

Lost Chances of the House of Habsburg

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OF ALL THE GREAT QUESTIONS of Habsburg history, perhaps the greatest is this: What would have been the consequence if Charles V had decided to prioritize differently his dealings with France, the Ottoman Empire, and Christian reformers? It is certain that the House of Habsburg would have proceeded along a different path, but such a truism hardly advances a better understanding of events in the empire, or in Europe more widely, in the sixteenth century. Charles V, as *pater ecclesiae* and as head of a *monarchia universalis*, stands astride the traditional and the modern. To him is attributed the last opportunity for Habsburg universal empire, with the long hand of the *casa de Austria* imprinting Habsburg ambitions on the world.¹

The sixteenth century was peppered with wasted opportunities, lost chances to end wars, settle religious disputes, and reduce grievances. It was to Charles V's eponymous heir, Archduke Charles (1685–1740), that the greatest opportunity presented itself—to recreate not just the empire of Charles V, but an imperial domain that might include the lands of the Holy Roman Empire, the *Erblande*, Bavaria, the East and West Indies, as well as Spain and the Spanish American lands. Such an opportunity was not the stuff of wild flights of imperial fancy. It was discussed at the highest levels of government; and on a number of occasions, it was almost within the grasp of the House of Habsburg, less falling from hold than bullishly pushed away in fits of ill-advised pique. Territorial expansion and diplomatic influence was accompanied by “the fullest unfolding of Baroque civilization: buildings, fine arts, display, popular piety, all reached their largest extent during the reign of the least colorful of Habsburg emperors.”² Under Charles, “Italian ambitions could be revived, even Spanish visions nurtured; an older dream of universal empire could be temporarily resuscitated.”³

This article seeks to consider the ripples of imperial ambition emanating from the person of Emperor Charles VI, centered on Charles's years in Spain and working out throughout his later life in Vienna. The echo of Spain and Spanish government was always there, sometimes quite

¹See, *inter alia*, Heinrich Lutz, *Reformation und Gegenreformation*, 3rd ed., (Munich, 1991), 148; and Horst Rabe, “Elemente neuzeitlicher Politik und Staatlichkeit im politischen System Karls V.,” in Heinrich Lutz, ed., *Das römisch-deutsche Reich im politischen System Karls V*, Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien vol. 1 (Munich-Vienna, 1982), 161–87, here 163.

²R. J. W. Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy 1550–1700. An Interpretation* (Oxford, 1979), 447.

³R. J. W. Evans, “Introduction. State and Society in Early Modern Austria,” in Charles W. Ingrao, *State and Society in Early Modern Austria* (West Lafayette, IN, 1994) 1–23, here 7.

audible, other times little more than a whisper, a rumor from a distant land. The proposition is simple: Charles was resolutely changed by his experience of life and leadership at his Spanish court in Barcelona, and this experience marked his form and style of rule in Vienna and throughout his imperial and royal lands. Charles, the last Habsburg Emperor, had the final chance to recreate the empire of Charles V; and even the most valiant of efforts failed to secure the imperial heritage he so desired. Charles's failed opportunity would dominate his life and rule. In developing these ideas, I will consider Archduke Charles of Austria's plans, as King Charles III of Spain and later Emperor Charles VI, to govern a united Habsburg Empire from Madrid, Barcelona, and Vienna in the light of his missed opportunities and lost chances between the commencement of the War of Spanish Succession and his death in 1740.

Charles attempted to follow in the footsteps of the King and Emperor Charles V in creating a universal empire; his plans ultimately failed. The opportunity to create a new Habsburg Empire also shows how ideas and theories developed in the Spanish Habsburg world came, after the loss of the War of Spanish Succession, to have real and significant impact on the Austrian Habsburg lands. This ambitious project to manage a united empire based round the "heterogeneous elements"⁴ of Central Europe, together with complex colonies in the Americas, was a Spanish Habsburg *reconquista* of Central Europe. It allowed methods and means of government developed in one Habsburg territory to permeate continental Europe and be used consciously in the management of peoples and lands.

When King Charles (Carlos) II Habsburg of Spain died without issue in November 1700, his will named as his successor the 17-year-old Philip Bourbon, grandson of Charles's sister Maria Theresa of Spain, as his successor, and not his godson the 14-year-old Archduke Charles.⁵ The feeble Charles II had fought to prevent his Spanish empire from falling victim to political intrigue and had decided on Philip Bourbon, duke of Anjou, to succeed him. Both Bourbon and Habsburg houses had a legal claim to the throne of Spain. Philip had the better claim; his grandmother and great-grandmother were older than Leopold's and took precedence. However, the Austrian branch of the Habsburg family claimed that Philip's grandmother had renounced the Spanish throne for her descendants as part of her marriage contract. This claim was countered by the French branch's own claim that it was predicated on a dowry that had never been paid. With the dauphin's support, it was agreed that Philip would ascend the Spanish throne but would forever renounce his claim to the French crown for himself and his descendants.

For some European powers, French support for Philip of Anjou in his claims as Philip V of Spain was greatly alarming. England, despite Bourbon assurances, was disturbed by the prospect of a trans-Pyrenees alliance of the crowns between France and Spain; and this fear helped to precipitate the War for the Spanish Succession (1705–1713). In the early stages of the war, Aragon, Barcelona and Valencia supported the Habsburg cause and invited English troops to assist them in their anti-Bourbon actions; Barcelona became a base for the pro-Austrian

⁴Evans, *Habsburg Monarchy*, 446. The historian Carl J. Burckhardt recalled a conversation with the Austrian writer Hugo von Hofmannsthal, in which he said "In our old Austria, orient and occident still permeated each other, giving to one another, taking from one another. How much still belonged to us, Byzantium as well as Spain." Carl J. Burckhardt, *Erinnerungen an Hofmannsthal* (Munich, 1964), 74; after: Joachim Remak, "The Healthy Invalid: How doomed the Habsburg Empire?" *The Journal of Modern History* 41, no. 2 (June, 1969): 127–43, here 129–30.

⁵Charles (Carlos) II Habsburg, king of Spain, b. 6 November 1661, d. 1 November 1700. Charles was both physically and mentally disabled. He reigned as king of Spain, Sicily, and Naples from 1665–1700, largely with the aid of his mother. Charles II's second wife, Maria Anna Pfalz-Neuburg, was Archduke Charles's aunt. Peter von Radics, *Kaiser Karl VI als Staats- und Volkswirth; nach zeitgenössischen Quellen dargestellt* (Innsbruck, 1886): 9.

camp, supporting Archduke Charles in his claims as king of Spain.⁶ It would not have been easy to predict the outcome of the war. After the cessation of hostilities, under the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), England was granted Gibraltar, Minorca, and trade concessions in the Spanish Indies (most notably the *asciento*). Additional negotiations granted the Spanish Netherlands and Spain's Italian possessions to Austria. Only on 11 September 1714 did Barcelona surrender to the Bourbon army under the leadership of Philip, an event that led to deep resentment toward the Catalan cause on the part of future Bourbon kings.⁷

In Vienna, in the earliest phase of the interregnum and in an act provoked by the earlier arrival of Philip Bourbon in Madrid in 1701, Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I and his first-born son (and later emperor) Joseph, ceded their rights to the crown of Spain in favor of Archduke Charles. He was proclaimed king of Spain on 12 September 1703, and a "*pacta familiae et reservata*" was sworn between Leopold and Joseph in favor of Charles.⁸ In the ceremony, the 19-year-old Charles promised to "conserve the rights and privileges of all kingdoms and provinces, communes and regions, within the Spanish dominions," in a statement that recalled the promise of the previous Habsburg king of Spain, Charles II. When he departed Vienna for Spain in 1704, Charles's claims to the crown of Spain would institute not just civil unrest in the kingdom, but an international war that would affect the European balance of power and heralded the end of Habsburg hegemony in two empires.

With the support of his father and of England and the United Provinces, and accompanied by the English ambassador George Stepney, by Prince Anton of Liechtenstein, and a large retinue, Charles of Austria departed Vienna for the United Provinces in February 1704, on the first leg of an arduous journey to Spain.⁹ Prior to leaving Vienna, Charles had visited the site of Marian pilgrimage in Styria, Mariazell, and had sent his baggage train ahead of him on the circuitous route to the Low Countries, via Prague, Franconia, and Düsseldorf, denied access as he was to the much easier route through the Italian lands because of the 1701 French invasion. In many respects, Charles's actions recall those of Emperor Charles V, for he travelled more than any other emperor since his sixteenth-century antecedent. At Düsseldorf, Charles met with the Duke of Marlborough and, a little thereafter, entered the United Provinces and held an audience with the provincial assembly of Holland and of the Estates General.

Charles continued in the direction of London where he was received with exceptional cordiality by Queen Anne at Windsor: Anne and Charles played cards and she presented him with a gift of 150,000 pounds sterling to aid his cause in Spain. Boarding a vessel of the English navy, Charles embarked for Portugal, where he arrived, amidst grand celebrations, on 6 March 1704. He was made most welcome at the court of King Pedro II in Lisbon between March 1704 and 23 July 1705. It was here that Charles first held court in exile, receiving many of the leading nobles of Spain, including the Count of Cardona and Cardinal

⁶Pedro Voltés Bou, *La Guerra de Sucesion en Valencia* (Valencia, 1964), 24–25; idem., *L'Arxiduc Carles d'Àustria. Rei dels Catalans* (Barcelona, 1967), esp. 25–38.

⁷José Luis Cervera Torrejón, *Joan Baptista Basset: vida i mort del líder Maulet* (València, 2006), 163. This date marks the historic "end of the Catalan nation," as it marked the end of the principality of Catalonia within the kingdom of Aragon, the suspension of the Catalan government, and the introduction of Castilian rule. See also: J. Nadal Farreras, *L'Onze de Septiembre i el centralisme borbònic* (Barcelona, 1977), 24.

⁸See details of the "Pactum mutuae successionis, 12 September 1703" in Gustav Turba, "Zur pragmatischen Sanktion. Vorläufige Mitteilung," *Zeitschrift für das privat- und öffentliche Recht der Gegenwart* 37 (1910): 319–322, here 319–20.

⁹Leopold I is recounted as saying to Charles, when he departed the court, "I shall not see you again unless it is in heaven." Virginia León, *Carlos VI. El emperador que no pudo ser rey de España* (Madrid, 2003), 57–58.

Álvaro of Cienfuegos, who now declared themselves for the Austrian cause against the Bourbon, and it was also in Lisbon that Charles heard news of his father's death on 5 May 1705.

While in Portugal, Charles declared his irrevocable rights to the throne of Spain and announced his intention to liberate Spaniards from the tyranny of the Duke of Anjou. Reacting to Charles's arrival on the peninsula and his recent pronouncements, Philip Bourbon, from his base in Madrid, proclaimed a state of war on 30 April 1704 and called for Spanish-French forces to mobilize along the Portuguese border. From this moment, the conflict in the Iberian peninsula became international. It did not only involve Spain (particularly Castile) and France and the Portuguese allies of Charles Habsburg, but also the Anglo-Dutch flotilla harbored off the coast of Cádiz. The Earl of Galway, Henri de Masseur, Marquis de Ruvigny, had been named commander of English troops in Portugal; he faced the Bourbon Spanish army, under the command of the Duke of Berwick, on the Portuguese frontier.¹⁰ (It is worth contemplating the international dimension to the conflict at this early stage in events: Galway was a French Huguenot who had served with William of Orange and earned his title on campaign in Ireland, whereas Berwick was a natural son of James II who had been named captain general of the combined Franco-Spanish army.) After a number of exchanges, the Bourbon army was forced to withdraw and Philip V retired to Madrid, Berwick being replaced by Marshall Tessé.

Most especially, representatives from Catalonia travelled to meet the Austrian king, declaring themselves for the monarch whom they now saw as the new Count of Barcelona, King of Aragon and King Charles III of Spain. On 23 July 1705, Charles and his retinue set sail from the port of Lisbon aboard the *Gran Bretaña*. The Anglo-Dutch flotilla arrived at Gibraltar on 2 August and the Valencian port of Altea—one of the first cities to declare for Charles—on 10 August, whence they travelled to Denia, where Charles and his party disembarked briefly before continuing on to Barcelona. Mustering support for his candidature along the way, Charles wrote to the Valencians on 15 August seeking that they support their new king.¹¹ Support was forthcoming, especially from the “Maulets” or “Austriacistas,” who opposed Philip Bourbon in his claim to the title Philip IV of Valencia. These supporters were growing in number in Catalonia, Majorca, and Valencia, joining the ranks of the “vigatans” and “regenerationists” who sought economic, political, and social independence for Catalonia, under a Habsburg king and who welcomed Charles all along the eastern Spanish coast.¹² On his arrival at Barcelona, Charles was welcomed into the city as a hero. Crowds in the streets greeted him with song, seeing him as a virtuous and good leader come to restore their rights. They hailed him as their king “Carlos Tercer.”¹³

¹⁰ Alfred Ritter von Arneth, *Feldzüge Eugens von Savoyen* (Vienna, 1876), 42, writes of Galway: “Er besass persönliche Tapferkeit, aber kein Feldherrentalent”; others considered him a brilliant tactician: Arthur Parnell, *The War of Succession in Spain during the reign of Queen Anne (1702–1711)* (London, 1888), 312.

¹¹ Torrejón, *Joan Baptista Basset*, 76–77.

¹² Carme Pérez Aparicio, *De l'Alçament Maulet al Triomf Botifler* (València, 1981), esp. 23–39; Henry Kamen, “The Catalan Phoenix: Narcís Feliu de la Penya and the programme for industrial renewal in Catalonia,” in idem., *Crisis and Change in Early Modern Spain* (Aldershot, UK, 1993), essay XI, 1–15; J. Albareda, *Els Catalans i Felip V. De la conspiració a la revolta (1700–1705)* (Barcelona, 1993), 171–86.

¹³ The crowds were recorded as singing: “Dictar vull una canço/dell fill del Emperador/Carlos, arxiduch d'Àustria;/ Per cert que es bell senyor,/bonich, virtuos y molt bo/vingut d'Àlemanya?” in Voltes Bou, *La Guerra de Sucesion*, 16. A slightly different version is given by Pedro Voltes Bou, *L'Arxiduc Carles d'Àustria*, 25. A collection of pro-Charlist poems and songs is reproduced in appendices to: Joseph Rafel Carreras y Bulbena, *Carlos d'Àustria y Elisabeth de Brunswick Wolfenbüttel a Barcelona y Girona* (Barcelona, 1902).

Archduke Charles's reputation in Spain was not universally positive, despite his rapturous reception in Catalonia.¹⁴ Warfare, a difficult diplomatic situation, and financial mismanagement made the viability of continued Austrian government in Spain a disappointing prospect for many Spaniards to envisage.¹⁵ When Charles began to rule as King Charles III of Spain after 1705, his Spanish administration was deeply worried, recognizing, as it did, the need to reform government in Spain and to correct the great economic and diplomatic decline that popular opinion attributed to Habsburg mismanagement and that marked the end of the Spanish golden age.

There was a danger, however, that many of the proposed administrative reforms would create more enemies than supporters at this crucial time in the effort to win hearts and minds to the Habsburg cause. Charles saw a possibility to use some of the monies available in Catalan coffers to create allies by rewarding loyal supporters with favors and rewards. Some believed that these Habsburg expenditures were distributed thoughtlessly and that they were characteristic of Habsburg sumptuary expenditure in a time of war.¹⁶ Despite some misgivings, supporters were liberally rewarded with monies and with honors. Charles issued a disproportionately high number of patents of honorable citizenship of Barcelona, when compared with the preceding and succeeding years: Charles awarded eighty-two *ciudadanías* in the years 1705–1714 and ennobled a total of 182 men, the second-highest average number of patents per annum (20.0) in the entire period 1558–1838.¹⁷ Charles and his party knew that only through a full reform of the administration in Spain and the Spanish colonies could he prove his suitability for the position as *rey d'España*.¹⁸ In an attempt to win popular support, Charles commenced a comprehensive reform of government in 1705.

It is striking that a great number of the reforms later credited to the Bourbon monarchs—the “Bourbon reforms” beginning in 1714—were first conceived of during the government of Archduke Charles in Spain. There was an evident reforming orientation in the period of government of the last Habsburg in Spain.¹⁹ The kingdom was habituated to foreign generals and administrators who knew more than many Spaniards about matters in the wider European arena. Habsburg and Bourbon were not dynastic or ideological concepts but represented real and significant interests and aspirations. Spaniards also knew that the war with France threatened the unity of the Spanish empire on three fronts: in the Low

¹⁴Virginia León Sanz, *Entre Austrias y Bourbones. El Archiduque Carlos y la monarquía de España (1700–1714)* (Madrid, 1993), 173.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 46.

¹⁶J. Mercader Riba, *Els Capitans Generals* (Barcelona, 1963), 13–14.

¹⁷The highest, 29 per annum, was in the Interregnum and period of rule of Louis XIII–XIV (1641–1652). James S. Amelang, *Honored Citizens of Barcelona: Patrician Culture and Class Relations, 1490–1717* (Princeton, 1986), 40–1; 66–68; 178. See also: Pedro Voltes Bou, “Noticias sobre las Mercedes nobiliarias otorgadas por el archiduque Carlos de Austria durante su gobierno en Barcelona,” *Documentos y Estudios* 10 (1962): 63–136.

¹⁸M. Danvila y Collado, *El poder civil en España* (Madrid, 1885), vol. 3:240; Teodoro Martínez, *La Saga de Los Borbones en España* (Madrid, 1987), 21–41.

¹⁹León Sanz, *Entre Austrias y Bourbones*, 88. “The Bourbon Reforms” refers to the work begun under Philip V, which reached its highest expression under Charles III Bourbon who ruled from 1759–1788. The early reforms attempted to establish state-owned textile factories and invited foreign technical experts into Spain; agricultural practices were modernized, ship-building reorganized, and an infrastructure created that would facilitate regional and national economic integration and development. In the American colonies, the Bourbon Reforms gave little thought to free trade for Spanish colonists with non-Spanish America; rather, commercial reforms were designed to stop smuggling and the contraband trade that had flourished for decades and to reinforce the exclusive commercial ties between Spain and her colonies. Spain hoped to once again “reconquer” her colonies economically, as she had politically in the sixteenth century.

Countries, in Italy, and in the Atlantic. These essential components to Spain's universal monarchy were now threatened by war, no longer by diplomatic posturing alone.²⁰

Catalonia, the heartland of Charles's power, had not been alienated by previous years of Habsburg government to the same extent as Castile.²¹ For Catalans, the War of Spanish Succession was an opportunity to exploit the principality's position; Catalan support for Archduke Charles was neither spontaneous nor popular in origin. Rather, that support expressed the political objectives of the ruling interest group. Crystallizing in the program of reform instituted in the 1560s by Philip II, Catalan society had grown increasingly embittered with encroaching royal authority, which left a deep impression on local attitudes in the seventeenth century.²² Catalonia, as the home of a cohesive urban elite, had seen a revival in its economy from the 1680s.²³ Such economic developments were expressed in the writings of the Catalan lawyer Narcís Feliu de la Penya, who called for a reorientation of Catalan trade from traditional markets in the Mediterranean toward America and Atlantic trade. De la Penya believed a greater role for Catalan traders and merchants in Spanish Atlantic trade could be best served by a Habsburg on the Spanish throne.²⁴ Such opinions fed Charles's ambitions and encouraged him to believe that, from a strong Catalan base, he could win the hearts and minds of the Spanish people and win the crown of Spain. Charles's reception in Valencia and Catalonia made him hopeful about gaining the crown of Aragon, but not of Castile; he realized he needed to work hard to win Castilians to his side.²⁵

Charles's innermost thoughts on the method and means by which he could govern Spain, her colonies abroad, and his continental European lands were expressed in his correspondence with Bohemian vice-chancellor Johann Wenzel *Graf* Wratislaw. Charles wrote to Wratislaw of the growing dilemma facing him and of his ambitions to govern both monarchies as his forefather Charles V had done. He would struggle, he wrote, to understand the "method and system" of Spain and would fight the lack of desire to understand the country so evident in Vienna. The German lands and Spain must be considered equal and "should seek to be united under one ruler." Only by bringing Germans to Spain and Spaniards to Germany, he believed, would both places grow closer and more understanding of each other. Charles noted that it would be necessary to travel frequently between both places to facilitate this mutual understanding, so that "there should be no difference between nations."²⁶ These were insightful words for a 25-year-old man, isolated from familial support in Vienna, exiled from his royal capital in Spain and yet desirous of a system that might restore the old empire of Charles V. Charles's use of "nations" is also telling, respecting the distinctive natures of the *naciones* of Spain while also acknowledging

²⁰John Lynch, *Bourbon Spain 1700–1808* (Oxford, 1989), 26.

²¹*Ibid.*, 37, 41.

²²Bruce Taylor, *Structures of Reform: The Mercedarian Order in the Spanish Golden Age* (Leiden, 2000), 421–23; Kamen, "The Catalan Phoenix," 11–12. Narcís's brother, Padre Maestro Fray Salvador Feliu de la Penya, was prior of the Barcelona monastery of the Merced and a strong supporter of the cause of the archduke Charles in the War of Succession.

²³Amelang, *Honored Citizens of Barcelona*, 15, 73–84, 221–22. For more on de la Penya's support for Charles and his justification for the restoration and maintenance of privileges in the Catalan principality, see Xavier Baró i Queralt, "Els privilegis originaris de Catalunya segons Narcís Feliu de la Penya i d'altres Historiadors de l'època," *Pedralbes* 22 (2002): 111–32.

²⁴Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, 41.

²⁵León, *Carlos VI*, 72–73.

²⁶Charles to Count Wratislaw, Barcelona, 31 July 1711. J.W. Stoye, "Emperor Charles VI: The Early Years of the Reign." *Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichts-Quellen* 16 (1856) (hereafter *AfK*): 203. *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, Vol. 12 (1961): 63–84.

the multiethnic composition of the Habsburg monarchy in similar terms, at a territorial-acquisitive time for the Austrian Habsburgs in Central Europe.

Charles' greatest initial difficulty was to win international recognition for his claims to the crown of Spain. He pushed for papal recognition of his title as Catholic Majesty, or at the very least for the pope to send him a nuncio in recognition of his claims to the crown.²⁷ Pope Clement XI agreed to recognize Charles as king, but this did little to sway international opinion; indeed, his allied Grand Alliance was predominantly non-Catholic and Charles's association with "Protestants" afforded his enemies, and particularly France, much ammunition in their propaganda war against him. For the French state, the Protestant origins of many of the soldiers in the Grand Alliance who supported Charles's claim highlighted that the Austrian pretender was a heretic, a claim that could only be balanced by the very real religiosity of the person of Charles.²⁸ Diplomatic recognition of his claim was less forthcoming and would dominate Franco-Spanish relations for over twenty years. Just as Philip of Anjou was determined in his refusal to address Charles with the title "King of Spain," until the Peace of Vienna of 1725, Charles refused to recognize Philip V as king of Spain, but rather referred to him as a "usurper."²⁹ Throughout the 1720s, Charles continued to use the title *D. Carlos por la gracia de Dios Emperador de los Romanos, siempre Augusto Rey de Germania y de Castilla...*³⁰

Charles was well aware that the international interests of his Grand Alliance allies far outweighed any expedient demands he had concerning his claims to the Spanish crown. He also knew that his allies would allow Spain and the American colonies to fall into "enemy hands" if it served their own interests.³¹ His ministers in Vienna also reminded him of the possibility of a territorial settlement that would necessitate the sacrifice of one or more of his territorial possessions for the greater good in treaty negotiations. Count Wratislaw reminded Charles that "negotiations will not be without difficulty, as the sea powers [England and the Dutch Republic] will certainly sacrifice Italy and perhaps also Spain and the Indies . . . so that one must consider whether, in such dire straits, we wish to retain Italy or Spain, or Spain and the American colonies, or Italy..."³² The overseas possessions remained at the forefront of Charles's mind, for he realized that a long-term reorganization of his administration would be possible only with revenue amassed from Atlantic trade. He was also aware that the influential support of Catalan mercantile interests would remain with him only as long as he could guarantee overseas trade for Catalan merchants.

Charles's plans for America considered the mode and means by which the American colonies might be reintegrated into a united, Spanish-Austrian empire.³³ The *Consejo* of the Indies, with a president and two administrative secretaries, dealt with the immense territories in the

²⁷ "... dass wan er machen kan dass der Pabst mich re catolico di Spagna erkene, qua tali alle notige bullas vnd brevia erfolgen lasse. . ." Charles to Count Wratislaw, Barcelona, 27 December 1708. *AfK*, 80. "Ich hoffe auch mit nechsten ein Nuncio zu haben dan nun die Nomina von Pabsten komen ist, . . ." Charles to Count Wratislaw, Barcelona, 28 March 1711. *AfK*, 141.

²⁸ León Sanz, *Entre Austrias y Bourbones*, 193.

²⁹ "Auch bericht euch (welches ihr auch der Kayserin sagen kont) dass ich ein condolenzbrif von Duc d'Anjou eigenhandig mit der Vberschrift *au Roy de boheme Monsieur mon cousin e frere* bekommen hab welchen nicht aufgebrochen sondern nach dem ich zuvor den aljrtzen ministren communicirt hab, widter zuruckgeschickt hab." Charles to Count Wratislaw, Barcelona, 27 May 1711. *AfK*, 163.

³⁰ León Sanz, *Entre Austrias y Bourbones*, 209.

³¹ Count Wratislaw to Charles, Vienna, 16 December 1706. *AfK*, 32; "... glaub nie dass sie spanien vndt Indien in des feinds handten lassen wurdten wegen Ihres selbsteigenen interesse, . . ." Charles to Count Wratislaw, Barcelona, 25 April 1711. *AfK*, 152.

³² Count Wratislaw to Charles, Vienna, 5 August 1711. *AfK*, 209.

³³ Charles to Count Wratislaw, Barcelona, 31 July 1711. *AfK*, 203.

New World and controlled commerce between Spain and the Americas.³⁴ The Austrian party did not have any real experts on the Americas, and so the *Consejo* served an educational purpose for Charles. Educating Charles in colonial matters and training him in the pacific maintenance of Spain's Atlantic trade routes, the *Consejo* also served as a repository for cartographic, cosmographic, and scientific knowledge, just as it has done in Madrid.³⁵ Critically, Charles also knew that Britain's attitude was changing. Britain was no longer in favor of supporting a union of monarchies that would potentially challenge its aspiration to dominate the Atlantic. Why support a Habsburg Empire that might, in more bellicose times, present a real and significant danger to English interests in Europe and in the Americas?³⁶

Unexpectedly, occident and orient collided for Charles in the spring of 1711. The death of Charles's brother, the Holy Roman Emperor Joseph I, on 17 April 1711, aged only 33 years, had the effect of seriously destabilizing the government in Vienna and casting doubt on the exiled Charles's commitment to the House of Habsburg in Austria. Unrest in Hungary, led by Ferenc II Rákóczi in Transylvania, was coming to an end; but negotiations between the Austrian and Hungarian forces were at a delicate and crucial stage. Events were not made any easier by the death of the Emperor Joseph. "Sad news," Charles wrote in his diary on 1 May 1711 in Spain, "my brother the emperor Joseph died of the pox on 17 April. From our House, only I remain, all falls to me."³⁷

Charles was heir apparent to the imperial title, but he had not been elected "King of the Romans," the title awarded to the chosen successor of the reigning emperor after consultation with the imperial electors. For this reason, the Habsburg claim to the imperial crown lapsed. Charles's mother, the dowager empress Eleanor, was prevailed upon to head up a regency. At the same time, senior servants of the crown wrote to Charles in Barcelona urging him to return to Vienna with utmost haste and secure both his position and the defense of Austria and the empire. Unsure of his future in Spain, Charles delayed his return to Vienna. Leaving Elizabeth Christine as his regent in Barcelona, where she remained until April 1713, he set out for Italy, arriving at Genoa on 12 October.³⁸ Charles made overland for Germany and was duly elected and crowned emperor in Frankfurt am Main on 22 December, without the feared opposition to his candidature. He finally arrived in Vienna on 26 January 1712.³⁹ News of his coronation as emperor was slow to reach Spain as corsairs at Argel captured the ship carrying word of the coronation.⁴⁰

³⁴G. Bernard, *Le Secrétariat d'Etat et le Conseil espagnol des Indes (1700–1808)* (Geneva, Paris, 1972); E. Schäfer, *El Consejo Real y Supremo de Indias*, 2 vols. (Seville, 1935–1937). Little relating to the War of the Spanish Succession took place on American soil; and where the American colonies were concerned, there was a tacit loyalty to the Bourbon claim.

³⁵Juan Pimentel, "The Iberian Vision: Science and Empire in the Framework of a Universal Monarchy, 1500–1800," *Osiris*, 2nd ser., vol. 15, Nature and Empire: Science and the Colonial Enterprise (2000): 17–30, here 21.

³⁶Charles to Count Wratislaw, Barcelona, 22 April 1711. *AfK*, 148–49.

³⁷Quoted in Hanns Leo Mikoletzky, *Österreich das grosse 18. Jahrhundert* (Vienna, 1967), 99, my translation.

³⁸Carreras y Bulbena, *Carlos d'Autria y Elisabeth*, 316; Alphons Lhotsky, "Kaiser Karl VI. und sein Hof im Jahre 1712/13," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichte* 66 (1958): 52–80, here 63. The empress returned to Vienna politically adroit, later becoming involved in promoting an alliance between the empire and Russia. Grete Mecenseffy, *Karls VI. spanische Bündnispolitik 1725–1729. Ein Beitrag zur österreichischen Außenpolitik des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Innsbruck, 1934), 68. And she remained a lifelong opponent of Philip V of Spain; Theodor Gehling, *Ein europäische Diplomat am Kaiserhof zu Wien: François Louise de Pesme, Seigneur de St Saphorin, als englische resident am Wiener Hof 1718–1727* (Bonn, 1964), 205.

³⁹A. Rosenlehner, *Die Stellung der Kurfürsten Maz Emmanuel von Bayern und Joseph Klemens von Köln zur Kaiserwahl Karls VI* (Munich, 1899); Bernd Rill, *Karl VI. Habsburg als barocke Großmacht* (Graz, 1992), 91–106; J. Ziekursch, *Die Kaiserwahl Karls VI, 1711* (Gotha, 1902); Mikoletzky, *Österreich*, 106.

⁴⁰J. I. Asensio Bernalte and J. Fabregas Roig, "Incidencias corsarias en las costas catalanas durante el reinado de Carlos III (1759–1788) según la "Gazeta" de Madrid," *Primer Congrès d'Historia Moderna de Catalunya*, vol. I (1984), 721–30.

At the start of his rather unexpected reign as emperor, Charles now found himself exiled—albeit briefly, as he believed—from his Spanish kingdom. Although he was now based in Vienna and his advisers at court had accompanied him from Spain to Austria, Charles's life would remain dominated by his struggle for the restoration of his lost Spanish and American lands. The large number of Spanish emigrants who accompanied him to Vienna would be a constant reminder of his lost lands and lost potential income from the Americas, to which he had dedicated his formative years to maintain.⁴¹ Charles insisted that he could gain at least Mexico and Peru in any negotiated settlement with the House of Bourbon. He therefore rejected Article VI of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713; this article placed the House of Savoy before the Habsburgs in the Spanish order of succession, in the event that the Bourbon line failed.⁴²

In fact, it would take Charles over a year to accept the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht.⁴³ His court at Vienna, urged on by the large number of exiled Catalans and Spaniards—perhaps exceeding 16,000 throughout Charles's Habsburg lands and including some 2,784 officials—opposed the Bourbon government of Spain. Names such as Perlas, Romeo, Stella, and Cardona were constant reminders of the Spanish claim; and Charles never forgot the hard fight to hold Barcelona in the face of a Franco-Spanish siege. In his diary entry for 12 May 1736, he recalled the crucial date, writing “Barcelona thirty years ago today.” The anniversary of the lifting of the 1706 siege of Barcelona was, by order of Charles, to be celebrated with a *Te Deum* in the cathedral of Saint Stephan.⁴⁴ Stella and Perlas, in particular, exercised great influence over Charles.⁴⁵ The influence of Spaniards at court was such that some even pushed for an immediate truce with the archenemy of Christian Europe, the Turks, favoring an all-out effort against the new real enemy, Bourbon Spain.⁴⁶ These difficulties continued for at least ten years. It took a Dutchman, one of Spanish extraction and a convert to Catholicism, to offer a possible solution to the problem of Austrian government of Spain.

Johann Wilhelm, Baron Ripperda, had come to Spain to make his fortune as superintendent of the royal factory at Guadalajara. He quickly rose to head of all royal factories and was made secretary of Marine and of the Indies.⁴⁷ Having grandiose plans for the thorough reform of Spain and seeing himself as the Olivares of the eighteenth century, Ripperda promised that

⁴¹Gehling, “Ein Europäischer Diplomat,” esp. 118. A large number of artists and craftspeople in royal employment left Catalonia for Vienna; one example are the royal decorators (*Tapezierer*) Wenzel Marcellini (c. 1666, d. 1720), Johann Christoph Partmann (d. 1739), Johann Pirchner (c. 1650, d. 1724), and Johann Peter Tratter (d. 1764); Herbert Haupt, *Kunst und Kultur in den Kameralzahlamt büchern Kaiser Karl VI.* (Vienna, 1993), 173, 176, 177, 183.

⁴²Michael Hughes, *Law and Politics in Eighteenth Century Germany. The Imperial Aulic Council in the Reign of Charles VI* (Suffolk, 1988), 86–87; Gehling, “Ein Europäischer Diplomat,” 125.

⁴³León Sanz, *Entre Austrias y Bourbones*, 84.

⁴⁴“Barcelona heut 30 Jahr.” Oswald Redlich, “Die Tagebücher Kaiser Karls VI,” in *Gesamtdeutsche Vergangenheit. Festgabe für Heinrich Ritter von Srbik* (Munich, 1938), 141–51, here 147; Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, *Zeremonialprotokolle 15 (1732–1734)*, 125.

⁴⁵The Marquis d'Este commented, in 1708, on Stella's influence over Charles, “Stella est celui qui a tout le credit sur le Roy parceque S.M. est persuadée qu'il n'y a que lui qui dise la verité sans seconde intention et qui n'est point intéressé.” Alfred von Arneth, *Prinz Eugen von Savoyen. Nach den handschriftlichen Quellen der kaiserlichen Archive*, 3 vols. (Vienna, 1858), here 2:513n20.

⁴⁶Francesc de Castellví va ser el primer a proposar una xifra global per als exilats austriacistes. En un comentari inclòs al capítol dedicat a 1715, el cronista afirma que, comptant els espanyols que eren a Nàpols, Sardenya i Milà a la mort de Carles II, els exiliats excedien del número de 16.000 personas, entre ellas 2.784 oficiales.” Agustí Alcoberro, *L'exili austriarista (1713–1747)*, 2 vols., Textos i Documents 35 (Barcelona, 2002), here 1:54. Michael Hughes, *Law and Politics*, 87.

⁴⁷Rill, *Karl VI*, 235–48; Lynch, *Bourbon Spain*, 85–88.

the empire of Charles V could be recreated and convinced Charles VI to commit to his plans.⁴⁸ Charles acceded to Ripperda's suggestions and, as part of this long-term plan, he was now willing to accept Spain's overtures for peace; an *entente cordiale* with Spain was achieved in 1725. Charles's period of imperial government was beset by more immediate, yet very familiar, problems: that of paucity of finances and the need to establish overseas trading companies in his largely land-locked empire.

The realization, tacit or explicit, that Spain and the Spanish Americas were lost came with Charles's removal from Barcelona. It was now necessary to remake Spain and the colonies wherever Charles found himself. Shortly after his arrival in Vienna, the new emperor instituted significant social and economic changes. Remembering the success of his Valencian and Catalan port cities, Charles instructed the development, at his personal cost, of the port cities of Trieste and Fiume. Again from his own purse, he built a lazaretto for travelers at Fiume. He viewed both ports as his points of access to the Mediterranean and by extension to the wide Atlantic.⁴⁹ Next, Charles established an Eastern Trading Company, modeled on the Western Trading Company (*Compagnie de las Indias*), to monopolize trade with the East and to capture a future expanding Balkan trade.⁵⁰ Plans for an East India Company had been floated as early as 1698, but it was not until the Treaty of Utrecht that Charles claimed the right to establish such a company at Ostend.⁵¹

At one point, colonies were even proposed for the Solomon Islands and Tobago, with trading ventures considered in Bengal and Madagascar.⁵² In 1715, even before the signing of the Third Barrier Treaty between the Dutch Republic and Charles, a ship at Ostend was fitted out to sail to Asia. Charles had issued the captain with a letter of marque and the vessel flew his imperial flag.⁵³ The Third Barrier Treaty had not been very popular with Charles; after the Battle of Belgrado (1717), he felt strong enough to take on the Dutch Republic. He ordered several new expeditions to Asia in 1717; and the following year, when the Quadruple Alliance agreed that Charles swap Sicily for Sardinia, Habsburg entrepreneurs established factories at Cabelon (Covelong, present-day Kovalam) on the Coromandel Coast (1719), and the most prized factory of all, Banquibazar (Bankibazar, Ichapur), in Bengal (1720).⁵⁴

Charles grew more confident in his actions and, undoubtedly as a result of his observation of trade and trade companies in operation in Catalonia, he grew determined further to cultivate overseas trade and to confront the rival maritime powers. In 1721, one John Colebrook was

⁴⁸Michael Hughes, *Law and Politics*, 194, 188.

⁴⁹Mayer, "Zur Geschichte der österreichische Handelspolitik unter Karl VI," *Mittheilungen des Inst. für österr. Geschichte* 18 (1897), 129; Radics, *Kaiser Karl VI*, "Trieste," 60–63; "Fiume," 64–65.

⁵⁰For Spanish trade to the Indies, see, *inter alia*, Gervasio de Artífano y de Galdácano, *Historia del comercio con las Indias durante el dominio de los Austrias* (Barcelona, 1917); C. H. Haring, *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs* (Cambridge, MA, 1918).

⁵¹Huisman and others have disavowed any Habsburg interest in the project, claiming it as a "Belgian" project. H. Pergameni, *La Compagnie d'Ostende* (Brussels, 1902). See also Georges H. Dumont, *La Compagnie d'Ostende* (Brussels, 1942); Abbé Norbert Laude, *La Compagnie d'Ostende et son activité coloniale au Bengale, 1725–1730* (Brussels, 1944).

⁵²Hertz, "England and the Ostend Company," 261.

⁵³K. Degryse and J. Parmentier, "Maritime Aspects of the Ostend Trade to Mocha, India and China, 1715–1732," in J. R. Bruijn and F. S. Gaastra, eds., *Ships, Sailors and Spices. East India Companies and Their Shipping in the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries*, NEHA Series III (Amsterdam, 1993), 139–75, Appendix; and J. Parmentier, *Oostende & Co. Het verhaal van de Zuid-Nederlandse Oost-Indiëvaart, 1717–1735* (Ghent, 2002), 137–41.

⁵⁴J. Parmentier, *Thee van overzee. Maritieme en handelsrelaties tussen Vlaanderen en China tijdens de 18^{de} eeuw* (Ghent, 1996). For the factory at Banquibazar, see J. Parmentier, *De Holle compagnie. Smokkel en legale handel onder Zuid-Nederlandse vlag in Bengalen, ca. 1720–1744*, *Zeven Provinciën-reeks* 4 (Hilversum, 1992), 21, ff.

sent to Vienna to convince the emperor that trade from Ostend to Asia was highly profitable. This was pleasing to Charles; consequently, recalling the *Consejo de Indias*, he granted permission for the founding of the *Société Impériale et Royale des Indes* as part of the *Generale Keizerlijke en Koninklijke Indische Compagnie gevestigd in de Oostenrijkse Nederlanden* (GIC), commonly called the “Ostend Company.” The *Société des Indes* was granted her charter on 19 December 1722, and in early 1724 the first ships set sail to Asia. Between 1715 and 1723, thirty-four such ships, among them the *Charles III*, were outfitted at Ostend for trade with Asia. Charles retained a personal interest in the activities and protection of the company, which enjoyed the right to trade with the East and West Indies and the coasts of Africa “on both this and the other side of the Cape of Good Hope.” Despite English and Dutch opposition, Charles and his Company had, briefly, the upper hand of the maritime powers.⁵⁵ Under the terms of the agreement of 1725 with Spain, ships of Charles’s Ostend Company were given free access to Spanish ports, as well as the right to trade as Spanish vessels in the East Indies. Charles had, it seemed, won access to the Atlantic, which he had long wanted when in Barcelona; and his seamen were, he believed, on the same most favored footing as those of the greater maritime powers. His trading aspirations knew no end; he empowered the company directors to equip expeditions to the whaling grounds of Greenland and to open trade relations with the West Indies and to build more factories on the Coromandel coast and in Bengal.⁵⁶

Charles believed that the maritime powers would not react to his encroachment on their Asian trade, but this proved a misjudgment on his part.⁵⁷ Popular English publications were irate at Charles’s attempts to gain a hold on Atlantic trade. The author of the *Importance of the Ostend Company Considered* demanded the London government “Destroy this cockatrice whilst young” and wrote of the rise of “the Austrian and popish interest” in a trade that was rightly the preserve of the Protestant powers.⁵⁸ In the Dutch Republic, the directors of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) were not impressed by Charles’s actions and did not value the new competition in the Indian Ocean. They lobbied with the States General, the highest executive body in the Dutch Republic, to stop this unwanted and, from their perspective, unlawful competition. Dutch jurists advocated that these extra-European activities emanating from the Habsburg Netherlands were prohibited under the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and constituted an attempt to use imperial, no longer relevant, Spanish Habsburg trading rights to sanction Austrian Habsburg trade in the Indian Ocean and potentially beyond. Lengthy legal arguments resulted about the rights of “Castilians” trading from Austrian territories under Charles VI’s flag.⁵⁹ Here, again, was evidence of Charles’s determination to reinstate united Habsburg rights at a time when international law of trade and war had limited those historic rights. Charles chose to transfer what he saw as his

⁵⁵R. Geikie and I. A. Montgomery, *The Dutch Barrier, 1705–1719* (Cambridge, 1930), 349.

⁵⁶Adolf Beer, “Zur Geschichte der Politik Karl VI,” *Historische Zeitschrift* 55 (1886): 28.

⁵⁷K. van der Mynsbrugge, “De pamflettenoorlog rond de Oostendse Compagnie” (MA diss., University of Ghent, 2000). For the Vienna perspective on the founding of the GIC, see M. Huisman, *La Belgique commerciale sous l'empereur Charles VI: la Compagnie d'Ostende: étude historique du politique commerciale et coloniale* (Brussels, 1902). For a critical review of Huisman, see A. Goslinga, *Slingelandt's efforts towards European peace*, Part I (The Hague, 1915), Appendices I–IX.

⁵⁸*Compagnie impériale et royale établie dans le Pays-bas autrichiens, The importance of the Ostend-company consider'd* (London, 1726), 4, 6, 31.

⁵⁹Patrice Count MacNeny, *The freedom of commerce of the subjects of the Austrian Netherlands, asserted and vindicated. Done into Engl.* (London, 1725).

Spanish-Habsburg rights to trade and explore overseas to his Austrian-Habsburg territories. International opposition would not permit this to happen.

The States General put ever more pressure on Vienna, and on Charles's representatives in Brussels, to withdraw the GIC's charter. In 1727, Dutch patience came to an end; and in November, the States General ordered that the army be prepared for an invasion of the Austrian Netherlands with the purpose of occupying the port of Ostend. Charles was forced to back down, principally because he was embroiled in detailed negotiations about succession. He needed the support of the Dutch Republic for the Pragmatic Sanction, granting his daughter Maria Theresa rights to succeed him after his death. Charles withdrew his support for the company and, in return, in the Second Treaty of Vienna (March 1731), Great Britain and the Dutch Republic guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction. Charles revoked the charter of 1722 and thereby terminated the GIC.⁶⁰

Turning away from maritime trade, building on these qualified successes, which placed hoped-for global influence behind local geopolitical necessities, Charles instructed his jurists to compose terms whereby the claims of the nobles to their estates in lands recently liberated from the Ottoman Empire in Central and South Central Europe might be rejected. These lands should be, by right of conquest, the booty property of the king.⁶¹ In these areas, Charles maintained a right completely different from that respectful attitude to historic rights that restrained Habsburg policy elsewhere.⁶² A *Subdelegation in Neoacquisitis* was established to administer these areas, and many of its first overseers were experienced Spanish administrators.

When, after arriving from Barcelona, he first conquered great stretches of Central and East Central Europe from the Ottoman Empire between 1712 and 1718, Charles determined that the reconquered lands should be established as a Cameral Province. The first Governor of the region appointed by Charles, Claudius Florimund, Count Mercy, called the area "a land without lords and rulers, in which everything is *puris camerale*."⁶³ In this Central European *reconquista*, the land could not, indeed should not, be left in the hands of the native residents and owners. Many of the poorer Catalans and Valencians who had followed Charles from Spain to Vienna were first maintained in the city at the emperor's personal expense, but plans were drawn up to settle them in these sites of *reconquista*, especially in Hungary.⁶⁴ Hungarians were guaranteed their rights, liberties and privileges, immunities, prerogatives and recognized customs by Charles III, but it did not stop the king and emperor from establishing new colonies in the kingdom, with "Új" or "New" Barcelona the biggest, settled by Catalan, Spanish, and Italian colonists who introduced mulberry trees and silk-weaving to the region.⁶⁵ Other Catalan colonists brought vines, olives, and lemons; but

⁶⁰V. Enthoven, "Dan maar oorlog! De reacties van de republiek op de Oostendse Compagnie, 1715–1732," in J. Parmentier, ed., *Noord-Zuid in Oostindische perspectief* (Zutphen, 2005), 131–48.

⁶¹William O'Reilly, "Divide et impera: Race, Ethnicity and Administration in Early 18th-Century Habsburg Hungary," in Gudmundur Halfdanarson, ed., *Racial Discrimination and Ethnicity in European History* (Pisa, 2003), 77–100.

⁶²An *absolutum inalienabile domanium vel peculium regium*.

⁶³Josef Kallbrunner, "Zur Geschichte der Wirtschaft im Temescher Banat bis zum Ausgang des siebenjährigen Krieges," *Südost-Deutsche Forschungen* 1, no. 1 (1936): 46–60, here 47n1.

⁶⁴"Den Cataloniern an den niederen Volksklassen, welche in Wien sich aufhielten und zumeist nur von der Freigebigkeit des Kaisers lebten, dachte man im Banate Wohnsitze anzuweisen." Alfred Ritter von Arneth, ed., "Die Relationen der Botschafter Venedigs über Österreich im achtzehnten Jahrhundert," *Fontes rerum austriacarum II. Abtheilung, Diplomataria et acta*, vol. 22 (Vienna, 1863): 34.

⁶⁵A. Takáts, "Spanyolok telepítése Pancsován," *Gazdaság-történelmi Szemle* (1900), 44; idem., "Spanyolok telepítése Pancsován," *Gazdaság-történelmi Szemle* (1903), 47–48; László Réti, "Magyarországi spanyol telepek," *Ethnographia*

their long-term success was more limited. Charles administered his European lands as if they were his Spanish lands; and the translation of vocabulary did not end with the terms of administration.

It is here worth considering the advent of a nomenclature of identification used during the reign of Charles in Central Europe. Administrators and bureaucrats promoted, through ascription, a more racialized form of ethnic identification in the region. The *naciones* of Spain became the *Nationalitäten* of the Austrian Habsburg lands, and this included all those non-Germans who were classified as different and potentially dangerous. “Nationalities” became a term, frequently of derision, which racially fixed groups as lower in this social reordering of the new Habsburg Central European ethnic hierarchy.⁶⁶ In terms very similar to those applied to colonists in Spanish America, settlers from the heart of the empire were perceived as the best bastion against the enemy, in this *terra deserta*.⁶⁷ Indeed, they were envisaged as a bulwark of Christianity, and colonization was planned with this in mind.⁶⁸ Even the *pinturas de castas* of the Spanish Americas, which commented in a pseudoscientific manner on the racial qualities of different peoples, found analogous representation in the Austrian lands. The Styrian *Völkertafel* offered a Central European alternative to the new world method of racial stereotyping. Charles was responsible not only for the introduction of the Spanish court to Vienna, but also for a system of administration that saw his imperial, and colonial, worlds collapse.

Just as he had done in Spain after 1705, Charles began an immediate reform of the financial administration of the Austrian lands. He took it upon himself to arrest the increasing deficit his lands faced.⁶⁹ These reforms were paralleled by the Bourbon reforms now taking place in Spain under Charles’s “successor” Philip V. In fact, Charles had conceived of such changes even before leaving Spain, as is clear from correspondence with both Wratislaw and with Starhemberg, president of the Viennese court chancellery.⁷⁰ Charles instructed that new taxes be raised, a reorganization of the administration of government was instituted with closer mechanisms for financial scrutiny, and a national effort to scale down debt was announced. A steady flow of revenue was expected, none less so than from a new tax to be placed on the Jews.⁷¹ The role of Jews in his empire, whether in Spain or in Austria, was something that Charles had already considered while in Spain. In fact, rather dramatically, Charles had recommended the readmission of Jews into the Kingdom of Spain as early as 1709.⁷²

Such reforming policies had their supporters at court, but they also had their opponents. In the first years of Charles’s government in Vienna (1712–1720), two groups were at loggerheads: the older, established group of Bohemian and Austrian magnates and a new, so-called Spanish party that pushed for a “Spanish-style” administration. Both groups pushed for their own

(1890), 300–03; Zoltan Fallenbüchl, “Espagnols en Hongrie au XVIIIe Siècle,” *Revista de Archivos Bibliotecas y Museos* 82, no. 1 (March 1979): 85–147; vol. 82, no. 2 (April–June 1979): 199–224.

⁶⁶Philip J. Adler, “Serbs, Magyars, and Staatsinteresse in Eighteenth Century Austria: A Study in the History of Habsburg Administration,” *The Austrian History Yearbook*, 12–13 (part 1) (1976–1977): 116–52, for a consideration of the “nationalities.”

⁶⁷Hans Rothfels, ed., *Das Auslandsdeutschtum des Ostens, Auslandsstudien* (Königsberg i. Pr., 1932), 122.

⁶⁸Erster Brief Kaiser Karls VI. an den Landgrafen Ernst Ludwig von Hessen-Darmstadt um eine weitherzige Erleichterung der hessischen Auswanderung in das Erbkonigreich Ungarn (20 April 1722), printed in full in Anton Tafferner, *Quellenbuch*, vol. 2, no. 47, p. 75.

⁶⁹F. Mensi, *Die Finanzen Österreichs von 1701–1740* (Vienna, 1890), 121, ff.

⁷⁰AfK, 143 ff.

⁷¹J.W. Stoye, “Emperor Charles VI: The Early Years of the Reign,” 69.

⁷²Charles to Count Wratislaw, Barcelona, 23 November 1709. AfK, 98.

interests, with the Spanish party hoping for continuation of Habsburg claims to the Spanish crown. The Spanish dominions that came into the possession of the emperor under the terms of settlement with Spain and the international powers—mainly in Italy—remained the principal sites of exile for Spaniards loyal to the Austrian cause, as well as those Germans within the Spanish party at Vienna. Some 163 nobles resident in Vienna in 1703 had accompanied Charles to Spain and returned with him to the city in 1712.⁷³ Comprised principally of Catalans and Neapolitans, and with a significant number of “Spanish priests”—Jesuits—in their number, the party formed a powerful bloc at the Viennese court. One in five nobles at Charles’s court was a Spaniard or Italian, compared with fewer than one in ten at the court of Joseph I.⁷⁴ It was said that they greatly supported Charles’s retention of his Spanish mistress, whom he had first come to know in Barcelona, Marianna Pignatelli-Belriguardo (later Countess Althann, married to Charles’s favorite Michael Johann Althann) and known universally as the “Spanish Althann,” as she proved a reminder of his Spanish connection.⁷⁵ As Charles’s favorite, *Graf* Althann had been given the “Spanish House” in Vienna, the former residence of the Spanish ambassador, a position Charles deemed unnecessary as he was rightfully Spanish king.⁷⁶ The Spanish party was not universally loved: *Graf* Wratislaw commented that they caused “the greatest confusion” at court. Even so, the Spanish language was much heard in Vienna under Charles, and the still-common equivalent of “that’s Greek to me,” *das kommt mir Spanisch vor*, is said to date from this period of linguistic confusion in the *Residenzstadt*.⁷⁷

Not just Spanish personnel, but Spanish style and custom accompanied Charles to the *Residenzstadt*. There was a political, economic, religious, and cultural infrastructural migration to Austria, and the Habsburg court-in-exile at Barcelona was completely dismantled and transferred to Vienna. When Charles left Catalonia in the autumn of 1711, he brought with him a large following; and shortly thereafter a junta of Spanish ministers was at work in Vienna. Symbolic of the desire to recreate the Spanish court in Vienna was the celebration—the “Toison-feste”—organized for 30 November 1712 in honor of Saint Andrew, the patron saint of the Order of the Golden Fleece.⁷⁸ This annual celebration, continued until 1739, was a loud and visible reminder of Charles’s claim to the Burgundian and Spanish inheritance and was an act of defiance against the Bourbon Philip V who claimed headship of the Order. Between 1712 and 1725, two Orders of the Golden Fleece

⁷³Hans Reitter, *Der spanische Rat und seine Beziehungen zur Lombardei 1713–1720* (Diss., University of Vienna, 1964), 101; S. Sanpere i Miquel, *Fin de la Nación Catalana* (Barcelona, 1905), 352–54; for Italian interest in Vienna and elsewhere, see Giuliano Gaeta, “Il Corriere di Vienna” del 1736. *Nel quadro della politica Italiana di Carlo VI*, Istituto di Scienze Politiche 4 (Trieste, 1965).

⁷⁴Spaniards and Italians made up 7 percent of the nobles at the *Kaiserhof* under Joseph, compared with 20 percent under Charles. Andreas Pecar, *Die Ökonomie der Ehre. Der höfische Adel am Kaiserhof Karls VI. (1711–1740)* (Darmstadt, 2003), 36.

⁷⁵Eduard Vehse, *Memoirs of the Court, Aristocracy, and Diplomacy of Austria*, trans. by Franz Demmler (London, 1856), 114–15; Carry Brachvogel, *Maria Theresia* (Bielefeld and Leipzig, 1911), 9.

⁷⁶Carlo Morandi, ed., *Relazioni di Ambasciatori sabaudi Genovesi e Venneti durante il Periodo della grande alleanze e delle successione di Spagna (1693–1713)* (Bologna, 1935), 119, ff.

⁷⁷“Alle Spanische und Wellsche Exulanten werden E. M. vollgen wollen, in hoffnung sich allhier zu stabilliren, dieses aber wurde allhier die grösten Confusiones erweken...” Alfred von Arneth, ed., “Eigenhändige Correspondenz des Königs Karl III. von Spanien (nachmals Kaiser Karl VI.) mit dem Obersten Kanzler des Königreiches Böhmen, Grafen Johann Wenzel Wratislaw,” *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte* 16 (1856): 3–224, here 183. Some exiles chose to return to Spain after 1725; Mecenseffy, *Karls VI. spanische Bündnispolitik*, 26, ff.

⁷⁸Johann Christian Lünig, *Theatrum Ceremoniale Historico-Policum oder Historisch und Politischer Schauplatz aller Ceremonien*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1719), here 2:1124.

existed in parallel and of the ninety-seven knights named to the Order by Charles during this time, the largest number, thirty-one, were exiles from Spain and Spanish-Italy.⁷⁹

In 1713, Charles established a new office in Vienna to deal with the diversity of dependencies to which he laid claim. These included not only the inherited lands in Central Europe, but also his Spanish lands in the Iberian peninsula and in Italy.⁸⁰ Vienna became the new seat of the office of the *Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho Universal del Consejo Supremo de España*, whose members were almost exclusively Spaniards or Italians. Charles remained convinced that his Spanish visions could be further nurtured and his dream of universal empire could be resuscitated, emulating the actions of his hero and namesake Charles V.⁸¹ Contemporaries were very conscious of the comparison, and Charles did much to underline how he, like Charles V, was both emperor and king of Spain. The poet Carl Gustav Heraeus wrote of the new emperor, when commemorating Joseph I, “we have a Charles, who is just like the Fifth”; and in other eulogies and poems, parallels were drawn between the new empress Elizabeth Christina and Charles V’s wife and empress, also named Elizabeth.⁸² Indeed, Charles’s quest for the crown of Spain was related to his quest to father a male heir with Elizabeth Christina.⁸³

As a consequence of his years in Spain, and in an attempt to make the court styles of both kingdoms more similar, Charles introduced the Spanish court ceremonial (*Spanisches Hofzeremoniell*) into Vienna, with the intention of reflecting greater imperial dignity, universality, and Catholicism.⁸⁴ A period of Spanish-influenced architecture commenced, under the watchful eye of the emperor.⁸⁵ In 1715, Charles charged a *Hofkonferenz* with the creation of a new *Kammerordnung*, and the emperor demanded a new court, as well as a court ceremonial.⁸⁶ Work began on the famous Spanish Riding School and Spanish Hospital. At the same time, building further on the ambitions of his father Leopold, and the latter’s ideal of a *Vienna Gloriosa*, Charles played a central part in the architectural enunciation of a *Kaiserstil* identifiable with this new ambitious Habsburg emperor-king. Fischer von Erlach the younger, Joseph Emanuel, was commissioned to build the imperial chancellery range (*Hofkanzleitrakt*) in the Hofburg in a style that was not only palatial, but also ambitious. The range was associated with culture in all its representative forms—the arts, religion, and learning.⁸⁷ The elder Fischer von Erlach, Johann Bernhard, designed the imperial library in

⁷⁹Pecar, *Die Ökonomie der Ehre*, 40.

⁸⁰“... la diversidad de las dependencies que ocurren y pueden sobre venir por los reinos y estados pertenecientes a la Monarquía de España, pensando en mi Real Nombre he dispuesto la separación de las cuatro negociaciones correspondientes a los dominios de Nápoles, Cerdeña, Flandes y Milán en el establecimiento del Consejo de España.” Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Italien-Spanischer Rat, B. Supremo Consejo de España, K. 22, after: León Sanz, *Entre Austrias y Bourbonnes*, 85. By 1715, a reorganization of the administration and government of Spain meant that the *Consejos* of Aragón, Flanders, and Italy were merged with that of Castille. *Ibid.*, 64.

⁸¹Evans, “Introduction,” in Ingrao, *State and Society*, 7.

⁸²Carl Gustav Heraeus, *Gedichte und lateinische Inschriften* (Nürnberg, 1721), 128, 81.

⁸³Karl Vocelka and Lynne Heller, *Die privat Welt der Habsburger: Leben und Alltag einer Familie* (Graz, Styria, 1998), 273–74; Charles W. Ingrao and Andrew L. Thomas, “Piety and Power: The Empress-Consort of the High Baroque,” in Clarissa Campbell Orr, *Queenship in Europe 1660–1815* (Cambridge, 2004), 107–30, here 113–14. In the same year, 1707, and immediately after her arrival in Barcelona, Elizabeth Christine and Charles visited the Marian shrine at Montserrat, seeking a blessing for their marriage and for prosperity. Franz Matsche, *Die Kunst im Dienst der Staatsidee Kaiser Karl VI.* (Berlin and New York, 1981), 179.

⁸⁴Jürgen Freiherr von Kruedener, *Die Rolle des Hofes im Absolutismus, Forschungen zur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, vol. I (Stuttgart, 1973), 76.

⁸⁵Radics, *Kaiser Karl VI*, 31–32: “. . . das wachsamste Auge hatte der Kaiser . . .”.

⁸⁶Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Vienna, *Zeremonialprotokolle* 8 (1713–1715), fol. 266–73.

⁸⁷Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann, *Court, Cloister, and City: The Art and Culture of Central Europe, 1450–1800* (Chicago, 1995), esp. chap. 12, 283–306, here 296–98.

the Hofburg, begun in 1722. Drawing on Leibniz's idea for a centrally planned library, Fischer worked into his building plans the design of the Spanish royal library of San Lorenzo de El Escorial, complete with its longitudinal plan, book shelves, and open space.

Charles took an active interest in the building of the Karlskirche, designed by Johann Fischer von Erlach (begun 1716, completed 1737).⁸⁸ Charles once again allowed, indeed encouraged, his association with Spain to be commemorated, physically, allegorically, and politically.⁸⁹ The church is dominated, externally, by two spiral, so-called Solomonic, columns that evoke the biblical temple and the pillars of Jachin and Boaz. They also evoke fortitude and constancy, considered the personal virtues of Charles, and underscored an association, much favored by Charles, with King Solomon.⁹⁰ Fischer von Erlach also invoked the Habsburg device of the Pillars of Hercules, first taken by the Emperor Charles V as his emblem, with the motto *Plus Ultra*. Most associated these Herculean columns with the Straits of Gibraltar (through which Charles had passed, when sailing from Lisbon to Barcelona, in 1705), standing as they did on either side of the means of access to and departure from the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. The pillars represented the gateway to Spanish discovery and conquest. For Charles V—and now his eponymous heir—they were the emblem of a Spanish, Habsburg, world empire.⁹¹ Charles V had incorporated the device frequently into buildings constructed during his reign, most notably at his palace in Granada.⁹² Through these pillars, Charles was connected with the Spanish empire overseas and with a world dominion. At the Karlskirche, dedicated to the saint Charles Borromeo, Charles used these pillars as a conspicuous symbol of his universalist claims, drawing not only on the example of Charles V, but also on the twin examples of his namesakes Charlemagne and his Burgundian ancestor Charles the Bold. Perhaps more than any other building constructed during Charles's residence in Vienna, the Karlskirche asserts his desire to recall, indeed reinstate, Spain in the *Residenzstadt*. With its harmonization of these various allegorical and historical elements and with symbolism expressing the ideal of a universal monarchy, Charles reinstated the *pietas austriaca* as the signal virtue of his reign.⁹³

Not just architecture, but Spanish music and art, too, played a great role in the reformation of artistic life in Vienna.⁹⁴ Ferdinand Ernst Graf von Mollarth accompanied Charles from Spain to Frankfurt for his imperial election, taking responsibility for music and subsequently becoming *Hof-Musik-Inspektor* in Vienna.⁹⁵ Charles brought trumpeters and a drummer

⁸⁸Hans Sedlmayr, *Johann Bernhard Fischer von Erlach* [1956] (Stuttgart, 1997), 292, ff.

⁸⁹Hellmut Lorenz, "Der habsburgische Reichsstil – Mythos und Realität," in Thomas W. Gaethgens, ed., *Künstlerischer Austausch. Artistic Exchange. Akten des XXVIII. internationalen Kongresses für Kunstgeschichte (15.-20. Juli 1992)* (Berlin, 1992), 163–76, here 169, ff.

⁹⁰Reference to a "pillar of prayer" is made in Psam 75. For examples of these virtues used in praise of Charles, as King Charles III of Spain, see the *libretti* written by Apostolo Zeno between 1708–1710 for *Atenaide* and *Scipione nelle Spagne*; Elena Sala di Felice, "Apostolo Zeno," in *New Grove Opera* 4, 1227; after Elisabeth Theresia Hilscher, *Der Kaiserliche Hofpoet Pietro Metastasio (1698–1782). Zur Kulturgeschichte des Hofes Kaiser Karls VI*, Johann-Joseph-Fux-Gesellschaft 23 (2000), 6. Graf Johann Waldstein described Charles, in his doctoral dissertation "Philosophia scholastica ethica" at the Charles University, Prague, in 1726 as a model of Christian virtue. Eduard Winter, *Barock, Absolutismus und Aufklärung in der Donaumonarchie* (Vienna, 1971), 122.

⁹¹Earl Rosenthal, "Plus Ultra, non Plus Ultra, and the Columnar Device of Emperor Charles V," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 34 (1971): 204–28.

⁹²Elisabeth Ollinger et al., *Der Traum vom Weltreich. Österreichs unvollendeter Escorial* (Vienna, 1999), 9–16.

⁹³DaCosta Kaufmann, *Court, Cloister, and City*, 300; Christina Hofmann-Randall, *Das spanische Hofzeremoniell von 1500–1700* (Frankfurt, 1985).

⁹⁴Matsche, *Die Kunst im Dienst*.

⁹⁵Haupt, *Kunst und Kultur*, 174.

from his Spanish chapel, increasing the size of the royal chapel's choir and orchestra and making it more "Spanish."⁹⁶

Most exemplary of this reliance on a Spanish style in Austria was the deliberate attempt to reproduce that great architectural symbol of Spanish imperial hegemony, the Escorial (the Royal Monastery of San Lorenzo de El Escorial) in the vicinity of Vienna. At Klosterneuburg, the "Austrian Escorial," Charles ordered that a replica of the Spanish complex be constructed, as his monastery residence. After years of planning, construction began in 1730 according to plans laid down by Donato Felice d'Allio.⁹⁷ The device of two pillars was once again used, but in its most provocative form. The stucco ceiling of the *Ecksalon* of Klosterneuburg shows the pillars flanking the world, a clear sign of this dream of a global empire. The ceiling of the oratorium portrays the different coats of arms and crests of the lands ruled over by the House of Habsburg; the crest of the kingdom of Spain takes a prominent place. The complex of Klosterneuburg was to be topped with nine domes, surmounted with crowns of the House of Habsburg from Spain and Austria, to proclaim the glory of imperial majesty.⁹⁸

Unlike his brother Joseph I, who had engaged Fischer von Erlach to design the palace of Schönbrunn as a Versailles- and *étatisme*-inspired building for a new age in imperial rule, Charles based his ideas for his palace at Klosterneuburg on very different historical and ideological interpretations. Schönbrunn was too French for Charles; in 1712, he gave it as a gift to his brother's widow, the empress Amalie Wilhelmine. Klosterneuburg, on the other hand, represented a physical manifestation of the coming together of the church and state, of *regnum* and *sacerdotium*, just as in the medieval partnership of ecclesiastical and secular leaders. In the Escorial, as completed under Philip II, the church took the dominant middle point in the design. In Charles's Klosterneuburg, it would alternate architecturally between residential and religious rooms. The palace and monastery of Klosterneuburg offer therefore a unique insight into Charles's personality and into his dreams and ambitions. He valued court ceremonial and formality while also valuing piety and human qualities of devotion to his family.⁹⁹ When Charles resided at Klosterneuburg, at the feast of St. Leopold in 1739, he expressed his great affection and appreciation for his Escorial, which was at that point only partly completed. He even considered retiring to the residence, just as Charles V had retired to Juste. The Austrian Escorial would never be completed as Charles intended, but it remains as the last great architectural expression of the idea of the Holy Roman Empire. It is symbolic, then, that it remained incomplete, as the empire became increasingly secular and the relationship of state and religion so evident in the building design no longer played as great a part in the age of enlightenment.

The "dream of universal empire" proved less a vision of liberation from Babylonian exile than oneiric affirmation of the loss of the promised land. Nothing came of Charles's hopes, dreams,

⁹⁶Herbert Seifert, "Die kaiserliche Hofkapelle im 17.-18. Jahrhundert," *Österreichische Musikzeitschrift* 53 (1998): 21–26; idem., "The Institution of the Imperial Court Chapel from Maximilian I to Charles VI," in Juan José Carreras López et al., *The Royal Chapel in the Time of the Habsburgs* (Woodbridge, UK, 2005), 40–47, here 46.

⁹⁷See Hans Aurenhammer, *J. B. Fischer von Erlach* (Cambridge, MA, 1973), 169; Victor Lucien Tapié, *The Rise and Fall of the Habsburg Monarchy* (New York, 1971), 166.

⁹⁸Construction was halted soon after the death of Charles VI in 1740, with only a quarter of the originally planned complex completed by the time of his death. Principally for financial reasons, Maria Theresa was reluctant to oversee the project to completion and work soon stopped; a brief revival of the building project began in 1776, and finally the architect Joseph Kornhäusel saw the last episode in the part-completion of a section of the building between the years 1834 and 1842. See Derek Beales, *Prosperity and Plunder: European Catholic Monasteries in the Age of Revolution, 1650–1815* (Cambridge, 2003), 54.

⁹⁹Pecar, *Die Ökonomie der Ehre*, 141–252.

and ambitions, as his time was consumed by the search for sanctioned pragmatism. Haunted by his time in Barcelona, by his subsequent loss of Spain, and by his inability to reinstate a Habsburg universal empire, Charles remained a disconsolate exile, never sure where home really was. He left behind a much-altered Europe. His favored form of government, which blended practices from Spain and Central Europe, would prove to have mixed success in his Austrian heartlands. Attitudes to religion, ethnicity, the economy, state, and society were significantly influenced by Charles's Austro-Spanish experiences. Most results were only seen long after Charles's untimely death. His decline, as his earliest biographers would have us believe, was caused by food poisoning after a meal of mushrooms—"a plate of mushrooms that changed the destiny of Europe."¹⁰⁰ Dying painfully over seven days, it would appear that Charles had had a premonition of the end, mentioning his imminent death to the papal nuncio almost three weeks earlier.¹⁰¹ Charles died in the early hours of 20 October 1740 very much as he had lived, thinking of Spain and an imperial life that might have been.¹⁰² His last word, it was recounted, was not "Vienna" but "Barcelona."

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¹⁰⁰See L. M. D. Massuet, *Histoire de l'Empereur Charles VI* (Amsterdam, 1741) and P. A. La Lande, *Histoire de l'Empereur Charles VI* (La Hâte, 1743); ". . . l'empereur Charles VI mourut, au mois d'octobre 1740, d'une indigestion de champignons qui lui causa une apoplexie; et ce plat de champignons changea la destinée de l'Europe." Voltaire, *Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire Tome I: Introduction et Biographie* (Paris, 1759); Robert Pick, *Empress Maria Theresa. The Early Years 1717–1757* (New York, 1966), 32–56, here 56.

¹⁰¹Konstantin Pachner, "Sind Papst Klemens VII. und Kaiser Karl VI. an den Folgen einer Pilzvergiftung gestorben?" *Zeitschrift für Pilzkunde* 16 (n.s.), no. 3:74–79 and no. 4:118–20, here 78–79.

¹⁰²Oswald Redlich, "Die Tagebücher Kaiser Karls VI." *Gesamtdeutsche Vergangenheit: Festgabe für Heinrich Ritter von Srbik zum 60. Geburtstag* (Munich, 1938), 145.