

Fearing for another thus proves to be a distinctive phenomenon of being-with. And it becomes clear that being with one another by way of the world is constitutive of it. The specific relations are as follows: the co-entity in the sense of the one who fears for the others, is with the other precisely when he is not in the other's mode of being; thus either he is not afraid with the other in the true sense of being afraid; or the other is not necessarily afraid when I am in fear about him. This fearing about is in a way an anticipation of fear for the others, without oneself necessarily having to be afraid. I cannot go any further here into the final correlations which are revealed here in regard to the structure of being with one another.

### b) Dread and uncanniness

We shall now consider dread as a fourth phenomenon in connection with our analysis of fear. In addition to all of these modifications of fear there is a being afraid which at bottom can no longer be called that. For the of-which of fear can remain indefinite, no longer being this or that worldly thing on hand. Correspondingly, in-being as being-involved-with is no longer affected in a definite way. No real confusion ensues, since the possibility of confusion exists only when a definite orientation of concern gets all mixed up, that is, when the circumspensively disclosed in-being in its definite, factual, environmental possibilities falls into disarray. What threatens is nothing definite and worldly, and yet it is not without the impending approach which characterizes the threatening. Indeed, what threatens in this indefinite way is now quite near and can be so close that it is oppressive. It can be so near and yet not present as this or that, not something fearful, something to be feared by way of a definite reference of the environing world in its meaningfulness. Dread can 'befall' us right in the midst of the most familiar environment. Oftentimes it does not even have to involve the phenomenon of darkness or of being alone which frequently accompanies dread. We then say: one feels *uncanny* [or in more idiomatic English: "Things look so *weird* all of a sudden" or "I'm getting this *eerie* feeling"]. One no longer feels at home in his most familiar environment, the one closest to him; but this does not come about in such a way that a definite region in the hitherto known and familiar world breaks down in its orientation, nor such that one is not at home in the surroundings in which one now finds himself, but instead in other surroundings. On the contrary, in dread, being-in-the-world is totally transformed into a 'not at home' purely and simply.

Being-in-dread-of likewise has its specific of-which. More precisely put, our question is: As what must we define that of which dread is in dread?

When dread has run its course we say, 'It was really nothing.' This kind of talk strikes the very heart of the matter. It was nothing; *the of-which of dread is nothing*, that is to say, nothing that takes place in the world, nothing definite, nothing worldly. But since it can nevertheless be oppressively present in an obtrusiveness, it is much more than something threatening for fear, for it is the *world in its very worldhood*. The indefiniteness of the of-which, this nothing as nothing worldly, is phenomenally quite definite. It is the world in its worldhood, which of course does not give itself like a world-thing. As that which threatens, this nothing is very close, so that what thus threatens (the worldhood of the world or the world as such) in a way wraps itself around someone and takes his breath away, without being something of which one could say: this thing here.

For this peculiar and wholly original phenomenon there now are, as for all such phenomena, characteristic delusions, delusions of dread which, for example, can be induced purely physiologically. But this physiological possibility itself exists only because this entity, which is corporeally determined, can by virtue of its being be in dread at all, and not because some physiological occurrence could produce something like dread. It is for this reason that we speak of inducing a dread which is always possible and to some extent latent.

Because that of which dread is in dread is this nothing in the sense of "nothing definite and worldly," the nothing amplifies its proximity, that is, the possibility of the can-be [*Seinkönnen*] and of "being able to do nothing against it." This absolute helplessness in the face of the threatening, because it is indeed indefinite, because it is nothing, offers no ways and means of overcoming it. Every orientation draws a blank. This worldly indefiniteness of that of which dread is in dread is in its constitution now accompanied by the indefiniteness of that *about which* dread is in dread.

It is not this or that concern which is threatened, but *being-in-the-world as such*. Inherent in being-in-the-world, however, (and now we need to bring in what we have already discussed for the understanding of the entire analysis of dread) is the world in its worldhood. The of-which of dread, which is nothing worldly, is the in-which which is constitutive of Dasein, of in-being itself. That *of which* dread is in dread is the *in-which of being-in-the-world*, and that *about which* one is in dread is this *very same being-in-the-world*, specifically in its primary discoveredness of 'not at home.' In dread, therefore, the of-which of dread and the about-which of being in dread are not only indefinite in a worldly sense, but they coincide. More precisely stated, in dread they are not yet even separated; *Dasein is the of-which and the about-which*. In dread being-in-the-world as such discloses itself, and that

not as this definite fact but in its *facticity*. Dread is nothing but *the disposition to uncanniness*.

The of-which and the about-which of dread are both Dasein itself, more accurately, the fact that I am, that is, "I am" in the sense of the naked being-in-the-world. This naked factuality is not that of being on hand like a thing, but the kind of being which is constitutive of finding oneself [in a situation].

Dasein is 'on hand' in a radical sense, in the sense of facticity. It does not find itself solely as something on hand in the sense of the ground and foundation, *that* it is. Rather, the ground is an *existential* ground, which means a disclosed ground—and a "bottomless ground," an *abyss* at that. This is the existential positivity of the nothing of dread. Facticity as a constituent of existence is not grafted onto something on hand, and man is not existence as the union of an extant soul and an extant body. In other words, existence rightly understood is not the union of the separated, but the original kind of being which defines this entity ontologically.

Dasein is such that it is this peculiar factic dimension; in short, Dasein *is its very facticity*. The 'fact' that Dasein 'is' at all and 'is not not' is not a mere property in it, but can be experienced by Dasein itself in an original experience; this is nothing but the disposition of dread. Facticity of Dasein means: It is in a manner of its being this being, *that it is*; more accurately: *It is its very 'there' and 'in.'*

In dread worldhood as such presents itself together with my being in it, without bringing any definite datum to the foreground. Earlier, in analyzing Descartes's concept of the subject, I referred to his statement that we actually have no affection of being as such. But there is such an affection (if one wants to use this mode of expression). Dread is nothing other than the pure and simple experience of being in the sense of being-in-the-world. This experience can, though it does not have to—just as all possibilities of being come under a 'can'—assume a distinctive sense in *death* or, more precisely, in *dying*. We then speak of the *dread of death*, which must be kept altogether distinct from the fear of death, for it is not fear in the face of death but dread as a disposition to the naked being-in-the-world, to pure Dasein. There is thus the possibility, in the very moment of departing from the world, so to speak, when the world has nothing more to say to us and every other has nothing more to say, that the world and our being-in-it show themselves purely and simply.

This analysis of dread depicts a phenomenon which in its nature simply cannot be forced and whose analysis here also has nothing whatsoever to do with any sort of sentimentality. The analysis has exhibited this phenomenon of dread as the foundation in being for Da-

sein's flight from itself. This phenomenon of dread is not something invented by me but has already been seen repeatedly, even though not in these concepts. Here I am only trying to provide the concepts for things which are usually treated in a nebulous way in the sciences, and at times also in theology.

Augustine did not regard the phenomenon of dread in a thematic way, but he in fact caught a glimpse of it in a short study "On Fear" within a collection of questions, "On Various Questions of the Eighty Tribes."<sup>4</sup> Luther then dealt with the phenomenon of dread in the traditional context of an interpretation of *contritio* and *poenitentia* in his commentary on Genesis.<sup>5</sup> In recent times, particularly in connection with the problem of original sin, Kierkegaard made the phenomenon of dread the theme of his separate work, *The Concept of Dread*.<sup>6</sup>

I cannot go into greater detail here into the various modifications whereby dread as implicit is directly concealed by the phenomenon of being afraid. We shall consider them in the persistent retrograde movement from discoveredness towards falling. From falling to dread we now come to the last fundament of being, which gives to dread in general, which means to being-in-the-world, its original constitution. This fundament is the phenomenon of care.

### **c) More original explication of falling and dread (uncanniness) as a preview of the basic constitution of Dasein as care**

The explication of the movement of falling as a flight of Dasein from itself led to the phenomenon of dread as a basic disposition of Dasein to itself, namely, to itself in its pure being, where being must always be taken in the sense already exhibited as being-in-the-world. The foregoing reflections on dread which we have just cited suffer from the basic deficiency of not really seeing the conceptual, existential structure of Dasein, so that dread then becomes a psychological problem, even in Kierkegaard. *But dread is dread of this being itself, such that this being-in-dread-of-it is a being in dread about this being.* But this implies that Dasein is an entity for which in its being, in its being-in-the-world, "it goes about its very being" [*es geht um sein Sein selbst*], for which, that is, *its very being is at issue*. This is the sense of the selfsame-

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4. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, questions 33, 34, 35, Opera Omnia, Migne, *Patrologiae Latinae* XL, Vol. VI, pp. 22ff.

5. Martin Luther, *Enarrationes in genesin*, Ch. 3, *Werke* (Erlangen Edition), *Exegetica opera latina*, Vol. I, pp. 177ff.

6. Soren Kierkegaard, *Der Begriff der Angst*, 1844, *Gesammelte Werke* (Diederichs), Vol. 5.