

**DISCOURSES OF COLLECTIVE  
IDENTITY IN CENTRAL  
AND SOUTHEAST EUROPE  
(1770–1945)**

**TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES**

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**VOLUME I**

**LATE ENLIGHTENMENT  
—  
EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN  
'NATIONAL IDEA'**

Edited by

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ber of major cities (Vienna, Warsaw, Bucharest, etc.) the internationally recognized name was kept. However, in the case of cities where this name was simply internalizing the name of the 'winners,' or there was a specific historical-contextual reason, the name of the time of the text was retained, i.e. a Hungarian born in 1887 in Transylvania was born in Kolozsvár (*Rom.* Cluj, *Ger.* Klausenburg; present-day Romania).

61 See Bülent Bilmez, "Mythologization of an Ottoman intellectual in the modern Turkish and Socialist Albanian historiographies based on 'selective perception': Sami Frashëri or Şemseddin Sami Bey?" in *Balkanologie* vol. VII, no 2 (December 2003), pp. 19–46.

## INTRODUCTION

### László Kontler: The Enlightenment in Central Europe?<sup>1</sup>

The question mark at the end of my title is intended as a reminder of the, still, problematic nature of these terms, especially when used in combination with one another. Happily, the editors save me the effort of explicating the second one: heuristically, 'Central Europe' here stands for what was once the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Habsburg Monarchy—and that is just about as acceptable as any (or several) other notions of the same. But what about the Enlightenment in these lands? Did they have one?

The question is not as trivial as it might look at first glance. On the linguistic evidence, the answer should be surely and unhesitatingly in the affirmative. There was *oswiecenie* (*Pl.* 'enlightenment'<sup>2</sup>), there were promoters of *világ* or *világosság* (*Hun.* 'light') as well as patriots regarded as *prosvitjenci* or *rasvećeni* (*Cro.* 'enlightened') even if only *buditeľ* (*Cz.* 'awakeners'<sup>3</sup>—forerunners of the National Awakening). Nevertheless, until relatively recently the underlying ideas of authoritative approaches to the Enlightenment rendered, in the final analysis, all claims inherent in this vocabulary unserious. We were told that the Enlightenment was, for better or worse, the instrumentalization of reason, the disenchantment of the world: man's confidence—or conceit, depending on the perspective—that he could become the master of nature by expelling the element of wonder from it; a 'modern paganism,' a secular utopia erected by its champions, a *petit troupeau des philosophes*, on the power of critical reason to bring and adjudicate tradition and prejudice before its tribunal.<sup>4</sup> 'Enlightenment' inevitably came to be measured by proximity to a standard which was anti-clerical and freethinking, whose tendency was antithetical to (at least, revealed) religion and could well be materialistic, and subversive of other authorities as well. The epicenter from which all of these rays of Enlightenment were supposed to be disseminated was, of course, Paris, with some secondary or subsidiary points of orientation for those who listened to the call of the times. By definition, recipients would produce belated and more or less faint replicas of the original—

surely so in underdeveloped regions, such as the ones explored in this volume, which, given the lack of a prosperous middle class that was the *par excellence* representative of enlightened ideas (both as their producer and their consumer), even needed to muster up substitute vanguards, and in which this process of reception could be superficial at best.<sup>5</sup>

Within this paradigm of inquiry, the role in which students of the Enlightenment in the "less happy regions of Europe" were cast was to meticulously reconstruct the evidence of proximity, only to find that, on the final analysis, distance was overwhelming. To be sure, this was not very different from the recorded experience of contemporaries, but more about that later. The point is that whereas the branch known as "eighteenth-century studies" was more than capable of treating Central Europe as a domain of interest in its own right and produced highly valuable scholarship, when it came to "Enlightenment," an ox sat on the tongue. With the exception of very distinguished, but relatively few examples, the Enlightenment in Central and Eastern Europe was approached as synonymous with the reception of the *philosophes* and the achievement of figures who could be mustered up as local counterparts, and of course the degree of penetration was not found convincing enough.<sup>6</sup> Even when scholars of the region suggested, very properly, "to integrate the history of Eastern Europe [in this case, the Enlightenment in Eastern Europe] with that of general European civilization," this was intended to counteract the habit whereby "European historical movements are generally described and analyzed where they originated and experienced their earliest and most intensive development" while "the belated and peculiar manifestations of these currents in Eastern Europe" are neglected.<sup>7</sup> Even though "peculiar" is added to "belated" by the author of this passage, the working hypothesis remains the juxtaposition of the "real thing" and the replica, i.e. the paradigm is contested while still accepting its premisses.

Developments in the study of the Enlightenment over the last two to three decades provide useful tools to overcoming this "structuring of the European space in an East-West dichotomy", if I may borrow the words of the editors of this volume. It is becoming possible to talk about "enlightenments," rather than a single phenomenon with a definite article and a capital letter (predominantly francophone, hallmarked by *philosophes*),<sup>8</sup> or at least to suggest that whereas the Enlightenment was a movement more or less unified by the questions it asked, the answers varied widely along cultural-geographical as well as ideological frontiers—while all had a legitimate claim to be regarded as "enlightened."<sup>9</sup> In a *lumières sans philosophes* it is also possible to acknowledge that typically enlightened goals could be pursued without being

subversive of established authorities, secular or ecclesiastical. Indeed, Enlightenment might become part of such establishments, and applied to their consolidation. Thereby nobles and clergymen (and not just French *abbés*, distinguished by their irreligion) may gain a foothold, if not in the pantheon, at least among the rank-and-file of the Enlightenment, and the reforming minister no longer looks like a special preserve of enlightened despotism, invented in peripheral regions as a last resort in order to keep the pace dictated by the progress of Europe's 'center.' As regards the centrality of reason, it remains unchallenged, but in the hands of a great many figures whose enlightened credentials would be hard to question, it is recognized as more or less synonymous with moderation, and its tribunal, rather than pronouncing verdicts, as serving up exhortations and advice—or, at its most militant, with warning.

To be sure, reason was 'instrumentalized' by the Enlightenment in the sense that the knowledge its practitioners 'dared' to accumulate<sup>10</sup> was not for its own sake. Enlightenment may have been many things to many people, but to all of them it was to discover hitherto unknown, and to examine and systematize already known facts and truths about man's physical and social-moral environment, to communicate them to (and about them with) their fellow human beings in order to test them and fully to assess their import—all of this with the ultimate goal of improving the environment which was the object of their inquiry. To put it simply, this was a pursuit of happiness: material and, no less important, spiritual well-being and satisfaction for themselves and others, the one being inseparable from the other. When it is claimed that the Enlightenment outside Western Europe lacked 'profundity,' what is meant is not only that the socio-cultural environment being different, its 'reception' could only have been 'superficial,' but also that the 'original contributions' in terms of the theoretical system(s) associated with the Enlightenment were meager in these intellectual wastelands. In view of the foregoing, this is to miss the point: those 'systems' themselves concerned to a considerable extent just the practical business of common life. And this already brings me closer to the point to be discussed in this introduction. For the Enlightenment conceived as a quest for improvement—which naturally targets an object to act upon—motivated by the sentiment of sympathy or fellow-feeling (sociability or 'humanity')—which, again, may be boundlessly cosmopolitan, but would more commonly be bestowed on a more or less clearly defined orbit—and, finally, to be expressed through communication within the space targeted by the effort of improvement,<sup>11</sup> is certainly not only applicable to circumstances in eighteenth-century Central Europe, but also highly relevant to the problem area of the shaping of collective identity dis-

courses in the period. For precisely these properties of the Enlightenment lent themselves readily to drawing the outlines of a novel discourse of collectivity and patriotism and, ultimately, of nationhood.

This is not to say that the contemplation of distance to a putative ('Westem') standard should not be prominent in our approach to the Enlightenment in Central (Eastern) Europe. But rather than based on the twentieth-century construction of a magisterial Enlightenment of cultural critics, religious seep-tics and political reformers, this contemplation should more usefully focus on the recorded evidence from the pens of eighteenth-century 'Easterners,' who saw the West and hailed it on account of its humanity, learning and urbanity—which *may* or *may not* have had to do with the daring and uncompromising radicalism implied in the familiar perspective. Indeed, if the (Western) Enlightenment "invented Eastern Europe" as a constitutive other in its rudeness, 'Easterners,' although too late to be contenders for the patent rights, did not always contradict. Exercises in real geography, whether with-drawing to the study room or taking to the road, led them to the construction of mental maps in which the measurement of distance was not by mileage but by improvement or the lack of it. In this process, the distance might assume dimensions that could only be grasped in terms of a linguistic barrier: Mozart's incomprehension, both very real and symbolic, on crossing the border on his way from Vienna to Prague, or that of Fichte passing through Silesia, has its telling counterpart in Dinicu Golescu's confession that his native tongue was insufficient to render the accomplishments observed during his travels.<sup>13</sup> As a matter of fact, to conceive of the distance in the rather abstract terms of one's language being inferior because unsuitable for expressing modern improvements—whether in the field of classical German philosophy, mining technology or the science of government—one did not at all need to heed maps, real or symbolic. And once this step was made, a quite direct link was forged between the project of cultivating the vernacular and the Enlightenment as presented above: besides, and, in some, cases rather than, being the token and the cement of a community of kinship, language was viewed as a tool of communication whose accuracy was indispensable for the enjoyment of the blessings of improvement. "No nation ever became learned in a language other than its own," György Bessenyei claimed earlier in his career with programmatic conciseness, long before he wrote the *Oration*, published in this volume, as yet another plea for the vernacularization of learning.<sup>14</sup> If a Hungarian example was mentioned, let it be immediately added that it was precisely on the same grounds that Croats rejected the use of Hungarian in public affairs and campaigned for the cultivation of their own štokavian dia-

lect (as evidenced by Janko Drašković's *Dissertation, or Treatise* in this collection).<sup>15</sup>

Anywhere in eighteenth-century Europe, the perceived ailing conditions of the local environment, whether in direct comparison to 'more fortunate' lands or just on the basis of 'impartial observation,' began to swell the hearts of those who referred to themselves and their likes as 'patriots' with sentiments of benevolence towards their countrymen and a dedication to the cause of their well-being and to promoting improvement. I am deliberately using a vocabulary of sentimentalism in order to emphasize that the Enlightenment as being an age of 'cool reason' is just another stereotype that does not hold: it was an age of sensibility and of emotions, felt to be humane and lofty by those who were imbued by them. The semantic content of patriotism itself was thereby undergoing a shift. By the heritage of the ancient city-states, enriched in so many ways by their humanist admirers, patriotism was civic activism, the exertion of one's political virtue by conscientiously turning one's freedom, guaranteed by the institutions of the republic, to public benefit. This, of course, crucially depended on the availability of a polity erected on the principle of participation. Enlightenment patriotism was ambivalent in regard to the activist element in the civic humanist paradigm (fearing that its lapse may result in a morally harmful political laziness and diffidence, while recognizing that its natural home was a smaller and 'runder' state, and that it also depended on compromises, such as legally sanctioned social inequality—slavery). It kept concern for the public weal as a criterion, but developed a different notion of what this implied. Rather than necessarily having his voice heard in government affairs, the patriotic citizen was now regarded as one who, having acquired a thorough knowledge of the conditions of the fatherland in need of improvement—hence the enormous significance of statistical and geographic descriptions which proliferated everywhere in the period—engaged in an informed exchange with like-minded individuals about the implementation of relevant projects, whether the founding of an educational institution or a society for the cultivation of natural philosophy, the launching of a learned or polite magazine or a subscription for a book, the collection of a library, the overhauling of roads and canals, or the emancipation of serfs.<sup>16</sup>

To be sure, the patriotic minister, or the patriotic monarch for that matter, is not a contradiction in terms according to this language. The Enlightenment in Central Europe, even today, and not unreasonably, is to a considerable extent still associated with the emblematic reforming rulers: two Habsburgs, Maria Theresa and (much more so) her son, Joseph II, and Stanislas Augustus

of Poland. The policies of the former were certainly inspired by the perspective of the *Gesamtmonarchie*, and thus ran counter to the *Landespatritismus* of the elites in their Bohemian and Hungarian possessions. But just as the entire issue of 'enlightened absolutism' is too complex to discuss here, the issue of their relationship to patriotism is also more complex than simply that it evoked, first, a conservative defense of the status quo (identified with national liberty) and, second, a quest by those elites for learned advice, which would then change the whole face of the resistance in these provinces. For not only did their initiatives, and the principles behind them, as explicated in documents like Joseph's *Réveries*, answer both the above criteria of eighteenth-century patriotism and their contemporary rendering in the little treatise *On the love of Fatherland* by Joseph von Sonnenfels, one of the architects of Viennese enlightened absolutism, they also created a network of administrative, educational and other institutions, and to a certain extent even provided for the operation of institutions of sociability, in which their not too numerous local partners could cultivate and exert their commitment to "patriotism" in the above sense—until their ways parted, because their answers to the questions they each asked now started to differ. But many a Hungarian enlightened patriot like Bessenyei started his career in Maria Theresa's Royal Hungarian Guard in Vienna, or, like József Hajnóczy, in the district administration set up by Joseph II. The Bohemian Count Franz Joseph Kinsky took over the command of the Theresian Military Academy at Wiener Neustadt in 1779 as a patriotic assignment. The latter's Polish counterpart, the Cadet Corps (or 'Knight School') in Warsaw's Kazimierz Palace, also had an aristocratic patron, Prince Adam Kazimierz Czartoryski as its first commandant from 1765. Here, as at the academy of Kinsky (himself an important writer on education), the ideas of Locke and Rousseau were creatively used in developing a curriculum aimed not only at training qualified officers and public servants, but broadly educated, patriotic citizens, aware of their country's faults and needs.<sup>17</sup>

Questions of political identity, in the sense of the demarcation of the community whose improvement was targeted by these initiatives, were more implicit than explicit in them, or rather they unfold when set against the background of the pattern of political thinking in the period. If I have played down the element of politicization within the Central European Enlightenment in this introduction so far, it is now time to address it. It is necessary, first, to take a brief look at the political status quo in Bohemia, Hungary and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth—each of which can be described by reference to the notion of a composite monarchy, yet in rather different ways.

As regards the former two, while the Habsburgs established themselves on both thrones in 1526, the forcible integration into the imperial administrative and cultural patterns that took place in the Czech lands after the battle of White Mountain in 1620, though attempted (especially under Leopold I), never succeeded in Hungary, where the positions of the estates were, if anything, consolidated in the compromise that followed the apparent defeat of the Rákóczi rebellion (1703–1711). Thus, by the time Maria Theresa and Joseph II launched their administrative, judicial and social reforms, in Bohemia the cameralist-inspired policies of their predecessors had done a great deal to prepare the ground. The situation was more ambivalent in the Kingdom of Hungary, where the ancient constitution (or rather, the customs and statutes of the realm) were in full vigor, and though the estates were willing partners in some improvements, there were limits to this—so, after 1754, Hungary was the only part of the Habsburg Monarchy where nobles still did not pay taxes. Finally, there was Poland's famous—or notorious—noble republic, the democracy of the gentry. If the Hungarian nobility insisted that the martial prowess of their ancient 'Scythian' ancestors created an indefeasible hereditary right for them, as the *communitas regni*, to have a voice in governing the realm, so even more emphatically did the 'Sarmatianism' of their Polish counterparts vindicate the right to govern themselves.

The Polish and the Hungarian cases offer particularly exciting comparative perspectives. In the latter, a segment of the estates, partly on their own initiative and partly encouraged and instigated by the "foreign" monarch, became enthusiastic about improvement, some of them serving him in office, while becoming increasingly jealous of the country's liberties—thus wedged between the court and most of their peers.<sup>18</sup> Similarly, there was an enlightened version of Sarmatianism, not confined to the defense of feudal liberties and supportive of the efforts of Stanislas Augustus to strengthen the country through reforms. This was an attitude that had to establish itself not only in the face of the reluctance of the bulk of the *szlachta*, but also in that of Poland's powerful neighbors whose interest was to keep it weak and anarchical—and at least one of them had a 'fifth column' in the country: the 'Russian party' that arose after Peter I's mediation in the conflict between the Polish nobility and King Augustus II early in the century.<sup>19</sup>

These peculiarities of the political traditions, institutions, realities and imperatives were also relevant to the character of the Enlightenment, and on the terms whereby its representatives expressed collective identity, in each of the three countries. Bohemia, where the legal and institutional means of asserting patriotic endeavours were least favorable for doing so in directly political

ways, was nevertheless—or, if we recall the pattern applied to Scotland's 'age of improvement' as mentioned above,<sup>20</sup> perhaps precisely for this reason—a quite natural home for a patriotism expressed in terms of sociability and projects for the refinement of the polite and the useful arts, of taste and the sciences.<sup>21</sup> As a matter of fact, there were vigorous attempts to stress the historic rights of the Bohemian kingdom and the estates, especially in the works of two learned Bohemian German Piarists, Gelasius Dobner and Mikuláš Adaukt Voigt, the title of whose work, *Of the Spirit of Bohemian Laws* (1788), speaks for itself. But civility, indeed civilization, and culture were central to the Bohemian Enlightenment, and the relative irrelevance of political representation through the nobility also facilitated a drift of notions of patriotism and identity away from the polity, its traditions and its excellence—and towards language. As already hinted, together with the main reasons, there were similar developments everywhere in the region, but in the Czech lands they came rather early. Its most striking expression, Josef Dobrovský's 1791 address to Emperor Leopold II, published in this volume, was preceded and prepared by two decades during which 'apologies' for the Czech language were firmly on the agenda.

In the given circumstances it would have been certainly rather difficult for Czechs in the Age of Enlightenment to develop, even desire, an identity based on political legitimacy and active citizenship. Also, from the preoccupation with language there is a more or less direct route towards definitions based on ethnicity. Nevertheless it is obvious that even the Czech case cannot be simply accommodated within the dichotomous view according to which modern notions of national identity were products of the Enlightenment in the 'West' and arose as a reaction to the Enlightenment in the 'East.'<sup>22</sup> Still more complex is the Hungarian and the Polish story. In both countries, a tradition in which *natio* was associated with political participation (to be sure, by the privileged) was unbroken. Both of them looked back to medieval origins, and if 'Scythianism' was conceived by reference to ancient custom, reinforced by legal humanism, 'Sarmatianism' spoke the language of participatory republicanism.<sup>23</sup> The one, towards the end of the period, created the myth of the parallel historical development of the English and the Hungarian constitution, while the other held that in England political freedom was too limited in comparison to Poland. Very tellingly, Montesquieu chose the example of the Hungarian nobility to illustrate the importance of intermediary powers for a monarchical state in the *Spirit of the Laws*, while Rousseau believed that Poland was the only European country still suitable for receiving a constitution to save it from the evils of modernity.<sup>24</sup> Both of these concepts,

'imagining' the nation as a body politic, were conservative and exclusive *socially*—but not exclusive on strictly ethnic grounds, and this, coupled with the Enlightenment project of improvement or social reform, made civic nationhood not at all a foregone conclusion. Arguably, the moment of Enlightenment came in Hungary when some patriots reminded that the country's ailing conditions were not so much the result of the 'colonial system' operated by Vienna but its lack of social solidarity, which depended on improvement as much as the other way round; and in Poland, when it was recognized that the improvement which was essential to avoid sinking into (even greater) dependence on foreign powers, also involved the assertion of social solidarity. Both recognitions concluded in proposals for the dismantling of estates barriers, framed in discourses of emancipatory patriotism by József Hajnóczy in the Hungarian case and by Hugo Kołłątaj or Stanisław Staszic in the Polish one.<sup>25</sup>

At the same time, very naturally, important statements on language as constitutive of nationhood were put forward by Hungarians and Poles, as by others in Europe East or West, only to remain mutually supplementary and not mutually exclusive with the civic definition, with shifting emphases as the circumstances dictated or allowed. After the demise of the Polish state, the views advanced by Franciszek Jezierski<sup>26</sup> quite quickly became the core of a dominant idiom of ethno-linguistic-cultural nationhood in Poland. In Hungary, too, once the language issue was thrown into prominence, partly by the above-mentioned imperatives of improvement, and partly by Joseph II's German language decree, and received reinforcement from the sensibilities of Romanticism, it remained an important current alongside the concept of the Hungarian liberals of the "unitary Hungarian political nation." The latter grafted the Enlightenment heritage, together with early-nineteenth century liberalism, on the gentry tradition, in arguing that the nation is the bulk of the emancipated citizens enjoying equal rights as individuals under a modern constitution—and onto that ground denied demands of collective rights established on the ethno-linguistic principle by those who did not possess an institutional and ideological tradition upon which 'political nationhood' could be erected.

The juxtaposition of the notions of civic and ethnic nationhood, together with the discourses of identity and belonging that support them, and their ascription to the Enlightenment and Romanticism (to the 'West' and the 'East' of Europe), respectively, thus belongs to the realm of those stereotypes that are defeated by the richness and complexity of the material presented in collections like this one. It is not only the case that between the two extremes

there are transitory types whose infinite variety calls the value of the above generalization into question. As I have tried to show, they also make it possible to offer another generalization: that there is a pedigree of each of the shades of nineteenth-century nationalism in Central Europe that can be traced back to what was, apparently, an unprejudiced quest to unite the talents and the commitment of men as reasonable and sociable beings in the service of improvement.

### Notes

- 1 I am grateful to Teodora Shek Brnardić and Maciej Janowski for their thoughtful comments.
- 2 Originally and predominantly used in the narrower sense of 'education,' also in the adjectival (*oświecony*: enlightened/educated) and verbal (*oświecić*: to enlighten/to educate) form, but capable of extension.
- 3 To be sure, bilingual Bohemians did not hesitate to use *aufgeklärt* and *aufklärung*.
- 4 Of course here I am conflating the very different perspectives of Ernst Cassirer, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Carl Becker and Peter Gay, and perhaps I am even caricaturing them. But whatever the sophistication of their own arguments, this was the tone they set for the general perception of what the Enlightenment was about.
- 5 Cf. Dorinda Outram, *The Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 3, where it is argued that until recently advocates of the Enlightenment as a cluster of ideas thought of it as "a unitary phenomenon with canonized thinkers who shared the obvious characteristics of being white, male and drawn from western Europe."
- 6 Before 1989, the political climate in the region itself also favored the quest for a "progressive tradition" in national histories and cultures. At the same time, or precisely for this reason, eighteenth-century studies was in fact a flourishing field especially in Hungary and Poland from the 1960s onwards, and it must be noted that several scholars produced work of lasting value. Salient cases in point are Kálmán Benda, Éva H. Balázs, Domokos Kosáry, Béla Köpeczi for Hungary, and Jerzy Michalski, Zofia Libiszowska, Zofia Zielińska for Poland. The fact that in 1987 Budapest hosted the quadrennial congress of the International Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies was to a certain extent a tribute to their achievement which, from about that time on, also started to make an impact on the Western perception of the Enlightenment in the "East".
- 7 Joseph Frederick Zacek, "Introduction," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 10/1 (Spring 1983), p. 1 (issue devoted to the Enlightenment and national awakening in Central and Southeast Europe).
- 8 See several studies by J. G. A. Pocock, most forcefully perhaps in the Introduction to *Barbarism and religion* vol. I. *The Enlightenment of Edward Gibbon, 1737–1764* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 1–10.
- 9 Mention must be made of a volume which over two decades ago set the problem of unity and diversity within the Enlightenment on a new footing. Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich, eds., *The Enlightenment in national context* (Cambridge, 1981)—

even though, from the region studied in this volume, only Bohemia received a chapter in it. For an attempt at a revision of both the premisses of this volume and the views advanced by Pocock, see John Robertson, "The Enlightenment above national context," *The Historical Journal* 40 (1997), pp. 667–697. For the notion of a "conservative Enlightenment," see, again the work by Pocock, especially "Conservative Enlightenment and democratic revolutions: The American and French cases in British perspective," *Government and Opposition* 23 (1989), pp. 81–106.

10 Let it be noted here that Kant was not the first to borrow Horace's dictum in order to give an identity to the period. *Sapere aude!* was the motto on the medal coined in 1736 for the *Societas Altiophilorum* [Society of the Friends of the Truth] in Berlin. See Erhard Bahr ed., *Was ist Aufklärung? Thesen und Definitionen* (Stuttgart, 1974), p. 57. *Sapere aude* ("to the one who dared to know") was the inscription on a medal King Stanislas Augustus of Poland coined in honor of the Piarist educational reformer Stanislaw Konarski in 1765. Cf. Franco Venturi, "Contributi ad un dizionario storico. I. Was ist Aufklärung? Sapere aude!" *Rivista storica italiana* 71, 1 (1959), pp. 125–6.

11 The relevant literature might fill libraries. The Enlightenment as a process of communication about matters of public concern among private individuals was of course, a topic introduced by Jürgen Habermas in *The structural transformation of the public sphere* (1962, English ed. Cambridge, 1989), which has been exploited by historians in many highly creative ways. For a recent summary, see James Van Horn Melton, *The rise of the public in Enlightenment Europe* (Cambridge, 2002). The topics of *Verbesserung* and *Geselligkeit* have become prominent in a torrent of studies on the German eighteenth century (while *Politisierung*, formerly less readily associated with the *Aufklärung*, has also been discovered). "Improvement" and "sociability" have been the organizing notions in a spectacular revival of Scottish Enlightenment studies since the late 1960s on the grounds that, after the incorporating union of 1707 and the resulting loss of the institutional conditions of asserting political virtue, they became the pillars of a new vocabulary of active patriotism and citizenship—not irrelevant to our present purposes. At the same time, it has been also suggested that sociability is a useful concept for making sense of the French Enlightenment itself. Daniel Gordon, *Citizens without sovereignty: Equality and sociability in French thought, 1670–1789* (Princeton, 1994).

12 Larry Wolff, "Mozart's Eastern Europe: Bohemians, Albanians, Wallachians and Turks," *Hatycyn* 15 (1993), pp. 58, 61, and, more comprehensively, his *Inventing Eastern Europe: The map of civilization on the mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, 1994).

13 See below, pp. 104–111.

14 See below, pp. 148–154.

15 See in Volume II.

16 A very poignant representation of the Enlightenment dilemma of "innocence and uncorruptibility versus progressivism" (as well as an attempt to resolve the dilemma) is to be found in the engagement of Ivan Lovrić with Alberto Fortis. See below, pp. 57–64.

17 See Teodora Shek Brnardić, *The Enlightened officer at work: The educational projects of the Bohemian Count Franz Joseph Kinsky (1739–1805)*. Ph.D. dissertation, Central European University, Budapest, 2004; Jerzy Lukowski, *Liberty's folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the eighteenth century, 1697–1795* (London and New York, 1991), pp. 221 ff.