Cultures in Times of Transition
Kultury w czasach transformacji

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(eds./red.)

Cultures in Times of Transition. East Central Europe after 1989

Kultury w czasach transformacji. Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia po 1989 roku

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Introduction

Mark Keck-Szajbel, Ondřej Klípa, and Alexander Simmeth

Cultures in Times of Transition. East Central Europe after 1989

> I think there are good reasons for suggesting that the modern age has ended. Today, many things indicate that we are going through a transitional period, when it seems that something is on the way out and something else is painfully being born. It is as if something were crumbling, decaying, and exhausting itself, while something else, still indistinct, were arising from the rubble.[1]

Václav Havel's words at a speech in 1994 illustrate the profound depth of the transformations that swept through Europe and the world at the end of the Cold War. Looking back at the previous years, especially the five years since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Czech president expressed the painfulness of the "transitional period," as well as the fact that nobody really knew which direction it would eventually take. He also seemed sure, however, that the transformation had been inevitable. The old was dead, something new was on the rise, and one would have to see where it would go.

As one of the leading intellectual figures in Europe's late twentieth century, as part of the opposition in communist Czechoslovakia for decades, and as the first democratically elected president of his country in the transitional years, Havel's words carried weight back then, as they do now. More than twenty years later, they impress the reader not only as a first-hand account on the depth of the transformations in Central Europe, but also on the complexity and scope of those transformations; politically, socially, culturally. As such, Havel's words stand as a brace for the contributions of this volume: Having depth and scope of the changes in mind, we asked broadly how central European societies were transgressed and transformed before and after 1989/1990. The six contributions impressively

1 Václav Havel: Liberty Medal Acceptance Speech. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 4 July 1994, https://constitutioncenter.org/liberty-medal/recipients/vaclav-havel, accessed 14 February 2018.

mirror the broadness of that question, but also hint at the heterochronous nature of those transformations.

Many question the degree to which the transfer of power from one-party rule to free market democracy was a transition, a transformation, or a "revolution" at all. Not only did some countries retain the same leaders as before 1989 (such as Bulgaria and Albania), but the process of economic and social change varied vastly in individual states.[2] Politically—with the possible exception of the calls to "return to Europe"—there was no unifying ideological underpinning of the events of 1989. As François Furet stated after the fact, the changes in Central Europe (and globally) did not introduce "a single new idea."[3] Unlike the French or Bolshevik revolutions, the actors in 1989 were anti-utopian and, as Timothy Garton Ash highlights, explicitly rejected violence in the public sphere.[4] Indeed, as the 2006 film *12:08 East of Bucharest* details, participants in the events of 1989 are still questioning just what happened in that historic year. How did the transition look to scholars in the field? Was it a revolution at all? Or did the changes in Central Europe represent a continuity, a bump in the road on an otherwise straight path to modernity?

Based on a conference held by the Center for Interdisciplinary Polish Studies of the European University Viadrina (Frankfurt/Oder) and generously supported by the Deutsch-Polnische Wissenschaftsstiftung and the Wende Museum in the late summer of 2016,[5] the six following essays are extended and revised versions of respective papers and talks. They range from cityscapes and smellscapes of transition to (un)changing notions of belonging, from the transformation of economic cultures to migration and abortion. The focus of all contributions is on one or several countries and/or places in East Central Europe during the 1980s into the early 2000s. Using a variety of methodologies and approaches—from discourse analysis to legislative history—each author reflects on identities in change. Whether it be the ways in which cityscapes changed with different political regimes, or whom was considered to be part of the nation-state, the contributions question how societies dealt with the transition from one-party rule to free market democracy. In general the contributions can be structured according to two broad categories and four disciplines.

2 Cf. Padraic Kenney, *The Burdens of Freedom. Eastern Europe since 1989.* London: Zed, 2006.

3 Quoted in Timothy Garton Ash, "Velvet Revolution: The Prospects," *The New York Review of Books,* 3 December 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/12/03/velvet-revolution-the-prospects/, accessed 3 June 2017.

4 Ibid.

5 See https://networks.h-net.org/node/73374/announcements/121218/cfp-conference-%E2%80%9Ccultures-times-transition%E2%80%9D-july-13–14, accessed 14 May 2017.

First, several authors focus on long-term transition. Generally analyzing macro structures, these contributions highlight how the transition in 1989 can and should be understood in terms of a longue durée. Both Claudia Rose (chapter 1) and Mark Keck-Szajbel (chapter 2) highlight long-term cultural transition. Claudia Rose (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) examines through the lenses of institutionalism the reasons why Western economic principles were adopted in three Baltic States relatively smoothly if compared to the other post-Soviet countries. Rephrasing August von Hayek, she argues that the new "formal institutions" could hardly be transferred unless there were already compatible "informal institutions" rooted in the society. Therefore, in her chapter she unfolded key historical moments which seeded individualism and entrepreneurship into Baltic societies—the cultural patterns needed for transition of capitalist institutions. Mark Keck-Szajbel, in contrast, shows how perceived backwardness of the Polish agricultural sector has come to be seen as advantageous in the new age of ecological farming. Since Polish authorities abandoned mass collectivization after the revolts in 1956, small farms dominated (and still dominate) the Polish landscape. While the European Union aims at increased efficiency and output in its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), Keck-Szajbel shows how the public both in Poland and in the EU more broadly are turning to support such family operations as are found in rural Poland.

Turning to legal history, Travis Schneider (chapter 3) and Ondřej Klípa (chapter 4) show long-term changes in the Czech Republic and Poland. Here, the transition can be seen as a watershed both for more progressive policies and more restrictive ones. Travis Schneider outlines the history of one of the most-debated topics in Poland: abortion. He highlights how Poland's history with abortion is a very complicated one: after World War I, it was one of the most progressive countries when it came to abortion. Indeed, it was not until the transition to free-market democracy that governments began to clamp down on abortion. Hence, while transition was hailed by most as a positive development, for a segment of the population, the transformation meant limited rights which had been guaranteed before 1989. Ondřej Klípa outlines the changes in the Czech minority policy, from the late state socialism through the EU accession process to the early membership years within the EU. The actual transition in minority policies, as Klípa points out, happened only after the Czech Republic joined the European Union in 2004, when Western European practices were slowly adopted by Czech authorities. Hence, while a change in political system in East Central Europe usually meant the adoption of more liberal laws (as would be the case in Klípa's chapter), societal voting patterns and mores can conserve laws or even make them more restrictive in the long-term.

Analyzing urban history, Kung Yin Ian Lo (chapter 5) unfolds his essay on Berlin urban landscapes around Karl Scheffler's 1910 description of the city as "forever to become and never to be." Setting a large chronological frame from 1933 to present-day Berlin, he examines transitions throughout three very distinct phases in the existence of the present German capital and, especially in the case of post-unified Berlin, also asks about policies and cultures of remembering the past.

The second approach authors had focused more specifically on short-term or synchronic transition. Hence, continuing with urban history, Stephanie Weismann (chapter 6) investigates sensual aspects of transitions. In her essay, she revives smellscapes of central eastern and eastern Europe, and traces the changing olfactory environments in communist and post-communist societies in the late 1980s and (at least the memory of vanishing smells) in the early 1990s. Particularly interested in notions of social, cultural, and ethnic othering, she unveils the oftentimes crucial roles of odors behind transition.

Finally, Tomáš Samek (chapter 7) presents a linguistic approach to the transition. His main interest lies in an identity shift of Czech and former East German societies vis-à-vis "the West." He compares the sense of belonging of these societies right after the political change in 1989 and in the recent "asylum crisis." Using sociolinguistic methodology, he reveals how significantly the meaning of words such as "we" and "other" changed. Whereas in the former case the emphasis was put on transforming into a part of the West (the "old" other), nowadays the discourse excludes "new" others not to enter the West.

Our book does not present revolutionary findings, nor does it build any new theory in transition studies. We also intentionally avoided discussion concerning historical uniqueness and definition of Central Europe, the topic so fascinating for Adam Michnik, György Konrád, Milan Kundera and later also Václav Havel and many others. However, we believe that the times of transition still offer a vast variety of yet insufficiently examined topics that often remained in the shadow of the "grand narrative" about Central Europe and (post)communism. Moreover, transition in our understanding should be relieved of traditional perspective which searches predominantly for "change." As our contributions present in disciplinary and thematically diverse examples, "continuity" or "return" may be often more appropriate description of the studied period than "change." We hope that our book can help with small stones to fill in the gaps in the larger picture of transition in Central Europe. If the book achieves to shed an unusual light on that picture, then we will have accomplished our goal.

Claudia Rose

The Cultural Imprint on Economic Transition in the Baltic Countries. Back to Normal?

When socialism collapsed, the belief that a whole economic system could be designed was epitomized, most obviously by the fact that the new institutions which replaced the lapsed institutions of state socialism were solidly modeled on the example of the Western political and economic system: Democracy and the rule of the market, based on competition driven by private entrepreneurs who own capital goods. The autocracy of the Communist Party was dismantled by free and democratic elections within a multi-party system, collectivization was reversed and state property privatized, and central planning was replaced by market coordination. In the Baltic countries, this transition from state socialism to democracy and market economy has been a success story, although the starting conditions had appeared a lot more desperate than in Central Europe. For 40 years, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had suffered from Soviet occupancy and economic mismanagement in a rigid system of planning and state-ownership. As the transfer of formal institutions which have proved viable in established Western market economies is not necessarily a sufficient condition for a rapid catching up to Western living standards and economic performance, it must be analyzed which characteristics of the Baltic countries have enabled the relatively smooth transition process. This article examines in how far historical experiences and the institutional heritage of state socialism as well as their present manifestations in culture and value orientations, the so-called informal institutions, match the imported formal market-type institutions and thereby have supported the Baltic countries' successful transition to market.

The word transition means the change from one initial state—state socialism—to a targeted state—market economy—during a transitional period. What sounds simple includes a lot of difficulties: How can the socialist system be characterized? In what condition were property rights, systems of incentives, market structures, workability of economic and political institutions? Also, the targeted

state is undefined. A workable market economy can be the Japanese model with a high degree of planning, German social market economy or liberal capitalism as in the United States. The transitional period itself is a complex process of learning and adapting. Another difficulty stems from the fact there is a necessity to define when transition started. Even though processes of reform started earlier than 1989—at the latest with Gorbachev's *perestroika*—changes prior to 1989 were only partial and did not mean a complete system change. Therefore, in the following the term transition refers to the processes which began after the first free elections in 1990, and initiated a complete change of the political and economic system. Based on Friedrich August von Hayek's view on the emergence of institutions, which is briefly summarized in section two, historical and cultural peculiarities of the Baltic countries and their implications for adoption of Western-type formal institutions are analyzed in section three. The article ends with an assessment of the compatibility of formal and informal institutions in the Baltic countries in section four.

Spontaneous Orders

When the Iron Curtain fell, history offered no blue-print for reform from plan to market. In many transition countries, though, the Washington Consensus became the fundament on which transition policies were built.[1] Policies recommended were largely based on neoclassical micro- and macroeconomics; the consequences were more or less equal recommendations for all transition countries.[2] Accord grew among scholars that key institutions such as the rule of law, private property rights and an independent judiciary enforcing them, regulation to safeguard competition, corporate governance, a transparent financial architecture, undistorted markets, social insurance, democratic accountability and participation rules, checks and balances, and strengthening of civil society should be crafted as quickly as possible.[3] Freedom of pricing, sound monetary policy, fiscal responsibility as well as liberal open markets can be added to this list.[4]

1 Manfred E. Streit and Uwe Mummert, *Grundprobleme der Systemtransformation aus institutionenökonomischer Perspektive.* Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001, pp. 231–261 (234); Grzegorz W. Kolodko, "Postcommunist Transition and Post-Washington Consensus: The Lessons for Policy Reform," in Mario I. Blejer and Marko Škreb (eds.), *Transition: The First Decade.* Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001, pp. 45–83 (46).

2 Streit, Mummert, *Grundprobleme der Systemtransformation* (as cited in note 1), p. 236.

3 Joachim Ahrens, "Transition towards a Social Market Economy? Limits and Opportunities," in Bernhard Seliger et al. (eds.), *Das Konzept der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft und seine Anwendung. Deutschland im internationalen Vergleich.* Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2009, pp. 109–142 (127).

4 Peter J. Boettke, "An 'Austrian' Economist Perspective on Transitional Political Economy," *Ama-gi: The Journal of the Hayek Society at the London School of Economics 6,* no. 2 (2004), pp. 12–14 (12).

Economists especially at the beginning of transition obviously expected something like a microeconomic automatism of adjustment. They expected enterprises and households to do what was needed now that macroeconomic stabilization and institutional renewal had been approached and partly fulfilled.[5] However, establishing institutions, often based on the Western model, has not been sufficient. In general, Boettke et al. outline the problem as follows:

> In the transition experience, as we attempted to achieve macroeconomic stabilization and get the prices right we learned that this task requires first that we establish the right set of institutions within which the right prices will naturally emerge as individuals realize the mutual benefits from exchange. But in moving to the institutional level of analysis we also learned that we cannot simply construct and impose whatever institutional design our theory suggests wherever we want it. [...] So we are drawn into the intellectual flame of focusing on the elusive concept of getting the culture right. If a culture accommodates the right institutions, the right prices will emerge and macroeconomic stabilization will be achieved. Not by policy design through managing the levers of monetary and fiscal policy, but naturally as individuals realize the mutual gains from exchange within an institutional environment that gives these individuals wide-scope to bet on ideas and find the financing to bring those bets to life, do economies grow.[6]

This insight underlines that though formal institutions matter for performance, informal institutions or more generally culture cannot be neglected as the workability of institutions rests on the coherence of the population.[7] Therefore, the rationale that informal institutions as culture, tradition, or mentality matter must be discussed in the framework of one central issue in transition: The question how new institutions should emerge.[8]

5 Thomas Brockmeier, *Wettbewerb und Unternehmertum in der Systemtransformation: Das Problem des institutionellen Interregnums im Prozeß des Wandels von Wirtschaftssystemen.* Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 1998, pp. 65–86; Grzegorz W. Kolodko, "Stabilisierung und Transformation in Polen. Zur Notwendigkeit eines wirtschaftspolitischen Strategiewechsels," in Hansjörg Herr and Andreas Westphal (eds.), *Transformation in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Makroökonomische Konzepte und Fallstudien.* Frankfurt: Campus, 1993, pp. 217–233 (221).

6 Peter J. Boettke et al., "The New Comparative Political Economy," *The Review of Austrian Economics 18,* no. 3–4 (2005), pp. 281–304 (289).

7 Bertram Schefold, "The Problem of European Integration: Implications for Economic Methodology, Research and Teaching," in Bertram Schefold (ed.), *Economic Interests and Cultural Determinants in European Integration.* Bolzano: European Academy of Bozen, 2000, pp. 13–37 (28); Helmut Leipold, *Kulturvergleichende Institutionenökonomik: Studien zur kulturellen, institutionellen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.* Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius, 2006, p. V; Katrin Mattusch, "Weltbilder als Weichensteller für die Richtung des Wandels. Zur Aktualität der 'Protestantischen Ethik' am Beispiel des Baltikums," in Anton Sterbling and Heinz Zipprian (eds.), *Max Weber und Osteuropa.* Hamburg: Verlag Dr. R. Krämer, 1997, pp. 73–93 (73).

8 Brockmeier, *Wettbewerb und Unternehmertum* (as cited in note 5), p. 82.

This is a question central to Austrian economics. Its most renown representative, Friedrich August von Hayek, elaborates on the idea that many of the most basic social institutions such as language, law, social customs, cultural rules of conduct or manners are unintentional outcomes of individual action and thus spontaneous orders.[9] In a narrow sense, spontaneous order is the result of human action and not of human design. More broadly, spontaneous order is any order generated by private actors. In both senses, spontaneous order emerges in a decentralized manner, in contrast to the centrally-created order of the state: It emerges endogenously.[10] In Hayek's conception, capitalism is as such a spontaneous order:

> Our civilization depends, not only for its origin but also for its preservation, on what can be precisely described only as the extended order of human cooperation, an order more commonly, if somewhat misleading, known as capitalism. To understand our civilization, one must appreciate that the extended order resulted not from human design or intention but spontaneously: It arose from unintentionally confirming to certain traditional and largely *moral* practices, many of which men tend to dislike, whose significance they usually fail to understand, whose validity they cannot prove, and which have nonetheless fairly rapidly spread by means of an evolutionary selection.[11]

Rules and institutions on which human cohabitation is based thus emerge from an evolutionary trial and error process.[12] Hayek's *Konstruktivismusvorwurf*, summarized in "The Errors of Constructivism," opposes the concept that institutions could serve a distinct target and be created consciously by politicians. Social orders within a society are so complex that they could neither be controlled by individuals nor by authorities. Instead, human beings follow rules that consist of codified civil law as well as of informal customs and conventions.[13]

Such informal institutions receive central importance in Austrian economics, as they are considered the foundation of formal institutions. Where both are

9 Richard M. Ebeling (1991), "The Significance of Austrian Economics in Twentieth-Century Economic Thought," in Richard M. Ebeling (ed.), *Austrian Economics: Perspectives on the Past and Prospects for the Future*. Hillsdale: Hillsdale College Press, 1991, pp. 1–40 (30); Peter T. Leeson, "Anarchy Unbound: How Much Order Can Spontaneous Order Create?" in Peter J. Boettke (ed.), *Handbook on Contemporary Austrian Economics*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010, pp. 136–153 (136).

10 Leeson, "Anarchy Unbound" (as cited in note 9), p. 136.

11 Friedrich August von Hayek, *The Fatal Conceit. The Errors of Socialism*. London: Routledge, 1988, p. 6.

12 Christopher Holl, *Wahrnehmung, menschliches Handeln und Institutionen. Von Hayeks Institutionenökonomik und deren Weiterentwicklung*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004, p. 95; Gerald F. Gaus, "Hayek on the evolution of society and mind," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hayek*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 231–258 (238).

13 Friedrich August von Hayek, "Die Irrtümer des Konstruktivismus und die Grundlagen legitimer Kritik gesellschaftlicher Gebilde," in Manfred E. Streit (ed.), *Wissenschaft und Sozialismus. Aufsätze zur Sozialismuskritik, Friedrich A. von Hayek, Gesammelte Schriften in deutscher Sprache Band 7*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, (1970 [2004]), pp. 16–36 (18, 22).

aligned, formal institutions will work in the desired manner; where they disconnect, formal institutions tend to be dysfunctional.[14] Hayek points out that effective formal institutions codify belief systems that are already part of a society's cultural endowment and therefore continuously stresses the importance of respecting traditions: "Paradoxical as it may appear, it is probably true that a successful free society will always in a large measure be a tradition-bound society."[15] Elsewhere, he underlines that rules should be built on the basis of tradition: "We must build on tradition and can only tinker with its products."[16] Consequently, he doubts whether formal institutions can simply be copied from one society to another, if the underlying informal institutions do not ensure the workability of formal institutions.[17]

Cultural Characteristics of the Baltic States: Heritage of the Socialist System

For half a century, the Balts have lived in an atmosphere which shunned entrepreneurship.[18] The bureaucratic apparatus decided on the foundation of enterprise, its dissolution and appointment, promotion, and dismissal of directors.[19] Directors were appointed for their party affiliation rather than for managerial ability.[20] The ministry determined the profile and activity of the business entity which was not allowed to produce products which had not been scheduled. While allocation of materials, products, and labor was in principle organized in the plan, the administration could interfere and determine how many production factors each entity had to receive and how many products it had to deliver. Investment decisions, technological development, foreign trade, prices

14 Peter J. Boettke, "Why Culture Matters. Economics, Politics and the Imprint of History," *Ama-gi: The Journal of the Hayek Society at LSE*, 2 (1998), pp. 9–16 (passim).

15 Friedrich August von Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty*, London and New York: Routledge, 1960 (2010), p. 55.

16 Friedrich August von Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty. A new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy, Vol.3: The Political Order of a Free People*. London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, p. 167.

17 Ibid., pp. 107–108.

18 Edward A. Tiryakian, "Modernization in a Millenarian Decade. Lessons for and from Eastern Europe," in Bruno Grancelli (ed.), *Social Change and Modernization: Lessons from Eastern Europe*. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995, pp. 249–264 (258).

19 János Kornai, *Das sozialistische System. Die politische* Ökonomie *des Kommunismus.* Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995, pp. 126, 338–339.

20 Raphael Shen, *Restructuring the Baltic Economies: Disengaging Fifty Years of Integration with the USSR*. Westport and London: Praeger, 1994, p. 20.

and financial regulation were scheduled in the plan.[21] Investment resources were allocated according to the influence of the ministry or local party rather than according to need.[22] Directors had no incentives to improve quality or commit themselves to innovation. Emphasis was on the fulfillment of production quotas, rather than improvements, the more so as it proved difficult to incorporate innovation and quality in quantitative plans.[23] High efficiency and technical progress were not related to particular advantages. Innovation was rendered almost impossible; efficiency of everyday routines was undermined. Chronic shortage even aggravated the problem. As several inputs arrived with delay or not at all, enterprises had to substitute goods and thereby either increased costs or hurt quality. The sellers' market meant that competition did not exist: Lowering prices, improving quality, or introducing new products was not rewarded, since demand was given, anyway. Consumers were no factor in decision-making.[24]

At the same time, initiative, self-responsibility and autonomy were undermined by the high degree of security the USSR offered to its citizens. There was full employment and labor shortage, public education was free of charge, there was a central and encompassing pension system (even though pensions were low), the state had to provide living space, there was a relatively wide social net.[25] Soft budget constraints in particular undermined the development of cost awareness and rational long-term calculations. Bad performance did not lead to bankruptcy, as every failure was mitigated by soft budget constraints. The necessity to fulfill the plan together with soft budget constraints resulted in various forms of waste and hoarding.[26]

Not only systemic factors, but also the way industrialization processed under socialism meant an obstacle for transition. Among the Baltic states, especially Estonia and Latvia became industrial showpieces of the Soviet Union.[27] Soviet industrialization meant a certain distortion as specialization was extreme

21 Kornai, *Das sozialistische System* (as cited in note 19), pp. 127–128.
22 Brian van Arkardie and Mats Karlsson, *Economic Survey of the Baltic States. The Reform Process in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1992, p. 119.
23 Shen, *Restructuring* (as cited in note 20), p. 20; Arkardie and Karlsson, *Economic Survey* (as cited in note 22), p. 119.
24 Arkardie and Karlsson, *Economic Survey* (as cited in note 22), pp. 11–12; Julianna Borsos, "Foreign Companies in Estonia—Industrial Environment and Experiences," *The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy Discussion Papers*, 1994, p. 58.
25 Kornai, *Das sozialistische System* (as cited in note 19), pp. 351–352; Fred Luthans et al. "Environmental and Psychological Challenges Facing Entrepreneurial Development in Transitional Economies," *Journal of World Business* 35, 2000, pp. 95–110 (103–104).
26 Arkardie and Karlsson, *Economic Survey* (as cited in note 22), pp. 11–12, 119.
27 Ibid., pp. 43, 70, 97–98.

within the Soviet Union and as certain industries were preferred over others. Facing backwardness versus the Western countries, the socialist countries, with the Soviet Union leading the way, wished to catch up as quickly as possible. The drive for expansion affected all levels of the hierarchy.[28] Authorities supported primarily those sectors which contributed to a direct increase of fixed capital, i.e. production of investment goods. In contrast, the non-productive sector, i.e. services and the production of consumer goods were underdeveloped.[29] This meant a radical break with inherited structures as interwar-Estonia had been oriented on retail trade.[30] In Latvia, this resulted in a strong emphasis of industrial development in machine building, metallurgy, electronics, chemicals and electric power. More than one third of industrial output was created by non-traditional industries whereas consumer goods or services were underrepresented. Heavy industry and military production were supported; more than 15 percent of the Latvian labor force was active in military production in 1985.[31] Nonetheless, by Soviet standards, a relatively diverse industrial structure emerged in the Baltic republics thanks to their comparably advanced stage of development and the skilled labor force. Taking Latvia as an example, heavy industry was accompanied by a strong agriculture and food industry, as well as a forestry and wood industry. Manufacturing in the field of textiles and consumer durables or electronics as communication equipment made Latvia also an important supplier of consumer goods within the Soviet Union.[32] In all three republics, knowledge-intensive industry which presupposed a high degree of intellectual work and a large number of highly-qualified workers coexisted with agriculture which produced both for the republican and the Soviet market, and industry which produced mass products with domestic resources.[33] Trade with Western Europe had been insubstantial as economic structures were largely incapable of working according to capitalist principles.[34]

28 Kornai, *Das sozialistische System* (as cited in note 19), pp. 178–179.
29 Ibid., pp. 189–191; Pasi Ahde and Teet Rajasalu, "Economic Structures," in Olev Lugus and Pentii Vartia (eds.), *Estonia and Finland. A Retrospective Socioeconomic Comparison*. Helsinki: The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, 1993, pp. 67–167 (132).
30 Ibid., pp. 136–137.
31 Marja Nissinen, *Latvia's Transition to a Market Economy. Political Determinants of Economic Reform Policy*. Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 74.
32 Arkardie and Karlsson, *Economic Survey* (as cited in note 22), p. 69.
33 Borisas Melnikas, *Probleme der Integration der baltischen Staaten in westliche Strukturen*. Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (ed.), Köln, 1999 (Berichte / BIOst 40–1999), http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-44252, pp. 10–11.
34 Frane Adam, Primož Kristan, and Matevž Tomšič, "Varieties of Capitalism in Eastern Europe (With Special Emphasis on Estonia and Slovenia)," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 42, no. 1 (2009), pp. 65–81 (67).

At the same time, industrialization had substantial demographic effects on Estonia and Latvia, as industrial workers mainly from Russia came in. Extensive urbanization and industrialization were imposed upon the three societies by the central governments. Both processes were apt to destroying traditional forms of life in the Baltic countries, but as many Balts continued to live in rural areas, while Russian-speakers moved to the towns, some archaic and traditional forms of culture were preserved by rural and intellectual communities.[35] Urbanization and industrialization are in general accompanied by societal modernization. However, starting with the late 1970s, many East European social scientists began to accept the idea of a *homo sovieticus*, a specific type of personality adapted to the Soviet political organization and the centrally planned economy, but lacking conscientiousness, diligence, industriousness, responsibility, independence, or discipline. At the beginning of the 1990s, the existence of such a *homo sovieticus* was taken for granted, and it was assumed that he presented a major obstacle to the transition to a Western society.[36]

However, notwithstanding the comparatively disadvantageous initial conditions and a focus on regaining independent statehood, the Baltic republics have quickly transformed their economies from plan to market and changed orientation from East to West. Particularly in Estonia, a strong commitment to reform has allowed for quick restructuring and modernization, even though ethnic and regional cleavages still burden economic performance. The problem how to deal with the large Russian-speaking population is even more pronounced in Latvia, and has superimposed economic necessities at times. On the other side, the wish to emancipate from Russia has spurred the willingness to undertake deep reforms and 'return to Europe' in both countries. Though the financial crisis hit both countries hard, they did not deviate from their general path and implemented thorough measures to overcome the crisis. In Lithuania, transition has been more prolonged; initially, the process was less clearly defined and hindered by the return of the communists into office. However, steady progress was made which allowed Lithuania to overtake Latvia in terms of economic progress and join the EU together with the other two Baltic countries in 2004.

35 Almantas Samalavičius, "National Identity, Culture and Globalization," in Stanislovas Juknevičius (ed.), *Post-Communist Lithuania: Culture in Transition*. Vilnius: Culture, Philosophy and Arts Research Institute, 2005, pp. 8–15 (12).

36 Victor Zaslavsky, "Contemporary Russian Society and its Soviet Legacy. The Problem of State-Dependent Workers," in: Grancelli, *Social Change* (as cited in note 18), pp. 45, 47–48.

Historical Developments and their Influence on Transition

The chances of the transition countries to be accepted as Western or European and to accept Western institutions in turn decisively depended on shared historical experiences. The history of Western Europe is shaped and distinguished from the Eastern Orthodox world by two developments: The Reformation and the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment was decisive for the transition of a corporatist society to rule of law, democracy, bourgeois society, free science and ultimately industrial market society. The Reformation rocked the social order and the basic world view fundamentally. Protestantism and its demand for self-realization and individualism deposed ecclesiastical and secular hierarchies; the way for the emancipation of rationality from inherited bounds was paved.[37] In addition, being recognized as European also depends on communication and regional integration. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia are clearly historically affiliated with Germany and Austria; Poland has traditionally been culturally attached to France.[38] Firmly integrated into the Western world and Western cultural development until the end of World War II, a return to the West in political, social and economic terms was rather a natural process after decades of unnatural orientation to the East, including the adoption of the socialist political and economic system.

For the Baltic countries, affiliations cannot be defined as clearly. Situated at the crossroads of opposing Great Powers, they have been influenced by different and changing foreign cultures which have determined their fate and fortune. Estonia and Latvia had no historical traditions of statehood, having been occupied by the German crusading knights and the Swedes before being incorporated in the Russian Empire in the eighteenth century.[39] Until the second half of the eighteenth century, the Baltic region was the eastern border of West and Central European culture, and therefore participated in the general socio-cultural, political, economic, and technological development of the West. The mostly peasant population being dominated by a German upper class, Estonia and Latvia were firmly integrated into the Western world. Under the Swedes, serfdom was abolished, the rule of law introduced, education promoted. The lasting German cultural and economic dominance resulted in a promotion of domestic literature and thereby

37 Helmut Leipold, "Kulturelle Determinanten der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung," in: Helmut Leipold (ed.), *Die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft als zentrale Aufgabe. Ordnungs-ökonomische und kulturvergleichende Studien.* Stuttgart: Lucius und Lucius, 2008, pp. 191–215 (206).

38 Marju Lauristin, "Contexts of Transition," in: Marju Lauristin et al. (eds.), *Return to the Western World. Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition*. Tartu: Tartu University Press, 1997, pp. 25–40 (32).

39 Arkardie and Karlsson, *Economic Survey* (as cited in note 22), p. 4.

literacy. A traditional affinity to Western norms was the result.[40] The Enlightenment entered the Baltics and fostered not only lament over existing conditions, but also the emergence of self-identity.[41]

With insignificant exceptions, the Baltic peasants had been in serfdom until the early 19th century.[42] The belonging to Latin Christendom related to special forms of rural cohabitation. The Baltic peasantry did not live in villages but on dispersed farmsteads.[43] Their life on farmsteads instead of in villages has contributed to the fundamental ideal-type cultural difference between Russia and the Baltic countries: While Russia is generally characterized as collectivist, the Baltic societies are described as individualist.[44]

Even though social upward mobility "had as its end result the adoption of German language and culture, that is, assimilation to the German-speaking population,"[45] and even though native freeholders were the exception to the general situation, peasants in the Baltic provinces enjoyed more freedom than in other parts of the Russian Empire. Baltic peasants bore economic responsibility, had to make rational calculations, and exercised control over work distribution. However, Lithuanian peasants lived under stronger collectivist structures than peasants in Estonia and Latvia.[46]

Modernization in terms of urbanization and industrialization was still driven by foreigners. They helped to spread Western ideas and business practices, but diffusion was insufficient, as foreigners mostly lived in the cities while the native peoples remained predominantly rural. The share of the autochthonous population in the cities remained low until the emancipation of the peasants allowed for more mobility. The few Balts who lived in the towns were economically and socially marginalized (as their exclusion from the guilds shows). The development of the Lithuanian cities is a particularly good illustration of the isolation of the rural native population from urban life. Lithuanians were barely present in Vilnius. Urban life, trade, crafts and administration were dominated by Jews. Therefore, World War II did not only destroy production facilities and led to the incorpora-

40 Melnikas, "Integration" (as cited in note 33), p. 8.
41 Shen, *Restructuring* (as cited in note 20), p. 11.
42 Andrejs Plakans, "Peasants, Intellectuals, and Nationalism in the Russian Baltic Provinces 1820–90," *The Journal of Modern History* 46, no. 3 (1974), pp. 445–475 (448–449).
43 Andrejs Plakans and Charles Wetherell, "Family and Economy in an Early-Nineteenth-Century Baltic Serf Estate," *Continuity and Change* 7, no. 2 (1992), pp. 199–223 (201).
44 Katrin Mattusch, *Demokratisierung im Baltikum? Über die Begrenzung von Demokratisierungschancen durch politische Kulturen*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1996, pp. 58–59.
45 Plakans, "Peasants" (as cited in note 42), p. 449.
46 Plakans and Wetherell, "Family" (as cited in note 43), pp. 200–201 (205–206); Mattusch, *Demokratisierung* (as cited in note 44), pp. 95, 117.

tion of Lithuania into the Soviet Union, the holocaust also deprived Lithuania of the former carriers of modernization and left behind a fundamentally rural society which underwent forced industrialization and urbanization. The resettlement of the German Balts and the murder of the Jews also meant that Estonia and Latvia lost two groups which had entailed many of the most educated and socially active individuals, who had played an important role in economy and culture.[47]

Just as urbanization, industrialization in both regions was first established by foreigners. The unbeloved connection with the Baltic Germans turned out to be a blessing in disguise for Estonia and Latvia. German businessmen had transformed the old Hanseatic town of Riga into an industrial center. While Germans retained the large businesses here and elsewhere as for example in Tallinn, the native population which moved to the towns in the course of the peasants' emancipation arrived in dynamic and modern urban centers which were tightly gripped by the spirit of capitalism. A proletariat emerged, which marked the first step away from rural society. Latvians and Estonians enjoyed greater prosperity as ever before.[48] Massive damages of the war notwithstanding, economic progress was made in the interwar period.

Estonia, alongside state-dominated policies, witnessed the rise of substantial entrepreneurial activity. Only about 30 percent of the population were wage-earners, which made the Estonian economy flexible in responding to developments on both internal and external markets.[49] According to Liuhto, the expansion of entrepreneurship created mercantilism rather than industrialization:

> The basis of entrepreneurship was formed from many small and medium-sized enterprises, which operated in the manufacture and sale of agricultural products, as well as in the sale of consumer goods. Contributors to the growth of industrial enterprises [...] were mostly foreign companies and the Estonian State.[50]

Nevertheless, a number of very successful small and medium-sized enterprises became more and more wealthy and started to spread their activities towards industrial activities. This feature proved an important asset for the transition during

47 Claudia Rose, *Competition, Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change in Transition. A Comparative Analysis of the Baltic and Three Post-Yugoslav Countries with Due Regard to the Austrian Tradition of Economics.* Marburg: Metropolis, 2015, p. 522.

48 Kevin O'Connor, *The History of the Baltic States*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2003, p. 65.

49 Arkardie and Karlsson, *Economic Survey* (as cited in note 22), p. 96; Kari Liuhto, "Entrepreneurial Transition in Estonia – Three Views," *Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, Business Research and Development Center and Institute for East-West Trade, Series C Discussion* 3/1995, p. 9.

50 Liuhto, "Entrepreneurial Transition" (as cited in note 49), p. 8.

the 1990s, which resembled developments in the 1920s and 1930s: The loss of Eastern markets and manufacturing contacts, the need to develop a national economy, and a growing sensitivity for national business culture.[51] Small entrepreneurship in the form of small shops or kiosks is by no means a new phenomenon in Estonia, rather is reminiscent of the 1920s and 1930s.[52] History seems to repeat itself with regard from the turn "from selling from suitcases to trade in kiosks, and from shops to industrial manufacturing."[53] Liuhto claims that "[t]raditionally, enterprising spirit has been regarded as one of the typical Estonian characteristics."[54] Ahde and Rajasalu or Hagfors and Kuus estimate that the immediate pre-war development levels of Finland and Estonia were roughly similar; the purchasing power of wages of industrial workers were approximately the same, and it is likely that they had a comparable living standard.[55] Similarly, Lainela and Sutela argue that Latvia's level of development at the time was comparable to Estonia's or even slightly better due to the higher degree of industrialization.[56]

The German upper class was resented by the Estonians as conquerors and exploiters of the domestic peasantry in historiography and equated with century-long serfdom. However, as the departure of the Germans was paralleled by Soviet occupation and repression by the NKVD, anti-German feelings were somewhat erased and especially after regaining independence, Baltic Germanism has experienced a sort of renaissance. Today, Estonians and Latvians are likely to emphasize the positive side of a common past with Germans and Swedes from whom they had been isolated under Soviet times. Modernization in Estonia is connected with Lutheran Reformation under German influence and with the emergence of a modern educational system which was established according to the Swedish pattern. As the Baltic German aristocracy successfully defended its dominant position, these peculiarities survived incorporation into tsarist Russia. Artistic culture, education, philosophy and science at the time of independence were closely connected with Western European modernity and ideas of rationalism, individual freedom, and modernity.[57] In contrast, Russian-speaking immigrants under Soviet

51 Liuhto, "Entrepreneurial Transition" (as cited in note 49), pp. 9, 30.
52 Ibid., p. 20.
53 Ibid., p. 30.
54 Ibid., p. 4.
55 Ahde and Rajasalu, "Economic Structures" (as cited in note 29), p. 68; Robert Hagfors and Toivo Kuus, "The Structure and Distribution of Income in Estonia and Finland," *The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy Discussion Papers,* 1991, pp. 3, 27.
56 Seia Lainela and Pekka Sutela, *The Baltic Economies in Transition*. Helsinki: Bank of Finland, 1994, p. 17.
57 Lauristin, "Contexts" (as cited in note 38), p. 34; Pille Petersoo, "Reconsidering Otherness. Constructing Estonian Identity," *Nations and Nationalism* 13, no. 1 (2007), pp. 117–133 (122).

rule were for a long time considered illegitimate; to a certain degree, Estonianness and Latvianness has been constructed against the Russians.[58]

The development of Lithuania differed from its northern neighbors. Lithuania experienced political independence during Medieval Times, when it oriented westwards:

> From the introduction of Christianity until the third partition of Poland-Lithuania and between the two world wars, Lithuania was part of the Western world which includes the countries which have assumed the religious, cultural, and, in part, political inheritance of the Western Roman Empire.[59]

However, van Arkadie and Karlsson state that despite its geographical location at the crossroads between East and West and its closeness to important historical waterways which connect Northern and Southern Europe, Lithuania "has throughout its history been characterized by a certain isolation and even backwardness,"[60] which differs from the thorough integration of Estonia and Latvia.

The long duration of serfdom in Lithuania accounted for weakening individual's self-regulation and autonomy; the social order was based on a relation characterized by patronage and obedience. Ideas of subordination were further supported by the Catholic dogma.[61] Owed to the belated agrarian reform and the lack of a financially strong bourgeoisie, urbanization and industrialization arrived later in Lithuania than in the other Baltic Provinces. The Lithuanian gentry, weakened by the repressions of the Russian rulers, could neither be the cradle of an industrial takeoff.[62] According to the 1897 census, 93 percent of the Lithuanians in Lithuanian majority areas were still peasants.[63] Upon achieving independence, "Lithuania was a small and impoverished state."[64] Illiteracy kept industrialization low between the two world wars, even though significant improvements were made. In contrast to Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania had not been favored by foreign capital. The important role of the Jews was largely limited to merchandise and financial intermediation, but Lithuania lacked a class of industrialists who could have turned the tide.

58 Petersoo, "Reconsidering Otherness" (as cited in note 57), p. 124.
59 Evaldas Nekrasas, "Is Lithuania a Northern or Central European Country?" *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review* 1998, p. 1.
60 Arkardie and Karlsson, *Economic Survey* (as cited in note 22), p. 25.
61 Raminta Pučėtaitė and Anna-Maija Lämsä, "Developing Organizational Trust Through Advancement of Employees' Work Ethic in a Post-Socialist Context," *Journal of Business Ethics* 82, no. 2 (2008), pp. 325–337 (329).
62 Ralph Tuchtenhagen, *Geschichte der baltischen* Länder. Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005, p. 71–72.
63 O'Connor, *History* (as cited in note 48), pp. 60–61.
64 Thomas Lane, *Lithuania: Stepping Westward*. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 8.

However, until the incorporation into the Russian Empire, all three Baltic countries were firmly integrated into Western European cultural developments, most notably the Enlightenment and the Reformation. With Russian rule, they were forcefully transferred to the Eastern World. It is no surprise that Russification proved a failure: It intensified the national movements, as German dominance in many spheres of live was kept in place, and the Balts were unwilling to become Russian nationals or convert to Orthodoxy. O'Connor is right with his claim that "the development of the Baltic nations was already too far advanced by the 1880s for any kind of cultural assimilation to take place."[65] As many people remembered life in the independent republics, the Baltic population did not accept Soviet ideology as their own:

> As the late 1980s would prove, the Sovietization of the Baltic nations was shallow. Having managed to preserve the historical memory of the independence era [...] the Baltic republics remained the most Western of the Soviet republics in heritage and lifestyle. Gorbachev's *glasnost* would finally provide them with the opportunity to reclaim that heritage.[66]

Values and Identity in Transition

Living under state socialism, however, meant that the Eastern European countries were isolated from late-industrial and post-industrial developments in Western Europe after the 1960s.[67] As a result, both Sovietized values and norms promoted under communism and the traditional disposition for Western orientation co-existed in the Baltic republics.[68] But unintentionally, the ethnoterritorial federalism of the Soviet Union, which was meant to be transitional, provided the framework for the cultural development of the various nationalities and nourished cultural uniqueness. The possibility to maintain a publishing industry and a system of secondary and higher education in the vernacular prolonged national differences.[69] For Estonians, their North European cultural heritage as well as lingual and folkloristic peculiarities helped to preserve inner distance from Soviet Russian everyday practices.[70] In general, cultural resources for resistance

65 O'Connor, *History* (as cited in note 48), p. 56.
66 Ibid., p. 43; for Lithuania see also: Lane, *Lithuania* (as cited in note 64), pp. 87–88.
67 Lauristin, "Contexts" (as cited in note 38), p. 34; Arkardie and Karlsson, *Economic Survey* (as cited in note 22), p. 74.
68 Melnikas, "Integration" (as cited in note 33), p. 9.
69 David J. Smith, *Estonia: Independence and European integration*. London and New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. xxi–xxii.
70 Lauristin, "Contexts" (as cited in note 38), p. 35.

were greater in the Baltic republics than elsewhere in the Soviet Union for several reasons: Totalitarian pressures were weaker, as the Baltic republics served as a showpiece to the outside world. In addition, they were more open to influences from the outside world.[71] Europe and especially the Nordic countries were and still are constructed as positive points of reference. In addition to geographical, cultural, and linguistic proximity, there is a certain admiration for Finland among the Estonians. Reference to Finland spurred the preservation of Estonian identity during Soviet occupation, particularly because watching Finnish TV became an important channel to participate in developments in the West. Similarly, the Swedish cultural heritage is considered a part of Estonian identity. Finally, the 'return to Europe'-narrative was essential to the political and cultural discourse in the 1980s; the national historiography is significantly pro-European.[72]

But on the other hand, for the

> Estonians and other people with Western mind-set, living under the Soviets meant a 'clash of civilizations' inside the mind of every single individual, the loss of personal integrity, and even the loss of the right to an authentic life-world. People were living in permanent fear of disclosure to the repressive system of one's 'otherness.'[73]

Identifying oneself with Western culture while having to live under communist tyranny were traumatic experiences for the Baltic peoples.[74] But on the other hand, their strong will to preserve Western traditions meant survival as national entities. Lauristin even points out that their wish to become an integral part of the West again was a more important anchor for development that the mere economic or political motivation.[75]

Against this background, it is no surprise that Westernization is a fundamental aspect of Baltic transition.[76] The popular perception of belonging to the West, the unambiguously positive attitude towards the West, and the wish to return to Europe have probably been the most important communalities. But nonetheless, it must not be neglected that the Baltic countries have been heading in different directions: Estonia is heading North, and in fact Estonians consider

71 Marju Lauristin and Peeter Vihalemm, "Recent Historical Developments in Estonia. Three Stages of Transition (1987–1997)," in Marju Lauristin et al. (eds.), *Return to the Western World: Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-Communist Transition*. Tartu: Tartu University Press, pp. 73–126 (75–76).
72 Petersoo, "Reconsidering Otherness" (as cited in note 57), p. 126–127.
73 Lauristin, "Contexts" (as cited in note 38), p. 37.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., p. 19.
76 Ibid., p. 31.

themselves kin of the Finns—leaving Latvia and Lithuania with the feeling that they are abandoning them for the Nordic countries. Lithuanians are culturally oriented toward Poland, whereas Estonian and Latvian culture developed under German tutelage.[77]

Finally, after the breakdown of socialism, the strive to join the European Union has become the most important anchor for development. The Baltic countries considered their accession a natural act for it meant the ultimate end of forceful inclusion into the Eastern world which had terminated their independence. Political independence, democracy—though short-lived—and market economy were remembered as the true heritage of the region by the titular nations. Values such as liberalism, individualism, self-responsibility, which had arisen from movements as Reformation and Enlightenment, were part of this heritage. Therefore, the willingness to implement fast reforms was immense. Particularly in Estonia, the public's and the politicians' drive towards Westernization was intense, all hardships notwithstanding. Though more reluctant, the general orientation in Latvia and Lithuania headed into the same direction.

Conclusion

The formal institutions imported from the West during transition were the result of a social differentiation characteristic of Western European development. The extended order had resulted from the supersession of traditional values of small groups as solidarity and altruism. In sort of a time lapse, the Eastern European transition countries were expected to skip different development stages, which the Western European countries had passed through over centuries. Countries which had participated to a higher extent in the cultural formation of Western Europe, i.e. those countries which adhered to Western Christianity, had at least partly participated in the social differentiation process. In the Orthodox countries, acculturation took more time. In contrast, their acculturation to the East had facilitated the adaption of the institutional setting of socialism: While the institutions were largely incompatible with Western Christianity, the holistic legacy of Orthodoxy facilitated adaption to the Soviet institutions.[78]

77 O'Connor, *History* (as cited in note 48), p. 6.

78 Joachim Zweynert and Nils Goldschmidt, "The Two Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and the Relation between Path Dependent Development and Politically Implemented Social Change," *HWWA Discussion Paper*, 2005, pp. 20–21, https://econpapers.repec.org/paper/zbwhwwadp/26391.htm, accessed 14 February 2018.

This is very much in line with Hayek, who continuously emphasized that rules must reflect moral convictions of the majority of the people to be enforceable. A certain match is important, as both formal and informal institutions exist simultaneously. This is not to reveal that even in established market economies, informal institutions are prevalent, and appear to conflict with market economy: Broad strata of the population support the idea of equal income distribution, or there are groups with conflicting informal institutions living under one legislation. Hence, enforced conformity between formal and informal institutions is not a *conditio sine qua non* for a functioning market economy. But it is decisive whether individuals consider the formal rules legitimate, and whether individual actors are ready to accept formal institutions even though they might have been imposed by other groups.[79] In a transition context, a certain congruence between the emerging formal institutional framework and the informal institutions is also important as legislature is incapable to devise a consistent system of private law in a singular effort so that informal conventions have to complement the formal rules.[80] In turn, those in charge of legislation have to set universal rules which are accepted by the population at large, instead of abusing their power for rent-seeking.[81] Informal institutions will decide over individual efforts to consistently implement new rules. Informal institutions are decisive for the degree of identification with Western-type democracy and capitalism and therefore for the readiness to undergo substantial, sometimes painful changes. Thereby Hayek's considerations can offer valuable analytical instruments for understanding the new fundamental re-orientation in transition countries.[82]

For these reasons, the spread of the market and capitalism as spontaneous orders within a framework of imported rules in the transition countries depended on: (1) the degree to which the transition countries had taken part in the emergence of the extended order of human cooperation before the establishment of socialism and therefore acculturated to the West, and (2) the degree to which the population considered the new formal institutions legitimate and reasonable, and to which the informal institutions were compatible with the formal institutions.

79 Uwe Mummert, "Kultur und Systemtransformation: Institutionenökonomische Aspekte," in Hans-Herrmann Höhmann (ed.), *Eine unterschätzte Dimension? Zur Rolle wirtschaftskultureller Faktoren in der osteuropäischen Transformation.* Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1999, pp. 61–77 (63).

80 Manfred E. Streit, "Constitutional Ignorance, Spontaneous Order and Rule-Orientation. Hayekian Paradigm from a Policy Perspective," in Stephan F. Frowen (ed.), Hayek: *Economist and Social Philosopher. A Critical Retrospect.* Houndmills: Macmillan Press and St. Martins Press, 1997, pp. 37–58 (51).

81 Mummert, "Kultur und Systemtransformation" (as cited in note 79), p. 63.

82 Norbert Kloten, "Comments on 'Constitutional Ignorance, Spontaneous Order and Rule-Orientation' by Manfred E. Streit," in Frowen (ed.), *Hayek* (as cited in note 80), pp. 59–62 (62).

In terms of acculturation to the West, especially Estonia and Latvia have, to a quite considerable degree, taken part in the cultural genesis of Western Europe. Protestantism and Enlightenment directly influenced the cultural genesis of the autochthonous populations under German cultural supremacy. Economically, modernization was yet somewhat retarded, as capitalism, which forced the agrarian societies to substitute traditional conceptions for a mindset built on initiative and individualism, entered the region relatively late. Under German Baltic dominion, modernization in terms of industrialization, urbanization, education, and integration within Western trade was initiated. Although the native population was at first largely bypassed by these developments, they nonetheless provided the basis for social differentiation and the replacement of traditional values, the basis for the development of a native bourgeoisie, as well as the basis of a work ethic which could favor the spread of the competitive market process. In addition, the fact that both Estonians and Latvians were predominantly rural people until the Second World War did not pose a serious impediment for development, thanks to the particular structure of agriculture: Peasants in both countries lived on individual farmsteads where values of small group identity were not particularly strong. Instead, individualism was traditionally relatively pronounced.

For their transition process in the 1990s, it was decisive that socialism did not go along with a complete re-traditionalizing of values. Even though family bonds became more important in a totalitarian political system and an economy of shortage, societies maintained their Western European heritage. In general, the Soviet dominion meant a mere interruption of the natural course of development of the Baltic countries. Among the former Soviet republics, all three Baltic republics stand out for one peculiarity: "They were the only areas of the USSR to have experienced an independent modern national life and modernization not patterned on the Soviet model."[83] Therefore, the extended order of capitalism which is based on values as individualism, autonomy or meritocracy could easily spread in transition.

Although being more provincial and less well integrated than Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania unquestionably acculturated to the West. However, belated emancipation of the peasants undermined the development of autonomy and self-responsibility which meant that many pre-capitalist characteristics were in place when the Second World War erupted. Laggard industrialization, urbanization and education which were only substantially driven under the socialist system meant that the extended order was only in an early stage of development until the Second World War.

83 Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, *The Baltic States: Years of Dependence 1940–1990*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993, p. 1.

A sophisticated social differentiation had not taken place; people largely bewared the traditions of agricultural life. In general, Catholicism did its bit by fostering a more collectivist attitude. Social modernization proceeded during industrialization and urbanization under the socialist rulers, but not enough to make up for the backlog which had emerged during centuries at the periphery of large empires. As a result, parochialism and traditionalism persisted to some degree. Nonetheless, even though somewhat behind, the orientation of Lithuania throughout its history was clearly and without any alternative towards the West which meant that socialism meant a break in development, although not one as severe as for Estonia and Latvia.

All three Baltic countries were thus united in their wish to become members of the EU, which means that in principle people considered the new institutions which brought them closer to the EU as legitimate. Consistent implementation has been more difficult in Latvia and Lithuania than in Estonia, as old behavioral patterns were not replaced as quickly. Both Latvia and Lithuania are nearer to the core of the EU than Estonia, but they lacked role models to which they could have adhered as unconditionally as the Estonians did to the Nordic ideal.[84] Nonetheless, in principle the new institutions are approved by the population. Particularly the well commemorated interwar period—though idealized—has contributed to the appreciation of democratic statehood and the market, so that it is often used as a reference point for certain institutional decisions.[85] Therefore, concerns expressed by Seliger that the "word-by-word translation of the Union's directives into national law [...] means a restriction of institutional evolution"[86] appear groundless.

Today, though some egalitarian convictions remain in place, market economy and its ingredients competition and entrepreneurship are respected. As soon as the barriers of socialism were removed, entrepreneurial activities manifested themselves as truly omnipresent phenomena. Thanks to the general respect for the institutional framework, they mainly showed up in legal and desirable forms and thereby contributed to increasing esteem for the market. Initial obstacles, such as a lack of information about markets or matters of business administration, were quickly overcome. The fact that openness towards new technology is huge,

84 Kazimierz M. Slomczynksi and Goldie Shabad, "Can Support for Democracy and the Market be Learned in School? A Natural Experiment in Post-Communist Poland," *Political Psychology* 19, no. 4 (1998), 749–779 (769–770).

85 Tõnu Roolaht, "Entrepreneurial Approach to Explaining the Internationalization of Estonian Small and Medium Enterprises," in Tõnis Mets et al. (eds.), *Entrepreneurship in Estonia: Policy, Practices, Education and Research.* Tartu: Tartu University Press, 2006, pp. 92–115 (100).

86 Bernhard Seliger, "Integration of the Baltic States in the European Union in the Light of the Theory of Institutional Competition," *Communist Economies & Economic Transformation* 10, no. 1 (1998), pp. 95–109 (100–101).

and innovative activities are substantial especially in Estonia, underlines readiness to take initiative, the feeling of self-responsibility, preparedness to undertake risk, and an appreciation of freedoms the market offers. For the Baltic countries, it can thus be constituted that spontaneous processes would have steered into the same direction which has been determined by constructivist change.

Mark Keck-Szajbel

From Backward to Forward. The Strange Death of Polish Agriculture

In late 2005, the Bush administration's Senior Advisor for Agricultural Biotechnology, Madelyn Spirnak, flew to Warsaw to meet with politicians and academics about US agriculture, and the view people had of US attempts to penetrate the Polish agricultural market. Poland, having only recently joined the European Union (in 2004), was ripe for development in the eyes of American agro-companies: It was a land with one of the largest agricultural sectors in Europe; the proportion of inhabitants living in rural areas had always been much higher than in the rest of Europe; its agricultural market was relatively new and in the need of reform; and the Polish government had been unwavering in its support of American politics and missions abroad.[1]

Spirnak was not a high-profile representative of the Bush administration. A career diplomat, she was more known for her advocacy of agricultural development in North Africa and the Middle East than in East Central Europe. That was also why she fit so well in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. In the 1950s and 1960s, organizations like the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation worked hand-in-hand with the Bureau to provide aid and research to third world countries. Their focus was on agriculture: In the Zeitgeist of 1950s—with an evil communist threat in Europe and Southeast Asia—the US strategized that agricultural development in the 'global south' would yield not only more crops, but would stave off the attraction of communism abroad.[2] How odd, then, was it to find officials trying to counsel Poles on good farming practices in 2005. The trip was not one to teach Poles how to farm, but to inquire why they insisted on turning down the advice of their newfound big brother to the West. In contrast to other revolutions (in technology, politics, and information), average Poles

1 Cf. David Ost, "Using America against Europe. Poland's National Reactions to Transnational Pressure," in Mitchell A. Orenstein, Stephen R. Bloom, and Nicole Lindstrom (eds.), *Transnational Actors in Central and East European Transitions*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008, p. 162–187.

2 Cf. James Lin, *International Development Organizations and Agricultural Development in Taiwan, 1945–1975*, http://www.rockarch.org/publications/resrep/lin.pdf, accessed 1 March 2014.

indicated that, in the realm of agriculture, they did not need to import an agricultural revolution.[3] Hence, if US officials could call the agricultural transformation of places like Taiwan or Japan "success stories," they clearly went wrong in post-Cold War Poland, and that despite the fact that, according to nearly every intergovernmental organization and international governing body, Poland's agricultural sector was in desperate need of improvement.[4]

In discussions of 1989, research generally focuses on the freedoms gained during the difficult transition after the fall of state socialism, and concentrate on three elements. First, they discuss the disproportionate role of the West in the East, or how the West over-ran a newly formed free market (usually to the detriment of local economies).[5] Secondly, they discuss the reshaping of the cultural landscape of the East after 1989.[6] Finally, they explore the politics of retribution, of lustration, and of retroactive justice.[7] All of these are in one way or another focusing on ruptures. How the political shift forced people to understand their world in different ways, and what the effects of this change was on society en masse. After regimes fell, ordinary people were confronted not only with new laws, but also a new economy and new political order. In Poland, as across the former East bloc, that generally meant the collapse of industries previously solvent only thanks to huge subsidies. While historians rarely use the term "backward" to describe the old system and their societies, politicians, journalists and Western societies frequently use the jargon of stagnation. As the popular slogan of the time suggests, the region's "return to Europe" would mean a reversal of decline, restoring "backward" societies to the path of free market democracy and liberal values. The slogan also made explicit that the West was to serve as a model to be emulated in East Central Europe. What I argue here is that, in many instances, the transition led to new configurations of actors and interests which were not path-dependent on the West. In a new globalized world, the legacy of socialism could be felt not only in inefficient factories, unemployed workers and polluted environments. In the case of agriculture, old ways gained in cultural currency. I explore agriculture and public opinion concerning reform from abroad, and show how perceived "backwardness"

3 Poland: Senior Advisor for Agricultural Biotechnology Spirnak's Meetings with GOP Officials and Academia, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06WARSAW107.html; "Polska a GMO—Depesza Ambasady USA z 2006 r." wyborcza.pl. N. p., n.d. Web, accessed 1 March 2014.

4 Ibid.

5 Charles Maier, *Dissolution. The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.

6 Daphne Berdahl, *On the Social Life of Postsocialism: Memory, Consumption, Germany*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

7 István Rév, *Retroactive Justice: Prehistory of Post-Communism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.

changed over the time. Currently, to many people in Poland and abroad, the same "backwardness" that was a bane during socialism came to become an asset in the age of globalized agro-business.

A Backward Development of Agriculture during State Socialism

Poland's agricultural sector was markedly different than other East bloc countries after 1945, and remained so throughout the Cold War. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Poland was briefly seen as a breadbasket to Europe. Since the devastation of World War II affected cities most, Poland was able to lever their modest agricultural strength even against the West until 1947.[8] More than 60 percent of the employed population worked in agriculture before the war, and while Poland lost almost half of its eastern territory after 1945, it gained in more productive land in the west.[9] Blessed with good weather for farming, Poland's agricultural sector was initially robust in the years after the War, and surpluses were gladly purchased by Western nations desperate to feed their urban populations using greenbacks.[10] But in the aftermath of the Tito-Stalin split and the establishment of the Marshall Plan, the Soviet Union moved to consolidate their control on East Central European governments. The Polish government initiated a 'voluntary' policy of collectivization, despite the fact that everyone in Warsaw—not to mention the West—knew that the policy would be derided by the overwhelming majority of Polish farmers.[11] After collectivization commenced in 1948, the US State Department used economic tactics (similar to those used in Southeast Asia a decade later) to try to prevent the government in Warsaw from nationalizing small farms: They guaranteed the purchase of surpluses to be shipped to West Germany and England.[12] Western Europe, too, was pushing for Poland to keep its small farms to ensure greater crop yields for a hungry continent (and, of course, to maintain political influence). The result was that planting plans changed: More pork and peas, for example, were planned to export explicitly to the British market. But in the coming years negotiations broke down, and communist Poland lost its unique position in the early 1950s.

8 Robert Mark Spaulding, "'Agricultural Statecraft' in the Cold War. A Case Study of Poland and the West from 1945 to 1957," *Agricultural History 83*, no. 1 (2009), pp. 5–28; see also Patrice Dabrowski, *Poland: The First Thousand Years*. DeKalb: NIU Press, 2014, p. 431.

9 Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992, p. 39.

10 Spaulding, "Agricultural Statecraft" (as cited in note 8).

11 Ibid., p. 9.

12 Ibid., p. 12.

Collectivization (and a poor 1951 harvest) brought stagnation to Polish agriculture. Private farmers were compelled to deliver grain, livestock and poultry to the central government at low costs. As in other countries, the effect of collectivization on Poland's agricultural sector was devastating. But the revolts of 1956—which ushered in Władysław Gomułka to First Secretary—forced change to the country's agricultural policy. Initially a very popular figure, the Gomułka government agreed to stop collectivization, which had been a hated policy in Poland, and in some instances even reversed the nationalization of agriculture. As a result—and in contrast to other East bloc countries—only a fraction of Poland's farms was collectivized.[13] Polish private farmers were unique in the Eastern Bloc due to their ability to maintain their own land. Nevertheless, agricultural processing—from mills to slaughterhouses—were largely nationalized, giving preference to socialized farms.

In the era of the Cold War, such distinctive fluctuations in socialist policy was considered an opportunity for would-be "enemies" to step in and utilize the changes to advance their interests. In this case, the West ensured loans and grain to Poland in exchange for political influence.[14] In comparison to 2005 (when Spirnak visited Warsaw), the US was essentially subsidizing an agricultural policy in support of small farmers. If this arrangement seemed at odds with global trends, so was the Polish government's stance towards the peasantry. In the early 1970s, Poland had the largest percentage of the workforce engaged in agriculture (forty percent, as compared to ca. twenty percent in neighboring East Germany and Czechoslovakia).[15] According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, a Polish farm would have to be at least twenty-five hectares in order to be commercially profitable. But by 1978, only half of all farms in Poland were ten hectares or more.[16]

While Poland was considered a breadbasket in the immediate aftermath of World War II, by the 1960s, governments in both the West and the East recognized that there was a problem in the country's agricultural sector. It was not only that net final production in agriculture was declining—and sometimes even contracting—it was also that private farms were outperforming larger, collectivized farms.

13 *An Agricultural Strategy for Poland: Report of the Polish-European Community-World Bank Task Force.* Washington: World Bank, 1990, p. 2.

14 Spaulding, "Agricultural Statecraft" (as cited in note 8), pp. 5–28; see also Patrice Dabrowski, *Poland: The First Thousand Years.* DeKalb: NIU Press, 2014, p. 24.

15 Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, *COMECON Data 1979*. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1980, pp. 44–53; *An Agricultural Strategy for Poland (as cited in note 13),* p. 2.

16 A. H. Dawson, "An Assessment of Poland's Agricultural Resources," *Geography* 67, no. 4 (1982), pp. 297–309.

In 1980, the value added to hectare in socialized agriculture was estimated at 1,235 złoty, one tenth of the value added to private farms.[17] Losses of state farms in the 1970s was estimated at nearly 30 billion złoty.[18] Each respective government in Poland after Gomułka attempted to reform Poland's agricultural policy, cat-walking around full-fledged collectivization but at the same time encouraging both private as well as state owned farms to become more efficient. Regardless of the approach, however, the government could only do little to solve major problems of Polish agriculture (namely, that wages were lower than in other segments of the economy, and that few people wanted to start a private farm under a fickle socialist regime).

Hence, due in part to political circumstances, but also to Polish economic policy, agriculture did not go through the "Green Revolution" seen in the first and third worlds. While that was largely true across the East Bloc, in Poland that was for different reasons. In Poland, where the early 1970s was marked by rapid growth in the early years of Edward Gierek's regime through comparatively large investment in wages and personal consumption, agricultural output was sufficient to sustain trade and consumption balances, even if farms were inefficient in comparison to other countries. Poland was consistently a net exporter of agricultural goods, hence while efficiency was a persistent concern to authorities, investment in both private and socialized farms was not well-directed. Private farmers, for example, were still doing the vast majority of repair work on machines themselves, and horse power still predominated in the Polish farm.[19]

A crucial element of the "Green Revolution" of the late 1960s and 1970s was the adoption of new crops, modified to become more draught-resistant and less vulnerable to pests and pesticides. Poland did not pursue importation of western seeds from companies like Monsanto, which would have at least made output greater. That attempts to force the sale of private farms were seen as an effort to "move toward American-style 'agribusiness'"[20] also hampered policies to reform the agricultural sector. Structural problems in agriculture were never resolved, and, by 1989, only a quarter of Polish agricultural land had been collectivized, and most of those remaining were privatized after the political change in the 1990s. Thanks to such deficiencies in the structure of Poland's agricultural sector, farmers were too poor to afford expensive equipment and goods from the West

17 Edward Cook, "Agricultural Reform in Poland: Background and Prospects," *Soviet Studies* 36, no. 3 (1984), pp. 406–426.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Flora Lewis, "Poland Preparing for New Policy to Overcome Economic Troubles," *New York Times*, 24 September 1976, p. D1.

immediately prior to and after the political change (only eight percent of villages had telephones!).[21] At the same time, the government in Warsaw was willing neither to change the status quo nor provide greater subsidies to boost infrastructural investment in the private farm.

Solving Poland's Agriculture Problem

Geopolitics altered after the transition. In the new world order, it was not the West which aimed to hinder an alternate political economy or to gain political pressure by encouraging the peasant farmer to resist the system. Instead, the West wanted to bolster "European" norms in Poland. The change in focus was crucial: What was once seen in the West as a positive aspect of Poland's economic sector—the presence of hundreds of thousands private farmers on small plots—became a liability. In Poland, farmers—who were now confronted with a new, globalized agricultural market—feared the competition coming from places as far as Australia and South America, and fought to maintain any advantages they hoped to inherit from the socialist system. For policy makers after the political transition, there was a veritable farm crisis: What to do with the huge number of agricultural workers previously employed by the state as well as the significantly larger percent of the population that farmed tiny parcels? As Czesław Janicki (Poland's Minister of Agriculture) bluntly put it, "You can't produce grain as efficiently on 5 acres as you can on 80 acres."[22]

Already in 1990, the World Bank and the European Community created a task force to help devise a strategy to reform the agricultural sector. This large group of policy makers, economists, bankers and agronomists described the "contradictory [...] behavioral patterns"[23] within Poland's agricultural sector. Of the major problems they foresaw in reforming Poland's agricultural sector was that farm management was "based principally on a logic of survival rather than on [...] development;" that there was an "attitude of resistance to, but also dependence on, the state;" and that, while private farmers were independent, state agricultural workers benefitted "from specific advantages."[24] While there were pluses in the agricultural sector—such as the vast informal economy which had developed dur-

21 *An Agricultural Strategy for Poland* (as cited in note 13), p. 3.
22 Steven Greenhouse, "Zubki Duze Journal; To Market, to Market: How Will Garden Grow?," *New York Times*, 11 January 1990.
23 *An Agricultural Strategy for Poland* (as cited in note 13), p. 3.
24 Ibid.

ing state socialism—it was clear to the task force that there were significant obstacles to reform.

That was most clearly shown in the potato crisis in the early 1990s. In May 1990, the government reported that there were over 500,000 tons of potatoes going unsold. Many farmers had planted an increase number of potatoes in the expectation that prices would soar after subsidies were lifted during the transition. However, since state-run food distributors still had a monopoly, they chose to purchase the goods at a fraction of market prices. In addition, the Soviet Union declined to import potatoes from Poland (causing many to wonder if Soviet authorities were punishing their county due to their transformation from state socialism). It was widely reported that the Polish government was trying to force uneconomical farms sell to neighbors to increase efficiency and to reduce the number of (still state-owned) cooperatives.[25] This impression was buttressed by the fact that the government cut subventions for food by 95 percent, and aid to farmers by over 75 percent.[26] At the same time, consumers were faced with the daunting challenge of increased prices on daily-used goods. The price of bread rose twenty-five-fold, and inflation was in the triple digits.[27] In a country where previous price hikes had caused revolts, the Solidarity government was in dire straits to control (at least minimally) the price of goods, which ultimately led to tons of rotting potatoes literally littering Warsaw streets.

Complicating matters were the hopes to one day join the European Union, a desired goal in both Poland and the West as early as 1992. One of the oldest policies in Europe, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was established in 1957 with particular focus on France and Germany. One of the desired aims of the CAP—outside of stabilizing the market—was to increase productivity in agriculture through investment in technology and in agricultural workers. By the early 1990s, France received by far the largest subsidies from the EU as the country with the largest agricultural sector. Poland—were it to become a member of the EU—would become the second largest agricultural country in the bloc, after France. By the mid-1990s, analysts were warning the West that Poland's small farmer could "milk EU budgets dry."[28] The conflict between member countries and hopeful members led to a major rethinking of the CAP, with western countries vying to prevent full rights

25 Stephen Engelberg, "Evolutions in Europe. Glut of Potatoes in Poland Is Showing the Price of Change to Free Market," *New York Times*, 15 May 1990.
26 Iwona Kiereta and Klaus Dorner, *Die Rolle der Agrarpolitik auf dem Weg Polens in Die Europäische Union*. Aachen: Shaker, 2001, p. 86.
27 Engelberg, "Evolutions in Europe" (as cited in note 25).
28 Mark Nelson, "Extra Accommodations," *Wall Street Journal*, 30 September 1994, p. R13.

to so-called "new Europe." In the end, a moderate conservative French and liberal German government made an agreement to offer newly admitted members of the EU twenty-five percent the amount Western farms received, while incrementally erasing the disparity by 2007.[29]

The possibility of entering the EU, however, was a double-sided coin. With Poland's ascension to the EU—as well as access to agricultural subsidies—small farms faced a new threat: European regulation. With only twenty-five percent of the subsidies (allotted proportionally to millions of small farms), Polish agricultural workers would have to modernize and become more efficient in the age of globalization. Milking cows or making cheese by hand, for example, would be considered unsanitary, although many Polish farmers and the society at large had a long tradition of consuming such goods. Hence, before Poland voted to join the Union (in 2003), one of the major arguments against ascension was the potential harm entering a free market agreement with technologically advanced western countries would have on traditional Polish agriculture. It was true that the agriculture sector of the Polish economy was relatively weak and inefficient, but would the small farmer have to replicate Northern and Western European agricultural practices to join the Union? In the Polish media, there was scant reflection on the fact that the agricultural policy to allow (and hence, implicitly encourage) small peasant farming was one of the hallmarks of Polish state socialism. In contrast to her neighbors, Poland had the highest percentage of agricultural workers as a percentage of the labor force (still twenty seven percent), and former allies vehemently protested allowing Polish farmers from entering "that greenest of all EU pastures: the provisions of the Common Agricultural Policy."[30]

While the European Union was pushing for Poland to advance their agricultural sector, the United States was encouraging Polish farmers to adopt genetically modified crops in their fields. By the early 2000s, a growing number of voices in the Polish government were backing a general ban on genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Six months after Madelyn Spirnak visited Poland, she returned to try to convince officials (and, in extension, the population at large) that the country was ripe for biotechnology. In a two-hour meeting with senators and the Chairman of the Agricultural and Environmental Protection Committee, "Spirnak discussed the increased yield and efficiencies gained through planting GM seed, the need for a no trade barrier approach to GM products, and the myths surrounding the dangers of

29 Craig Whitney, "The German Elections: The Reaction. Europeans Congratulate both Winner and Loser," *New York Times*, 28 September 1998.

30 Nelson, "Extra Accommodations" (as cited in note 28).

GMOs."[31] But the government officials would not take the bait. They first explained that "Poland does not have a food shortage and thus does not need to produce more food."[32] Beyond that, they highlighted how, were larger farms to begin to use GMOs, that would put more pressure on small farmers to be more efficient: "Thousands of agricultural workers would lose their jobs if GM foods were introduced."[33] It was true that Poland's agricultural politics had brought individuals to escape the countryside since after World War II. But in the post-Cold War era, the government wanted to ensure that residence of the countryside remained, if for no other reason that "no other sector of the Polish economy could absorb"[34] a huge influx of urban residents. Highlighting America's restrictive visa policy towards Poles, one senator concluded that "obviously the US does not want Polish workers,"[35] so why should the Polish government support American agro-business in disseminating GMOs? That companies like Monsanto would receive the freedom to sell their products in Poland was all the more less likely in 2006 (at the second meeting of Spirnak in Warsaw), since none other than the conservative peasant party, Samoobrona (self-defense) had taken control of the offices of the agricultural ministry.

Polish Reactions

If there was a growing movement on the part of the European Union and such entities as the IMF and the US Bureau of Economic Affairs to force Poland to become more efficient, technologically more advanced and universally standardized, there were also outlandish cultural forces at work, growing strength amongst two very different core populations: Polish populists and the anti-GMO movement. In the context of the 2000s, after Poland had joined the EU and was enjoying many of the benefits of belonging to the Schengen Zone, Polish populists rose in popularity amongst villagers and agricultural workers thanks to their vocal support of the segment of society that seemed to be forgotten in Poland's post-Cold War economic boom. At the same time—largely fed by similar movements in western Europe—society at large was growing more critical of would-be "advances" to agriculture.

31 Senior DOS Agricultural Biotech Advisor Spirnak's Trip to Poland—May 21–25, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06WARSAW1142_a.html, accessed on 13 February 2018.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.

The Samoobrona Party was best represented by the outspoken and brash Andrzej Lepper. A former member of the Polish communist party, he rose after 1990 as the paradigmatic example of an anti-government Eurosceptic. Despised by most Poles, he gained notoriety in the country by leading farmer demonstrations across the country, blocking roads to protest what was seen as governments' lack of support towards the average farmer.[36] The fact that he was a former collective manager and a farmer himself gave him an aura of authenticity when he held rallies promoting a new form of "farmer war" against the ruling elites in Warsaw and Brussels. While his party usually numbered in the single digits, it continued to grow until, by 2004, it received the fourth highest percentage of votes.[37] Central to Samoobrona's political platform—if there was a coherent platform—was to bring back subsidies to the small farmer and to prevent Poland from cooperating with the EU, which the party saw as a new form of slavery for the country.[38] Spectacularly, he was named Minister of Agriculture in 2006 after elections gave his party the third largest percentage of votes. When Madelyn Spirnak first visited Poland, she was dealing with the liberal government under Marek Belka. Now, she had to deal with a minister who despised globalization and America's attempt to colonize Poland with GMOs.

That Andrzej Lepper was appointed to the Ministry of Agriculture might have been a shock to the average Pole, but one could not deny that, at least in one aspect, Samoobrona's platform coalesced around a similar philosophy of Poland's agricultural sector. While immediately after 1989, Poland's small farms were seen as grossly inefficient and backward, by 2005 many Poles agreed that the country's farmers produced better produce than its neighbors. When Spirnak met with scientists and experts in 2005, they "lamented the fact that several years ago Polish society accepted the idea of GMOs, but that now 70 percent of the Polish public rejected them as potential sources of food and for use in agriculture."[39] Influenced by similar movements across Europe, the average citizen firmly felt that genetically modified crops were unsafe and should not be permitted in the Polish market. The conservative government even went so far (while Andrzej Lepper was Minister) to ban the use and import of GMOs.

36 Christian Schmidt-Häuer, "So ängstlich ist Suleyken," *Die Zeit*, 16 March 2000.

37 Natalja Reiter, "Ich, der Diktator. Wer rettet Polen vor Andrzej Lepper? Jan Rokita, der Held im schwarzen Mantel," *Die Zeit*, 17 June 2004.

38 Ibid.

39 Poland: Senior Advisor for Agricultural Biotechnology Spirnak's Meetings with GOP Officials and Academia, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06WARSAW107.html; "Polska a GMO—Depesza Ambasady USA z 2006 r." wyborcza.pl. N. p., n.d. Web, accessed 1 March 2014.

While the government was moving against genetically modified crops, there was a growing realization in the country that the small farmer needed protection in the face of EU regulations. The best example here was one particular organization: The International Coalition to Protect the Polish Countryside (*Międzynarodowa Koalicja Dla Ochrony Polskiej Wsi*), or ICPPC. Formed in 2000 between an Englishman and a Polish woman, members of the coalition committed themselves not to political conservatism like Andrzej Lepper's Samoobrona, rather aimed at presenting themselves as libertarian, Luddite alternatives to European standardization.[40] By and large farmers themselves, they highlighted how they were more 'traditional,' and encouraged green energies—mounting solar panels on farms and using sheep to mow lawns. All the while, they decried the lack of EU subsidies to their small farms.[41] Currently, the ICPPC is able at least to claim thousands of farmers in Poland. That their fates were implicitly dealt to them by a socialist system which grudgingly accepted small farmers goes unnoticed. But after twenty years of free market democracy and ten years of the European Union, they have gained the attention of hundreds of followers internationally. They are not considered backward, rather are classified as having "reverted to subsistence farming [...] and barter[ing]."[42] Similar to the revolutionary spirit of 1989, they dawn the mantel of environmentalism, non-GMOs, and traditional craftsmanship.

Nostalgic notions of tradition drive the push towards small farms and antiquated technics. Over the past decade, ecological agriculture has had a boom in Poland. When the country joined the European Union in 2004 there were under 4,000 ecological farms. By 2011, there were over 23,000.[43] The amount of land being ecologically cultivated also grew six-fold in the same time period. National brands like *Polskie Jadło* (Polish Grub) and restaurants such as the chain *Chłopskie Jadło* (Peasant Grub) recall an imagined but much desired return to traditional Polish cuisine. Both companies use modern advertising techniques and distributive networks, but they have packaged themselves in nationalist garb, giving consumers the perception that goods come from small farms. To be sure, most Poles still consider farmers to be hopelessly backward and unsophisticated. But most also believe that their countryside is unspoiled and more traditional than their neighbors. Backwardness has become, in many ways, a positive aspect of Polish agriculture.

40 Elisabeth Rosenthal, "Old Ways, New Pain for Farms In Poland: European Laws Change Market," in *New York Times*, 4 April 2008.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Länderbericht Polen, http://www.ekoconnect.org/tl_files/eko/p/14-Laender/13–01–18_%20polen.pdf, accessed 14 February 2018.

Conclusion

I return to Madelyn Spirnak's unremarkable visit to Poland in 2005. While she visited the various agricultural schools of Warsaw, she took note of public reaction to US attempts to sell GMOs to Polish farmers. On her way, she noted her surprising visit to Sławomir Zagorski, a reporter from Gazeta Wyborcza. In her conversation with him she noted, that in the last meeting,

> Sławomir Zagorski, the paper's Science Editor, lent a sympathetic ear to [me], and recounted that he had written a story on GMOs recently, following a visit to the U.S. sponsored by the Department of Agriculture. In the aftermath of publication, Zagorski was accused of being an 'agent' for Monsanto, who had taken bribes to write a story portraying GMOs positively. Although he is still interested in the subject, he explained, he simply cannot write on GMOs right now, given the deeply negative public reaction to his last story.[44]

At the time Spirnak was writing, she noted how individuals in Poland knew that there was enough food on the market, and that GMO foods could not compete with "natural" Polish agriculture. Hence US attempts at developing Polish agriculture in 2005 failed. But it did bring my story to full circle.

I have explored the discourse in international media and in Poland to trace where Euroscepticism ends and (n)ostalgia begins, and have shown alternative visions of Polish agriculture in the age of mass consumption. That Poland's farmers were so poor and inefficient meant that traditional production techniques and organic farming could be maintained into the twenty-first century. In the 1990s, small farms were being forced to become more efficient, and to follow European health codes. Such was the case that something that survived communism was only forced to collectivize with the advent of modern open market democracy. In the past ten years, there has been a growing market in Poland and especially in the European Union for "eco" products. As such, communist inefficiency has become traditional, Polish methods.

The late Daphne Berdahl argued in her book, *On the Social Life of Post-Socialism*, that

> consumption was not only a metaphor for East-West distinctions before and immediately following the fall of the Wall [...]. It was also a means of preserving and re-constructing them. Indeed, consumption was part of a process through which the former political boundary that once divided East and West [...] was replaced by the maintenance, indeed invention, of a cultural one.[45]

44 Poland: Senior Advisor for Agricultural Biotechnology Spirnak's Meetings with GOP Officials and Academia, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2006/01/06WARSAW107.html; Depesza Ambasady (as cited in note 3).

45 Berdahl, *Postsocialism* (as cited in note 6), p. 38.

In the case of Poland, the transition from communism to capitalism brought a unique mixture of old and new philosophies. While Poles were moving into larger cities, and consuming more things from the global marketplace, their views towards globalization in agriculture was more complex than the United States and many large agro-companies would like. Indeed, while Spirnak admitted that "most of the Polish public [were] not directly involved in agriculture or politics [and did] not really feel a strong attachment"[46] to keeping GMOs out of Poland, it was the "Polish countryside, and… anti-GMO interest group activity throughout Europe"[47] which drove public opinion.

In this case, cultural boundaries in disparate consumer cultures were overcome to make new political forces. The legacy of state socialism is that former enemies—liberal "eco freaks" in Western Europe, and traditional country bumpkins in Poland—made for strange bedfellows in the era of the European Union.

46 Poland: Senior Advisor (as cited in note 44).
47 Ibid.

Travis Schneider

Culture in the Pendulum. The Abortion Issue in Poland

A perennial problem in post-socialist state of Poland has been the abortion issue, which has plagued lawmakers since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Poland was characterized by one of the most liberal abortion policies in Europe for more than four decades until 1993, when it became one of the most restrictive on the continent with only Ireland placing more restrictions on the policy of abortion. The about-face of Poland's liberal abortion policy in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union has its roots in the Catholic Church, politically dormant during the officially atheist communist regime, reasserting its political influence in ties with the state. Jokingly, it has been said in Poland that the red regime has been substituted by a black regime (as in the black of a Roman Catholic priest's cassock).[1] This issue has had a wave of repercussions for feminism, politics, and even the medical field. In general, one must observe Polish society, if not at the very least the Polish government, has grown increasingly conservative since its transition to democracy. Strangely, one might conclude that, in terms of reproductive healthcare, women in Poland were better off under the communist government—a strange idea at least from a Western perspective. However, one casualty for Poland's transition in government was the sense of egalitarianism under communism which has resulted in the loss of agency for many pregnant women, for whom having a child is not only impractical, but perhaps even dangerous.

Poland's strict and rigid abortion laws stand in diametric opposition to its nearly-century long tradition of fairly liberal laws in comparison to the rest of the world. In 1932, with the introduction of the criminal code, Poland was one of the first countries in Europe to allow for abortion in the instance of a crime (rape or incest), most countries at the time only allowed such a last resort option in the circumstances of danger to the mother's health or life. Two decades later, Poland was again one of the first countries to liberalize its abortion policy even further, in this instance, allowing abortion on social grounds. In 1959, Poland issued in abortion

1 Joanna Mishtal, *The Politics of Morality. The Church, the State, and Reproductive Rights in Post-socialist Poland.* Athens: Ohio University Press, 2015.

on request, something that its Western neighbors would not have for many years.

As one can see in Table 1, the progression of abortion law in Poland became increasingly unrestricted over the twentieth century until 1993 after the passage of the Family Planning, Protection of Human Embryo and Conditions of Termination of Pregnancy Act.[2] Based on the act's extremely restrictive nature, the moniker "Anti-Abortion Act" should not come as a surprise.

Table 1. The history of abortion in Poland

1932	Criminal Code – abortion allowed in instances of crime of threat to mother's life/health
1956	Abortions become decriminalized and allowed on social grounds (poor material/personal situation)
1959	Abortions on social grounds available upon request
1993	Anti-Abortion Act, abortion limited to three strict instances
1996	Amendment to Anti-Abortion Act, abortion on social grounds legalized
1997	Amendment declared unconstitutional and act is restored to 1993 version

Source: Wanda Nowicka, "The Struggle for Abortion Rights in Poland."[3]

Poland currently only allows for abortion in three cases: 1) the mother's life or health is in danger; 2) the pregnancy is a result of a crime (rape or incest); or 3) the fetus is malformed or irrevocably damaged. While these conditions may sound straightforward, the additional stipulations explain why there are ever-fewer abortions. In instances of a pregnancy resulting from a crime, a prosecutor must corroborate the details. Understandably, some women may not feel comfortable coming forward in instances such as rape and the lack of anonymity diminishes what little agency there is in the abortion process. In cases where the mother's life is in danger or the fetus is malformed, this opinion must be confirmed from a separate physician and the abortion must take place in a public hospital. Given that the penalty for illegally giving a woman an abortion is a prison sentence, many doctors are reluctant to be involved and prefer to abstain from legally

2 Jacqueline Heinen and Stephane Portet, "Reproductive Rights in Poland: When politicians fear the wrath of the Church," *Third World Quarterly* 31, no. 6 (2010), pp. 1007–1021.

3 Wanda Nowicka, "The Struggle for Abortion Rights in Poland," in Rosalind Petchesky, Richard Sember, and Robert Sember (eds.), *SexPolitics—Reports from the Front Lines*. New York: Sexuality Policy Watch 2007, pp. 167–196.

permissible abortions, even if they do not morally object.[4] This will be discussed at length later, but having a doctor determine if the fetus is malformed, or if the mother's health or life is at risk is not always especially direct—a common practice is for doctors to delay any judgment until after the first twelve weeks, after which it is no longer possible for the woman to obtain the abortion. On the issue for the stipulation of abortions taking place in public hospitals—some women, especially those living in rural areas do not have easy access to these hospitals and it becomes costly or impractical to receive an abortion there. Women also might fear the stigma of having an abortion in a public hospital where this could become known to others. For women who have become pregnant as the result of a crime, this creates a "double jeopardy" situation in which women must suffer the stigma of two social taboos—it becomes little wonder then, that many women opt for the secrecy of a private clinic.

As stated in the previous paragraph, one barrier to women obtaining their legal abortions (note that these are all instances of abortions that should be available to women under Polish law) was the practice of doctors deliberately "timing out" pregnancies until twelve weeks had already transpired and a woman would no longer be eligible for an abortion.[5] To examine the root of the medical community's anxiety in being involved with abortions, we should look back to 1991 when the conscience clause passed by the National Assembly of Physicians allowed doctors to refuse performing an abortion as conscientious objection. The Assembly also placed a restriction on abortions—namely, that they only be performed in the circumstances of a threat to the life or health of the mother or as the result of a crime.[6] Note that this restriction was passed two years before the Anti-Abortion Act in 1993—abortion was still legal under social grounds, but this would have a tremendous effect on the number of abortions that were actually carried out.

4 Mishtal, *Politics of Morality* (as cited in note 1), p. 51.

5 Anna Grzymala-Busse, "Why would Poland make its already strict abortion law draconian?" *The Washington Post*, 18 April 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/18/why-would-poland-make-its-already-strict-abortion-law-draconian/?utm_term=.ade70198f2fc, accessed 18 June 2016.

6 Mishtal, *Politics of Morality* (as cited in note 1), pp. 45–46.

Table 2. Official number of abortions in Poland by year

1988	105,333
1989	82,137
1992	11,640
1993	777

Source: Andrzej Kulczycki, "Abortion Policy in Postcommunist Europe: The Conflict in Poland"[7]

As one can see in Table 2, the number of abortions fell drastically within a few short years. By 1991, just after the passage of the conscience clause stipulation and the restrictions on abortions, the number of recorded abortions fell to "under 31,000."[8] It seems that the Anti-Abortion Act may have been superfluous—abortions, even legal ones, were simply not happening anymore (that is to say, abortions were no longer being performed in public hospitals). Doctors were becoming afraid of performing abortions—something that only became worse when doctors were threatened with jail time for an illegal abortion in 1993.[9] Before then, though, doctors found that they still had a lot to lose by performing any abortion—their reputation and their livelihood. Anthropologist Joanna Mishtal cites the hierarchal organization in the Polish medical profession as making it difficult for doctors to protest against decisions of their superiors when entire clinics or even hospitals decide on whether abortions will be performed at all within its walls.[10] The stigma is so great that doctors who perform abortions are referred to as "skrobacz" or "scrapers."[11] One interviewed doctor remarked that, when living in a small community, doctors would be afraid of local priests who might publically denounce a doctor's practice[12], thereby bringing financial ruin, necessitating a practice to close its doors or move elsewhere. It even went as far, as Mishtal observes, in some cases as doctors being excommunicated from the church or being denied a religious [Catholic] burial.[13] The conscience clause, which was originally conceived to protect the beliefs of individual doctors, became wielded like a shield

7 Andrzej Kulczycki, "Abortion Policy in Postcommunist Europe: The Conflict in Poland," *Population and Development Review* 21, no. 3 (1995), pp. 471–505.
8 Ibid.
9 Stefania Szlek Miller, "Religion and Politics in Poland: The Abortion Issue," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 39, no. 1/2 (1997), pp. 63–86 (77).
10 Mishtal, *Politics of Morality* (as cited in note 1).
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., pp. 50–51.

by the medical community to protect itself—even individuals that had no moral qualm with abortion became hesitant to get involved with abortion of any kind. This kind of "culture of fear" certainly has a chilling effect on abortions. However, this chilling effect was not just limited to abortions. An unfortunate side effect of the conscience clause was the extent to which its interpretation was stretched. For some doctors, prescribing contraceptives, or even more alarmingly, emergency contraceptives, fell into the category of conscientious objection. This paints an increasingly disquieting situation for women who find their list of options becoming ever shorter. The stipulations of the conscience clause, which became Polish law as of 1996, state that a doctor, when declining to perform an abortion on moral grounds, must give recourse as to another clinic or facility where this might be possible. Just as recently as 2015, the Constitutional Tribunal declared it unconstitutional for doctors, who had objected on moral grounds, to have to pass on information as to where else a woman might receive an abortion. If nothing else, this move appears as another in a long line of state-erected barriers to prevent women from having a legal abortion.

Women being at the mercy of doctors is not a secret phenomenon—an issue raised by professor of law Nicolette Priaulx, as made famous in the case *Tysiąc v. Poland* (2000), what exactly constitutes a threat to a mother's health or life?[14] In the case, a woman suffering from severe myopia had seen three separate ophthalmologists, all of whom ascertained that retinal detachment (blindness) could be a possible consequence of delivering the baby—despite Ms. Tysiąc seeking out yet other medical professionals, none were willing to issue a certificate that the pregnancy established a credible threat to her health and she subsequently gave birth and lost her eyesight. Unfortunately, this has not been the only case of its kind—in the instance of *P. and S. versus Poland* (2008), a fourteen-year-old rape victim was denied the request for an abortion from two separate hospitals. While it was later debated if Tysiąc's pregnancy directly contributed to her blindness, the case (among others) raised serious questions about the process for abortion women have and their options for legal recourse.

All of these factors combined explain the paltry number of (recorded) abortions in recent years—in 1993, the first year of the new law, the Ministry of Health reported 777 abortions, an absurdly unreasonable number in comparison to the 82,137 recorded just a few years earlier in 1989. Given this colossal discrepancy

14 Nicolette Priaulx, "Testing the Margin of Appreciation. Therapeutic Abortion, Reproductive 'Rights' and the Intriguing Case of Tysiąc v. Poland," *European Journal of Health Law* 15, no. 4 (2008), pp. 361–379.

in abortions in a matter of just four years, one has to wonder what the possible explanation could be. During the communist regime, due to poor sex education and poor availability of contraceptives (as well as poor quality of available contraceptives[15]), abortion became the leading form of birth control and most of these abortions were not for the circumstances granted under Poland's current abortion law.[16] However, and this point cannot be underscored—only 3% of all abortions that have taken place in Poland since 1956 were for the three circumstances currently allowed under the 1993 abortion law.[17] It is unlikely that this law abruptly changed a culturally-embedded way of thinking of birth control. This law succeeds mostly in a transfer—the transfer of power away from women, giving them fewer choices in an especially personal matter. This has given rise to a number of clandestine and illegal abortion services, underground abortion clinics and abortion tourism. Women undergo abortions in underground private clinics at great risk, often paying an exorbitant fee. In the case of abortion tourism, pregnant woman travel, again at great personal expense and risk, to neighboring countries with more liberal abortion laws, sometimes putting themselves in harm's way through such an ordeal.

Since the passing of the so-called Anti-Abortion law, there have been numerous attempts at liberalizing the law and an equal number of attempts of trying to ban abortion outright (or restricting it more than its current form). The issue has been likened to one step forward, two steps back.[18] If anything, public opinion on abortion—or at least citizen's initiatives trying to instigate change regarding the topic—seems to swing back and forth in a pendulum motion. As soon as there is enough pro-life sentiment, a wave of walk-outs and protests against the restrictive abortion policy will sweep over Poland. As recently as July 2016, a bill was put before parliament, restricting abortion only to the condition of when the pregnancy was a threat to the mother's life, as well as increasing jail time for any doctor that preformed an illegal abortion and, something that had been on the table before but had yet to pass, a stipulation that any woman found convicted of having had an illegal abortion would also be subject to jail time. A citizen's initiative, advocating for the liberalization of the abortion act to its pre-1993 form was submitted and summarily rejected by parliament around the same time. Only through unparalleled protest and an intense international spotlight, the restrictive abortion bill was rejected in October. The understanding of the Polish abortion debate requires

15 Kulczycki, *Abortion Policy in Postcommunist Europe* (as cited in note 7), p. 475.
16 Miller, *Religion and Politics in Poland* (as cited in note 9).
17 Mishtal, *Politics of Morality* (as cited in note 1), p. 59.
18 Wanda Nowicka, "Two Steps Back: Poland's New Abortion Law," *Journal of Women's History* 5, no. 3 (1994), pp. 151–155.

an examination of the culturally-specific nature of the problem. Given Poland's trend of economic conservatism and transition into democracy, the repeated attacks on the state's already restrictive policy reveal the issue as not of human rights, but rather as a moral issue.

In recent years, there has been a waning support for abortion. In the most recent public opinion poll of Poles' stance on abortion, as demonstrated in Table 3, there was decreased support in nearly all circumstances.

Table 3. Conditions when abortion should be legal

	July 2010	April 2016	October 2016
	Abortion should be legal if…		
mother's life is threatened	87%	81%	86%
mother's health is threatened	78%	70%	77%
pregnancy is a result of crime (rape / incest)	78%	78%	79%
child would be born handicapped	60%	52%	60%
woman is in difficult material situation	26%	15%	20%
woman is in difficult personal situation	23%	12%	17%
woman does not want the child	18%	14%	14%

Source: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS) 07/2010[19], 04/2016[20], 10/2016[21]

How can one explain this tendency, given that there is a civil initiative nearly every year to try and liberalize the abortion law? One must conclude that there is certain sensitivity to phrasing—the circumstances with the lowest percentages of support are those in which the pregnant woman is simply referred to as "the woman"—starkly in contrast to the two circumstances in which she is referred to as "the mother." Another aspect of phrasing the particular wording is the instance in which the fetus is damaged—the public opinion survey asks whether abortion should be allowed if the child would be born handicapped. While this is reasonably worded enough in instances such as Down syndrome—a mentally

19 CBOS (2010) *Opinie na temat dopuszczalności aborcji*. Warsaw: CBOS.
20 CBOS (2016) *Legal Availability of Abortions*. Warsaw: CBOS.
21 CBOS (2016) *Expectations about Abortion Law*. Warsaw: CBOS.

handicapped, but otherwise healthy child, this phrasing is misleading in cases such as anencephaly, where the infant only can survive a few hours after birth. Babies born with conditions such as these may sometimes cause harm for the mother, especially in instances where there is a fetal tumor or the fetus is attached to the uterus wall. Although these circumstances would lead one to describe a fetus as malformed, the connotation with the word handicapped is misleading. Given the passive construction of "the child would be born handicapped" and removing any mention of woman/mother—perhaps the polled would find the last three situations in a more favorable light if the circumstance was changed to "the child was not wanted" or "the child would grow up in difficult circumstances/poverty." Given that the polled persons are reflecting on a hypothetical pregnancy, this wording appears to tend to skew their judgment more among moral than realistic/practical lines—especially when polled persons are asked to consider whether a child should grow up in a family where it was not wanted.

Despite the very recent push to ban abortion in late 2016, Poles generally seem to agree with the current version of the abortion status. Almost two-thirds (see Table 4) think the abortion law should not be changed and prefer the status-quo that has been intact for almost an entire generation. Poles who call for a more restrictive abortion policy are very much in the minority. It remains to be seen, however, if the percentage of Poles who support a more liberal policy (almost one-fourth) will increase.

Table 4. Poles' stance on abortion law changes

23%	Yes, it should be more liberal
7%	Yes, it should be more restrictive
62%	No
8%	Don't know / it's hard to say

Source: CBOS 10/2016 (as cited in note 21)

In a study of rural women's opinion on abortion, Wanda Nowicka (2000) found that there were generational differences between younger and older women[22]. Younger women, who had been brought up under the more restrictive abortion legislation tended to accept the status quo. This might explain the decreasing support for abortion from Table 3—since there has almost been an entire generation since the implementation of the 1993 Anti-Abortion Act, young Poles never

22 Nowicka, *Struggle for Abortion Rights in Poland* (as cited in note 3).

experienced the liberal version of the policy and, having grown up with the restrictive policy, are accustomed to the culture it constructs.

Given the consistent erosion in support over the years, is it inevitable that abortion law will become more restrictive again? Since the end of the communist regime, Poland has been a state in transition, but the end state is still unknown—the prospects of abortion policy liberalizing under a right-wing populist party seem very unlikely. It appears as if Poland is still searching for its post-communist identity—and if the trend of recent years continues, that identity will likely be that of a state, much like Malta or the Vatican, with a total ban on abortions. Given the conservatism of the current Polish government, is moral conservatism entirely surprising? How will societal conservativism affect current issues such as immigration, Poland's involvement with the European Union, and other aspects of gender politics? After the fall of the Soviet Union and Poland's transition to a liberal democracy, perhaps it was only inevitable that Poland's trajectory would differ from the democracies of its Western neighbors.

As a final note, in the time between the presentation of this paper and its publishing, there has been a change in administration in the author's home country of the United States. While some might wonder why abortion rights in Poland particularly matter if one is not Polish, not having an abortion, or not even female (especially since the author is categorically none of those)—there comes a gentle reminder, abortion on request in Poland was summarily scrapped after nearly four decades of being in place. This liberal policy was in place so long that it was seen as a given, yet was so easily revoked, despite the repeated protest of the majority of the population. It has now been twenty-four years since the passage of the Anti-Abortion Act (arguably twenty-six based on the conscious objector clause) and the notion of abortion on request may well soon fade from the generational memory of Poles and the current version being accepted as the new "given." There are consecutive attempts to erode the circumstances for when abortion is currently legally allowable and, as discussed earlier with the human rights' cases and the culture of fear that seems to pervade the medical community, there are serious, organized attempts to undermine what little recourse women presently have. As to countries in Western Europe and the United States, countries who have only comparatively recently legalized and allowed for abortion on demand and are now shifting towards the discourse of right-wing populism, we now have to ask ourselves whether a future of re-criminalized abortion is so far-fetched.

Ondřej Klípa

Old Orders behind the New Façade. Minority Protection in the Czech Republic

After the split of the Czechoslovak federation, the newly created Czech Republic unambiguously oriented itself on Western political realm. Although there were some disputes among the ruling elite and opponents (mostly communists and far-right nationalists), striving for a full membership in NATO and the EU became an utmost objective of the foreign policy for the next decade.[1] It was made clear soon that especially the accession to the EU would require a lot of changes in a national legal framework, in order to harmonize it with the *acquis communautaire*. The basic directives were designed by the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993. Achievements in the transition period that followed were controlled and evaluated by various means, most comprehensively by the Agenda 2000, with its annual reports of the European Commission evaluating progress of particular candidate states since the EU Amsterdam Summit in 1997.

A part of the political chapter of the Copenhagen Criteria was also "respect for and protection of minorities," which were under scrutiny of the evaluation process too. The Czech Republic with only some 2–3 percent of "national minority" population was a diligent student in that regard. Although the country was criticized for the situation of the Czech Roma (especially after a large migration flow to the Western Europe in 1997), the protection of minorities has not become a serious issue within the accession process to the EU unlike in case of Slovakia or the Baltic States.[2] Thus, the transition process of the minority protection in the Czech Republic seems, at first sight, unattractive to academic attention.

1 The Czech Republic submitted the application of membership in January 1996, and the accession talks with the EU officially began in March 1998.

2 See "Report submitted by the Czech Republic pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities," Council of Europe, *Monitoring the EU Accession Process. Minority Protection: An Assessment of Selected Policies in Candidate States*, Central European University Press, 2002.

However, in this chapter I will not focus on the question whether the Czech Republic met the EU standards sufficiently or not. My aim is to challenge the very narrative of "transition" or "Europeanization," connected with the pre-accession period that might reveal some lesser known data. I argue that the new provisions and legal acts on minority protection were in fact a smooth continuation of institutions and instruments from the previous communist (and even pre-communist) period, and not a substantial change by any means. Moreover, not only the legal framework, but the core theoretical approach from which the transitional changes originated, was firmly grounded in the pre-1989 periods. My main argument is that the most important difference between the communist and post-communist minority policies is of quantitative, rather than qualitative nature. In other words, the new legal provisions for the protection of national minorities mainly extended and/or specified already existing constitutional or other legal acts, but did not change the same structure and premises from pre-1989 period.

I will unfold my argument in two directions. First, I will present the discussion in which various authors evaluate the post-communist policy change in the field of minority protection, especially with regard to the EU conditionality. Second, I will examine particular areas of minority protection measures in the Czech Republic, as case studies underpinning my argument.

The EU conditionality in minority policy transition. Was there any?

One of the comprehensive assessments of the role of the EU conditionality in the field of minority rights was presented by Peter Vermeersch, in the year when the East Central Europe (ECE) states entered the EU (2004). In his text, Vermeersch opposes widely shared opinion that the candidate states built their minority policies in a direct response to the EU accession requirements. Although he acknowledges the role of the EU, he describes other motivation for change, mainly bilateral relations. He also shows how the candidate states were capable in presenting the measures in the minority policy as if they were the response to the EU requirements, even though they in fact served regional strategic purposes or bilateral relations (e.g. Hungarian Minority Act from 1993 or the Czech provisions to tackle the Roma issue).[3]

3 Peter Vermeersch, "Minority Policy in Central Europe. Exploring the Impact of the EU's Enlargement Strategy," *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 3, no. 2 (2004), pp. 3–19 (13, 17).

A few years after the accession of the ECE states to the EU, the EU conditionality was also analyzed by Bernd Rechel. He made a few remarks that are substantial for my text. First, he identified and described broad range of factors that plaid a role in minority policy development in ECE states during the EU accession period. In addition to international factors, that have been partly defined by Vermeersch as well, he elaborates more on domestic factors. For my chapter, the important ones are especially "historical legacy and pattern of transition," "state nation-building and use of nationalism by the political elite," and "public opinion—popular attitude toward minorities and minority rights."[4] Second, he noticed that "in many countries [of ECE, O. K.], the basic parameters of the status of minorities were already established in the early 1990s, long before the start of accession negotiations with the EU."[5]

Despite these important findings, I must disagree with Rechel on the extent to which he applied them. Rechel identifies four areas of minority policy changes to which "can be directly related to pressure from the EU."[6] I argue that in his analyses, the role of the EU conditionality is rather overestimated. I agree that the adoption of the Council of Europe document Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by ECE states (FCNM, entered into force in 1998) was a direct effect of the EU conditionality. As Rechel put it: "Instead of setting up its own standards in the area of minority rights, the EU has encouraged candidate countries to adopt the Framework Convention."[7]

Nevertheless, I have serious doubts whether the same cause and effect mechanism could be drawn from the area of anti-discrimination legislation and integration of the Roma as another policy areas directly related to the EU influence. Although the pressure from the European Commission was obvious, the decisive role why some countries with substantial Roma population, the Czech Republic at the head, hastily adopted some pro-integration measures should be attributed rather to deteriorating bilateral relations.[8] Moreover, when the efficiency of these measures is taken into account, one has to admit that despite their visibility and spectacular image of some of them (e.g. establishment of the Inter-ministerial Committee for Roma Community Issues in 1997

4 Bernd Rechel, "Introduction," in Bernd Rechel (ed.), *Minority Rights in CEE*. London and New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 5.
5 Ibid., p. 10.
6 Ibid., p. 7.
7 Ibid.
8 Mainly in terms of visa regime, imposed by some of the "old" EU member states on the candidate countries, from which the Roma asylum seeker migrated in the late 1990s. See e.g. Vermeersch, "Minority Policy" (as cited in note 3), p. 13.

and the Government Council for Roma Community Issues in 2001), they proofed desperately ineffective.[9]

The same applies to the anti-racist measures. It is difficult to talk about the impact of EU conditionality, as the Czech Anti-Discrimination Act, transposing the EU Race Equality Directive (200/43/EC) into the domestic legal framework, was adopted as late as in 2009. Finally, I cannot agree with attributing the EU conditionality effect to the establishment of consultation mechanisms with the minorities. In the Czech case, the Government Council for National Minorities, established in 2001, was in fact a continuous arrangement with predecessors, set up not only before the accession process begun, but dating back as far as 1970.

As Rechel correctly put it, "in the case of several countries, such as Estonia and Latvia, these [minority policy, O.K.] parameters were not significantly altered in the accession process, although some minor changes to existing policies were enacted."[10] In my opinion, this observation should have been extended beyond the two Baltics. Looking at the core of the minority policy, they applied to the Czech Republic as well.

Another author who ought to be mentioned, and who studied the EU conditionality on minority policies in the volume edited by Bernd Rechel, is Gwendolyn Sasse. Unlike Rechel, Sasse questioned not only the effects of the European Commission's annual recommendations on the development of minority policies in candidate states, but she challenged the whole phenomenon of the EU conditionality in this context. Due to the lack of consensus among the "old" EU-15 on minority issues, and the lack of any standardized measurable indicators of "solving" minority problems, the European Commission's reports are based on vague fundaments and fuzzy rhetoric. According to Sasse, the only exception concerns the problem of Russophones in Estonia and Latvia, as well as Roma minorities in several other states. As Sasse put it, "this 'hierarchy' of minority issues reflects the EU's interest in good relations with its most powerful neighbour and energy supplier Russia and its own soft security concerns linked to migration."[11] Nevertheless, given a relatively low (and decreasing) importance of minority agenda within the whole accession process, even in these issues the leverage of the European Commission was rather weak and ineffective.[12] One may add that

9 See Council of Europe, *Monitoring* (as cited in note 2).

10 Rechel, "Introduction" (as cited in note 4), p. 10.

11 Gwendolyn Sasse, "Tracing the Constructions and Effects of EU Conditionality," in Rechel (ed.), Minority Rights (as cited in note 4), p. 22.

12 However, Sasse admits that the EU might have had indirect influence as it inspires democratic activities and political mobilization, which can serve also for purposes of minorities (e.g. the presence of ethnopolitical parties); Sasse, "Tracing the Constructions" (as cited in note 11), p. 28.

the lack of determined pressure might have resulted also from the fact that not all of the "old" EU-15 states were in compliance with the standards demanded from the candidate states.[13] Using the quotes of one of the Commissioner official in interview with Gwendolyn Sasse, "we help them to do what they are already doing anyway."[14]

Continuity across regimes

Whereas Veremeersch and Rechel shed more light on the issue of EU conditionality and broadened the spectrum of intervening factors, their approach did not go beyond the understanding of the post-1989 period as a "transition" that brought "change" in minority policies. In this chapter, I would like to elaborate more on Sasse's observation that the entire rhetoric of "change" deserves attention. A milestone concerning the transition period in this field is a book by Karl Cordell, Timofey Agarin, and Alexander Osipov, published in 2013, and focused precisely on continuities in minority policies from the communist period.[15] In this book Ada-Charlotte Regelmann, studying the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, touched the very core of the similarities between the communist and post-communist period of the national minority policies. She argued that the foundation for so many similarities in minority policy during communism and in the independent Slovakia is the reific and primordialist perception of ethnicity. As Regelmann put it,

> Essentialism is the component that has helped diffuse the institutional framework for minority protection from communist to democratic statehood to EU membership in many states across ECE. Essentialism has also been the means by which conflicting pressures encountered by the minority have been reconciled. Essentialism, then, has been a stabilizing element of nationalities policies across regimes not simply because of majority elite decisions to their own benefit, but also because of how institutions have shaped the opportunity structures as well as the experiences and perceptions of the minorities.[16]

13 See Michael Johns, "'Do As I Say, Not As I Do.' The European Union, Eastern Europe and Minority Rights," *East European Politics and Societies* 17, no. 4 (2003), pp. 682–699.

14 Sasse, "Tracing the Constructions" (as cited in note 11), p. 24.

15 Karl Cordell, Timofey Agarin, and Alexander Osipov (eds.), *Institutional Legacies of Communism. Change and Continuities in Minority Protection*. Oxford: Routledge, 2013.

16 Ada-Charlotte Regelmann, "Damp Squibs? Essentialist Underpinnings of Nationalities Policy and the Limits of Minority Participation in Slovakia," in Cordell, Agarin, Osipov (eds.), *Institutional Legacies* (as cited in note 15), pp. 107–123 (120).

"Eastern" theories in "Western" standards

What made the illusion that the minority policy in the candidate states genuinely changed so easily acceptable? I argue that that the cornerstone was inclusion of the "Eastern" approach toward ethnicity and nationalities policy in general into the fundaments of the "Western" international standards that soon became the benchmark for the candidate states in their accession process to the EU. The main principle that has been integrated into the "Western" standards was the very notion of "ethnic/national minority." Since the end of World War II, the term "minority" disappeared from international legal framework and was nearly taboo due to war and pre-war reminiscences. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 speaks just about application of all rights and freedoms without distinction of any kind, including the one of language or national origin (Art. 2). As late as 1966, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights mentioned the term "minority" and minority "rights" for the first time (Art. 27), in the historic context of growing civil rights movement in the US and transforming the Western European states into multicultural societies.

Nevertheless, the terms "ethnic" or "national" minority appeared only in late 1980s, when increasing attention of the Western organizations, including the EU, focused on growing tensions in communist Europe. Gwendolyn Sasse, referring to the following years, said that "the violent disintegration of former Yugoslavia and a number of intractable post-Soviet conflicts, as well as a perception of further conflict potential in view of sizeable minorities in many countries of East Central Europe shaped the EU's approach."[17] Alexander Osipov, in his recent study, discovered the proximity and even mutual influence between the nationalities policy in the late USSR and the emerging standards of minority protection on the platform of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Osipov identified several features that were then similar both in the communist and Western Europe. He found inter alia that "both sides demonstrated an overarching nationalist worldview treating ethnicities as building blocks of society and perceiving cultures and languages as attributes of ethnic groups and concurrently as universal values."[18] According to Osipov, the emerging congruence between the blocs resulted in the Copenhagen Document, adopted by the CSCE in 1990, that became the backbone for later agreements developeding general directives of the Docu-

17 Sasse, "Tracing the Constructions" (as cited in note 11), p. 20.

18 Alexander Osipov, "The Background of the Soviet Union's Involvement in the Establishment of the European Minority Rights Regime in the Late 1980s," *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 15, no. 2 (2016), pp. 59–77 (72).

ment into more precise provisions.[19] The key agreement based on the Document is the Framework Convention (adopted in 1995, in force since 1998), developed by the Council of Europe which, as mentioned above, played an essential role in the accession process of the candidate states to the EU. Hence, one may conclude that the standards aimed to "Westernize" the minority policies in ECE were to significant extent influenced and shaped by the approach toward the minorities of the same "Easterners" that were deemed "Westernized."

Unavoidable "belonging" and the Framework Convention

To make the argument of continuity of the minority policy in ECE across regimes more persuasive, one has to look at the Framework Convention in detail. Two aspects deserve particular attention. First, it is important that the subject of the FCNM is primarily defined as "persons belonging to national minorities." The idea of an objective existence of minority "groups" or "communities" to which people "belong" met with strong sentiment in the post-communist Europe. Rogers Brubaker, who deconstructed the automatic acceptance of the existence of "ethnic groups" as an objective phenomenon,[20] published a comprehensive study of the Soviet nationalities policy as early as in 1994. In his text, he explained that the Soviet policy was—at least officially—antinationalistic, but it definitely was not "antinational," as the national identity was firmly institutionalized. Thus, it did not serve only as a statistical category, but as ascribed identity with far-reaching "legal" consequences and with decisive impact, especially on one's professional (or party) career. In this way, national groups to which everybody "belonged" the entire life from the day of birth (no matter whether willingly or not) became a fundamental societal form that engraved deep into people's cognitive structures.[21] Pål Kolstø, unlike Brubaker, focused on particular legal instruments that helped to anchor perception of nations as immutable phenomena of "biological" nature ("ontological nationalism"), widely shared among most of the Soviet ruling elite, as well as influential Soviet social scientists. Particularly important was the introduction of obligatory internal passports by Stalin in 1932, with a special entry on ethnicity (widely known in the USSR as the "fifth point"). It "locked the individual into an identity he or she

19 Ibid., p. 59.
20 Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," *Arch. europ. sociol.* XLIII, no. 2 (2002), pp. 163–189.
21 Rogers Brubaker, "Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Euroasia. An Institutionalist Account," *Theory and Society* 23, no. 1 (1994), pp. 47–78.

could not change"[22] and in that way substantially enhanced the acceptance of one's unchangeable and inevitable "belonging" to a given national group, especially if it was not a dominant ("titular") in particular soviet republic. The Soviet example of this kind of "ethnic management" influenced, to a high extent, both theory and praxis of the non-Soviet satellite states in ECE.

The second specific aspect for FCNM that enabled development of the minority policies in ECE, while maintaining their core unchanged, is the very "framework" nature of the Convention. Not only decided the authors of FCNM not to define the central element of the Convention—national minority—but their deliberately vague and diluted statements in particular articles allow everyone to "fit in." Hence, each signatory party could continue in its previous direction, letting other fields lag behind. Therefore, the ECE candidates states were not very active (or successful) in "encouraging a spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialog," nor in launching anti-discrimination measures (Art. 6), but they broadly unfolded their policies by maintaining and developing the culture of "belonging" to national minorities and preserving "the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage" (Art. 5), i.e. the direction that actually permeated most of the articles of FCNM.

The Czech case

In the next part of my chapter, I will present three examples from the Czech minority policy—minority schools, consultation mechanisms, and bilingual signs—that belong to the most visible and robust (from legal and/or financial point of view) areas. As all of them are components of FCNM, they were often presented by the Czech state as well as by Advisory Committee on FCNM as a part of desirable minority policy development.[23] I will argue, however, that although the number of adopted new laws and measures linked to these three areas was significant, the "change" in the three fields was formal and quantitative, rather than substantial and qualitative.

22 Pål Kolstø, "Faulted for the Wrong Reasons. Soviet Institutionalization of Ethnic Diversity and Western (Mis)Interpretations?" in Cordell, Agarin, Osipov (eds.), *Institutional legacies* (as cited in note 15), pp. 31–44 (42).

23 Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Council of Europe, *Opinion on the Czech Republic adopted on 6 April 2001*, p. 13.

Minority schools

Schools with the minority language of instruction are definitely among the most important instruments for maintaining and developing culture and language as well as preserving identity of the minorities. In the Czech Republic they exist only with Polish language, thus serving the Polish minority in Teschen, Silesia. This is the only territorially concentrated minority having sufficient number of students. The Polish minority belongs to the second largest national minority in the Czech Republic (after Slovaks), and certainly to the most organized. Therefore, the Czech politicians and policy maker were often asked by the Polish minority representatives to protect and boost the minority education.[24] Thus, many steps have been taken to improve the minority schooling. In 1995 the Pedagogical Centre for Polish Minority Schools (*Pedagogické centrum pro polské národnostní školství*) was established. The Czech Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports created many tools (publishing special magazines, textbooks, educating teachers etc.), and spent significant resources (mandatory spending related to employees, school maintenance etc.) to preserve this segment of primary schools and pre-school education. All these measures and achievements were regularly presented during the FCNM monitoring process.[25] Nevertheless, the whole system of Polish minority schools existed before. Up until the new Law on Education from 2004, the schools were regulated based on the previous law from 1984. More generally, the right of education in the mother tongue became part of the post-communist constitutional laws and bilateral agreements adopted in the early 1990s. The schools even existed before the communist regime. Thus, although many new steps were taken in the transition period, they were aimed at preserving already existing (and steadily decreasing) minority schooling.[26]

24 See the chapter "The Introspection of National Minorities: Polish Minority," Annual Reports on the Situation of National Minorities in the Czech Republic, https://www.vlada.cz/scripts/detail.php?pgid=125, accessed 14 July 2017.

25 See *Second report submitted by the Czech Republic pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*, p. 37, Council of Europe, https://rm.coe.int/168008b5e1, accessed 14 July 2017.

26 In 1920, 22.104 students in 106 Czech elementary schools in Teschen, Silesia, were instructed in Polish; see Zenon Jasiński, "Školství" in Karol Daniel Kadlubiec (ed.), *Polská národní menšina na Těšínsku v České republice*. Český Těšín: Ostravská Univerzita, 1997, pp. 184–213 (189). Their number has been decreasing to 1.739 in 25 schools in 2008.

Consultation mechanisms

Similar observations can be made concerning the consultation mechanisms with minorities that belong to the FCNM requirement. The mechanisms are designed "for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them" (Art. 15). The current Government Council for National Minorities was established by the Minority Act in 2001. Although the Council is presented in the Act as a new arrangement, it is not new at all. Its predecessor, the Council for Nationalities, was set up as early as 1970 by the Government Resolution (in the Czech part of the newly established federation) No. 20/1970 "to the institutional arrangement to settlement of national issue in the Government and in state administration bodies of the Czech Socialist Republic."[27] After the end of communism, the statutes of the Council were amended (in 1991), and after the split of the federation the Council for Nationalities of the Government of the Czech Republic was established on the basis of the Government Resolution in 1994.

Perhaps one of the reasons that reinforced the image of the current Council as a new arrangement is a significantly higher number of minorities that are represented as members. The number reflects a gradually widening circle of recognized minorities in the country. Since the Minority Act does not provide any list of recognized minorities—unlike some other countries within the candidate group—nor stipulates any exact definition on which a national minority can be unambiguously recognized, it is an unofficial praxis that recognition means membership of minority representative in the Council.[28] In the postwar period, the number or more or less officially recognized minorities has gradually grown (see table below). Thus, having scrutinized the recognition dispatched from the consultation mechanisms, it is evident that in the post-1989 period, the development is again of quantitative—although impressively—rather than qualitative nature.

27 The Minority Act has its communist predecessor too, the Constitutional Law No. 144/1968 Coll. about nationalities in Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

28 The Minority Act itself might be perceived as a step forward in the accession process to the EU or the general transition of the minority policy, see Kinga Gál, "The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and its Impact on Central and Eastern Europe," *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, no. 1 (2000), pp. 1–17; or even the outset of the new type of minority policy, see Rechel, "Introduction" (as cited in note 4), p. 9. However, the act only repeats, summarizes, organizes, reshapes (the case of the Council, for instance) and in some cases specifies what has already been present in other legal provisions and/or in constitutional acts.

Table 1. Development of the number of "recognized" national minorities in the postwar Czechoslovakia/ Czech Republic

Year	Minority	Related measure
1945	Poles, Ukrainians	The only minorities with permitted minority organizational structure (unofficial recognition)
1960	Hungarians	New Czechoslovak constitution[29]
1968	Germans	Constitutional Law No. 144/1968 on the situation of nationalities in Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
1991	Roma	Amendment of statuses of the Council for Nationalities
1994	Slovaks	Council for Nationalities of the Government of the Czech Republic
2001	Greeks, Ruthens, Russians, Croats, Bulgarians	Government Council for National Minorities based on the Law No. 273/2001 on rights of members of national minorities (Minority Act)[30]
2004	Serbs	Amendment of statuses of the Government Council for National Minorities
2013	Vietnamese, Belarusians	Amendment of statuses of the Government Council for National Minorities

Source: Author's own compilation

Bilingual signs

Specific case within the Czech minority policy is the issue of bilingual signs. Similar to the case of minority education, they are only in place for Polish minority in Teschen Silesia[31]. And they also existed long before the communist regime collapsed. The Polish minority entered the democratic period with bilingual signs

29 According to René Petráš, the three minorities have been already recognized and their basic rights (organizations, schools, media, partly bilingual signs etc.) secured in internal party documents and guidelines since 1952. René Petráš, "Menšinová otázka v prvé polovině komunistické éry 1948–1968" in René Petráš, Helena Petrův, and Harald C. Scheu (eds.), *Menšiny a právo v České republice.* Praha: Auditorium, 2009, pp. 104–116 (108).

30 Unlike in some other states of the CEE region, the Jewish community openly declared its will not to be treated as a "national minority," so that the representative of the Federation of Jewish Communities in the Czech Republic accepted a status of a "permanent guest" in the Council.

31 Although, according to the Law on Municipalities, there are some small mountain villages in the Western border regions of the Czech territory eligible to establish Czech-German bilingual signs, they have never expressed their wish to do so.

in certain municipalities mostly on buildings of public administration and state-owned shops. The list of selected municipalities, and the extent of bilingual signs was regulated by the document Information No. 2022/102, issued by the North Moravian Region National Committee in 1976. Nonetheless, the Czech Republic endeavored to launch, for the first time, bilingual road signs—something that had been common during the accession process in many European states, including some CEE countries. For that purpose, the Ministry of Transport issued a completely new directive; however, it again can be perceived as a simply quantitative extension of an already existing praxis.

What makes this field specific, compared to the ones discussed above, is the fact it has been directly influenced by another international agreement developed by the Council of Europe. Although there are articles of FCNM calling the signatory parties "to display traditional local names, street names and other topographical indications intended for the public also in the minority language when there is a sufficient demand for such indications" (Art. 11), it was later perceived as a paramount agenda of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML), signed by the Czech Republic in 2000, and ratified in 2007. And this is precisely the implementation of the Charter where persistence of pre-1989 schemata of minority policy, later reinforced by adopting FCNM, was most salient. Unlike the Framework Convention, ECRML was supposed neither to protect national minorities, nor persons belonging to them. Moreover, it deliberately avoided any reference to "groups" of people. It protects only languages as an objective cultural heritage that belongs to the whole society and refers only to their "speakers."[32] As the Explanatory Report of ECRML makes clear, "the charter sets out to protect and promote regional or minority languages, not linguistic minorities;" and again, even more explicitly, the Charter's "aim is not to stipulate the rights of ethnic and/or cultural minority groups, but to protect and promote regional or minority languages as such."

Nevertheless, legal provisions to implement the Charter on local level were designed exactly in line with FCNM's protection of "persons belonging to national minorities." Thus, instead of designing a geographically defined territory where Polish language is traditionally spoken or at least to base the regulations on the number of "speakers" who claim in census that their "mother tongue" is Polish, the conditions for establishing bilingual signs depend solemnly on the share of "members" of given "national minority" in populations, according to the latest

32 It stems surely from the fact that, although entering into force in the same year as FCNM (1998), the Language Charter was designed in the mid-1980s, before the above described turn to more "Eastern" approach in minority policy, i.e. when the minority policy in Western Europe was still determined by the postwar "non-ethnic" principle.

census and on the will articulated solely by "national minority representatives." The Law on Municipalities (No. 128/2000) from 2000 stipulates that in order to display signs "also in the language of a given national minority," at least ten percent of the inhabitants of the municipality must declare "ethnicity" of the given national minority in the latest census (par. 29, clause 2). Hence, paradoxical situations occur when in a region of compact settlement of Polish speakers, some small villages have the right to display the bilingual signs, whereas neighboring bigger communities with higher number of Polish speakers (but lower in relative terms) have not. Moreover, in the original version of the Law on Municipalities from 2000, there was also a condition that in order to establish the signs at least forty percent of adult persons "belonging to the national minority" in the municipality must submit a petition requesting the signs to the local council. This "ethnic mobilizing" clause—blatantly contradicting the "spirit" of the Language Charter—was eventually revoked by the law amendment in 2006, after protests of Polish minority leaders. Nevertheless, the implementation of the Charter provisions remains heavily under influence of the "traditional" minority policy perspective in accord with the Framework Convention.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I tried to show that beside obvious pervasive democratization that hit the whole society and encouraged minority life to flourish from inside, the development of minority policy in the Czech Republic in the period of the accession to the EU could not be simply labeled as "transitional." Although the new legal framework for protection of minorities was constructed, and several new provisions were adopted, this fresh *façade* did not constitute a substantial transformation from the previous regimes. With looking closer at the three examples from the Czech minority policy during the EU accession period, I argued that the major "change" was quantitative, rather than qualitative. In other words, the pre-1989 approaches, trajectories and "orders" remained predominantly intact.

What can surely be concluded from my findings is the assessment of the EU conditionality in this field. As opposed to opinions of some other authors dealing with the issue,[33] I consider the EU's role in the minority policy smaller, due to

33 See Gál, "The Council of Europe" (as cited in note 28); H. Morris, "The EU and Minority Policy does Enlargement Signal the end of Influence?" *Euractiv.com*, 2003, http://www.euractiv.com/section/science-policymaking/opinion/the-eu-and-minority-policy-does-enlargement-signal-the-end-of-influence/, accessed 17 July 2017.

"domestic factors" as identified by Rechel, namely "historical legacy" and "popular attitude toward minorities."[34] That is why I also do not perceive the accession to the EU in 2004 as any significant landmark in the minority policy and supposedly the end of the policy evolution,[35] which is actually proven by the post-accession development in the Czech Republic (let alone the ratification of the Language Charter in 2007 and adoption of number of related provisions).

What is of no less importance, but goes far beyond the scope of my chapter, is the impact of the analyzed "non-transition" of the minority policies on the well-being and the overall situation of the minorities themselves. Several authors, including those already cited, shared their concerns about the outcomes of typical features of the minority policy in ECE states, indirectly enhanced with the instrument of FCNM during the EU accession process. Gwendolyn Sasse observed that

> an intense and highly visible international involvement in a politicized issue (or one aspect of them) can produce an overlay of contradictory outcomes: a legal change can hide deeper political or societal problems which might, in fact, have become ingrained in the context of the EU's involvement.[36]

Beside this rather general remarks, Alexander Osipov is more specific in his opinion on the current minority policy in Russia, saying that "encoding social issues in cultural terms allows for the avoidance of risky, burdensome and potentially destabilizing issues such as participation, equality and non-discrimination."[37] Similar worries regarding reification of ethnicity and instrumentalization of the national minority policy are raised also by Cordell and Regelmann.[38] Even more recently, Frederika Prina has made pertinent comments on the same issue in the same country. She said that "ethnicity is becoming a purely cultural phenomenon, politically harmless and non-threatening to the federal centre. The trade-off is both menacing and farcical: 'Don't complain, and we'll pay for your dancing.'"[39] Of course, Russia—although one of the signatory parties of FCNM—did not go through the EU accession process, and is different from the Czech Republic in many ways. However, some elements of the minority policy, as well as concerns

34 Rechel, "Introduction" (as cited in note 4), p. 5.
35 Compare to ibid., p. 11.
36 Sasse, "Tracing the Constructions" (as cited in note 11), p. 28.
37 Alexander Osipov, "Soviet Parity of Nations or Western Non-Discrimination? Is there a Dilemma for Russia?" in Cordell, Agarin, Osipov (eds.), *Institutional Legacies* (as cited in note 15), pp. 59–73 (67).
38 Karl Cordell, "The Ideology of Minority Protection During the Post-Communist Transition in Europe," in Cordell, Agarin, Osipov (eds.), *Institutional Legacies* (as cited in note 15), pp. 77–89; Regelmann, "Damp Squibs?" (as cited in note 16).
39 Federica Prina, "Russia for the Russians – a Putative Policy," *Open Democracy—Russia and Beyond*, 5 April 2013, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/federica-prina/russia-for-russians-%E2%80%93-putative-policy, accessed 14 July 2017.

about its outcomes, are common in the whole post-communist Europe. As early as in 1994 in the Czech Republic, high ranking state officials explained why a specific Minority Act—eventually adopted seven years later—should not be a part of the Czech legal framework. As they put it, "this seemingly simple solution bears the inherent danger of (...) artificial exclusion of certain groups of citizens from the political society."[40]

Another topic that deserves thorough academic attention, but that reaches beyond this chapter, is a recent political development considering the integration of the Roma minority. Especially the last amendments of the Law on Education, which entered into force in 2016 and in 2017, caused a substantial change for the first time in the history of the Czech Republic that efficiently tackles the segregation of Roma pupils in the "special schools" (and the Czech schooling system in general), and lead to their inclusion. In addition, the recent efforts to pass a bill on social housing (not yet adopted) can lead to structural changes on the Czech housing market, and diminish spatial segregation of the Roma in "ghettoes." There are already many examples in a number of municipalities in the Czech Republic that introduced successful measures in the field of Roma integration, especially with the assistance of the "non-ethnically" designed Government Agency for Social Inclusion (established in 2008).[41]

To conclude, while the "transition" period showed poor results in transforming the core of minority policy in the Czech Republic, the signs of structural policy changes could be observed in the post-accession and "post-transition" period, and might be further expected in the years to come.

40 Hana Frištenská and Andrej Sulitka, *Průvodce právy příslušníků národnostních menšin v* České *republice*, Praha, 1994, p. 7. Andrej Sulitka perhaps changed his mind later on as he was still in office at the time when the Minority Act was prepared and implemented. To one of the critical evaluators of the aftermaths of the Czech minority policy, and especially their founding principles, belongs also author of this text; see my recent text on the 'recognition' of the Vietnamese minority in the Czech Republic, Ondřej Klípa, "Protection of the Rights of National Minorities in the Czech Republic as a Prevention of Ethnic Conflicts? The Case of Vietnamese," *Wschodnioznawstwo* 1 (2015), pp. 201–219.

41 For more details see www.socialni-zaclenovani.cz.

Kung Yin Ian Lo

Nazi Berlin, Communist Berlin, Reunified Berlin. How Berlin's Urban Landscapes Transitioned over Three Historical Periods

There is probably no other city which embodies the transitions of Germany's political ideologies in the twentieth century as intensely as Berlin. Berlin's unique urban environment has been influenced by the numerous historical events it experienced, as well as the embrace and abandonment of different political ideologies: The collapse of the German Empire, World War I, a short-lived democracy called Weimar Republic, Nazism, World War II, the Holocaust, the Cold War, communism,[1] capitalism, and reunification.[2] In this essay, the overall phenomenon of urban transitions in East Central European cities will be analyzed, followed by an in-depth examination of how urban transition in Berlin has taken place, especially with regards to how Berlin's perception of its future has also transitioned as it moved through the three historical eras from 1933 to the present-day:[3] Nazi Berlin (1933–1945), Communist Berlin (1945–1989), and Reunified Berlin (1989–present).

Urban Transitions from Communism to Post-Communism

Transition, a term coined by anthropologists, sociologists and geographers in the 1990s, describes post-communist changes, especially the shock therapy consisting

1 Although socialism and communism have sometimes been used interchangeably, communism here describes the socio-political sphere in the former German Democratic Republic (aka East Germany, later GDR), as well as East Berlin, based on the social geographers Sýkora and Bouzarovski's definitions. They claim that although the rulers described themselves and their political systems as socialist and aimed to build an ideal socialist society, the living conditions created under their system were far from ideal. Instead, the GDR was communist because it was ruled top-down in an authoritarian regime by a single political party.

2 Andreas Huyssen, *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003; Brian Ladd, *The Ghosts of Berlin*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997; Karen Till, *The New Berlin: Memory, Politics, Place*. Twin Cities: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

3 Huyssen, Ladd, and Till all share the chronology of these three distinct eras.

of the forced introduction of neoliberalism and democracy into an originally communist political and economic systems in East Central Europe (ECE).[4] This notion, however, is not uncontested: The anthropologist Thomas Chivens for example, specialized in post-communism, argues that due to the speed and complexity of the political changes, and the unintended consequences from the collapse of communism and adoption of capitalism, the term transition is inadequate.[5] In any case, the social geographers Luděk Sýkora and Stefan Bouzarovski propose that the post-communist transition in East Central European cities has generally been a three-step process: Initially, institutional changes took place rapidly, followed by gradual economic, social and cultural changes, and finally changes in the urban form. These three-step transitions have been following different trajectories, are an ongoing phenomenon, and differ vastly between as well as within different cities.[6]

At first, institutional reconfigurations happened within the first few months after the fall of communism. Communist parties were ousted, together with the state-controlled market and central planning. Instead, we saw democratic elections, privatization of state assets, liberalization of prices, development of the private sector and the establishment of free trade relations with other countries.[7] The introduction of the free market economy created the basic conditions for the second transition: The changes in economic, socio-cultural and political practices. The introduction of foreign investments created jobs for the skilled, while the decline of state-owned industries left many others jobless. These changes worsened socio-economic polarizations. With the introduction of the free market, social values changed, and there was a greater tendency towards individualism and consumerism, especially among the younger generation which had never experienced communism first-hand. After the fall of communism, national governments were dominated by a neoliberal discourse: The free market appeared as the only tool in allocating resources efficiently, and politicians often saw state control as a hindrance.[8]

After the abovementioned transformations took place, the urban landscapes in East Central Europe had to adapt to capitalism. Today, they can no longer be seen as communist cities—many of them have "capitalist" city centers with high-rise office buildings, tourist attractions and shopping malls. Their suburbs, how-

4 Luděk Sýkora and Stefan Bouzarovski, "Multiple Transformations. Conceptualising the Post-Communist Urban Transition," *Urban Studies* 49, no. 1 (2012), pp. 43–60 (46).
5 Thomas Chivens, "After Post-Socialism? Transition's Obscured Inevitability," *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 23, no. 2 (2005), pp. 26–29.
6 Sýkora and Bouzarovski, "Multiple Transformations" (as cited in note 4), pp. 43–60.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.

ever, still consist of communist-era high-rise, prefabricated concrete apartments which, despite the large-scale rejuvenation efforts, are still typically "communist" in typology.[9] This led to the re-emergence of urban typologies that were typical in many cities before communism. In Berlin for example, Hans Stimmann, the Director of Urban Development, implemented the project of "Critical Reconstruction" in the 1990s: A re-introduction of the urban pre-World War II structure in order to resurrect Berlin's 1920s Golden Age glory, erased by the destruction of the city during the war. Conservative stone facades, five or six-storied buildings and traditional city blocks were promoted, while high-rise buildings were not favored.

The need to adapt to capitalism created new urban landscapes and landmarks, which often represent the cities' aspirations for their futures, especially in the historical old towns. As a result, the typical East Central European city today consists of both, the standard capitalist districts such as the commercial district of Potsdamer Platz in Berlin developed in the 1990s, and districts which resemble frozen mirrors of socialism such as Marzahn, a residential district with numerous high-rise concrete apartments in the former East Berlin.[10] Building on Sýkora and Bouzarovski's concept of transition, the geographers Golubchikov, Badyina and Makhrova argue that after transition, the original communist structures and urban landscapes became anachronistic and "alien to the new [democratic] regime."[11] As these communist structures could not be eradicated overnight, they were tolerated out of necessity, but many were erased from the city gradually.

Numerous examples of such buildings have already been erased or will soon be removed. In Berlin, the GDR-modern style Palace of the Republic, which used to house the GDR parliament and other social facilities, was demolished in 2006. In Sofia, the Mausoleum of Georgi Dimitrov, the first communist prime minister of Bulgaria, was demolished in 1999, during the rule of the first staunchly anti-communist government in Bulgaria after 1989.[12] Moscow recently commenced its plans to demolish 7,900 of its prefabricated concrete residential buildings, colloquially known as *khrushchevki*, built in the 1960s and 1970s.[13] Across cities in Ukraine, a prominent feature in the post-communist urban transition has been

9 Ibid.

10 Sýkora and Bouzarovski, "Multiple Transformations" (as cited in note 4), pp. 44–45.

11 Oleg Golubchikov, Anna Badyina, and Alla Makhrova "The Hybrid Spatialities of Transition. Capitalism, Legacy and Uneven Urban Economic Restructuring," *Urban Studies* 51, no. 4 (2014), pp. 617–633 (621).

12 Mariya Ivancheva, "The Fall of Socialism. The Mausoleum of Georgi Dimitrov in Sofia and the Berlin Wall Compared" [not published].

13 Alec Luhn, "Moscow's Big Move. Is this the Biggest Urban Demolition Project Ever?" *The Guardian*, 31 March 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/mar/31/moscow-biggest-urban-demolition-project-khrushchevka-flats, accessed 3 July 2017.

the removal of Lenin statues. Not long after Ukraine's independence in 1991, many busts of Lenin were removed in the western oblasts, but after the Ukrainian revolution in February 2014, hundreds more were removed across the country.[14] In the city center of Skopje, FYR Macedonia, the socialist-era concrete buildings from the 1970s have not been erased per se, but they have recently been covered up with neo-classical façades to erase its two other heritages, the Ottoman and socialist ones, and evoke a European, Slavic-Macedonian character.[15]

The geographers Diener and Hagen argue that the post-communist transitions in different East Central European cities do not follow a single trajectory, due to variations in how national identities were forged before, during and after communism in different countries. After the fall of communism, different cities negotiated traditional national identities and globalization in different ways. In most cases, new or updated national narratives have led to reconstruction or creation of new historical landmarks, related to pre-communist figures or events.

World Capital Germania—Unfulfilled vision of Berlin's future

On 30 January 1933 in Berlin, Adolf Hitler was appointed chancellor of Germany. Hitler and his chief architect Albert Speer, later minister of armament and war production, envisioned Berlin to become the capital of a new German empire, which would eventually encompass most of Europe. Hitler planned to eventually rename Berlin as Germania in 1950, after all his plans were completed. However, he deemed Berlin's architecture in the early 1930s as unimpressive, and saw the need to drastically improve the cityscape in order for it to qualify as the capital of the so-called Third Reich.[16]

In 1936, Hitler appointed Albert Speer as the chief architect of Berlin, responsible for redesigning the city. Speer planned to remove the alleged chaos from Berlin's previously-unregulated constructions. In the Weimar Republic, Berlin

14 Lisa Premiyak, "Looking for Lenin," *The Calvert Journal*, 31 March 2016, http://www.calvertjournal.com/features/show/5790/lenin-soviet-monument-ukraine, accessed 3 July 2017.

15 Fabio Mattioli, "Unchanging Boundaries. The Reconstruction of Skopje and the Politics of Heritage," *International Journal of Heritage Studies* 20, no. 6 (2014), pp. 599–615.

16 Thomas Friedrich, "A real and Genuine Capital 1933 and Later. Hitler's Metropolis," in Friedrich (ed.), *Hitler's Berlin. Abused City*, New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2012, pp. 316–372; Anthony Read and David Fisher, "River of Fire," in Read and Fisher (eds.), *Berlin. The Biography of a City*, London: Hutchinson, 1994, pp. 198–214; Andreas Hillgruber, "England's Place in Hitler's Plans for World Dominion," *Journal of Contemporary History* 9, no. 1 (1974), pp. 5–22; Joachim Fest, "Germania. The Capital of the World," in Fest (ed.), *Speer: The Final Verdict.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2002, pp. 66–93.

was seen as an inclusive and democratic city;[17] in during the Third Reich, architecture and urban planning were dictated by Hitler and used as an instrument to promote political propaganda, with its buildings as a permanent, indestructible physical demonstration of political power.[18] To Hitler, monumental architecture was the most expressive form of artistic showcase; oversized buildings and wide boulevards would display the greatness of his thousand-year Reich to the world. According to him, the proposed buildings "would most likely still be standing... just the way they are, in 10,000 years."[19] They would all be designed in the neoclassical style, regarded as austere and everlasting.[20] Hitler wanted the World Capital Germania to be as majestic as ancient Egypt, Babylon or Rome,[21] and to become the only "city that could possibly be Europe's capital." [22] Therefore, Berlin "must become the most colossal city on earth... [and] be the magnet it should be as the center of a New Europe."[23]

One of the most monumental buildings in Hitler's plans was *The Great Hall of the People*, designed by Albert Speer in 1938 (Figure 1). It was scheduled for completion by 1950; construction never began, however, as the Nazis were defeated in 1945. The building was planned to be 290 meters high, capped by a dome 250 meters in diameter, and to hold 180,000 people. The volume was supposed to be sixteen times that of St Peter's Cathedral in Rome.[24] Hitler looked forward to preaching his ideologies to 180,000 Germans at a time, and he criticized the lack of such large venues in other countries.[25]

As part of Hitler's plan to overshadow the magnificence of Paris and other European cities, he proposed a *Triumphal Arch*. Measuring 118 meters in height, it would easily dwarf the 49-metre Arc de Triomphe in Paris.[26] Both, *The Great Hall of the People* and *Triumphal Arch*, were designed to stand in the middle of the proposed *Avenue of Splendors* (Figure 2), a seven kilometers long and 120 meters

17 Wolfgang Sonne, "Specific Intentions—General Realities. On the Relation between Urban Forms and Political Aspirations in Berlin during the Twentieth Century," *Planning Perspectives* 19, no. 3 (2004), pp. 283–310.

18 Jochen Thies, *Hitler's Plans for Global Domination Nazi Architecture and Ultimate War Aims*. New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2012.

19 Ibid., p. 77.

20 Thomas Friedrich, *Genuine Capital* (as cited in note 16); German Historical Museum, Berlin: *Permanent Exhibition: German History in Images and Artefacts*.

21 Stephanie Kirchner, "How Hitler Would Have Rebuilt Berlin," *Time*, 24 March 2008.

22 Thies, *Global Domination* (as cited in note 18), p. 81.

23 Ibid.

24 German Historical Museum, 2015. *Permanent Exhibition: German History in Images and Artefacts*. Berlin: German Historical Museum; Ladd, *The Ghosts of Berlin* (as cited in note 2).

25 Thies, *Global Domination* (as cited in note 18).

26 Sherree Owens Zalampas, *Adolf Hitler. A Psychological Interpretation of His Views on Architecture, Art, and Music*. Madison: Popular Press, 1990.

Figure 1. A model for *The Great Hall of the People* in the German Historical Museum



Source: Photo by the author

wide north-south boulevard designed by Albert Speer.[27] It would have been about two and a half times longer than the famous Champs-Élysées in Paris, and on both sides of the boulevard, there would be forty new government buildings and military administrative complexes, all to be designed in the neo-classical style. On each end of the *Avenue of Splendors*, Speer planned huge railway stations; the South Station would dwarf the Grand Central Station in New York. The avenue was to be decorated by weapons captured by the German army from other armies, in order to display military power and might. The main aim behind these projects was to allow Germany to "gain world supremacy"[28] through architecture.

While most Nazi-era urban plans were never realized, a few buildings were completed and still stand in present-day Berlin. Built in the neo-classical style favored by Hitler in 1934, Tempelhof Airport was nearly completed by 1945. It was supposed to represent the Nazis' power with its imposing façade and huge departure hall (Figures 3 and 4). Designed to resemble an eagle (state symbol of Germany), the airport's layout consisted of a 1,320-meter arc, as seen in Figure 4. According to a guided tour in Tempelhof Airport in December 2015, and despite the determination

27 Sonne, "Specific Intentions" (as cited in note 17).
28 Thies, *Global Domination* (as cited in note 18), p. 93.

Figure 2. A 3-dimensional model of the *Avenue of Splendors* and *The Great Hall of the People*



Source: Guy Saville[29]

of contemporary German architects to avoid designing anything that could resemble Nazi-era architecture, the building is not perceived negatively in current Berlin: Other than serving the Nazis' political and logistical needs in the first few years of its inception, the airport also became the site and symbol of numerous other historical events.[30] During the Berlin Blockade in 1948, for example, when the USSR prevented West Germany from supplying West Berlin with resources via road and rail, the United States Air Force carried out the Berlin Airlift by delivering all their necessities, including food, water, coal and construction materials for post-war reconstruction through 213,000 flights from West Germany to Tempelhof.[31] During the Cold War, Tempelhof Airport was seen as a gateway to the free West, and a symbol of freedom. It continued operating as a civilian airport until 2008, after which

29 Guy Saville, "Germania—A Virtual Tour," *The Afrika Reich Trilogy*, 2 July 2012, http://afrikareichtrilogy.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/germania-virtual-tour.html, accessed 24 December 2015.

30 Monica Riera, "How Should We Build? Architecture, History and the Post-Cold War Context in Germany," *National Identities* 8, no. 4 (2007), pp. 383–400.

31 Timothy Moss, "Divided City, Divided Infrastructures: Securing Energy and Water Services in Postwar Berlin," *Journal of Urban History* 35, no. 7 (2010), pp. 923–942.

its huge airfield was opened as a public park.[32] Since 2015, its hangars have been operating as a temporary refugee camp for about 2,000 Syrian refugees. Therefore, this Nazi-era structure originally embodied Hitler's totalitarian regime, but subsequent historical events and the people's memories transformed it into a site representing collective nostalgia and now a site of humanitarian aid.

Figure 3. The grand departure hall in Tempelhof Airport



Source: Photo by the author

World War II started in Europe in 1939, and it was no longer financially and logistically possible to carry out most of the proposed projects for transforming Berlin. However, according to recent analyses by some historians, Hitler never felt the compulsion to realize most of them. He felt that the narrative generated by announcing the plans for the megaprojects was sufficient and more important than actually building them. The plans were to showcase the triumph of Nazism, to legitimize the social utopian dreams he had for Germany, and to generate hope and anticipation among Germans for their future. At the end of World War II in 1945,

32 Ciarán Fahey, "How Berliners refused to give Tempelhof airport over to developers," *The Guardian*, 5 March 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/mar/05/how-berliners-refused-to-give-tempelhof-airport-over-to-developers, accessed 18 July 2017.

Figure 4. A banner displayed in Tempelhof Airport showing the entire structure



Source: Photo by the author

the Nazi Party ceased to exist, and these plans became abruptly irrelevant. Soon, Berlin would be guided by two entirely different and opposing ideologies for the next several decades as a divided city.[33]

East Berlin as a Communist Utopia

"Berlin had no identity. Its future would be dictated by foreigners. Soon the western part of the city became 'Showcase Berlin'—a demonstration of capitalism at its best. The east became the 'Showpiece of Real Existing Socialism.'"[34] In 1949, Germany was divided into the communist German Democratic Republic (GDR; East Germany) and the capitalist Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). Berlin as well was divided into East and West: East Berlin was occupied by Soviet forces, while the West was divided into the English, French and US sectors. East Berlin became the capital of GDR, but West Germany relocated its capital to Bonn.

33 Thies, *Global Domination* (as cited in note 18).
34 Victorino Matus, "The once and future Berlin," *Policy Review* 106, no. 2 (2001), pp. 61–71 (68).

As the only Cold War-era city where two opposing ideologies were next to each other, both East and West Berlin attempted to display their prestige through architecture.

During the Cold War, the ways Berlin perceived its future were affected by the legacies of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich. Architecture in East Berlin actively avoided any associations with the Third Reich, by portraying itself as the epicenter of the international communist movement, and by (re-)introducing new heroes and figures such as Vladimir Lenin or the worker and peasant traditions of German culture.[35] After large-scale destruction in the war, East Berlin architects and politicians took a tabula rasa approach to design the new communist capital city from scratch.[36] However, the architectural historian Ed Taverne argued that because some buildings in East Berlin were designed mainly to "impress, equal, and eventually surpass"[37] the capitalist West, they were "stripped of its symbolic, mythic and representative functions and converted into a political barrier of violence, anxiety, and control."[38]

One of the GDR's strongest marketing and propaganda tool was the monumental boulevard Karl-Marx-Allee, a "model of the socialist future"[39] which still stands today (Figure 5). Built in 1950, it was first named Stalinallee, and was supposed to be finished for the Soviet leader's birthday. Modelled after Gorky Street (now known as Tverskaya Street) in Moscow, its design was perceived as revolutionary in Berlin. It modelled Moscow as the best example of socialist realist architecture, and Berlin sought to imitate Moscow's triumphant Stalinist architecture, and erase all hints and horrors of the Nazi past from its streets.[40] Socialist realist architecture attempted to generate solidarity among citizens, to serve the national consciousness, and to reinforce awareness of cultural history. While such buildings aimed to display power, the art historian Anders Åman argued that because the style was enforced by the USSR, the power demonstrated was foreign (i.e. Soviet), not German.[41] Stalinallee was almost two kilometers long, and 75 to 100 meters wide, with two three-lane roads and lined with trees. The buildings were built

35 William J. V. Neill, "Berlin Babylon. The Spatiality of Memory and Identity in Recent Planning for the German Capital," *Planning Theory & Practice* 6, no. 3 (2005), pp. 335–353.
36 Ibid., p. 338.
37 Ed Taverne, "The last avenue of the 'Other' Europe. The Stalinist Universe of the Karl-Marx-Allee in Berlin," *European Review* 13 no. 2 (2005), pp. 207–218 (208).
38 Ibid.
39 Greg Castillo, "The Nylon Curtain. Architectural Unification in Divided Berlin," in Philip Broadbent and Sabine Hake (eds.), *Berlin Divided City, 1945–1989.* New York; Oxford: Berghahn, 2010, pp. 46–55 (47).
40 Taverne, "Karl-Marx-Allee" (as cited in note 37).
41 Anders Åman, "What Do Buildings and Cities Tell and How Do They Do It," *International Review of Sociology* 16, no. 2 (2006), pp. 379–394.

Figure 5. Karl-Marx-Allee

Source: Photo by the author

in the socialist realist style favored by Stalin, which focused on solidarity, beauty and cultural legacy.[42] The neo-classical facades, Doric columns and ceramic tiles reminded residents and visitors of imperial Prussia.[43] The project was modernist and utopian, and sought to create a new urban fabric for the new German to live in monumental "people's palaces."[44] It was supposed to outshine the architecture in West Berlin and represent a future, unified and democratic Germany. In many 1950s East German films, Stalinallee was the backdrop for the ideal German worker in a socialist state—a diligent working-class male, who after struggling through exploitation and social inequality could finally walk along the grand boulevard and reach his apartment which he had built with his own hands.[45]

To date, full-height glass windows line the ground floor. In communist Berlin, behind these windows, luxury products from the Eastern Bloc were displayed to flaunt the wealth of the socialist state: Bulgarian cheese, Romanian wine, Polish eggs, canned pineapple from China, etc. In today's Berlin, standard shops and cafes have taken over the boulevard. Stalin's statue was already erased from the street at the same time it was renamed from Stalinallee to Karl-Marx-Allee in 1961,

42 Taverne, "Karl-Marx-Allee" (as cited in note 37).
43 Castillo, "Nylon Curtain" (as cited in note 39).
44 Taverne, "Karl-Marx-Allee" (as cited in note 37), p. 211.
45 Ibid.

during the era of Destalinization, in order to erase Stalin's personality cult and dictatorship which had caused millions of Soviet citizens to perish in labor camps.[46]

Despite the popularity of Karl-Marx-Allee in East Berlin, critics in West Berlin perceived it as soulless and representative of a dictatorial regime. Even though it was portrayed to be apartments for the average socialist citizen, they were eventually inhabited by elites such as scientists and party members.[47] However, East Berlin criticized West Berlin's American-styled redevelopment of their city center because it would reduce its German character. The East German Building Academy attempted to appeal to West Berliners who were offended by Americanization through advocating a new German architectural style, based on the traditions of Gothic, Renaissance and Classical architecture.[48] During one of his speeches, the founder of the Communist Party Walter Ulbricht flaunted his communist showcase to the West: "With the Stalinallee in Berlin, we wish to demonstrate how we see our future, united, democratic Germany [...] On seeing the beauty of the Stalinallee, [West Germans] would be converted to socialism at one fell swoop!"[49]

Figure 6. Prefabricated concrete apartments along Karl-Marx-Allee contrasting with the socialist realist buildings

Source: Photo by the author

46 Taverne, "Karl-Marx-Allee" (as cited in note 37).
47 Castillo, "Nylon Curtain" (as cited in note 39).
48 Taverne, "Karl-Marx-Allee" (as cited in note 37).
49 Ibid., p. 213.

Notwithstanding the enthusiasm in creating the ideal socialist showcase, Stalinallee/Karl-Marx-Allee was the first and last Stalinist street in East Berlin, because Stalinist buildings were expensive, wasteful and time-consuming to build.[50] In the 1960s, after Stalin's death, socialist realist buildings were no longer in fashion, thus the uncompleted sections of Karl-Marx-Allee were hastily filled up with prefabricated concrete apartment blocks (Figure 6) which saved time and money.[51]

With its assortment of socialist architectural styles and monuments, by the 1970s East Berlin did not only seek to represent the future communist paradise, but also as a prime tourist destination for other communist countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. A 1971 publication by the state-owned hotel chain *Interhotel* promoted East Berlin as the "heart of the young socialist state […] [where] the tourist experiences more, more intensively and immediately than in any other place, how Germany's past is overcome, how the present is being made, and how the future takes shape."[52] Despite its socialist values, East Berlin aimed to be the hub for consumer goods and leisurely travel. By offering tourists luxuries such as cafés, restaurants and shops selling consumer goods often unavailable in their home countries, and by bringing them to museums and communist landmarks, East Berlin hoped to showcase the future of communist modernity, one which could be enjoyed by everyone, not only the elites. East Berlin was supposed to be perceived as the most advanced communist city and be the envy of Poland, Hungary and other Eastern Bloc members.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, it became apparent that East Berlin's dream of becoming a communist utopia would never be realized. In 1991, the reunified German government voted to move the capital city from Bonn to Berlin.[53] Nevertheless, many eastern Germans retrospectively felt that life was better under communism than under a democratic, capitalist system. In a 2009 survey, 57% of the polled eastern Germans claimed that they preferred life in the GDR, while 49% of them agreed that there were more good sides than bad sides to life in the GDR.[54]

50 Ibid.

51 Castillo, "Nylon Curtain" (as cited in note 39).

52 Michelle Standley, "'Here Beats the Heart of the Young Socialist State.' 1970s' East Berlin as Socialist Bloc Tourist Destination," *The Journal of Architecture* 18, no. 5 (2013), pp. 683–698 (688–689).

53 Biljana Arandelovica and Dushko Bogunovich, "City profile: Berlin," *Cities* 37, no. 2 (2014), pp. 1–104.

54 Julia Bonstein, "Homesick for a Dictatorship. Majority of Eastern Germans Feel Life Better under Communism," *Der Spiegel*, 3 July 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/homesick-for-a-dictatorship-majority-of-eastern-germans-feel-life-better-under-communism-a-634122.html, accessed 18 July 2017.

Nonetheless, with reunification, these utopian visions were relegated to mere *nostalgia* among East Berliners for life under communism, or at least a resurgence of interest in all products, art and film related to the GDR, known as *Ostalgie*, in which "Ost" is "East" in German.[55]

Preparing for the Future and Negotiating with History

After its reunification, Berlin was perceived to be finally on its way to normalization after a hundred years of deviation from the path of history.[56] It has been associated with many different identities, including both official and unofficial ones. Officially, it aimed to portray to the world that it was ready to serve as the new capital city of reunified Germany,[57] and become the upcoming "center of Central Europe,"[58] the "gateway to the East,"[59] and the "hub between East and West."[60] In 2001, twelve years after reunification, Svetlana Boym, Professor of Slavic Languages and Literatures and one of the first academics who explored the concept of nostalgia, described in her book *The Future of Nostalgia* that in the "center of Berlin [...] every site is a battleground of clashing nostalgias and future aspirations. Between 1989 and 1999, Berlin was an exemplary porous city that embodied both the euphoria and anxiety of transition."[61] Until today, the influences of the Nazi and communist pasts are still visible in the urban form, and there have been debates on how Berlin should negotiate with its complicated history. Unofficially, Berlin has also gained reputation for its vibrant nightlife and local arts scene, together with relatively low costs of living. With this reputation, Berlin has even become an unofficial role model for other cities in East Central Europe. Occasionally, travel guides and blogs mention how cities in East Central Europe like Belgrade are predicted to "become the next Berlin." While I was in Bucharest and Warsaw, I heard from local tour guides that their cities, with even lower costs of living than Berlin, are aspiring to "become the next Berlin" with their increasingly-vibrant nightlife and growing visitor numbers.

55 Jennifer M. Kapczynski, "Negotiating Nostalgia. The GDR Past in Berlin Is in Germany and Good Bye, Lenin!," *The Germanic Review: Literature, Culture, Theory* 82, no. 1 (2007), pp. 78–100; Petra Rethmann, "Post-communist ironies in an East German Hotel," *Anthropology Today* 25, no. 1 (2009), pp. 21–23.
56 Matus, "The once and future Berlin" (as cited in note 34), p. 61.
57 Virág Molnár, "The Cultural Production of Locality. Reclaiming the 'European City' in Post-Wall Berlin," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 34, no. 2 (2010), pp. 281–309.
58 Ibid., p. 282.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*. New York: Basic, 2001, p. 216.

To symbolically prepare itself for its future, modern Berlin has been engaging in "willful forgetting."[62] Post-communist states are often burdened with the need to improve their public image to show that they are ready for the future. To generate credibility for themselves in the modern world, the "socialist past, as well as other 'inappropriate' periods, events and personalities, has been selectively 'airbrushed' from the historical record."[63] Berlin was determined to avoid any built forms or symbolisms that could trigger memories from the Nazi era. Since the Nazi-era chief architect Albert Speer had proposed a north-south axis for Nazi Berlin, after reunification, all planning proposals which included hints of north-south connections were not considered. Architects were determined to avoid designing neoclassical buildings because this style was characteristic of the Third Reich.[64] Yet at the same time, because Berlin had been divided for four decades, after reunification residents and politicians from the East and West often had differing visions of the future based on their different histories.[65]

The sociologist and urban planner Claire Colomb proposed that to transform to a post-Nazi and post-communist era, Berlin could take four different paths: Renaming places, or demolishing, modifying or conserving buildings.[66] In order to forget the past, many street names in East Berlin which were related to communist figures were renamed after neutral or anti-communist figures.[67] In 1991, Leninplatz in the former East Berlin district of Friedrichshain was renamed as Platz der Vereinten Nationen, or Square of the United Nations, together with the removal of the eighteen-meter tall Lenin monument erected in 1970 (Figure 7).[68] The government of the newly-unified Germany decided that the statue commemorated Lenin, who allegedly was a despot and murderer, was incompatible with the new ideals, and thus decided to demolish it despite it being a protected landmark.[69] However, many East Berliners felt that the new government was too eager to erase their history in order to create a new Berlin without any signs of a communist past, and that they were forced to adapt to a future that is shaped after West German ideals.

62 Huyssen, *Present Pasts* (as cited in note 2), p. 53.
63 Tim Coles, "Urban Tourism, Place Promotion and Economic Restructuring. The Case of Post-Socialist Leipzig," *Tourism Geographies* 5, no. 2 (2003), pp. 190–219 (193).
64 Michael Z. Wise, "Hitler's Words Into Stone. Can Architecture itself be Fascist?," *Wall Street Journal*, 12 April 2013.
65 Claire Colomb, "Requiem for a Lost Palast. 'Revanchist Urban Planning' and 'Burdened Landscapes' of the German Democratic Republic in the New Berlin," *Planning Perspectives* 22, no. 3 (2007), pp. 283–323.
66 Ibid.
67 Huyssen, *Present Pasts* (as cited in note 2).
68 Colomb, "Requiem for a Lost Palast" (as cited in note 65).
69 Ladd, *The Ghosts of Berlin* (as cited in note 2), p. 197.

They accused the Senate of Berlin of purging alternative, outdated communist memories which no longer fit into the rhetoric of the current political economy, and prescribing a new set of state-enforced memory.[70] However, most West Berliners thought that symbols of communist authority were incompatible with the newly-reunited, democratic and capitalist Germany. Eventually, the square was renamed Square of the United Nations to represent a new, internationalist future, and it consists of a small fountain with boulders that originated from the different continents.[71] Yet in reality, when I visited the square on a weekday morning in December 2015, it was desolate; the fountain was not functioning, and there was no sign that the boulders were supposed to represent the globalized ideal that the government had envisioned, other than the inconspicuous street signage nearby (Figure 8).

Figure 7. Leninplatz in October 1991 featuring the Lenin monument

Source: Bundesarchiv

Although it is still haunted by its history, Berlin is attempting to reconstruct itself as a "traditional European city, [partly by] re-civilizing"[72] and correcting the mistakes of urban planning and architecture in East Berlin under communism.

70 Colomb, "Requiem for a lost Palast" (as cited in note 65).
71 Ladd, *The Ghosts of Berlin* (as cited in note 2), p. 199.
72 Molnár, *Locality* (as cited in note 57), pp. 282–283.

Figure 8. The former Lenin Square comprising of an unremarkable and non-functioning fountain with boulders in the bottom left of the photo, and the signboard on the bottom right which indicates Platz der Vereinten Nationen (Square of the United Nations).

Source: Photo by the author

Berlin is determined to construct itself as a logical, democratic, modern and forward-looking (Western) European city, which stands in opposition to the Eastern European *other*, perceived as illogical, communist and backward. However, after four decades of communist urban planning, the Eastern European other is still obvious.[73] Buildings from the communist era are ubiquitous in eastern Berlin, such as the abandoned House of Statistics near Alexanderplatz (Figure 9), and the hundreds of high-rise apartment blocks.

To redesign and integrate the vastly different urban fabrics in the two Berlins after reunification, the new city architect Hans Stimmann in 1991 promoted the idea of Berlin "becoming a traditional European city"—an ironic concept that implies Berlin is not European *despite* being located in the heart of Europe.[74] In 1996, Stimmann developed the *Planwerk Innenstadt*, or City Centre Plan, for a 30 km2 area in

73 Gisa Weszkalnys, *Berlin, Alexanderplatz. Transforming Place in a Unified Germany*. New York, Oxford: Berghahn, 2010, pp. 31–67.

74 Paul Stangl, "The vernacular and the monumental. Memory and landscape in post-war Berlin," *GeoJournal* 73 (2008), pp. 245–253.

Figure 9. The abandoned House of Statistics

Source: Photo by the author

central Berlin which comprises of most of the historical and official buildings in both the former East and West Berlin. Berlin's "golden age" is now widely regarded to be from 1900 to 1914, when it was a *Weltstadt* (Global City), and was cosmopolitan, tolerant and economically powerful.[75] Therefore Stimmann enforced a pre-1914 German architectural style and street layout which was unaffected by the undesirable histories of the Third Reich and communism, and by reintegrating the East and West.[76]

Stimmann's policy of "Critical Reconstruction," which adhered to pre-modernist architectural styles, restored streets to their pre-World War II outlines, required new buildings to blend in with old ones, and enforced height limits and nineteenth century building codes to rebuild Berlin in a Prussian neoclassical style.[77] According to Stimmann, during the Cold War, West Berlin saw the US as their model for development, while East Berlin identified with the Soviet Union, thus critical reconstruction attempted to unify these two identities.[78] However,

75 Matus, "The once and future Berlin" (as cited in note 34), p. 65.
76 Weszkalnys, *Berlin Alexanderplatz* (as cited in note 73), p. 52.
77 Florian Urban, "Designing the past in East Berlin before and after the German reunification," *Progress in Planning* 68 (2007), pp. 1–55 (44).
78 Katharine Burgess, "Putting Berlin Back Together," *Planning* 81, no. 3 (2015), pp. 26–31.

the plan actually advocated a Western, democratic ideal which was arguably imposed forcibly on the former East Berlin. It rejected the modernist, socialist ideals in the East, and saw the era of urban planning as a *mistake* to be rectified by re-urbanization and reconstruction.[79] For example, new shopping centers were added into Alexanderplatz in the center of East Berlin (Figure 10). However, the plan saw the high-rise socialist-era buildings in East Berlin's city center as a problematic obstacle for the future developments. Many planners, politicians and ordinary citizens from East Berlin vehemently opposed this vision of the future imposed onto them, because nobody from the East was consulted, and while the modernist, communist-designed city center of the East was far from perfect, they already possessed distinctive identities.

Figure 10. A relatively empty Alexanderplatz in the 1980s

Source: Gisa Weszkalnys [80]

Berlin's urban transition is probably best represented by the current reconstruction of the Berlin Palace (*Berliner Schloss*), and the previous buildings that used to stand on the same site on Schloßplatz on Museum Island, which was part of the former East Berlin. The original Baroque-style *Schloss* was founded in

79 Molnar, *Locality* (as cited in note 57), p. 293.
80 Weszkalnys, *Berlin Alexanderplatz* (as cited in note 73).

1443, and its subsequent expansions over the next few centuries reflected Berlin's growth from a village to a metropolis. Despite surviving the World War II with reparable damages, it was demolished in 1950, mainly because it symbolized Prussian imperialism, incompatible with communism. Subsequently, the Palace of the Republic (*Palast der Republik*) was completed in 1976 on the former site the *Schloss*. Apart from housing the GDR Parliament, it was also a public building consisting of art galleries, bars, a bowling alley, concert halls and restaurants, and therefore many GDR citizens remember it for the youth meetings, family outings and private parties that they attended, but it was only used for 14 years before it was officially closed due to asbestos contamination in 1990.[81]

After 1990, there were many discussions on the future uses of the empty *Palast*. To quote the urban historian Brian Ladd, some people, mainly residents of the former West Berlin, regarded the contaminated *Palast* as a "symbolic legacy of a poisonous [GDR] state"[82] in reunified Germany. The lingering presence of the *Palast's* remnants many years after the downfall of communism follows the social geographers Sýkora and Bouzarovski's concept that institutional changes after communism took place within a few months while urban transformations often took much longer. Initially it was decided that the asbestos could be removed without demolishing the building, so it was carried out from 1998 to 2002. However, the remaining steel structure could not serve any major purposes, thus in 2002 parliament eventually decided to demolish it and rebuild the Prussian-era *Berliner Schloss* in its place. This was of course met with opposition from some members of the public and the Green Party and the Party of Democratic Socialism, but these attempts were futile. Demolition began in 2006 and was completed in 2008. Prior to its demolition, between 2003 and 2006, the remaining structure of the *Palast der Republik* was used as a low-cost interim space for individual artists to hold exhibitions, concerts and theatrical performances.[83] This itself was also a part of the larger trend of Berlin becoming a popular place for artists to establish themselves due to the city's low rents and abundance of vacated buildings in the 1990s and 2000s.

Although the *Palast* has been removed, many other structures built in the similar GDR-modern style still stand. The building that resembles the *Palast* the

81 Colomb, "Requiem for a lost Palast" (as cited in note 65); Anke Kuhrmann, "The Palace of the Republic in Berlin. The Demolition of a Politically and Aesthetically Burdened Building," *Historic Environment* 25, no. 1 (2013), pp. 46–51.

82 Ladd, *The Ghosts of Berlin* (as cited in note 2), p. 59.

83 Colomb, "Requiem for a lost Palast" (as cited in note 65); Christos Varvantakis, "A monument to dismantlement," *Memory Studies* 2, no. 1 (2009), pp. 27–38.

most is probably the Palace of Culture (*Kulturpalast*) in Dresden, since both were designed in the 1960s in the GDR-modern style, and are rectangular with full-length windows covering their entire façades, although the latter not only escaped the fate of demolition after the fall of the GDR but is also undergoing a refurbishment which will be completed in April 2017.[84] Many other GDR-modern structures in Berlin have escaped demolition and have even been refurbished or conserved, e.g. the House of the Teacher (*Haus des Lehrers*) and *Kino International*.[85]

In 2008, the Berlin government held an architectural competition for the design of the upcoming *Schloss*, and the design by the architectural firm headed by Italian architect Franco Stella won the first prize. Subsequently, in 2011 the Berlin parliament voted for the establishment of the Humboldt Forum in the Schloss, which would consist of an Ethnological Museum, a Museum of Asian Art, a library for Non-European Art and Cultures, exhibition areas of the Humboldt University of Berlin, as well as other institutions, restaurants and public spaces. Ever since the removal of the Palast der Republik in 2008, Schloßplatz remained as an empty space in the heart of Berlin awaiting development, while there were ongoing debates on and oppositions to the reconstruction of the *Schloss*, which could be a representation of Berlin's uncertainty of the direction the city should be heading towards. Finally, in 2013, construction of the *Schloss* finally commenced.[86]

The establishment of the Humboldt Forum and the reconstruction of the *Berliner Schloss* represented the selective remembering and specific forgetting of certain historical events and the preference for certain narratives, and four main narratives underpinned the contentiousness of the resurrection of this Prussian-era icon.[87] First, proponents of the reconstruction saw the *Schloss* as a tool for Berlin to remember (and become) the European city that it should have always been. The Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation, which oversees the implementing of the Ethnological Museum and the Museum for Asian Art in the upcoming *Berliner Schloss*, emphasized on the importance of cities to have cultural sites in the defining of their image and identity, and that the *Schloss* could serve this purpose.[88]

84 Kulturpalast Dresden, *Baugeschichte des Kulturpalastes*, http://www.kulturpalast-dresden.de/baugeschichte.html, accessed 15 April 2017.

85 WBM, *The History of an Architectural Icon*, https://www.hausdeslehrers.de/en/history/, accessed 15 April 2017; Visit Berlin, *Kino International*, http://www.visitberlin.de/en/spot/kino-international, accessed 15 April 2017.

86 Kung Yin Ian Lo, *Narratives of Selective Remembering and Forgetting in Berlin. The Humboldt-Forum in the Reconstructed Berlin Palace*, Unpublished Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science.

87 Ibid.

88 Berlin Palace-Humboldtforum Foundation, *The Humboldt Forum. To be in Touch with as much as the World as Possible,* Berlin: Berlin Palace-Humboldtforum Foundation, 2011.

Similarly, the Berlin Palace Association asserted that the twentieth century buildings in Berlin had destroyed the city's original identity, thus the reconstructed *Schloss* could recover Berlin's lost aesthetic values and compensate for the inadequacies of modern architecture to establish Berlin as a major European city in the future.[89]

Second, opponents to the reconstruction perceived it as a selective adaptation of the desirable aspects of Berlin's history and a selective forgetting of those that are less desirable. The architect Philipp Oswalt, a strong critic of the project, regarded it as a utopian one which has chosen to link today's Berlin to an idealized version of pre-nineteenth century Berlin, ignoring the historical ruptures of the twentieth century which defined Berlin.[90] During an open house event in June 2016, when members of the public were invited to tour the construction site of the *Schloss*, I observed that the years "1443–2013" were inscribed on a large cornerstone at the main entrance, seemingly implying a historical continuity from the year of the laying of the foundation stone of the original *Schloss* to that of the new *Schloss*, and a direct connection between today's Germany and the Prussian empire, ignoring the historical events of the twentieth century and the Palast der Republik which once stood on the same spot.[91]

The third narrative behind the reconstruction of the *Schloss* was that it is a symbol of victory over communism after the end of the Cold War. During the GDR era, the demolition of the original *Schloss* and the construction of the Palast der Republik represented the triumph of communism, but the removal of the *Palast* after Germany's reunification was a symbolic victory over communism.[92]

Fourth, the establishment of the Humboldt Forum in the *Schloss* has also resurfaced issues related to Germany's colonial exploitations in the late nineteenth century. In the upcoming Ethnological Museum, some of the artefacts on display were obtained during Germany's colonization of parts of today's Namibia, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, Cameroon, Togo, and Ghana, and New Guinea and Samoa in the Pacific. Many non-governmental organizations have called for a moratorium on the Humboldt Forum because the display of these seized artefacts in a Prussian-

89 The Berlin Palace Association (German: Förderverein Berliner Schloss e.V.) is a not-for-profit association founded in 1992 by businessman Wilhelm von Boddien, Hamburg, in order to gain support for the reconstruction of the *Berliner Schloss*; see Berlin Palace Association, *New Images of Berlin 2019 | Berlin Palace*, Hamburg: *Förderverein Berliner Schloss e.V.*, 2016 http://berliner-schloss.de/en/new-palace/new-images-of-berlin-2019/, accessed 6 July 2016.

90 Philipp Oswalt, "Utopien und ihre Rekonstruktion," in Thomas Demand and Udo Kittelmann (eds.), *Nationalgalerie 'How German is it'*, Berlin: Suhrkmamp 2011, pp. 324–332.

91 Lo, *Narratives of Selective Remembering and Forgetting* (as cited in note 86).

92 Ibid.

Figure 11. Typical *Plattenbau* in Marzahn today

Source: Photo by the author

styled building was a form of glorification of the colonization under the Prussian Empire and violates the dignities of the people in the former colonies, and was also a form of exoticization of the non-European "other." With these artefacts added to the museum's collection, the City of Berlin and the Humboldt Forum would gain international acclamation and visitorship, while the people of the former colonies would continue to suffer from the loss of their cultural identities.[93] Despite all these controversies and the estimated cost of EUR 590 million, the reconstruction of the *Schloss* began in 2013, and is scheduled for completion in 2019.

The peripheral parts of Berlin have also experienced physical changes after the fall of communism. Along the S-Bahn route east of Alexanderplatz in the residential districts of Lichtenberg and Marzahn-Hellersdorf, although hundreds of communist-era high rise prefabricated apartment buildings like that in Figure 11 can still be seen today, the facades, insulation features and amenities in these buildings have already been upgraded.[94] In 1989, about a third of the former East Berlin's residents stayed in such buildings; after reunification, some West Berlin

93 Ibid.

94 Xiaoxi Hui, *Housing, Urban Renewal and Socio-Spatial Integration. A Study on Rehabilitating the Former Socialistic Public Housing Areas in Beijing.* Delft: TU Delft, 2013, pp. 564–581.

residents and politicians denounced the uniform design of these *Plattenbauten*, and there was a stereotype that they were inhabited by an undesirable populace, so they argued that they should be demolished because they were incompatible with the future of reunified Germany.[95]

One of the most notable Plattenbauten neighborhoods is Marzahn, at the eastern end of the S7 train line. Built between 1977 and 1990, and designed to house 400,000 citizens in 150,000 apartments, Marzahn was one of the largest housing projects in Europe, but it was not merely another typical modernist housing scheme designed the German Architectural Academy. In Marzahn, the complex narratives of radical modernity, utopian promises and newness were interwoven with the Socialist Unity Party's promise to bring "Real Existing Socialism" to East Berlin, and their responsibility to provide quality housing to legitimize its one-party rule over the GDR. Just as Karl-Marx-Allee was a model communist boulevard in early communism, so during late communism, Marzahn was a model district which dignitaries like Mikhail Gorbachev and Soviet cosmonauts visited when they visited Berlin.[96] Yet after the fall of communism, Marzahn was quickly perceived by outsiders as an unwelcomed ghetto and eyesore from the communist era in Berlin.[97]

After the collapse of communism, shopping malls sprang up in Mitte district, the heart of the former East Berlin. Potsdamer Platz Arcade, one of the first developments on the former death strip between East and West Berlin, opened in 1998.[98] Alexanderplatz, which the anthropologist Gisa Weszkalnys described as an empty space in the heart of the former East Berlin,[99] was transformed into a shopping district after new shopping centers were opened in the 1990s. In 2009, Marzahn finally achieved a significant milestone in the post-communist transition—Eastgate shopping center was opened (Figure 12). Situated next to Marzahn railway station, Eastgate boasts a futuristic façade but a standard, run-of-the-mill interior and selection of shops, not dissimilar to other shopping centers in the country.[100] Marzahn was where "Real Existing Socialism" was to be realized in the GDR era, but now it is where "Real Existing Capitalism" is being experienced. If

95 Ladd, *The Ghosts of Berlin* (as cited in note 2), p. 191.
96 Eli Rubin, "Concrete Utopia. Everyday Life and Socialism in Berlin-Marzahn," in Uta A Balbier and Cristina Cuevas-Wolf and Joes Segal (eds.), *East German Material Culture and the Power of Memory,* pp. 29–45.
97 Eli Rubin, *Amnesiopolis. Modernity, Space, and Memory in East Germany*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
98 Visit Berlin, *Potsdamer Platz Arkaden*, http://www.visitberlin.de/en/node/3239, accessed 4 January 2017.
99 Weszkalnys, *Berlin Alexanderplatz* (as cited in note 73).
100 Malls.com, *Eastgate*, http://www.malls.com/de/malls/eastgate.html, accessed 4 January 2017.

Figure 12. Eastgate, Marzahn

Source: Photo by the author

the opening of shopping centers is evidence of the transition towards post-communism, Eastgate finally brought Marzahn into the new era in 2009, much later than inner East Berlin. Yet Marzahn's transition is reminiscent of Sýkora and Bouzarovski's concept of how the peripheral areas in East Central European cities tend to retain more of the communist urban typologies than the central areas after the fall of communism—situated at the northeastern end of the S-Bahn network, Marzahn is one of the last places in Berlin to be redesigned, and despite capitalist features such as shopping centers and billboards, the hundreds of high-rise concrete apartments still "resemble frozen mirrors of socialism."[101] However, under the "Urban Development Concept Berlin 2030," the IGA 2017 (International Horticultural Exhibition) is currently being held in the Gardens of the World in Marzahn as part of the over-arching aim of decentralizing Berlin's urban growth and tourist destinations, and transforming the image of the district by bringing international visitors to *Marzahn*—perhaps another milestone in its transition from a communist-era residential neighborhood.[102]

101 Sýkora and Bouzarovski, "Multiple Transformations" (as cited in note 4), pp. 44–45.
102 IGA Berlin 2017, https://iga-berlin-2017.de/en/faq, accessed 14 April 2017.

Figure 13. Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe

Source: Photo by the author

In line with the "general memorial obsessions"[103] in post-reunification Germany, in present-day Berlin there are about 600 monuments which commemorate historical events and atrocities that were not acknowledged during the Cold War. Cities often build monuments to demonstrate that they are able to include their ruptured histories into their modern-day rhetoric and landscapes.[104] One of the largest structures is the Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe built to remember the six million Jews killed during the Holocaust,[105] which consists of 2,711 concrete blocks in the geographical center of Berlin (Figure 13), close to other historically-important sites like the former headquarters of Gestapo, Hitler's bunker, Brandenburg Gate and the former Berlin Wall.[106] Completed in 2005, these blocks range from a few centimeters to three meters high, and resemble coffins without any inscriptions. They were built on an artificially-created undulating

103 Huyssen, *Present Pasts* (as cited in note 2), p. 52.
104 Elke Grenzer, "The Topographies of Memory in Berlin: The Neue Wache and the Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe," *Canadian Journal of Urban Research* 11, no. 1 (2002), pp. 93–110.
105 Jocelyn Hellig, *The Holocaust and Antisemitism. A Short History.* Oxford: Oneworld, 2003.
106 Maike Mügge, "Politics, Space and Material: the 'Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe' in Berlin as a Sign of Symbolic Representation," *European Review of History* 15, no. 6 (2008), pp. 707–725.

ground with narrow passageways running between the blocks, and such a design was intended to make visitors feel uneasy or disturbed. The architect Peter Eisenmann "attempted to decontextualise the Holocaust, in the sense of trying to see it as a cut in the history of Germany."[107] Grenzer argued that in contemporary Germany, most people have never experienced war and the Holocaust first-hand and will never be able to fully grasp them as a memory.[108] However, these postwar generations have still been affected by the consequences of the war, thus Holocaust memorials attempt to map out the collective trauma of these generations as "victims of a history [that they] did not create."[109] Such memorials will serve as critical tools for the average German or visitor to come to terms with the Holocaust and its effects on the world.[110] Although there is no perfect solution in memorialising the Holocaust, it must be memorialised in a country like Germany which is committed to creating a democratic future and ensuring that atrocities like that will never happen again.[111]

Conclusion: Berlin, July 2016

Twenty-seven years after Germany's reunification, any visitor to Berlin will still be constantly reminded of all the layers of history. Today's Berlin, with its efforts in resolving its traumatic past while constantly preparing itself to be a modern capital city, can be represented by the German word *Gegenwartsbewältigung*, meaning coming to terms with the present.[112]

Communist-era architecture and planning still has a significant effect on today's Berlin, in the form of the socialist realist showcase boulevard of Karl-Marx-Allee and the numerous high-rise residential buildings in the city center and peripheries of the former East Berlin. These buildings from Berlin's past lives as a Nazi and then a communist city represent lost dreams of two distinct futures which were partly fulfilled before they were abruptly disrupted by the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, and the collapse of communism in 1989 respectively.

The social geographers Sýkora and Bouzarovski suggested that urban transitions in post-communist ECE cities are incomplete and uneven. In Berlin, the

107 Simon Houpt, "Building a Different View of Memory," *The Globe and Mail Canada*, 7 Feb. 2001.
108 Grenzer, "The Topographies of Memory in Berlin" (as cited in note 104).
109 Stephen K. Levine, "Mimetic Wounds: From Tragedy to Trauma. An Essay/Review," *Poeisis* 3 (2001), pp. 126–132 (128).
110 Grenzer, "The Topographies of Memory in Berlin" (as cited in note 104).
111 Huyssen, *Present Pasts* (as cited in note 2).
112 Ibid., p. 15.

process is further complicated by its Nazi history, and there have been ongoing debates on how remnant structures from the two undesirable eras of Nazism and communism should be managed or whether they should be demolished. While the *Avenue of Splendors* and its mega sized buildings such as *The Great Hall of the People* were not completed, a few buildings such as Tempelhof Airport still stand and remind people of the era of Nazi Berlin.

While urban transitions in ECE cities after communism are inevitable and not undesirable per se, in discourses of post-communist urban transitions it is problematic to think that the transitions from communist urban typologies to capitalist ones across different cities should follow the same trajectory, and that in the present-day, any form of urban relic from the communist era is incompatible should be removed. First, just as cities in Western Europe have unique urban forms, there was no universal communist urban typology and there should not be a universal capitalist urban typology that ECE cities should follow. Second, urban transition is not a phenomenon unique to post-communist cities—cities in general are dynamic and everchanging. Third, many communist-era buildings such as the demolished Palast der Republik or the Berlin Fernsehturm (TV Tower) are heritage buildings in their own right, and are symbolic representations of Berlin's formative post-war years. Removing these relics would be an irreversible loss of cultural heritage. Yet across ECE many communist-era buildings have often not been conserved and are abandoned or sometimes demolished. In Berlin, most of the structures in Alexanderplatz have been retained, albeit with refurbishments, except for the House of Statistics which seems to have been abandoned.[113] Finally, it should be noted that urban transition should be seen as a never-ending process, and it is not possible to define whether Berlin or other ECE cities have already completed their transitions, nor predict when these cities will have fully transitioned from a communist to a capitalist one.

Berlin might have been Europe's largest construction site in the 1990s, but today there are still many upcoming developments such as the Berliner Schloss, the future "Urban Tech Republic" at the existing Tegel Airport, "Europa City" around Berlin's Central Railway Station, and the Berlin-Brandenburg Airport which is scheduled for operations in 2018 after a seven-year delay. As the geographer Alexander Tölle concludes, Berlin, having experienced three historical eras

113 CityLab, "Alexanderplatz Is Difficult to Love, But Berlin Wants to Save It Anyway," http://www.citylab.com/design/2013/09/alexanderplatz-difficult-love-berlin-wants-save-it-anyway/6787/, accessed 20 April 2017.

within just a century, seems to still have "no clear idea of its current identity and its future, and therefore it returns to what it is most famous for: change."[114] Therefore, Berlin today can still be accurately described by the cultural critic Karl Scheffler's comment in 1910: Berlin is a city fated "forever to become and never to be."[115]

114 Alexander Tölle, "Urban Identity Policies in Berlin: from Critical Reconstruction to Reconstructing the Wall," *Cities* 27 (2010), pp. 348–357 (356).
115 Huyssen, *Present Pasts* (as cited in note 2), p. 31.

Stephanie Weismann

Smellscapes of Transition. Prospects and Potentials of a Sensory Approach to Study East Central Europe

This is a short reflection on studying "cultures of transition"[1] from a sensory history perspective. I intend to introduce some preliminary thoughts, based on recent studies, focusing on the history of East Central and Eastern Europe in the twentieth century from a sensory perspective. This contribution discusses the prospects of the rather novel sensory approach to study the history of the region. It introduces recent approaches, indicates research lacunae and discusses the impact of the human sensorium to study transformation.

Sensory Studies

Sensory Studies hold a lot of promise when investigating East Central European history and its transitions, because "senses are not only apprehending, but form avenues for the transmission of cultural values, social classifications."[2] The prominent advocate of sensory history Mark M. Smith argues: "Sensory history is not only about the history of a given sense but also its social and cultural construction and its role in texturing the past."[3] Thus, sensory studies are about exploring, investigating and scrutinizing the full social and cultural contexts of (sensory) experiences.

Among the senses, it is especially the sense of smell that strongly influences us in how we appreciate the atmosphere of a given place,[4] but also the atmosphere

1 Based on a conference paper for "Cultures in Times of Transition: Europe 1985–2004" at the *Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Polenstudien* (ZIP) in Frankfurt/Oder, July 2016.

2 Kelvin Low, "Ruminations on Smell as a Sociocultural Phenomenon," *Current Sociology* 53, no. 3 (2005), pp. 397–417 (411).

3 Mark M. Smith, *Sensing the Past: Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting, and Touching in History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007, p. 4.

4 See John Urry, "City Life and the Senses," in Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson (ed.), *A Companion to the City*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008, pp. 388–397; Paul Rodaway, *Sensuous Geographies*. London: Chapman & Hall, 1994.

of a certain time in history. Scent "is ubiquitous, persistent and has an unparalleled connection to memory, but is usually overlooked,"[5] as the sense of smell traditionally ranged among the lower senses, referred to as an "animalistic sense."[6] It is the odors, however, which crucially complement the atmosphere of a place in time. Nosing around the twentieth century makes us understand which smells mark past eras, which ones represent a new time, and which ones seem to be constant.

These *smellscapes*[7]—the full smell-scenery of a space or place—"do exist at varying levels of scale, ranging from continents, countries, regions, cities, neighborhoods up to houses, staircases, rooms and drawers."[8] *Smellscapes* are constituted by various aspects: People (shaping the *sensescape* of their neighborhood), places (from the past and the present, like market places, train stations etc.), objects—in particular consumed products (cleaning agents, (fast) food etc.).[9] The encounter with smells is strongly linked with emotions. Therefore, *smellscapes* are intrinsic to the social constructions of space and its various political and socio-cultural implications. "By paying closer attention to the smells that filled the air, historians can literally sniff out complex social/political conditions or conflicts."[10] An incorporation of the senses into historical inquiry, an evaluation of senses as agents of historical research, thus, holds great potential. Smell perceptions give important insights into physically and socially constructed environments: Which smells affected people and how smells influenced the perception of everyday life? How do these smells reflect socio-cultural, economic, ecological and political continuities and transformations?

Smells and transformation

Smell often signals transformation—as olfaction always had an important warning function by drawing our attention to changes in the environment,[11] changing

5 Victoria Henshaw, *Urban Smellscapes*. London: Routledge, 2014.
6 See Constance Classen and David Howes, *Aroma: The Cultural History of Smell*. London: Routledge, 1994.
7 See Douglas Porteous, "Smellscape [1985]," in Jim Drobnick (ed.), *The Smell Culture Reader*. Oxford, New York: Berg, 2006, pp. 89–106.
8 Jim Drobnick, "Toposmia: Art, Scent, and Interrogations of Spatiality," *Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities* 7, no. 1 (2002), pp. 31–47 (33).
9 Martyna Sliwa and Kathleen Riach, "Making Scents of Transition: Smellscapes and the Everyday in 'Old' and 'New' Urban Poland," *Urban Studies* 49, no. 1 (2012), p. 23–41 (36).
10 Connie Y. Chiang, "Monterey-by-the-Smell: Odors and Social Conflict on the California Coastline," *Pacific Historical Review* 73, no. 2 (2004), pp. 183–214 (214).
11 See Trygg Engen, *The Perception of Odors*. New York: Academic Press, 1982.

smellscapes are likely to reflect transitional processes.[12] Thus, smell-awareness is an indicator (and result) of changing political and social practice. In the context of this anthology's focus we can ask: Which were the significant odors preceding, indicating or marking transition in East Central Europe around the crucial years of 1989/1990?

Transition has been rather a process than a caesura, and consists of more than mere political and economic events. Instead, it can be understood as "a comprehensive, sustainable and irreversible process of intense change encompassing all areas of society, and hence the political, economic, social and cultural spheres."[13] So far, most of the publications on transition on East Central and Eastern Europe is still focusing on the political and economic changes, however, this process encompassed all spheres of life and started long before 1989. Thus, it is fruitful to open research on transition to cultural and social spheres, focusing increasingly on subjective or individual experiences, that is how transformation processes were perceived by ordinary people in their everyday life.[14] In this context, it is sensible to put further emphasis on the human sensorium, which holds enormous potential to study transition from a different perspective. However, the amount of studies narrating the history of the region from a sensory perspective is still negligible.

The *smellscapes* of East Central and Eastern Europe

The sense of smell includes a physiological as well as a socio-cultural dimension of perception: In *The Smells, Sights and Sounds of Transition*, the Swiss journalist Christoph Neidhart states that

> [t]he Soviet Union smelled different. […] The scents of hard soap, bleach, chlorine, and floor polish had all but disappeared from Western households and given way to more elegant odors. In the Soviet Union they prevailed. […] Soviet streets smelled of diesel and dust, Soviet houses of cabbage and chlorine. The staircases were musty and reeked of cat urine.[15]

12 See Alain Corbin, *The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French Social Imagination*. Cambridge/Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988; Adam Mack, *Sensing Chicago. Noisemakers, Strikebreakers, and Muckrakers*. University of Illinois Press, 2015; for Eastern Europe see Alexander Martin, "Sewage and the City: Filth, Smell, and Representations of Urban Life in Moscow, 1770–1880," *The Russian Review* 67 (2008), pp. 243–74.

13 Florian Kühler-Wielach, Sarah Lemmen (ed.): Introduction to *Transformation in East Central Europe: 1918 and 1989. A Comparative Approach*. *European Review of History* 2016, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 573–579 (573).

14 As suggested by Philipp Ther, *Die Neue Ordnung auf dem alten Kontinent: Eine Geschichte des neoliberalen Europa*. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014, p. 31.

15 Christoph Neidhart, *Russia's Carnival: The Smells, Sights, and Sounds of Transition*. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, p. 95 and pp. 98–90.

When reading Neidhart's description of the *sensescapes* of the Soviet Union, one has to acknowledge similar sensory encounters in the so-called Eastern Bloc. Pre-1989 odors in Eastern Bloc countries are often described as strong and distinctive. During the 1980s in the 'West,' the 'East' was associated with an intense smell of coal and diesel. Both smells were not uncommon in the West decades earlier, but had almost vanished in the 1980s. The question here is, are we confronted with a mere outsider's perspective, which recalls certain (prejudicial) experiences and stereotypes of the "East?" Do Neidhart's observations reflect a kind of "othering," intrinsically linked to the notion of Eastern or communist "backwardness?" Certainly, the Iron Curtain symbolized not only an ideological-political border, but embodied also some kind of sensory, olfactory divide. Here, research on the notion of backwardness through the perception of "outmoded" aromas of questionable hygiene and obsolete cleansing agents would be of great interest in the context of the history of a divided Europe.

Speaking of cleansing agents so unpleasing to the "Western" nose: If we consider "sensory bloc" of communist countries, assumed by "Western" observers, we should ask, how these "other" *smellscapes* were perceived by its actual inhabitants? What about, for instance, the smell of chlorine, a common cleansing and disinfection agent in schools, shops, offices and hospitals, experienced as distinctively "Soviet" by Neidhart? For former Soviet citizens, the intrusive smell of chlorine unanimously symbolizes the unloved *smellscape* of collectivity and common space in the Soviet Union.[16] Russian interviewees refer to it as repulsive omnipresent Soviet *smellscape*, touching strongly on notions of private and public, individual and collective. Chlorine has not been a phenomenon of the Soviet Union only, but affected the Eastern Bloc in general. It is one of the intrusive, omnipresent odors shaping a collective sensory experience of "public" space and/or political entity. Although this shared olfactory experience has a negative overtone, it also gives account of its strong collective perception and thus, of a certain shared olfactorium.

This shared olfactorium or *sensescape* can also be intrinsic for shaping a notion of selfhood and identity.[17] Already in the 1940s Russians, for instance, distinguished themselves from capitalist Americans based on scent. Communist Soviets saw themselves as living in a full textured olfactory world where "everything

16 Maria Pirogovskaya, "Odour of Chlorine in Soviet Urban Reality: Notes on the Clean and the Collective," in Robert Beck, Ulrike Krampl, and Emmanuelle Retaillaud-Bajac (eds.), *Les Cinq Sens De La Ville Du Moyen Âge À Nos Jours*. Tours: Presses universitaires de Tours, 2013, pp. 199–210.

17 For the Russian case see: Alison K. Smith, "Fermentation, Taste, and Identity," and Tricia Starks, "The Taste, Smell, and Semiotics of Cigarettes," in Matthew P. Romaniello, Tricia Starks (ed.), *Russian History through the Senses from 1700 to the Present*. London: Bloomsbury, 2016, pp. 45–66 and pp. 97–116.

smells" in contrast to the Americans with their "bland sterile air."[18] Whereas Russians "expect things to smell, especially food,"[19] they thought that American food and vegetables were rather odorless. "Russians styled their *smellscape* as richer, fuller, more emotional and sensuous than the tepid, faint, and withered American one."[20] Therefore, the sensory approach opens the possibility to study Cold War-identities from a different perspective. Smell-ascriptions and self-descriptions tell us about stereotypes and othering from outside (Neidhart), but even more about self-definitions and (political, socio-cultural) identity, as "odors play a crucial role in internalizing one's culture as well as in shaping one's identity."[21] Smell-ascriptions generally are an important key to distinguish between "we" and "them," "olfactory othering" is applicable for all sorts of "selfhood" and of "otherhood." That also includes the olfactory differentiation between Eastern Bloc and the West. In this context, it is worth asking which (political/ideological) beliefs are communicated through sensory perception? How to generalize these sensory encounters? But also, if or in what way "othering" and self-perceptions might overlap, as they both are strongly shaped by stereotypes and/or official politics.

The shared olfactorium mentioned earlier changed significantly in the process of transition, as an interview with a Cracow citizen suggests:

> After 1989 people started to smell more pleasantly, although, still when one gets on a bus, it stinks. But these are people from lower 'casts.' Richer people move around in cars and on a daily basis don't smell it. In the past, we all used to stink in the same way so it wasn't that disturbing.[22]

"We used to stink the same" refers to a collective history and a shared (collective) olfactorium. This previously shared olfactory aura signified a positive collectivity, including the notion of equality and fraternity, so eagerly emphasized by the authorities of Socialist countries. Although the loss of a "collective stink" before 1989 is not bemoaned, it still addresses the issue of a new class-consciousness after 1989/1990, identifying the losers or winners of the transformation-process through their un/pleasant smells. The diverse *smellscapes* of different modes of transportation signify increasing social distinction and ruptures generally observed after the fall of communism. The Socialist's idea of (sensory) collectivity, whether approved or rejected, was dissolved in olfactory/sensory judgements.

18 Magret Mead and Rhoda Metraux, *The Study of Culture at a Distance*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2000, pp. 174–182 (177–78, "Russian Sensory Images").
19 Ibid.
20 Smith, *Sensing the Past* (as cited in note 3), p. 73.
21 Uri Almagor, "Odors and Private Language: Observations on the Phenomenology of Scent," *Human Studies* 13, no. 3 (1990), 253–274 (256).
22 Sliwa and Riach, "Scents of Transition" (as cited in note 9), p. 32.

However, something was in the air long before 1989/90, hinting at transformational processes. While chlorine triggered exclusively negative connotations, the pungent smell of *denaturat*—denatured alcohol—during Polish People's Republic (PRL) underwent a semantic shift, thus indicating change. At some point, it did not only serve as cheap surrogate alcohol, but also for conspirative printing machines in Poland in the 1970/80s, mostly using *denaturat* for reproduction. Witnesses involved in illegal printing agreed: "The denaturat-printers smelled awfully. To print in an apartment block implied that you are hosting a drunkard's nest."[23] The familiar aroma of alcoholics now changed semantics. The testimony also addresses the fact that you cannot hide smells and you cannot hide from smells, smells are ubiquitous and thus demonstrate the challenge as well as the potential of studying *smellscapes*: "The very problem was the stench of denaturat, which pervaded everything, especially our clothes, and above that this stench circulated in the staircases—which raised the attention of the neighbors."[24] or

> We tried to find a place in the countryside. There you didn't have the problem with stench – whereas in flats, when we were printing in our homes, you could smell it in the whole staircase. If someone was sensitive to smell, he would realize that something was going on there.[25]

Importantly, these smell references also tell us about everyday problems of cohabitation—the fear that someone would sense that something "was going on," the threat of suspicion up to denunciation. Smells can be familiar and intimate and thus are revealing when it comes to their meaning: On the communal staircases, there was a mingling of the "communist" smell of soup and the dissident's or drunkard's smell of *denaturat*. Chlorine stood for the hygienical hysteria of a backward region, as well as the notion of collectivity forced on people's everyday sensorium. On the other hand, the familiar aroma of *denaturat* would undergo a transformation from the air of alcoholic's resignation to the air of change and opposition. Thus, we can conclude that the *smellscapes* of Eastern Bloc's staircases do not only tell us about lifestyles and cuisines, but also that different worldviews were emanating from various doorsteps. By following the changing effluvium of staircases, we can observe transformations towards transition already from the 1970s on.

23 Paweł Nowacki, "Niezwykła przygoda," *Scriptores: Drogi do wolności: spotkania* 2, no. 39 (2011), pp. 147–156 (151–152).

24 Maciej Sobieraj, "Okres romantyczny 'Spotkań,'" *Scriptores: Drogi do wolnosci: spotkania* 2, no. 39 (2011), pp. 181–200 (195).

25 Anna Samolińska, "Drukowanie bez lęku," *Scriptores: Drogi do wolnosci: spotkania*, 2, no. 39 (2011), pp. 157–170 (169).

Also, descriptions of *smellscapes* are a major resource to recognize the move from a socialist past towards becoming a nation of Westerners. Whereas Cold War perceptions stylized Soviet Union's *sensescapes* as more distinct, more real (in the United States, "one can walk from one floor of a department store to another, without being able to tell by the smell what merchandise is being sold. In Russia every store smelled of its wares, and smelled strongly"[26]) we can trace different perceptions of this 'authentic' *smellscape* and its transformation after 1989/90, as a Polish citizen recalls:

> How would one recognize a grocery shop in Poland or Eastern Bloc countries in general? …by the wrapping of milk, the wrapping of cheese, unwashed vitrines. There was such a smell, that you really had to be very resistant …a dreadful stench…after transition it changed—suddenly it smells nice in shops, it is clean.[27]

This gives us an idea, which role odors play in people's everyday experience and understanding of transition, when the senses in general—that is sight, sound, scent, taste and touch—were subjected to new and very different sensations.[28] Smell is also conflated with specific social and cultural practices—the interviewed here insinuates the insufficient refrigeration and uncleanliness of the communist shop in contrast to the pleasantly (de-)odorized modern supermarket. Political transition and economic globalization around 1989 paved the way for new aromas and made familiar scents disappear. The influx of new products brought new sensorial experiences into society. In this context, sensory studies also offer fruitful insights on the issue of food supply and groceries. Observing the transformation of the *sensescapes* of a shop from the famous empty shelves of communism to the rich choice of the globalized supermarket, one can study globalization and economic restructuring, new spaces of production and consumption as well as processes of acculturation.[29]

26 Cited after Constance Classen, *Worlds of Sense: Exploring the Senses in History and across Cultures*. London: Routledge, 1993, p. 92.

27 Marcin Waciński, *Sklepy spożywcze w demoludach* (fragment relacji świadka historii 2014), Oral history archive Ośrodek "Brama Grodzka - Teatr NN": http://biblioteka.teatrnn.pl/dlibra/dlibra/docmetadata?id=50418&from=&dirids=198&ver_id=&lp=1&QI=, accessed 4 July 2017

28 See Neidhart, *Russia's Carnival* (cited in note 14), p. 81.

29 See the section "The Senses in the Marketplace" of the 6-volume-series: J. P. Toner, Constance Classen, Richard Newhauser, Herman Roodenburg, Anne C. Vila, and David Howes eds., *A Cultural History of the Senses* (from Antiquity to the Modern Age), New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014; Adam Mack, "Speaking of Tomatoes: Supermarkets, the Senses, and Sexual Fantasy in Modern America," *Journal of Social History* 43, no. 4 (2010), pp. 815–42.

Prospects and Call for a Sensory History of Transition

This contribution only touches on few possible olfactory aspects of studying the history of East Central and Eastern Europe around the crucial transition of 1989/90. However, I would like to conclude that by observing the flow of *smellscapes*, by sniffing out what was in the air, we can, among others, trace processes of transformation. Strongly interconnected with the *smellscapes* of transition of 1989/90 are the distinct odors preceding and following the process, reflecting old and new systems, societal identities and ascriptions, notions of selfhood and otherhood as well as culture-specific sensibilities. The smell of *denaturat*, emanating from the doorsteps of the 1970/80s in Poland, despite its stench, symbolized a new wind blowing in society. The *smellscape* of chlorine and unwashed shop vitrines vs. that of deodorant and deodorized supermarkets narrate the formation of a (sensory) divide of Europe in the twentieth century, but also the processes of globalization and sensory acculturation. As odors are of great importance when it comes to the construction of "self" and "others," the sense of smell is often used unconsciously to distinguish between "us" and "them." This can be applied to ethnic and social othering, but contains special potential when it comes to political or ideological differentiations and a new class consciousness after transition. When studying cultures of transition, an analysis of the sensory identities during the Cold War and sensory rapprochements during the process of transformation and globalization seems beneficial.

The sources and studies cited mostly draw on ego-documents and narrative interviews. Narrative interviews are highly useful documents in search of smell perception and olfactory memory[30]—recalling is an overwhelmingly sensory act.[31] It brings out associations with local sites and atmospheres. Enhancing studies of the history of everyday life, we trace old and new smells and their symbolisms and thus get scent of distinct *smellscapes* as part of a personal and general history.[32] Personal sensorial recollections as introduced above give valuable insights into (urban) everyday life under transition. This paper refers mainly to studies based

30 See Pamela Hamilton, "The Proust Effect: Oral History and Senses," Donald A. Ritchie (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Oral History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 71–86.

31 Dennis D. Waskul and Phillip Vannini, "The Aroma of Recollection: Olfaction, Nostalgia, and the Shaping of the Sensuous Self," *Senses and Society* 4, no. 1 (2009), pp. 5–22; Alan R. Hirsch, "Nostalgia, the Odors of Childhood and Society," in Jim Drobnick (ed.), *The Smell Culture Reader*. Oxford: Bloomsbury, pp. 187–189.

32 See also Susanna Trnka, "When the World Went Color: Emotions, Senses and Spaces in Contemporary Accounts of the Czechoslovak Velvet Revolution," *Emotion, Space and Society*, no. 5 (2012), pp. 45–51.

on interviews or other personal recollections. For the Polish case I strongly recommend the material of the two main oral history archives, the Polish *KARTA Center Foundation*[33] documenting the recent history of Poland and history of Eastern Europe with biographic accounts of the twentieth century history witnesses, as well as *The Grodzka-Gate-Center*[34] with their Oral History Programme, collecting of audio and video recorded memories of witnesses of various historical events and Polish (everyday) life, with a special focus on opposition and underground publishing in the 1980s. These testimonies have great potential to be surveyed regarding sensory aspects. Besides, drawing on older sociologists' field work research could be beneficial for studying everyday life *sensescapes*. The *Archiwum Danych Jakościowich*[35] of the Polish Academy of Science (PAN), for instance, contains a highly interesting collection of life style-research on various Polish towns between 1976 and 1980.

Because the close relationship between olfactory perception, memory, nostalgia and the self has been studied thoroughly already,[36] it would be worthwhile to survey some of the popular "nostalgia"-webpages on East Central and Eastern Europe or certain nostalgia TV-channels for sensory accounts and testimonies about e.g. the "lost *sensescapes* of childhood" or the sensory impacts of transition and the fall of the Iron Curtain.[37] Looking at the broader sensory spectrum of East Central and Eastern Europe will crucially enhance studies on the history of the region, especially in the context of transition.

33 http://www.karta.org.pl/, accessed 14 February 2018.
34 http://teatrnn.pl/, accessed 14 February 2018.
35 http://www.adj.ifispan.pl/o_archiwum, accessed 14 February 2018.
36 Hamilton, *The Proust Effect* (as cited in note 30).
37 As for example the Russian "nostalgia-TV," a 24-h-TV-channel with the slogan "something to remember" for those "who appreciate the idols of the past," http://www.nostalgiatv.ru/, accessed 14 February 2018.

Tomáš Samek

Test the West. Transformations of Central European Ideas of Belonging to the West

The close relationship between the notions of "culture" and "language" led some scholars to the conclusion that it often makes more sense to speak of an integral concept of "language culture," rather than analyzing the two notions separately.[1] Consequently, the study of the cultures in transition requires a certain amount of attention to be paid to the linguistic aspect of the transition processes. Language interactions in public space have been both expressive and constitutive of varied thoughts and images, by means of which European populations have identified with "the West." In most European countries, the sense of political and sociocultural belonging to the West has changed in time. This chapter focuses on how that sense has evolved in (predominantly eastern part of) Germany and the Czech Republic between the late 1989 and the early 2015. I explore the developments in the fluid notions of "we" as reflected in, and created by, the most salient parts of public discourses—slogans used in public rallies.

In late 1989 and early 1990, the West was the much desired other for many citizens of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic; at the turn of 2014 and 2015, the West frequently became a rhetoric means by which to protect "us" against the undesired other, i.e. the (often Muslim) migrants coming from non-European territories—the East and the South. The once cheerful we-want-to-be-part-of-the-West attitude has been, by some people at least, transformed into a much less cheerful we-don't-want-others-to-be-part-of-the-West.

Despite juxtaposing various time periods after all, the starting point as well as the dominant perspective of the chapter is synchronic. First, I examine language and discourse, using a special methodological and conceptual tool developed in my recent book,[2] *A Deictic Perspective*, an innovative amalgam of certain synchronic

1 Michael Agar, *Language Shock: Understanding the Culture of Conversation.* New York: Quill–William Morrow, 1994.

2 Tomáš Samek, *Tahle země je naše: Český a německý veřejný prostor v deiktické perspektivě [This Land is Our Land: Czech and German Public Space—A Deictic Perspective].* Pardubice: Univerzita Pardubice, 2016.

approaches utilized in linguistic anthropology and social semiotics. Second, I compare the results of such analysis of 1989/1990, and of 2014/2015. Though it may appear diachronic, the approach is not historical; rather it contrasts the results of a synchronic analysis applied to two different time periods, some twenty-five years apart. First, however, theoretical and methodological questions have to be clarified: What is the deictic perspective, and what kind of light does it shed on the social, cultural and political identities linguistically manifested in the public sphere?

Deictic perspective

The Viennese linguist and psychologist Karl Bühler divided language into two semiautonomous subfields: The symbolic field (*Symbolfeld*), and the deictic field (*Zeigfeld*).[3] The former comprises all words and expressions whose referent (i.e., a person or thing to which a linguistic expression refers) is relatively independent of a given speech situation (e.g. *table, horse, justice*), whereas the latter consists of those expressions whose referent is substantially determined by the context and/or situation of a given speech act (e.g. *I, you, we, there, yesterday*). While the referent of the word *table* usually does not change if pronounced by a speaker *X* or *Y*, the referent of the word *I* changes considerably if uttered by a different person.[4] Therefore, the actual meaning of any deictic expression depends upon the position the expression occupies in deictic field, the center of which is called the *origo*. Origo is the *here-now-I center* of each speaker's subjective orientation: The center of the deictic field is often situated in his or her mind, thus contributing to the semiosis of any deictic word(s).

Three axes may be distinguished in the deictic field: A *spatial* axis comprises of such expressions as *there* and *this way*; a *temporal* axis comprises of expressions such as *then*, *later*, *tomorrow*, or *yesterday*; and a *personal* axis comprises of expressions such as *you*, *we*, *ours*, and *they*. All three axes share a common ground or a starting point in the origo: The spatial axis starts in *here* of the speech situation, the temporal in 'now,' and the personal in *I*. This is the core of Bühlerian theory of deixis. In contrast to that theory, I propose three central innovations:

3 Karl Bühler, *Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache.* Stuttgart: Uni-Taschenbücher, 1965 [1934].

4 Compare also with the notion of "shifters" as described in Jakobson and in Silverstein: Roman Jakobson, *Shifters, verbal categories and the Russian verb.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957; Michael Silverstein, "Shifters, linguistic categories, and cultural description," in Keith H. Basso and Henry A. Selby (eds.), *Meaning in Anthropology*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976, pp. 11–56.

The origo is not inextricably bound to speaker. The listener/recipient and even the message have their own kinds of origo, that interact with the speaker's origo in establishing web of complex deictic meanings of a speech situation. Every symbolic expression has its deictic potential that can be foregrounded in a given context or situation: Thus, each symbol is protodeictic to an extent and this protodeictic potential may be turned into actual deictic meaning in a given situation.

In an analogous way, every deictic expression has its symbolic potential that can be foregrounded in a certain context or situation: Thus, each deictic expression is protosymbolic.

Therefore, the symbolic and deictic fields are united into an *integral symbolic-deictic field*.[5]

Especially the third point is relevant for what I call a deictic perspective, and it needs to be clarified briefly. Whereas Bühler juxtaposes and separates the two fields to a substantial degree, I integrate them into a single unit with only two opposite poles—the deictic one and the symbolic one. Consequently, the whole of language is spread as a continuum between two extreme poles since each linguistic expression has both deictic and symbolic component: The stronger the deictic component of a particular expression, the closer is that expression situated toward the deictic pole; the stronger the symbolic component of an expression, the closer is the expression situated toward the symbolic pole. In other words, since I consider each word or collocation of words as having both deictic and symbolic component (at least in terms of potential meaning), the entirety of any given language and, by the same token, the entire symbolic-deictic field looks as follows:

Figure 1. Expressions and collocations positioned in a united symbolic-deictic field according to their increasing motivation by origo



Source: Translated and slightly adapted from Samek[6]

As an instructive example, let us take the collocation "former regime" (*minulý režim* in Czech), often used in contemporary Czech to denote the state-socialist

5 Samek, *Tahle země je naše* (as cited in note 2), p. 50–65.
6 Ibid., p. 62.

regime in Czechoslovakia 1948–1989 (in less politically correct speech, it is also referred to as *the Communist regime*). Although the referential meaning may look symbolic at first, it is obvious that the referent would change if uttered, say, not in recent Prague but in Madrid: Suddenly it might denote the Francoist regime. The meaning would shift, thus being dependent on context/situation, which provides evidence that the collocation may foreground its deictic potential meaning and function as a deictic expression under certain circumstances.

In Figure 1, the expressions closer to the deictic pole have and reveal a stronger deictic component in their meaning while the expressions closer to the symbolic pole have a stronger symbolic component. Nonetheless, even *I* as the most deictic of all the words in that scheme has a (weak but certain) protosymbolic potential that can be foregrounded in sentences such as "The human *I* is constitutive of the world that surrounds it." On the opposite side of the spectrum, *table* as the most symbolic of all aforementioned words has a (weak but certain) protodeictic potential that may be foregrounded in a given speech act.

Now the *deictic perspective* can be defined as analytical approach that examines a given phenomenon (be it a process or a state-of-affairs) by posing the following question: To what extent can that phenomenon be projected onto the integral symbolic-deictic field? That is, what kind of similarities can be discerned in the dynamic structure of that phenomenon that make it analogous to the dynamic structure of the symbolic-deictic field? What can we see in the fluid world of social identities and communicative interactions, as long as we watch that world through the lenses of a broadly conceived notion of deixis?

From a deictic perspective, it is clear for instance that the dual and ever-shifting concepts of "identity" versus "alterity" may be, to a certain extent, projected onto the integral symbolic-deictic field. Such mental operation reveals that "identity" tends to being closer to the origo than "alterity," which resides outside the origo. Since collective identity can be conceived as including the *here–now–we* image (thus embracing the *here–now–I* of the origo), the ultimate alterity might be deictically characterized as *elsewhere(but-not-here)–some-other-time(but-not-now)–them*—those are general deictic parameters of the ultimate other.

In utterances as well as in any other real communicative or social interactions, identity notions like those tend to be marked by at least one of the spatial, temporal or personal axes.[7] For example, the other can be expressed in a speech

7 For the notion of markedness see Linda R. Waugh, "Marked and Unmarked: A Choice between Unequals in Semiotic Structure," *Semiotica* 38 (1982), pp. 299–318.

segment as *them*, who share the place and time with *us*; the personal axis alone is sufficient to signal the otherness of those whom *we* do not consider to be part of *us*. Later I will demonstrate the dynamic ways in which one axis may be functionally replaced by another one while keeping the "otherness" intact. Exactly this is an example of analysis in which deictic perspective may reveal connections and interrelationships that might be easily overlooked if scrutinized from a different analytical point of view.

Two more terms have to be introduced here, because of the relevant role they play in deictic perspective: (a) Let *autodeixis* be used as a term to designate all types of deictic references that include, in an explicit or implicit way, speaker's origo in a given context or situation (e.g. *we*); (b) let *heterodeixis* be used as a term to designate all types of deictic references that exclude, in an explicit or implicit way, the speaker's origo in a given context or situation (e.g. *they*). Now, with that minimal theoretical and methodological equipment, the changes in public *we*-deixis—related directly or indirectly to the sense of belonging to the West—may be examined in two Central European countries, in the time of the societal upheavals of 1989, and a quarter century thereafter.

The West as the desired Other: 1989–1990

At the turn of 1989 and 1990, the West was the much desired other for many people in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. People in both countries manifested against those who were perceived as powerholders. For that purpose, the protesters employed what I call *manifestation deixis* to contest the state-socialist establishments in the streets of Prague, East Berlin and other cities and towns.[8] The slogans used in both countries had the same or very similar purpose in the beginning: To push the government towards changes that would open the borders and, somewhat later, westernize the political as well as economic system. The crowds often behaved as a collective subject that claimed its own legitimacy by using various types of langue in which deixis played a crucial role: "*Wir sind das Volk*" (We are the people), frequently shouted the protesters in East

8 By "manifestation deixis" I mean messages a) that are intentionally displayed in public space, b) that are, at the same time, based upon explicit or implicit "us" versus "them" ideologies, and c) whose difference between "us" and "them" is both deliberately reflected and strategically used by the addresser to achieve a certain goal from the addressee. In a typical situation, the interests of the addressee do not coincide with those of addresser. Manifestation deixis is unveiled to get attention of other possible supporters (to enlarge or strengthen the set of "us") or opponents (to elicit "their" reaction to "our" demands).

Berlin, Dresden and other GDR cities, while one of the most common Czech slogans was "*Nejsme jako oni*" (We are not like them).[9]

Although the goal was similar for the rallies at least in the very beginning, when the primary aim was to challenge socialist powerholders in the government as well as in the ruling Party (the SED in the GDR and the KSČ in Czechoslovakia), that goal was rendered by different deictic strategies. East German protesters distanced themselves from the powerholders in a positive way: *We* are the legitimate referent of the word *Volk* (people/nation), therefore, the power belongs to *us*, or should at least take notice of our concerns. The Czechs, though, distanced themselves from the officialdom in a negative way: *We* are unlike the communists, that is why *we* will not go down to *their* ways of conduct. By not being associated with those undemocratic and corrupt people in power, *we* claim moral legitimacy to make political demands in the public space.

I think the difference has to do with dissimilarities in emotional connotations in public vocabularies of that time. While the word *Volk* (the people) was perceived as positive in the GDR, its closest Czech equivalent *lid* (the people) was seen as being part of the official communist vocabulary. That vocabulary was despised in Czechoslovakia perhaps even more than in East Germany, as a result of the Soviet-led occupation that crashed the Prague Spring of 1968. Despite the post-1969 Czechoslovak government's claims about defeating the "counterrevolution of 1968," the Prague Spring was perceived positively by most Czechs and Slovaks at least up until 1989. What officials called "liberation" was viewed quite unambiguously as foreign occupation that ended something positive: The societal moves toward democratization in 1968. Hence, each word built in the official vocabulary had a damaged reputation, even more than was the case in GDR. It is quite inconceivable that the Czechs would hold their 1989 protests with slogans using *lid* in a politically positive sense.

From a deictic perspective, it is apparent that the East German slogan uses *positive autodeixis*, while the Czech one clings to *negative heterodeixis*. Both aim at the same goal of claiming legitimacy and dissociating the protesters from the powerholders. Whereas East Germans used a *political* word to achieve their political goals, the Czechs retreated from the realm of politics and used rather *moral* terms to achieve those goals. After the violent crash of 1969, moral hangover and general bitterness towards officials was probably even stronger than in the GDR.

9 According to the Czech historian Vančura, that slogan was first used in the downtown of Prague on 20 November 1989. See Jiří Vančura, "Jsou jako my. Proč chodit k volbám?" *A2 kulturní čtrnáctideník* 11 (2009), p. 35.

That has been translated into a small and yet quite telling difference in the manifestation deixis deployed in the time of the societal upheavals of 1989.

That having said, it is important not to overlook the fact that the commonalities between GDR and Czechoslovakia are much stronger and more salient than the differences. For both societies, the public deixis used against those in power shared a common (though not always explicit) understanding—namely, that the powerholders should leave in order to enable the desired move towards westerns levels of consumption and even western types of democracy. Implicitly or explicitly, the imaginings of the West were always present in public rallies at the turn of 1989 and 1990. *They*—the state-socialist establishment—should step down because *we* want to be, sooner or later, a part of the West. *We*, as some concurrent slogans had it, wanted "back in Europe."

The West as a shield against the undesired Others: 2014–2015

Diachronic comparisons are always imprecise, and yet they may reveal something important about the development in a society whose time periods are subject to diachronic scrutiny. What has changed in a quarter of century after *Die Wende* in East Germany and the *Velvet Revolution* in Czechoslovakia? The most obvious shift was geopolitical: The GDR dissolved into a reunited Germany, and Czechoslovakia split into the independent Czech Republic and Slovakia soon thereafter. To put it simply, one country was integrated, and the other disintegrated. Institutionally, all countries are now NATO and EU members, so there is no doubt about their belonging to "the West," at least in that sense. In late 2014 and early 2015, there was no such thing that would be as groundbreaking and fundamental as the upheavals of 1989 and 1990.

Yet the political behavior of Czechs and (former) East Germans slightly differs from that of their more western counterparts in some respects. Somewhat stronger xenophobic reactions, oriented against migrants, is just one example. It seems to be no accident that *Pegida* (Patriotic Europeans Against Islamization of the Occident/*Abendland*) formed in Dresden, former GDR territory, in October 2014, and has enjoyed the strongest support in the former GDR-states of the reunified country. The movement has been nationalist, far-right, anti-Islam, xenophobic and anti-migrant, using the *Abendland* as a protective ideological shield against the predominantly Muslim migrants coming to Europe in general, and to Germany in particular.

Let us examine a typical Pegida banner from a deictic perspective. Since deictic references are situational to a large extent, the manifestation deixis might be perhaps most clearly discerned on a photograph taken at Pegida rally in Dresden at the turn of 2014 and 2015.

Figure 2. *"Frau Merkel, hier ist das Volk:"* Manifestation deixis of Pegida

Source: Byung-Chul Han[10]

In the background of the banner, we can see the German chancellor Angela Merkel veiled in a Muslim way and standing in front of the Bundestag building in Berlin, on the top of the roof a crescent as a symbol of Islam. The slogan translates into "Mrs. Merkel, here are the people." We again see a phrase with a deictic structure, very similar to that of the 1989's "*Wir sind das Volk*" ("We are the people"). The difference between the two, however, seems to be quite significant: The *personal* deictic *wir* (we) has been replaced by a *spatial* deictic *hier* (here), in order to achieve almost identical anti-establishment message in both cases. The legitimate referent of the word *Volk* is represented by those in the streets, holding banners like that and shouting their slogans.

10 Byung-Chul Han, "Touha mít nepřítele," *A2larm.cz*, 14 January 2015, http://a2larm.cz/2015/01/touha-mit-nepritele/, accessed 6 January 2017.

From a deictic perspective, the banner is held in Dresden and its message are built on the deictic contrast between *here*, i.e. the streets of Dresden, and the implicit *there*, meaning official institutions in Berlin. Thus, spatial distance is used to reinforce the *we*—i.e. the group identity of the protesters who are unwilling to accept German government's open stance toward migration. The personal deixis of the late 1989 has been replaced by the spatial deixis of late 2014 and reused for a similar purpose of indicating that the concurrent government is not *ours*, thus fundamentally lacking legitimacy. Through the employed deictic means of expression, we can see that (physical as well as social) space can be strategically semioticized, in a way that is constitutive of the same collective identities that used to be expressed by personal deixis. *Here* bears almost the same political meaning as *we*, and in a certain sense works perhaps in a more powerful way—at least linguistically since it translates the actual physical distance into a political message.

In fact, each of the three fundamental axes of the deictic field—even the temporal one—can be deployed in a verbal struggle over the character of public space. This can be seen perhaps most clearly from the deictic perspective that is built upon the assumption of ever-shifting translations and mutual transpositions among those three meaning-bearing axes.

Despite all differences, the closest Czech ideological parallel of *Pegida* at that time was the movement "*Islám v ČR nechceme*" ("We Don't Want Islam in the Czech Republic"), abbreviated as IVČRN, which was also sharply critical of Islam and presented itself as a defense group with the goal to stop the spread of Islam within Europe in general and Czechia in particular. Like *Pegida*, it is nationalist, far-right and xenophobic. Although IVČRN public rallies have never reached the relative high numbers of people of *Pegida*, its public pronouncements, often spread via social media, were even harsher and more openly Islamophobic than in the case of *Pegida*.

The number of protesters willing to express public support for *Pegida* and its local varieties—like *Bärgida* in Berlin for instance—was constantly growing at the turn of 2014 and 2015, making the German political class increasingly nervous. Many Germans protested against *Pegida*, but their numbers were smaller in most (former) East German cities and towns in the beginning. Portraying the West as being threatened by Islam and by the incoming Muslim migrants seemed to be convincing for ever larger groups of people marching in the streets. But then something fundamental happened: On January 7, 2015, two brothers, associated with an Islamist terrorist group, attacked the offices of French satirical weekly newspaper *Charlie Hebdo*, killing twelve people and injuring eleven others.

The event raised rallies of people across Europe who wanted to express their solidarity with the victims. According to the news, these rallies were the largest gatherings of people marching in public space in the entire history of Europe. Some people also demonstrated their willingness to stand up for values such as freedom of speech. It is no surprise that such manifestations were taking place in Germany as well as in the Czech Republic. To show their adhering to certain values, people carried posters such as the French "*Je suis Charlie*" ("I am Charlie"). The deictic *je* ("I") is used in that slogan to designate a sense of belonging to a collective identity—to all of *us* who are not willing to accept terrorism as a legitimate means of force. However, the Czechs and Germans reacted differently in one essential aspect that I find revealing something about the differences in political cultures of the two nations.

IVČRN movement got large support at their Facebook page after January 7, and there was no unambiguous sign in the public space that anti-Islam attitudes and sentiments, as exposed in the streets, would considerably weaken in those days. The German situation appeared to be more interesting. After the attack, many people, who did not take part in public rallies expressing a pro- or counter-

Figure 3. "*Wir sind Charlie, wir sind nicht Pegida*." Anti-*Pegida* manifestation deixis after the attack on Charlie Hebdo

Source: *Die Welt*[11]

Pegida stance, suddenly went to the streets to manifest their solidarity with Parisian victims. Yet the majority of those newly active and suddenly visible people did not support *Pegida*, as one might be tempted to expect when watching Czech majority reactions, but rather made a clear anti-*Pegida* statement. Consequently, the ratio of pro- to anti-protesters in German cities changed to the benefit of the latter: After the terrorist act, opponents of *Pegida* gradually outnumbered its fans in the public space for the first time.

German media made extensive coverage of those antagonistic rallies. A typical manifestation deixis has been captured by the following photograph, taken in Berlin on January 12, 2015, and published in the online version of the German conservative daily *Die Welt* the same day.

Because of being repeatedly outnumbered by its opponents, the *Pegida* movement was pushed aside step by step, and both its visibility and importance considerably diminished. That part of silent majority, which took it to the streets after *Charlie Hebdo*, distanced themselves from the anti-Islam movement while demonstrating their unambiguous disagreement with Islamist terrorism. Nothing truly comparable happened in the Czech Republic. That might be related to considerable differences in Czech and German mainstream media discourses: While the German press was very careful in distinguishing Islamist terrorism from Islam, the Czech press (and even the Czech president) occasionally pronounced statements that might be read as blurring the clear borderline between Islam and radical Islamist terrorism.

One may argue that Czech majority did not feel the need to distance themselves from Islamophobia in such an explicit way, because the IVČRN never had as many supporters willing to go to the streets and, therefore, had never been as visible as *Pegida* in Germany. Another explanation—not necessarily contradicting the previous one—would see the average Czech public reactions to *Charlie Hebdo* as more Islamophobic, or at least unable to differentiate clearly between the anti-Islamist and anti-Islam stance, combining both of them into a broader, vaguely anti-Islam(ist) attitude. One may find indirect support for such a claim in the differences that can be seen in the media discourses of both countries in that time. The question is open to further research for social scientists. My aim was only to demonstrate how, and to what extent, the deictic perspective can be of analytical use in both opening and answering questions of that kind.

11 "Tausende demonstrieren in Berlin gegen ‚Bärgida,'" *Die Welt*, 12 January 2015, https://www.welt.de/regionales/berlin/article136298490/Tausende-demonstrieren-in-Berlin-gegen-Baergida.html, accessed 6 January 2017.

Conclusion

Deploying deictic perspective, I have analyzed similarities and differences in varied notions of *us* and *them* that can be seen in the most visible parts of public discourse—in slogans typically used in Czech and German rallies in two distinct time periods, during societal upheavals of late 1989 and a quarter century later. The advantage of such a perspective consists in having a single analytical tool for describing the interplay of social identity, time and space since all three aspects are seen as originating in the same *here-now-I* point of a given speech situation. This point is called origo and effectively unites all fundamental features of sociocultural identity: The spatial axis of identity starts in *here,* the temporal in *now*, and the personal in *I*. The closer a given speech segment is to origo, the more likely it expresses a high degree of identity and vice versa: The larger is the distance from origo, the more likely the speech segment expresses alterity defined as remoteness from speaker's perspective. Integrating Bühler's two distinct fields into one integral symbolic-deictic field makes it possible to analyze *all* speech expressions as to their distance from origo.

Applied to slogans used in public rallies, deictic perspective makes several points clear:

There are spatial differences in public *we*-deixis, which was used in the same time but in different countries. In late 1989, for instance, the difference in expressing sociopolitical identity of the protesters can be described as Czech tendency towards using *heterodeictic* means of expressing the distance from the powerholders (*We are not like them*). The protesters in (former) East Germany, on the other hand, clung to *autodeixtic* means (*We are the people/nation*) to achieve the same goal.

There are spatial similarities in public *we*-deixis, which was used in the same time. For instance, in late 1989 both Czech and German protesters deployed similar *manifestation deixis*, which a) was oriented against concurrent powerholders, b) emphasized the growing gap between the people in the streets and the political regime of late state-socialism, c) pushed those in power towards fundamental changes in economic and political system, and d) was predominantly portraying West as the desired place.

There are temporal differences in public *we*-deixis, which was used in the same place but in different times. For instance, in downtown Dresden the dominant and almost unanimous we-want-to-be-part-of-the-West attitude of 1989 has been, at least by some people, transformed into a we-don't-want-others-to-be-part-of-the-West attitude a quarter century later. Deictic perspective shows the

way in which the distance from powerholders, expressed by a personal pronoun in late 1989 ("*We* are the people/nation"), was replaced by a spatial adverb in late 2014 ("*Here* are the people/nation"). *Spatial deixis* took the place of *personal deixis* and become an efficient means for the protesters to demonstrate their distance from the government policies. Such a change is both expressive and constitutive of collective identities of the protesters, thus rendering an important shift in the stance towards values typically associated with the West.

There are obvious temporal similarities in public *we*-deixis used in the same place but in different times. For instance, the deictic mechanics continually works in such a way that it is always *we* who believe are right, despite all the changes in goals and identities described thus far.

Deixis is linguistic mechanism that contributes to the paradox of social identities. Despite their constant changes, social actors often believe they remain the same across time and space. The deictic perspective helps identify both constants and variables in that part of collective consciousness that is articulated in, and shaped by, language. It goes without saying that language is understood here in a broad sense—it is any kind of meaningful social behavior. The ideas of belonging to the West have both influenced and expressed people's hopes, political imaginings, social values, moral orientations, cultural beliefs and group identities in east central Europe in the last decades. The changing image of the West can serve as a mirror, showing the dynamic developments in social allegiances. The goal of this chapter was to show what we as social analysts can see in that mirror if we focus upon certain communicative aspects of public life in two Central European "cultures in transition."

Notes on Contributors

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Ondřej Klípa graduated in Slavic Philology (spec. in Polish Language) and Ethnology as well as in Area Studies from Charles University in Prague, where he also obtained his PhD. He worked at the secretariats of the Government Council for National Minorities and the Government Council for Roma Minority Affairs at the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic. He is currently affiliated to the Center for Interdisciplinary Polish Studies, European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), as well as to the Institute of International Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. In his academic work he combines approaches of historiography, sociology and political sciences. In 2017 he was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Illinois at Chicago, dealing with labor migration within the Soviet Bloc.

Kung Yin (Ian) Lo graduated from the London School of Economics and Political Science with a MSc in Regional and Urban Planning Studies, and is currently an urban planner at the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Singapore. He is interested in urban landscapes, society and culture in the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union under communism, as well as their transitions after the end of communism.

Claudia Rose professor of economics at FOM Hochschule für Oekonomie und Management, study center Frankfurt am Main. She holds a doctorate degree in economics from Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main. The topic of her dissertation was *Competition, Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change in Transition—A Comparative Analysis of the Baltic and Three Post-Yugoslav Countries*

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Tomáš Samek is a linguistic anthropologist who studied at the University of Virginia and Charles University in Prague. He teaches sociocultural and linguistic anthropology at the University of Pardubice, Czech Republic, and is a doctoral adviser at Charles University Faculty of Humanities. His recent focus includes the dynamic relationship among linguistic interactions, social consciousness and media: he examines the question how these factors influence, and simultaneously mirror, identities of social actors who are shaping the Czech and German public space. Author of the monograph *Tahle země je naše: Český a německý veřejný prostor v deiktické perspektivě* [*This Land is My Land: Czech and German Public Space—A Deictic Perspective*], Pardubice 2016.

Travis Schneider is a graduate student at the University of Georgia where he is a teaching assistant for German. His research pertains to language, linguistics, and culture. More specifically, he focuses on the syntax of the German language. His favorite place to do research is northern Germany.

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Stephanie Weismann currently is elaborating on her study *Lublin. An Olfactory Urban History of Interwar Poland* at the Institute for Cultural Studies at Marie Curie-Skłodowska University Lublin/Poland ("Polonez"-fellow, National Science Center Poland). She is an accomplished literary scholar with a background in Comparative Literature, German and Slavic Studies (University of Vienna and St. Petersburg), and obtained her PhD with a monograph about the writer and "father of masochism" Leopold von Sacher-Masoch within the interdisciplinary doctoral program "Austrian Galicia and its Multicultural Heritage" at the University of Vienna. Fields of interest: Sensory History/Sensescapes and Urban History as well as the social and cultural history of East Central and Eastern Europe in the 19th/20th century.

Streszczenia

Claudia Rose

Wpływ kultury na transformację gospodarczą w krajach bałtyckich: powrót do normalności?

Kraje bałtyckie – co wydaje się zaskakujące ze względu na ich wcześniejsze zintegrowanie ze Związkiem Radzieckim – wyróżniają się swoim szybkim i gruntownym przejściem do gospodarki wolnorynkowej. Na podstawie teorii spontanicznego porządku Friedricha Augusta von Hayeka, według której zmiany o charakterze konstruktywistycznym są skazane na porażkę, natomiast skuteczne reformy rodzą się samorzutnie, odzwierciedlając tradycję i kulturę danego społeczeństwa, autorka bada, w jakim stopniu kultura była pomocna w transformacji gospodarczej w trzech republikach bałtyckich. Historia polityczna i gospodarcza jest rozpatrywana pod kątem jej konsekwencji dla systemów wartości oraz dla chęci adaptacji do zasad i instytucji rynkowych. Analiza przynosi wniosek, że w Estonii i na Łotwie świecki, postnowoczesny system wartości i silna identyfikacja z Zachodem przetrwały socjalizm. Gospodarka rynkowa i demokracja są uważane za prawdziwe dziedzictwo – dlatego transformacja zyskała szerokie poparcie, a przedsiębiorczość i konkurencja cieszą się uznaniem. Cierpienia, jakich w przeszłości doznała ludność autochtoniczna za sprawą socjalizmu i rusyfikacji, kładą się zarazem cieniem na stosunkach z rosyjskojęzyczną mniejszością, która bywa marginalizowana ekonomicznie. Natomiast na Litwie system wartości jest mieszanką tradycji przedsocjalistycznych, ideologii socjalistycznej i orientacji na Zachód. W krajach bałtyckich występuje więc częściowa spójność między konstruktywną zmianą a spontanicznymi procesami społecznymi. Unia Europejska stała się punktem odniesienia, a reformy akceptowano, choć radykalne zmiany budziły dezaprobatę. W sumie Hayekowska teoria spontanicznego porządku znajduje potwierdzenie.

Mark Keck-Szajbel

Od zacofania do progresywności: dziwna śmierć polskiego rolnictwa

Historia polskiego rolnictwa po drugiej wojnie światowej jest wyjątkowa pod wieloma względami. W niniejszym artykule autor analizuje rozmaite polityczne podejścia do rolnictwa po 1945 r. Rezygnacja reżimu komunistycznego z kolektywizacji

po buntach w 1956 r. oznaczała, że do 1989 r. w tym sektorze gospodarki dominowali drobni rolnicy. W dobie Unii Europejskiej i postępującej globalizacji te same małe gospodarstwa, które przetrwały komunizm, zostały wszelako uznane za nieefektywne i niewydolne. Jednak paradoksalnie już w latach dwutysięcznych, a nawet wcześniej coraz więcej konsumentów w Polsce (i za granicą) miało poczucie, że te same małe gospodarstwa zapewniają zdrowsze i bardziej ekologiczne produkty.

Travis Schneider

Wahadło kultury: sprawa aborcji w Polsce

Artykuł „Wahadło kultury" streszcza zagadnienie polskiego prawa aborcyjnego w XX i XXI wieku, analizując skutki, jakie radykalna zmiana polityki wywołała w polskiej kulturze. Autor rozpatruje pogłębiający się rozdźwięk między różnymi pokoleniami i ich postrzeganiem aborcji jako kwestii moralnej. Jedną z głównych tez artykułu jest to, że Polska niczym wahadło zdaje się wychylać z jednej skrajności w drugą. Autor próbuje również rozbudzić świadomość sytuacji współczesnych polskich kobiet, które narażają się na trudności i stygmatyzację, próbując uzyskać dostęp do aborcji zgodnej z konstytucją.

Ondřej Klípa

Stare porządki za nową fasadą: ochrona mniejszości w Republice Czeskiej

Ondřej Klípa skupia się w swoim artykule na okresie transformacji czeskiej polityki wobec mniejszości, poświęcając szczególną uwagę roli uwarunkowań Unii Europejskiej. Opiera swój wywód na autorach, którzy kwestionowali rolę UE w przeobrażeniach polityki postkomunistycznych krajów kandydujących wobec mniejszości. W odróżnieniu od nich idzie dalej, twierdząc, że poza oczywistą powszechną demokratyzacją, która objęła całe społeczeństwo i przyczyniła się do wewnętrznego rozkwitu życia mniejszości, ewolucja polityki wobec mniejszości w okresie akcesyjnym nie powinna być nawet określana mianem „przejściowej." Chociaż stworzono nowe ramy prawne ochrony mniejszości i przyjęto pewną ilość nowych przepisów, ta świeża fasada nie stanowiła istotnego przeobrażenia w stosunku do poprzednich form ustrojowych. Przyglądając się bliżej trzem przykładom czeskiej polityki wobec mniejszości z okresu akcesyjnego, Ondřej

Klípa dowodzi, że główna „zmiana" była raczej ilościowa niż jakościowa. Sposoby podejścia i działania oraz „porządki" sprzed 1989 roku pozostały w większości nienaruszone. Niemniej oznaki strukturalnych zmian polityki można było zaobserwować w okresie postakcesyjnym i „posttransformacyjnym."

Kung Yin Ian Lo

Berlin nazistowski, Berlin komunistyczny, Berlin zjednoczony: jak zmieniały się miejskie krajobrazy Berlina w ciągu trzech okresów historycznych

Niepowtarzalne środowisko miejskie Berlina jest odzwierciedleniem jego przeobrażeń od epoki nazistowskiej do komunistycznej, a następnie postkomunistycznej. Hitler planował zmienić oblicze Berlina, wyposażając go w megastruktury i szerokie bulwary – miasto miało się stać na tyle okazałe, by mogło być stolicą nowych, większych Niemiec. Ukończono jednak tylko nieliczne z tych projektów. Następnie – podczas zimnej wojny – komunistyczny Berlin Wschodni próbował za pomocą bulwarów takich jak stalinowska Karl-Marx-Allee stworzyć nowoczesną Utopię, aby unaocznić triumf komunizmu nad Zachodem. Od upadku komunizmu Berlin usiłuje przekształcić się w nowoczesną, „normalną", „europejską" stolicę, selektywnie usuwając struktury pochodzące z nazistowskiej i komunistycznej przeszłości. Wiele z tych projektów jest kontrowersyjnych, jak rozbiórka komunistycznego Pałacu Republiki i odbudowa pruskiego Zamku Berlińskiego. Zarazem pewne elementy komunistycznego miasta, takie jak ogromna dzielnica mieszkaniowa Marzahn, bywają niekiedy uważane za nieprzystające do przeobrażeń. Niemniej przejście Berlina od komunizmu do postkomunizmu jest tylko odbiciem większej, wciąż trwającej transformacji, która obejmuje również zmiany w konfiguracjach instytucjonalnych i gospodarce, doświadczane przez wiele innych miast w byłym bloku wschodnim.

Stephanie Weismann

Smellscapes transformacji: perspektywy i potencjał podejścia sensorycznego do badań nad Europą Środkowo-Wschodnią

Badania sensoryczne są bardzo obiecującym sposobem badania historii Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej: jak analizować „kultury transformacji" z perspektywy historii sensorycznej? To właśnie w szczególnym stopniu zapachy sygnalizu-

ją transformację i służą jako wskaźnik zmieniających się praktyk politycznych i społecznych. W tekście poruszono następujące główne zagadnienia: jakie były najważniejsze zapachy poprzedzające, zwiastujące lub znamionujące przeobrażenia w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w latach 1989/90 i jakie ewentualne *smellscapes* należy poddać badaniom w kontekście „transformacji"?

Tomáš Samek

Test the West: przeobrażenia środkowoeuropejskich idei przynależności do Zachodu

W niniejszym artykule proponuję nowe narzędzie metodologiczne do analizy zjawisk społecznych I komunikacyjnych, które nazywam „perspektywą deiktyczną". Wykorzystując tę perspektywę, artykuł analizuje różne sposoby, w które pojęcia *my* formowały się i ulegały przemianom w najważniejszych fazach dyskursu – chodzi tu o hasła używane podczas zgromadzeń publicznych w dwóch krajach środkowoeuropejskich w dwóch różnych okresach. Pod koniec 1989 r. Zachód był najbardziej pożądanym Innym dla wielu obywateli Czechosłowacji i Niemieckiej Republiki Demokratycznej; na przełomie 2014 i 2015 r. Zachód stawał się zaś często środkiem retorycznym, służącym ochronie *nas* przed niepożądanym Innym, czyli (często muzułmańskimi) imigrantami, przybywającymi z terytoriów pozaeuropejskich – Wschodu i Południa. Entuzjastyczna niegdyś postawa „chcemy być częścią Zachodu" przeobraziła się – przynajmniej u niektórych ludzi – w znacznie mniej entuzjastyczne „nie chcemy, żeby inni byli częścią Zachodu". Na podstawie próbek publicznego dyskursu z Niemiec i Republiki Czeskiej dowodzę, że perspektywa deiktyczna nadaje się do porównywania subtelnej współzależności między czasem, przestrzenią i tożsamością. Artykuł kończy się podkreśleniem podobieństw i różnic w publicznej deiksie pojęcia *my* w czasie i przestrzeni w Europie Środkowej, dokumentujących zarazem zmieniające się poczucie(-a) przynależności do Zachodu.