international community, the latter of which fundamentally changed its posture toward South Asia after the 1998 nuclear tests.

The volume effectively argues that Pakistani planners, rather than calculating the balance of power at the strategic level, instead were focused on the pattern of localized firefights and aggressive probing that had taken hold along the northern segments of the LoC in the wake of India's occupation of the Siachen Glacier in 1984. Believing (erroneously) that India was preparing for its own military action along the LoC in the summer of 1999, Pakistani commanders wanted to shore up their own tactical positions with a preemptive maneuver. Because they viewed the operation as part of the normal jockeying for military advantage each side had engaged in for years, they assumed that the reaction from New Delhi and the international community would not be vigorous. Reinforcing this expectation was the supposition that the forbidding mountain terrain and high-altitude weather conditions would effectively constrain any Indian response, thereby forcing New Delhi to acquiesce to a limited fait accompli. Of course, events did not unfold as envisioned by the gambit's architects. The problem, as Lavoy puts it, is that the 'Kargil maneuver was a victim of its own success' (p. 180); others in the volume describe inadvertent 'mission creep' (pp. 62, 82, 90) or 'opportunistic occupation' (p. 98). Encountering large stretches of territory unexpectedly abandoned by Indian forces during the harsh winter season, Pakistani intruders were emboldened to continue past their initial objectives. Instead of occupying 25–30 posts close to the LoC as originally planned, they wound up seizing some 130 along a 65-mile-long salient. When they finally stopped, they were in over-extended positions 5–6 miles from the LoC and highly vulnerable to Indian counterattack.

Besides Pakistani testimony, the volume's contributors point to several other pieces of evidence that Pakistan considered the Kargil operation as 'business as usual' along the LoC rather than an exercise in nuclear brinksmanship or a high-stakes probe of Indian deterrence commitments. The first is Pakistan's utter lack of preparedness for the major crisis that ensued. A small coterie of military officers – none of whom had prior involvement in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program – planned the maneuver in great secrecy

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and little thought was given to broader coordination within the Pakistan Army or the wider government – a situation that accounted for the utter disarray in Islamabad's response once the crisis was joined. Nor was any provision made for troop reinforcement and logistical supply of the captured posts.

Second, apart from a few ad hoc veiled remarks, Pakistan did not make a concerted effort to manipulate the threat of nuclear war or ready its nuclear capabilities for use during the crisis. Lavoy goes so far to say that Pakistan launched the Kargil maneuver even though its nuclear arsenal was not yet operational (p. 11).[21] Timothy Hoyt, too, downplays claims about Indian and Pakistan nuclear preparations. At most, he submits, Pakistani dispersal of its 'nuclear-capable missiles out of storage sites for *defensive* purposes' was likely 'misinterpreted by intelligence agencies as an operational deployment' (p. 159, emphasis in original).

Third, Robert Jervis notes that Pakistan's nuclear deterrent posture was particularly weak since its claim that the intruders were actually insurgents and not soldiers reduced 'any deterrent umbrella that Pakistan might have been able to extend over them' (p. 395).

Observing that the Kargil episode demonstrates that 'the armed forces of nuclear powers can fight each other, but only where their vital interests are not at stake' (p. 31), Lavoy does not deny the general operation of the stability-instability paradox in South Asia. But he and his collaborators do assemble a persuasive case that the nuclear factor had little bearing on Pakistani calculations. Given that the paradox is not integral to optimism's core logic, this finding is more of a minor corrective than a significant reproach to the school's interpretations of the conflict. But the ramifications are more serious for the pessimists' views, especially for Kapur's hypothesis that Pakistani actions were a function of changes in the nuclear equation. It also casts doubt on Sagan's contention about the risk-taking propensities of the Pakistani military.

Escalation Dynamics or Existential Deterrence?

Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia contains findings about the conflict's escalatory dangers that are more supportive of other pessimist arguments. The volume details the well-known measures New Delhi took to keep the fighting localized, even when they were militarily costly. Yet it also emphasizes that the primary reason for Indian restraint did not lie in fear of nuclear escalation. As the crisis dragged

[21]Musharraf, who was chief of the Pakistan Army during the crisis, has made the same claim. See *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (New York: Free Press 2006), 97.

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into its second month and heavy casualties mounted, leaders in New Delhi started to consider widening the conflict, an action that ran the risk of escalation to the nuclear level. In the end, India was able to turn the tide of the battle, thus sparing New Delhi's leaders from having to undertake more momentous action. Yet the possibility of things spiraling out of control was real. Drawing on interviews with Indian political and military leaders, Lavoy notes that they 'were within days of opening another front across the LoC and possibly the international border, an act that could have triggered a large-scale conventional military engagement, which in turn might have escalated to an exchange of recently tested Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons' (p. 2).

Pessimist accounts of the crisis have emphasized this escalatory potential. Kapur in *Dangerous Deterrent* quotes Vajpayee as saying that 'nothing was ruled out. If ground realities required military operations beyond the LoC, we would have seriously considered it' (p. 130). Whether New Delhi would have indeed expanded the conflict, and how Pakistan would have reacted, are ultimately unknowable. Post-hoc Indian statements about their readiness to escalate the fighting add insight into New Delhi's decisionmaking, though they may also be a bit self-serving since few leaders are willing to acknowledge publicly that an adversary nation's deterrent power caused them to hold back. It may well be true, as pessimists claim, that the nuclear lid on the conflict's escalatory dynamics was not as sturdy as optimists maintain. It could also be the case, as Jervis emphasizes in *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia*, that 'threats that leave something to chance' (p. 394) would have exerted a strong inhibiting effect as Indian leaders pondered their next move. A clearer resolution of this part of the proliferation debate will have to wait for a fuller record of New Delhi's internal deliberations.

A similar inconclusiveness attends the discussion about the Twin Peaks episode. As with the Kargil conflict, Pakistani nuclear brinksmanship is central to Kapur's understanding of the origins of the crisis. He asserts that the jihadi attacks that sparked the border standoff 'were part of a larger pattern of Pakistani low-intensity conflict, which was promoted by Pakistan's possession of a nuclear weapons capacity…. Despite Kargil's failure, Pakistan continued with its strategy of supporting anti-Indian militancy after Kargil, confident that it was insulated from the possibility of large-scale Indian retaliation' (pp. 138–9). This specific claim would be more persuasive had Kapur better justified it, however. That Pakistan's security agencies have sponsored and employed jihadi proxies to advance its objectives vis-à-vis India is beyond doubt, though it remains uncertain whether Islamabad specifically sanctioned the attack on the Indian

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parliament or if it did what its precise calculations were.[22] It is not clear, for instance, what strategic gain Pakistan could have plausibly hoped to achieve by launching or condoning such a bold-faced provocation following the international reprimand of the Kargil operation and the stern military rebuff delivered by New Delhi. Islamabad also could not have been under any illusions about the US response to the assault, coming as it did just three months after the 9/11 attacks and Washington's subsequent ultimatum that Pakistan sever its ties to the Taliban–Al-Qa'eda alliance in Afghanistan. Moreover, if the jihadi strike was part and parcel of a grand strategic design as Kapur alleges, Islamabad was strangely ill-prepared for the inevitable blowback. With two of its army corps deployed to seal the Afghan border following the collapse of the Taliban regime at the end of November 2001, Pakistan was caught off guard by the scale and rapidity of India's military buildup along its eastern border.[23]

Relying on personal interviews with key Indian decisionmakers, Kapur is more substantive when it comes to New Delhi's calculations as the prolonged crisis unfolded. He argues that while nuclear deterrence did prevent New Delhi from contemplating an all-out conventional offensive against Pakistan, it did not stop the Indians from planning significant large-scale attacks that, it was hoped, would be sufficiently limited to avoid Pakistan's nuclear redlines. He quotes Vajpayee as saying that 'We did not think that Pakistan would have responded with nuclear weapons even if we had attacked. Nuclear war was ruled out' (p. 138). In the end, Kapur contends, New Delhi's decision not to

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[22]As one account of the crisis relates, US and British intelligence analysts 'felt that they had evidence that [Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate] provided systematic support to Kashmir jihad groups....Yet intelligence about whether or how ISI directed particular terrorist strikes within India was less certain; according to officials familiar with CIA intelligence reports, the agency did not have evidence of direct instructions from ISI controllers to jihadi cells to carry out attacks such as the raid on Parliament House. Nor could India offer specific evidence about what role, if any, Pakistan's Army or its intelligence services had played in that raid.' Steve Coll, 'The stand-off,' *New Yorker*, 13 Feb. 2006. Similarly, John R. Schmidt, who served as political counselor in the US embassy in Islambad just prior to the Parliament assault, contends that the jihadi groups responsible for the attack were by that time already carrying out 'brazen, highly provocative attacks against Indian targets that were almost certainly not sanctioned by their ISI taskmasters.' Schmidt, 'The Unravelling of Pakistan', *Survival* 51/3 (June–July 2009), 35.

[23]Bruce Riedel raises the possibility that the Parliament attack may have been a jihadi effort to divert Pakistani military attention from the Afghan border precisely when Osama bin Laden and hundreds of Al- Qa'eda and Taliban fighters were fleeing out of Afghanistan. *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press 2011), 69–70.

escalate was mainly due to a belief that its compellence strategy had been successful in eliciting Pakistani curbs on terrorist operations, thus vitiating the need for further military pressure.

Sumit Ganguly, however, offers a dissenting perspective in *India, Pakistan and the Bomb*. In his view, 'the critical factor that inhibited India from resorting to any form of military action was ... Pakistan's ability to threaten to escalate to the nuclear level'. He adds that 'The BJP-led regime had few compunctions about the use of force. However, faced with the possibility of nuclear escalation it was forced to exercise considerable self-restraint' (p. 57). Elsewhere, Ganguly has argued that New Delhi's use of coercive diplomacy to end the crisis on favorable terms accomplished little.[24]

As with the Kargil crisis, the available empirical record does not permit a conclusive adjudication of these contending perspectives. But it is worth noting that New Delhi's resolve may not have been as firm as Kapur makes it out, since not all Indian leaders believed war was imminent. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, for example, has denied that New Delhi was actively contemplating offensive military operations.[25] Moreover, the window of opportunity for Indian action rapidly closed after January 2002 as Pakistan moved quickly to shore up its eastern flank. For all of the heated rhetoric caused by the May 2002 terrorist attack in Kashmir, senior Indian military officers apparently realized that the likelihood of battlefield success had markedly declined in the intervening months.[26] This may account for Vajpayee's rather incongruous behavior: two days after he thundered about decisive battle, he departed for a five-day vacation, reportedly musing that 'we should have given a fitting reply' the day after the Parliament attack.[27]

The Dog That Failed to Bark

The spectacular November 2008 terrorist strike in Mumbai, often regarded as 'India's 9/11', would seem a signal test of Kapur's proposition that grave Pakistani provocations have inspired an aggressive shift in India's conventional military posture that make the rapid escalation of crises more likely. In April 2004, New Delhi unveiled the Cold Start doctrine which aims to deter Pakistani support

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[24]Ganguly and Kraig, 'The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani Crisis'.

[25]Alex Stolar, 'To the Brink: Indian Decision-Making and the 2001–2002 Standoff' (Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center Feb. 2008), 14.

[26]Ibid., 20, 23.

[27]Inder Malhotra, 'Of diplomacy, rhetoric and terror: ground realities matter most', *The Tribune*, 27 May 2002, as cited in Nayak and Krepon, 'US Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis', 18.

for terrorist attacks like the one in Mumbai by threatening swift and forceful military retaliation. A marked shift away from the Indian Army's traditional defensive orientation, Cold Start envisions launching eight division-size combined-arms battle groups into Pakistan, along with integrated close-air support, for the purpose of inflicting damage on Pakistani formations and seizing limited swaths of territory that could be traded away in post-conflict negotiations. Importantly, Indian military leaders seem to believe that these calibrated incursions would not precipitate a Pakistani nuclear riposte.[28] As part of its efforts to operationalize the doctrine, the Indian Army established a new Southwest Command along the Pakistani border in 2005 and has conducted major exercises to validate key concepts.

Given all of this effort, New Delhi's remarkable forbearance following the Mumbai terrorist attack is a critical puzzle. In *India, Pakistan and the Bomb*, Ganguly posits that nuclear weapons, reprising the role they played in earlier crises, were once again a vital force for Indian restraint (p. 67), while Kapur maintains the episode is not a significant test of Pakistan's deterrent power since the Mumbai assault was less of a national affront than the 2001–02 attacks 'which targeted the foremost symbol of the Indian state' (p. 72). This later argument lacks credibility, however, given the strike's sheer audacity and scope, ample evidence linking the terrorists to controllers based in Pakistan, and the resulting fury of the Indian public. One could, of course, argue that India's hand was ultimately stayed by the sobering realization in New Delhi that military retaliation would serve no useful purpose since Islamabad's control over the militant groups it once spawned had by then become increasingly tenuous. But Kapur dismisses this explanation by cautioning that if 'militants were to stage a large-scale operation similar to the 2001 Parliament attack, the Indians could hold the Pakistani government responsible, regardless of whether Islamabad was actually behind the operation' (p. 80).[29] One cannot rule out such a

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[28]For more background, see Subhash Kapila, 'India's New "Cold Start" Doctrine Strategically Reviewed', Paper No. 991 (Noida, India: South Asia Analysis Group), 4 May 2004; Tariq M. Ashraf, 'Doctrinal Reawakening of the Indian Armed Forces', *Military Review* 84/6 (Nov./Dec. 2004), 53–62; Gurmeet Kanwal, 'Cold Start and Battle Groups for Offensive Operations,' *Strategic Trends* 4/18 (June 2006); Walter C. Ladwig III, 'A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine', *International Security* 32/3 (Winter 2007–08), 158–90; and Kanwal, 'India's Cold Start Doctrine and Strategic Stability', *IDSA Strategic Comments*, 1 June 2010. For recent concerns about the doctrine by the Pakistani and US governments, see Lydia Polgreen and Mark Landler, 'Obama is not likely to push India hard on Pakistan,' *New York Times*, 5 Nov. 2010.

[29]For similar arguments that Indian military restraint cannot be taken for granted in the event of another major attack by Pakistan-based terrorists organizations, see Daniel

possibility, of course, though Indian inaction after the Mumbai attacks casts doubt upon the strength of Kapur's warning.[30]

So, what does account for Indian passivity? Much remains uncertain about New Delhi's decision making, but what is known does not square well with Kapur's argument or with Sagan's concern about the offensive inclinations of militaries. For all the effort on Cold Start, Indian military leaders reportedly told the government during the crisis that the armed forces were ill-prepared to go to war. Indeed, a 2009 internal assessment that the Army submitted to parliament concluded that it will take some two decades for the Army to gain full combat preparedness. And in a February 2010 cable to the State Department, Timothy Roemer, the US ambassador in New Delhi, assessed that the strategy 'may never be put to use on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints'. The shadow of nuclear deterrence may have also had a bearing on New Delhi's calculations. In Roemer's report, he noted that India 'failed to implement Cold Start in the wake of the audacious November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in Mumbai, which calls into question the willingness of the [Indian government] to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice'.[31]

Another key but little examined factor in Indian calculations may have been that the Indian government was now led by the Congress Party. Unlike the prior BJP government that controlled decision making in the Kargil and Twin Peaks crises, Congress is more reflective of the preference for military restraint over risk-taking that is ingrained in Indian strategic culture. Importantly, while the Cold Start doctrine was promulgated during the BJP's tenure in power, the succeeding Congress government has distanced itself from the concept. Ambassador

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Markey, 'Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation', Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 6 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Jan. 2010); and Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, 'Assessing the Terrorist Threat,' (Washington DC: Bipartisan Policy Center 10 Sept. 2010).

[30]Novelist Aravind Adiga may have a more accurate prediction regarding New Delhi's response to the next major terrorist strike: 'The government will immediately threaten to attack Pakistan, then realize that it cannot do so without risking nuclear war, and finally beg the US to do something. Once it is clear that the government has failed on every front – military, tactical and diplomatic – against the terrorists, senior ministers will appear on television and promise that, next time, they will be prepared.' 'Tips for India's next premier', *Financial Times*, 12 May 2009.

[31]Quotations in 'US embassy cables: India "unlikely" to deploy Cold Start against Pakistan', *The Guardian*, 1 Dec. 2010. Similarly, Shankar Roychowdhury, who served as Indian chief of army staff in the mid-1990s, argues that 'Pakistan's nuclear weapons deterred India from attacking that country after the Mumbai strikes', 'Pakistan's nuclear weapons deterred India' *The Hindu*, 10 March 2009.

Roemer, for example, relates that 'several very high level [Government of India] officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported, or advocated for this doctrine....While the army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is less clear'.[32] Other commentators argue that Cold Start is reminiscent of 'the South Asian game of *Kabbaddi*, a kind of touch wrestling, characterized by a great deal of posturing but little violence – in other words, a strategy perfectly suited to India's tendency toward strategic restraint'.[33]

Future Prospects

That the ideological leanings of the BJP, were it ever to return to the helm in New Delhi, may push Indian strategic weapons behavior in dangerous directions is a main theme in *Inside Nuclear South Asia*. Kanti Bajpai draws sharp distinctions between the BJP's emphasis on military power and status and the Congress Party's 'rather ambivalent attitude toward a full-fledged nuclear weapons program' and its 'discomfort with the politics and culture of power and status' (pp. 37, 38). Arguing that the BJP's nationalist ideology, as well as electoral compulsions, was at the root of the 1998 nuclear tests – a debatable point given the role of Congress prime ministers in developing India's nuclear weapons program – Bajpai predicts that a future BJP government would likely initiate a new round of tests.[34]

In similar fashion, Vipin Narang maintains that fundamental ideological differences between the BJP and Congress mean that the pace and tone of Indian strategic developments – including whether the country deploys fully-assembled nuclear assets in the field or makes nuclear and ballistic missile threats during future crisis situations – turn largely on which party holds the reins of power in New Delhi. Whether these divergences account for the contrasting responses BJP and Congress governments have had to Pakistani provocations over the past decade is left unexplored by these authors, however, as is the question of why the BJP for the six years it remained in power

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[32]'US embassy cables: India "unlikely" to deploy Cold Start against Pakistan.'

[33]Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, *Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2010), 68.

[34]For an alternative view of the 1998 tests, one that emphasizes security-seeking behavior on India's part, see Sumit Ganguly, 'The Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program', *International Security* 23/4 (Spring 1999), 148–77.

following the 1998 tests moved so slowly to expand the country's nuclear inventory.

Sagan's contribution to the volume highlights the external influences he fears are causing nuclear doctrines in South Asia to evolve in pernicious ways, increasing the risk of a nuclear arms race as well as the danger of misperception during crises. He argues that US strategic thinking is seeping into the Indian and Pakistani security establishments, leading them to move away from the minimum deterrent postures each declared following the 1998 nuclear tests. As he sees it, Pakistan may be adopting a Cold War-style nuclear strategy by acquiring a capacity to launch major preemptive nuclear strikes as well as execute battlefield nuclear options against invading Indian forces. India, for its part, is mimicking US doctrine statements and diluting the strict no first use policy it enunciated more than a decade ago. This doctrinal shift is not only encouraging the Pakistani military to contemplate earlier dispersal of its arsenal in crises, thus increasing the risk of terrorist theft or seizure, but also laying the intellectual justification for an expanded Indian nuclear armory. Sagan warns that 'the Indian government faces strong internal pressures to increase the size and diversity of its nuclear arsenal in the future' (p. 251). The reoccurring debates inside the Indian strategic weapons complex over ending New Delhi's voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, which most recently bubbled into public view in the summer of 2009, may be evidence of such pressures.[35]

But Sagan's account does leave unexplained the reason why the Indian and Pakistani militaries – oppositional bureaucracies with contrasting threat perceptions and strategic dilemmas as well as markedly different civil-military experiences – are so susceptible to US doctrinal influences in the first place. For instance, in view of the long-standing security ties between Beijing and Islamabad, including close collaboration on nuclear weapons, why is Pakistan not more receptive to Chinese conceptions of minimal deterrence? And why is a military focused largely on its land borders – and wary of cooperating with the United States on nuclear matters – potentially gravitating toward a truncated version of Flexible Response, a doctrine that sprang from the centrality of extended deterrence in US strategic policy decades ago?

Sagan is also silent on several noteworthy 'non-events' related to Indian and Pakistani force development that deserve greater explication. In the years before the 1998 tests, pessimists sounded the alarm that overt nuclearization would most likely be followed by the

[35]See Rama Lakshmi, 'Key Indian figures call for new nuclear tests despite deal with US', *Washington Post*, 5 Oct. 2009.

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deployment of ready-to-use weapons and the predelegation of launch authority. Given the crucibles of the Kargil and Twin Peaks crises, this part of the pessimist brief should have already come to pass. Yet India and Pakistan continue to maintain de-alerted and disassembled force postures and in many respects have moved quite cautiously as nuclear weapons states.

Debates Unending

The empirical base regarding South Asia's nuclearization is something of a paradox. It has broadened in dramatic fashion since the 1998 tests, so much so that both sides of the proliferation debate can reasonably claim some evidentiary support. Yet as the articulate but ultimately inconclusive dialogue in *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb* illustrates, it also remains shallow on many of the most contested issues. Firmer judgment about these issues must await a more solid historical reconstruction of the variable pattern of conflict and cooperation that has defined Indo-Pakistani security interactions over the last decade or so. Definitive evidence may be slow to emerge, however, and in instances where it does not exist counterfactual reasoning will only go so far.

The four books reviewed in this essay point the way to the tasks now before scholars. The illumination of Pakistani decision making contained in *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia* is a fine example of the kind of hard historical spadework that needs to be done, and one looks forward to the work that the volume's core research team is now conducting on the Twin Peaks crisis. The concern for systematic theory building and testing that Kapur exhibits in *Dangerous Deterrent* is commendable even if the explanations he advances seem suspect. And Sagan and his colleagues in *Inside Nuclear South Asia* are quite right to alert us to the possibility that internal processes may be as determinative of proliferation outcomes as the supposedly inviolable logic of nuclear deterrence. Finally, it is worth bearing in mind, as Ganguly and Kapur write at the end of their otherwise irreconcilable dialogue, that the real key to deterrence stability in the region may actually lie at the sub-national level, with Islamabad needing to confront the militant groups it helped spawn but which now challenge the authority of the Pakistani state, and New Delhi tending to the legitimate grievances of the Muslim population in Kashmir.

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