sia, the relatively homogeneous state of Kelantan has a history of supporting an anti-Chinese party, but that is because the party also has had a religious appeal and the state is well endowed with influential religious functionaries. Indeed, there is good ground for thinking that anti-Chinese sentiment is not stronger in Kelantan than it is elsewhere in Malaysia.[125] So what look like variations in raw hostility may be variations in institutional structures.

There are therefore two imperatives in ethnic conflict: the spontaneous and sentiment-driven versus the institutionally constrained. The more spontaneous the conflict behavior, the more pertinent will be the elements of group entitlement; the more tied into institutional constraints, the more we shall have to probe institutional arrangements. The tension between these two imperatives can result in the violent overthrow of the institutional system when it fails utterly to reflect ethnic sentiment.

The theory of group entitlement cannot by itself answer a question such as when will an interethnic coalition be formed, but it can put flesh on otherwise skeletal empirical observations about group position. Merely to know the position of a group, in terms of worth and legitimacy, is probably to be able to forecast what political claims it makes, what idiom it speaks in, what issues divide it from others, what counterclaims the others make, and generally how each will behave in and out of power. As a matter of fact, a test of the utility of this perspective is at hand. We have seen that some groups try to make states ethnically homogeneous by expelling members of other groups, and we shall not be surprised if some territorially separate groups try to achieve homogeneity by withdrawing from the state. The predictive uses of a theory based on group position will become apparent in examining the logic of secessionist movements.

125. Douglas Raybeck, "Ethnicity and Accommodation: Malay–Chinese Relations in Kelantan, Malaysia," *Ethnic Groups* 2 (Jan. 1980): 241–68.

CHAPTER SIX

The Logic of Secessions and Irredentas

Around the time of Asian and African independence, there was talk of the "artificiality" of territorial boundaries imposed by colonial powers. Many ethnic groups had been divided between two or more colonies. With few exceptions, the new states accepted independence within existing boundaries, but there was much speculation that "troublesome irredenta[s]"[1] were in store for them.

At the same time, the success of anti-colonial movements had diverted attention from ethnic divisions within the new states. With the accent on "nation-building," scant attention was paid to the possibility of ethnic secession, at least until the Katanga secession of 1960; and even that tended to be viewed as *sui generis*.[2]

Events have belied these expectations in the most dramatic way. Troublesome irredentas have been few and far between, whereas troublesome secessions have been abundant. The few irredentas that have broken into warfare have been virulently fought, as have many of the wars of secession. Yet almost none of the secessionist or irredentist movements has achieved its goals.

These developments raise several interesting questions. What accounts for the emergence of secession? What kinds of groups attempt to secede and under what circumstances? What accounts for the success of such movements, and what effects does success have, both in the secessionist state and in the rump state? Similar questions can be asked for irredentas.

1. Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1960), 105.

2. In part, this was because Europeans in Katanga were thought to be behind the movement. But see note 61, below. Some, however, saw Katanga as portentous. See note 8, below.

PATHS TO SECESSION

Despite its frequency, secession is a variable phenomenon. Some movements emerge early in the life of a new state, seemingly with little provocation. Others develop only after a prolonged period of frustration and conflict. Some movements simmer for years, even decades, and in the end may come to nothing, whereas others burst quickly into warfare. But many movements never even reach a slow simmer, much less a quick boil.

To discern patterns of secession, it is necessary to recognize that this is a special species of ethnic conflict, but a species nonetheless. Though modified by their territorial character, secessionist conflicts partake of many features that ethnic conflict in general exhibits. Calculations of group interest play their part, although some ethnic groups opt for secession when it does not appear to be in their interest to do so. In decisions to secede, group interest is alloyed with enmity and offset by apprehension. The roots of those decisions are to be found in the texture of group relations.

One fairly firm rule of thumb can be laid down at once. Whether and when a secessionist movement will emerge is determined mainly by domestic politics, by the relations of groups and regions within the state. Whether a secessionist movement will achieve its aims, however, is determined largely by international politics, by the balance of interests and forces that extend beyond the state. Occasionally, considerations of means available to support secessionist movements, including external assistance, may modify secessionist sentiment—though separatists are often surprisingly heedless of such prudential constraints. Occasionally, too, external relations reinforce separatist proclivities, as for example when Kurds and Southern Sudanese took exception to pan-Arabist activities in Baghdad and Khartoum. Secession lies squarely at the juncture of internal and international politics, but for the most part the emergence of separatism can be explained in terms of domestic ethnic politics.

To this broad rule of thumb, there is a major exception. A group that might otherwise be disposed to separatism will not be so disposed if its secession is likely to lead, not to independence, but to incorporation in a neighboring state, membership in which is viewed as even less desirable than membership in the existing state. The cases in which this is likely to occur involve irredentism, where an international boundary divides members of a single ethnic group. The Baluch and Pathans of Pakistan,

for example, are likely to limit their separatist activity to the extent that it makes them vulnerable to incorporation in Afghanistan or, in the Baluch case, Iran.[3] The Ewe of Ghana are not likely to do anything that would risk merger into Togo. Similar considerations, however, will not restrain the Malays of Southern Thailand, many of whom might indeed prefer to join Malaysia. This does not indicate under what conditions irredentism will occur; it merely highlights what is, in at least a few important cases, a limitation on domestically generated collective inclinations.

At this point, a definitional issue intrudes, one well illustrated by the limited goals of some of the groups just mentioned. Should the terms *separatism* and *secession* be confined to movements aiming explicitly at an independent state or extended to movements seeking any territorially defined political change intended to accord an ethnic group autonomous control over the region in which it resides? Conceived in the latter way, separatism would include ethnic demands for the creation of separate states within existing states or for a broad measure of regional autonomy, short of independence.

There is some ground for thinking that groups demanding complete independence may have the strongest sense of grievance. The contrast between Catalan and Basque claims in Spain is revealing on this score. Catalan ethnic sentiment runs as deep as Basque sentiment does, and it probably has broader support. But Basque political organizations have more frequently turned to violence and more frequently demanded independence, whereas Catalan organizations have aimed at autonomy within Spain. Franco's severe repression of the Basques, many of whom had supported the Republicans, probably helps explain the unyielding character of some Basque organizations. (So, too, may the fact that Basques also reside on the French side of the border, making independence a more attractive goal.) In the Basque case, at least, there seems to be a clear and direct linkage between ethnic antipathy and declared political objectives.

In many other cases, however, this linkage is more tenuous. The Kurds in Iraq consistently denied that their objective was independence. Even as they fought and died in the 1960s and '70s, they eschewed anything

3. "No one in Baluchustan wants to break away [from Pakistan]. All the Baluchis want is not to lose their identity," commented a Baluch spokesman. "Who in his right mind would want to join Afghanistan? We'd be worse off there than we are in Pakistan." *Washington Post*, Feb. 8, 1976. This is also the theme of Khalid B. Sayeed, "Pathan Regionalism," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 63 (Autumn 1964): 478–506.

beyond regional autonomy. The reason, presumably, was tactical: had they declared independence as their goal, the Iraqi Kurds would have engendered hostility from neighboring regimes in Syria, Iran, and Turkey, all of which have Kurdish minorities. In the 1974 warfare in Iraq, Iran supplied arms, food, and cross-border facilities for the Kurdish fighters, and this support particularly insured that the movement demanded only autonomy.

Demands can also shift from autonomy to independence and back again, depending on the state of negotiations between central governments and separatists. The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines moved from autonomy demands to demands for separate statehood after the Philippine government adopted a decentralization plan the MNLF found wanting.[4] The Mizo National Front in India followed the same path, agreeing to a solution within the framework of Indian federalism in 1976 but, after a cease-fire broke down three years later, returning to warfare to achieve independence.[5] Other movements, such as the Southern Sudanese, equivocated on their demands, using ambiguous terms like "self-determination" to cover internal differences.[6] The Chad National Liberation Front, presumed to be fighting a war for the secession of the North, long refused to declare its objectives, and eventually most of the country, including the capital, was in rebel hands. Tactics play a large role in the statement of objectives.

The often tactical nature of demands, their elasticity, even fickleness, the willingness of independence movements to settle for much less than statehood, and the occasional interest of secessionists in capturing the whole state if that proves possible—all of these argue for an inclusive conception of separatism and secession, terms I shall therefore use interchangeably. Such a conception should embrace movements seeking a separate region within an existing state, as well as those seeking a separate and independent state.[7]

4. *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Aug. 17, 1979, p. 28.
5. Ibid., Sept. 14, 1979, p. 30.
6. See Keith Kyle, "The Southern Problem in the Sudan," *The World Today* 22 (Dec. 1966): 512–20. An article in the journal published by the Southern Sudan Association in Britain during the Sudanese civil war illustrates the point: "What, then, are we fighting for? We are fighting for freedom; freedom to unite with the North; freedom to federate with the North; freedom to reject the North; freedom for the people of the South Sudan to determine their own future without interference from the Arabs or any other people." Jacob J. Akol, "What We Are, and Are Not, Fighting For," *The Grass Curtain* (London) 2 (Oct. 1971): 25–26, at 26. When a settlement was suddenly reached, such formulations could readily be invoked in justification of it. See ibid., 2 (May 1972): 1.
7. For an equally inclusive conception, see Joane Nagel, "The Conditions of Ethnic Separatism: The Kurds in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq," *Ethnicity* 7 (Sept. 1980): 279–97.

OF GROUPS AND REGIONS

"Inevitably," wrote Immanuel Wallerstein at the time of the Katanga secession, "some regions will be richer (less poor) than others, and if the ethnic claim to power combines with relative wealth, the case for secession is strong. . . . [E]very African nation, large or small, federal or unitary, has its Katanga."[8] Wallerstein was right to link the ethnic claim with the character of the region from which the ethnic group springs. These are the two conditions that matter most. But he limited the potential for secession unduly when he confined it to relatively wealthy regions. In point of fact, there are several paths to secession, and rich regions are not the leading secessionists. They are far outnumbered by regions poor in resources and productivity. Despite strong feelings of alienation—or worse—neither Ashanti in Ghana nor the Western Region of Nigeria nor Buganda in Uganda, all prosperous regions, made a serious effort to secede. By contrast, wars have been fought by peoples in the poor regions of, among many others, the Southern Sudan, the Southern Philippines, and Northern Chad. Why this is so we shall soon see.

Table 2 provides a simple matrix of potential secessionists. It includes groups that have and have not attempted to secede. The variables are straightforward. They are based on the positions of ethnic groups and regions relative to others in the state.

Separatist ethnic groups are characterized as "backward" or "advanced" for shorthand purposes, in accordance with our earlier discussion of group juxtapositions. An advanced group is one that has benefited from opportunities in education and non-agricultural employment. Typically, it is represented above the mean in number of secondary and university graduates, in bureaucratic, commercial, and professional employment, and in per capita income. As we have seen, certain stereotypes are commonly associated with these attributes. Advanced groups are generally regarded by themselves and others as highly motivated, diligent, intelligent, and dynamic. Backward groups, less favorably situated on the average in terms of educational attainment, high-salaried employment, and per capita income, tend to be stereotyped as indolent, ignorant, and not disposed to achievement. Just as group position and the putative qualities associated with it are potent factors in ethnic conflict

8. Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Independence* (New York: Vintage, 1961), 88. See also Peter Alexis Gourevitch, "The Reemergence of 'Peripheral Nationalisms': Some Comparative Speculations on the Spatial Distribution of Political Leadership and Economic Growth," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 21 (July 1979): 303–22.

TABLE 2 POTENTIAL SECESSIONISTS, BY GROUP AND REGIONAL POSITION

	Backward Groups	Advanced Groups
Backward Regional Economies	Southern Sudanese Karens, Shans, others in Burma Muslims in the Philippines Muslims in Chad Kurds in Iraq Nagas and Mizos in India Muslims in Thailand Bengalis in Pakistan Northerners in Ghana[a]	Ibo in Nigeria Tamils in Sri Lanka Baluba (Kasai) in Zaire Lozi in Zambia[a] Kabyle Berbers in Algeria[a]
Advanced Regional Economies	Lunda in Zaire Bakonjo in Uganda Batéké in Gabon[a]	Sikhs in Indian Punjab Basques in Spain Yoruba in Nigeria[a] Baganda in Uganda[a]

[a]Denotes groups that have not had a strong secessionist movement.

generally, so do they condition collective orientations to the possibility of secession.

Separatist regions are characterized as backward or advanced by the relative economic position of the region, as measured by regional income per capita excluding remittances from other regions (which would likely be terminated or reduced in the event of secession). I say "measured by," but in fact data on regional income per capita are only sporadically available, and rarely available on a reliable basis for Asian and African countries. While this excludes the possibility of analysis based on precise degrees of regional backwardness, advancement, or disparity between the two in given countries, identification of backward and advanced regions is not difficult. The same is true, of course, regarding group position.

This characterization of both regions and groups ignores some common complexities. The table assumes the existence of geographically concentrated ethnic groups that may or may not become separatist. However, many groups that possess a geographically identifiable homeland are no longer geographically concentrated. Large numbers of group members may live outside the home region, a circumstance likely to have some impact on the emergence of separatism. Conversely, a secessionist region often contains more than one major ethnic group, and the groups

may differ in their position relative to groups outside the region. Likewise, the measurement of regional position by per capita income may obscure important elements of intraregional difference. Eritrea, for example, has had industrially developed cities but an exceedingly poor countryside: which is the politically relevant reality? Then, too, although I shall speak of a backward region and an advanced region, as if any state had only two regions, rarely is a state so clearly bifurcated. I shall deal with some of these complexities at later points, but for the moment it is best to proceed with a simpler framework.[9]

The interplay of relative group position and relative regional position determines the emergence of separatism. In stressing this interplay, I mean to reject direct causal relationships between regional economic disparity and ethnic secession. If degree of regional economic disparity alone determined the emergence of separatism, it would be reasonable to expect the preponderance of such movements in those states occupying the middle-income levels, for in such states regional economic disparities seem to be greatest.[10] But no such tendencies can be identified. Secession is attempted in low-income states like Ethiopia and Chad, as well as in the Philippines and Nigeria, countries with incomes four to six times higher; and, needless to say, it is an issue in a number of economically developed countries, too. Relative regional position is a causal element in the emergence of secession, not because it predicts separatism in any straightforward way, but because it conditions the claims ethnic groups make and their response to the rejection of those claims.

The four categories of potential secessionists depicted in the table differ from each other in several major respects. The demands the groups advance before separatist sentiment crystallizes, the events that move the groups to secession, the calculations that attend the decision to separate, and the timing of the decision all vary according to whether the group is

9. The framework advanced in this section was first presented in Donald L. Horowitz, "Patterns of Ethnic Separatism," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23 (Apr. 1981): 165–95.

One complexity of which I shall not take adequate account concerns differences of opinion within given ethnic groups on the advisability of secession. Sometimes secessionist sentiment is virtually unanimous, but very often there are debates on whether to secede. See, e.g., B. J. Dudley, "Western Nigeria and the Nigerian Crisis," in S. K. Panter-Brick, ed., *Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War* (London: Athlone Press, 1970), 106–08, identifying at least five Yoruba opinion strains *circa* 1966–67. More often than not, I shall ignore such differences, dealing instead with central tendencies or merely with the outcomes of such debates.

10. Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 13 (July 1965): 3–84, at 14, 17.

considered backward or advanced and whether it resides in a backward or advanced region. Table 2 does not provide an exhaustive enumeration of movements, of which there have been dozens, if not hundreds, in the post-colonial period. Furthermore, the table includes some non-secessionist groups for comparison. Even so, the table suggests the prevalence of backward regions among secessionists. In part, this may be a function of the coincidence of regional backwardness with geographic distance from the center. Economic backwardness is more common on the periphery. In states where the span of governmental control is limited, peripheral areas might more readily contemplate secession.[11] Yet the logic of secession comprehends much more than just the difficulty of the center in exerting control. Distance is but a minor factor in the overall prevalence of backward regions among secessionists. Indeed, there is more than one rationale for the secession of a backward region. There are four different paths to ethnic secession, which correspond to the four different cells of the table.

BACKWARD GROUPS IN BACKWARD REGIONS

By far the largest number of secessionists can be characterized as backward groups in backward regions. These groups are typically early seceders. They often attempt to secede rather soon after independence or after rejection of the claims they advance. They conclude rapidly that they have a small stake in preserving the undivided state of which they are a part. In fact, some such groups had earlier doubts: Moros in the Philippines, Nagas in India, Karens in Burma, and Southern Sudanese were among those groups that asked for a prolonged colonial period, a

11. See Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, *Issues of Political Development*, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 75. When the Uganda government refused to accede to demands for a separate district, the Rwenzururu movement in Western Uganda became secessionist very quickly, for reasons that are probably related to span of control. "The Ruwenzori mountain areas are extremely inaccessible; effective administration had never become established in the higher altitudes and, in a sense, anybody could set up an independent government there without facing the consequences for at least some time." Martin R. Doornbos, "Protest Movements in Western Uganda: Some Parallels and Contrasts," in Raymond L. Hall, ed. *Ethnic Autonomy—Comparative Dynamics* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 274. But the emergence of the movement in the first place had little to do with these geographic conditions. Distance, of course, is a condition that can cut both ways. While great distance may make secession easier—or at least make its suppression more difficult—distance may also reduce the intrusiveness of central government penetration of peripheral areas.

separate independence, or special arrangements to protect them after independence. All of them feared competition with their neighbors within the bounds of a single political arena.

Fears of this kind were not merely based on numerical inferiority, but on a sense of weakness *vis-à-vis* more "efficient," "aggressive," "sharp-witted," "dynamic," "industrious," and better educated members of other ethnic groups.[12] Sensing competitive incapacities, backward groups in backward regions at first tend to demand representation in politics and the public service in proportion to their numbers. Inevitably, this demand is unmet, for relative group backwardness implies a shortage of eligible candidates for such positions. When the denial of such opportunities is coupled with clear signs that the state is dominated by members of other groups, backward groups in backward regions choose to opt out.

Quite often the swirl of conflicts is reflected in a bewildering succession of separatist organizations, each with more uncompromising demands than the one that preceded it. This was the case in the Southern Sudan, in the Karen areas of Burma, in the Toro Kingdom of Uganda, and in other such regions as well. The rapid passage of leadership and the escalation of demands reflect the character of the calculations such groups make. They see little choice.

Often these are deficit regions that receive a subsidy from the center.[13] Consequently, the decision to secede is taken despite the economic costs it is likely to entail. This willingness to sacrifice, together with the rapid-

12. See, e.g., Ba Maw, *Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939–1946* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968), 187; Fred R. von der Mehden, *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1963), 193; Rodolfo Bulatao, *Ethnic Attitudes in Five Philippine Cities* (Quezon City: Univ. of the Philippines Social Science Research Laboratory, 1973), 57–62; Hugh Gray, "The Demand for a Separate Telengana State in India," *Asian Survey* 11 (May 1971): 463–74, at 464.

13. For example, in Southern Thailand, "Narathiwat, which is not atypical, collected $1.25 million in local revenue in 1970, while the [Narathiwat] budget as subsidized by the central government totalled $5.87 million, excluding capital investment effected directly under central administration offices." Astri Suhrke, "The Thai-Muslim Border Provinces" (unpublished paper presented at the seminar on contemporary Thailand, Australian National Univ., Sept. 6–9, 1971), 12–13. In wealthier states, however, even this subsidy may not be enough to bring per capita spending in poor regions up to levels proportionate to their share of the state's population. In such a case, a demand for per capita proportionate spending is likely to be received most unsympathetically by the center. See, e.g., Charles M. Benjamin, "The Kurdish Non-State Nation" (unpublished paper presented at the 1975 annual meeting of the International Studies Association), 6.

ity with which such movements get going, is evidence of the sense of desperation backward groups feel in assessing their ability to compete in the undivided state.

Elite and mass economic interests, however, generally diverge at the moment of decision. Whereas the region as a whole stands to suffer if it opts for secession, educated elites stand to gain from the creation of new opportunities in a smaller, albeit poorer, state. This includes those high positions from which these elites, with their generally lower seniority, would be excluded in the undivided state. Secession creates new positions, while reducing the pool of competitors. Advanced segments of backward groups do not resist but generally lead the movement.[14]

Nonetheless, the frequency, enthusiasm, and violence of separatist movements among backward groups in backward regions can scarcely be put down to selfish elite motives alone. It is true that, whereas secession enables leaders to eliminate the interethnic competition they previously faced, many other people may be adversely affected by an end to revenue subsidies and the severance of the backward economy from the state. Yet the formal divergence of interest is just that: by the time the movement gets underway, calculations of sacrifice and opportunity are invariably overwhelmed by an avalanche of ethnic sentiment that the undivided state is intolerable. It is instructive to examine more concretely how such sentiments develop.

Time and again, it is the civil service issue that highlights grievances. Not only do backward groups in backward regions receive a dramatically smaller share of government positions than their share of the population, but, in addition, civil servants are imported from more advanced regions into theirs. Kurdish demands in Iraq reflect this dual grievance very well. They recurrently embody proposals for proportional representation in the Iraqi civil service, cabinet, and national assembly and for

14. See, e.g., von der Mehden, *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia*, 171; Rasheeduddin Khan, "Political Participation and Political Change in Andhra Pradesh (India)" (unpublished paper, Osmania Univ. Department of Political Science, June 1969), 33.

In some cases, even elites that were ahead of ethnically differentiated competitors saw separatism as a way of reducing the competition. The agitation for a separate Pakistan in the 1930s and '40s was disproportionately led by Muslims in what was then called the United Provinces (U.P.). As a whole, Indian Muslims were backward, and they feared domination by educationally more advanced Hindus. But in the United Provinces, Muslims were ahead of Hindus in government employment, the professions, and the modern private sector. Still, U.P. Muslim elites feared their minority position in an undivided India, and they demanded a separate state to protect their position. Paul R. Brass, "Muslim Separatism in United Provinces: Social Context and Political Strategy Before Partition," *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), Jan. 1970, pp. 167–86.

the exclusion of non-Kurds from government service in Kurdish areas.[15] The dual character of the demands indicates that the issue is not merely one of ethnic representation; it has shifted to domination. In the Sudan, for example, Southerners, more than one quarter of the population, received only six of 800 civil service openings at independence, and they were slighted in other ways as well. They held only three of forty-three seats on a constitution-drafting committee. Their position in other government bodies was equally poor: less than 3 percent of post-independence army commissions, 4 percent of newly gazetted police officers, and so on.[16] The Southern elite was small, but it had great expectations that were quickly thwarted. Moreover, British civil servants in the South were usually replaced by Northerners. By all accounts, the new administrators were not attuned to Southern sensibilities. It took little beyond this to convince Southerners that a new colonialism had arrived: imposition of Arabic for certain official purposes in the South, hints of alignment with Arab Egypt, hostility toward Christian missionaries. Concluded two Southern leaders: "the administration, the army, the police, the judiciary and trade in the South [are] all in Arab hands; Arabic is the official national language as well as the medium of instruction; Friday is the day of rest, etc. Could domination be better expressed?"[17]

Civil service appointments and postings have been prominent accelerators of separatist sentiment among a variety of backward groups in backward regions, ranging from Chad to Baluchistan to Nagaland to the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh. With the French departure from Chad in 1960, Southerners, better educated in French, were able to claim the best civil service positions. Like Northern Sudanese sent to administer the backward South, Southern Chadians were sent to govern the backward North, which they did with scant regard for Northern local

15. Lorenzo Kent Kimball, *The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971* (New York: Robert Speller, 1972), 141–42; Abdul H. Raoof, "Kurdish Ethnic Nationalism and Political Development in Republican Iraq" (unpublished paper presented at the 1971 annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association), 10. So conscious are the Kurds of their backwardness that these demands sometimes make provision for exceptions when no qualified Kurds can be found for particular positions.

16. Mohamed Omer Beshir, *The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict* (London: C. Hurst, 1968), 72; Richard Gray, "The Southern Sudan," *Journal of Contemporary History* 6 (1971): 108–20, at 117.

17. Joseph Oduho and William Deng, *The Problem of the Southern Sudan* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963), 14. For reports of similar sentiments, see Kyle, "The Southern Problem in the Sudan," 513; I. William Zartman, *Government and Politics in Northern Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1963), 140; Robert O. Collins and Robert L. Tignor, *Egypt and the Sudan* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 147–64.

authorities. This, perhaps more than the arrest of Northern politicians, prompted rebellion. Within a few years of independence, there was fighting.[18] Similarly, estimates gave Baluch only 5 percent of civil service positions in their province, and almost none at the highest levels.[19] In Nagaland, non-Naga Indian officials replaced the British, and "a change in the spirit of administration, if not yet in the pattern, was immediately felt by the Nagas."[20] By 1951, the Nagas had issued a declaration of independence. And when Andhra Pradesh was created out of a mosaic of Telugu-speaking areas in 1956, well-qualified Coastal Andhras moved into Telangana to take civil service positions in Hyderabad. Aspiring Telangana students were outraged by what seemed a theft of their opportunities. On top of this, it was said that a shortage of "skilled" Telangana public service applicants existed, and Telanganas were told they were "indolent," that their "Urduized" Telugu was impure and that their habits were "feudal."[21] In each case, a backward region inhabited by a backward group was, it seemed, "colonized" by administrators from a more advanced region and a more advanced group.

In economic terms, of course, the actions that precipitate separatist activity can be viewed as merely the equilibration of factors of production between two unequally developed regions.[22] Regions with a surfeit of human resources export them to regions with a deficit. The same is true of investment. In Telangana, to cite one case, cheap but fertile land was purchased by ambitious Coastal Andhra farmers. A single state implies a single, unbounded market for labor and capital. And there, precisely, is the rub, for the market may be unbounded, but its populations are encapsulated within ethnic and psychological boundaries. Telangana farmers thus resented the more efficient, productive Coastal

18. Robert Pledge, "France at War in Africa," *Africa Report*, June 1970, pp. 16–19; John A. Ballard, "Four Equatorial States," in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1966), 272–74; William H. Lewis, "Francophone Africa," *Current History* 60 (March 1971): 142–45, at 143; René Lemarchand, "Sisyphus in Chad: The MRA as a Development Partnership" (unpublished paper, Univ. of Florida, n.d., *ca.* 1973), 4; *Africa Report*, Nov. 1969, pp. 10–12.

19. Robert G. Wirsing, "The Protection of Frontier Minorities: The Case of the Baluch of Pakistan," in Wirsing, ed., *Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspectives* (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1981), 293. These estimates were as of 1972.

20. Neville Maxwell, *India and the Nagas* (London: Minority Rights Group, Report no. 17, n.d.), 9.

21. Gray, "The Demand for a Separate Telengana State." I shall deal in more detail below with separatism in Telangana (both spellings are used).

22. See Williamson, "Regional Inequality and the Process of National Development."

farmers who migrated there, even though their activity presumably raised the value of Telangana land.

Typically, developments that occur within separatist regions are paralleled by actions at the center that are unfavorable to the backward group. These include abandonment of promises of special concessions—for example, ignoring repeated pledges to consider federalism in the Sudan or failing to enforce arrangements for local job preferences in Telangana. They also include policies that augur homogenization, such as adoption of a single state language in Assam and the Sudan, of a single state religion in Burma, or of pan-Arabist doctrine in the Sudan and Iraq.[23] Groups like the Karens, the Nagas, the Mizos, the Southern Sudanese, the Philippine Muslims, and the Kurds, with a keen sense of weakness, are easily convinced by such policies that their only hope of resisting domination lies in some form of separation. As I shall show, advanced groups are not so readily persuaded to withdraw from competition within the unified state.

It may seem paradoxical that poor regions, benefiting from association with more prosperous regions, should want to terminate the arrangement. Yet the desire recurs. Occasionally, the economic costs of separatism are tempered by the prospect of claiming some resource located in or near the secessionist area, such as oil on the fringes of Iraqi Kurdistan. But this is rarely decisive. Many groups without such opportunities simply choose to pay whatever price is required. In the secessionist idiom of the Northern Nigeria of 1966, "What does money matter when it is a question of honour?"[24] For backward groups in backward regions, secessionist sentiment is weak when political debate still revolves around predictions of whether secession would entail an economic loss and, if so, whether the political gain would be worth the economic sacrifice.

Finally, it is necessary to take account of some exceptions. Why, for

23. C. P. Cook, "India: The Crisis in Assam," *The World Today* 24 (Oct. 1968): 444–48, at 446; Collins and Tignor, *Egypt and the Sudan*, 159; Donald Eugene Smith, *Religion and Politics in Burma* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966), 230; Zartman, *Government and Politics in Northern Africa*, 140; Eric J. Hooglund, "Cross-Current Nationalism: A Study of Kurdish Insurgency, 1961–1969" (unpublished paper, Johns Hopkins Univ. School of Advanced International Studies, Nov. 1970).

24. Quoted in Walter Schwarz, *Nigeria* (New York: Praeger, 1968), 249. For an explanation, cast in terms of welfare economics, of "why even individuals who will probably lose in terms of tangible rewards through increased political autonomy may nevertheless be willing to invest in its attainment," see Douglas G. Hartle and Richard M. Bird, "The Demand for Local Political Autonomy: An Individualistic Theory," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15 (Dec. 1971): 443–56, at 455.

example, did East Bengal remain in Pakistan for almost twenty-five years before seceding? Why did Northern Nigeria edge toward secession in 1966, only to pull back again?

The East Bengalis, particularly the Bengali Muslims, were clearly a backward people in a backward region. At $63, per capita income in East Bengal before secession was just half that of West Pakistan. At independence, only three Bengali Muslims, of a total of about 100 members of the Indian Civil Service, chose to serve Pakistan.[25] Poorly represented in the civil administration, in the army, and in business, the Bengalis were said to be rich only in politicians.[26] The Bengalis contended that expenditure per capita was skewed toward West Pakistan, where development investment would presumably bring a higher rate of return. In addition, they could claim something backward regions are usually in no position to claim: that they made a disproportionate contribution to export earnings because of jute production. As in other cases, even the East Bengal administration was filled with West Pakistanis, and Bengali was only grudgingly recognized as an official language. If backward groups in backward regions have a low threshold for separatism, why were the Bengalis, having similar characteristics, such late seceders?

For one thing, the great distance between East and West Pakistan, which was so often said to have rendered the unity of the country precarious, may instead have contributed to its durability. Distance may have made complete domination of the East by the West more difficult and may have limited irritating contact between people in the two wings. More important for present purposes, however, the East Bengalis were a very large group, more than half the total population. Unlike backward minorities, they could and did, right up to the eve of secession, entertain a hope that their numbers might be translated into sufficient political power at the center to compensate for their competitive disadvantages. This was reason enough to be patient, at least until the majority finally won by the Bengali party, the Awami League, in the 1970 elections was decisively rebuffed by the armed forces.

For the Nigerian Hausa, the strategy was the same. Despite their competitive weakness, they embarked on a course of pan-regional politics, because the Northern region gave them formidable numerical resources to do so and also because they had an historic aspiration, antedating the British conquest, to march south to the sea. For some years after independence, Hausa politicians ruled at the center by skillful exploitation of differences among Southerners. When military rule reversed this political ascendancy, there was separatist sentiment expressed by some Hausa, but it was quickly checked. After the Northern countercoup of July 1966, nothing further was heard of it.[27]

25. Richard D. Lambert, "Factors in Bengali Regionalism in Pakistan," *Far Eastern Survey* 28 (Apr. 1959): 49–58, at 54. Hugh Tinker, *India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis*, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1968), 167, reports that none of Pakistan's share of the former Indian Civil Service was Bengali.

26. Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 482.

The East Bengalis and the Hausa traveled in different directions, to be sure, but the animating forces were the same. The Bengalis waited a long time but finally chose to leave Pakistan. The Hausa clearly contemplated leaving Nigeria but reversed course. In both cases, urges to secede were propelled by the same fears that underlay the actions of backward groups in backward regions elsewhere. In each case, however, these were offset by the prospect of exerting hegemonic power in the undivided state. What distinguished the Hausa and the Bengalis from comparable groups in other countries was their large numbers, which afforded them a chance to resist domination and perhaps even impose their own. That is why neither chose an early secession. Regardless of advancement or backwardness, groups with substantial political power in the undivided state will prefer to remain in it rather than secede.

ADVANCED GROUPS IN BACKWARD REGIONS

In sharp contrast to the secessionist activity of backward groups in backward regions is the behavior of advanced groups in backward regions. Where backward groups are early seceders, advanced groups are late seceders. Where backward groups often sought colonial protection, a postponement of independence, or special arrangements once independence seemed inevitable, advanced groups were, more often than not, in the forefront of the anti-colonial movement.[28] Where backward groups

27. The Biafrans suggested that influential foreigners (presumably the British) discouraged the idea of a Northern secession. *Nigerian Crisis 1966* (Enugu: Eastern Regional Government, n.d.), 41–42, 49. Ruth First, *Power in Africa* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), 320, attributes the suppression of secessionist sentiment to a group of Northern civil servants, British and American diplomats, and Middle Belters in the army "who saw in Northern secession the danger that they would be a perpetual and unbearable minority in the North."

28. Though not invariably so. Before independence, the Ceylon Tamils, for example, sought additional parliamentary representation to compensate for their numerical weakness. See W. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960), 91.

seek proportionality in government employment, advanced groups seek only assurances of nondiscrimination. Where backward groups attempt to keep ethnic strangers from government service in their region, advanced groups affirm the principle of unrestricted mobility. Where backward groups attempt secession as soon as their competitive fears seem confirmed, advanced groups attempt secession only when all hope of salvaging their position in the country is dashed. Where backward groups in backward regions attempt to separate despite the economic costs of secession, advanced groups in backward regions decide on separation only when the advantages of remaining in the unified state are much reduced and the costs of remaining seem perilously high. Advanced groups in backward regions have a much higher threshold of tolerance for political events inimical to their interests than backward groups do.

Initially, most groups try to remain in the undivided state, but how hard they try is a function of how able they feel to compete in it. After the first serious rebuffs, the Southern Sudanese moved rapidly from an equivocally federalist to an openly secessionist position, though there was never perfect agreement in the declarations of the various organizations. It took little to push them out. By contrast, the Ibo went through serious collective violence at Jos in 1945 and at Kano in 1953, their nationalism unimpaired. It took two massacres in 1966, separated by a Northern coup in which many Ibo officers and men lost their lives, before the Ibo embarked on Biafra. Thus did the Nigerian-nationalist Ibo become secessionists and the Northern secessionists become preservers of a single Nigeria. The Ceylon Tamils have also been patient. They endured the riots of 1956 and 1958, Sinhala-Only legislation, and discrimination against them in government employment, without demanding anything more than a mild federalism. Then, in 1972, came a new constitution that ignored their demands and conferred state patronage on Buddhism, the religion of most Sinhalese. This was followed by sharp discrimination against Tamil university applicants and by the anti-Tamil violence of 1977, 1981, and 1983. Only in 1976 did Ceylon Tamil leaders unequivocally declare for a separate state, and since 1978 there have been very serious incidents of separatist terrorism. The Tamils could still go either way.

Because advanced groups in backward regions secede only as a last resort, many advanced groups in backward regions, even when severely frustrated, do not reach the point of choosing separatism. The Lozi in Zambia are such a group, aggrieved but not inclined seriously toward

secession. The Lozi homeland, Barotseland, was administered separately by the British. At independence it was agreed that Barotseland would have a special status within Zambia.[29] This arrangement was soon abrogated by the Zambian government, which treated Barotseland as just another province, restricting the powers of the Lozi monarch and abolishing the Barotse legislature. Periodically, there has been violence between Lozi and Bemba. Following the restrictions imposed by the central government, Barotseland turned decisively away from the Zambian nationalist party and toward the opposition. Each time the central government has acted to limit provincial power, secession has been on the lips of the Lozi aristocracy. But it has gone no further. Secession has had no real support from educated Lozi elites and has produced no coherent movement. Despite provocation, important elements of the Lozi community still prefer a unified Zambia.

The position of advanced groups in backward regions makes it clear why their threshold of tolerance is so much higher than that of backward groups. Advanced groups in backward regions are generally population exporters. Barotseland has poor soil. Jaffna, the heartland of the Ceylon Tamils, is dry and unproductive. Iboland, having suffered soil erosion, is also infertile. In each case, group survival has depended upon the search for opportunities outside the region, upon push migration. Barotseland exported Lozi labor to South African gold mines and white-collar workers to the Zambian Copperbelt. Lozi also sought education far out of proportion to their numbers; they were the largest group of students at Lusaka's premier secondary school on the eve of independence. This opened the way to opportunities all over Zambia.[30] As we have seen, the same applies to the Ceylon Tamils, who took advantage of educational opportunities and migrated to the South of Sri Lanka as traders, bureaucrats, and professionals.[31] Ibo, too, settled all over Nigeria; Ibo clerks, traders, and laborers were to be found in every urban area.[32] Each of these backward regions thus came to depend on remittances from the sons it had exported to other regions of the country.

This explains why the Ibo became the apostles of pan-Nigerian na-

29. Gerald L. Caplan, *The Elites of Barotseland, 1878–1969* (London: C. Hurst, 1970), chaps. 6–8; Caplan, "Barotseland: The Secessionist Challenge to Zambia," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 6 (Oct. 1968): 343–60; Margaret Rouse Bates, "UNIP in Post Independence Zambia" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard Univ., 1971).

30. Caplan, *The Elites of Barotseland*, 175–76.

31. Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation*, 234.

32. James S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1958), 332–34.

tionalism and the implacable opponents of compartmentalizing the country. "The Ibo, as well as the Ibibio, had strong personal economic reasons for wanting Nigeria to be a nation with freedom of movement and enterprise."[33] The educated Lozi elite, especially but not only those outside Barotseland, took an equally strong position in favor of a united Zambia.[34] And the Ceylon Tamils preferred "fruitful participation in national affairs instead of being cramped and cribbed in the arid and overcrowded Jaffna Peninsula."[35] One undivided, nationwide field of opportunity seemed in each case to be at the heart of ethnic interest.

Whereas for backward groups, unable to compete outside their home region, the question is whether they will govern themselves or be governed by carpetbaggers, for advanced groups the issue is whether they will be accepted outside their own region. For an advanced group, widely distributed throughout the country, secession would have the clearest disadvantages. It would dry up vital extraregional income sources and trigger a return of talented but unemployed group members to the homeland. Alternatively, it would leave large segments of the secessionist ethnic group outside the homeland, where they would be vulnerable to discrimination and attack and where their own income and their remittances to the home region would also be jeopardized. Advanced groups do not feel unable to compete—indeed, others often sense in them excessive confidence. Unlike backward groups, therefore, advanced groups are unwilling to disregard these formidable economic costs of secession in order to free themselves from disagreeable competitive relationships. Hence their extreme wariness of abandoning the national system for a more parochial secessionist region, with its greatly restricted opportunities.

Backward groups are, of course, not troubled by these inhibiting considerations. One reason for their ability to make such a quick judgment in favor of secession is that they need worry less often about the presence of large numbers of their kinsmen outside their home region. There are exceptions, to be sure: the majority of Karens, for example, do not live in the core Karen area, and it was not easy for Karen secessionists to stake out a contiguous territory that would embrace an acceptable number of Karens.[36] But the usual situation of backward groups is different.

33. Ibid., 338–39.
34. Caplan, *The Elites of Barotseland*, 194.
35. Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation*, 146.
36. Brian Crozier, *The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrections* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 89.

Often lacking education and marketable skills, they are less likely to migrate in large numbers out of their region.[37] Migration out of their region is inherent in the situation of advanced groups from backward regions, as it is not for backward groups.

It is their diaspora, then, and the nationwide field of opportunity that inhibit secessionist impulses among advanced groups from backward regions. Still, the Ibo did fight a war of secession, the Kasai Baluba of Zaire did set up their own state, and the Ceylon Tamils have threatened to do the same. What forces overcame their inhibitions?

If the dispersion of group members and the advantages of a single, unbounded, nationwide field of opportunity impede the growth of secessionist sentiment among population-exporting groups, then clearly the reversal of these conditions can provide a real fillip to separatism. When the national system begins to break down because of regional parochialism or because of discrimination against advanced groups, the advantages of "one Nigeria" or "one Sri Lanka" can readily be called into question. When a population-exporting region experiences an in-gathering of its scattered exiles, inhibitions on secessionist impulses can be swept aside. This is all the more so because push migrants from backward regions do not return home *en masse* unless something dramatically unfavorable has happened to them. The two unfavorable things that happen most often are discrimination that curtails their opportunities and violence that threatens their lives. The two sometimes go together, and they are the most common precipitants of secession among advanced groups in backward regions.

Advanced groups from population-exporting regions are disproportionately victims of ethnic violence. This explains the paradox of their position: reluctant separatists yet not infrequently pushed to the point of seceding. The most severe episodes of such violence produce massive back-migration that fosters secession. In Zaire, in 1959, when Lulua killed Baluba in Luluabourg in Central Kasai, some 50,000 Baluba fled back to South Kasai. Gradually, Baluba from all over Central Kasai

37. This is not an inflexible rule, of course, but it does hold for large parts of the developing world, especially less industrialized countries. Often the migration such groups undertake is temporary or seasonal, as in the case of agricultural labor. That tendency is altered, however, as industrialization proceeds, creating a need for large, unskilled and semi-skilled labor forces. In Spain, for instance, the poor Southern region of Andalusia exports much unskilled labor to Northern industry. The distribution of the population of backward groups may be a major difference—with implications for secession of backward regions—between developing and developed countries.

followed suit. By 1963, the population of South Kasai had quadrupled. The result of this flight, which signified an end to Baluba opportunities outside their own region, was the attempted secession of South Kasai.[38]

This was the Ibo case in microcosm. The Nigerian violence of 1966 spurred a similar eastward movement of Ibo. Many Ibo fled after the May riots, then later returned to the North. But the September-October killings were more organized and extensive. These riots generated a flood of refugees, some of them maimed. Their arrival in the East inflamed sentiment there. Perhaps a million Ibo returned to the East, convinced that it was dangerous to be an Ibo elsewhere in Nigeria.

The violence was the culmination of a long process of whittling away Ibo opportunities. The process began, in formal terms, with the "Northernization" of administration and business pursued by the Northern Regional Government in the 1950s.[39] Discrimination was practiced against Ibo government servants and businessmen in employment, contracts, and licenses. The process accelerated in the 1960s, with attacks on alleged Ibo nepotism and concerted struggles to remove Ibo from high government and university positions. The victims of violence who fled eastward were joined by those who felt that Ibo prospects in other regions were no longer salvageable. The Ibo, it was said, had built the country but would not be permitted to reap the rewards.[40]

Thus far, the Ceylon Tamils have been spared the massive violence of an episode comparable to Nigeria in 1966. But they have increasingly been victimized in widespread riots. At such times, refugees from the South have carried back credible tales of lack of protection for Tamils in Sinhalese areas.

More than this, the Tamil position in the country has time and again failed to receive the official recognition the Tamils demand. The relegation of the Tamil language to a distinctly secondary place in official business resulted in a decline in opportunities for Tamil government servants without a knowledge of Sinhala. The 1972 constitution reinforced the position of Sinhala, accorded a "foremost place" to Sinhalese

38. Thomas Turner, "Congo-Kinshasa," in Victor A. Olorunsola, ed., *The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1972), 217–24.

39. Richard L. Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963), 327–28.

40. K. Whiteman, "Enugu: The Psychology of Secession, 20 July 1966 to 30 May 1967," in Panter-Brick, ed., *Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War*, 117; Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, 467–68; Victor A. Olorunsola, "Nigeria," in Olorunsola, ed., *The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa*, 35–36.

Buddhism, and denied Tamil claims for regional autonomy.[41] The constitution was a decisive symbolic rebuff.

Then came a policy of "standardizing marks," a system of weightage in grades to offset the superior performance of Tamil students in academic examinations. The result was a dramatic decline in Tamil representation in higher education, a decline that had begun earlier. Reductions of 30 to 40 percent in Tamil enrollment, depending on the field, were experienced in a period of one to three years.[42] In the decade between 1963 and 1973, the percentage of Ceylon Tamils with university education fell from 2.2 to 0.6, below the Sinhalese level.[43] Tamil prospects in government service and the professions dwindled.

For the Tamils, as for the Ibo—but to a lesser degree—repeated failure to acknowledge the Tamil position in the country, the steady contraction of opportunities in the South, and periodic violence have all contributed to a growing willingness to forgo opportunities in an undivided state if those opportunities could be exchanged for expanded opportunities in a smaller, sovereign Tamil state. For most Tamils, this willingness remains equivocal, partly because many Tamils remain in the South. Recurrent anti-Tamil violence, such as the serious riots of 1983, may change this, but so far, like other advanced groups in backward regions, the Tamils are still reluctant secessionists.

ADVANCED GROUPS IN ADVANCED REGIONS

As indicated previously, the vast majority of secessionist regions are economically backward. Advanced regions are far less inclined to separatism. But just as backward and advanced groups in backward regions have different reasons for choosing a separatist course, so, too, do the paths traversed by groups inhabiting advanced regions differ from each other.

The calculations of advanced groups in advanced regions are easy to fathom. In the nature of things, they are likely to have a regional economic grievance. Advanced regions usually generate more income and

41. Robert N. Kearney, "Language and the Rise of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," *Asian Survey* 18 (May 1978): 521–34. See also Urmila Phadnis, "Keeping the Tamils Internal," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Mar. 25, 1972, pp. 21–22; W. A. Wiswa Warnapala, "Sri Lanka in 1972: Tension and Change," *Asian Survey* 13 (Feb. 1973): 217–30.

42. Kearney, "Language and the Rise of Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka," 531; Walter Schwarz, *The Tamils of Sri Lanka* (London: Minority Rights Group, Report no. 25, 1975), 12–13.

43. *Report on the Survey of Consumer Finances*, part 1 (Colombo: Central Bank of Ceylon, 1974), 32.

contribute more revenue to the treasury of the undivided state than they receive. They believe that they are subsidizing poorer regions. The Basque and Catalan cases in Spain are an extreme example of this, well documented and worth discussing even though not in Asia and Africa. The Basque country and Catalonia are industrialized regions, with per capita incomes far above the national average—in the Basque case, more than twice that average. In the late 1960s, Catalonia paid 31 percent of all of Spain's taxes, but received only 13 percent of all expenditures. The Basque region paid 13 percent of all taxes but obtained only 5 percent of all expenditures.[44] Myths have grown up in the Basque country that the hardworking Basques are supporting less productive peoples and regions of Spain. A Basque protest song characterizes Spain as "a cow with its muzzle in the Basque country and its udder in Madrid."[45] From this standpoint, separatism would permit productive regions like the Basque country to retain their revenues and to control and limit migrants from other regions who are attracted to advanced industrial regions because of economic opportunities there.

If this were all there were to it, there would be many more separatist advanced regions than there are. There are, however, countervailing considerations that stem the growth of secessionist activity among advanced groups in advanced regions.

To begin with, such groups are likely to export surplus capital and population outside their region. Their prosperity generates investment that does not respect regional boundaries. Their education creates a talent pool in search of opportunities. Like the Ibo, but less out of necessity than out of opportunity, the Yoruba sent their sons all over Nigeria, and particularly to the North, where they were engaged in business and in government service. When the Ibo created Biafra, the Yoruba did not follow suit. There are several reasons for this,[46] but surely one of the most prominent is that the Yoruba were well positioned, by dint of qualifications and seniority, to move into opportunities in Nigeria vacated by the Ibo. And this they did. In Uganda, the Baganda were vastly

44. Willliam T. Salisbury, "Some Aspects of the Regional Issue in Contemporary Spanish Affairs" (unpublished paper presented at the 1976 annual meeting of the International Studies Association), 6, drawing on data developed by Juan Linz.

45. William A. Douglas and Milton da Silva, "Basque Nationalism," in Oriol Pi-Sunyer, ed., *The Limits of Integration* (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Department of Anthropology, Research Report no. 9, 1971), 149–50. For the underlying resentments, see also Kenneth Medhurst, *The Basques* (London: Minority Rights Group, Report no. 9, 1972), 5.

46. For some of these, see Dudley, "Western Nigeria and the Nigerian Crisis," 109.

overrepresented in the civil service during the 1960s.[47] They also were overrepresented in business and the professions, and they had a long history of taking up opportunities all over the country. This favorable position no doubt had much to do with overcoming initial Baganda reluctance to join an independent Uganda. Ultimately, the Baganda ruler did threaten secession, but only after the prime minister, A. Milton Obote, had reneged on the independence agreement, removed the ruler as head of state, and forced through a new constitution.[48] For the Yoruba and the Baganda, the attractions of exerting influence and reaping rewards in a large, undivided state were stronger than the temptations of a more homogeneous, contracted homeland. Perhaps the same will hold true for the Sikhs in the Indian Punjab, even after the widespread anti-Sikh riots of 1984, unless further violence triggers a wave of refugees returning to the home region. The Sikhs are heavily represented in the transport business all over India and in the Indian army.[49] The effect of investment and employment not tied to the home region is to create among advanced groups from advanced regions outward-looking interests that retard their enthusiasm for secession.

There is something beyond this that is not present in the situation of advanced groups in backward regions (such as the Ibo). The economic development of advanced regions almost inevitably leads to claims of revenue imbalance of the sort described earlier, but this may mask the enormous economic advantages that inhere in the undivided state. If the advanced region produces for the domestic market of the undivided state, it is not certain that regional prosperity will survive separation. Some 90 percent of the production of the Basque provinces, for example, is purchased within Spain under a protectionist economic policy in aid of Basque products that would not be competitive on the international market.[50] Once the Ibo returned home, the economic interest of Iboland in the undivided state was practically at an end. But this would not be

47. Nelson Kasfir, "Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Uganda," in Olorunsola, ed., *The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa*, 123–28.

48. On the Baganda, see Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, 149–56.

49. See Dalip Singh, *Dynamics of Punjab Politics* (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 1981), 52–53; Satinder Singh, *Khalistan: An Academic Analysis* (New Delhi: Amar Prakashan, 1982); Paul Wallace, "Religious and Secular Politics in Punjab: The Sikh Dilemma in Competing Political Systems," *Punjab Journal of Politics* 5 (Jan.–June 1981): 1–32; Harish K. Puri, "Akali Politics: Emerging Compulsions," *Punjab Journal of Politics* 5 (Jan.–June 1981): 33–51.

50. See Pedro González Blasco, "Modern Nationalism in Old Nations as a Consequence of Earlier State-Building: The Case of Basque-Spain," in Wendell Bell and Walter Freeman, eds., *Ethnicity and Nation-Building* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974), 347.

true for the Basques—or for other, similarly situated advanced groups in advanced regions—even if all group members were to return at once to the home region. The prosperity of advanced groups in advanced regions typically depends, not merely on the contributions of migrant sons located in other regions, but on a web of interregional economic relations that may include dependence on other regions for materials and markets, sometimes specially protected markets.[51] Like advanced groups in backward regions, advanced groups in advanced regions will secede only if the economic costs of secession are low, but the reduction of such costs is far less likely in the case of advanced groups in advanced regions.

This circumstance is reflected in the Basque ambivalence toward secession. The Basque movement is strong but far from unanimous on its goals. Businessmen and others with far-flung interests, or with doubts about the ability of the region to survive an end to protection, have tended to oppose a separate state.[52] Noting that Basque industry has always thought in terms of the broader Spanish economy, Stanley Payne has opined that Basque separatism is "shrill and fanatical" partly "because of its minority position" in the Basque country.[53]

Nevertheless, the Basques have experienced some special conditions conducive to separatism. The Basques have relatively fewer group members outside their region than most other similarly situated advanced groups do, though exact figures are not available. In the past, many who left the Basque country became Castilianized. The Basques have also faced an enormous influx of immigrants from other areas of Spain. Both of these conditions I shall comment on in dealing with forces that foster separatism regardless of the backward or advanced character of the region or group. For the moment, it is enough to note that these conditions are especially acute among the Basques. So, too, was the repression of the Franco regime, a regime that had remarkably few Basques in its public service and that carried out its repression largely through the medium of the *Guardia Civil*, a military body composed of ethnic strangers to the Basque country.

51. So far as tariff protection is concerned, much is likely to depend on whether the prosperity of the region is based on production of finished goods for the domestic market or on production of primary products or extraction of minerals for export. For elaboration, see page 257, below.

52. González Blasco, "Modern Nationalism in Old Nations as a Consequence of Earlier State-Building," 366.

53. "Catalan and Basque Nationalism," *Journal of Contemporary History* 6 (1971): 15–51, at 50. The reference to Spanish industry appears at p. 38.

What the Basque case shows is that a powerful secessionist movement is not impossible among advanced groups in advanced regions but that it takes some extraordinary conditions to bring it about. Most of the time, the lure of interests and opportunities throughout the undivided state is enough to ward off the possibility.

The point is well illustrated by what might at first appear to be the exceptional case of Eritrea. With about 8 percent of the total population of Ethiopia, Eritreans have had, by some estimates, as much as one-fourth of the opportunities in higher education and government service all over the country. Their literacy rate is estimated to be considerably higher than the Ethiopian average.[54] Under Italian rule, Eritrea experienced industrial development that more than compensated overall for the region's soil erosion and unreliable rainfall, leaving it with a per capita income higher than the Ethiopian average. Moreover, as Ethiopia's only access to the sea, Eritrea benefited from the transit trade and from priority in government investment.[55] Yet, practically from the moment of federation with Ethiopia in 1952, there was Eritrean resistance, culminating in a full-fledged secessionist war by the 1970s. Is this a case, then, of an advanced group in an advanced region willing to forgo the advantages of the undivided state, including numerous opportunities outside the home region, on scarcely a moment's reflection?

To answer this question, it is necessary to restore some of the complexity that our simplified framework has deliberately omitted. Eritrea is a heterogeneous region, composed of nearly equal numbers of Christians and Muslims. The advanced group that has had opportunities in education and employment, and has migrated out of the region, has been disproportionately Christian.[56] For example, nineteen of one hundred and thirty-eight senior central government officials between 1941 and

54. John Franklin Campbell, "Background to the Eritrean Conflict," *Africa Report*, May 1971, pp. 19–20. Campbell's estimate is three to four times the Ethiopian average. Asmara, the Eritrean capital, had a literacy rate of 50 percent in the early 1970s, higher than any other area of Ethiopia, including Addis Ababa, which had a 43 percent rate. Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia, Central Statistical Office, *Population and Housing Characteristics of Asmara* (Addis Ababa: Central Statistical Office, Statistical Bulletin no. 12, Dec. 1974), 5.

55. Ethiopiawi (pseud.), "The Eritrean-Ethiopian Conflict," in Astri Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, eds., *Ethnic Conflict in International Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1977), 131.

56. There are many indirect indications of this. Asmara, by far the largest city of the region, is 85 percent Christian. Literacy in those districts of Asmara with the heaviest Muslim concentration (Akria and Geza Berhano) was below the average for the city, and housing in those districts was also of less than average quality. Provisional Military Government, Central Statistical Office, *Population and Housing Characteristics of Asmara*, 68–69, 76–78.

1966 were Eritreans—a total second only to the Emperor's own Shoan Amhara—but, of the nineteen, only three were Muslims.[57] The secessionist movement, although not totally lacking in Christian support, has been disproportionately Muslim. The ties of Christians in the Eritrean highlands have historically been closer to other Ethiopian groups than to the Muslims in the Eritrean lowlands.[58] Around the time of federation, many Christians supported full integration with Ethiopia—witness the growth of a Unionist Party composed of Christians.

When these Muslim-Christian qualifications are introduced, the profile of the Eritrean secessionists no longer resembles that of an advanced group from an advanced region. Rather, it is largely a movement of a backward group from an advanced region. Groups so positioned have, as I shall show very shortly, little reason to equivocate on secession once they detect signs of domination. (In Eritrea, one strong sign that we have observed elsewhere was the frequent appointment of Shoans, rather than Eritreans, to key positions in Eritrea.) Advanced groups from advanced regions, however, are more often inclined to participate actively in the undivided state—and even, if possible, to dominate it—than they are to withdraw from it.

BACKWARD GROUPS IN ADVANCED REGIONS

There is a different reason for the infrequency of secessionist claims made by backward groups in advanced regions. Such groups are quite likely separatists, but they are rarely in a numerically predominant position in such a region.

Economically advanced regions tend to be the home of advanced ethnic groups who have benefited from the economic institutions that bring prosperity to the region. Over and over again, fortuitous location in or near a center of investment has given local ethnic groups opportunities for education and employment denied to those less well situated. Like the Basques, the Yoruba, the Kikuyu, and the Baganda are all advanced groups indigenous to economically advanced regions. But this is not invariably the case. Sometimes opportunities of this kind are taken up by migrants to the area, typically by advanced groups from backward, population-exporting regions. This has been largely the case in the Sind province of Pakistan, the prosperous urban centers of which are

57. Christopher Clapham, *Haile Selassie's Government* (New York: Praeger, 1969), 75–76, 83.
58. Ibid., 81.

controlled by Urdu-speaking migrants from North India, rather than by Sindhis. Where this occurs, the indigenous population becomes a backward group in an advanced region.

Katanga (later renamed Shaba) in Zaire was such a case. Mineral-rich,

> Katanga was sparsely populated . . . with the result that by the 1920s labor recruiters began going farther afield, notably to what became Kasai Province. The new mining towns, Elisabethville, Jadotville, Kolwezi, and others, began filling up with "strangers" from outside Katanga, predominantly Luba from Kasai, who were particularly receptive to European influences and social change . . . . In both commercial and clerical jobs in Katanga towns, the Luba/Kasai were markedly more numerous than the Katangans.[59]

By the late 1950s, Lunda and other indigenous groups were greatly outnumbered by migrants in the towns, especially by Kasai Baluba. In Elisabethville, for example, more than half of those employed came from outside Katanga, and Kasai Baluba outnumbered Lunda by more than four to one, a fact quickly reflected in election results.[60]

Political organization in Katanga responded to this situation. Moise Tshombe's party, the Conakat, described itself as a movement of "authentic Katangans," which was another way of saying it was organized by indigenous Lunda and Bayeke of Southern Katanga and directed against the Kasai Baluba. Conakat had originally had some support from the Baluba of Northern Katanga (a different group from the Kasai Baluba), but this proved short-lived. The key reason for the split was Conakat's hostility to the Kasai Baluba, with whom the Katanga Baluba feel at least some affinity.

It took very little beyond the double threat of immigrant Kasai Baluba power in Southern Katanga and Katanga Baluba power in the Northern part of the province to persuade Conakat of the desirability of a separate state. As Zaire neared independence, the Baluba of Northern Katanga seemed to have greater influence in the central government, and this was

59. Turner, "Congo-Kinshasa," 224.
60. Ibid., 226; Jules Gérard-Libois, *Katanga Secession*, trans. Rebecca Young (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 12–13, 27–28; René Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1964), 235–36, 241; Crawford Young, "The Politics of Separatism: Katanga, 1960–63," in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., *Politics in Africa: 7 Cases* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), 172–74; René Lemarchand, "Congo (Leopoldville)," in James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1964), 581.

enough to push Tshombe over the brink.[61] Within the first fortnight of independence, the secession of Katanga was underway. But the secession was effective only in the South of Katanga, where the Lunda and Bayeke are concentrated. In the North of the province, a separate movement developed among the Katanga Baluba.

The sentiments and claims expressed by backward groups in advanced regions are a hybrid of those put forward by backward groups in backward regions and by advanced groups in advanced regions. They are compounded of a substantial dose of collective anxiety and a desire to end revenue-expenditure imbalances.

Like backward groups in backward regions, those in advanced regions are fearful of competing with advanced groups and keenly sensitive to threats of domination. Their fears are magnified by the large number of advanced group members in their midst. Backward groups in backward regions can escape disagreeable competition by withdrawing from the undivided state. A backward group in an advanced region—such as the Lunda—must also cope with the advanced group within its own regional borders. To do so, it proposes various discriminatory measures. Secession foreshadows yet more severe and xenophobic action.[62]

As noted earlier, backward groups in backward regions typically attempt secession despite economic costs. For backward groups in advanced regions, however, secession appears to promise economic benefits. The region typically contributes more to the income of the undivided state than it receives. The contribution of Katanga to Zaire's total income was close to 50 percent just before independence. But Katanga's share of Zaire's budgetary expenditure was only 20 percent, more than its per capita share but less, obviously, than its share based on productivity.[63] Just as Basques likened Spain to a cow being fed by the Basques but

61. In the 1960 Katanga provincial elections, Conakat did well. It also did better than Balubakat, the party of the Katanga Baluba in the North of the province, in the national elections, but the Balubakat leader, Jason Sendwe, was nonetheless named by the central government to be High Commissioner for Katanga. This appointment triggered the Katanga secession. Turner, "Congo-Kinshasa," 227.

I leave aside the role of Katanga's European settlers in supporting the secession. For the settlers' role, see Gérard-Libois, *Katanga Secession*. Lemarchand's judgment, which seems well supported by the evidence, is that the settlers' secessionist "dispositions could not have led to the secession of the province unless they were shared and abetted by a substantial segment of the African population." *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo*, 233.

62. In Katanga, this meant, concretely, the exclusion of Kasai Baluba from political and administrative positions and the expulsion of many from the province. Lemarchand, *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo*, 239; Gérard-Libois, *Katanga Secession*, 28.

63. Gérard-Libois, *Katanga Secession*, 3–5.

milked in Madrid, so in Katanga there was a long-standing slogan, "Katanga, milk cow for the whole Congo."[64] Before independence, Tshombe demanded that "the resources of each province be properly its own."[65] These are claims characteristic of advanced regions, even expressed in the same bovine imagery.

Against the anticipated benefits of secession, backward groups in advanced regions do not need to balance certain costs that trouble the calculations of advanced groups in advanced regions. Unlike advanced groups, backward groups generally do not have widespread interests throughout the undivided state. Unless other regions of the state are industrialized, backward groups are less likely to export population or capital.[66] Tariff protection for the products of an advanced region may be another matter, but three factors are apt to limit or cancel its inhibiting effect on secession. First, there is a difference between industrialized and developing countries. In less developed countries, the prosperity of advanced regions is less likely to be based on production of finished goods for a protected domestic market than on exports of minerals or primary agricultural products. The latter are very often taxed, rather than subsidized. As tariff protection is a disincentive to secession, so tax levies are an incentive. Second, this is particularly so for advanced regions dominated by backward groups, who are likely to be located in areas where primary agricultural products are cultivated or minerals are extracted. Third, even if the economy of the advanced region depends on tariff protection or other benefits derived from membership in the undivided state, the loss of these benefits that accompanies secession, though it hurts the region as a whole, may still be offset by gains that inure to the backward group that controls the region and opts for secession. A regional loss may still be an ethnic gain.

Altogether the incentives are heavily weighted toward separatism in such a case. Backward groups would like simultaneously to have a free hand to deal with the advanced groups in their midst and to retain the

64. Ibid., 51.

65. Ibid., 41.

66. See note 37, above. If anything, a backward group in an advanced region may have the opposite problem: a population so compact it does not cover the whole region. If so, the secession will be of a limited area, as were the Katanga secession and the Rwenzururu movement of Western Uganda, the latter confined to the areas inhabited by Baamba and Bakonjo. Doornbos, "Protest Movements in Western Uganda"; Kasfir, "Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Uganda," 99. In both cases, these happened to be areas within which major mineral resources were also located. As noted earlier, Eritrean Muslims are also confined largely to lowland areas.

TABLE 3 THE DISPOSITION TO SECEDE

Group and Region	Political Claims	Precipitants	Calculations	Timing, Relative Frequency
Backward Group in Backward Region	Proportionality in civil service, occasionally also in revenues	Denial of proportionality in civil service; symbolic issues like language and religion; influx of advanced civil servants	Secede despite economic costs	Early, Frequent
Advanced Group in Backward Region	Nondiscrimination; no revenue issue	Severe discrimination; repeated violence; migration back to home region	Secede only if economic costs are low	Late, Somewhat Frequent
Advanced Group in Advanced Region	Nondiscrimination; spend revenue where generated	Severe discrimination; violence and migration back to home region if population exporter	Secede only if economic costs are low	Late, Rare
Backward Group in Advanced Region	Proportionality in civil service; spend revenue where generated	Denial of proportionality; political claims made by immigrant strangers in the region	Secede regardless of economic benefits or costs	Early, Rare

revenues of economic enterprises located in their region. But, as I have indicated, it is rare that a backward group finds itself in political control of an advanced region. Katanga, once the specter haunting all of Africa, turns out to be an exceptional case.

THE DIFFERENTIAL DISPOSITION TO SECEDE

Table 3 summarizes much of the discussion so far. It makes clear just how much can be deduced from group and regional position. Backward groups tend to measure disadvantage in terms of deviation from some concept of proportionality in relation to population. Advanced groups gauge deprivation by discrimination, utilizing a standard of proportionality in relation to merit. Advanced regions tend to complain of revenue-expenditure imbalances. Backward regions may also complain of inadequate expenditure if they receive from the center less than their per capita share, albeit more than their contribution to revenue. Backward regions that are the home of advanced groups, however, tend not to complain of revenue imbalances, probably because they receive remittances from outside the region and certainly because they eschew claims based on numbers. Here, too, there is more than one criterion of proportionality.

The four categories of political claims are, as the table shows, a combined function of group and regional characteristics. These claims do not, however, invariably ripen into secession. The columns headed "Precipitants" and "Calculations" indicate when dispositions to secede are likely to emerge. Precipitants tend to be events that have the effect of rejecting unequivocally claims put forward by ethnic groups. In the case of backward groups, as we have seen, precipitants foreshadow political domination. In the case of advanced groups, precipitants tend to reduce the advantages of remaining in the undivided state. In short, precipitants may act either to raise the costs or to reduce the benefits of remaining in the state—provided, of course, that benefits and costs are understood to embrace nonmaterial as well as material values.

Indeed, the table makes clear that separatism results from varying mixes of sheer economic interest and group apprehension. Economic interest may act either as an accelerator or a brake on separatism. Yet, among the most frequent and precocious secessionists—backward groups in backward regions—economic loss or gain plays the smallest role, ethnic anxiety the largest.

The precipitating events and the calculations that follow them are not inexorable. Claims need not be denied. Advanced civil servants need not

be posted to backward regions. Advanced groups from population-exporting regions can be protected from discrimination and violence; they need not migrate home. Much depends on the reception accorded group claims. The conditions that promote a disposition to secede, though derived from group and regional position, are subject to intervention and deflection.[67] The list of potential candidates for secession is much longer than the list of actual secessionists. Some Basques in Spain want independence; but Nigerian Yoruba, who might have chosen to secede, chose not to; and Baganda, who threatened secession, did not follow through. The Ibo fought a war of secession; but the Lozi, not treated like the Ibo, did not secede; and the Tamils of Sri Lanka might still go either way. Backward groups are frequent secessionists, but the Northerners in Ghana, every bit as backward as Northerners in Nigeria[68]—and far less powerful—have not even mooted secession. Likewise, the backward Batéké in Southeast Gabon, a region rich in uranium and manganese, have evidenced no serious inclination toward a Katanga-like secession.[69] Every category of regional group has its negative cases.

Moreover, as I have suggested all along, there are varying thresholds of secession and therefore differential frequency of secession among the various categories of groups. Clearly, backward groups in backward regions are easily persuaded that it is in their interest to leave. So are backward groups in advanced regions, but there are many fewer such groups in a position to secede. Despite their generally greater reluctance to secede, there are differences among advanced groups. Advanced groups from advanced regions often receive extraregional benefits that are not confined to remittances from migrant sons and therefore not terminated precipitously if back-migration should occur. They are less likely to secede. As the last column in the table shows, the four paths to secession are not equally well-trodden.

The much greater frequency of secessionist movements in backward

67. It would be a mistake, however, to minimize the policy dilemmas created by the coexistence in a single state of various kinds of regional groups. Occasionally, the claims are in direct opposition to each other, so that what can salve the apprehensions of one group will simultaneously precipitate secessionist action by another. I deal with this issue in Chapter 16, below.

68. See Philip J. Foster, "Ethnicity and the Schools in Ghana," *Comparative Education Review* 6 (Oct. 1962): 127–35.

69. Brian Weinstein, *Gabon: Nation-Building on the Ogooué* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966), 220–25. The Batéké case, however, may fall within a caveat stated earlier regarding Pakistani Baluch and Pathan reluctance to do anything that might link them with Afghanistan. There is a similar reluctance among Batéké to do anything that might result in their annexation by neighboring Congo (Brazzaville).

regions has a number of important implications. Many regions that choose secession are likely to be economically least capable of sustaining themselves. This applies particularly to the secession of backward groups in backward regions. They may also be short on administrative capacity and personnel. However, the position of advanced groups in backward regions is at least equivocal. They will have no shortage of administrative talent, once their migrant sons return to the region. But this surfeit of talent may quickly become a drain on the budget. The experience of Biafra and Benin's difficulties in reabsorbing civil servants it had exported to other West African states both attest to this.

No doubt many countries once proclaimed "unviable" have survived. It is all too easy to exaggerate the economic problems a secessionist region will face. Yet there is no gainsaying the fact that a great many regions that do manage to secede can be expected to have post-secession economic difficulties.

The distinction between early and late seceders—which, as the table makes clear, is largely coterminous with the distinction between backward and advanced groups—also has important consequences. In general, late secessions are more cohesive, better organized, and more often conducted under the auspices of a political party than are early secessions. Early secessions in countries like Chad, the Sudan, and Burma consisted of more than one movement. The secessionist regions were heterogeneous, and the secessions occurred so soon after independence that no political party had a chance to capture the support of the entire region. Because it was not centrally organized, the warfare was sporadic, and—except in the Sudan—there was no single organization in a position to make peace. In Chad, for example, an amnesty was accepted by members of one ethnic group fighting in one region but ignored by other groups fighting elsewhere. In all the cases, the fighting lingered on for many years; in Burma, it still does. In the late secessions of Biafra and Bangladesh, by contrast, the movements were under much tighter control. The fighting was more intense, widespread, and simultaneous in all areas; and victory for one side or the other was quicker and more decisive.[70]

In the case of groups likely to become late seceders, if seceders at all,

70. All else being equal, there will also be more subgroup amalgamation among advanced groups than among backward groups (see Chapter 2, above). On these grounds, too, late seceders will be more cohesive, their fighting forces less likely to fight with each other than with the forces of the rump state.

there is more time to work on policies averting secession and, because of their reluctance to secede, more latitude regarding the actual substance of policies that might prove sufficient to avert secession. There is also, however, more time for both sides to prepare for the battle when it comes: to cement foreign alliances, procure sophisticated weapons, and organize the secessionist region and the rump region for war. This extra time, preparation, and organization are likely to insure that the resolution of the fighting, when it eventually occurs, will be clear-cut.

WHEN PATHS CROSS: RECURRENT THEMES IN SECESSION

There are times in the development of knowledge when classification is more important than the identification of common elements. Secession, a phenomenon that has been discussed in unduly homogeneous terms, is a case in point. I have been at pains, therefore, to emphasize the existence of different paths to secession. Nevertheless, there are also elements common to all the paths, elements submerged in taxonomy.

Many such conditions could be singled out as contributing to the emergence of separatist sentiment regardless of the character of the separatist group or region. For example, Crawford Young has rightly noted that three major wars of secession—Biafra, Bangladesh, the Southern Sudan—were fought against military regimes inaccessible to the political influence of the secessionist region.[71] The development of a wholly ethnically-based party system may have the same effect of producing inaccessibility—especially if the majority groups that control the center are themselves divided by intraethnic party competition. Such divisions, we shall soon see, frequently encourage intransigence *vis-à-vis* potential secessionists. One can identify this pattern in Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Burma, and Chad. Then, too, the occurrence of violence, particularly in the form of ethnic riots, seems to abet the growth of separatist inclinations. Riots, polarizing elections, or military coups can serve as signs that alternatives to secession are unpromising or that negotiations would be futile. Such events catalyze separatism.

There is another class of common conditions that seems to have a more direct causal relation to the emergence of separatist inclinations in the first instance. Two such conditions are especially powerful: the loss

71. *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, 502.

of group members through assimilation and the migration of ethnic strangers into the potentially separatist region.

The separatism of the Kurds, the Basques, and tribal groups in the Indian state of Assam, among others, owes much of its impetus to the erosion of group boundaries. Migrants from all of these groups to towns in the territory of neighboring ethnic groups often became, respectively, Arabized, Castilianized, or Assamized. In the Indian Punjab, too, Sikhs felt their distinctive identity threatened by the prospect of absorption in the much larger Hindu community. In Sri Lanka, untouchables among the Ceylon Tamils have recurrently been targets for conversion to Buddhism and to the Sinhalese language, to the alarm of the Tamil community. In each case, separatism is linked to boundary maintenance.[72]

Even more prominent is the question of in-migration. Over and over again, ethnically differentiated settlers provoke a separatist response. The influx of Franco-Algerians in Corsica, German-speakers in the Swiss Jura, Coastal Andhras in Telangana, Punjabis in Pathan areas of Pakistan, Christians in the Southern Philippines, and Buddhist Thais in Southern Thailand are among many instances. How seriously in-migration is taken is indicated by the case of Mizoram in Northeast India. Periodically, the Mizos issued ultimata that all non-Mizos leave their territory by specified deadlines; when a deadline was ignored, the Mizo National Front proceeded to kill high officials who came from other states.[73]

Government-supported colonization schemes that bring ethnic strangers into the region are uniformly regarded as plots to overwhelm the existing majority in the region by weight of numbers. In Sri Lanka, the quest for agricultural land led governments to place Sinhalese settlers from the South in the Gal Oya Valley, a no-man's-land between traditional Tamil and Sinhalese homelands. Sinhalese have also been moving into the heavily Tamil Eastern Province, creating fears that Tamil majorities and pluralities will become minorities.[74] Nefarious motives are often attributed to governments that promote ethnically differentiated

72. See Urmila Phadnis, "Neo-Buddhists in India and Ceylon," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Dec. 6, 1969, pp. 1897–98.

73. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 7, 1975, p. 36; ibid., Sept. 14, 1979, p. 30; *Indian Express* (Madras), June 23, 1975. The same thing happened subsequently in neighboring Manipur, where Meiti separatism grew as the number of Bengali and Nepalese immigrants grew. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Nov. 30, 1979, p. 22.

74. For some figures, see Schwarz, *The Tamils of Sri Lanka*, 14.

colonization schemes. The Kurds, for example, accused the Iraqi government of attempting to Arabize Kurdish areas in the 1970s by evicting Kurds and replacing them with Arab settlers.[75] Whatever the motives, an end to such settlement is both a goal of separatism and a common negotiating demand of separatists.[76] "Swamping" is, again, a word frequently invoked.[77] And since the relations of groups to regions are an integral part of separatism, disputed territories are a common accompaniment of separatist movements: the Kurds claim the Kirkuk area, which the Arabs say has an Arab majority; the Basques demand the inclusion of Navarre province within their territory, though it is the least Basque province; Muslims have claimed sovereignty over some Christian-majority areas of the Southern Philippines; and Muslims in Southern Thailand seek a state that will embrace a large part of the Thai-majority Songkhla province.

Some groups have had to worry simultaneously about out-migration and assimilation, on the one hand, and colonization and territory, on the other. Prominent among such groups have been the Basques, whose language is spoken by only a minority within the Basque country, whose concern, beginning in the nineteenth century, has been with the "*invasión de maketos*," the invasion of Spanish in-migrants, and who speak of the "process of Basque extinction."[78] The Kurds of Iraq have also been concerned about both issues. They have demanded double restrictions: an end to Arab colonization and a prohibition on posting Kurdish civil servants outside of Kurdish areas.[79] They wish to keep Kurdish elites at home—and keep them Kurdish—and to keep others out. In point of fact, these two issues are part of the same underlying ethnic drive to render group boundaries secure. In this drive, relative group size is a major area of anxiety. Hence the central place accorded related issues of intermarriage, relative birth rates, and who will speak what language. Relative group size in the undivided state as a whole is threatened by

75. Martin Short and Anthony McDermott, *The Kurds* (London: Minority Rights Group, Report no. 23, 1975), 12.

76. See, e.g., Peter G. Gowing, "Muslim Filipinos Between Integration and Secession" (unpublished paper presented at the 1973 annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies), 14; Astri Suhrke, "Loyalists and Separatists: The Muslims in Southern Thailand," *Asian Survey* 17 (Mar. 1977): 237–50, at 241; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 2, 1980, p. 30 (Bangladesh hill areas).

77. "Our province has been swamped by the Punjabis." Abdul Ghaffar Khan, quoted in Sayeed, "Pathan Regionalism," 499.

78. Silva, "Modernization and Ethnic Conflict," 230.

79. Raoof, "Kurdish Ethnic Nationalism and Political Development in Republican Iraq," 10.

assimilation, and it is equally threatened for the region by in-migration. It is easy to see why such concerns are rapidly converted into separatism, for separatism allows the use of territorial boundaries to control—and to shore up—endangered ethnic group boundaries.

SECESSION AND SUCCESS: THE STRENGTH AND OUTCOMES OF SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS

Many groups have fought separatist wars in the last thirty years, but few have succeeded. The Southern Sudanese were able to negotiate a measure of regional autonomy after years of fighting. By a combination of protracted warfare in the field and surprise operations in the capital, Chadian Muslims managed to overwhelm the Chad government and secure most of the country, but their ascendancy was soon challenged again on the battlefield. Muslims in the Philippines and Kurds in Iraq have periodically been offered regional autonomy schemes, the genuineness of which they doubt or the generosity of which they think can be enhanced by fighting. Various groups in Burma, especially the Shans and the Karens, have long had control of large stretches of territory. Baluch and Pathans in Pakistan have occasionally been able to deny the government full access to their regions, and this has been true of Iranian peripheral groups as well. Yet, despite all of these successes attributable to force or the threat of it, it remains remarkable that only one country—Bangladesh—owes its independence to a war of secession fought since the Second World War.

The infrequency of successful secessions, despite the ubiquity of secessionist movements, cannot be attributed to the legitimacy accorded existing state boundaries or to the efficacy of the international system in promoting conciliation. Many states have been willing to meddle in the affairs of their neighbors by supporting secessionists in border areas. Rather, the inadequacy of this help, together with the internal strains present in many separatist movements and the determination of central governments to secure international aid to subdue them, result in defeat or a willingness to settle for less than the original secessionist aims.

The strength of a secessionist movement is a function of several domestic and international elements, some of which are easy to identify. If, for example, the events preceding the secession are dramatic enough to induce the wholesale defection of forces formerly committed to the gov-

ernment side, a powerful movement is assured. The desertion of Southern Sudanese soldiers, the return of Ibo officers to the Eastern Region of Nigeria, the mutiny of Bengali police, and comparable defections among Kurds and Eritreans all helped produce protracted struggles. Similarly, if separatist aspirations coincide with traditional banditry, a fusion of criminal and separatist violence is likely. The Karen, Shan, and Kachin movements in Burma have thrived on smuggling and theft; the same was true in Northern Chad; some gangsters have been incorporated by secessionist organizations in Southern Thailand; and the first phases of the Moro movement in the Southern Philippines involved extortion and violent enforcement of payments from Christian settlers by Muslim gangs. In areas where martial traditions are strong and weapons are common, separatist organizations will probably be able to harness these military assets. But these are idiosyncratic conditions, present in relatively few cases.

A more general condition affecting the strength of the separatist movement and the strength of the resistance to its demands is the structure of the separatist region and of the rump region. Heterogeneity has opposite effects on the two regions, weakening the separatists but generally strengthening the resolve of the central government.

HETEROGENEITY OF THE RUMP REGION

The more deeply divided a state is on more than one front, the more likely it is to be faced with secessionist movements—and the more likely it is to resist them, no matter what the cost. Countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Pakistan all feared the demonstration effect of a successful secession, and all were willing to combat separatism with force and to invoke the aid of outside powers. Other countries with somewhat less to fear on this score have also been willing to fight to keep the state intact, but it is noteworthy that serious discussions of regional autonomy have occurred in Iraq, the Philippines, and the Sudan (in the latter two, plans were actually implemented). These are all heterogeneous states, but the Kurds, the Moros, and the Southern Sudanese, respectively, are the only major secessionists they need be concerned about.

Heterogeneity of the rump region also has other effects. If that diversity includes even members of the potential secessionists—as the South of Sri Lanka contains some Ceylon Tamils—this, as I suggested earlier, is likely to retard enthusiasm for secession. A geographically divided

group may well settle short of complete control of its own regional affairs.

Only in one way does the heterogeneity of the rump region work to the advantage of separatists. An ethnically divided army, called to suppress a secession, may have less than universal eagerness for the job. In the war for the independence of Bangladesh, it was said that Bengali units were able to buy some arms from Baluch in the Pakistan army. Like the Bengalis, Baluch resent Punjabi domination. Much depends on the precise direction of antipathies, for very often the secessionist group will be sufficiently disliked by all groups fighting against it; but, as the Bengali-Baluch transactions indicate, it is possible that covert alliances between nominal opponents will emerge.

HETEROGENEITY OF THE SECESSIONIST REGION

The strength of a secessionist movement and the heterogeneity of its region are inversely related. Since most secessionist regions are ethnically or subethnically heterogeneous, most secessionist movements end up divided, and quite a few begin that way. Asked why the many ethnic groups opposed to the Burmese government do not form an alliance, a Karenni secessionist replied straightforwardly: "Because most of us don't get on well together. That's why we want independence in the first place."[80]

Ethnic diversity within the secessionist region will not prevent the emergence of a secessionist movement, unless groups opposed to the secession of their region are armed.[81] What inhibited a Northern secession in Nigeria in 1966 was not only the opposition of Middle Belters to a movement that would put Hausa in a dominant position but the fact that those Middle Belters were heavily represented in the army. If opponents of the movement are not armed, the secession will be concentrated in some parts of the region and perhaps completely ineffective elsewhere. If opponents are armed, the choice of secessionists is to accede to their wishes and abandon the movement, as Northern Nigerians did, or to fight them.

Kurdish separatists in Iraq chose to fight their Kurdish opponents.

80. Quoted in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Apr. 1, 1974, p. 23.

81. For the view that heterogeneity inhibits secession, see Josef Silverstein, "Politics in the Shan State: The Question of Secession from the Union of Burma," *Journal of Asian Studies* 18 (Nov. 1958): 43–48.

The Kurdish rebellion of the 1960s was preceded by extensive hostilities between the separatist Barzanis and their rivals, the Baradost and Zibaris, who had cooperated with the Iraqi government. By 1961, there was large-scale fighting among the Kurds, for Mulla Mustafa Barzani had apparently decided that suppression of his Kurdish opponents was a prerequisite to a strong separatist movement. The Iraqi regime supplied and incited Barzani's opponents, whereupon he drove most of them into Iran and Turkey. Barzani thus gained control of the whole Kurdish region, clearing the way for warfare against the regime. Periodically, however, the Barzanis had to attend to their Kurdish opponents, especially the Talabanis, who cooperated with the Iraqi government. Indeed, a major point in the abortive 1970 settlement of the decade-long war was the withdrawal of government support for the Talabanis. Subethnicity among the Kurds meant a divided military effort among Kurdish separatists.[82]

More often than not, opponents of the movement within the secessionist region are not armed—at least initially—and so the movement can begin without the prior need to fight the opposition. Differential enthusiasm for separatism is, nonetheless, not long in manifesting itself. The Moro National Liberation Front has been led disproportionately by Tausug, who populate the Sulu archipelago of the Southern Philippines; the Thai Muslim movement has been strong in some provinces and weak in others; Tamils from the North of Sri Lanka have been more disposed to separatism than Tamils from the East; and Protestants from Ankole and Toro in Uganda were more militantly secessionist than Catholics.[83] Differential enthusiasm for separatism is an aspect of the geography of ethnic extremism mentioned in Chapter 5 and partakes of all the complexity of that issue.

82. See Derk Kinnane, *The Kurds and Kurdistan* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964), 64–67; George S. Harris, "The Kurdish Conflict in Iraq," in Suhrke and Noble, eds., *Ethnic Conflict in International Relations*, 68–92; *Middle East Record* (Jerusalem) 2 (1961): 280–84; J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Praeger, 1969), 156–58; *Violence and Dialogue in the Middle East: The Palestine Entity and Other Case Studies* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 24th annual conference, mimeo., Oct. 2–3, 1970), 35–37. For similar clashes in the Chittagong hills of Bangladesh, see *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 2, 1980, p. 30.

83. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 10, 1978, pp. 21–23; ibid., Aug. 17, 1979, pp. 28–30; Astri Suhrke, "The Muslims in Southern Thailand: An Analysis of Political Developments 1968–78" (unpublished paper, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1978), 13; Kearney, "Language and the Rise of Separatism in Sri Lanka," 533; Doornbos, "Protest Movements in Western Uganda," 267–72, 282. For the end of the Rwenzururu movement, see Martin R. Doornbos, *Not All the King's Men: Inequality as a Political Instrument in Ankole, Uganda* (The Hague: Mouton, 1978).

What matters for present purposes is not the correlates of differential enthusiasm but its widespread character and its important consequences—indeed, consequences that grow more important as secessionist warfare proceeds. These consequences are both organizational and military.

Consider the Southern Sudanese movement, which in the late 1960s and early 1970s had the usual array of military and civilian organizations, exiles and in-country leaders, politicians still operating in the capital and those confined to the secessionist region.[84] Permeating all of these divisions were ethnic differences. At first the rebellion was concentrated in Equatoria; like the Sulu archipelago in the Philippines, Equatoria was the southernmost province, furthest removed from the people being fought. Concentration of the fighting in Equatoria signified participation of the Zande and Madi ethnic groups. Less involved were the Dinka and Nuer, located in other provinces. The Dinka, by far the largest of the Southern groups, were generally more moderate than others toward the North and were disproportionately represented among those seeking a parliamentary rather than military solution. The Dinka dominated the Sudan African National Union, which was strongly represented in Khartoum even after fighting was raging in Equatoria. A rival party, the Southern Front, was largely based on ethnic groups in Equatoria that feared Dinka domination.

Equally split were the military units. The guerrilla organization, Anyanya, had Dinka units in Bahr al-Ghazal province, but these had little contact with Anyanya units operating elsewhere. Beginning in 1969, Anyanya began to train ethnically mixed units to bridge such differences. But the differences persisted. Indeed, even Western and Eastern Dinka were divided, and a specifically Zande movement sprung up in 1969 as well.

Efforts to form umbrella organizations repeatedly fell apart, usually over the issue of "Dinka domination." In 1967, a Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG) was formed, but it soon had a rival organization. In 1969–70, a civilian-military Anyidi Revolutionary Council appeared, but the Nile Provisional Government (successor to the SSPG) was convinced the Anyidi, heavily Equatorial in leadership, was anti-

84. Some of the complexity of the Southern Sudanese movement is reflected in Godfrey Morrison, *The Southern Sudan and Eritrea* (London: Minority Rights Group, Report no. 5, 1971), as well as in Morrison's newsletter, *Africa Confidential* (London), and in various issues of *The Grass Curtain*.

Dinka. The Anyidi attacked NPG headquarters in 1970 and eventually was defeated. Differences over objectives, strategies, and resources thus tended to overlap ethnic differences, producing multiple organizations that ended up fighting each other. It took years before the Anyanya was able to establish enough authority to conclude a binding peace.

The Southern Sudan was unusually complex but not different in kind from other separatist areas. In the Biafra war, the lack of enthusiasm of the Rivers people for a cause they viewed as Ibo turned to violence between the two as Ibo forces retreated. The separatist Shans in Burma are divided into four movements, and non-Shan minorities in the Shan States have created their own armed forces to insure that the Shans do not take over the entire territory. Sporadic Baluch separatist rebellions in Pakistan have been confined to particular Baluch subgroups, especially the Mengals and the Marris, both of whom have been at least as much engaged in warfare against other Baluch subgroups as against the central government. The Eritrean movement has had Christian and Muslim units that have fought pitched battles with each other. The several movements that operated in the North and East of Chad in the 1960s and '70s also clashed with each other; when the Tombalbaye regime declared an amnesty, only Easterners responded. Muslims in the Philippines have been divided between a Tausug-led organization and a Maranao-led organization, the latter more amenable to compromise with the central government. It is well known that Biharis in Bangladesh identified with the Pakistani regime and fought against the Bengalis. So, too, did the Bazzia, a hill people in the West of Eritrea, fight with the Ethiopian government. The Brong in Ghana reacted to Ashanti demands for federation by supporting the central government and demanding that their own area be carved out of Ashanti. Likewise, Moors in the East of Sri Lanka, though Tamil-speaking, have opposed a separate Tamil state, in which they would be vulnerable to Tamil domination. The appearance of separatism by one group in a region is quite often enough to provoke another group, fearful of the outcome, to support the central government or to demand its own state.

Central governments, of course, attempt to exploit this tendency. They play on group differences, arm one group against another, imply that the more moderate organization will have a leg up in bargaining, attempt to create a Fifth Column in the secessionist region—or all of these things. We have already seen how the Iraqi government was able to take advantage of Kurdish subgroup differences. The Nigerian, Philippine, Pakistani, Ethiopian, Burmese, and Sudanese governments have tried to do the same.[85] Such tactics by themselves are usually not enough to destroy the movement; but, as separatist violence progresses, other things may happen that undermine it.

If the secessionists seek external aid, as they must, the source of the support may drive even those on the same side further apart, either because of ethnic affinities between one of the groups and groups in the foreign state or because of a tendency for states to sponsor one or another separatist organization but rarely all. This may have been a factor in the Southern Sudanese schisms, as supplies came through Equatoria, often from groups related to those who lived in Equatoria. It was important in Chad, for Libyan aid long went to rebels in the East, rather than the North, where the Libyans had their own territorial ambitions and fought the Northern secessionists. It has been decisive in Eritrea, for foreign help came from Arab states: the Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Libya. As the movement gained firepower, it espoused pan-Arab ideals and lost Christian support.[86] Depending on the relations of groups across borders, there may well be a tradeoff between two resources needed for success: internal cohesion and external support.

As the movement gains in military strength, groups united in their opposition to those who control the government at the center begin to appraise each other's intentions more carefully. Some become wary of the independence for which they have fought. "If we did secede," said a Philippine Muslim, "we would only fight among ourselves." Under "a federation," he concluded, "the top government [in Manila] could still exert some control," in order to foster harmony among the Muslims themselves.[87] Heterogeneity can induce a willingness to compromise with the central government.

There is a resemblance between this and the process that occurred at the end of colonial rule: as success approaches, the political context—and with it the focus of effective loyalty—shifts downward. Paradoxi-

85. For a few examples, see R. J. A. R. Rathbone, "Opposition in Ghana: The National Liberation Movement," in *Collected Seminar Papers on Opposition in the New African States, October 1967–March 1968* (London: Univ. of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, mimeo., n.d.), 35; von der Mehden, *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia*, 190; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Feb. 10, 1978, pp. 21–23; ibid., Dec. 22, 1983, p. 26; Nabo B. Graham-Douglas, *Ojukwu's Rebellion and World Opinion* (Apapa, Nigeria: Nigerian National Press, 1968).

86. Morrison, *The Southern Sudan and Eritrea*, 32; Barbara A. Alpert, "The Ethiopian Perplex," *Current History* 70 (Mar. 1971): 151–56, 179, at 153.

87. Quoted in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Mar. 18, 1974, p. 28.

cally, the very thing that earlier weakened the states against which secessionists rebel—heterogeneity—weakens the rebels, too. In the concise words of an Eritrean Liberation Front leader, "The nearer we get to independence, the less chance there is for unity."[88]

EXTERNAL FORCES

International relations play a prominent role in explaining the outcome of secessionist movements, including why so few succeed.[89] Virtually all of the strong post-war secessionist movements have been supported by powerful international connections, and so have many regimes fighting against secessionists. At various times, Eritrean rebels have had training in Syria, bases in the Sudan, Soviet and Chinese weapons sent through Libya and South Yemen, and financial aid from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The Ethiopians have had training aid from a number of countries, including Israel; they were able to turn the tide of battle against Eritrean forces by enlisting the support of Cuban combat troops. Biafra existed as long as it did because of its formidable international supply network. It was defeated because the Nigerian government arrayed against it an even more powerful, internationally constructed arsenal. Philippine Muslims have had diplomatic support from the Islamic Conference and military aid from Libya, from the Malaysian state of Sabah during the chief ministership of Tun Mustapha, and occasionally from Indonesian provincial officials in Sulawesi. Bangladesh, of course, achieved its independence because India was willing to fight a war with Pakistan and invade East Bengal. The Kurds in Iraq failed to achieve their goals precisely because Iran was not then willing to fight a war with the Iraqis.

The singular case of Bangladesh's success suggests that external support is difficult for separatists to obtain and, once obtained, difficult to keep. There is a certain circularity involved in securing foreign support in the first place. No foreign state will risk committing itself to a movement that appears weak. This is one reason why, as suggested earlier, the *emergence* of separatism is not generally a function of international relations. Yet, to grow in strength, a movement may require outside help. Hence, the very strength that attracts foreign support is also hard to build without foreign support to begin with.

88. Quoted in the *Washington Post*, Apr. 30, 1977.

89. In writing this section, I have benefited particularly from Suhrke and Noble, eds., *Ethnic Conflict in International Relations*, especially chap. 9. See also Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1981), chap. 6.

Once secured, foreign support for secessionists is undependable. It is vulnerable at several levels of politics.

First, foreign states usually have more limited motives for supporting separatists than the separatists themselves have for fighting. (This is not true of irredentist states, but they are another matter.) Foreign states are therefore more easily induced to end their support than separatists are induced to abandon their movement. Foreign support tends to come and go, and, in the life of any secessionist movement, there may be periods of no support, multiple sources of support, or dramatically shifting sources of support. To some extent, foreign support is also variable for states fighting against secessionists.

Second, foreign states have multiple international objectives. This opens the way to the *quid pro quo*. States combatting secession can offer states supporting it various inducements in exchange for their forbearance. The multiplicity of objectives works, of course, both ways. It gives states otherwise unsympathetic to separatism reasons to aid separatists despite lack of sympathy, just as it subjects that support to precipitous termination.

Third, the vicissitudes of domestic politics in the assisting states can also produce an abrupt end to their support for secessionists. One strategy of combatting foreign support, then, is to raise the domestic costs for the assisting state, if the international costs are still acceptable.

For all of these reasons, foreign commitments to separatists are likely to be less complete and less enduring than the separatists may require for success in what are often long, drawn-out wars. But what, concretely, are the reasons external actors become involved in secessionist warfare, on one side or the other, or refrain from such involvement?

Diffuse strategic objectives, having little to do with relations between the states that happen to be involved, account for some such decisions. The clearest case of this is Libya's support for separatists in Corsica, Sicily, and the Southern Philippines. These are efforts that do not originate in interstate quarrels but in the desire to expand Libyan influence and ideology. American, Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban involvement in Ethiopia-Eritrea, Nigeria-Biafra, Iraq-Kurdistan, or Pakistan-Bangladesh has the same kind of motive.

Similar to this is intervention that derives from the common propensity to regard the enemies of one's enemies as friends. Israel took the Southern Sudanese side against the North and the Ethiopian side against the Eritreans for these reasons, while Arab states were especially helpful

to the Eritreans because of Ethiopia's Israeli connections. Pakistan and China have helped Mizos and Nagas against India. The opportunity to dismember Pakistan was irresistible for India in Bangladesh. Regional rivalries are a natural source of assistance for and against separatism.

Specific interstate disputes also provide occasions for support, because the support becomes leverage for bargaining and concessions. An interesting case of this was the limited Malaysian support for Philippine Muslim separatists. The Philippines had earlier asserted a claim to the Malaysian state of Sabah and had trained guerrillas for an invasion. The Malaysians had ample reason to inflict revenge on the Philippine government and to contemplate that additional pressure might induce the Philippines to abandon the Sabah claim.[90] With Philippine vulnerability demonstrated, the Sabah claim was finally abandoned. Revenge, deterrence, and leverage were equally Iranian motives in Pakistan and Iraq. In 1973 and after, the Iranians supported Pakistan in suppressing Baluch separatism, not only because the Baluch span the Iranian border, but also because the Baluch had support from Iraq. Iran and Iraq had a number of important disputes between them, including Iraqi support for Arab separatists in Southwest Iran and Iraqi claims in the Shatt al-Arab estuary that divides the two countries. For this reason, Iran involved itself deeply in Kurdish separatist warfare in Iraq in 1965–66, 1969, and again in 1974–75. The Iranians helped suppress separatism in one case and abetted it in the other, but they consistently opposed Iraq.

Irredentism aside, ethnic affinities are only occasionally and weakly a motive for intervention in separatist warfare. Trans-border Bengali kinship may have marginally affected Indian willingness to intervene in Bangladesh, and felt kinship with the Ceylon Tamils may yet do the same in Sri Lanka. Groups such as the Madi and Kakwa span the Sudan-Uganda boundary, and Idi Amin, a Kakwa, may have been moved to aid the Southern Sudanese in part on these grounds. But more important was his then-cordial relationship with Israel.

Trans-border ethnic affinities more often promote restraint in supporting separatists or intervention in behalf of a central government fighting to suppress separatism. Fear of contagion and domino effects is widespread. Among separatists, this creates a fear that the failure of a movement in one state will hurt movements in others—hence the ties among them. Among states, fear of the success of separatism works in

90. Astri Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, "Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand," in Suhrke and Noble, eds., *Ethnic Conflict in International Relations*, 183–84.

the opposite direction. Iran has been apprehensive that Baluch separatism in Pakistan might embrace Baluch in Iran as well. Malaysia, though it modestly took advantage of the Philippine Muslim rebellion, was extremely careful to keep its involvement limited, lest it encourage separatism among related groups in the state of Sabah.[91] For similar reasons, Indonesia has consistently taken the Philippine government side against Muslim separatists. And, unlike the Iranians, who had a tight rein on their own Kurds as they helped the Kurds in Iraq, the Turks took no such risks, preferring instead "a pro-Iraqi neutrality."[92]

Even where ethnic affinities relate, not to peripheral minorities in the external state, but to centrally influential groups, support is by no means automatic. Despite the fact that Thai Muslim separatists are Malays closely related to Malays in the North of Peninsular Malaysia, the Malaysians have eschewed support. Limited Thai cooperation in suppressing Communist guerrillas operating in Malaysia from Thai territory is highly valued and could not be preserved if the Malaysian government aided Malay separatists. Various considerations, some pointing to aid for the separatists, some to aid for the regime fighting them, some to restraint from all involvement, can coexist, and regimes must weigh one against the other.

Now it becomes possible to see exactly why separatists rarely obtain the aid they need or, if they do, rarely retain it for as long as they need it. As the Thai Muslim case suggests, states suppressing separatists may be able to offer potential foreign supporters things they value, in exchange for their forbearance. Sometimes they offer too little, or nothing at all, until external aid to the separatists raises the stakes. It will not necessarily be too late then. Iran's aid to the Kurds in Iraq reached formidable proportions in 1974–75, but Iran was abruptly dissuaded from all-out war when the Iraqis agreed to settle the unrelated dispute over the Shatt al-Arab estuary. In a matter of days, this doomed the Kurdish insurrection. Iran ended its support because of a *quid pro quo*, and Turkey refused to let retreating Kurds cross into its territory because of the fear of infecting Turkey's Kurds with separatism. To be sure, the Iran-Iraq agreement came apart in 1979, but by then Kurds in Iran were on the verge of a separatist revolt that made Iranian aid to Kurds in Iraq un-

91. See Lela Garner Noble, "Ethnicity and Philippine-Malaysian Relations" (unpublished paper presented at the 1974 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association).

92. Astri Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble, "Spread or Containment: The Ethnic Factor," in Suhrke and Noble, eds., *Ethnic Conflict in International Relations*, 219.

thinkable. The chances that domestic and external conditions will simultaneously be conducive to sustained intervention are not great.

To the extent that larger alliances and enemy perceptions are involved in decisions to aid separatists, these alliances can change, either because international conditions change or because regimes change. When Idi Amin's friendship with Israel ended, so did his aid to Southern Sudanese separatists. When East Pakistan became Bangladesh, the Nagas and Mizos of Northeast India lost supplies and bases. Later, Indian and Bangladesh forces mounted joint operations against Mizo fighters in the Chittagong hills. Of course, conditions can change in the opposite direction as well—as when French influence with Libya waned to the point where it could no longer induce nonintervention in Chad.[93] But, overall, the fluidity of international relationships, the availability of bargaining to induce restraint (a matter in which the government side has a clear advantage over the separatists), and the increasing possibility of contagion or other domestic consequences as assistance to separatists increases in scale and duration all point to the ephemeral quality of external forces.

All of this is quite apart from the ability of regimes threatened with separatism to inflict direct harm or indirect revenge on states that offer aid to the separatists. The government of Chad was able to take countermeasures that stopped Sudanese aid to Chadian Muslim separatists; and Sudanese aid to Eritreans fighting an Ethiopian regime that was aiding Southern Sudanese finally induced moderation on the Ethiopian side. Few states, in short, will be willing to go to war for secessionists in another state, as India did in Bangladesh. A willingness to meddle and weaken one's enemies is common enough. But sufficient staying power is a rare thing.

Interestingly enough, external aid seems longest-lived when it comes, not from strong, established states with clear-cut interests, but from irregular forces across porous, remote borders. The long duration of several Burmese separatist insurrections owes much to the uncontrolled Thai-Burmese border, to arms supplied by smugglers, to revenue from opium exports, and to military assistance provided since 1952 by units of the Kuomintang army that escaped from China into Burma. The same is true in Northeast India. Thai gunrunners there have transported American weapons left from the Vietnam war across Burma to Mizo secessionists, Mizos have cooperated with Arakanese secessionists in Burma, and Bihari "Razakers" left over from the Bangladesh war have

93. See Andrew Lycett, "Chad's Disastrous Civil War," *Africa Report*, Sept. 1978, pp. 4–6.

linked up with both Mizos and Nagas. In such cases, external ties make it difficult to end a separatist movement, but the external aid is never enough to allow the movement to succeed either. Where external assistance is plentiful, it may also be ephemeral; where it is enduring, it may be insufficient.

Finally, even strong external support may not achieve the goals for which the separatists aim. Sometimes it provokes the central government to secure its own, overwhelming outside aid. At other times, external help to separatists produces moderation on the part of the regime they are fighting. Cease-fires, amnesties, and concessions far short of autonomy or secession are all recurrent effects of international involvement on the side of the separatists. Indeed, the state supporting them may insist on a drastic scaling down of their goals, as the Libyans did with the Moro National Liberation Front.[94] By opting for foreign help, secessionists risk losing control over their destiny to states that have different, usually more limited, objectives. Even if this does not happen, after protracted warfare any conciliatory gesture may look appealing to some of the separatists, and this may be enough to split or demoralize them, especially if, as is commonly the case, there is more than one group fighting. External support, necessary to the success of the separatist movement, can just as easily end up undermining it.

THE IMPACT OF SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS

The impact of a secessionist movement will vary with the degree of success the movement encounters. A movement that achieves independence will obviously have different effects from one that meets defeat, but even an unsuccessful war can transform the structure of politics and group relations dramatically.

The extent to which secessionist warfare can alter ethnic alignments and antipathies is illustrated by the Nigeria-Biafra war. When Ibo military officers and civil servants returned to the East, the positions they vacated tended to be filled by Yoruba and smaller, well-educated groups. After the war, much resentment of the sort earlier directed against the Ibo was directed against Yoruba. When civilian rule returned in 1979, Ibo and Hausa found themselves political allies, with the Yoruba opposition isolated. The creation of new states also strengthened the position

94. See the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Jan. 28, 1977, p. 14.

of Middle Belters and weakened their ties to Hausa, just as the ties between Ibo and other Easterners had been weakened by the war. The secessionist war and its aftermath reshuffled the structure of ethnic conflict without obliterating it.[95]

RECIPROCAL SEPARATISM

The separatism of one region can lead to the separatism of others. Indeed, there are identifiable sequences of separatism in the same state. Some of these have already been noted. In Nigeria, a Northern secession was mooted before the Ibo secession.[96] The Katanga secession, with its center of gravity in the South, quickly produced an equal and opposite secession among the Baluba of North Katanga.[97] In Chad, when it looked as if the Muslim North and East might take control of the newly independent state, the Sara of the South demanded division of the country.[98] Eventually, the Sara took power and excluded Muslims from influence. Then it was the turn of the North and East to pursue a separatist course for more than a decade. When the Chadian government was defeated and Sara fled southward in large numbers, a new Sara secession was proclaimed in 1979. The country settled into a *de facto* partition, albeit one that did not preclude further fighting. In a sense, everyone had seceded.

The key to these sequences is the escalation of mutually exclusive claims to power. When the Bakongo gained political ascendancy in Congo (Brazzaville), Northerners spoke of detaching their region from the state; after a coup brought Northerners to power, the Bakongo spoke in the same terms.[99] When the Sindhis in post-Bangladesh Pakistan spoke of following the Bengalis out, Urdu speakers in the Sind were moved to similar claims. Though the Urdu speakers were proposing, so to speak, secession from secession, the idea was the same: one group's independence is another's servitude.

95. I leave for later treatment the creative political impulses that were also released by the Nigerian and Sudanese wars. Especially in Nigeria, these later produced a new set of institutions to cope with ethnic conflict. See Chapter 15, below.

96. Olorunsola, "Nigeria," 35; Schwarz, *Nigeria*, 206, 210, 215; First, *Power in Africa*, 313–25.

97. Young, "The Politics of Separatism," 190–91; Gérard-Libois, *Katanga Secession*, 123–27, 156.

98. Ballard, "Four Equatorial States," 267–74.

99. René Gauze, *The Politics of Congo-Brazzaville*, trans., ed., and supplemented by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1973), 67–69.

The policy response to separatism is complicated by these considerations. What will placate one group may be precisely what is required to inflame another. The satisfactions are seen as zero-sum. In such cases, it is appropriate to speak of reciprocal separatism. Because these effects bear so heavily on policy, I shall defer consideration of reciprocal secession to Chapter 16.

DEMONSTRATION EFFECTS

There is another way in which one separatist movement can lead to another: by demonstration effect. The example of one movement cannot create separatist sentiment where it does not exist; this is not a question of contagion.[100] But the strength of a movement, particularly one supported by external aid, can propel other separatists into action by convincing them of the plausibility of success or of concessions short of success.

The extent to which movements increase their overtly separatist activity in response to such considerations is a function of the strength and proximity of the demonstration movement. Biafra catalyzed a few movements in Africa. In the first stages, there was a possibility the Yoruba in Nigeria might follow suit. This was perhaps not so much demonstration effect as anticipation of an unfavorable Yoruba position *vis-à-vis* the North if the Ibo made good their exit from Nigeria. The Ivory Coast government was one of two African regimes to recognize Biafra. The Ivory Coast was in turn confronted with a resurgence of separatism among the Agni of the former Sanwi kingdom who had earlier fought the Ivorian government. Threatening a Biafran-type conflagration and citing Houphouët-Boigny's recognition of Biafra, the Sanwi movement turned again to armed warfare.[101] Some months after this was suppressed, the Bété around Gagnoa, who had mooted an independent republic, went on the march. The Ivory Coast government had little difficulty putting these insurrections down. The Eritreans and Chadian Muslims also cast more than a sideways glance at Biafra, but their movements continued even after the Nigerian victory; and the Southern Sudanese, who ended their war, did so on the basis of more directly relevant

100. It should also be underscored that demonstration effects are different from reciprocal secession, where two antagonists alternatively opt for separatism. Demonstration effects do not involve antagonists with opposing claims but groups that learn something from the example of an earlier seceder. For reciprocal secession, see Chapter 16, below.

101. *West Africa*, Jan. 3, 1970, p. 10; Colin Legum, ed., *Africa Contemporary Record, 1969–70* (New York: Africana, 1970), p. B498.

considerations of waning foreign support. The emergence and defeat of Biafra were not without external impact, but it was a strictly limited impact.

The success of Bangladesh had a stronger effect than the unsuccessful war in Biafra. The main effect was to unglue relations in West Pakistan, giving a fillip particularly to Pathan and Baluch separatism. The example of Bangladesh was cited by separatists in Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu in India,[102] but neither of these movements was propelled to concrete action as a result. It was no doubt a factor in encouraging Mizos and Nagas, Philippine and Thai Muslims, the perennial secessionists in Burma, and perhaps even the Kurds. But all of these movements antedated Bangladesh, and each had to consider its own peculiar circumstances before making decisions about warfare.

A secession can have a significant demonstration effect within the state of which the secessionist region is a part. Even the Telangana movement in Andhra Pradesh created a momentary flurry next door in Karnataka, where politicians in the former princely state of Mysore demanded a separate "old Mysore."[103] The creation of Pakistan in 1947 gave great impetus to the demand for Sikhistan, a Sikh state in the truncated Indian Punjab. If the Punjab could be divided once, why not twice? The same was true in post-Biafra Nigeria. Once twelve states had been created, a flood of movements sprung up to demand still more ethnically based states. One movement in Burma also led to another, until there were nearly a dozen. The long-standing Basque and Catalan movements in Spain have been demonstration movements for other Spanish regions, such as Andalusia, the Canary Islands, Galicia, and the Balearic Islands. The Eritreans have inspired the Galla in Bale, Christian groups in the Gojjan, and the Tigreans; some of these have also fought the Ethiopian government. Perhaps the ultimate in demonstration effects has been Assam.[104] First it was the Nagas and the Mizos, then the Khasi and other hill tribes, that demanded separate states, some of which were conceded after protracted warfare. Then it was the plains tribes and the Ahom who demanded territorial recognition. And finally the idea of a separate

102. Urmila Phadnis, "Keeping the Tamils Internal," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Mar. 25, 1972, pp. 21–22; *New York Times*, Mar. 3, 1972.

103. Glynn Wood and Robert Hammond, "The 'Indira Wave' in Mysore—An Extreme Case" (unpublished paper, American Univ., Washington, D.C., Jan. 1972), 7. For a similar example in Uganda, see Doornbos, "Protest Movements in Western Uganda," 275.

104. See the excellent report by Mohan Ram, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Nov. 30, 1979, pp. 21–22. See also C. P. Cook, "India: The Crisis in Assam," *The World Today* 24 (Oct. 1968): 444–48.

state spread to the core group, the Assamese themselves, who began to scrawl "Indians go home" on walls—though, to the tribals, it is the Assamese who are "Indians."

Neighboring states have some modest cause for concern if a powerful secessionist movement takes root. Malaysia, for example, stopped calling its two wings "East" and "West" Malaysia after East Pakistan separated from West Pakistan. And no doubt a wave of successful movements would have wider demonstration effects. Yet the limitations on external aid make such waves improbable. The principal impact of single powerful movements is bound to be in the rump state itself, for the one thing a powerful movement does demonstrate is the vulnerability of that state's central government. *Ceteris paribus*, states experiencing one strong secessionist movement are likely to experience more than one. They are right to be concerned about fragmentation.

IRREDENTISM: PREROGATIVE OF THE FEW

The potential for irredentism in Asia and Africa is enormous. A quick *tour d'horizon* reveals the rich range of possibilities. The Ghana-Togo border divides the Ewe, as the Nigeria-Benin border divides the Yoruba. There are Hausa in Nigeria and Hausa in Niger. There are Fulani across a wide belt of West and Central Africa, Batéké in Gabon and Congo (Brazzaville), and Fang in Cameroon, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea. The Bakongo are divided among Zaire, Congo (Brazzaville), and Angola; the Lunda among Zaire, Zambia, and Angola. There are Somalis in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. There are Wolof in Mauritania, in Gambia, and in Senegal, Kakwa in the Sudan and in Uganda. Various Berber groups are distributed among more than one North African state. There are Malays in Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei, Indonesia, and Singapore. There are Tamils in Sri Lanka, as well as in India; Bengalis in Bangladesh and India; Baluch in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran; Pathans in Afghanistan and Pakistan; Turkomens in Iraq and Iran. If irredentism is conceived as a movement to retrieve ethnic kinsmen and their territory across borders, the common disjunction of group boundaries and territorial boundaries affords scope for irredentas aplenty.[105]

105. Although I have listed only certain African and Asian boundary disjunctions, Europe has abundant examples: Irish in Eire and Ulster, Basques in France and Spain, Albanians in Yugoslavia and Albania, Hungarians in Hungary and Rumania, Tyroleans in Austria and Italy, Croats in Austria and Yugoslavia, Macedonians in Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, and so on.

Given these opportunities in an ethnic conflict–prone world, why is it that this particular version of ethnic conflict has not contributed its share of discord? Why, when examples are sought, are the Somalis nearly the only consistent irredentists in the developing world? Clearly, the presence of an ethnic group divided by one or more territorial boundaries is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a serious movement to unite the group.

The decision to retrieve group members across a territorial border by forcibly altering the border is a governmental decision. In this respect, it differs from the decision to initiate a secessionist movement, which is an ethnic group decision.[106] Group leaders may agitate for a new boundary that embraces group members not within the present boundary, but the irredentist decision, as a matter of state policy, is not simply the product of group sentiment. It is susceptible to all the forces and constraints that impinge upon policy decisions in general. And, because irredentism aims at permanent alterations in the population and territory of the state choosing to pursue it, it differs also from the decision merely to aid a secessionist movement in another country; the latter decision tends to have consequences more ephemeral and less centrally important to the assisting state.

The decision to embark upon an irredentist course is freighted with elements that counsel restraint. Unlike aid to secessionists, it probably means direct involvement in actual warfare. It is, however, the domestic rather than the international consequences that constitute the principal disincentive to irredentism.

The propensity to irredentism is greatly enhanced as the ethnic homogeneity of the retrieving state increases. Indeed, it is tempting to say that irredentism is the prerogative of homogeneous states.[107] In heterogeneous states, irredentism is bound to be a divisive ethnic issue.

If the retrieving group does not have a strong position in the putative irredentist state, its claims will be ignored or suppressed. It frequently happens, in fact, that such groups are themselves participants in domestic ethnic conflict; this acts to discourage the governments to which they

106. As I shall suggest below, the irredentism of groups like the Kurds, spread among several states and in control of none, really requires multiple secessionist movements, rather than retrieval and incorporation of group members and territory in a preexisting state.

107. See Ravi L. Kapil, "On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa," *World Politics* 18 (July 1966): 656–73, at 670: "The cultural heterogeneity of most African states is responsible for preventing boundaries issues from coming to the forefront of their domestic and foreign policies."

are subject from considering claims in behalf of their kinsmen across borders. The Ewe, for example, are a minority in Ghana and Togo, and in both countries there are significant tensions between Ewe and others. In Ghana, certain Akan groups would hardly be pleased at the prospect of an accession of yet more Ewe, who are regarded as clannish, shrewd, and nepotistic. The same holds on the other side of the border, where an Ewe regime actually held power until it was overthrown in a coup. No Northern Togolese would like to augment the ranks of Togo's Ewe population by a border adjustment. When the Togolese government is inclined to make a certain amount of trouble for the Ghanaian government, it goes only so far as to tolerate Ghanaian Ewe secessionist organizations on its soil. Likewise, no Ghanaian Ewe, sensing the anti-Ewe character of the Togolese regime, would like to join Togo under present conditions. And so those Ewe who care about unification are consigned to plotting something other than incorporation in one or the other existing regime, thus risking suppression by both.

The situation is much the same elsewhere. The Northerners who control Congo (Brazzaville), but who in the past have been subject to Bakongo control, would not consider for a moment the prospect of adding still more Bakongo to the population of the Congo; and neither would Angola or Zaire. The Lunda, split among three countries, find themselves in the same position.[108] Nor, of course, would any of the countries with Kurdish minorities consider accommodating the Kurdish desire for unity within its borders. All of this practically goes without saying. Groups in this position are much more likely simply to become secessionists—or secessionists who hope ultimately to carve out a new Kurdistan, a greater Eweland, or a resurgent, Bakongo-based San Salvador Empire—than they are to attempt absorption of their kinsmen in unfriendly existing states.

But suppose the putative irredentist state is not unfriendly but merely heterogeneous. Suppose, for example, that the Bakongo are in a controlling position in Congo (Brazzaville), as they were under Fulbert Youlou in the early 1960s. One might expect the regime to support irredentism under such circumstances. This expectation would be misplaced. René Gauze cogently explains why:

> . . . it was improbable that the 350,000 politically divided Bakongo in Youlou's republic could absorb and control the 470,000 Kongo in the former Belgian

108. See Brian Weinstein, "Zaire's Shaba Is a Spark That Never Goes Out," *Baltimore Sun*, May 28, 1978.

colony who, moreover, were far from being politically united. . . . If through exaggerated ambition the [Bakongo] "nationalists" actually tried to carry out their expansionist aspirations . . . they in all probability would awaken a strong defensive tribal reaction that could disrupt the precarious unity of Youlou's republic. Already that unity had been undermined by Opangault's efforts to promote a secession of the north.[109]

Gauze, speaking in particulars, has put his finger on three general points. First, within the putative irredentist state, heterogeneity may restrain irredentism even when the retrieving group is in power and enthusiastic. Second, even within the putative irredentist group, enthusiasm for retrieval is not automatic. Third, it is not clear whether the group to be retrieved across a border will in fact wish to be retrieved. Each of these points, as I shall show, is a serious obstacle to irredentism.

If an ethnic group in power attempts to shore up its position in a heterogeneous state by retrieval of group members across a border, it invites disaffection on the part of those groups that would be disadvantaged by a successful irredenta. As Gauze notes, the fear of Bakongo irredentism induced Northern Congolese to contemplate secession from the Brazzaville regime. In Afghanistan, the Hazara, Tadjik, and Uzbek minorities look with disfavor on periodic Pathan appeals to Pathans across the border in Pakistan.[110] Malaysia's espousal of an irredentist claim regarding Malays in Thailand would bring a strong and dangerous reaction from non-Malays in Malaysia. The principle is the same as that which governs ethnic opposition to international regional integration: if such schemes threaten to alter domestic ethnic balances, groups disadvantaged by them will oppose them.[111]

Even if in power, putative irredentists will not necessarily become irredentists in action. The determining variables are to be found in domestic politics and group structure. More often than not, these retard

109. *The Politics of Congo-Brazzaville*, 120.

110. This is a point used by Pakistani governments to counter Pathan irredentism. See, e.g., *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Aug. 2, 1974, p. 12.

111. See also William Petersen, "Upward Mobility and Ethnic Identity: The Case of the Flemish" (unpublished paper presented at the VIIIth World Congress of the International Sociological Association, Aug. 23, 1974), 9: "Holland's political and social institutions have long been divided along religious lines, with the Catholics controlling a plurality of votes and influence. If the Flemish Catholics were to be absorbed into the Dutch state, this plurality would become a majority. Thus, the prime advocates of cultural unity . . . have generally been Catholic partisans. Because of this very fact, however, every non-Catholic in the Netherlands would be dubious about any proposed unity, for it would upset the sometimes delicate balance that has been achieved in Dutch social life."

enthusiasm for retrieval. Suppose the Malaysian government sought to retrieve Malays across the border in Thailand. Apart from adverse non-Malay reaction, what would it get for its trouble? The accession of a group of heavily religious Malays with relatives in the Malaysian states of Kelantan and Kedah—or, to put it more directly, a group of Malays likely to be supporters of the opposition Parti Islam, in numbers sufficient to tip the political balance.[112] What would Albania get if it succeeded in absorbing the Albanians across the border in Yugoslavia? Albanian politics has revolved around the rivalry of Ghegs and Tosks. For several decades, the regime has been overwhelmingly Tosk. To absorb the Albanians in Yugoslavia, who are predominantly Ghegs (and nearly as numerous as all the Albanians in Albania) might doom the Tosk regime.[113] What would the Irish Republic get if it seriously attempted to embrace Northern Ireland? It would get a Protestant majority in the North that would form a recalcitrant minority in Ireland as a whole. The Malaysian and Albanian examples show once again that seemingly cohesive groups are not as solidary as they look from afar—and that subgroup cleavages have a prominent bearing on irredentist decisions. The Irish example shows that the heterogeneity of the group and territory to be retrieved is equally pertinent, for retrieval will import this heterogeneity into the expanded state.

This brings us right up to the third of the issues touched on by Gauze: will the group across the frontier wish to be retrieved? Clearly, Ulster Protestants and other differentiated groups do not. But even groups with ethnic affinities may be averse to being retrieved. Especially where the putative irredentist state is heterogeneous, members of the group to be retrieved may prefer secession to absorption in yet another state they may not wholly control. For some time, this was the response of the Toubou in Northern Chad to the irredentist blandishments of Libya, which has its own Toubou population; in the mid-1970s, the secessionists fought their Libyan liberators. Alternatively, the group to be retrieved may prefer remaining where it is, particularly if there are clear economic advantages to doing so and if it can use the prospect of irreden-

112. Cf. Astri Suhrke, "Irredentism Contained: The Thai Muslim Case," *Comparative Politics* 7 (Jan. 1975): 187–203.

113. Cf. Dennison I. Rusinow, "The Other Albanians: Some Notes on the Yugoslav Kosmet Today," American Universities Field Staff *Reports*, Southeast Europe Series, 12 (Nov. 1965): 1–24. I am also indebted to Melvin Croan for a helpful discussion of this issue.

tism as a bargaining lever to improve its current position, as the Pathans in Pakistan have.[114] Finally, as in secession, the distribution of population can impede the willingness to be retrieved. The overwhelmingly Bengali population of Cachar in Assam might prefer to attach Cachar to West Bengal, but that would abandon the Bengali minority in the Assam Valley. The composition of the territory to be retrieved and the distribution of the group to be retrieved, as well as the composition of the irredentist territory, affect the willingness of a group to be retrieved.

In such decisions, the relative economic condition of the two countries—and their relative prestige—will be aggravating factors. It matters, as I have just indicated, that Afghanistan is poorer than Pakistan and, before the coup of 1978, that it was viewed as a "feudal" country. It apparently mattered, too, to the Sudeten Germans that Nazi Germany had become a major power, for in the mid-1930s they became Hitler's staunchest supporters, abandoning the ethnically conciliatory parties to which they formerly adhered.[115] But these are not necessarily dispositive considerations. It is generally more attractive to be retrieved by a rich rather than a poor neighbor, but rich neighbors like Libya do not invariably attract, and poor neighbors like Somalia do not invariably repel. The same is true for the attractiveness of the region to be retrieved.

The desire to pursue irredentism and the desire to be retrieved by an irredentist power are thus independently variable. Where enthusiasm is present among the retrievers, it may be absent among those to be retrieved, or vice versa. Unrequited irredentism is common.

Given the significant risks and the dubious rewards of irredentism, states that ardently pursue strategies of retrieval probably have some specially compelling reasons for doing so. The irredenta may form part of a generally adventurous, expansionist foreign policy, as it did for Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and does on a smaller scale for Libya. Beyond this, however, there are some striking common elements in the irredentism of Libya for Northern Chad, Somalia for the Ogaden, and Afghanistan for Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province.

First of all, though a claim is asserted on the basis of ethnic affinity in general, the source of the affinity is much more particularized. In each

114. The Croats in Austria are yet another group uninterested in joining the large number of Croats in Yugoslavia, in part, no doubt, because of economic disparities. See William T. Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1973), 208–18.

115. Walter B. Simon, "A Comparative Study of the Problem of Multilingualism," *Mens en Maatschappij* (Amsterdam) 42 (Mar.–Apr. 1967): 89–101.

case, traditional trans-border ethnic affinities can be identified, but in each case there is something more: personal links between rulers of the irredentist state and the group or territory to be retrieved. Qaddafi's own family has roots in Northern Chad. Siad Barre is not just a Somali but a Somali Darood; it is the Darood who inhabit the Ogaden across the border in Ethiopia. The last king of Afghanistan and his leading ministers were "direct descendants of the Peshawar Sardars. 'The lure of Peshawar is a passion, deep in their hearts.' "[116] Peshawar is on the Pakistani side of the border. The king's successors have had similar family ties. The first two Marxist rulers of Afghanistan, Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, were both Pathans of the Ghilzai subgroup, deeply rooted in Pakistan.[117] Marxism and irredentism have coexisted in Afghanistan since 1978. Tun Mustapha, the Malaysian state politician who aided Philippine Muslim rebels and probably entertained irredentist aspirations in the Southern Philippines, was a Suluk with family ties in the Philippines. In each case, irredentism has been sustained, not merely by ethnicity, but by kinship in a more direct and narrow sense. And it is worth noting that each of these irredentist states was governed by a patrimonial regime in a traditional society where kinship could operate largely unfettered.[118]

If the unswerving pursuit of irredentism is, unlike separatism, an unusual phenomenon, the passion for retrieval has produced results no more impressive than has the passion for secession. No groups have been retrieved across territorial borders in the post-colonial period. The pursuit of irredentism encourages the formation of defensive alliances and other countermeasures. Ethiopia has had Cuban and Soviet help against a Somali invasion. When Iraq contemplated retrieval of Arabs in Southwestern Iran, Iran was able to counter by aiding the Kurds in Iraq. Although irredentism, unlike secession, involves state action to realign borders, this does not weight the scales more heavily in favor of success. Indeed, as I have suggested, the more calculative quality of state decisions probably makes deterrence more effective. But where irredentism

116. Sayeed, "Pathan Regionalism," 503, quoting Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans* (London: Macmillan, 1958), 435.

117. Selig Harrison, "Tribal Pawns in a Superpower Match," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Dec. 22, 1978, pp. 24–26.

118. In some cases, even these special conditions might not have been enough. The Somali regime that preceded Siad's had reached an agreement for détente with Ethiopia, and the Afghan regime that preceded Taraki's had done the same with respect to Pakistan. The successor governments used these decisions to shore up their own position and in the process became committed to pursuing the irredentas.

does break into violence, the state-to-state character of the conflict makes escalation a more dangerous possibility.

If irredentism should succeed, the results are unlikely to be much different from the consequences of secession: probably a general unglueing of ethnic relations in the rump state and new tensions in the irredentist state as well. For what we know is already sufficient to deflate the myth of homogeneity in the retrieving states. Even in Somalia, so often described as monoethnic, it takes little imagination to forecast the reaction of powerful groups like the Hawiye to the gain in Darood strength that the inclusion of the Ogaden would produce. To be sure, the Hawiye and the Darood are both Somalis, but it is a much more particularized conception of ethnic identity that will prevail in the new, wholly internal context. Ethnic generalities do not determine the impact of a boundary change.

PART THREE

Party Politics and Ethnic Conflict