

## 7 The age of revolution (1789–1815)

It has long been customary to regard the French Revolution as a great event in western civilization, a defining moment in the development of world democracy that sounded the death-knell of monarchy. Today a great many scholars see it as at best a mixed blessing, both for France and for the continent as a whole. But it was worse than that. Far from heralding the end of monarchy, it gave new life to conservative forces by permitting them to blame the Enlightenment for the Revolution's unfortunate legacy of domestic terror and international aggression. The French Revolution was nothing short of a catastrophe for the monarchy, not because it was ideologically hostile to the Habsburg state, but because it unleashed hugely powerful, aggressive forces that prompted much of the monarchy's ruling elite to cast off Enlightenment values that now became linked to the French enemy in favor of the reassuring safety of an outmoded feudal order.

### The twilight of the Old Regime, 1789–94

Of course, the domestic political turmoil of the past three years had closely coincided with the outbreak of the French Revolution. Yet events in France had virtually no impact on the government's handling of their own domestic crises. Neither Joseph II nor Leopold II viewed the Revolution as a direct threat. They did not expect it to spread to the monarchy's core lands, if only because the sources of opposition in the two countries came from diametrically opposite directions: whereas the Belgian revolt and Hungarian conspiracy articulated the privileged elite's opposition to Joseph II's populism and rationalization of traditional institutions, the French nation was driven by the need for a more just and efficient form of government. In beating a hasty retreat from his most controversial innovations, Joseph and his brother were merely trying to appease the monarchy's traditional ruling elite, not avert a popular revolution comparable to the one in France.

To a certain extent both emperors and many of their academic and civil officials welcomed the Revolution as an endorsement of their own domestic policies. Joseph II was quick to note that he had already instituted most of the

National Assembly's legislation within his own realms, even if he was less pleased by the reception his reforms had received. Leopold II viewed the collapse of Louis XVI's authority as a reaffirmation of his own constitutional principles and an "urgent warning to all sovereigns to treat their subjects with great consideration." The two emperors even expressed their disdain for the émigrés who fled France after the storming of the Bastille: Joseph by expelling them from the Austrian Netherlands, Leopold by ignoring their incessant pleas for support against the new French government.

What concerned both men most about the Revolution was its effects on the monarchy's international position. Although they took solace from Kaunitz's prediction that France would henceforth be incapable of acting aggressively toward its neighbors, they also feared that it would be in no position to discharge its commitments as an ally. In reality, the Habsburg–Bourbon alliance had never been popular in France, which remembered its humiliation in the Seven Years' War, the subsequent despoliation of its Polish and Turkish allies, and Louis XVI's hapless marriage to the emperors' sister, Marie Antoinette. Yet Leopold now urged the royal couple to work with the National Assembly and accept its draft of a new constitution, knowing that reconciliation with the nation was the best way to save both them and the alliance from ruin. Instead, they ignored his counsel and lost everything in their futile flight to Varennes in June 1791.

The demise of the Austro-French alliance severely undermined the monarchy's position in eastern Europe. It had already forced Leopold to relinquish Laudon's Balkan conquests at Reichenbach and Sistova. Even though the treaties had extricated the monarchy from any imminent danger, Leopold knew that France was no longer available as a counterpoise to Prussian or Russian expansionism. Catherine's Balkan designs remained a source of concern, especially since she remained at war with the Turks. Meanwhile, the most immediate danger came from Prussia, which was now set on annexing part of Poland. In characteristic fashion Leopold attempted to preserve that kingdom's territorial integrity by dealing with both sides. Once again he demonstrated his penchant for populist politics by supporting the ongoing efforts of Polish patriots to strengthen the kingdom's constitution. But he also cultivated closer ties with Prussia, hoping thereby to enlist its support in protecting Poland against Russia – and the Bourbon royal family against the National Assembly.

The result was the notorious Pillnitz Declaration (27 August), in which Leopold and Frederick William II announced that they were willing to act in concert with their fellow monarchs in forcibly restoring Louis XVI's position as king. There is no question that Berlin valued the proclamation as a handy pretext for annexing French territory. The emperor and his ministers were also confident that any war with France could be won quickly. Yet Leopold

was only bluffing, hoping that tough talk would simultaneously keep Prussia preoccupied in the West and protect the French royals by shaping the behavior of the National Assembly. He knew that Great Britain's reluctance to join a European concert rendered the proclamation a dead letter. His decision to reduce the Austrian army by 25,000 men also suggests that he neither wanted nor expected war. Indeed, news of Louis XVI's belated acceptance of the French constitution (13 September) prompted the emperor to replace his threat of intervention with a call for a "Concert of Observation" by the great powers; it also delighted Kaunitz, who still hoped to revive the Austro-French alliance that he had created. Unfortunately, Leopold's motives were not so evident to the new, more radical Legislative Assembly that had been created by France's constitution. A war party soon emerged that exploited a number of minor squabbles and the threat of invasion to unite the country behind them. On 20 April the Legislative Assembly declared war on the emperor.

At the eleventh hour Leopold anticipated the outbreak of hostilities by concluding a formal alliance with Prussia on 7 February. Yet he never had to face the consequences of his confrontation with revolutionary France. He died suddenly on 1 March 1792 – killed by his doctors, who had repeatedly bled him for a respiratory ailment. Nor did the 80-year-old Kaunitz, who was soon driven from office by the advocates of a Prussian alliance against France. Instead, the burden fell on Leopold's 24-year-old son and successor, Francis II (1792–1835). The new sovereign was not without his strengths. He was a cultivated, virtuous, and reasonably intelligent man, whose affable and unpretentious nature earned him the immediate and lasting affection of his subjects. He was also extremely conscientious. Like Joseph II, he had prepared for his eventual succession by travelling extensively throughout his future dominions. When in Vienna he spent little time or money on court extravagances, choosing instead an austere daily regimen that included long hours at his desk. The young sovereign did, however, lack the self-confidence that comes with experience. Consequently, he made no immediate changes in course, in either foreign or domestic matters.

Kaunitz's resignation left foreign policy in the hands of Philip Cobenzl and Anton Spielmann, both of whom were avid proponents of the Prussian alliance. Their tenure at the *Staatskanzlei* would, however, be brief and disastrous. Prussia remained every bit as predatory and unreliable as it had been under Frederick the Great. Whereas Francis's war aims were limited to restoring Louis XVI and securing Prussian approval for a Belgian-Bavarian exchange, Prussia was intent on being compensated for its intervention with new acquisitions, either in the Rhineland or in Poland. Although Catherine II joined the alliance, she promptly committed her forces to an invasion of Poland, rather than to war against France. As a result, the monarchy was

assisted in the west by only a few thousand émigrés, 6,000 Hessian auxiliaries, and 40,000 Prussians under the aged duke of Brunswick.

The allies expected that such a force would be more than adequate to march on Paris. But Brunswick's ill-advised manifesto (25 July) threatening "unforgettable vengeance" if the French offered resistance or mistreated their royal family helped rally the French nation against their enemies. Their first victims were Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, who were imprisoned following Jacobin-led riots on 10 August. Next came Brunswick, whose poorly prepared forces were turned back by the rag-tag French army at Valmy (20 September). The National Convention celebrated the news by formally ending the monarchy one day later. Its forces now went on the offensive, seizing much of the Rhineland during October and the Austrian Netherlands one month later. The news from the east was no better. Having been denied any spoils in France, Prussia promptly joined Russia in dismembering Poland. Vienna's opposition to the Second Partition (23 January 1793) was totally without effect, except in guaranteeing its own exclusion from the proceeds.

Having recognized the folly of the Prussian alliance, Francis removed Cobenzl and Spielmann by the customary means of transferring them to other posts. For the next eight years, the difficult job of confronting revolutionary France and the equally aggressive Prussians and Russians was born by Franz Maria Baron Thugut. This typically hardworking, but humorless career diplomat had been quick to appreciate revolutionary France's great military potential, as well as Prussia's unsuitability as a partner in opposing it. Fortunately, the French made it easy for Thugut to find more appropriate allies: their occupation of Belgium and the Rhineland had quickly aroused the Maritime Powers and the German states; meanwhile, the execution of Louis XVI (21 January 1793) provided further motivation to Europe's crowned heads. By the end of March the monarchy was part of a formidable coalition reminiscent of the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV: aside from Great Britain, the Netherlands, the Habsburg monarchy and the Holy Roman empire, it included British client states like Portugal, Sardinia, and numerous German princes with troop subsidy treaties, as well as the remaining Bourbon monarchies of Spain, Naples, and Parma. Most important, unlike Prussia and Russia, the so-called First Coalition (1793–7) generally shared the Habsburg monarchy's desire to uphold the status quo by maintaining legitimate frontiers and governments. Thus, while Prussia and Russia devoted the spring of 1793 to devouring half of Poland, Coalition forces quickly retook the Austrian Netherlands and most of the Rhineland from the French.

Francis's early domestic policies reflected a similar continuity in outlook. In a more stable political environment the young emperor would have

doubtless sustained the enlightened agenda of his immediate predecessors. Like them he criticized the landed nobility's exploitation of the peasantry as both shortsighted and inhumane. Barely a month into his reign he decided to carry out his father's project for a resumption of mandatory *robot* commutation. At the beginning of 1793 the Lower Austrian estates even accused the government of "Jacobin tendencies" because of its unwillingness to abandon some of Joseph II's agrarian reforms. Indeed, one element that had not changed was the army of civil officials which was destined to retain its Josephinian outlook until well into the next century.

The men around Francis were, however, more conservative and less capable of innovative thinking than previous ministries. Led by his childhood tutor, Count Colloredo-Waldsee, they were hesitant to play Leopold's difficult and devious game of appealing simultaneously to the monarchy's privileged and unprivileged elements. Above all they feared that a continuation of his predecessors' populist policies would inspire rising expectations among the masses and opposition from the estates. To avoid a renewal of domestic chaos while the monarchy was at war made good sense; it also led to a more one-sided, conservative agenda that re-enlisted the privileged classes' support for the struggle against France. Thus, at the last minute Francis's advisors dissuaded him from issuing the *robot* commutation order, thereby keeping it voluntary; as a result, compulsory labor service made a comeback within the Habsburg lands as landlords let existing commutation contracts lapse once they came up for renewal. The emperor also dropped his father's plans for broader town and peasant representation in the various diets. In return for securing additional assistance from the Hungarian diet, he sacrificed the Illyrian Chancery and recent privileges granted to the kingdom's Protestants. Even the church hierarchy received a valuable concession with the abolition of the regime's supervisory Commission for Ecclesiastical Affairs.

However unfortunate we may judge Francis's retreat, it did have the desired effect of sustaining internal order and enlisting the estates' support for the war effort. Within Hungary, "enlightened" and feudal nobles alike joined the rest of the monarchy's elites in rallying behind the government, especially after the French Revolution entered its radical phase. The beheading of Louis XVI and, nine months later, Marie Antoinette appalled all segments of the population. Although the ensuing wars of the next decade were not popular, they caused little unrest or popular protest in the countryside, if only because harvests were very good and grain prices high. When people criticized the government it was the "war baron" Thugut rather than the emperor, whose popularity remained intact.

Francis's reluctance to launch additional reforms did prompt a few dozen enlightened nobles and officials to yearn for a republican revolution. The

Austrian Jacobins were, however, neither well organized nor united by a single agenda. Notwithstanding the suspicions of police officials and some Marxist historians, most were not Jacobins at all, but merely frustrated Josephinians. One leading figure, the Hungarian Ignaz von Martinovics, did seek a republic but one dominated by the gentry in which the peasantry would still pay their feudal dues! Moreover, any expectations of a popular revolution were totally unrealistic. By the summer of 1794 they had done little more than sing the *Marseillaise* and dance around "liberty trees" that they had planted in and around cities like Graz and Vienna.

The emperor did take some precautions against the spread of revolution. At the beginning of 1793 he banned all secret societies and French publications, while placing strict limits on all French nationals. He not only rehired Pergen, but sanctioned the secret trial and sustained imprisonment of at least four individuals for making politically injudicious remarks. Others were detained for shorter periods, including the famed hypnotist Franz Anton Mesmer, who was eventually deported for defending the revolution (though not the Jacobins) in a talk with his Viennese landlady. Yet, during the opening years of the reign neither Francis nor his ministers were particularly alarmed by police reports of these activities. They resisted Pergen's more extreme requests, which included the outright expulsion of French and other undesirable foreigners, the removal of public officials and university faculty who were sympathetic to the ideals of the revolution, and even the authority to deny due process to anyone suspected of treasonous activity. Instead, the civil courts generally followed the government's lead in refusing to condemn individuals for expressing revolutionary, or even pro-French views.


The turning point came during the summer of 1794, after an Austrian army lieutenant, Franz Hebenstreit, delivered a "drunken diatribe" to a police agent in which he divulged a plot to overthrow the monarchy. It also came to light that Hebenstreit had developed a mobile artillery piece, which his accomplices had smuggled to France for use against the Austrian cavalry. The invention was not quite the technological equivalent of a cruise missile, consisting as it did of a standard gun barrel, adorned with pikes and mounted on baby carriage wheels. However infantile Hebenstreit's plans may have been, they did constitute treason. Many of the forty-five individuals who were arrested with him were guilty of little more than inflammatory rhetoric. This too was construed as treason now that the monarchy was at war with republican France. While Hebenstreit and three other soldiers were tried by military courts, Francis ordered that the remaining defendants be afforded due process in a series of public trials. The resulting Jacobin Trials yielded forty convictions; Martinovics, Hebenstreit, and seven others were subsequently executed, while the remainder received lengthy prison terms.

*The failure of the coalitions, 1793–1805*

The government's willingness to punish its dissidents so severely reflected the outbreak of war hysteria and paranoia within its ranks. The monarchy was, in fact, just entering a twelve-year period during which it led no fewer than three anti-French coalitions to defeat. Much of France's success stemmed from its resort to a *levée en masse* (August 1793), which had given it overwhelming numerical superiority on the battlefield. By the end of 1794 its citizen armies had not only retaken the Rhineland and the Austrian Netherlands, but had even conquered the United Provinces. One by one, the monarchy's allies began coming to terms with the French. Although Prussia briefly contributed some forces to the Coalition, it soon concluded a separate peace (March 1795) in return for France's promise to compensate it for its Rhenish losses. Within a year most of the emperor's German allies had also deserted him in return for comparable promises from the French. The news was no better in the Mediterranean, where France's successes forced the capitulation of both Spain (June 1795) and Sardinia (April 1796). The only other major land power left in the Coalition was now Russia, which had recently joined the monarchy and Prussia in consummating the Third Partition of Poland. Yet its remoteness and the succession of a new tsar prevented it from committing its forces in the West.

Despite its lack of powerful allies, the Austrian army fought successfully in 1796, especially in Germany, where the emperor's brother, Charles, won a series of brilliant victories. But the First Coalition finally collapsed one year later, following Napoleon Bonaparte's conquest of all of northern Italy. On 17 October the emperor accepted the peace terms that Bonaparte offered in the treaty of Campo Formio. He recognized France's dramatic expansion to the Rhine, as well as the creation of the puppet Batavian Republic in the northern Netherlands and the Cisalpine Republic in northern Italy. Although he was forced to surrender Belgium and most of Lombardy, the monarchy was compensated with most of the former republic of Venice (see Map 5). Before handing Venice over to Francis, Bonaparte's forces stripped it of everything useful, including its priceless manuscript collections, artworks, even the four bronze stallions from atop St. Mark's Cathedral, and the gondolas from its canals.

Campo Formio proved little more than a truce. The French government felt that Bonaparte had treated the monarchy too leniently. Indeed, when combined with its new Polish province of West Galicia, the acquisition of Venice had actually increased the monarchy to its greatest extent ever. There were even those in Vienna who were convinced that the loss of its outlying Belgian and Italian lands would actually strengthen the monarchy by streamlining it. Yet the most devastating losses lay just beyond its frontiers.



5 Napoleonic Europe in 1812

The addition of over a million more Polish subjects was hardly worth the 1,000-mile border that the monarchy now shared with Prussia and Russia. Nor was Venice adequate compensation for the end of three centuries of Habsburg hegemony in the peninsula. Worst of all, France's conquest of the Rhine dealt a deathblow to imperial power within Germany. In return for deserting the Coalition, Prussia and other German states were now compensated for their Rhenish losses with the promise of territories elsewhere in the *Reich*. This could only mean the absorption of those ecclesiastical and smaller lay principalities that had traditionally been the emperors' most loyal vassals. At the same time larger states like Prussia, Bavaria, and Württemberg were now beholden to France, rather than to the emperor. In just five years, the monarchy had lost three of its four foreign buffers.

It is not difficult to appreciate Thugut's eagerness to forestall the provisions of Campo Formio. Even before its final implementation could be worked out, further French aggression against neutral Switzerland, the Papal States, and the Ottoman empire enabled him to piece together a Second Coalition (1799–1801) that included both Great Britain and Russia. At first, Admiral Nelson's victory at Aboukir Bay and Austro-Russian successes in Italy deluded the allies into contemplating a march on Paris. The Coalition collapsed, however, after Tsar Paul (1796–1801) clashed with his Austrian and British allies over strategy. By 1800 the twin defeats at Marengo (4 June) and Hohenlinden (2 December) had effectively eliminated any chances of revising the Campo Formio settlement.

With a French army advancing on Vienna, the emperor finally accepted the inevitable. Although he held on to Venice, the treaty of Lunéville (9 February 1801) now consigned the rest of peninsular Italy and the Rhineland to French control. As additional compensation, the monarchy received the bishoprics of Passau, Brixen, and Trent, while the displaced Habsburg princes of Tuscany and Modena were awarded Salzburg and part of Austrian Swabia. Two years later an imperial commission formalized the elimination of the empire's ecclesiastical states, most of its smaller lay principalities, and all but six of its forty-eight free cities. As France's new head of state, Bonaparte bound the princes of Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Cassel closer to him by obliging Francis to make them imperial electors; although Francis also made Salzburg an electorate, the newly configured empire now counted just four Catholic princes among its nine electors. The first Protestant electoral majority ever was, however, hardly a source for concern in Vienna. The Holy Roman empire was now as good as dead.

The defeat of the Second Coalition spelled the end of Thugut's career. The task of dealing with France's military dictator now fell to Colloredo and Ludwig Cobenzl. It was not long before Bonaparte aroused in them the same apprehension that had inspired Thugut. In May 1804 he crowned himself

Napoleon I, emperor of the French. The possibility now arose that the Holy Roman empire's eventual dissolution would place Francis behind both Napoleon and Tsar Alexander in princely rank. Francis responded on 11 August by declaring himself "hereditary emperor of Austria," by which he meant all of the remaining Habsburg dominions. Nearly three centuries after its creation, the Danubian commonwealth finally rested under a single crown. What worried the emperor's ministers most was Napoleon's progressive creation of puppet states in Germany, Italy, and Spain. Fearing that the new Austrian empire might be next, Cobenzl concluded a defensive pact with Russia at the end of 1804.

Though intended as a deterrent, the alliance actually made war inevitable by provoking Napoleon and by emboldening the tsar to press for a resumption of hostilities. Napoleon's decision to anoint himself king of Italy (May 1805) pushed the emperor and his ministers over the edge. Once again the monarchy's statesmen had allowed themselves to be dragged into an unwanted – and ultimately unsuccessful – conflict by the need to hold onto their more aggressive Russian ally. Great Britain soon joined them by contributing the usual combination of subsidies and sea power. But Cobenzl suffered a key setback when he was unable to convince Prussia to risk war against France. Indeed, if the Third Coalition (1805–7) differed from its two predecessors, it was that virtually all of the remaining German states were now firmly allied with their French benefactor.

The outcome was all too familiar. The Austrian General Mack failed to make good on his pledge "to triumph or die" fighting the French when his 60,000-man army was captured by Napoleon at Ulm (20 October 1805). Although Nelson destroyed the Franco-Spanish fleet at Trafalgar just one day later, neither British ships nor the promise of Russian assistance were of much help. On 12 November Napoleon entered Vienna, the first foreign enemy to do so since Matthias Corvinus 320 years before. Francis still had a chance of winning the war. A Russian army under general Kutuzov had recently reached Bohemia; a second force under the emperor's brother, Archduke Charles, was also on its way from Italy. Both field armies were larger than Napoleon's own forces. Yet, in their eagerness to defeat the French, Francis and the Russian Tsar Alexander ordered Kutuzov to attack Napoleon without waiting for the archduke's army to arrive. The ensuing battle of the three emperors, better known as Austerlitz (2 December), was perhaps Napoleon's most brilliant and decisive victory.

Francis immediately concluded an armistice, followed by the formal peace at Pressburg (26 December). This time Napoleon was far less lenient. Although the monarchy acquired Salzburg, it now lost Venice (to Italy), the rest of its Swabian lands (to Württemberg), and the Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, and the recently acquired bishoprics of Passau, Brixen, and Trent (to

Bavaria). It was also required to pay an indemnity of forty million livres. Napoleon even contemplated forcing Francis to abdicate in favor of the Archduke Charles, but dropped the idea when the archduke expressed no interest in the offer. Francis was, however, forced to recognize Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden as fully sovereign states. On 12 July 1806 Napoleon finally delivered the *coup de grâce* to the Holy Roman empire by uniting his German satellites in a new Confederation of the Rhine (*Rheinbund*). In response to pressure from Napoleon and his German clients, Francis formally dissolved the Holy Roman empire four weeks later, 1,006 years after its creation by Charlemagne. Yet the last act in the German tragedy was reserved for Prussia. Napoleon had recently given it Hanover in return for its continued neutrality. But soon after Austria's defeat he turned on Prussia, forcing it into a short, suicidal conflict. After a single afternoon on the battlefields of Jena and Auerstädt (14 October 1806), Napoleon was able to take away over half of its territory and subject the rest to a French army of occupation.

Francis could take grim satisfaction from Prussia's fate. If the French Revolution and Napoleon had killed the Holy Roman empire, it was Prussia that had doomed it to destruction by undermining the emperor's leadership. Together with Russia, it also bore primary responsibility for France's destruction of the European balance of power. Although all of the great powers had been slow to realize exactly how dangerous and powerful France had become, Prussia had repeatedly allowed itself to be seduced into neutrality by the prospects of Polish and German territory. Only Great Britain had shared the emperor's determination to stop France and had expressed that commitment by advancing considerable subsidies to the monarchy and other coalition members. But French control of the Low Countries and the co-opting of its German client states prevented the British from fielding an army of their own. Thus, in contrast to the wars it fought against Louis XIV, the Austrian army had been compelled to bear the brunt of the military operations. This would have posed no problem had it been fighting a more conventional, mercenary army. It had a number of competent commanders. The Archduke Charles was an especially gifted tactician who had stopped the French at the Rhine during the first two conflicts and defeated them in Italy during the third. Moreover, the rank and file was well trained and equipped, certainly better than any of its predecessors. Nevertheless, no conventional force could stand alone against France's larger, more aggressive citizen armies, at least so long as its commanders adhered to the traditional tactics of preserving their manpower and supply lines.

#### The monarchy during the revolutionary age

Although the defeat of the three coalitions had inflicted considerable territorial and strategic losses on the monarchy, the greatest casualty was the

enlightened political culture that had emerged over the past generation. Twelve years of military disasters had not only forced the government to suspend controversial domestic innovations that might spur opposition from its traditional ruling elite or rising expectations among the common people. They had also created a link in Francis's mind between the ideas of the Enlightenment and the demonstrable evils of the French Revolution. As a result, anyone who advocated a return to populist absolutism risked being labeled a freemason or Jacobin sympathizer, even if his intention was to strengthen the monarchy against France. This was not the first time that a threat to the monarchy's security had forced a major catharsis in its political culture. Two centuries earlier the danger of internal conflict had convinced men like Ferdinand II to end religious toleration and embrace the Counter-Reformation as an instrument of social control. More recently, the sudden emergence of the Prussian threat had inspired Maria Theresa and Joseph II to jettison the feudal *Ständestaat* in favor of a more efficient, tightly centralized bureaucratic state. The Franciscan reaction did not constitute an outright rejection of the Enlightenment, if only because many of his ministers and most civil officials retained the populist mind-set of his predecessors. Like Francis himself, they continued to yearn for greater social justice, even as they sacrificed it to the more immediate need for domestic and external security. But then again, the desire for social justice has always been a recessive trait in governments obsessed with their own survival.

Another casualty of the Franciscan reaction was intellectual freedom. Francis had already revived censorship shortly after the onset of hostilities. Newspapers had been prohibited from reporting about events in France or printing anything that might place the revolutionaries in a favorable light. Reading rooms and circulating libraries had been shut down. Even literary journals were banned in order to prevent them from discussing prohibited books. The police also redoubled its efforts to prevent the formation of organizations that might conspire against the government. The monarchy's masonic lodges were suppressed, as were all learned societies except those engaged in promoting agriculture. Even music ensembles of more than two instruments required prior police approval before they could perform. Following the defeat of the Second Coalition all state employees – even members of the royal family – were obliged to swear that they did not belong to a secret society. Nor were Francis's ministers and family members exempted from the army of police informers who now infiltrated every echelon of society. At the same time, censorship was extended to virtually everything written, including even the inscriptions on fans, toys, and snuff-boxes. By 1803 a "Re-Censoring Commission" had begun reviewing all books that had been approved between 1780 and the restoration of censorship in 1792. Roughly 2,500 were subsequently banned. People were even

prohibited from inheriting the libraries of dead relatives until they had been screened by the police.

To his credit, Francis never allowed his fear of revolution to undermine his respect for the law. He used Pergen's police mainly to gather information on public opinion and prevent possible conspiracies, rather than to imprison political opponents. At his insistence, the police were not allowed to use intercepted letters as evidence against their authors or addressees. In fact, convictions were few and the sentences fairly light. The question arises, however, whether any action was necessary. Notwithstanding widespread apprehension at the highest levels of government, the monarchy was in no imminent danger of succumbing to a Jacobin revolution. When he retired in 1804 even Pergen was convinced that the threat of revolution had long since passed. Unfortunately, so had much of the intellectual growth of the previous generation. Of Vienna's many political periodicals, only the *Wiener Zeitung* survived the turn of the century. Meanwhile, censorship helped to reduce the number of Hungarian newspapers from eighteen (1792) to just four (1805).

One concept in which Austria's leaders retained complete confidence was the rationally organized, efficiently run bureaucratic state. Although everyone was aware of Napoleon's genius and the superiority of France's citizen armies, the men around Francis believed that victory could still be achieved by the all-too-familiar resort to administrative reform. In their relentless push for change, Colloredo and Cobenzl received crucial assistance from among Francis's eight younger brothers. Several of the archdukes were more talented than Francis. Their royal blood also afforded them the luxury of criticizing the emperor's shortcomings. Some of them objected to his refusal to revive Joseph's populist reforms, such as *robot* commutation or the Tax and Agrarian Regulation of 1789. But they focused their criticism on his failures as an administrator. In his first fifteen years as emperor Francis had issued twenty-four thick volumes of ordinances, among them Sonnenfels' long-awaited Criminal Code in 1803. Yet his arduous work habits had singlehandedly slowed the pace of government. He not only refused to delegate decisions to subordinates, but tended to agonize over even the most trivial matters. With as many as 2,000 reports piled on his desk at one time, it was sometimes years before some matters were acted on.

Far from welcoming their views, Francis distrusted his brothers to the point of spying on them. He also disappointed their expectations of being included at the highest levels of policy-making. The one exception was Archduke Charles. Although Francis wrongly suspected that Charles might still want to replace him as emperor, the archduke's successes on the battlefield afforded him leverage to force some innovations. In 1802 he convinced Francis to combine foreign, domestic, and military affairs in a single State

and Conference Ministry. By establishing a joint policy-making body, the archduke and his supporters hoped to acquire the same comprehensive overview of the monarchy's affairs that was enjoyed by the emperor. Instead the *Staatskonferenzministerium* proved too cumbersome and was eventually obliged to relinquish its oversight of foreign affairs. The archduke achieved somewhat better success in his capacity as director of the *Hofkriegsrat*. It proved a task of Herculean proportions. Upon assuming control in 1801 he found a mountain of 154,000 unpaid bills and 33,000 unanswered petitions for pensions and supplies. He also discovered that no fewer than forty-eight different officials were needed to process a typical document, a ritual that he was able to cut by half. Within a year he had also reduced the enlistment period from life to a mere ten to fourteen years, because it was both inhumane and had left the monarchy with an army of old men.

The most intractable problem confronting the monarchy was not administrative, but financial. The staggering cost of fighting revolutionary France had increased annual expenditures to roughly double the average state income of 75 million fl. During Francis's first decade as emperor, the *Hofkammer* was compelled to finance a deficit of over 400 million fl. Half of the shortfall was added to the state debt, which went from 417 to 613 million fl. between 1793 and 1801. The rest was met by printing over 200 million fl. in paper money. The result was inflation, which the French aggravated by flooding the monarchy with additional millions in counterfeit banknotes. Although the government used the brief period of peace to redeem some of the notes, the Third Coalition brought a further spiral in prices; by 1805 the cost of living had nearly trebled in just four years.

People living on fixed incomes, such as pensioners and government employees, were hurt most by the wartime inflation. One police report estimated that only one in five petty officials could afford to buy meat for their families. Yet spiraling prices proved a boon to the monarchy's peasant majority, especially those who owed money or had commuted *robot* service into cash. Together with their landlords, they also benefited from grain prices that quadrupled between 1799 and 1806. Inflation was sustained in part by massive requisitions by the Austrian military, which now provided a major stimulus for both agriculture and industry. As the army's primary source of food, Hungary experienced the greatest agrarian boom in its history. Croatia used the demand for uniforms to become a producer of merino wool, for both domestic and foreign military consumption. Indeed, the overall value of the monarchy's exports increased by two-thirds between 1790 and 1804. Most of the growth came from the hereditary lands, which continued the industrial expansion that had begun in the 1780s. After 1800 its well-established textile industry grew at an annual rate of 5 percent. Six years later Napoleon's continental blockade against Great Britain provided a

further boost by creating a huge captive market for the *Erblände's* industrial products.

### Stadion and Metternich, 1805–15

Despite its military defeats and the recent loss of 3 million people in the treaty of Pressburg, the Austrian empire was still a great economic and military power. Until the 1805 campaign its core lands had not even been occupied by foreign troops. Furthermore, with the possible exception of West Galicia, the emperor's subjects remained steadfastly loyal. None of this was lost on the new foreign minister, Count Philip Stadion. Like all Austrian statesmen of the past half-century, Stadion advocated further administrative reform. But he also felt that Francis could defeat Napoleon only by enlisting the support of all segments of the population. He hoped to achieve this by reviving the double game first employed by Leopold II: the government would reassure the ruling elite by reaffirming its traditional institutions and privileges, but would also play to the masses by integrating them into the empire's power structure. Francis readily endorsed a number of administrative changes by recreating the *Staatsrat*, delegating some authority to his brothers, and placing the talented Galician-Irishman Joseph O'Donnell in control of state finances. But, in contrast to Baron Stein's Prussia, he limited his appeal for popular support to meaningless public gestures. Thus he promised to allow freer intellectual life and talked about the great "inner strength" that would come from the cooperation of all elements of society. He refused, however, to reduce police power or increase local autonomy.

It was not long before news from abroad prompted Francis to reconsider the popular appeal of Stadion's agenda. Napoleon's ill-considered decision to invade Portugal (November 1807) and place his brother on the Spanish throne (May 1808) reminded Francis of the risks of coexisting with Napoleonic France. In the words of the Archduke Charles, "There can no longer be any question what Napoleon wants – He wants everything!" Furthermore, the resulting Spanish revolt against the French occupation suggested that Austria might be able to lead a popular war of liberation in central Europe. Finally, the Austrian ambassador to Paris, Count Metternich, reported that Napoleon's latest aggression had inspired opposition at the highest levels of the French government. With Stadion, the archdukes, and his own wife clamoring for action, Francis now prepared for war.

In May 1808 the emperor approved plans for mobilizing popular support for a war of liberation – at least among the peoples of the hereditary lands. Austrian propagandists avidly spread news of the successful Spanish resistance to Napoleon. Patriotic journals mobilized public support by praising the accomplishments of the cameralist Austrian state. A single article in the

newly established *Vaterländische Blätter* enumerated "culture, welfare, public peace and security, public instruction, religious life, the arts and sciences, trade, industry and agriculture, crafts and poor relief." Others mentioned the rule of law, and social mobility attainable through ennoblement and equal access to careers in administration, the army, and the church. To build a sense of national identity, the government began to stress a common history, not only in the journals but in the public schools and in several historical museums founded in the major cities. Francis and his wife even worked to build military enlistments by touring the *Erblände* amid patriotic displays of support. At the urging of the liberal Archduke John, the army accommodated its citizen soldiers in a newly established national militia, or *Landwehr*, which he hoped would politicize the nation by merging all social elements into a single fighting force. Stadion articulated his design by entrusting the organization of individual units to the provincial nobility, while dividing the overall command among several of the archdukes. Once they had enlisted, volunteers were further inspired by patriotic war songs that were translated from German into each of the hereditary lands' Slavic languages. Stadion's campaign struck a chord among the *Erblände's* population. Large numbers of men joined the *Landwehr*, including many students and others who were otherwise exempt from military service.

Notwithstanding its appeal to all of the *Erblände's* language groups, the government made a special effort to inspire German national feeling against the French. Stadion employed exiled German publicists, like Friedrich von Gentz and Friedrich Schlegel, to whip up support not just within the *Erblände* but throughout Germany. Here too Archduke John played an important part by fomenting a popular insurrection in the Tyrol against Bavarian rule. By contrast, the government was more circumspect about encouraging popular support from the rest of the Austrian empire. There was no attempt to extend the *Landwehr* to Galicia and West Galicia, mainly because of Napoleon's immense popularity among the Poles. Nor was Francis especially eager to summon the Hungarian diet. When he convened it at Pressburg, the diet quickly rejected the idea of extending the *Landwehr* to Hungary, but did surprise him by offering 60,000 troops for a period of three years – a 50 percent increase over previous levels. Once again, however, the diet's expressions of support proved more valuable than the *insurrectio*, which never exceeded a fifth of the forces promised.

Despite Hungary's meager contribution, the empire was still able to field an army of 300,000 men, no small accomplishment for the thrice-defeated and truncated monarchy. The French empire and its numerous satellites had twice that number of troops at their disposal. Nevertheless, the war party expected that Napoleon would be tied down in the Iberian peninsula, where the British had landed forces in support of the Spanish *guerrillas*. It could also



count on Britain's promise of a second diversion in the Low Countries, together with a 5 million subsidy. In October Prussia's promise to join forces had reinforced Stadion's hopes for a war of liberation in central Europe, during which Napoleon's German and Italian auxiliaries would either defect or fight without enthusiasm. Upon his return from Paris, Ambassador Metternich even suggested that Russia would join the new coalition, or that anti-war sentiment in France might force Napoleon to come to an accommodation.

By the time spring arrived, any notion of an allied coalition had collapsed. Napoleon had not only scattered the Spanish *guerrillas* and their British allies, but had returned to Paris, where he quickly suppressed opposition within his government. Not only did Russia remain neutral, but Prussia repudiated its earlier promise of military aid. Although the British made good on their subsidies, their amphibious diversion at Flushing was both late and dismally unsuccessful. True to their Habsburg heritage, the Tyrolean peasantry successfully rose against their new Bavarian overlord. But less serious uprisings elsewhere in Germany were quickly suppressed by Napoleon's client princes. Instead of participating in a fourth anti-French coalition, the Austrian army was now obliged to face Napoleon and his German and Italian auxiliaries all by itself.

Whatever chance Austria had of defeating Napoleon was doomed by the tactics pursued by the Archduke Charles. Unlike the rest of his brothers, Charles had opposed the war because he realized that one more defeat might spell the end of the monarchy. This fear now led him to pursue a defensive strategy throughout the campaign, thereby making victory impossible. Although the *Landwehr* fought well in the war's opening engagements, its units were soon demoralized by the enemy's progress. Indeed, the fall of Vienna (13 May 1809) quickly replaced popular enthusiasm for the war with relief that peace would soon be at hand. One observer reported that the eagerness with which the city's women rushed to accommodate the French soldiers "made Vienna look like Sodom and Gomorrah." Archduke Charles's victory at Aspern (21 May) – Napoleon's first battlefield defeat – did little to change the empire's prospects, primarily because the archduke was unwilling to risk his forces by pursuing the enemy. When Napoleon rebounded with the hard-fought victory at Wagram (6 July), the archduke rushed to sign an armistice while his army was still intact.

Although Charles's defeatism enraged his brother, news of the British fiasco at Flushing left Francis with no alternative but to conclude yet another unfavorable peace. Having now lost four wars to revolutionary France, the emperor seriously considered abdicating as a means of attaining more favorable peace terms. In fact, the French negotiator Champagny hinted that dividing the Austrian, Bohemian, and Hungarian lands among three arch-

dukes might provide the best guarantee for peace. Yet Napoleon never considered partitioning the Habsburg monarchy, let alone dissolving it altogether. The same man who had destroyed the thousand-year *Reich*, dethroned the princes of Germany, Italy, and Spain, and created countless new entities, shared the conventional wisdom of those before him that the monarchy was a European necessity. His foreign minister Talleyrand had advised him on the morrow of Austerlitz that, "Your Majesty can now eliminate the Austrian monarchy or reestablish it. [But] this conglomeration of states must stay together. It is absolutely indispensable for the future well-being of the civilized world."

The treaty of Schönbrunn (14 October 1809) reflected Napoleon's judgment that Austria should be severely punished, but retained as a European power. He took away its entire coastline by annexing Croatia west of the Sava River and all of Inner Austria, except Styria and eastern Carinthia. He also rewarded his allies by ceding Salzburg and the *Innviertel* to Bavaria, and West Galicia to the Polish duchy of Warsaw; even Russia received the small Galician district of Tarnopol as a reward for having remained neutral. That Napoleon decided against giving all of Galicia to the Poles or establishing an independent Hungary suggests that he intended Austria to serve as a counterpoise to Russia. He did, however, further degrade its ability to make war against him by levying an 85 million franc indemnity and limiting its army to 150,000 men.

Defeat also brought the downfall of the war party. Although Stadion and Archduke Charles resigned voluntarily, Francis went one step further by prohibiting his *generalissimus* from participating in all public affairs. If the other archdukes were spared the humiliation, they also lost most of their influence over state affairs. For the next quarter century, Francis left no doubt about who was in control and what he expected from the men who served him. His determination was not lost on Stadion's successor, Clemens Wenzel Count Metternich. Contrary to his reputation as a staunch reactionary, Metternich was very much a product of the Enlightenment. The son of a freemason, he was notably secular in outlook and a convinced advocate of enlightened absolutism. One of his associates claimed that his favorite motto was "everything for the people, nothing by the people," a formula that he preferred to execute while respecting historically distinct and diverse institutions. But Metternich also knew his place. Although he did not share Francis's rejection of the Enlightenment and the populist reforms it had inspired, he realized that the emperor would sooner change ministers than his policies. Having carefully climbed to the top of the career ladder, he had no intention of causing his own fall by being out of step with Francis's domestic agenda.

Metternich's mission as foreign minister was clear enough. The latest

peace treaty had reduced the empire by another 3.5 million subjects and left state finances in a shambles. In addition to a 700 million fl. debt and the latest indemnity, the *Hofkammer* had had to support a crushing six-month military occupation. A sixfold increase in paper currency – to 1.437 million fl. – had reduced banknotes to only a twelfth of their face value. Unable to get private credit, the government was forced to declare its first bankruptcy ever in 1811. To save money the army had to be reduced to well below the 150,000 maximum set by the peace treaty. If revolutionary France was to be defeated, another country would have to assume the lead, and the risks that went with it.

The need to avoid offending Napoleon was so great that Austria was now reduced to the status of a French satellite. The *Landwehr* was disbanded at his request. Metternich even urged Francis to offer Napoleon the hand of the 18-year-old Archduchess Maria Luisa; the wedding took place in April 1810, even though both father and daughter detested him. One year later Metternich suppressed Austrian newspaper reports of French reverses in Spain to forestall public displays of support for their enemies. Soon thereafter he dissuaded Francis from concluding what would have been another potentially fatal defensive alliance with Russia. Instead, he negotiated Austria's first alliance with revolutionary France in March 1812. When the Grand Armée invaded Russia three months later, it was supported by an independent corps of 30,000 Austrians under Prince Karl Philip Schwarzenberg.

Schwarzenberg was chosen to command because he had the diplomatic experience that would be necessary to carry out Metternich's strategy: to promote French goodwill by participating in the campaign, but to keep alive the option of joining a subsequent anti-French coalition by avoiding active hostilities with the Russians. By the following summer, the Grand Armée's destruction by the Russian winter had led to the formation of a Fourth Coalition (1813–15); comprising Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal, it was the first anti-French alliance in which Austria had not been a founding member. Although Schwarzenberg had already concluded a cease-fire with the tsar in January, Metternich proceeded with extreme caution. Austria could not risk provoking a French attack before its own forces could mobilize. Hence, when he discovered that Archduke John was organizing another Tyrolean uprising, he had him interned and his accomplices arrested. He even offered to mediate a peace settlement between the belligerents that would have preserved France's Rhine frontier. Only after Napoleon rejected these terms – and the allies had accepted Austria's war aims – did the emperor declare war on France (12 August).

The Austrian army that took the field in the fall of 1813 was poorly trained and equipped. Many soldiers were without shoes, muskets, or uniforms; some even marched to the front in their underwear. But it also numbered

568,000 men, easily the largest in the coalition. More than half of these troops now joined the 570,000-man allied field army, to which Schwarzenberg was named supreme commander. And they fought well in the subsequent campaign that culminated in the decisive victory at Leipzig (16–19 October). Deserted at last by the German princes, Napoleon was now doomed by a four to one advantage in allied forces. The following spring brought the march on Paris that everyone had expected two decades earlier. On 31 March 1814 the city fell to a foreign invader for the first time in over thirteen centuries. Napoleon's abdication followed eleven days later.

As they marched on Paris, the allies issued a proclamation in which they reassured the French nation that its postwar borders would still be larger than they had ever been under the Bourbons. If the proclamation was in marked contrast with the infamous Brunswick Manifesto of 1792, it was because Metternich had obliged Prussia and Russia to place a stable balance of power ahead of territorial gain. This implied not only retaining France as a great power, but preventing Russia from replacing it as a threat to European security. When the great peace conference convened in Vienna, it restored most of the countries and international frontiers that had existed before the wars. There were unavoidable exceptions: Poland, an early casualty of the revolutionary wars, could not be restored because that would have come at expense of the victorious allies. The only difference was that Russia received most of the lands that had been parceled out to Prussia and Austria in 1795. Prussia got much of the Rhineland and northern Saxony as compensation. In fact, both countries emerged from the Congress considerably larger than they had been in 1792.


By contrast, the Austrian empire in 1815 was only slightly larger and more populous than at the outbreak of the revolutionary wars. This was partly due to the coalitions and defeats that it had sustained while Prussia and Russia were expanding in the East. Indeed, Austria had fought revolutionary France for 108 months, roughly twice as long as either of them. Another reason was that its aims were more strategic than territorial. For much of the past century its leaders had worked to consolidate the far-flung dominions that had been acquired during the War of the Spanish Succession. Metternich now accomplished this by making the monarchy wholly contiguous for the first time in its history. Although the monarchy essentially reassumed its pre-revolutionary configuration, it forsook far-off Belgium and its ancient, but scattered Swabian lands for Venice and the adjoining prince-bishoprics of Salzburg, Brixen, and Trent. In addition to its concern for the balance of power, Metternich also addressed the monarchy's long-standing interest in maintaining regional security beyond its frontiers: in Italy it not only directly ruled the new kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia, but benefited from the restoration of the Habsburg duchies of Modena and Tuscany, as well as the

essentially innocuous Spanish Bourbons; even though Prussia remained a virtual equal within Germany, the emperor was still its titular head as president of the newly formed German Confederation. Moreover, in the best traditions of Habsburg statecraft Metternich reinforced the restored international order with an alliance system that embraced every major European power.

If the Quadruple Alliance was different from past coalitions, it was because it was primarily directed against the threat of domestic revolution, rather than foreign aggression. Hence the overriding criticism of Metternich: Whereas few historians have disputed his diplomatic genius, most have criticized him for having tried to reinstitute the Old Regime without taking into account the new currents that had begun to transform the European world. Actually, the Austrian empire would have been far better off if he *had* restored the situation that obtained in the Habsburg lands on the eve of the French Revolution. A combination of cameralist and Enlightenment ideas had convinced a generation of monarchs, ministers, and common bureaucrats that populist reform was not only ethically, but practically correct. The resulting program of domestic reform had won the gratitude of the peasantry and various religious and ethnic minorities; it had also co-opted much of the nobility and bourgeoisie through education and government employment in the ever-expanding bureaucratic state. Their joint patronage of the arts and participation in reading clubs, masonic lodges, and salon society attested to their empowerment by the state, not their alienation from it.

The young Emperor Francis never grasped the breadth of this emerging national consensus and the patriotism that it engendered. Even the great resilience that the monarchy demonstrated during the revolutionary wars failed to convince him that revolutionary subversion was unlikely to occur within his own dominions. Despite multiple military defeats and Francis's own fear of Jacobinism, the progressive political culture of the pre-revolutionary generation survived in Count Stadion and many of the archdukes, the mass of faceless bureaucrats, and the legions of *Landwehr* volunteers. Only the defeat of 1809 and the advent of the Metternich System ended any chance of returning to Leopold II's condominium of populist politics and corporate institutions.

And so the Austrian empire commenced on its century-long "decline." It survived for another century, despite the revolutions of 1848 and major defeats in 1859 and 1866, primarily because it retained its *raison d'être* in the eyes of its subjects and the other great powers. Indeed, the monarchy weathered each of the great crises of the early modern period not only because it won victories on the battlefield, but because both its people and its neighbors had an interest in its survival; even in defeat, the actions of men like Frederick the Great in 1742, Napoleon in 1809, Nicholas I in 1849, and



6 The Austrian empire 1815

Bismarck in 1866 suggest that its enemies also regarded it as a European necessity. Of course, by 1918 there were those among its people and foreign adversaries who no longer saw the Danubian monarchy as an indispensable solution to the problems of east central Europe. Perhaps they should have.

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The following summary is not intended as a comprehensive bibliography of the field or even of the titles I employed in writing this book. Instead it is presented here as a guide for further reading. Although I have included a select number of major works in German and French, the bibliography emphasizes English-language titles.

### I GENERAL

Except for Jean Bérenger, *Histoire de l'empire des Habsbourg, 1273–1918* (Paris, 1990), those general treatments that cover the early modern monarchy are now somewhat dated. The most comprehensive and authoritative remains Hugo Hantsch, *Die Geschichte Österreichs* (Vienna, 1951). Robert A. Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526–1918* (London and Berkeley, 1974) is more complete and accurate than Victor-Louis Tapié, *The Rise and Fall of the Habsburg Monarchy* (New York, 1971). Kann and Zdenek David, *The Peoples of the Eastern Habsburg Lands, 1526–1918* (Seattle, 1984) is a carefully compiled study that gives individual attention to each nationality of the Habsburg core lands, except the Germans and Italians. R.J.W. Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy 1550–1700: An Interpretation* (Oxford, 1979) is indispensable for understanding the alliance between crown, aristocracy, and church during the Counter-Reformation and the distinctiveness of Habsburg culture. Ernst Wangermann, *The Austrian Achievement 1700–1800* (London, 1973) provides a very readable survey for the following century, principally from a social and cultural perspective. A more comprehensive narrative is available in Hanns Leo Mikoletzky, *Österreich: Das grosse 18. Jahrhundert* (Vienna 1967) and *Das entscheidende 19. Jahrhundert: Geschichte, Kultur und Wirtschaft* (Vienna, 1972). Charles Ingrao, ed., *The State and Society in Early Modern Austria* (West Lafayette, In., 1994) examines various aspects of the monarchy's religious, cultural, economic, social, and diplomatic history from the mid-sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries.

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#### HUNGARY AND THE TURKS

Ladislav Baron Hengelmüller, *Hungary's Fight for National Existence* (London, 1913) is a very well-written, if somewhat chauvinistic account of the first half of the Rákóczi Revolt; Orest Subtelny, *Domination of Eastern Europe* (Gloucester, 1986) places the uprising in an east European context, while Charles Ingrao, "Guerrilla Warfare in Early Modern Europe: the Kuruc War (1703-1711)," in Gunther E. Rothenberg and Béla Király, eds., *War and Society in East Central Europe*, 2 (New York, 1982) analyzes it from a military perspective. *Acta Historica*, 22 (1976), 27 (1981), 33 (1987) contain numerous specialized articles in English, German, or French on the kingdom's social, economic, and political history. For the siege of Vienna there is Thomas Barker's definitive *Double Eagle and Crescent* (Albany, 1967) and the shorter, very readable John Stoye, *The Siege of Vienna* (New York, 1965). The continuing Austro-Turkish conflict under Charles VI is covered by the somewhat journalistic Lavender Cassels, *The Struggle for the Ottoman Empire 1717-1740* (London, 1966) and the more scholarly but engaging Karl Roeder, *The Reluctant Ally: Austria's Policy in the Austro-Turkish War, 1737-1739* (Baton Rouge, 1972).

#### IMPERIAL AND FOREIGN POLICY

Charles Ingrao, "Habsburg Strategy and Geopolitics during the Eighteenth Century," in Gunther E. Rothenberg and Béla Király, eds., *War and Society in East Central Europe*, II (New York, 1982) visualizes the broader structures and strategic concerns that helped predetermine foreign policy throughout the century. Michael Hughes, *Law and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Germany: The Imperial Aulic Council in the Reign of Charles VI* (Woodbridge, Suffolk and Wolfeboro, N.H., 1988) analyzes not only how the *Reichshofrat* functioned but how its judgments were affected by the emperor's German and foreign policy. For the monarchy's troubled relationship with the Maritime Powers there is Jeremy Black, "When 'Natural Allies' fall out: Anglo-Austrian relations, 1725-1740," *MÖSA*, 36 (1983).

#### V REFORM AND ENLIGHTENED ABSOLUTISM (1740-1792)

There is nothing in any language remotely comparable to Alfred von Arneth's monumental ten-volume *Geschichte Maria Theresia's* (Vienna, 1863-76, reprinted Osnabrück, 1971). Nevertheless, Edward Crankshaw, *Maria Theresa* (London, 1969), William McGill, *Maria Theresa* (New York, 1972), and especially C.A. Macartney, *Maria Theresa and the House of Austria* (London, 1969) are all useful biographies. For the great empress's consort, see Georg Schreiber, *Franz I. Stephen: An der Seite einer grossen Frau* (Graz, Vienna, and Cologne, 1986). Her stormy relationship with her son and heir is just one of the contributions of Derek Beales, *Joseph II: In the Shadow of Maria Theresa* (Cambridge, 1987). Both Paul Bernard, *Joseph II* (New York, 1968) and T.C.W. Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Absolutism* (London, 1970) provide brief but excellent surveys. For Leopold II's early years as grand duke of Tuscany, see Eric Cochrane, *Florence in the Forgotten Centuries, 1527-1800* (Chicago, 1973). Otherwise there are only two German-language biographies, Adam Wandruszka, *Leopold II.*, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1963-5) and

the more recent but less scholarly Helga Pehem, *Leopold II: Herrscher mit wieser Hand* (Vienna, Graz, and Cologne, 1987). Paul Bernard, *From the Enlightenment to the Police State: The Public Life of Johann Anton Perger* (Urbana, 1991) is a superb study of the founder of the Austrian secret police. For the two Swietens, there is Frank Brechka, *Gerhard van Swieten and his World 1700–1772* (The Hague, 1970) and Ernst Wangermann, *Aufklärung und staatsbürgerliche Erziehung: Gottfried van Swieten als Reformator des österreichischen Unterrichtswesens 1781–1791* (Munich, 1978). The second half of the aforementioned R.A. Kann, *A Study in Austrian Intellectual History* focuses on Joseph von Sonnenfels.

#### WAR AND DIPLOMACY

The imminent appearance of Reed Browning, *The War of the Austrian Succession* will likely pre-empt the informative articles on Anglo-Austrian relations in Richard Lodge, *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy 1740–1748* (London, 1930). Max Braubach, *Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV. bis Kaunitz* (Bonn, 1952) is still the best account on the origins and realization of the Diplomatic Revolution. For the first two partitions of Poland, see Herbert Kaplan, *The First Partition of Poland* (New York, 1972) and Robert H. Lord, *The Second Partition of Poland* (Cambridge, Mass., 1915, reprinted New York, 1969). Karl Roeder, *Austria's Eastern Question* (Princeton, 1982) is particularly valuable for attempts to balance Russian expansion and Ottoman decline under Maria Theresa and her sons. Paul Bernard, *Joseph II and Bavaria* (The Hague, 1965) handles Joseph II's repeated attempts to absorb the strategic Wittelsbach electorate. For his relations with the British, see Jeremy Black, "British Policy towards Austria, 1780–1793," *MÖSA*, 42 (1992). Christopher Duffy, *The Army of Maria Theresa* (Vancouver, 1977) and *The Wild Goose and the Eagle: A Life of Marshal von Browne, 1705–1757* (London, 1964) are two very readable studies of the Theresian military establishment.

#### FISCAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY

P.G.M. Dickson, *Finance and Government under Maria Theresia 1740–1780* (Oxford, 1987) is a two-volume work of monumental scholarship that contains a wealth of information in meticulous detail. Henry E. Strakosch, *State Absolutism and the Rule of Law: The Struggle for the Codification of Civil Law in Austria 1753–1811* (Sydney, 1967) deals with legal reform, while Paul Bernard, *The Limits of Enlightenment: Joseph II and the Law* (Urbana, 1979) focuses on Joseph II's meddling dealings with it. Agrarian reform is best studied by individual crownland, through Edith Link, *The Emancipation of the Austrian Peasant 1740–1798* (New York, 1949, reprinted 1974); William Wright, *Serf, Seigneur and Sovereign: Agrarian Reform in Eighteenth-Century Bohemia* (Minneapolis, 1966); and Béla Király, "Maria Theresa's Hungarian Serf Reforms," in the aforementioned William McGill, ed., *The Habsburg Dominions under Maria Theresa*. For Habsburg political economy, see Helen Liebel[-Weckowicz], "Free Trade and Protectionism under Maria Theresa and Joseph II," *Canadian Journal of History*, 14 (1979).

#### RELIGION, EDUCATION AND CULTURE

Grete Klingenstein, *Staatsverwaltung und kirchliche Autorität im 18. Jahrhundert: Das Problem der Zensur in der thesesianischen Reform* (Munich, 1970) traces the secularization of censorship, while suggesting some continuity between the reigns of Charles VI and Maria Theresa. James Van Horn Melton, *Absolutism and the Eighteenth-Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria* (Cambridge, 1988) is a provocative and well-written comparative analysis of school reform. Paul Bernard, *Jesuits and Jacobins: Enlightenment and Enlightened Despotism in Austria* (Urbana, 1971) profiles political and social commentary under Joseph II. Virtually all of the work on Josephinism is in German, most notably Elisabeth Kovacs, *Katholische Aufklärung und Josephinismus* (Munich, 1979); and Eduard Winter, *Der Josephinismus: die Geschichte des österreichischen Reformkatholizismus 1740–1848* (Berlin, 1962). Joseph Karniel, *Die Toleranzpolitik Kaiser Josephs II.* (Gerlingen, 1986) is especially valuable for Joseph II's policies toward the Jews, as is William McCagg, *A History of the Habsburg Jews, 1670–1918* (Bloomington, 1989). For contemporary attitudes and reactions to government policy, there is also Charles O'Brien, *Ideas of Religious Toleration at the Time of Joseph II*, *American Philosophical Society Transactions*, 59 (Philadelphia, 1969). For a profile of music and patronage, see Giorgio Pestelli, *The Age of Mozart and Beethoven* (Cambridge, 1984) and Mary S. Murrow, *Concert Life in Haydn's Vienna* (Stuyvesant, N.Y., 1989).

#### INDIVIDUAL CROWNLANDS

There are several informative accounts for the reigns of Joseph II and Leopold II, especially Béla Király, *Hungary in the Late Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1969); Robert J. Kerner, *Bohemia in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1932, reprinted The Hague, 1974); and Janet L. Polasky, *Revolution in Brussels, 1787–1793* (Brussels and Hanover, N.H., 1987). Hamish Scott, *Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe* (Basingstoke, 1990) includes two stimulating articles by R.J.W. Evans, "Maria Theresa and Hungary" and "Joseph II and Nationality in the Habsburg Lands."

#### VI AUSTRIA IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (1792–1815)

Both C.A. Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire 1790–1918* (New York and London, 1968) and Hanns Leo Mikoletzky, *Österreich: Das entscheidende 19. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1972) begin with excellent sections on the early revolutionary era. There is no modern study of Francis II/I, except William C. Langsam, *Francis the Good: The Education of an Emperor, 1768–1792* (New York, 1949). There are, however, several good studies of the men around the emperor, most notably Karl Roeder, *Baron Thugut and Austria's Response to the French Revolution* (Princeton, 1987); Gunther E. Rothenberg, *Napoleon's Great Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army, 1792–1814* (Bloomington, 1982); Hellmuth Rössler, *Graf Johann Philipp Stadion: Napoleons deutscher Gegenspieler*, 2 vols. (Vienna and Munich, 1966); William C. Langsam, "Count Stadion and the Archduke Charles," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, 6 (1946); Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castle-*

reagh, and the Problems of Peace 1812–22 (Boston, 1973); Enno Kraehe, *Metternich's German Policy*, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1963–83); and Paul Bernard's aforementioned biography of Pergen. Various aspects of the monarchy's reception of the French Revolution are treated in Ernst Wangermann, *From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials*, 2nd ed. (London, 1969); T.C.W. Blanning, *The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars* (London and New York, 1986); Kinley Brauer and William Wright, eds., *Austria in the Age of the French Revolution* (Minneapolis, 1991); F. Gunther Eyck, *Loyal Rebels: Andreas Hofer and the Tyrolean Uprising of 1809* (Lanham, Md., 1986); Frida Knight, *Beethoven and the Age of Revolution* (London, 1973); William C. Langsam, *The Napoleonic Wars and German Nationalism in Austria* (New York, 1930).

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