José Casanova’s *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994) has transformed the study of religion quite considerably. As I recall, the book was received relatively slowly in its first years. Casanova’s thesis gained momentum with the escalating focus on religion after 9/11 and the ensuing publicity for Huntington’s (1996) thesis of an imminent clash of civilizations. While many only then turned to the study of religion, Casanova had already prepared the ground for a global comparative approach with his path-breaking diagnosis of the state of religion in the different modes of modernity. The growing reception of Casanova’s thesis was accompanied by the increasing interest of political science (and politics in general) in religion. In fact, Casanova has shed new light specifically on the role of religion in politics. Furthermore, his thesis on ‘public religion’ has had profound impacts on the long-lasting debate on secularization in the humanities as well as in the public domain. In this respect, there is no doubt that Casanova has contributed a major, classic work to the social study of religion.

Since then, Casanova has continued working on and refining his thesis. However, despite minor concessions to his critics (see Casanova 2008), he still maintains the major strands of the arguments developed in his 1994 volume. The core of his thesis consists in the claim that religions assume a new role in public. To be more exact, “precisely those religious traditions” (Casanova 1994: 5) that theories of secularization, as well as cyclical traditions, predicted would become marginal in contemporary society have succeeded in assuming a new public role and have affected—to a greater or lesser degree—recent social changes. Casanova’s thesis is framed within the context of the secularization thesis, which he subdivides into three separate arguments: first, that secularization refers to the increasing separation of religion from politics, science, and other secular domains; second, that this separation is to be distinguished from the declining social significance of religious belief; and, third, that the secularization thesis includes the concept of the privatization of religion, according to which, as Luckmann (1967) claims, religion is increasingly reduced to the private sphere. It is this third aspect of the secularization thesis that Casanova is challenging. As much as he assumes that the first two processes are ongoing, the process of the privatization of religion is, he claims, being reversed. Religion has become subject to a process of deprivatization. In other words, it is going public, becoming public religion, and Casanova provides abundant evidence from a broad range of societies that has amply confirmed that the process of deprivatization of religion is a global trend (Casanova 2008: 101).
In his assessment of Casanova’s thesis, Asad (2003) wonders to what extent the different parts of the secularization thesis in general can actually be separated from one another. Indeed, Casanova’s claim parallels Berger’s (1999) strong thesis of ‘desecularization’. Yet, while Berger implies that privatization is a part of secularization, to Casanova privatization is not an essential element of secularization. Instead of discussing the secularization thesis in its entirety, in this short comment I want to focus on the aspect that is so crucial to Casanova’s thesis: deprivatization and the transformation into public religion. In fact, in his review of his own work, Casanova (2008: 102) mentions the restriction to the “public sphere of civil society” as one of the three shortcomings of his own argument (next to “Western-centrism” and the neglect of “transnational global dimensions”). He concedes that his analysis covers mainly Western societies, and there is also a certain bias toward “Western Christendom” and an orientation toward a notion of religion that is strongly influenced by the institutional structure of the Catholic Church (ibid.).

Institutions are, in fact, the major focus of Casanova’s studies. He focuses particularly on religious organizations that have serious effects on other institutional structures within society. For example, he analyzes the influence of the Catholic Church on the political movement in socialist Poland and the impact of political Protestantism on political parties and leaders in the US. One could say that Casanova follows an institutionalist view of religion, if he did not also focus on the role that these organizations play in what he calls the ‘public sphere’.

This special focus is of quite some importance (as one sometimes has to remind scholars working in the field of religion and politics), for it was exactly the institutionalist view on religion in sociology that had earlier been subjected to severe criticism by Luckmann (1967). He was concerned that the concentration on religious organizations leads to what one might call ‘institutional reductionism’: religion becomes identified with the official structures and legitimations of religious organizations. The identification of religion with its institutionalized forms means that the role it plays in actions that are not part of or oriented toward formal organizations is as much neglected as its role among actors outside the religious organizations. Moreover, institutional reductionism causes the widespread methodological problem whereby the definitions of religion that are legitimations of the religious organizations (or ‘collective actors’) are accepted at face value by the social scientists studying them.

It comes as no surprise that religious organizations and those who are interacting with them (most notably state organizations) are eager to accept these institutionalist views as ‘the’ social reality of religion. This tendency should not, however, be seen as evidence for the institutionalist view. As the massive loss of formal membership in many mainstream religious organizations has made clear, there is a huge difference between organized religion and religious practice by actors. As an example, consider the attempts to organize Islam in Germany, where a number of Muslim organizations are in dialogue with the Ministry of the Interior in order to be able to practice public religion, despite the fact that they do not represent a substantial proportion of Muslim practitioners. Institutionalist definitions of religion face not only the question of whether members of institutions are ‘included’ in the formal organizations (with respect to various religious dimensions, such as dogma, ritual, knowledge, ethics, etc.); they also face the question of whether actors indeed share the official definition of religion, either of the religious organizations or of the social scientists who adopt the organizations’ views. This question is posed, for example, by the rising gap at global levels between people who consider themselves to be ‘religious’ and those who see themselves as ‘spiritual’ (cf. Knoblauch 2008). Does their religiosity not differ in an important way from what is claimed and legitimated as being religious by organizations for the sake of symbolic capital?

This question relates to institutionalist approaches in general, yet it may seem to concern only a subordinate problem in the work of Casanova himself—the thesis of global denominationalism
or, in other words, the dissemination of the American model of religious organization. The problem of institutional reductionism also has repercussions for Casanova's major thesis of deprivatization. The first reason for this is that Casanova's claim of deprivatization is somewhat exaggerated in Western societies. Privatization is still effective in many legal systems, not only in ‘laicist’ societies, as in France, but also in societies in which organized religion exerts official and institutional influences upon other spheres (science, military, media, etc.), as in Germany. The second and more important reason is that the thesis of public religion presupposes that it is opposed to the private sphere. Instead, the major tendency consists in the transgression of the boundaries between the public and the private spheres. The most important question, as Asad (2003: 182) expresses it, is "how religion becomes public."

In fact, Casanova (1994: 6) himself recognizes insightfully that religion participates in the struggle to define the boundaries “between the private and public spheres.” Yet by pushing the thesis of deprivatization, he establishes a rigid distinction between them. Empirically, however, the boundary between the two in religion is continually transgressed. Take as an example Billy Graham’s hybrid ‘electronic church’ events televised from Madison Square Garden, in which religious communication crossed the gap between the private and public spheres in a way that transformed the phenomenon of conversion (cf. Stromberg 1993)—an experience that could now be enacted in front of the television. The tendency to transgress the boundaries between the private and public spheres can also be detected when, starting in the 1980s, private confessions became a standard genre of mass media communication. In the last decade, interactive forms of mediated communication, in particular digital network media, have contributed enormously to the transformation of communication structures and, consequently, to the shift of the public sphere into “mass self-communication” (Castells 2009: 4). Every individual can, in principle, publish anything and everything, so that the private tends to become public and the public tends to become private.

By transgression, I do not mean that the distinction between the private and public spheres is being dissolved. Rather, it seems that ‘private’ and ‘public’ cannot be regarded as a pair of mutually exclusive categories. If public religion, however, cannot be separated categorically from ‘privatization’, the thesis of deprivatization cannot be maintained. The reason why Casanova sticks to an opposition between private and public is to be found in the institutional reductionism mentioned above, which predominantly (but not exclusively) considers organizations as relevant actors participating in the public sphere. If, following Habermas’s (1989) proposition, one takes the public sphere to be not just a set of institutions but a result of communicative actions (without accepting Habermas’s normative stance), one can easily discern that the increasing amount of public religious communication is accounted for not by religious organizations but by individual actors. Supported by modern technology, they are communicating on religious issues in a way in which their subjectivity finds its own—mostly very popular—expression (Knoblauch 2010). As Meyer and Moors (2006) show, these forms of religious communication that transgress the dichotomy of private and public can be found not only in predominantly Christian cultures but also in other cultural areas and transnationally in a way that is not identical with the official forms of communication by institutional actors in organized religion, for example, Casanova’s public religion.

Without doubt, one of José Casanova’s lasting achievements is to have demonstrated the importance and relevance of the public sphere for religion: the understanding of contemporary religion has gained much through this notion. This concept can be of even more use, I want to suggest, if we acknowledge the communicative dimension of public religion.
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**NOTES**

1. In this piece, I am commenting on Casanova’s general work rather than on his specific text for this volume.

**REFERENCES**


Always stimulated by my meetings with and reading of José Casanova, I have chosen two themes from his work as a trigger for the following comments. The first concerns his celebrated account of the ‘deprivatization’ of religion (Casanova 1994). The second relates to the claim that the so-called secularization of Europe has more to do with the knowledge regimes of European intellectuals, public and otherwise, than with processes of economic and social change (Casanova 2006). The two are necessarily related.

I begin by reflecting on the assumptions of European social scientists in the mid post-war decades and the extent to which they were mistaken regarding the public and the private dimensions of religion. Initial (i.e., mid-twentieth-century) interpretations of this situation went more or less as follows: scholars of religion very largely agreed that religion was disappearing from the public sphere in Europe, but that it continued to endure in the private lives of many Europeans. Indeed, Bryan Wilson (1969) went so far as to define secularization as the decline in the social (public) significance of religion. This was moreover a normative position: most Europeans, notably the political class and a wide range of intellectuals, deemed the privatization of religion to be a good thing.

The question can also be approached in terms of religious practice. As the twentieth century progressed, the decline in churchgoing became increasingly evident. The fact that this happened more quickly in some parts of Europe than others, that the patterns of detachment varied from place to place, and that certain countries in Europe bucked the trend should not detract from the overall pattern that can be illustrated in any number of empirical inquiries.¹ Religious belief, however, proved more resilient than practice, at least in the short term—a situation captured by the phrase ‘believing without belonging’ (Davie 1994). Not everyone agreed with the thinking that lay behind this expression, but it became, without doubt, a touchstone for the debate. Central to the discussion was the long-term viability of non-institutional forms of religion. Many commentators argued, quite rightly, that detached belief was unlikely to sustain itself for more than one or two generations (Bruce 2002; Voas and Crockett 2005).

For precisely this reason I introduced the notion of ‘vicarious religion’ (Davie 2000, 2007, 2010), which evokes rather better than ‘believing without belonging’ the residual attachments of European people to their majority churches. This notion in turn has now come under attack, largely from the same commentators as before (Bruce and Voas 2010). Such exchanges are interesting in themselves, but they also prompt a further question about ways of working. Are the methodological tools currently in use in social science sufficiently sensitive to reveal not only the existence but also the full potential of passive as well as active membership in the historic churches of Europe, and the implications of this situation for a better understanding of the societies of which they
are part? I argue strongly for more imaginative approaches—those that, among other things, capture the ambiguity between the public and the private (Davie 2010).

Much more radical, however, are the very visible changes that began to appear in the final decades of the twentieth century, which are, if anything, intensifying at the present time. The series of events or episodes that brought the question of religion to the forefront of public attention in Europe is well-known and need not be restated here. It is important to note, however, that the majority of these complex and difficult issues relate to the existence of Islam in Europe, rather than to the mainstream churches. Clearly, there is a need for a mutual learning process, as European societies find ways to accommodate forms of religion that—simply by their existence—challenge the notion of privatization. Muslim communities, meanwhile, must find ways to live in diaspora, beyond the borders of a Muslim state. Neither the host societies nor the incoming populations will find this process easy.

In short, a somewhat unexpected combination of events has occurred, undermining earlier predictions. The ongoing process of secularization is continuing to erode the effectiveness of religion in the private lives of many European people; conversely, religion continues to figure strongly in public discussion—exactly the reverse of what was anticipated some 30 years ago. An important, if regrettable, consequence of this situation is the lamentable standard of debate regarding religious issues in some, if not all, European societies. The reason is simple enough: despite their continuing attachment to their churches, European populations are losing the vocabulary and understanding that are necessary to discuss the place of religion in public life just when they are needed most. Deprivatization has taken an unexpected turn.

Pushed to its logical conclusion, moreover, the process of deprivatization will demand a great deal more of the economic, political, and social sciences than they are currently prepared to give. Casanova (2006: 15) captures this situation as follows: “[T]he most interesting issue socio-logically is not the fact of progressive religious decline among the European population since the 1950s, but the fact that this decline is interpreted through the lenses of the secularization paradigm and is therefore accompanied by a ‘secularist’ self-understanding that interprets the decline as ‘normal’ and ‘progressive’, that is, as a quasi-normative consequence of being a ‘modern’ and ‘enlightened’ European.” We can agree that this situation is far from satisfactory, but how can we move on? The following paragraphs suggest a starting point for the discussion.

Both in Europe and elsewhere, the study of religion is currently in transition in the sense that religion, in all its diversity, has shifted from being ‘invisible’ to being a ‘problem’. There is, of course, a secondary debate to be had at this point, one that asks whether this is primarily a shift in reality or a shift in perception (or indeed in both), but it is not an argument that can be developed in a short article. More to the point is the fact that, however conceived, this shift has prompted a huge investment of public money into research on religion in the last decade or so. The rationale runs as follows: given its unexpected—and for many untimely—appearance in the public spheres of almost all Western societies, religion constitutes a problem, and, in order to be better managed, it must be thoroughly researched. On one level, it is important to welcome these initiatives. At the very least, they correct the serious underinvestment in research in the field of religion that was evident until the 1990s.

The motives for this activity, however, are dubious since they rest on the assumption that there is a necessary incompatibility (both philosophical and structural) in being fully religious and fully modern. Why else would this topic merit such intense scrutiny? Or, to put it differently, it seems that the seriously religious constituencies that are currently emerging in different parts of the world, including Europe, are challenging the coherence of late-modern, essentially secular societies and must therefore be investigated—precisely the point made by Casanova. Research on this scale, however, has a logic of its own in the sense that it not only gathers new data but also...
generates new questions. These are many and varied, but among other things it becomes necessary to think again about the philosophical core of the disciplines in question—specifically, the economic, political, and social sciences—and inquire what difference the serious study of religion might make to their ways of working. Is it possible, in other words, simply to ‘add’ religion to research agendas without this having a serious effect on the discipline(s) themselves?

The size of the task should not be underestimated. The areas of inquiry under review have emerged more or less directly from the European Enlightenment, implying that they are underpinned by a markedly secular philosophy of social science, a fact that determines their agenda. And the more ‘scientific’ their aspirations, the worse the problem gets. Interestingly, it is precisely this point that Jürgen Habermas (2006) appreciates so clearly and addresses in his recent writing. He insists, moreover, that others have a similar responsibility to rethink the foundations of their respective fields of study in order to accommodate fully the implications of religion and religious issues in their analyses of modern societies. Quite apart from anything else, this means accepting religion as it is, not as we would like it to be. It also suggests that we might consider religion to be as much a resource as a problem—in other words, as an integral and healthy part of late-modern societies, including European ones.

As a postscript to this short contribution, it is important to nuance the generalizations made in the previous paragraph. It is quite clear that these are more applicable in some places than in others, to some disciplines than to others, and to some researchers than to others. Broadly speaking, the potential of religion to become a positive resource and therefore a welcome feature of social and cultural existence is most easily appreciated by those who know it best. Specifically, American scholars find this notion easier to envision than their European counterparts, and those who work in the global South—notably, anthropologists and development workers—find it easier still. Right from the start, the former have been less affected by the secular turn than their sociological cousins. The latter are practical people driven by the circumstances in which they find themselves. They often work in places where religious networks are both more intact and more reliable than their secular equivalents. It seems, moreover, that researchers who ‘live’ in the field (in whatever capacity and in whatever kind of society) are more likely to display a respect for their subjects and the lifestyles that they embrace, keeping in mind that respect must include a critical perspective.

It is at this point that the questions set out at the beginning of this article join together. Religion is most easily appreciated by those who are ready to deploy imaginative approaches to the study of religion in public as well as private life. Positivists, on the other hard, will find this harder, both with respect to their philosophies of social science and to the methods that they use. Most important of all is to grasp that simply deeming religion to be a private matter is not a sensible policy, in that it almost always hides the very problem that it is trying to solve.

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NOTES

1. See, for example, the data generated by the European Values Study (http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/) and the International Social Survey Programme (http://www.issp.org/).
2. See Davie (2011) for an overview of recent research on religion.

REFERENCES

Casanova, Asad, and the Public Debate on Religion in Modern Societies

Kim Knibbe

Until recently, I was mostly aware of José Casanova's work as a milestone within the secularization debate; my own research on Catholicism and spirituality in the Netherlands did not touch on the theme of 'public religion.' This concept has now become one of the most important cross-disciplinary frameworks for discussing the role of religion in the contemporary world. My awareness of the importance of Casanova’s contribution to this debate grew when I started to think about the role of religion in the public sphere in relation to my research on Nigerian-initiated religious networks in Europe. While rereading his works, I realized that the qualities that can be criticized—and have been, notably by Talal Asad (2003, 2006)—are the very qualities that make Casanova’s writings extremely relevant to current, heavily politicized debates on the role of religion in the world. These features are, namely, his unembarrassed discussion of normative questions and his commitment to the political form of modern liberal societies. Below I will outline what I think has been the importance of Casanova’s concepts to the study of religion in contemporary societies in general before examining Asad’s critique. I will then go on to explore why I think that Casanova’s work is still of considerable importance, both inside and outside academia.

Shifting the Debate from Secularization to Public Religion

My purpose in attempting to offer a reformulation of the theory of secularization was to mediate in what I considered to be a fruitless and futile debate between European and American sociologists of religion concerning the validity of the theory of secularization. The fact that the contentious debate has continued unabated only indicates how unsuccessful my attempted mediation has proven to be and how ingrained are the positions. (Casanova 2006: 15)

While offering a reformulation of the secularization thesis, Casanova’s book *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994) shifted the discussion about religion away from tedious debates on secularization—in which numbers of churchgoers and ‘believers’ were endlessly disputed by those who supported or countered the thesis—toward an appreciation of the various ways that religion is relevant in present-day societies and the implications that this salience has for theorizing religion. To anthropologists, the relevance of religion in contemporary life, even in Western Europe, seemed obvious, but it proved hard to maintain this position in the face of the demands of quantitative sociologists to see ‘proof’ in terms of increasing numbers of churchgoers. There was simply no common language to enable the discussion. Casanova’s discussion of this issue has provided social scientists with a conceptual vocabulary to discuss the role of religion in society beyond the secularization paradigm and across disciplinary traditions.
I will briefly summarize the most relevant points of Casanova’s critique here in order to be able to refer to it later on. First, Casanova distinguishes within the debate on secularization three separate hypotheses: secularization as the differentiation between religious and secular domains; secularization as a decline in belief; and secularization as the privatization of religion. These theses have to be examined separately from each other. In Casanova’s view, only the first (differentiation) really holds: “The differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms remains a general modern structural trend” (Casanova 1994: 212).

Second, Casanova concludes that the central assumptions from which the social sciences have been working concerning the relationship between religion and modernity have to be re-examined. Although the sociology of religion has become a marginal topic within mainstream sociology, the relationship between religion and modernity was a central concern for the founding fathers of the discipline, such as Durkheim and Weber (and was viewed by Marxists as a form of ‘false consciousness’). This means that these assumptions pervade the social sciences in general, leading to the general neglect of a very important topic.

Third, Casanova maintains that religion in fact has a legitimate role to play within the public sphere of modern liberal societies, provided that it is differentiated from state power. This last argument is clearly a normative standpoint that is based on a particular notion of how modern liberal societies should function and the role of the public sphere, which can be traced to Habermas (1989), although with significant modifications inspired by critics of Habermas’s public sphere theory, such as Seyla Benhabib (1998).

Despite Casanova’s clear-headed criticism of the secularization thesis, I have to agree with him that it has not really changed the debate on secularization itself. In rereading the first chapters of his book (Casanova 1994), I realized that his statement that the events of the 1980s prove that religion is not disappearing and has no ‘intention’ of disappearing could be substituted by the 1990s or the first decade of the twenty-first century and republished to address those who are still investing their energy in the secularization debate and discussing whether the process is a temporary reaction to modernization and globalization. This is a pity, since such energy could be much more fruitfully devoted to developing new concepts and tools for analysis to address the important role of religion in the contemporary world. This point is especially true for British sociology.

However, in another sense Casanova has been successful because in the meantime a completely new field of discussion has been opened up by his book, augmented by the increasingly prominent role that religion now plays on the world stage. Secularization sociologists may argue until their last breath about the significance of such developments in terms of this old paradigm, but the fact is that much inspiring new research and many discussions have taken place under the heading of ‘public religion’ or the ‘religion in the public sphere’ concept.1 These notions, moreover, bring together people from various disciplines: sociology, anthropology, political science, and philosophy. They have provided a vehicle for these disciplines to share their ideas and findings across boundaries. The much-discussed ‘return of religion’, which to anthropologists does not look like a return at all since in their eyes it has never disappeared, is nevertheless very beneficial due to the interest now expressed in their work, not to mention the funding made available for their research.

Normative Questions

As noted, a feature that I have found refreshing about Casanova’s work is that he is not ashamed to ask and answer normative questions. Normally, such questions and social scientific research on religion do not go together well. The implicit normative attitudes held by students toward
religion are among the first things that need to be reflected on, whether their background is religious or not. In the Netherlands, the most common assumptions among students are either that religion cannot but be a good and beneficial influence on people's lives or that it is inevitably an oppressive force from which people will slowly liberate themselves.

Furthermore, many discussions of religion suffer from being informed more by normative agendas than by a proper understanding of the religious ideas and practices being discussed. In Casanova's work, however one might criticize the details of his study, this is not the case. In fact, he has shown how a better appreciation of social and cultural realities can inform important theoretical and normative discussions that have shaped our societies, but which have too often simply ignored or dismissed these realities relating to religion because they did not tally with the implicit assumptions of the social sciences—that religion is a thing of the past or that, if it is not so yet, it soon will be.

Nevertheless, there are some problems with his conceptual framework, which owes a lot to Habermas's notion of the public sphere and to critical theory in general. Although one cannot say that Casanova is unaware of these problems, it might still be worthwhile to contrast his treatment of religion with that of one of his most incisive critics—Talal Asad.

**Asad and Casanova**

In chapter 6 of his *Formations of the Secular*, Asad (2003) has criticized the restatement of the secularization thesis by Casanova, a critique that he restates in reply to Casanova's defense in an edited volume (Scott and Hirschkind 2006) in which Casanova and others react to Asad's work. For the sake of brevity, I will base my summary of Asad's critique primarily on his 2006 reply to Casanova's defense.

First of all, Asad (2006) criticizes Casanova's work on secularization for equating the differentiation of religious and secular domains with modernity. This seems to reinstate the 'teleological' character of the types of secularization theories that Casanova himself criticizes: when secular and religious domains are not differentiated, a society is not (yet) modern. At the same time, Asad argues, an analysis of the relationship between religion and the state in France and the US—two countries that are supposedly 'modern' in different ways—shows that religion and state are never completely separate. Furthermore, if religion indeed goes public, this undoes the very separation of domains in the original secularization thesis that Casanova says can still be maintained. Finally, Asad points out that there are many questions concerning the historical processes by which the boundaries between the religious and the secular come to be defined as modern that simply do not seem to interest Casanova.

Casanova (2006: 15) sees the crucial difference between Asad and himself in the following way: "Asad follows a Foucauldian genealogical approach with illuminating results. I follow a more traditional comparative historical sociological analysis." However, Casanova states, their aims seem to be similar: they both offer a critique of dominant ways of thinking about the supposed secularity of modern societies.

**Weakness = Strength**

Asad protests that he does not think that their aims are the same, and I would agree with him. Unlike Asad (presumably), I do not think that this is a bad thing. I agree that Casanova does not adequately historicize the concepts that he uses, but I consider that to be the strength of his
approach. He engages fully with some of the most influential political theories—as well as the ideals of these theories—on a topic that has become even more controversial since he wrote the original book. This makes him an important public intellectual. To know that our concepts are accidental historical formations (and it seems to me that Casanova is not unaware of this) does not answer the question of how politicians, publics, and states should deal with developments that (1) challenge European self-identities as modern and secular or (2) are in danger of causing worldwide religious polarization between Christianity and Islam.

Researchers are often frustrated by the fact that their nuanced uses of notions such as culture and ethnicity and their discussions about the dynamic and fluid nature of religious ideas and practices are ignored in public debate. This seems to indicate that, to many academics, good research informing intelligent normative discussion is often the ‘submerged’ aim of what they do (and why else should we think it is important?). Although normative questions can be blinding in research, we cannot maintain that we should keep these questions away from our work and leave them to populist politicians such as Geert Wilders2 in my own country. Most importantly, by its very ‘flawed’ nature, this conceptual basis engages with current political discussions that are used to shape the world, which are inevitably teleological. However, Asad’s implied questions to Casanova remain relevant even in normative political discussions: Is the differentiation of the religious and the secular the most important characteristic of modern societies? Are those societies that we usually identify as modern actually differentiated in this way? Following from this, can a society be modern if religious and secular domains are not differentiated?

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NOTES

1. For example, see the Program on Religion and the Public Sphere of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) at http://www.ssrc.org/programs/religion-and-the-public-sphere/. See also the many discussions where some version of the term ‘public religion’ or ‘religion in the public sphere’ is used on another SSRC site, The Immanent Frame: Secularism, Religion, and the Public Sphere, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/. In addition, see The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere (Butler et al. 2011), which includes contributions from Habermas, Judith Butler, and Charles Taylor, and edited volumes such as Religion, Media, and the Public Sphere by Meyer and Moors (2006).

2. Wilders is a controversial Dutch politician who has managed, in the space of a few years, to gain a huge following in the Netherlands by promoting a largely anti-immigration and particularly anti-Islam program. His negative views on Islam have gained him international fame (and notoriety), and his sudden popularity has forced other parties to adopt some of his views. He is currently a major force in Dutch politics because he supplies the supporting votes to the current minority (right-wing) coalition.
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José Casanova is well-known for his ground-breaking work on secularization. His volume *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994) was one of the earliest and most successful attempts to transcend unproductive debates in the sociology of religion between those who wanted to reject the theory *tout court*, such as Rodney Stark and Roger Finke (2000), and those who, notwithstanding the visible role of religion in the Iranian revolution, the election of Ronald Reagan, and the political upheavals in Latin America, wished to defend the theory’s nomothetic status as a universal law about the dwindling public place of religion in modernity. In his book, Casanova showed that the secularization paradigm is in fact a complex and evolving research program (in the Lakatosian sense) with differentiated claims, some of which are more tenable than others. Moreover, by contextualizing the underlying assumptions behind the secularization thesis, Casanova (2003: 22) was able to “dissociate the historical theory of European secularization from general theories of modernization. The secularization of Europe is a particular, unique and ‘exceptional’ historical process, not a universal teleological model of development which shows the future to the rest of the world.” In fact, “[t]here are multiple and diverse secularizations in the West and multiple and diverse Western modernities” (Casanova 2006: 11). Recognition of the contingent and variegated nature of the secularization thesis, in turn, has enabled the conversation about the enduring vitality of religion to move in more fruitful directions, leading directly to Charles Taylor’s *A Secular Age* and Robert Bellah’s *Religion and Human Evolution*.

Less well-known but arguably just as important is Casanova’s work on the interaction between religion and globalization. This work represents the best of what we may call a post-Weberian comparative and historical sociology of religion. In his effort to identify the confluence of material and spiritual factors that made possible the emergence of modern capitalism in Europe yet not in other places such as China or India, Weber constructed a typology of religions according to their soteriological loci (this-worldly vs. other-worldly) and their mode of subjectivation or ethos (asceticism vs. mysticism). For all its flaws—its Orientalist imagination and essentialist views of culture and religion—this typology allowed for the first systematic, comparative study of world religions, a critical ingredient in the rise of a true *Religionswissenschaft* in the sense first envisioned by Max Müller.

Casanova’s work on religion and globalization preserves the historical and comparative impetus of the Weberian sociology of religion, as well as the stress on the analytics of institution building and maintenance. However, by focusing on the historical development of polymorphic transnational religious regimes, Casanova (2003) avoids falling into the reductive essentialism that informs Weber’s thesis of European exceptionalism. The relationship between religion and globalization has been examined by seminal thinkers such as Roland Robertson (1992)
and Peter Beyer (1994). Nonetheless, while these theorists focus on macro-processes, such as the simultaneous emergence of a global sense of humankind (humanization) and of the value, uniqueness, and irreducibility of the individual (individualization), Casanova (2001: 424) advances the conversation by introducing a focus on changing institutional morphologies, that is, a focus “from a long-term historical perspective [on] the changes in the patterns of relations between church, state, nation and civil society brought about by processes of globalization.”

Building on the work of Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller and Cristina Szanton Blanc (1994), Casanova (2001: 429) identifies the effect of globalization on culture and religion as one of deterritorialization: “By de-territorialization I mean the disembeddedness of cultural phenomena from their ‘natural’ territories.” From the Peace of Westphalia onward, these natural territories have been determined by the boundaries of nations as ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983). While contemporary globalization does not spell the end of the nation-state, it does mean that “states are becoming less undivided and exclusive sovereign territorial domains and more regulatory administrative territorial networks interlinked and overlapping with wider networks … The solid territorial embeddedness of all social phenomena under the sovereign jurisdiction of the state is dissolving into more fluid conditions” (Casanova 2001: 429). According to Casanova, religion played an ambivalent role in the process of building nations as imagined communities. On the one hand, with the breakdown of Western Christendom, churches contributed to the rise of the system of nation-states by seeking to fuse religious identity with polity and with linguistic, cultural, and national identities. On the other hand, Christianity’s constitutive missionary imaginaire, which is reflected by the Great Commission, the injunction in the Gospel of Matthew (28:19) to “go forth and make disciples of all nations,” always lay ill at ease within the “straight jacket of the sovereign state” (Casanova 2001: 429), particularly as the state became increasingly dominated by secular elites inspired by Enlightenment ideals.

Globalization’s deterritorialization, therefore, represents a reworking of the cognitive and politico-cultural cartography in which religion has occupied increasingly narrow and marginal spaces within the modernizing nation-state. Here Casanova’s (2001: 430) rethinking of the secularization paradigm informs his understanding of the changing place of religion within globalization.

Globalization facilitates the return of old civilizations and world religions not only as units of analysis but as significant cultural systems and as imagined communities, overlapping and at times in competition with the imagined national communities. Nations will continue to be, for the foreseeable future, relevant imagined communities and carriers of collective identities within this global space, but local and transnational identities, particularly religious ones, are likely to become ever more prominent. While new transnational imagined communities will emerge, the most relevant ones are likely to be once again old civilizations and world religions.

Casanova puts this notion of the return of old-time transnational religious actors to good use in his insightful analyses of modern Catholicism. In Casanova’s eyes, the current episode of globalization offers Catholicism the possibility of repositioning itself as a universal church, of placing the Holy See at the center of a myriad of transnational networks, flows, and movements that are responding to the local challenges posed by late modernity. “Ongoing processes of globalization offer a transnational religious regime like Catholicism, which never felt fully at home in a system of sovereign territorial nation-states, unique opportunities to expand, to adapt rapidly to the newly emerging global system, and perhaps even to assume a proactive role in shaping some aspects of the new system” (Casanova 1997: 122).

Casanova traces the recentering of Catholicism on the global stage to the papacy of Pius IX, an assertion that may seem paradoxical, given that under his reign the Papal States were lost.
But this loss of temporal sovereignty was matched by the proclamation at the First Vatican Council (1869–1870) of the doctrines of papal infallibility and primacy. As Casanova (1997: 125) expresses it:

[F]rom their position of seeming captivity, Pius IX's successors began to renew the papal tradition of speaking ever more frequently urbi et orbi, thus setting the basis for the process of globalization of the modern papacy, a process that has accelerated since the 1960s … Three processes characterize the operation of the current Catholic transnational regime: [1] … the ever wider publication of papal encyclicals dealing not only with matters of Catholic faith, morality, and discipline but also with issues of the secular age and of the secular world affecting all of humanity; [2] … the increasingly active and vocal role of the papacy in international conflicts and in issues dealing with world peace, world order, and world politics; [3] … the public visibility of the person of the pope as the high priest of a new universal civil religion of humanity and as the first citizen of a global civil society.

While Casanova illustrates the first two processes through a rich and persuasive analysis of papal encyclicals and church-state relations starting with the Lateran Treaty, his most compelling treatment of the dynamics behind the transnational Catholic regime centers on the public visibility of the pope, particularly John Paul II, who was recently beatified, bypassing the normal requirement to wait five years after death before canonization proceedings can begin. Pointing not only to John Paul II's key geopolitical role in the fall of the Berlin Wall and his missionary travels throughout the world, but also to his deft use of the mass media as a means to project his charisma, Casanova (1997: 133) demonstrates how the papacy has “assumed eagerly the vacant role of spokesperson for humanity, for the sacred dignity of the human person, for world peace, and for a more fair division of labor and power in the world system.” More than any pope in history, John Paul II employed the most advanced tools of modernity—electronic communications—to deploy a “direct contact with the masses of faithful extremely effectively as a kind of popular plebiscitarian support for his authority and policies, using it whenever necessary to impress secular leaders, to bypass national hierarchies, or to check dissenting tendencies from Catholic elites” (ibid.).

Casanova’s analysis can be easily extended to more recent developments in the Vatican. While Benedict XVI does not have the charisma that allows him to establish a direct, almost visceral contact with the masses through electronic media, as John Paul II did, he shares his predecessor’s drive to “re-create the universalistic system of medieval Christendom, but now on a truly global scale” (Casanova 1997: 133). Benedict XVI’s strategy has been to highlight the excesses of modernity, which, devoid of faith and a sense of transcendence, have led to a ‘dictatorship of relativism’. In a lecture given the day before the death of John Paul II in 2005, the then Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger declared that today moral strength “has diminished, because the technical mentality relegates morality to the subjective realm, while we have need, precisely, of a public morality, a morality that is able to respond to the threats that weigh down on the existence of us all.”

According to such a view, this moral subjectivism undermines the claims to the universality of values such as freedom and tolerance that are at the heart of the Enlightenment. Moral subjectivism is the symptom of a new dogmatism: relativism. Relativism “becomes a dogmatism which believes itself to be in possession of the definitive scope of reason, and with the right to regard all the rest only as a stage of humanity, in the end surmounted, and that can be appropriately relativized. In reality, this means that we have need of roots to survive, and that we must not lose sight of God, if we do not want human dignity to disappear.” In his homily to the College of Cardinals gathered to elected John Paul II's successor, Ratzinger was even more...
Relativism, that is, letting oneself be ‘tossed here and there, carried about by every wind of doctrine’, seems the only attitude that can cope with modern times. We are building a dictatorship of relativism that does not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists solely of one’s own ego and desires.”

Against the dictatorship of relativism, Benedict XVI has sought to present the Church as the true heir of modernity, as the source of the foundational values that inform modern European civilization, insisting that the stability and health of Western democracies demand the recognition of Catholicism’s moral, spiritual, and cultural authority—particularly against the thread of an anti-modernist Islam brought to the core by large numbers of Muslim immigrants and the potential integration of Turkey into the European Union. Casanova’s analysis thus continues to hold water. The bottom line is that “transnational religious regimes are reacting to the new challenges [of globalization] and are playing a crucial role both in the revitalization of particular civil societies and in the emergence of a global civil society” (Casanova 1997: 138).

If that assertion is correct, can we extend the notion of transnational religious regimes to other salient global religious dynamics? Indeed, Casanova (2001: 434) has attempted to apply the concept to global Pentecostalism: while the Catholic transnational regime is highly centralized, Pentecostalism is “a highly decentralized religion, with no historical links to tradition and no territorial roots or identities, and which therefore can make itself at home anywhere in the globe where the Spirit moves.” Peggy Levitt (2004: 8) has helpfully described Pentecostalism as primarily a “negotiated transnational religious organization” that links immigrants, pastors, and missionaries through dense informal and horizontal networks in sending and receiving countries. In this type of organization, “relations between sending and receiving country churches evolve without a strong federated institutional structure or rules. Instead, individuals and organizations enter into informal agreements with one another that have weaker connections to political circles but are more flexibly constituted” (ibid.).

Casanova prefers to describe Pentecostalism as a “de-territorialized global culture” (ibid.: 437). As he puts it, “It is truly the first global religion. Global Pentecostalism is not a religion with a particular territorial center like Mormonism, which is rapidly gaining worldwide diffusion. Nor is it a transnational religious regime like Catholicism, with global reach” (ibid.). To provide an alternative characterization, Casanova (ibid.) quotes Paul Freston, a scholar of Brazilian Pentecostalism, who holds that “new churches are local expressions of a global culture, characterized by parallel invention, complex diffusion and international networks with multilateral flows” (see Freston 1997: 185).

The notion that Pentecostalism is a global culture dovetails nicely with the work of Thomas Csordas (1997, 2009) and Simon Coleman (2000, 2010), who show that, despite the great local diversity and the polycentric production of discourses, practices, and institutional forms, Pentecostalism does have a common set of technologies of the body and forms of subjectivation that make possible and render authoritative widespread practices such as glossolalia, prophesizing, divine healing, and exorcism. Coleman (2010: 188) also refers to “charismatic corporthetics” to make sense of the ways in which Pentecostals link the disciplining of the body and the inculcation of Christian habitus with “technologies of visualization,” including the global circulation of images through media such as television and the Internet. In particular, the spectacle of exorcism—of the cosmic battle between Jesus and the Devil and his minions, who cause
the evils of poverty, crime, domestic violence, and drug addiction that affect vast sectors of the world’s population—has become a defining “mediascape” (Appadurai 1996: 35) in Pentecostalism’s imagined world.

It remains to be seen whether Casanova’s notions of transnational religious regimes and globalization as the deterritorialization of unruly religions hitherto contained within the system of nation-states can also be useful in exploring the global dynamics of Islam or the ‘diaspora’ of new religious movements. These dynamics include, for example, the simultaneous commodification (via exoticism and primitivism) and re-Africanization of African-based religions such as Santería, Candomblé, and Umbanda, as well as the tension between New Age hybrid appropriations of indigenous spiritualities and the construction of global pan-indigenous identities around neo-shamanism. As Csordas (2009: 8) rightly points out, “the transcendence of local boundaries by indigenous religious traditions is not limited to contacts among third and fourth world peoples. The current context of globalization includes the increasing likelihood of religious influence extending in a ‘reverse’ direction, from the margins to the metropole.” In turn, multi-scalar and multi-directional transnational and global religious networks and flows render Weberian notions of European (and even American) exceptionalism still more problematic.

Casanova himself recognizes that the sociology of religion needs to be “more attuned to the new forms that religion is assuming in all world religions at three different levels of analysis: the individual level, the group level, and the societal level. In a certain sense, Ernst Troeltsch’s three types of religions—‘individual mysticism,’ ‘sect,’ and ‘church’—correspond to these three levels of analysis” (2006: 17). Thus far, Casanova has focused primarily on global religions at the societal level, which include secular nationalism and national civil religions, as well as transnational imagined religious communities. To a lesser extent, in his discussion on Pentecostalism, he has also begun to address the group level, which he associates with voluntary religious congregations. “Most of the so-called ‘cults,’ ‘new religions,’ or ‘new religious movements’ assume the form of voluntary congregations, but so do the most dynamic forms of Christianity, like Christian base communities in Latin America or the Pentecostal churches throughout the world, or the most dynamic forms of Islam—such as Tablighi Jamaat, a form of evangelical Islam akin to early nineteenth-century American Methodism—and the many forms of Sufi brotherhoods” (ibid.: 19). Given the multiplicity of religious phenomena at this level of analysis, however, further theoretical and methodological specification is needed.

Finally, Casanova has written only a tantalizing paragraph for those global religions operating at the individual level. These religions are part of a ‘post-materialist’ spirituality that results from individuals sifting through deterritorialized religious symbols, narratives, identities, and practices in an effort to make sense of the uncertainties and anxieties of the postmodern condition. What is “new in our global age is the simultaneous presence and availability of all world religions and all cultural systems, from the most ‘primitive’ to the most ‘modern,’ often detached from their temporal and spatial contexts, ready for flexible or fundamentalist individual appropriation” (Casanova 2006: 18). This is certainly an excellent starting point to begin to make sense of such phenomena as the spread of the Umbanda and Ayahuasca religions. Built around the ritual preparation and use of a psychoactive substance, these religions, which originated with the shamanic practices of indigenous peoples in the Amazon, have now spread among the rapidly expanding urban middle class in Brazil and in ‘advanced’ countries as diverse as the Netherlands, Japan, and the US, as well. Still, much remains to be done at this analytical level.

Despite these gaps, there is no question that Casanova has made significant contributions to the sociology of global religions. By offering a fruitful post-Weberian comparative and historically deep approach to the interplay between religion and globalization, Casanova has
generated a valuable framework through which we can study the evolving place of religion and religions in late modernity. The bottom line is that “[b]y undermining the territorially-based fusion of state, market, nation, and civil society, globalization also undermines the model of territorially based national religion or culture. At the very least, we can say that globalization makes Weber’s definition of both, church and state, outmoded and increasingly irrelevant” (Casanova 1997: 425).

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NOTES

1. Offering an alternative to philosopher Thomas Kuhn's understanding of the evolution of scientific knowledge, which involves radical ruptures generated by the confrontation of incommensurable paradigms, Imre Lakatos (1970: 91) argues for a “methodology of scientific research programmes.” Science grows as competing research programs seek to protect their core epistemological assumptions against falsification, generating new testable hypotheses that can successfully account for an increasing variety of phenomena. Those research programs that fail to expand their “protective belt” around the core or that encounter a growing number of anomalies are “degenerating” (ibid.) and will eventually be superseded by more progressive ones. What Casanova did was to show that the secularization thesis is not a paradigm that can be replaced once and for all by a ‘new paradigm’, as sociologists influenced by Stephen Warner (1993) would argue, but that it is, in fact, a complex research program with multiple claims, some of which are progressive, while others are degenerating in the Lakatosian sense.


3. Ibid.


REFERENCES

Manuel A. Vásquez


I have always held the belief that science is to a large extent autobiographical. Such an assumption, which is probably valid even for much of natural science, is even more evidently so for the social sciences. That all knowledge and knowledge production is socio-historically situated is of course one of the main premises of the sociology of knowledge. “I am I and my circumstance” is one of Ortega y Gasset’s famous aphorisms. The invitation to write a ‘profile’ of my work for this volume offers the opportunity to sketch a self-autobiographical reflection of my own ‘circumstance’, of the biographical conditions that have shaped my scholarly lifework, the choice of academic discipline (sociology rather than anthropology), and the evolving thematic focus of my work—from modernization to secularization to globalization.

Modernization and Sociology

I was born and grew up in a rather secluded village in Lower Aragon in the 1950s during the autarkic phase of development—or rather underdevelopment—of Franco’s regime. For Spain, this was a time of extreme isolation from the rest of the world, before the re-establishment of diplomatic relations of the pariah fascist regime with the Vatican and the United States, and before the criss-crossing migrations of European tourists going south in search of sunny beaches and Spanish Gastarbeiter going north in search of industrial work. It was the kind of ‘traditional’ village that anthropologists were just discovering in rural Mediterranean Europe (e.g., Lison-Tolosana 1962; Pitt-Rivers 1961). Naturally, being a ‘native’ villager, I had little inclination to dedicate my life to the study of ‘primitive’ or ‘traditional’ Gemeinschaft, a way of life that I knew all too well and wanted to leave behind. I was attracted instead to the study of sociology, the science of modern, urban, industrial Gesellschaft. Of course, our post-industrial and postmodern consciousness finds the binary juxtaposition of tradition and modernity, and the meta-narrative of modernization that it implies, problematic and suspect, if not outright ideological. Indeed, anthropologists who tended to come from more ‘modern’ contexts also tended to have a more critical attitude toward progressive teleological theories of ‘Western’ modernity, knowing all too well the heavy costs and damage that modernization and colonial encounters continued to bring to so-called primitive peoples and communities.

Personally, however, I found that the narrative of modernization made compelling phenomenological sense to me. I had experienced it in my own life trajectory, starting in a traditional village and ending up studying and teaching sociology at the New School for Social Research in New York, the paradigmatic modern global metropolis. One could even view me and my career
as an embodied illustration of modernization, of the passage from tradition to modernity. Alternatively, one could say that sociological theory offered me a form of self-reflective critical knowledge of my biographical circumstance. Fortunately, my encounter with sociology was first mediated through theology, and my passage from a rural village to New York first took the intermediate detours of secondary education at the Metropolitan Seminary of Zaragoza and higher education at the University of Innsbruck in Austria. My first choice of vocation, as far back as I could remember as a child, was actually that of becoming a priest, a rather common ambition (or tradition) among young boys in my village. Consequently, my academic ‘calling’ to sociology was as a rather late adult, graduate avocation. It came, moreover, after a solid education in German philosophy and theology.

I have always thanked Fortuna, or Providence, for such a German theological detour. It saved me from first encountering modernity in American society or from discovering the discipline through some ‘introduction to sociology’ textbook in some American college course. It would have been highly unlikely that such an undergraduate experience would have awakened in me the interest in becoming a sociologist. Had it done so, however, I would most likely be doing an altogether different kind of sociology. In fact, I came to New York not in order to study American sociology but to study German sociology. My first encounter with sociology was through the work of Jürgen Habermas (1962, 1967) and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. Indeed, it was Franz Schupp, my professor in Dogmatic Theology at Innsbruck, who introduced me to critical theory and, upon learning of my interest to study German sociology, suggested that I go to the New School, because if I went to Germany, I “would end up studying American sociology.”

The definition of sociology that I first encountered on reading Habermas (1988: 176–189)—‘a theory of the present with practical intent’—corresponds to a large extent with the kind of sociology that I was taught at the New School. It is a definition that stuck with me and which I believe has shaped to this day both my own self-understanding of what the discipline ought to be and my lifework as a sociologist. I have always found the emphasis on ‘theory’ more relevant than the emphasis on ‘science’, and I have never been overly concerned about the ‘scientific’ claims and aspirations of sociology. It was not theoretical sociology or theory building for its own sake that I found attractive, but rather theoretically informed empirical research and an empirically grounded theory of the present, which is in my view the model represented by classical sociological theory.

Moreover, I have considered the practical intent of coming to an explanatory self-understanding and interpretation of the present, which may serve to inform and guide our practical collective action, to be the real aim of sociology, rather than the discovery of the positive ‘laws’ of society, which may serve to manage or control social change. The present has always meant for me ‘the modern world’ in all the historical complexity of the ‘three worlds of development’. In this respect, my main interest has been linked to the comparative historical study of types of modernization. Furthermore, I have understood modernization in the very broad sense of the still unfolding world-historical expansion of the two modern revolutions, the ‘industrial’ and the ‘democratic’, with their accompanying structural, institutional, and cultural dimensions. In this broad sense, sociology was born as a theory of modernization.

Briefly, classical European social theory (Marx, Tocqueville, Durkheim, Simmel, and, above all, Max Weber) and what my professor Benjamin Nelson used to call “the comparative, historical, and differential” sociology of modernization constituted the two main areas of my sociological training. Searching for a topic for my dissertation and being concerned, like so many young intellectuals since the young Marx, with the ‘backwardness’ of my own society, after finishing my coursework I spent much time revisiting the history of Spain from the sixteenth century to the Spanish Civil War, looking for the key to explain Spain’s ‘failure’ to modernize.
But while searching for the sociological explanation of what modern Spanish intellectuals had called 'Spain as a problem', I realized that the modernization of Spain—or at least what used to be called, in the jargon of the modernization theory of the times, 'the take-off phase' of modern industrial economic development—had already taken place under the Franco regime (Casanova 1982b).

This seemed to be a paradox in need of sociological explanation. How could a reactionary, clerical, traditionalist, and anti-modern 'fundamentalist' regime have contributed in any way to the modernization of Spain? I was at first rather reluctant to take the Opus Dei seriously or to view its 'ethic' as the functionalist equivalent of the Protestant ethic. The parallel was at first too obvious and seemingly superficial (Casanova 1983a). Moreover, I had already expressed serious reservations concerning the uses of the functionalist-equivalent thesis by Parsonian-Weberian scholars of modernization such as Edward Shils, S. N. Eisenstadt, Robert Bellah, and Clifford Geertz (Casanova 1979: 236–239). Yet I ended up writing a dissertation titled “The Opus Dei Ethic and the Modernization of Spain.”

It was to be sure an application of Weber’s Protestant ethic thesis, but it was also an application of Habermas’s (1970, 1975) critique of technocratic political ideology, which was directed to a large extent against Weber and against Weberian political theories. However, I was more interested in developing a critique of the political ethic of the Opus Dei technocrats than in probing the associations between the Opus Dei economic ethic and modern capitalism (Casanova 1983b). In a nutshell, my main thesis was that the Opus Dei ethic had a kind of elective affinity with authoritarian technocratic capitalism that was similar to the relationship that existed, as Weber claimed, between the Protestant ethic and liberal bourgeois capitalism. My central argument was that the Opus Dei technocrats could serve from 1959 to 1973 as carriers of the modernization of Spain, but not because of their own technocratic expertise or because they formed a 'Holy Mafia' that just happened to gain power at the right time. Rather, they offered the Franco regime a model of technocratic capitalist development that had elective affinities with the political ethic of Opus Dei and that promised to be able to integrate the Spanish economy into the American-led world capitalist system without challenging the authoritarian structures of the regime and without curtailing the arbitrary decisionist power of the Caudillo at the top.

You may have noticed that so far I have not used the word ‘religion’ even once. Of course, given my personal background, I could not possibly claim (falsely like Weber) that I was ‘religiously unmusical’. While studying theology, I had been influenced not only by the giants of twentieth-century German Protestant and Catholic theology (Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Karl Rahner and Urs von Balthasar) and the French Nouvelle Théologie (Yves Congar, Henri de Lubac, and Marie-Dominique Chenu), but also by the negative theology of Theodor Adorno, the messianic thinking of Walter Benjamin, and the utopian theories of Ernst Bloch. Other influences included Latin American liberation theology and the more contemporary political theologies of Johann-Baptist Metz and Jürgen Moltmann. While at the New School, I had immersed myself in all the classical works on sociology and much of the anthropology of religion. I followed closely the secularization debates of the 1960s. After all, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann had preceded me as students and teachers at the New School. I had also examined the literature on the new religious movements and what Bellah (1976) referred to as the ‘new consciousness’ reformation, which he associated with the counterculture.

But while studying sociology at the New School, I did not become particularly interested in the sociology of religion—at least, not in the way that it had become a differentiated and rather isolated sub-discipline in the United States. I did not find the study of the differentiated sphere of religion within modern societies, or of its internal structure and dynamics, to be that compelling sociologically. My interest has always been in the mutual interrelations between religion
and society, insofar as they become relevant for a theoretical understanding of the present. My relative distance from the sociology of religion was reflected in the fact that, prior to the publication of Public Religions in the Modern World (Casanova 1994), only once had I presented a paper specifically on religion at some kind of professional sociological meeting.\footnote{In retrospect, it is obvious that I had adopted two of the key theoretical assumptions of the dominant paradigm of secularization, namely, the progressive decline and the increasing privatization and marginalization of religion in the modern world.\footnote{I even tended to agree with Luckmann’s (1967) thesis that religion was becoming ‘invisible’ and that the sociology of religion should not pay so much attention to the traditional ecclesiastical institutions since they were becoming, so it seemed, increasingly irrelevant.}}

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As I have stated frequently, four dramatic events that erupted unexpectedly and almost simultaneously on the world stage in 1979 forced ‘all publics’ to take religion a bit more seriously: the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the election of a Polish pope and the rise of Solidarity, the Nicaraguan Revolution, and the emergence of the Moral Majority in the United States. Besides their dramatic performative character, which they had in common with most unexpected world-historical events, these public outbursts of religion in political conflicts in all three worlds of development put into question one of the central premises of most theories of secularization, namely, that religion was becoming an increasingly private and irrelevant phenomenon in the modern world. This was considered to be especially the case for the larger and dominant modern systemic structures, particularly for the world of realpolitik at the national level and, most importantly, at the level of international relations and world politics.\footnote{When it was published in 1994, Public Religions in the Modern World challenged both the empirical claims of sociological theories of secularization and the normative claims of secularist liberal political theories and theories of the secular public sphere. Since the reviewers of my work in this volume have offered critical yet generally sympathetic reconstructions of those elements of my thesis that have had some influence in shaping the direction of public debate and new reformulations of our theoretical understandings of secularization, public religions, and modernity, I do not need to reconstruct what I think are the book’s most important and lasting contributions. I am very thankful for their generous reviews. I can only touch here briefly upon some of the critical questions that they have raised concerning those aspects of my argument that appear to be either problematic or ambiguous and in need of clarification.}

Secularization and Modern Public Religions

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Hubert Knoblauch has raised a very important critical point concerning the extent to which what I called ‘deprivatization’ should be viewed as a reversal of a previous trend of privatization.
Deprivatization represents a reversal only in the sense that, at the time, the dominant perception had been that privatization was the only relevant religious trend in the modern world. Yet, acknowledgment of the relevance of the new trend does not need to imply that the old trend of privatization might not also continue unabatedly. As I emphasized in the round-table debate with Luckmann that Knoblauch moderated in November 2008 at the Institute of Social Sciences in Lisbon, Luckmann’s theory of ‘invisible religion’ and my theory of ‘public religion’ are not to be viewed as incompatible but rather as complementary theories. Both processes go on simultaneously in most societies: the question as to which of the two might be dominant at a particular time and in a particular place, or how they might be interrelated, is empirical. The very notion of deprivatization implies a previous process of privatization. Habermas’s theory of the public sphere presupposes individual citizens who first secure the right to privacy and only then also attain the right to constitute and enter a public sphere. So long as the right to privacy and to freedom of conscience is viewed as an inalienable individual right, the movement toward increasing individuation and privatization is likely to persist.

Moreover, the boundaries between ‘private’ and ‘public’ are not spatially fixed or located equally everywhere. Because they are always socially constructed, they are also open to contestation. This contestation in turn leads to constant redrawing. This point was central to my argument, which I had simply appropriated from various critiques of Habermas’s theory of the public sphere, particularly from the feminist critiques of Nancy Fraser and Seyla Benhabib. As I have also pointed out repeatedly, and as the current sexual abuse scandal within the Catholic Church makes so evident, the process of deprivatization is a two-way street. It is not only religion or the Church that claims the right to enter the public sphere: the public sphere and other kinds of ‘publics’ force their entry into the hidden, private sphere of the Church in order to turn private abuses into public scandals. Transgressions, as well as the blurring and shifting of boundaries, are happening all the time, everywhere. Indeed, the very contestation over how, where, and by whom the boundaries should be drawn constitutes one of the most remarkable aspects of our contemporary global situation.

It is of course our spatial conception of the public sphere that leads to some terminological misconceptions. Knoblauch is right when he argues that ‘private’ and ‘public’ should not be reified spatially “as a pair of mutually exclusive categories” and that it is better to view them as overlapping and intersecting ‘virtual’ fields of communication (here again we find the problematic spatial imagery from which it seems so hard to free ourselves). But I do not think that he is right in attributing the problem to my concern about “institutional reductionism,” which “predominantly (but not exclusively) considers organizations as relevant actors participating in the public sphere.” It is true that ‘church’ is the central analytical category of my historical comparative study Public Religions in the Modern World (Casanova 1994: 70). The five case studies analyzed in this volume are structured as long-term historical reconstructions of the relations between church, state, nation, and civil society. But I also make it clear throughout that there is a constant tension between three different meanings of ‘church’: (1) the ideal-typical sociological meaning, as defined analytically by Weber, Troeltsch, or anybody else; (2) the phenomenological, doctrinal self-definition of the relevant collective actors who constitute the church as an ecclesiastical institution; and (3) the changing structural location of the church in relation to state, nation, and civil society. My study focuses on the changing structural location. I argue that, in terms of their internal ecclesiastical organization, there are no significant institutional differences between the Spanish, Polish, or Brazilian Catholic Churches. It is in terms of their relations with state, nation, and civil society that the differences have been substantial throughout history.10

In fact, neither the self-definition of the actors nor the changing structural location needs to imply any institutional reductionism. Vatican II’s redefinition of the Church as ‘the people
of God’ had dramatic repercussions for the kind of ecclesiastical communications entering the public sphere: Who is the Church? Who speaks for the Church? Which kind of Church communication is relevant for whom? These now became open empirical questions. My analysis of the deprivatization of Catholic Church actors, individual and collective, since the 1960s makes this evident in all of the case studies (Casanova 1994). Sometimes bishops’ pastoral letters would go through several rounds of communication with laity at the parish and diocesan levels before they were drafted. Sometimes the public intervention of Cardinal O’Connor of New York would provoke the response of lay Catholic Governor Cuomo, who might challenge the propriety of the cardinal’s intervention, who in turn might then recognize that the lay governor was right. I could mention many other illustrations.

My own book can be read as a public intervention in the transnationally organized Catholic public sphere, which in turn intersects with many other public spheres. Individuals on the Internet are constantly adding their own voices to public communication and to the cacophony of commentary in any public sphere. Evangelical Protestantism in the United States does not purport to constitute a single ecclesiastical institution. It is actually formed by hundreds of denominations, thousands of different congregations, and millions of individuals who sometimes speak or act in unison but very frequently do so at cross purposes. At first, the Moral Majority was nothing more than a rhetorical project. Whether such an enterprise ever becomes institutionalized as some kind of collective action, collective organization, collective identity, or collective movement is an empirical question. What we can ascertain is that communication in the public sphere and the mobilization of pre-existing institutional resources can create the very conditions of possibility for the constitution not only of any majority (moral or otherwise) but of any collective action. To argue, as I do, that the institutional resources of the Catholic Church in the period that I analyzed (the 1960s to the 1990s) were put to extremely effective use in the four countries under scrutiny (Casanova 1994) does not imply any institutional reductionism. Other actors, individual and collective, may have responded to the Catholic communications and mobilizations with their own counter-communications and counter-mobilizations.

I agree with Grace Davie that the issue in Europe is not so much that of religious actors re-entering the public sphere, but rather the fact that secularist assumptions have turned religion in the abstract into a ‘problem’. The deprivatization of religion in Europe manifests itself primarily as a general public anxiety about religion. Most often, it is the presence of Muslim immigrants in Europe, or even more broadly the presence of Islam, that appears to trigger this concern or general anxiety, which I have written about in two recent essays (Casanova 2006, 2008). When one of these pieces, “The Problem of Religion and the Anxieties of European Secular Democracy” (Casanova 2008), was translated into German (Casanova 2009d), the level of concern was raised from ‘anxiety’ to ‘fear’. In some of my recent essays I have indicated that the contemporary discourse on Islam in the West, in Europe as well as in the United States, has structural similarities with the nineteenth-century discourse on Catholicism that emerged in Protestant societies such as the United States and Britain, which were confronting Catholic immigrant minorities (Casanova 2009a; see also Casanova 2001a, 2005, 2009e).

It is only in the last 20 years that we have moved from confidently measuring degrees of secularization in terms of the decline of beliefs and practices to questioning more critically and systematically the ways in which the categories of ‘religion’ and ‘the secular’ are variously produced, entangled, and mutually constituted. The work of Talal Asad has been crucial in this respect, and I gladly acknowledge the extent to which his critique of my work has forced me to rethink both categories and to revisit my own theory of public religions, redirecting my work accordingly. I cannot elaborate further here, but I would like to indicate simply that lately my work has focused much less on religion and secularization and much more on the analytical
reconstruction of the category of the secular, on modes of secularism, and on comparative histori
tical analyses of regimes of secularism and modes of state management of religious freedom
and religious pluralism (Casanova 2009c). 11

I appreciate very much Kim Knibbe’s critically insightful and nuanced reading of the debate
between Talal and myself. I also appreciate her generous defense of the relevance of my norma-
tive position, although I have to acknowledge that under Talal’s incisive critique my own norma-
tive position may have shifted more than Knibbe seems to realize. In a sense, in all of my recent
work I have been trying to answer the critical questions raised by Talal, which Knibbe has
reformulated most succinctly here: “Is the differentiation of the religious and the secular the
most important characteristic of modern societies? Are those societies that we usually identify
as modern actually differentiated in this way? Following from this, can a society be modern if
religious and secular domains are not differentiated?” (see also Casanova 2011c).

The short response would have to be both yes and no. The longer response has taken the form
of a series of public conversations with Jürgen Habermas, Robert Bellah, Charles Taylor, and Hans
Joas, all of whom in different ways have lately been addressing similar questions. In my debate
with Taylor, I have tried to revisit the question of European and American exceptionalism, but
now in terms of Taylor’s (2007) own analysis of the phenomenological conditions of belief and
unbelief across the North Atlantic. What can explain the fact that, within the same secular age,
one finds such different phenomenological conditions of belief and unbelief (Casanova 2003,
2009b, 2010, 2011b)? In my conversation with Habermas, I have indicated that the discourse of a
post-secular society that he himself has initiated in Europe requires a more precise analysis of the
different meanings of ‘secular’ (Casanova, forthcoming a). In response to Joas’s (2008) stimulating
collection of essays, Do We Need Religion? On the Experience of Self-Transcendence, I counter with
a rhetorical question, “which kind of religion do humans need?” (Casanova 2011a). My central
argument is that Joas has incorporated into his theory of religion as ‘transcendence’ (and not with-
out tension) two radically different theories of religion, namely, Durkheim’s theory of ‘the sacred’
as the collective social religion and William James’s theory of individual religious experience. I
argue that, after many attempts, sociology has not been successful in incorporating Durkheim’s
and Weber’s radically different theories of religion into a single, unified sociological theory.

I develop a related argument (Casanova, forthcoming b) more systematically in my critical
review of Bellah’s (2011) theory of religious evolution. There I point out the intrinsic difficulty of
constructing not only a consistent transhistorical and transcultural category of religion, but also
one that cuts across the very different binary systems of classification of reality implied in Bel-
lah’s own evolutionary scheme, namely, the pre-axial ‘sacred-profane’, the axial ‘transcendent-
mundane’, and the modern ‘religious-secular’. It should be obvious that these three dichotomous
classificatory schemes do not fit neatly with one another. The sacred tends to be immanent in
pre-axial societies, transcendence is not necessarily religious in some axial civilizations, and
obviously some secular reality (the nation, citizenship, the person, and individual human rights)
can become sacred in our modern secular age.

In fact, we now find ourselves within a global secular-religious system of classification, in
which the category of religion has to do extra work and serve to articulate and encompass all
kinds of different ‘religious’ experiences, both individual and collective; all kinds of magical, rit-
ual, and sacramental practices; all kinds of communal, ecclesiastical, and institutional arrange-
ments; and all kinds of processes of sacralization of the social, be it in the form of religious
nationalism, secular civil religions, or the global sacralization of human rights. We use the same
qualifier, ‘religious’, to characterize all of these diverse phenomena in a way that has to be mind-
boggling for both secular and religious mind-sets. But there is no point in bemoaning this fact,
since the global secular-religious system of classification of reality is here to stay.
Globalization

This brings me to my final comments concerning my most recent work on globalization and religion, which Manuel Vásquez has reviewed so generously and sympathetically. I wish that he had raised some more critical and difficult questions, since this is an area in which he himself has made such important contributions. I would like to add only two final comments concerning the globalization of the secular-religious system of classification and the simultaneous temporal and spatial co-existence of all forms of religion.12

We scholars of religion are confronted with an interesting paradox. Some of our distinguished colleagues have been questioning for some time the validity of the category of religion at the very moment when the discursive reality of religion is more widespread than ever and has become global for the first time. I am not entering here the debate as to whether people today are more or less religious than they may have been in the past. I am only claiming that religion as a discursive reality—indeed, as an abstract category and as a system of classification of reality used by modern individuals as well as modern societies around the world—has become an indisputable, global social fact. Religious studies scholars may bemoan this social fact, but it is our task as social scientists to understand its coming into being and to analyze it in all its global complexity.

Certainly, we ought to be as analytically clear as possible about the manifold and very different discursive ways in which we use the category of religion today in our contemporary global age, namely, to identify what counts and what does not count as religion and to recognize the diverse phenomena (beings as well as things, groups and institutions, beliefs, practices, and experiences) to which we may attach the attribute or qualifier ‘religious’. Included in this latter ‘we’ are not only scholars of religion and religious practitioners (religious elites as well as ordinary people) who denominate what they do, what they believe, or what they experience as being somehow ‘religious’, but also secular political authorities (legislators, judges, administrators) and citizens who constantly have to make decisions concerning what, when, and where something is constitutionally protected or prohibited precisely for being or not being religious. After all, every state constitution in the world today makes some reference to religion, to religious freedom, or to the freedom to believe or not to believe.

In fact, the modern secular-religious system of classification that emerged out of the transformation of Western Christianity and which we tend to characterize as a process of secularization has now become globalized, entering into dynamic transformative interaction with all non-Western systems of classification, pre-axial as well as axial. All the religio-cultural systems, Christian and non-Christian, Western and non-Western, are now being transformed through these global interactive dynamics. Following Taylor (2007), one can understand this process as the global expansion of the secular ‘immanent frame’.

In this respect, not only the so-called secular societies of the West but the entire globe is becoming increasingly more secular and ‘disenchanted’, in that the cosmic order is increasingly defined by modern science and technology; the social order is increasingly defined by the interlocking of democratic states, market economies, and mediatic public spheres; and the moral order is increasingly defined by the calculations of rights-bearing individual agents, claiming human dignity, liberty, equality, and the pursuit of happiness. Yet, comparisons of secular Europe and religious America, as well as the evidence of religious revivals around the world, make clear that within the same secular immanent frame one can encounter very diverse religious dynamics (Berger et al. 2008). In this respect, the disenchantment of the world does not necessarily entail the disenchantment of consciousness, the decline of religion, or the end of magic. On the contrary, it is compatible with all forms of re-enchantment and religious revival.
What is increasingly less tenable is a secularist reading of the historical process of secularization. As a modern philosophy of history, secularism turned the particular Western Christian historical process of secularization into a universal teleological process of human development from belief to unbelief, from primitive, magical irrational religion to modern, rational, post-metaphysical secular consciousness. Even when the particular role of internal Christian developments in the process of secularization is acknowledged, it is not to stress the particular, contingent nature of the process but rather to emphasize the universal significance of the uniqueness of Christianity. According to Marcel Gauchet’s ([1985] 1997) striking formulation, Christianity is the religion that produced an ‘exit from religion’.

Globalization is likely to make such a Western-centric view of history and human development increasingly less credible. Indeed, what characterizes the contemporary global moment is not simply the fact that all forms of human religion, past and present, from the most ‘primitive’ to the most ‘modern’, are available for individual and collective appropriation. Equally relevant is that fact that increasingly these forms must learn to co-exist side by side in today’s global cities. This contemporary social reality tends to put into question all teleological schemes of religious rationalization and development that tended to place ‘primitive’ and ‘traditional’ forms of religion as older human cultural forms to be superseded by more modern, secular, and rational ones. Paraphrasing Johannes Fabian’s (1983) analysis in Time and the Other, one could say that the social scientific study of religion had been permeated by a modern secularist stadial consciousness that placed the social scientists ‘here and now’ in secular modernity, while placing their object of study, religion, ‘there and then’, as the ‘Other’ that somehow persisted as a pre-modern anachronistic survival in a time not contemporary with our secular age.

This was the fundamental premise on which every theory of modernization and every theory of secularization was built. Our age of globalization, however, is changing this perspective. Globalization is the new philosophy of space that has come to replace the modern philosophy of history. In a sense, with globalization the spatial metaphor has begun to replace the dominant temporal-historical metaphor of Western secular modernity. It is a short trip indeed from the most traditional village to the most modern global metropolis and back.

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Notes

1. What this anthropology soon began to document was not ‘unchanging village tradition’ but rather the aspiration for, and increasingly the reality of, rapid modernizing change. See also Aceves (1971), Aceves and Douglass (1976), and Barrett (1974).
2. See the debate between Habermas and Hans Albert in Adorno et al. (1969).
3. Schupp succeeded Karl Rahner as the chair of Dogmatic Theology at the University of Innsbruck and was the first post-Vatican II theologian to be removed from a faculty of Catholic theology due to his heretic teachings. One only needs to read typical entries in the academic journal Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie of the late 1960s to grasp the acuteness of Schupp’s observation. The work of Weber, to a large extent forgotten in post–World War II Germany, was rediscovered later...
through the systematic reconstructions of Niklas Luhmann, Wolfgang Schluchter, and Habermas, all of whom were indebted in different ways to the interpretations of Talcott Parsons, Reinhard Bendix, and other American sociologists.

4. For an illuminating discussion of the origins of ‘theory’ in the axial age and its various meanings, see Bellah (2011), particularly the introduction to the axial age chapters (ibid.: 265–282) and the conclusion (ibid.: 567–606).

5. The lifework of Max Weber and the sociology of modernization, broadly and critically understood beyond the American paradigm of modernization of the 1960s, formed the two thematic areas of my PhD comprehensive exams. The papers I wrote for the occasion were published as “Legitimacy and the Sociology of Modernization” (Casanova 1979) and “Interpretations and Misinterpretations of Max Weber: The Problem of Rationalization” (Casanova 1984a).

6. The relative isolation of the sociology of religion within American sociology is manifested in the fact that the two most important professional associations, the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) and the Association for the Sociology of Religion (ASR), have separate organizations and meet separately from the American Sociological Association (ASA) and that a section within the ASA on the Sociology of Religion was first established only in the late 1990s. This was partly the reason that I rejected a professor’s suggestion that I choose the sociology of religion as one of my two PhD comprehensive examination fields.

7. This sole presentation was at a meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society (ESS) in Providence, RI; the paper was later published (Casanova 1982a). Professionally, I have tended to present my work at interdisciplinary and international thematic conferences dealing with current or ‘present’ issues, instead of professional meetings that are organized to advance the trends and paradigms of scientific disciplines.

8. After all, I had studied theology at a time when even theologians were proclaiming the ‘death of God’ and the inevitability of the ‘secular city’.

9. Since the 1990s, many books have appeared discussing the resurgence of religion in world politics and the questions that it raises for traditional international relations theory. See Toft et al. (2011), Hurd (2008), de Vries and Sullivan (2006), Thomas (2004), and Banchoff (2008).

10. Commenting on the sermon given by Cardinal Wyszyński concerning the perennial union between the Catholic Church and the Polish nation, I point out that it would have unthinkable for any Spanish cardinal to make such a public communication, since it would not have been credible. The question is not whether the claim is objectively true, but whether the communication is publicly effective and works rhetorically (Casanova 1994: 262n20).

11. This article appears in a special double issue of Social Research, which contains the papers of a conference that I helped to organize at the New School under the title “The Religious-Secular Divide: The U.S. Case.”

12. For a succinct presentation of my theory of globalization, see Kumar and Makarova (2002) and Casanova (2001b).

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