CHAPTER 4

# Fundamentalism as Radical Patriarchalism

The goal of this work has been to investigate fundamentalism as an urban protest movement in the United States (1910–1928) and Iran (1961–1979). This was intended to test whether such a cross-cultural comparison makes sense and is useful for other societies and cultures. We have investigated the ideology, carriers, and causes of mobilization of two fundamentalist movements. The overall design makes it obvious that the generalizations herein apply to the two cases under investigation with no further claim to validity. The term fundamentalism as used here, therefore, refers to the characteristics of a "rational fundamentalism of world mastery" as they have emerged from the comparison of Protestant and Shi'ite fundamentalism as protest movements in the given time periods.

This comparison, of course, has also identified significant differences, which are by no means to be denied. Shi'ite fundamentalism was organized in hierocratic and clientelistic structures and became revolutionary; Protestant fundamentalism was democratic, individualistic, voluntarist, and reformist. The respective political structures of the United States and Iran, within which fundamentalism developed, are also essentially dissimilar. And Protestant fundamentalism evidenced no parallel to the Shi'ite charisma of suffering.

Despite these and other differences, structural characteristics of fundamentalist protest movements can be identified, which make it appear worthwhile to continue serious attempts to take fundamentalism as the research subject of a cross-cultural comparative sociology.

What features, then, do Protestant and Shi'ite fundamentalism have in common?

## FUNDAMENTALISM AS RADICAL TRADITIONALISM

Fundamentalism can be characterized generally as a radical or radicalized traditionalism. For fundamentalism represents not a continuous constituent of ascetic Protestantism or Shi'ite Islam but a position that recurs periodically over time. It may be that there is at its core a continuity of ideological content. Yet it is also true that each instance of fundamentalism bears innovative elements issuing from the specific conditions of its constitution, which any interpretation must take into account.

The point of departure is a traditionalism that is called into question by manifold processes of transformation. Traditionalism becomes subject to new pressures for legitimation, a circumstance that leads to a reformulation of the tradition that necessarily includes the introduction of novel aspects, whether in the form of accentuations, the shifting of emphases, or true innovations. Both Protestant and Shi'ite fundamentalism are instances of a traditionalism that has become reflexive and radicalized.[1]

In both cases, however, fundamentalism exceeds the compass of an intellectual disposition or ideological position and is transformed into a movement, initially into a religious movement and then into a protest movement, which in Iran became revolutionary and in the United States remained reformist. Fundamentalists revitalize existing institutions and create new ones, found publications and associations, and organize regular gatherings of the like-minded. They mobilize their sociomoral milieu and recruit new adherents. Fundamentalism is thus a mobilized traditionalism, a social phenomenon in the sense that it effects new associations; it reanimates both existing institutions and noninstitutional relationships and it prompts the creation of new ones.

A "rational fundamentalism of world mastery," as we have seen in both the United States and Iran, is primarily an urban movement. In both countries all of the significant fundamentalist institutions, the leadership associated with them, and the mass of followers are found in the city. It may be true that many of them spent their childhood in villages or provincial towns or even that they are new arrivals in the cities, yet their political-religious mobilization occurs only under an urban influence. The countryside or provinces have, if any, a marginal role in fundamentalism.

This confirms the old sociological observation that the city, rather

than, for example, peasant or nomadic societies, is always the site of a statutory ethical regulation of life conduct, represented by orthodox text-based faiths and rationalist exegesis.[2] Accordingly, fundamentalism is typically not a rural type of religiosity that is imported by migrants into the city, but one that is urban in origin. It is the means by which the traditional middle class conveys to a part of the population of urban migrants the principles of its statutory ethical, rationalized life conduct. Fundamentalism is thus a radical-traditionalist protest movement within the rapidly growing cities by means of which rural migrants are socialized into their new social environment. At the same time, it sponsors the integration of the city-dwelling traditional middle class and the new urban migrants.

I will return to the concept of radical traditionalism in conclusion, for I believe that it is necessary to introduce greater precision into the term "tradition." Tradition in this sense does not refer exclusively to the preservation of arbitrary, received conventions, ethical precepts, or customs but implies quite specifically structured social relationships and an ethical regulation of life conduct the transformation of which is protested. As I will discuss in more detail, these are derived primarily from patriarchal structural principles and culturally specific patriarchal structural forms, which fundamentalism attempts to preserve and recreate. Radical traditionalism under the influence of rapid urbanization and modernization is thus in essence a radical patriarchalism. In practice, fundamentalism adapts to some of the societal changes but creates new forms of personalistic-patriarchal relationships. In terms of this capacity for innovation it is always a neopatriarchalism.[3]

## BASIC PATTERNS OF FUNDAMENTALIST IDEOLOGY

The analysis here of two fundamentalist ideologies has identified basic similarities with regard to not only the social critique but even the salvation history, the conceptual model, and the ideal notions of order. Fundamentalist thought can be characterized primarily according to six structural criteria: its primary as well as secondary patriarchal moralism; its organic social ethic; its statutory ethical monism; its religious republicanism; its religious nativism with a claim to universal validity; and its messianism and millenarianism.

**Fundamentalism as Patriarchal Moralism** At the center of the fundamentalist critique of society is the moral decay of society, which is

regarded as the result of a turn away from divine law. Social decadence is overwhelmingly identified in phenomena displaying a lack of self-discipline and self-control. Passions, compelling dependencies, and materialist greed are revealed in prostitution and pornography, adultery and divorce, music and dancing, the consumption of alcohol and gambling, and crime and class hatred.

A large share of these phenomena refer to the role of women in society or, more precisely, to the sexual aspect of the female body. Fundamentalism is particularly occupied with the public display of the female body. In both the United States and Iran its themes are the immoral dress of women in public, the creation of a uniform type of "decent" women's clothing (veiling, national costume), the stimulation of male sexuality by women (dress, films, theater, swimming pools), and unsupervised contact between the sexes and opportunities for meeting (dance halls, swimming pools, coeducation).

Behind this critique, as I documented above, is the idea of woman as the potential seducer of man into sin. Female sexuality is an instrument of Satan, which is to be rendered harmless and subdued within a patriarchal family structure. Outside of this institution, however, it poses a danger to the stability of the worldly order and to religious salvation.

This point of view necessarily creates a division of roles between men and women, in which men find their gender-specific ("natural") tasks primarily in the public sphere and women find theirs in the home. From sexual difference is derived, however, not only a division of roles but also—admittedly much more markedly in Iran than in the United States—a distinct legal status for men and women. This, in turn, is interpreted not as discrimination but as an expression of the proper consideration of gender-specific attributes.

The fundamentalist critique of changed consumer and leisure-time behavior likewise emphasizes above all their destructive effects on the family and morality. In Shi'ite Iran as well as in Protestant America, alcohol consumption, gambling, public dancing, musical events, and attendance at the cinema and theater were regarded as the most damaging symptoms. Such activities, in their various ways, were seen as stimulating the passions, which hindered men, in particular, from adopting a moral way of life and thereby destroyed families and plunged them into poverty and misfortune. Against these modern leisure-time practices conducted under the influence of Satan, fundamentalism juxtaposes religious activities. In Protestant fundamentalism this meant, above all, respecting the sabbath and going to church and Bible readings; in Shi'ite

fundamentalism it meant attending Friday prayers, religious gatherings, and pilgrimages to holy sites.[4]

Although fundamentalism thematizes the dissolution of patriarchal structures and morality above all in reference to primary social relationships, the same basic pattern can also be found in its critique of politics and the economy. Depersonalized (and therefore morally vacuous) bureaucratic structures appeared to both Protestant and Shi'ite fundamentalists as tyrannical institutions exercising illegitimate power over the individual. Modern large-scale industrial enterprises and unions—"big business" and "big labor"—as well as the modern state bureaucracy were regarded as reprehensible from a religious-moral point of view. Fundamentalism's economic ideal is the small enterprise organized along personalistic-patriarchal lines as the cornerstone of an economy regulated by religious moralism.[5]

Fundamentalism emphasizes the individual freedom of economic activity and the individual right to property insofar as they remain within divine commandments. It regards property gained from religiously proscribed activities, such as gambling or prostitution, as illegitimate and immoral. It rejects all forms of "conspicuous consumption" and has a clear "ascetic-puritan" idea of what a person really needs and what goods are superfluous luxuries.[6]

Fundamentalism recognizes the obligation of the rich to provide for the poor. However, it rejects bureaucratically organized welfare, which construes support as a right and is not combined with any kind of social control. As a rule, charity is to be practiced either by individuals or the church, whereby religious-moral supervision is guaranteed as to whether the welfare recipient deserves it or is truly needy. For poverty is worthy of assistance only when it has been caused by a blow of fate and not when it comes from immorality, such as laziness, alcoholism, or a passion for gambling. Thus, in reference to the organization of the economy, property rights, and welfare, fundamentalism is based on a personalistic-patriarchal model with religious-moral social control.

Despite these basic correspondences between Shi'ite and Protestant fundamentalism, Shi'ism tends to put greater emphasis on the obligation of providing assistance to the poor. One reason for this concerns the traces of the Calvinist tradition still palpable in American Protestantism, which tends to identify misfortune with sin. Moreover, the lower classes in the United States often belonged to non-Protestant confessions, but in Iran they were, as a rule, adherents of the same creed.

**Fundamentalism as an Organic Social Ethic** In line with its patriarchal moral ideas, fundamentalism also rejects modern conceptions of class and class struggle, opposing them with a religious model of integration. Fundamentalism does not perceive any conflict of interest between industrialists and workers or between the poor and the rich because these relationships are regulated religiously through the protection of property, one's duty toward one's fellows, and patriarchal or patrimonial charity.

In modern industrial society, therefore, it is not social classes that stand opposed, but believers and unbelievers, people who obey the religious commandments and those who disdain them. From this there frequently derives a critical position toward both industrialists and unions; toward the rich when they live in luxury, neglect their charitable obligations, or fail to support the church or mosque adequately; and toward the poor when they raise unjustified demands.

This organic religious social ethic represents the fundamentalist countermodel to modern formulations of class and class conflict. It is the basis of the ideology of the "special path," in which only the terminology varies. In Shi'ite fundamentalism the special path is Islam as such and is distinct from both capitalism and socialism. In Protestant fundamentalism it is (religiously regulated) capitalism, which is distinguished on the one hand from socialism, anarchism, communism, and bolshevism and from bureaucratic, "social Darwinist" industrial capitalism on the other. What is meant in both cases is the defense of a petit bourgeois capitalism subject to religious-moral regulation as opposed to large-scale depersonalized enterprises, whether state run or privately operated. Nevertheless, the organic social ethic is not merely "ideology" but also corresponds to the practice of fundamentalist associations. For these associations actually transcend class boundaries and thus symbolize the possibility of integration on the basis of religious-moral values, rather than conflict on the basis of material interests.

**Fundamentalism as Statutory Ethical Monism** Both the patriarchal moralism and the organic social model of fundamentalism are based on its statutory ethical monism. There is only one morality, namely, the one revealed by God and contained in the holy texts of divine law. This morality is regarded as universal in a twofold sense. On the one hand it is valid for all people of all times and cultures, and on the other it regulates all situations and spheres of life.

Fundamentalism thus represents a total religious statutory ethic. It rejects all forms of cultural or structural pluralism, whether it be the ethics of other social groups or foreign cultures, or the particular ethics of specific social subspheres and the groups of individuals within them. Its rejection of cultural pluralism means that, though it accepts other cultures as given, it regards its own as superior and expects, over the long run at least, that missionary work will convert others to the "true religion."

The denial of structural pluralism signifies the unified whole fundamentalism sees formed by private life, the family, politics, the economy, justice, and culture through the subordination of all of them to religious law. Society is not differentiated into particular spheres with particular ethics. All people are equally subject to the law in all spheres of life and society, meaning that fundamentalism rejects any privileging of particular persons or groups through a limited exemption from particular ethical obligations.[7]

**Fundamentalism as Religious Republicanism** Fundamentalism derives its political ideals from its statutory ethical monism. Its ideal of government is republicanism, as the embodiment of and attempt to realize divine law. This republicanism, depending on the respective constitution of religious institutions, bears either hierocratic or democratic features.

In Iran the hierocratic moment dominates because of the legal scholars' monopoly on interpretation; in the United States the democratic moment prevails because of the belief in individual religious autonomy. Accordingly, Shi'ite fundamentalism bears features that are structurally antagonistic to democracy, which are legitimized rhetorically by reference to its origin in foreign cultures. But Protestant fundamentalism is also subject to a certain tension in relation to democracy, and even becomes antidemocratic when majority decisions fail to harmonize with what it regards as a divine commandment. In Protestant fundamentalism as well, the republican ideal is clearly superior to the democratic.[8]

**Fundamentalism as Religious Nativism with a Claim to Universal Validity** A further characteristic of fundamentalist thought is its nativism, which has two aspects, one regressive and one expansive. The basis for both is Manichaeism, a division of the world into two opposing forces, good and evil, light and darkness, God and Satan.

Regressively, nativism signifies the turn to one's own religious roots

and the rejection of all influence defined as foreign. Both in Shi'ite and in Protestant fundamentalism the changes perceived in worldview, culture, society, and politics are interpreted as foreign imports. In Iran the source is the United States, Israel, the Soviet Union, or Western imperialism in general; in the United States it is German "Kultur," Rome, or bolshevism. Native religious roots are interpreted as "pure," "good," and received of God; the foreign as "impure," "evil," and stemming from Satan. This correspondence is remarkable insofar as many have interpreted Islamic fundamentalism primarily as a reaction to neocolonialism of the superpowers, referring to the dominating influence of Western politics and culture and the low status of Islamic countries in international comparison.[9] This does indeed appear plausible at first glance, but, given the example of Protestant fundamentalism, it can be seen that internal processes of social transformation, such as, for example, a heavy influx of poor immigrants, suffice to summon up anxieties and bring the nativist-xenophobic pattern of thought into play.[10]

Nativist-xenophobic characteristics combine with a conspiracy theory. The foreigner comes into the society in question not by accident but intentionally, in accord with the secret plans and designs of satanic powers. In pursuit of his plans the foreigner makes use of domestic agents who contribute, either out of naïveté or malevolence, to the corruption of society.

In a fundamentalism of world mastery these regressive elements of nativism do not lead to withdrawal and renunciation of the world, although this development is also possible, but to an offensive position. The revitalization of the domestic religious-cultural roots serves as a model for the world. Fundamentalists regard themselves as the avant-garde of a radical movement that gains legitimacy through their religious-nativist model's claim to universal validity. They are expansive, building their organization worldwide through missionary activities. Thus Shi'ite fundamentalism attempted to spread the revolution to other countries, such as Lebanon and Iraq, and Protestant fundamentalism vigorously pursued its worldwide mission, especially in Latin America and Asia.

**Fundamentalism as Messianism and Millenarianism** Fundamentalism regards itself, however, not only as the carrier of divine law on earth but also as the herald of the approaching millennium and vanguard of the coming messiah or, in the Shi'ite case, Imam Mahdi. One essential peculiarity of Shi'ite as well as parts of Baptist fundamentalism is its

mobilization of people accustomed to thinking primarily in quietistic-messianic, profoundly apolitical categories. The premillenarians' focus on catastrophe and their millenarian-messianic anticipation of salvation, however, infuse their political action with a high degree of willingness to suffer. The politicization of premillenarianism necessitates a reinterpretation of millenarian expectations, at least in the sense that the believers have to give up their passive anticipation in order to contribute personally to the return of the messiah or imam and the dawning of the millennium. Neither in Baptist nor in Shi'ite fundamentalism did this reinterpretation proceed altogether consciously or even coherently.[11]

Summarizing fundamentalist ideology once again, we find relationships between the central characteristics of the social critique, the ideas of religious salvation, and the intellectual projections of the social order. The core of the social critique is the decay of morality in the family and society, in the economy and politics, in leisure-time and consumer behavior. The salvational ideas polarize the world into two antagonistic camps, excluding the carriers of social and cultural change from the community of the pious and, above all, from true membership in the nation. Fundamentalism's ideal order is a religious republicanism, the realization of divine law on earth, and the spread of this model throughout the world.

## BASIC PATTERNS OF THE CARRIERS OF FUNDAMENTALISM

Despite all the social structural differences between the United States and Iran, surprising parallels exist between their carriers of fundamentalism, in particular the sociomoral integration of individuals in a milieu instead of socioeconomic integration into a class.

**Fundamentalism as a Mobilized Sociomoral Milieu** The analysis of the composition of the carriers of both Protestant and Shi'ite fundamentalism has shown that they cannot be adequately characterized either objectively or subjectively by the conception of "class." Adherents came from the lower, middle, and upper classes, from among the unemployed, domestic personnel, blue-collar and white-collar workers, students, artisans and craftsmen, small and large merchants, and professionals. The composition of the adherents also corresponds to their self-perception, which was based not on economic interests but on common values and ideal ways of life. In terms of ideology and social composition, fundamen-

talist associations offer a countermodel to an industrial class society dramatizing material interest conflicts.

Accordingly, segments of various classes, strata, and groups are found within the fundamentalist milieu that are integrated on the basis of common sociomoral ideas. Four groups can be roughly distinguished: the clergy; the traditional middle class; urban migrants; and the "border crossers" between the traditionalist and the modern milieus. Each of these social groupings is further differentiated internally and characterized by specific experiences. In the following, I once again summarize these groups and their experiences of urbanization that are decisive for their mobilization as part of a fundamentalist movement.

**The Clergy** The clergy, in both Protestant and Shi'ite fundamentalism, have the outstanding and leading roles as the organizers and intellectuals of the movement. A common characteristic in both cases is that the religious practitioners, rather than the leading theologians of the universities or *madrasas,* dominate the movement both in influence and because of their much greater numbers. In Iran the lower clergy, preachers, and theology students are the leaders; in the United States, the pastors, evangelists, and lay preachers. The inclusion of persons ranking high in the hierocracy, like Khomeini, or of respected theologians, like J. Gresham Machen (who, in many respects, is better characterized as conservative than as fundamentalist), is more the exception than the rule in both Shi'ite and Protestant fundamentalism.[12]

Fundamentalist intellectuals are strongly stamped by their education in traditional religious ideals, as well as by their practice-oriented mediation and application of these ideals. The ideology of fundamentalism is not the product of theological faculties within the modern universities but essentially represents the accumulated intellectual fruits, in politically radicalized form, of traditional educational institutions, the confessional colleges, Bible schools, and *madrasas.* From these places it is spread by religious practitioners to its predominantly urban followers.

Another common characteristic is the rural heritage of a large share of the fundamentalist clerics. Many of them come originally from the countryside or small towns. Similarly, a considerable portion of *madrasa* and Bible college students come from a rural milieu. Nevertheless, with its rigorous adherence to statutory thought, with its literalist rationalism and its statutory ethical regulation of life conduct, fundamentalism represents a typically urban form of religiosity. Although charismatic fundamentalism no doubt preserves the magical and ecstatic elements of rural

religiosity in the city, rational fundamentalism represents an instance of socialization of urban migrants into their new environment.

Precisely among people with a rural or small-town heritage, the selection of a career in religion is particularly bound up with expectations of upward social mobility. These expectations are realized in various degrees. Religious practitioners have indeed attained their professional goals but have done so in a phase of social transformation in which their functions are relatively limited and their social prestige on a sharp downturn while that of other groups is markedly on the rise. For reasons of their education, ultimate values, and life conduct ideals, they are not willing to adapt or, as the case may be, not capable of adapting to a different clientele. They remain captives of the traditionalist milieu. Instead of the social betterment they had hoped for, they experience an enormous loss in prestige.

Students in the religious educational institutions, who are likewise predominantly practice oriented, are confronted with a fundamental change in educational values. Upward social mobility is now possible only through the acquisition of educational credentials in the secular sector. Few of them, however, have either the educational or financial resources requisite to gaining advanced degrees in the secular educational sector. Thus they find that the channels of upward mobility are closed off, the responsibility for which lies with the state or the church.

**Urban Migrants** Urban migrants, in both Shi'ite and Protestant fundamentalism, are significant both in the leadership and among adherents. It is, to be sure, necessary to distinguish between members of the middle and lower-middle classes and the lower class; urban migrants do not all belong to the lower class. In both Iran and the United States parts of them belong to the traditional middle classes (merchants, artisans, professionals) and are employees in administration and industrial operations. Taken together, they make up an important and active component of fundamentalism. Like a career in religion, migration to the city is also bound up with hopes for upward social mobility, subject to various degrees of realization. Above all, the need to associate with others is particularly strong in foreign surroundings. Urban migrants tend either to found their own new (religious) associations or to join existing ones.

Those migrants in particular who are drawn to the big city because of their ambitions ("pull effect") have as their ideal an independent economic existence. Consequently, their positive reference group is the city-

dwelling "middle class" of independent entrepreneurs and professionals. And this is the group from which they get oriented religiously, socially, and economically. This established middle class, however, has meanwhile lost prestige and significance and has been made economically insecure by the increase in modern, large-scale merchandising, warehouses, or supermarkets. Urban migrants from the middle class are plunged into this crisis, even if they are thoroughly successful in economic terms. The loss of prestige attached to the social location toward which they are striving or that of their positive reference group affects them as well and represents one of their critical experiences.

Urban migrants from the lower class who are seeking to escape bad living conditions in the countryside ("push effect") are put in an economically precarious position, which does not necessarily mean that they experience this as a worsening of their situation. Frequently faced with unemployment, they manage to get by with occasional jobs or as street vendors or peddlers. Women commonly work as domestic help. Their children are particularly subject to the temptations of criminality or prostitution. For this class, fundamentalism awakens the hope of rising from their slum or shanty milieu by their own efforts.

Protestant and Shi'ite fundamentalism are different in their integration of lower-class urban migrants. In Iran such persons made up a relatively inactive but still numerically significant part of the fundamentalist camp; in the rational fundamentalism of the United States they tended to be subordinate, turning in greater numbers to charismatic groups. There are a number of reasons for this difference.

The clergy's monopolization of sacred knowledge in Shi'ite Iran favored their control over all population groups and classes. The voluntarist and pluralistic organization of religion in the United States, however, tended more to encourage the formation of separate religious subcultures. In addition, the urban lower class in Iran, in comparison with that in the United States, was much more culturally and religiously homogeneous. Moreover, the notion common in ascetic Protestantism that poverty is "guilt," that is, the consequence of sin and immorality, may have encouraged a segregation of the lower classes; the obligation to support those in need in the form of the poor tax (*zakat*), which is deeply anchored in Islam in general, as well as the patrimonial political tradition might have favored in Iran an integration of the urban lower class on a clientelist basis.

The most important difference, however, is presumably the integration of rational and charismatic elements in the practice of Shi'ism as

opposed to their separation in Protestantism. In Shi'ite Islam, rational, ritualistic, charismatic, ecstatic, and magical elements are woven together in religious practice. Religious legal judgments coexist with pilgrimages to saints' graves, self-flagellation in the Ashura processions, and magical belief in miracles. The traditional "heterodox" popular religion is integrated into "orthodoxy" and thus controlled by the hierocracy. In pluralist Protestantism in the United States, in contrast, differences in religious style and theological issues of dogma lead to institutional differentiation. Manifest in less institutionalized Sunni Islam as well is this tendency toward differentiation into a rational orthodoxy of the established urban middle classes and a charismatic heterodoxy among urban lower classes and the rural population.[13]

But this difference in the social composition of Shi'ite and Protestant fundamentalism refers only to the numerical representation of those categorized as lower-class urban migrants. Protestant fundamentalism also attempted to reach these people but required them to conform to its religious style. A larger share of them therefore were more strongly attracted by charismatic sects with ecstatic practices. Nevertheless, such people are also represented in rational fundamentalism emphasizing the ethical regulation of life conduct. It is true in general, however, that these lower classes are difficult to mobilize politically. The economic struggle for survival is their main priority, and they are most likely to be found in political action at bread riots or defending their usually illegally constructed settlements.

**The Traditional Middle Class** Both in Shi'ite and Protestant fundamentalism the traditional urban middle class has a central role. In Iran the bazaar was the financial backbone of the Shi'ite clergy and the fundamentalist movement. And in the United States a significant portion of the movement's adherents were merchants, artisans, small traders, and professionals.

Moreover, "middle-class" ideals clearly predominate in fundamentalism, in reference to both values and the "rational" religious style. Even if charismatic, magical, and ecstatic elements were incorporated in Shi'ite Islam, their presence in fact represented a compromise with popular religious traditions and needs, which the clergy had always regarded as suspect but tolerated for reasons of power. Rational exegesis and rational discourse, legalistic ethics and a doctrine of virtue that emphasizes sobriety, modesty, and orderliness, characterize the practical orientation of the dominant forces within fundamentalism.

The traditionalist middle classes are made up above all of independent businesspeople, merchants, and artisans. The family business, not the large-scale enterprise, is typical, with a few employees if necessary. This settled urban grouping suffers a considerable loss of prestige and is reduced, at least subjectively, to precarious economic conditions. The nationalization and internationalization of the market forces the established middle class to adapt to the new competitive situation. But even if they continue to earn respectably during the growth phase associated with the change, the profits of newly ascending entrepreneurs and speculators are many times higher. Thus even their economic success loses its sheen in relation to that of others. Moreover, the changes inspire anxieties over their long-term prospects.

At the same time, their self-concept as the "healthy middle," as the representatives of a pious, morally exemplary way of life, is threatened.[14] New lifestyles spread through society, tempting even their own children. The criteria of moral and immoral, of good and evil, become confused. Still exemplary just a few years earlier, they are now regarded as unmodern and backward. The basic experiences of the traditional middle class are thus economic insecurity and an enormous loss in cultural prestige.

**"Border Crossers" between the Milieus** As "border crossers" I have designated the younger generation from the traditionalist milieu who have received a (secular) university or college education. They come either from the traditional, settled urban middle class or from a small-town or rural-provincial milieu. The attainment of modern educational credentials, as always, is bound up with an expectation of considerable social betterment. In fact, however, the striving for upward mobility (especially, of course, in Iran) is either disappointing or denied altogether. Their values put them more in the traditional milieu, but their aspirations and their professional activities, for example as subordinate employees in the public or private sector, make them part of the modern milieu.

**The "Uprooted"** In the interpretation of the Iranian revolution of 1979, as well as of other radical-right movements, the "dislocated" or the "uprooted" are often named the most important carriers.[15] This interpretation appears to me problematic for several reasons. First, it largely ignores the role of the traditional middle class. Even if it is no longer possible to maintain the interpretation of right radicalism as a

movement of the "radical middle," from my point of view it is an overreaction to disregard this component of the carriers altogether.[16] In Shi'ite as well as Protestant fundamentalism the traditional middle class of merchants, artisans, and independent professionals are an important element.

Much also depends on what is meant by "dislocation." Does it mean a loss of social relationships because of a change of locale—as a rule, from small-town provincial or rural milieus to the big city? Or is the meaning more one of a change in social position? Or does it refer above all to an orientation crisis? For the first version it is possible to find evidence in the biographies of many representatives of fundamentalism. The argument loses some of its persuasive force, however, when one considers the demographic development of cities like Tehran or Chicago or the overall social data in the time periods relevant to the respective cases. Thus, 13.1 percent of the population in Iran in 1966 and 23.2 percent in 1976 were not born in the place where they were living at the time the data were collected.[17] Of these "dislocated" masses obviously only a fraction found their way into the fundamentalist camp. Fundamentalism did not take hold at all among industrial workers, and it scarcely mobilized the lower class.

Nor is it possible to delimit the carriers of fundamentalism more precisely by understanding "uprootedness" primarily as a dramatic change in social position. During rapid urbanization, the entire social structure changes so profoundly that, after a few years, even those who have changed neither location nor profession come to embody a different social status than they did previously, measured according to income, education, political influence, or the public prestige attached to their way of life. Only when "uprootedness" is conceived as the coincidence of "relative deprivation"—such as the experience or fear of downward social mobility or disappointed hopes of social betterment—and a profound crisis of orientation or meaning is it possible to arrive at a more precise understanding of the carriers of fundamentalism.[18]

## BASIC PATTERNS OF THE CAUSES OF MOBILIZATION

Having named the most important characteristics of the ideology and carriers of fundamentalism in comparative perspective, I turn now in conclusion to the causes of mobilization. Both in Iran and in the United States three processes above all contributed to the transformation of traditionalism into fundamentalism: rapid urbanization and the socio-

cultural pluralization associated with it; the dramatic processes of transformation in the social structure, especially the rise of a new economic elite and a new middle class; and the centralization and bureaucratization of the political institutions.

The transformative process attending rapid urbanization most significant for the mobilization of fundamentalism lies in the cultural sphere. It, too, can be distinguished according to three aspects: sociocultural differentiation of the urban population into modern and traditionalist milieus; the role of the state in the conflict between the two milieus; and the symptoms of dissolution within the traditionalist milieu brought about by the penetration of modern tendencies.

**Sociocultural Differentiation in Urbanization** Among the most significant causes of mobilization is the public loss of validity and prestige of traditional values and life conduct ideals, as is manifest in the sociocultural differentiation inside cities. This process took place in different but comparable ways in the United States and Iran.

Along with urbanization came the decline of the inner cities and the formation of slums on the one hand and of new, modern business centers, residential districts, and suburbs on the other. Considerable numbers of the newly arriving lower class in the cities, the upper middle and upper classes leaving it, and the expanding new middle class all break with traditional values, ways of behaving, and consumer and leisure-time habits.

Thus, in the process of rapid urbanization the traditionalist values and behavior patterns that had been respected, if not practiced by all as a standard, become the moral attitude of a partial culture. The sociocultural differentiation that leads to the formation of a modern competitive milieu signifies to the traditionalist milieu the loss of its widely accepted monopoly of a religiously and culturally exemplary way of life. In this loss of public prestige and respect lies an important component contributing to the mobilization of the entire fundamentalist camp as a protest movement.

**The Withdrawal of Privileges by the State** The devaluation of traditionalist ideals is intensified by changing attitudes on the part of governments, legislative bodies, and parties. In the United States, political parties had long provided an institutional anchor for the exemplary status of traditionalist moral attitudes. In Iran following the period from the initiation of drastic measures by Reza Pahlavi to his abdication

and after the anti-Mosaddeq putsch in 1953, a kind of truce ensued between Mohammed Reza Shah and the Shi'ite clerical elite. But the stance of the administrations changed after the death of the supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Borujerdi, and in the course of the "White Revolution." Now the shah undertook a conscious policy of humiliating the religious class.

In the United States the change in governmental support was less dramatic and not as onesided. Yet there as well administrations on the state and federal levels increasingly withdrew the privileged cultural status previously enjoyed by the traditionalist milieu. Thus, for example, they no longer enforced Sabbath restrictions, in some states prohibited Bible readings in the public schools, and allowed the teaching of evolutionary theory. In contrast to Iran the traditionalist camp in the United States also won partial victories, such as the passage of Prohibition legislation and a ban on the teaching of evolutionary theory in the public schools of some states.

Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the governments in the United States and Iran considerably limited or even eliminated altogether the cultural privileges previously extended to traditionalist culture and life conduct. Thus, along with the public devaluation of the traditionalist milieu came its official degradation to the status of a subculture of equal or even inferior rights and prestige. This loss of its privileged status represents the second component in the process of cultural differentiation that leads to the mobilization of fundamentalism.[19]

**The Problem of Cultural Reproduction and Generational Conflict**

With the loss of its sociomoral monopoly, the value of traditionalism is also no longer self-evident. From now on it must reassert its legitimacy and organize to hold its ground. Yet the traditionalist milieu's chances to reproduce itself as one subculture among others are decreased and endangered by the multitude of transformative processes. Three aspects of the transformation are particularly prominent: changes in the educational system; the influence of the media of mass communication; and the mere existence of alternative subcultures.

In Iran as well as the United States, changes in the educational system had a central role. The modern milieu gained increasing influence over curricula and the control of educational institutions. Children from the traditionalist milieu were confronted with a body of thought that alienated them from their original milieu. In addition, many of them received a much better education than the generation of their parents. All of this

contributed to alienation between the generations, to a weakening of parental authority, and to the threat to the cultural reproduction of the traditionalist milieu.

Alongside these difficulties, which are grounded in the unreliability or active hostility of the central institutions of socialization, the cultural reproduction of the traditionalist milieu is further complicated by general changes in sociomoral attitudes and in consumer and leisure-time habits. Just the circumstance that a large part of society no longer abides by traditional norms and orients its life conduct according to other values turns the raising of children in a pious traditionalist spirit, with the ascetic demands it entails, into an exceedingly difficult task, above all, of course, in the cities.

Modern consumer and leisure-time opportunities exert a powerful attraction on the youth of the traditionalist milieu. For they offer a loosening of self-restraint and emancipation from personalistic-patriarchal authority structures, symbolizing this emancipation and the upward social mobility frequently associated with it.

The reproduction of the traditionalist milieu confronts further difficulties in the spread of the media of mass communication, which are essentially dominated by the modern milieu and are influential as agents of the change in values. Alongside magazines, radio, television, and the cinema, advertising in particular propagates new definitions of social roles, uses female sexuality to stimulate consumption, and revolutionizes leisure-time and consumer behavior.

The effects of modernism, the problem of cultural reproduction, and the accompanying conflict between the generations are especially significant in the mobilization of fundamentalism. This is manifest not only in fundamentalism's critique of society but also in its attempts to maintain institutional stability. Fundamentalism distinguishes itself sharply from its environment both ideologically and socially, and establishes the infrastructure requisite to its cultural reproduction. This radicalization of traditionalism proves compulsory. To the extent that one does not want to give up one's place in society and withdraw from the world, it is not possible, given the change in the environment, to remain traditionalist without becoming fundamentalist.

**Disappointed and Threatened Expectations of Upward Social Mobility** A further component of fundamentalist mobilization is thwarted upward social mobility. This applies above all to the students in traditional religious educational institutions and to parts of the new middle

class. To a large number of students in the *madrasas* and Bible schools the career of a legal scholar or mullah, pastor or evangelist, signifies upward mobility. With the expansion of the modern educational sector and the change in curricula, social advancement is not easily attained by way of the traditionalist religious educational institutions.

Financially, career prospects are extremely modest. In Iran the secularization of education and jurisprudence eliminated a number of income possibilities. In the United States, fundamentalist clerics belonged among the most poorly paid professionals in their field. In regard to power and influence as well as social prestige the attractiveness of the clerical profession increasingly declines, especially once the exemplary function of religious education has shifted to secular education.

In both Iran and the United States, moreover, endeavors were under way to repeal the autonomy of the religious educational system and recast it academically in the context of the modern universities. A career in the clergy thus became impossible for the students in the *madrasas* and Bible schools, who lacked the formal prerequisites and, in part, the financial means for a university education. All of these factors make it understandable that the students and staff of the nonacademic (in a modern sense) religious educational institutions were among the most fiercely mobilized groups in the fundamentalist camp.

Yet the social expectations of the "border crossers," that is, students and members of the new middle class, were frequently disappointed as well. These disappointments could be economic or social, for example, failure in entering a desired profession or low wages. Frequently, however, the sensibilities of these "border crossers" were offended by the "modern world," by the anonymity of their working or educational conditions, or by the lack of social contact and communication. Because of their education and professional ambitions they were alienated from their original milieu but insufficiently integrated into the modern milieu, left isolated by their different sociomoral values. "Border crossers" are particularly receptive to associations that overcome their alienation and to ideologies that integrate modern and traditionalist elements, thus helping them to interpret and overcome their circumstances.

**The Loss of Political Influence** The loss of direct access to political power in the mobilization of the traditionalist camp is less a factor than the cultural issues. For fundamentalism, political power serves above all to maintain a moral order in which its economic interests are embedded. As long as this order remains undisturbed, there is little occasion for

direct political engagement. And even when this order is first threatened, the tendency is not to seek political office but to appeal to the government to remedy the situation. Fundamentalist protest is thus directed not so much against an exclusion from political office as it is against the dwindling of its influence over those in power.

In Iran the political influence of the traditionalist milieu was always limited. Only the top rungs of the hierocracy, to which the bazaar or clergy could bring their grievances for a hearing, were part of the political elite. Moreover, the *mujtahids* often came from influential large landholding or merchant families. The "White Revolution," however, introduced a radical change into the social composition of the political elite. For one thing, the large landholders were considerably stripped of their power and replaced by modern entrepreneurs and Western-trained civil servants at the peaks of state administration. Secondly, the shah used the transition period following Borujerdi's death to push the clergy out of politics. Their legal opinions were ignored and their institutions opposed. With that change the power of the clergy and the traditionalist milieu was restricted to closings of the bazaar and protest demonstrations. This closing of the vertical channels of interest articulation and mediation led necessarily to a radicalization of the protest.

It is also possible to identify a considerable loss in influence on the part of the traditionalist camp in the United States. On the one hand, organized interest groups increasingly translated their economic weight into political power. On the other, non-Protestant immigrants came increasingly to dominate party apparatuses, especially in the big cities. This loss of political power by the established middle class, as well as the traditionalist camp in general, found expression in their partial critique of democracy, and even in antidemocratic sentiment, which was frequently directed against Catholics, modern industrialists, and unions.

**Economic Marginalization** In contrast with cultural and sociomoral issues, economic concerns were marginal in the ideology of fundamentalism. In the periods under investigation in both Iran and the United States no economic crisis can be identified in which the fundamentalist camp suffered to any particular extent. And, although the nationalization and internationalization of the market subjected both economies to dramatic changes, fundamentalists expressed hardly any direct fear of decline or dispossession. Nevertheless, a reflection of these processes of economic transformation is to be found in the fundamentalist protest against economic immorality and political repression and injustice.

In the United States, protest was directed against big industrialists, the nouveau riche, war profiteers, speculators, and occasionally, organized labor. In Iran fundamentalism protested against state support of foreign enterprises, banks, and supermarkets (when the bazaar was suffering new impediments); expanding state enterprises (which competed with the bazaar); and the ostentation and extravagance of the upper class and the court. Fundamentalism's primary target, however, was the decline in economic morality, manifest in the money that was being made off of immorality. Even if fears of economic marginalization contributed to mobilization, fundamentalists formulated them as sociomoral issues. Not material interest but moral implications of changes in the economic structure and economic ethics were in the foreground of fundamentalist mobilization.

## FUNDAMENTALISM AS RADICAL PATRIARCHALISM

The comparisons undertaken here between Protestant fundamentalism in the United States in 1910–1928 and Shi'ite fundamentalism in Iran in 1961–1979 have shown that the two protest movements manifest clear parallels in ideology, carriers, and causes of mobilization despite all the admitted differences in the political and economic systems of the respective countries and in their religious-cultural traditions. Fundamentalism thus proves to be an independent type of social movement, which cannot be reduced to other types, such as fascism or populism, that are already familiar in the literature. Religion is not an arbitrary embellishment that can be easily dispensed with, but has an independent role, evident in the dramatization of the social critique in terms of a salvation history, in the universalistic features of the ideology, in the symbolism and rhythm of protests, and in the selection of its leadership.[20]

The theoretical approaches discussed at the outset, which interpret fundamentalism, for example, as a status movement, as "antimodernism," or as nativism, appropriately illuminate major aspects of the fundamentalist protest movement. Nevertheless, the interpretations narrow the perspective to one important characteristic, isolating the causes of mobilization or elements of the ideology arbitrarily, without their primacy having been systematically derived or justified. Other aspects of fundamentalism by no means of secondary significance are simply underestimated.

But, how can one avoid the shortcomings of eclectic interpretations? A satisfying explanation should accomplish two things. First, it should

work out the basic patterns of the different traits of fundamentalism (ideology, constituency, and factors of mobilization). Second, it should integrate all relevant features into a coherent whole in which the social critique is adequately taken into account.

In our case, such a systematic coherence can be achieved, in my judgment, only when the conflict between fundamentalism and modernism is understood as a confrontation over principles of social organization and ideals of life conduct. Fundamentalism is not a "single-issue" movement, and it formulates its critique not of arbitrary phenomena but of quite specific social structural principles. Its idea of a legitimate order is bound up with patriarchal structural principles and values, and it raises its protest against their erosion and transformation into depersonalized structural principles.[21] Fundamentalism is a reaction to a transformation of epochal proportions of the foundations of interpersonal relationships in all social spheres. It is this aspect that I will bring to the fore of my concluding interpretation of fundamentalism, which simultaneously represents a systematic ordering of the various structural characteristics.

**Mobilization: The Experience of Anomie as a Problem of Theodicy**

Essentially, the transformation of traditionalism into fundamentalism is the result of different experiences of anomie: as a collapse of social order, that is, as chaos; as social injustice, in that the traditionalist milieu is intentionally subjected to disadvantageous conditions; as loss of legitimacy on the part of the state because of its inability to guarantee order and justice; and as the infiltration of foreign influences into state and society.

Anomie derives, first, from collapse of the general validity of received religious ideas of order. "Evil" and "immorality" exist in all times. Yet suddenly the meaning of these dissolves. Norms lose their obligatory quality and are no longer observed; transgresssions are no longer condemned, prosecuted, and penalized. Both social and state controls fail. In this sense, anomie is an orientation crisis, the experience of living in a chaotic and inverted world.

This aspect of anomie is related to the conception of cultural pluralism elaborated in modernization theory but remains distinct from it. For the problem of cultural pluralism is obviously not exhausted by reference to the formation of a multiplicity of lifestyles and subcultures, toward which the state behaves neutrally. For one thing, the state by no means behaves "neutrally" but withdraws privileges. For another, there

yet remains an "anomic remnant" of criminality, prostitution, abuse and neglect of children, socioeconomic deterioration of cities, and mass poverty. Fundamentalism's critique of society is directed not the least against these phenomena, the cause of which it declares to be the turn away from faith and thus the direct responsibility of the "modernist milieu."

The second source of anomie is the subjection of the traditionalist camp to disadvantages by virtue of the willingness of others to violate hitherto established rules. The entirety of experiences of deprivation and of fears of social decline and disappointed hopes in upward social mobility in the context of the rapid rise of other social groups is explained as the fruit of unbelief and immorality. Those who continue to observe the customary rules legitimized by religious tradition will be disadvantaged compared with those who disdain them.

This aspect of anomie corresponds to modernization theory's concept of structural pluralism, that is, the formation of religiously disassociated partial ethics in the economic, political, legal, and cultural system. Furthermore, it corresponds to the conception of "relative deprivation." Yet, here as well, there remains an "anomic remnant" of corruption, structural discrimination, speculation, unregulated class conflict, exploitation, and impoverishment, that is, of phenomena again featured in the fundamentalist critique of society. Above all, the critique identifies a new type of elite that disregards religious morality both in the acquisition and expenditure of its wealth. With that, prosperity loses its religious legitimation.

Third, anomie results from a loss of the state's legitimacy. State institutions contribute both to the erosion of ideas of order and to the disadvantaging of the traditionalist camp, or, at least, prove themselves too weak to effectively counter these developments.

A fourth source of anomie is the increased influence of "foreigners" in the political, economic, and cultural sphere. "Foreigners" either enter the country themselves as advisers (Iran) or immigrants (United States), or they make use of indigenous accomplices. They import their culture and economic enterprises and increasingly take over political power. In extreme cases the state is even regarded as the instrument of such foreign powers, which have infiltrated it.

The anomie resulting from these four conditions contributes to the mobilization and radicalization of the traditionalist camp and to its transformation into a fundamentalist movement. An important prerequisite to this process, however, is a reinterpretation of the quietistic-messianic

conception of the theodicy problem into a political-activist one. Anomie necessarily leads to a reconsideration of the religious premises of God's justice as well as the meaning of the current crisis and the tasks of the "pious" in response. It is not only true that people want their good fortune to be legitimate; the converse is also true: they want their misfortune to be illegitimate. And if a just settlement is not possible on earth, then it will at least be expected in the beyond.

The traditionalist camp finds itself in need of an explanation for why it is that the godless enjoy ever better fortune and the pious ever worse. The godless appear to hold power, to be luxuriating in wealth and abundance, while the pious are largely excluded from power, are humiliated and persecuted. Traditionalism tends to accept this situation passively, waiting for the messiah and the millennium, but fundamentalism politicizes the theodicy problem. Messianic expectations do not relieve believers of their duty to struggle against satanic powers. One must check the spread of evil, or, in other words, emulate Imam Hussein and battle to establish a just order. Only in this reinterpretation of the theodicy problem from a quietistic waiting for the messiah and millennium into an active struggle for the just order and against satanic powers does fundamentalism take form.

**Legitimation: Religious Nativism as a Strategy of Exclusion** Anomie and the theodicy problem represent the foundations of the delegitimation of the government and the modernist milieu. Nativism, and the xenophobia and conspiracy consciousness associated with it, represents the basis of self-legitimation. Thus does fundamentalism justify its Manichaean dualism, which divides the world and the nation into representatives of the divine order and instruments of Satan. It claims exclusive authenticity for itself, a monopoly on the historical transmission and embodiment of divine law and the religious-national identity. Opponents are identified as the tools of Satan or as agents of the "foreigner" and excluded, regarded as wanting to destroy the nation (or, as the case may be, the transnational religious community) and robbing it of its religious-cultural heritage.

Although foreign or alien powers are represented here as the carriers of "evil," this argument also serves essentially to discredit domestic enemies and exclude them from the community of solidarity. As "agents" of foreigners they are stamped as traitors to their own nation or faith. What is interesting here is that this argument is not limited to Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, where, of course, it is correct to speak

of the intervention of foreign powers, but appears to represent a universal characteristic of the fundamentalist mentality and rhetorical strategy. The most important function of nativism as a cognitive figuration thus lies in its monopolization of the claim to a divine mission and an authentic religious order, and thus to the timeless foundation of religious-national identity.

**Dramatization: Millenarianism and Messianism** Fundamentalist millenarianism and messianism lend this Manichaean image of the world the possibility of an additional dramatization. The conflict between modernists and fundamentalists is embedded in the universal drama of the struggle between God and Satan, the powers of light and darkness. The conflict thus far surpasses its contemporary historical significance. It is part of an overall salvation history directed toward the messiah's establishment of the millennium and thus of the kingdom of God on earth. Yet, in distinction to traditionalist quietism, which perseveres in passivity, awaiting the messiah's intervention, fundamentalism takes an active part in the struggle against satanic powers.

Fundamentalism transforms millenarianism into an ideological justification and motivation for political action. It offers a guarantee of victory over the long run, despite current defeats, and it offers the prospect of special compensation for injustice suffered and for the courage to make sacrifices. The pious will be rewarded and the unbelievers held in judgment, just as would be expected from the logic of a statutory ethics. But counted among the pious are not so much the religious quietists as the fundamentalist activists. It is this staging of the conflict between traditionalism and modernism as a universal eschatological drama, in which activism and a willingness to sacrifice are required, that transforms the quietistic or world-fleeing tendencies of traditionalism into a fundamentalist protest movement.

**Countermodel: The Legitimate Order** To counter the prevailing anomie, fundamentalism offers *nomos*, the eternally valid order of divine salvation, but now no longer as a distant historical ideal but as an immediate political program. The ideal order of the past in fundamentalist symbolism and rhetoric is primarily the original community of the founders of the respective religions, with the addition, in the American case, of the pilgrims and founding fathers. The ideal order in the future is the theocratic republic, the realization of divine law.

A common central characteristic is the restoration of the universal

validity of traditional patriarchal social relationships and morals in the family, in consumer and leisure-time behavior, in politics, the economy, law, and culture. A religious conception of integration is juxtaposed against class conflict, ethical monism against ethical pluralism, and the universal claim to validity of the theocratic-patriarchal model against the expansion of "foreigners," injustice, and immorality.

The concrete institutional forms taken respectively by Shi'ite fundamentalism in Iran and Protestant fundamentalism in the United States are, naturally, distinct for reasons of evolved political structures. An essential difference between Iranian Shi'ite and American Protestant fundamentalism also lies in the methods selected to pursue their goals. For various reasons Protestant fundamentalism proceeds along the course of democratic reformism. It assumes that the American constitution provides for a Christian republic in its sense. Moreover, it is by no means hostile in principle to the political culture and democratic process in the United States, by which it has achieved some, if partial, reforms.

Shi'ite fundamentalism, in contrast, became revolutionary. First, the ruling order never possessed a high degree of religious legitimation, for the Iranian monarchy was never regarded as having been in agreement with the principles of the original community. Second, the government progressively delegitimized itself because it never respected the constitution of 1906–1907, which was officially in force until 1979 and provided for a kind of "Islamic supreme court." When, finally, the political system began to react to protest exclusively by intensifying repression, the only choice remaining was between traditionalist quietism and radical activism. That the latter ultimately ended in a successful revolution probably came as a surprise even to the bulk of the fundamentalist camp.

**"Radical Traditionalism" as "Radical Patriarchalism"** At the beginning of this study I referred to Said Arjomand's concept of "revolutionary traditionalism," proposing the modification "radical traditionalism" for present purposes. It is now time to elaborate this concept further. Traditionalism, of course, in essence refers not only to the handing down of arbitrary ethical precepts and customs but also to ideas about the principles and forms of legitimate social relationships.[22] Thus it is possible to specify more precisely those concepts of an ideal and just, that is, religiously legitimate, social order.

In judging the fundamentalist protests of the 1920s in the United States and of the 1970s in Iran, two themes are dominant: the loss of religious identity, that is, of the Protestant character of the United States

and the Shi'ite character of Iran; and—closely connected—general moral decay. Fundamentalist thinking is dominated, therefore, not by market or power opportunities on the part of economic or political interests but by sociomoral questions concerning the proper conduct of life and a just order. Even more prominent in the foreground than the moral dimension of politics and economics is the relationship between the sexes and thus the structure of the family.

If we assume that sociomoral questions do not always substitute for other "genuine" motivations or that their meaning does not always derive from their symbolic representation of other, "deeper" conflicts but that they are independent mobilizing factors, it becomes reasonable to interpret fundamentalism primarily as a protest against the assault on patriarchal structural principles in the family, economy, and politics brought on by official policy, public disdain, and general moral erosion.[23] If, following Max Weber, the tendency toward rationalization and depersonalization of social relationships in all social spheres is the central characteristic of Western modernity, fundamentalism can in that sense be termed "antimodern." Fundamentalism reacts to epochal structural and value transformations in central social institutions.

The erosion of patriarchal norms and structures takes place primarily in the sphere of the family and sexual morality. The progressive repeal of gender-specific distinctions in legal status and the diminishing need for a gender-based division of labor weakens paternal authority over women. This process also occurs through the public school system, which offers relatively large segments of the young the opportunity to acquire a higher educational status than their parents and exposes them to a changed and, as a rule, strongly secularized body of knowledge. Moreover, transformative processes in professional mobility, in opportunities for leisure-time and consumer activities, and in sexual morality make supervision of children more difficult. The younger generation's willingness to submit to paternal authority and family solidarity is diminished in favor of individual autonomy and the independent identification of goals.[24]

In the economic sphere a marginalization of patriarchally organized enterprises takes place. With the expansion of large-scale operations the patriarchal relationship between entrepreneur and worker is increasingly replaced by a depersonalized and codified relationship between capital and labor. The family operation with only a few employees is faced, first, with competition from large businesses and, second, with a gradual erosion of the nearly unlimited decision-making power of the

entrepreneur as "master of the house."[25] Because of the newly arisen competitive environment, the defense of patriarchal economic structures by traditional businesspeople acquires the implicit character of a defense of market opportunities, even if the latter is of secondary significance and is formulated as a moral, rather than an economic, problem.

In politics, bureaucracies become increasingly powerful. Thus, for example, in the social sphere, patriarchal charity, coupled with social control, is supplanted by bureaucratically organized welfare. And in the educational system the state bureaucracy interferes in the organization and curricula of the schools. Even in areas where previously there had been no marked local autonomy, the centralizing and bureaucratizing tendencies of the modern state intensify the degree of control and intervention.

Fundamentalism protests first of all against this revolutionizing of patriarchal structural principles, which are stripped of all historical relativity by reference to divine law and the ideal order of the original community. The pluralization of culture and lifestyle, the depersonalization and codification of social relationships, the bureaucratization of politics and economics, and the removal of social phenomena from traditional moral regulation all represent a direct assault on fundamentalism's conceptions of the ideal ordering of collective social life. At the same time, fundamentalism distinguishes itself from illegitimate forms of patriarchalism. Thus, for example, Protestant fundamentalism in the United States opposed the Mormons' practice of polygamy and the political clientelism of Catholic and Jewish immigrants.

Moreover, fundamentalism succeeds in placing responsibility for the anomie of broad segments of the population, primarily their fear of social descent and disappointed hopes for social advancement, on modern institutions and the organizational principles underlying them. The frustration of the "border crossers" is thus channeled into a conflict of worldviews and cultures. Because it not only holds modernist innovations responsible for society's crises and abuses but also sees them as directly opposed to eternally valid divine law, the conflict takes on the character of a "holy war" or "crusade."

## NEOPATRIARCHALISM: BETWEEN MODERNIZATION AND RESTORATION

There are a number of distinctions between the fundamentalist patriarchalism and traditionalist patriarchalism. First, the former represents a

radicalization of the latter. Second, fundamentalism modifies the form of patriarchalism according to changes in society. For example, in order to preserve patriarchal morality under the conditions of the modern city, fundamentalism necessarily resorts to measures other than the ones used in traditionalist villages or small towns. Social control, the segregation of men and women, and behavioral and dress prescriptions have to be intensified to have the same effect.

In view of the increasing professional employment of women, higher population density, and big-city anonymity, not even fundamentalists are consistently able to realize strict gender separation. For precisely that reason, however, the multitude of opportunities for unsupervised meetings between the sexes forces them to intensify their efforts to control female sexuality in public. The attempt is made to compensate the loss of physical segregation of the sexes through greater symbolic segregation. In addition, the traditional order has been called into question, leading in response to an accentuation and symbolic overloading of such cultural features as alcohol consumption and women's dress, which had had much less symbolic significance under traditional conditions of daily life.

Juxtaposed against this radicalization are processes of adaptation to modern mass society. In order to be able to organize successfully, fundamentalism is forced to adopt the methods of its opponents, resort to technological aids, take into account the social ambitions of its adherents, and utilize its resources efficiently. Fundamentalism, like other comparable movements, readily employs the most modern technology and techniques. It sees in such aids the chance to spread its message effectively, and in reference to their social-structural implications, they are regarded as ethically "neutral." In the fundamentalist view modern technology in itself does not necessarily depersonalize social relationships. The unity between technicism and modernism breaks apart; or, in other words, fundamentalism is "reactionary modernism."[26] This proves, once again, that the formal and structural transformations of social relationships, rather than "modernity," are decisive for mobilization.

The adaptation of its patriarchal ideals to modern mass society poses a greater difficulty to fundamentalism. Here it seeks new forms within the patriarchal structural principle. What it cannot prevent in the way of structural transformation, it attempts at least to control sociomorally and to channel. Thus it gradually ceases (out of necessity) to reject professional employment for women out of hand but concentrates on preserving propriety in the workplace. Or it accepts better education for

women but rejects coeducation. When that position can no longer be maintained, it takes aim against mixed physical education. In these cases fundamentalism combines adaptation with damage control.

Nor does fundamentalism by any means promote the complete removal of women from public life, at least, that is, as long as it remains a protest movement. Traditional conceptions of the role of women combine with their political mobilization. For fundamentalism recognizes and makes use of the fundamentally conservative attitude of a large number of women. Both in the campaign for Prohibition in the United States and in the fundamentalist movement to topple the shah in Iran, women had significant roles. Thus arises the paradox of fundamentalism's promotion of the political mobilization of women, in order thereby to maintain or recreate a patriarchal segregation of the sexes, division of labor, and morality that largely removes women from the political public sphere and attempts to limit their roles to the household. In efforts to maintain or recreate traditional roles, a radical reinterpretation of those roles emerges, at least temporarily.

The development of American fundamentalism in the 1970s and 1980s, in light of the change in its policy on alliances with other social groups, offers a good opportunity to observe the dominance of its neopatriarchal intentions. Catholic and Jewish immigrants, as well as sectarian Mormons, were still agents of Satan for the Protestant fundamentalism of the 1920s, because they undermined the religiously legitimate patriarchal order through alcohol consumption and prostitution (or polygamy), or even because they were seen as agents of a worldwide Catholic or Jewish conspiracy. This nativist view has lost ground in the fundamentalism of the 1980s in favor of a conservative alliance, as represented, for example, by the Moral Majority. The latter represents in essence a neopatriarchal alliance of conservative Protestants with Catholics, Jews, and Mormons, which, unhindered by their respective religious forms, opposes the erosion of the patriarchal family structure. Thus they have cooperated in the fight against the Equal Rights Amendment, the women's movement, the legalization of abortion, and the gay movement.

Fundamentalism represents an attempt, in times of intensifying rationalization, to preserve or recreate patriarchal structures and sociomorality to the greatest degree possible. In so doing, it is often thoroughly innovative, accomplishing radical although perhaps only partial change of the structural *form* in order to preserve the patriarchal structural *principle*. In many cases it is, of course, forced to construct a

bureaucracy of its own to organize its institutions. It attempts to compensate for these tendencies by subordinating the bureaucratic to the personalistic. Bureaucratic institutions then stand in the service of charismatic leaders, thus prompting new, person-based dependencies.

Two clichés dominate the literature in reference to fundamentalism. One reduces it to its theological and mythical elements and asserts that it represents a "return to the Middle Ages." The other emphasizes its socialization function and sees it, because of its statutory ethical regulation of life conduct and its ascetic, "Puritan" attitude, as a force for modernization. Both interpretations, in my judgment, rather arbitrarily seek out one aspect in order to characterize fundamentalism either as reactionary or progressive. The consideration of the ideology and practices of fundamentalism in a larger context, however, makes it impossible to characterize it either as a "return to the Middle Ages" or as an agent of "modernization."

Fundamentalism is rather a retarding force within the general trend away from patriarchalism and toward depersonalization of social relationships. It offers an alternative vision that combines the technical side of Western modernity with, depending on the culture, quite various versions of partiarchal organizational forms and social morals. The inescapable need to conform to a changing social framework leads to innovations in the specific forms assumed by patriarchal social relationships. In reference to the organizational principles of social relationships and the ethical regulation of life conduct, fundamentalism is therefore most appropriately characterized as a patriarchal protest movement.

I have repeatedly pointed out that the results presented here refer exclusively to the comparison between Protestant fundamentalism in the United States in 1910–1928 and Shi'ite fundamentalism in Iran in 1961–1979. They make no claim to validity beyond this comparison but must be tested in other cases and, no doubt, modified accordingly. For that reason I resist the temptation to violate my good intentions by selectively identifying parallels between the movements investigated here and Sunni fundamentalism in Egypt and Turkey or fascist movements.[27] Instead, I will simply indicate, in conclusion, a few of the theoretical implications of the work by briefly contrasting them with feminist and Marxist perspectives.

Although my interpretation of fundamentalism as a radical patriarchal protest movement suggests considerable proximity to feminist interpretations, it distinguishes itself from the latter through its sociological

perspective. A large part of the feminist literature is focused on the fact of male dominance and thus emphasizes its historical continuity; in my work this dominance is structurally qualified. The distinction between personalistic-patriarchal and male-dominated depersonalized structural principles and forms, however, is essential. Only when the personalistic principle of piety has been replaced by the depersonalized principle of performance are the foundations of legitimacy of social relationships transformed and does dramatic change become possible precisely in the relationship between the sexes as well. Those who think in terms of unstructured categories of male dominance fail to understand the drama of the transformation processes from which fundamentalism as an urban protest movement derives.

Approaches to the problem from within the Marxist tradition, in contrast, are possessed of a pronounced sense for such structural upheavals. They assume, however, even in their most elevated versions, the dominance of the economy in the structural formation of consciousness. Compared with this perspective, the Weberian conception of rationalization and depersonalization proves superior for an analysis of fundamentalism. The rationalization of the economy into modern industrial capitalism is, indeed, an essential aspect of this development but is by no means always the dominant one. And even within the economy, as is clearly manifest in fundamentalism, the quality of its social relationships can be an issue of greater importance than the quantitative distribution of goods.

Moreover, an essential factor in the rise of fundamentalism proves to be the institutional contexts in which the transformative processes are experienced most dramatically. Therefore, the "subjective" experiences and interpretations of fundamental historical change, not "objective" interests, define the conceptual framework of my study. This has the advantage of openness to the multitude of fundamentalist phenomena. In studying fundamentalist movements, as I hope I have now shown, it is not always necessary to assume that social upheaval is experienced most strongly in the realms of sexual morality and the family.

Yet the confirmation and qualification of this statement must be left to other comparative investigations. In reference to Protestant fundamentalism in the United States in 1910–1928 and Shi'ite fundamentalism in Iran in 1961–1979, however, it can be maintained that they are most appropriately designated radical patriarchal protest movements that counterpose to a modern society characterized by antagonistic

interests and class conflict the ideal of a religiously and morally integrated society. Fundamentalism's conceptions of order may not be practical or even capable of garnering a democratic majority. Nevertheless, fundamentalism has succeeded in identifying certain structural problems in modern societies that can by no means be characterized as resolved.[28]