

THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN FRANCE

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The French branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, like the branches in other European countries, aims to establish an Islamic government and substitute the prevailing secular laws. In Europe, including France, the Muslim Brotherhood has used peaceful methods and even denied that it is seeking such an outcome. The organization's declared aim instead is to "re-Islamize" Muslims and direct them as to how to behave religiously in countries where they are in minority and seek ways to preserve and abide by Islamic faith. The group also mobilizes Muslims on political issues elsewhere, in particular, over the Palestinian, Iraqi, Bosnian, and Afghan questions.

In France, the Muslim Brotherhood branch encounters specific problems, given the political system, which is based on the secularism of state and society. Referred to as *laïcité*, this system implies strict separation of church and state with religion limited to the private sphere. Thus, ideally, no religious symbol should be displayed in the public sphere or embodied in government institutions, especially those at the heart of citizen-building, such as government schools.¹ Muslim Brotherhood organizations must manage this issue in order to gain public recognition. Their official aim is not so much to put the official secularism into question as to propose a more religious-friendly definition of it.

The Brotherhood's influence in France has been manifold and deep among many Muslims. Two types of influences can be distinguished—at the individual level and at the institutional level. On the institutional level, two organizations deeply influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood are the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF) and the Muslim World League. The UOIF is the main representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in France and one of the most potent Islamic organizations in the country. It is the French branch of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE), which is partly funded by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and whose aim is to promote an Islam adapted to the European context. The UOIF is assisted by the European Council for Fatwa and Research, which studies and edicts "collective *fatwas* to answer questions for

Muslims of Europe and solve their problems, in accordance to the rules and aims of the *sharia*.”²

UOIF AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

The UOIF was formally founded in 1983 by two students, Tunisian Adallah Ben Mansour and Iraqi Mahmoud Zouheir. The UOIF has a strong base among Muslim youth—particularly students—and the middle classes. It encompasses more than 100 local associations and owns around thirty mosques in cities all over France. UOIF has divided France into twelve regions by the, and each region has its own representative. The UOIF is directly connected to the other European organizations attached to or inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood ideology and structure.

The umbrella group includes many organizations, the most important among them being the Young Muslims of France (Jeunes Musulmans de France, JMF), Muslim Students of France (Etudiants Musulmans de France, EMF), the French League of Muslim Women (Ligue Française de la Femme Musulmane, LFFM), Imams of France (Imams de France), the European Institute of Human Sciences (Institut Européen des Sciences Humaines, IESH), and the Welfare and Charity and Rescue Committee for the Palestinians (Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens, GBSP).

One of the UOIF’s important subsidiaries is the IESH, located at Château-Chinon, which opened its doors in 1990. In IESH, future UOIF imams are educated, which includes training in the Arabic language. This institute trained more than 300 imams between 1990 and 2004. Every year, the UOIF gathers its members and sympathizers at the Bourget locality near Paris, where thousands of people meet and listen to religious personalities and political figures. In 2003, then Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy spoke about Islam in France and the necessity for women to take off the veil in their official identity card photos.

The UOIF is one of the most significant representatives within the French Council of Muslims (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, CFCM), an organization set up in 2003 to represent Muslims and serve as the direct contact with the French government on questions concerning the problems of Muslims in France (halal meat, the education and training of imams, cemeteries, construction of new mosques, and the like). In 2005, elections results for the CFCM gave ten out of forty-three seats to the UOIF, a decrease of three seats from the first elections in 2003. The National Federation of French Muslims (Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France, FNMF) won nineteen seats (three more than in 2003). The Great Mosque of Paris won ten seats (three fewer than in 2003).

In terms of its priorities, the UOIF singles out a number of themes, some related to the situation of Muslims worldwide and others related to the daily life of French Muslims. The first category mostly concerns Muslims’ fate in the Middle East, for example the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the Palestinian question. During the war in the Gaza Strip, in December 2008, the

UOIF issued a public statement asking to “stop the massacre of the Palestinian people” and “to stop the genocide against the population of Gaza.”

Thami Breze, president of the UOIF, went to Rafah on the Gaza–Egypt border with representatives of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe to show support for its population there. It called the Gaza bombings “a crime against humanity.”³ At the same time though, the group was careful not to say anything that would inspire a direct conflict with French Jews who supported Israel. The group denounced Islamophobia, anti-semitism, and racism. The UOIF’s intent was thus to mobilize French Muslims against the Israeli attacks on Palestinians without bringing the conflict onto the streets of France, since many young Muslims in poor suburbs of French cities might be inclined to accept broader anti-semitic ideas.⁴ This stance contributed to limiting violence within France itself.⁵

Rather than incite conflict in France, it can be argued that the UOIF tried to engage in nonviolent demonstrations. Similarly, the UOIF tries to cope with drug-dealing, theft, and other criminal offenses in poor districts by trying to impose a religiously based discipline on those who dwell there by integrating them into a more pious lifestyle. Of course, this is only effective among those who are willing to accept religious views or participate in organizational activities. Other disaffected young Muslim males may express their rage in confrontational terms toward people and institutions (the police, bus drivers, firemen, and more generally, all government officials, employees, and minorities such as Jews).

Attempts to show responsibility and even French patriotism are important themes in the UOIF’s activities. For example, on November 7, 2005, the UOIF issued a *fatwa* condemning the civil unrest going on then, saying that “it is strictly forbidden for any Muslim . . . to take part in any action that strikes blindly at private or public property or that could threaten the lives of others.” Thousands of cars were burned during that period by young people, Muslims or otherwise, in protest against alleged police violence, social segregation, racism, for financial gain or simply in order to create a festival atmosphere.

Another subject where UOIF is particularly active is giving religious advice on Muslim daily life in a non-Muslim country. A key issue here is the mobilization of UOIF followers on the headscarf matter.

In 2003, a French law banned “ostentatious religious signs” in government-sponsored schools. This law translates into a ban on the scarf at every public meeting sponsored by the state or at any official gathering. Through legal counsel, the UOIF helped Muslim girls who did not want to comply with the ban at school. In January 2009, it issued a *fatwa* decrying as discriminatory the treatment of Muslim women who had been barred from wearing the headscarf while being employed as childcare workers at places housed in school buildings. The UOIF also encouraged and helped them to take legal action.⁶ This has become an important symbolic issue in France, with public opinion viewing Muslims who take off or do not wear the scarf as “moderates” and those who insist on its necessity as “fundamentalists.” The UOIF has also explored to change the law.

An example of combining legal rulings and politics can be seen in the demonstration organized against Israel during the Gaza war in December 2008. For those Muslims who took part in the demonstration, there was a conflict between participating fully and performing all the daily prayers at the prescribed times. There was thus a necessity to perform the noon and the afternoon prayers at noon rather than separately or to put together the evening and night prayers at night in order to take part fully in the demonstration. The UOIF provided and justified a dispensation in reference to two rules. First, taking part in the demonstrations was “fighting against the evil” and could be vindicated under the Islamic saying of “Commending the Good and Forbidding the Evil” (*amr bi ma’ruf and naby an al munkar*). As for the simultaneous performance of the two daily prayers, be it those of noon and afternoon or those of evening and night, it could be justified under another Islamic saying, namely that passersby in the street would be inconvenienced if the Muslims prayed in the street at noon or in the evening.⁷ According to the *hadith* (sayings of Muhammad), Muhammad did not intend to disturb the pedestrians of his time. The UOIF ruled that so too Muslims today should not disturb French non-Muslims by praying in the street and thus giving them a derogatory picture of Allah’s religion.

In this respect, the UOIF combines social mobilization and religious devotion in a single act by providing religious justification for both in reference to Islamic tradition as well as a concern for the image of Islam in a non-Islamic land.

Other topics are less political or social and strictly pertain to finding a compromise between Islamic religious prescriptions and the secular laws of France. The third National Conference of Imams promoted by the UOIF and held on March 15 and 16, 2008, under the title, “Marriage between the Traditional (Islamic) Procedures and the French Law” sought to give Islamic legitimacy to secular marriage procedures in the French municipalities.

The Internet has been utilized to provide a “simplified *fiqh*” (Islamic jurisprudence) for devout Muslims. The UOIF closely cooperates with the European Council for Fatwa and Research in Dublin, whose prominent members, such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, are among the best-known Brotherhood spiritual advisors on the daily problems of Muslims in secular European environments.

Among the topics addressed in these discussions are the following: the substitution of Islamic lending to the usual banking practices that are considered “usury” (*riba*); intermarriage between Muslims and non-Muslims; the daily prayers and their timing; and Islamic rituals that are difficult to implement in a French environment (including ablutions before prayers and the performance of the daily prayers themselves).

Another subject that mobilizes the UOIF as well as other Muslim organizations is the promotion of Islamic schools. Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish private schools in France abide by the rules set by the Ministry of National Education but have a degree of freedom toward religious observance far higher than in the government-sponsored schools. The French public’s suspicion toward these Muslim associations makes the generalized acceptance

of the Islamic schools a matter of debate in the country. There are only a few of them authorized within France itself.

While itself not a Muslim Brotherhood organization directly, the Muslim World League (MWL) is a conduit for Brotherhood influences. It is one of the largest Islamic nongovernmental organizations in the world, founded in 1962 in Mecca by Prince Faysal with the support of twenty-two countries. Its French branch is La Ligue Islamique Mondiale (LIM).

The LIM contributes to the construction of mosques and Islamic centers and other cultural activities. In the suburbs of Paris, the Evry mosque, for example, was built with the cooperation of the LIM and the Hassan II Foundation. In the same fashion, the grand mosque in the city of Lyon that opened in 1994 was financed by the LIM as a personal gift of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd. In the West, MWL often cooperated with Muslim Brotherhood-type organizations since the latter have more influence on European Muslims than the Salafi-Wahhabi message from Saudi Arabia itself.⁸

The LIM, which is close to the UOIF as well as to the FNMF, was founded in 1985. It is currently the most important member of the CFCM in terms of the number of people elected to its governing board.⁹ It joins forces with other Islamic associations to press charges against people or organizations that allegedly slur Islam, as in the lawsuit against the French writer Michel Houellebecq, who, in an interview in 2002, called Islam the coarsest religion on earth, or against the magazine *Charlie Hebdo* that published the caricatures of the Muhammad in 2007 to support the Danish journal that initiated the controversy.

The LIM's influence is largely institutional and economic, and it does not directly have any influence in France comparable to that of the UOIF. The competition between the two institutions, however, does not prevent their close cooperation.

LEADERSHIP

Many prominent Islamic individuals have been directly influenced by Muslim Brotherhood ideology even if are not members of that group. Tariq Ramadan is one of them. He denies any formal link to the Muslim Brotherhood, but his modern approach to Islam and his attempt at "updating" it without renouncing its core message is inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in many respects.

Both Ramadan¹⁰ and the UOIF have been accused of using a "double language": a supposedly "democratic" mind-set toward French non-Muslims and a fundamentalist, anti-*laïcité* attitude with regard to French Muslims.¹¹ The main objection, in France, is that the UOIF and those intellectuals who sustain it put into question—without expressing it explicitly—the secular state and its laws, in particular regarding the public sphere that should be free from religious symbols.

The "hypocrisy" lies in the fact that not only what they say is different according to the audience to whom they are saying it, but also in their aim

at promoting Islam as a public norm—that is, against the secular state and its citizenship rules and, even more so, against democracy and its equality and freedom. In part, many Muslim Brotherhood offshoots in the West do promulgate their aim to impel the Islamization of the West. However, the picture regarding the group in France is more complex.

The first and major point, according to which the UOIF has a double nature,¹² is in part true. Yet, it is also accurate to say that the organization has taken a democracy-friendly attitude toward major issues such as anti-semitism, gender, the problem of believers versus nonbelievers, the allegiance to human-made law that is, by definition, different from the law of God, or other topics where the traditional Islamic tenets contradict rules of democracy.

The attitude of the UOIF has been to support new ideas that might soften the traditional orthodox stance without denouncing it directly or rejecting it. If it were to choose the second attitude, many of its sympathizers might be tempted to opt out in favor of other Islamic organizations (Tabligh, neo-Salafist groups, or others). As for their end goal and the establishment of an Islamic state, one might surmise that a long involvement in European politics might change it *de facto*, without any explicit change on their part.

This, in turn, is in direct relation to the situation of Muslims caught between the highly secular Europe where they live and their places and families of origin. External society pushes Muslims either toward total secularization or the espousal of Islamic attitudes that mark a sharp break with those of their parents, who were often functionally illiterate and more likely than not highly traditional.

In this context, young people of Muslim origin have in most cases no religious culture or any ability to be informed through family channels on Islamic matters. A *de facto* secularization coupled with a sense of guilt and self-disrespect characterizes many young Muslims in France. They seek a renewed sense of religion as a means of self-respect. This cannot be achieved other than through self-imposed restrictions and the rejection (moderate or violent) of the secular norms that have led to their alienation from their roots and sense of honor and dignity.

Fundamentalism becomes attractive in this sense: in contrast to the denial of real citizenship and a sense of uprootedness, it opposes a universal construction of Islam, independent of specific cultures (they do not master the language and the culture of their own parents or grandparents) and ambivalently at odds with the secular societies in which they do not feel at home. Islamic rigorism becomes a substitute to a second-rate citizenship in a highly secular environment.

The UOIF, the FNME, Tabligh, and the neo-Salafist movements in France offer a new sense of dignity through allegiance to an “intransigent” religious feeling. Most of the Muslims in France are of working-class background and deeply resent the denial of citizenship to them—despite their having a French passport—as a sign of deep disrespect toward them. Their cultural uprootedness—they know very little about Islam or the countries

of their parents or grandparents—and their immersion into a permissive, largely secular world has entailed estrangement of their own parents and French society.

The UOIF insists on Muslims learning Arabic and becoming immersed in the religious ambience of Islam. Teaching Arabic and reading the Koran become part of the education and acculturation for the young culturally uprooted second- or third-generation Muslims who discover a new identity through this learning, different both from the surrounding French milieu and the culture of parents who spoke at best an Arab dialect and had only a sketchy knowledge of the Koran. Fundamentalism becomes a prodding toward self-discipline in religion—daily prayers, learning Arabic, reading the Koran, performing pious acts—that distinguishes the new self from the lax one in a permissive society where nonreligious attitudes are positively reinforced.

Given the need for roots and the failure of mainstream society to provide them, the appeal of fundamentalism through associations like the UOIF (for the lower-middle classes) or Tabligh and neo-Salafist organizations (for the lower classes, the so-called excluded jobless youth) is therefore potent. These organizations cannot be attractive unless they hold to a rigorous religious framework to stand in contrast to the permissive secular European environment. In France, the attraction is heightened by the tangible target of *laïcité*.

The UOIF finds itself in a double-bind: to win legitimacy in a nonreligious society, it has to be “open-minded”; to captivate the Islamic youth, it has to be counter-laïque. The “double discourse,” be it from the UOIF or from the Muslim intellectuals who appeal to a wider audience, arises from the need to close in an imaginary way this unbridgeable gap between the two mind-sets. The optimistic view emerging is that this ambivalent attitude will ease the future understanding between the two worlds. The pessimistic attitude would stress the double standard and the hypocrisy of this type of attitude that forestalls the “reality shock” for Muslims and perpetuates the dogmatic attitudes of the past, staving off the adjustment in the mind-set of the Muslims to the European setting.

For a long time, this ambivalence will be part of the coexistence between the non-Muslim French and France’s Muslim minorities. This ambivalence is rooted in the social status of Muslims. Unlike their American counterparts, who are middle or upper-middle class, Muslims in France are of the lower or lower-middle classes in an overwhelming majority. They do not share, in their core, the “American dream” of their counterparts in the United States. Fundamentalism is for them a way of escaping dissolution in the ultrasecular France, on the one hand, and the building up of an identity in a situation of economic uncertainty or precariousness, on the other hand.

Their ambivalence toward French society is based on a malaise that has no foreseeable end to it. The fascination for a tiny minority of them to jump completely from a fundamentalist attitude toward Islamic radicalism is real.¹³

Tareq Oubrou is a Muslim scholar, president of the mosques within the regional Association des Musulmans de Gironde (AMG) who also belongs

to the UOIF. He is active in deterring young Muslims from adhering to the extremist brands of Islam and legitimizing the submission of Muslims to the people's law (instead of God's law) by referring to the "fiqh of the minority."

In non-Muslim societies, according to the *hadith*, he argues, one has to submit to the prevailing laws and adapt Islamic prescriptions to it. That is why he proposes performing the prayers all at once if for any reason a Muslim cannot do them separately during the different times of day and night. In the same vein, he looks for solutions to gender issues in Islam. He has propounded new ways of reading the Islamic duties in light of modern life and has brought the individual's decisions and adaptations as a major yardstick, in conjunction with the *umma* (Islamic community).¹⁴

His "fiqh of the minority" is in opposition to the "*fiqh al-aqalliya*," whose proponents imply that the West must recognize Islamic laws governing the relations between Muslims, who must be treated as a legally separate group. For Oubrou, obedience to the rules of the society, even though they are not Islamic by nature, is part of the moral pact between Muslims and others in non-Muslim societies. *Fiqh* is subordinated, in his perspective, to ethics, and the latter is the ground upon which Muslims and non-Muslims can find common denominators independently of religion. Metaphysics and ethics, from this standpoint, are over jurisprudence, and *fiqh* can adapt to them without putting the Islamic creed into question.

In spite of his open stance toward to the secular world, Oubrou's views are subject to much ambivalence. His relation to gender and his view of Islam cannot entirely submit to the secular standpoint without seeing Allah's religion lose its specificity. Other intellectuals, such as Hassan Iquioussen or Tariq Ramadan, assert their views in a more explicit way and are exposed to criticism and suspicion by secular people.

The malaise of a "mutually distrustful coexistence" can best describe the situation of the Muslim Brotherhood organizations and intellectuals in France. On the one hand, in civil society they are the targets of acerbic critics regarding their attitude toward religion and its scope, democracy and its legitimacy, and personal freedom and its limits, as well as the degree to which Islamic norms and prescriptions should be followed or tolerated within civil society and government institutions.

Unlike Great Britain and Holland, where multiculturalism grants Muslims many rights, France denies such things as their recognition as a religious community, tolerance toward their holidays, the wearing of a headscarf by civil servants (in Britain), or of religious insignia (the beard) by male policemen. In France, the main bone of contention is the *laïcité* and the way these Muslim associations have to cope with it.

CONCLUSION

Although the UOIF or personalities like Tariq Ramadan or Tareq Oubrou deny any direct link to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, they are deeply

influenced by the Brotherhood in terms of ideology, thought, and political views. As in the Egyptian case, they believe that democracy (and more generally, parliamentary political systems) are not antithetical to Islam. They also believe that the Islamization of society can be achieved through peaceful means from action at the grassroots' level. In both cases, they can be accused of insincerity by the opponents.

Their role is ambivalent at best. On the one hand, they prevent the passage to Islamist extremism by Muslims. On the other, they propose an "Islamic alternative" to the secular democratic political system. This alternative oscillates between creeping Islamization that instrumentalizes democracy for other ends and a "democratic compromise" that reconciles Allah's religion with the pluralist political system.

In the West, where Islamization cannot reasonably go beyond certain levels, organizations like the UOIF challenge the secularization of young Muslims, push them toward becoming "born-again Muslims," combine Islamic identity and fundamentalism in order to save Allah's religion from dissolution into secular European societies, and harness youth identity into a framework that can control and mobilize them on specific social, political, and cultural topics.

In France, the role of the UOIF and like-minded Islamic organizations is to create a distinct identity that will push toward the preservation of Allah's religion in an ultrasecular environment and create solidarity with other Muslims around the world without bringing the conflicts that split the Muslim world back to France in a violent manner.

Muslim Brotherhood associations play yet another role: they contribute to creating an imaginary *umma* that extends from Europe's shores to the limits of the Muslim world with new ties and a homogeneous religious view, independent of the specific cultures of the countries where they are established. Unlike the Wahhabi type of transnational organizations marginal in Europe, the only two types of transnational "fundamentalist" Muslim associations that have taken root in Europe are the loosely connected Muslim Brotherhood associations and the Tabligh, which is highly centralized and has a strong pyramidal organization, with its head at Duisebury, England.

These two types of transnational associations in part compete with each other and in part have different audiences: UOIF-like associations, inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and loosely in touch with it, aim at the new lower-middle and middle-class Muslims, whereas Tabligh mainly entices lower-class Muslims who mostly have lost the hope for economic and social integration into European societies.

Wahhabi-type associations prosper in the Sunni Muslim world where they can attract many sympathizers who accept strict Islamic orthodoxy. In Europe, their local versions seduce only a marginal part of the Muslim community due to its stringent rules and its way of life that is too alien to European Muslims.

The UOIF and similar organizations propose an ambivalent compromise between orthodox Islam, on the one hand, and the secular and pluralist

French society, on the other. Their aim is to gain recognition, in the long run, in the French public sphere as a major representative of French Muslims. Even if some of their leaders harbor pan-Islamic ideas, the “ordeal of reality” pushes them toward the recognition of the French brand of secularism (*laïcité*) and a compromise with it. This prevents them from officially espousing radical stances toward major social, cultural, or political events in society. Ambivalence is part of the institutional interplay with society, which is multifaceted by necessity.

NOTES

1. John R. Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007).
2. See www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/UOIF.
3. See www.uoif-online.com/webspip/spip.php?
4. Some Jewish organizations in France characterize the UOIF as being anti-semitic and pro-*jihad* in reference to its relations to Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. See Simon Wiesenthal Center, “The True Face of the UOIF: Antisemitism, Advocacy and Financing of Terrorism, and the Call to *Jihad*,” www.wiesenthal.com/atf/cf/{DFD2AAC1-2ADE-428A-9263-35234229D8D8}/trueUOIF.pdf.
5. According to *Haaretz*, “The incidents included a stabbing of a young Jewish man by two masked car thieves outside Paris, and two firebombing attacks against synagogues in Saint Denis, a northern suburb of Paris, and in Strasburg.” See “Jewish Agency: Anti-Semitic Acts in Jan. 2009 Triple Last Year’s Records,” *Haaretz*, January 25, 2009, www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1058555.html. According to another account “A total of 55 anti-semitic incidents occurred in France since the start of Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, said President of the French Jewish Students’ Union Raphael Haddad on Monday.” See “France: 55 Anti-Semitic Acts Since the Start of Cast Lead,” *Yediot Aharonot*, January 14, 2009, www.ynet.co.il/english/articles/0,7340,L-3655372,00.html.
6. See “*Le Comité 15 mars et les libertés*,” February 3, 2009, www.uoif-online.com.
7. According to Ibn Abbas quoted in the reliable (*sahih*) Saying of the Prophet as reported by the compiler Muslim. See comite15mars.net.
8. See Johannes Grundmann, *Islamische Internationalisten—Strukturen und Aktivitäten der Muslimbruderschaft und der Islamischen Weltliga* (Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2005).
9. See earlier text about the number of the members of each Muslim organization within the CFCM.
10. For Caroline Fourest, Ramadan is a war leader and the political heir of his grandfather Hasan al-Banna, his discourse being often just a repetition of the discourse that al-Banna had at the beginning of the twentieth century in Egypt. According to her, Ramadan presents al-Banna as a model to be followed. From her perspective, “Tariq Ramadan is slippery. He says one thing to his faithful Muslim followers and something else entirely to his Western audience. His choice of words, the formulations he uses—even his tone of voice—vary, chameleon-like, according to his audience.” See Caroline Fourest, *Brother Tariq*:

The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan (New York: Encounter Books, 2008). This picture is too Machiavellian to be entirely true.

11. "Qu'est-ce que l'UOIF?" éditions de l'Archipel, Collection l'information citoyenne dirigée par Claude Perrotin, Paris, 2006. Riposte Laïque, *Face à une charte islamique européenne, il faut une résistance laïque et féministe européenne*, January 16, 2008, www.ripostelaique.com/Face-a-une-charte-islamique.html.
12. See Fiammetta Venner, *OPA sur l'Islam de France : Les ambitions de l'UOIF*, Calmann-Lévy, May 2005.
13. See for this complex web of ambivalence and the appeal to jihadism Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Inside Jihadism, Understanding Jihadi Movements Worldwide* (New Haven, CT: Yale Cultural Sociology Series, Paradigm Publishers, 2009).
14. Tariq Oubrou, "La Shari'a de minorité : réflexions pour une intégration légale de l'islam," in F. Frégosi (ed.), *Lectures contemporaines du droit islamique- Europe et monde arabe*(Strasbourg: PUS, 2004); Leila Babès et Tariq Oubrou, *Loi d'Allah, loi des hommes-liberté, égalité et femmes en Islam* (Paris, Albin Michel, 2002). See, for a summary, Alexandre Caeiro, "An Imam in France Tareq Oubrou," *ISIM Review*, vol. 15 (Spring 2005).

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