3, hodina – republikanismus

Dokončení: Burn! (1969)

**Pettit, Liberal and Republican Liberty**

Harrington (1977, 170) greets Hobbes's comment with derision: 'to say that a Lucchese have no more liberty or immunity from the laws of Lucca than a Turk hath from those of Constantinople, and to say that a Lucchese have no more liberty or immunity by the laws of Lucca than a Turk hath by those of Constantinople, are pretty different speeches'

* secure liberty or liberty-by-the-law
* Law helps to constitute liberty, not just to serve it in an instrumental way

The first and perhaps most obvious difference between the two philosophies, as they have been characterised so far, is that liberalism hails a distinctively isolationist, and republicanism a distinctively communal, ideal. This comes out in the fact that the quantity-centred notion of liberty is one that is perfectly realised out of society, whereas the quality-centred one requires participation in a communal life.

**The image of perfect freedom, under the republican approach, is that of enjoying the freedom of the city**

* It is that ‘it is only possible to be free in a free state’. (Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, 60)

But though liberalism and republicanism contrast on the social versus non-social dimension, there is an important commonality between the approaches that we ought to mark. This is that both philosophies are opposed to the so-called **communitarian** theory which has lately come to prominence among political thinkers (see Kymlicka 1990 and Holmes 1989 for critiques). Communitarians deny the possibility of the neutral state or constitution, the state that is justified without reference to any particular conception of the good life. (Tamtéž)

* Liberalism favours the idea of putting such a state in place that the adherents of different conceptions of the good life can all lively happily under it (Larmore 1987). Indeed this feature is sometimes treated as definitional of liberalism. But it should be clear from all we have said that this is misleading, since republicanism is equally well disposed to the idea of a neutrally justified state.

A second contrast comes of the fact that while the liberal ideal has no particular subjective resonance, the republican ideal connects intimately with people's attitudes and feeling

* The liberal tradition undermined this connection between freedom and feeling.

I said that the liberal tradition was attracted by the invisible hand idea introduced by Adam Smith: the idea that although they are each self-interested, people may discipline one another into behaving in a socially desirable fashion. (tamtéž)

* The idea that drives a lot of republican thinking may be described, in parallel, as an intangible hand (Pettit 1993a, Brennan and Pettit forthcoming)

Montesquieu uvažoval o ideálním nastavení společenských institucí tak, že „každý přispívá ke společnému dobru, i když si myslí, že se žene za osobními zájmy“. (O duchu zákonů, 3. kniha, 7. kap.) (Sandel, Co je správné dělat, s. 32) … Montesquieu tedy neočekává, že občané budou uvědomělými ctnostnými občany jako v antice a že obecné dobro budou prosazovat jaksi přímo a bezprostředně (v moderní době nelze podle něj zakládat stát na ctnostech)

četba Rousseaua

O vztahu individuality a universa:„Universum však k nim promlouvá, jak stojí psáno: kdo přijde o život pro mne, zachrání jej, a kdo by ho chtěl zachránit, ten o něj přijde (Luk 9,24).

* jako u Rousseau, když se má individuum odevzdat obecné vůli
* svoboda, kterou by chtěli zachránit před obecnou vůlí, je žalostná

z pohledu negativní svobody vystupuje obecná vůle jako pád, jako ztráta svobody (Žižek: Puppet and the Dwarf):

It is with regard to the theme of the Fall that the opposition between Gnosticism and Christianity is most conspicuous. Both share the notion of the Fall—for Gnosticism,however,we are dealing with the Fall from the pure spiritual dimension into the inert materiál world, with the notion that we strive to return to our lost spiritual home; while for Christianity, the Fall is not really a Fall at all, but “in itself” its very opposite, the emergence of freedom.There is no place from which we have fallen;what came before was just the stupid natural existence.The task is thus not to return to a previous “higher” existence, but to transform our lives in this world. In Saint Thomas’s Gospel, we can read: “His disciples said to him:‘When will the resurrection of the dead take place, and when will the new world come?’ He said to them:‘That (resurrection) which you are awaiting has (already) come, but you do not recognize it.’” (The Fifth Gospel (Harrisburg:Trinity Press International, 1998), p. 19.) This is the key “Hegelian” point of Christianity: the resurrection of the dead is not a “real event” which will take place sometime in the future, but something that is already here—we merely have to shift our subjective position.

The problem with the Fall is thus not that it is in itself a Fall, but, precisely, that, in itself, it is already a Salvation which we **misrecognize** as a Fall. Consequently, Salvation consists not in our reversing the direction of the Fall, but in recognizing Salvation in the Fall itself.