

is worth reiterating, however, that his successes stemmed not so much from his religious zeal as from his ability to work with geopolitical and diplomatic realities over which he had little control. His willingness to tolerate Turkish provocations on his eastern flank and to make concessions to his Protestant adversaries in Hungary, Transylvania, and Germany illustrate his sensitivity to these forces. Of course, Ferdinand III was also subject to these same factors and, although history has chosen to ignore him, he also made a crucial contribution to the monarchy's destiny. Whereas his father had survived the great crisis of 1619 by appealing to his allies, Ferdinand III insured the monarchy's recovery from the events of 1645 by deserting them. By concluding a separate peace at Westphalia, the emperor forced his brother-in-law, Philip IV, to fight on alone in an already hopeless struggle against France. His was the right decision. Spain was doomed to defeat no matter what the monarchy did. At least Ferdinand III – unlike the Habsburgs of World War I – had the good sense to dissociate himself from the threat that his loyal, but all-too-powerful ally posed to European security before it dragged the monarchy down with it. Indeed, given the monarchy's exposed geographical position, it never could have risen as a great power so long as it had an ally with as many enemies as Spain. If there was a virtue to be found in the monarchy's capitulation at Westphalia, it was that the dramatic reduction of imperial power in Germany and the isolation and imminent collapse of Spain made it possible for the monarchy to remove the fears of its former adversaries. Only after these apprehensions had been allayed could the monarchy ever emerge as a great power by the traditional Habsburg recourse to coalition diplomacy.

### 3 Facing east: Hungary and the Turks (1648–1699)

#### The Westphalian aftermath

Notwithstanding the triumphs and accomplishments of the previous three decades, the Habsburg dominions confronted a number of challenges following the Peace of Westphalia. Above all they desperately needed a period of peace to recover from the wartime devastation wrought by a combination of invading armies and royal tax collectors. Although the dynasty had forged a working relationship with its landholding aristocracy based on loyalty, patronage, and a common faith, the central government still had to convert its essentially disparate dominions into an integrated state; Hungary in particular remained administratively, constitutionally, and confessionally distinct from the rest of the monarchy. Outside the monarchy the renewed emergence of France, and lately Sweden, as powerful and aggressive adversaries compounded the traditional threat posed by the Ottoman empire in the east. Given the impending collapse of Spain and deep divisions that the Thirty Years' War had engendered among his German vassals, the emperor needed to meet these new challenges to the monarchy's security by reestablishing or reviving an effective alternative to the alliance system of the past century. Each of these problems would be resolved by the end of the seventeenth century. Success would not, however, come easily.

#### *Foreign affairs: isolation and insecurity*

The monarchy's international position looked especially bleak at mid-century. By itself the Peace of Westphalia had done little to check the continued growth of French and Swedish power, or the emperor's own diplomatic isolation. Once they had suppressed the revolt of the Fronde in the summer of 1653, the young Louis XIV (1643–1715) and his prime minister Cardinal Mazarin were able to devote their undivided attention to the final stage of their war with Spain. The cession of the Habsburgs' Alsatian lands to France had already cut the Spanish Road between the Low Countries and Italy; with the surprise entry of Cromwell's England into the

war in 1654, the Spanish Netherlands' encirclement was complete. Helpless as he was to assist his Habsburg brother-in-law, Ferdinand III's most pressing concern was the Swedes. They had not evacuated the Bohemian crownlands until 1650, after the emperor (or, more accurately, his subjects) had paid them 5 million fl. for the costs of their occupation. Nearly four more years passed before their forces had withdrawn from the rest of the *Reich*, following the satisfaction of all of the territorial, religious, and financial terms of the peace.

No sooner had the Swedes left the empire than their new king, Charles X Gustavus (1654–60), took advantage of a border conflict between Poland and Russia by invading Poland in the summer of 1655. By the end of the year he had occupied much of the country. Although Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg was troubled by this latest example of Swedish expansion, he joined forces with Charles in January 1656 in the expectation of balancing Charles's gains with his own Polish conquests. By December the new prince of Transylvania, George II Rákóczi (1648–60), had launched his own invasion from the south, after being offered southeastern Poland and the prospect of the Polish crown. By 11 April 1657 the combined armies of Charles X and Rákóczi met in apparent triumph at the Polish city of Sandomierz. Although Poland was not formally allied with the emperor, the impending partition of his northern neighbor represented a grievous blow to the monarchy's security, especially since it would be accompanied by a corresponding extension of the influence of the Habsburgs' Swedish and Transylvanian adversaries. Nevertheless, given the monarchy's current isolation and desperate need for peace, Ferdinand III could do little more than offer the Polish King John Casimir a mere 4,000 auxiliaries and a safe refuge in Austrian Silesia.

Although the triumph of France in the west and Sweden and Transylvania in the east seriously jeopardized the monarchy's international position and security, the greatest threat of all now arose in central Europe, where the Habsburgs suddenly faced the prospect of losing the imperial crown. On 2 April 1657, Ferdinand III died. The death of the 50-year-old emperor was not wholly unexpected. The strain of his earlier military campaigns and subsequent imperial responsibilities had long since taken their toll. Several years earlier he had attempted to insure the dynasty's retention of the imperial crown by having the eldest of his three sons, Ferdinand Maria, elected King of the Romans prior to his death. Yet no sooner had he secured his election (31 May 1653) and coronation as King Ferdinand IV (18 June 1654) than the 21-year-old heir died of smallpox just three weeks later. Ferdinand III quickly arranged for his next oldest son, the 14-year-old Leopold Ignatius, to succeed in the Habsburg lands by securing his election and coronation as king of Hungary (1655) and by having him crowned king

of Bohemia (1656). But imperial law prohibited anyone from succeeding as German emperor before the age of eighteen.

The four-year wait for Leopold to become eligible for election gave the dynasty's enemies a golden opportunity to contest its control of the imperial crown. Mazarin was especially assiduous in cultivating alternative candidates for the imperial throne, including the elector of Bavaria and his own master, Louis XIV. Like the current military resurgence of France and Sweden, Mazarin's prospect of dethroning the Habsburgs was another unwelcome residue of the dynasty's defeat in the Thirty Years' War. He had little trouble nurturing the residual fear of Habsburg authority within the *Reich*. Nor had the three Protestant electors forgotten the Edict of Restitution and the Habsburgs' readiness to advance the Catholic cause within the empire. Finally, he played on the continued German fear that Leopold would renew his dynasty's alliance with Spain, either by intervening in the Franco-Spanish war or by inheriting Spain itself on the death of the childless Philip IV.

Yet, while none of the German electors wanted a Habsburg state capable of threatening them, they also appreciated the role it played in maintaining the empire's internal peace, or *Reichsfriede*, and protecting them against potential foreign enemies like France, Sweden, or the Turks. In fact, during the first years after the war, many German princes had formed a series of armed associations to protect themselves not only against Spain and the emperor, but against the anarchy into which parts of the empire had fallen following his defeat. Nobody better appreciated the princely dilemma than the influential archbishop-elect of Mainz, John Philip von Schönborn. As the ruler of Mainz, John Philip held considerable constitutional pre-rogatives through his position as imperial archchancellor. He presided over most of the empire's central organs, including the *Reichstag*, the imperial chamber court, and even the imperial chancery through his personally designated appointee, the imperial vice chancellor. He was also a true champion of the smaller states that relied heavily on the emperor's policing power to retain their security against the ambitions of Germany's most powerful princes. Hence, while he too feared the specter of Habsburg absolutism, John Philip genuinely desired to preserve the effectiveness of imperial institutions, including its executive authority.

In the final analysis the German electors, together with the rest of the European powers, needed to make some refinements in the balance of power within post-Westphalian Europe, by defining the role of the imperial crown, the Polish commonwealth, and ultimately the Austrian Habsburg monarchy itself. By the spring of 1657 the successes of the dynasty's enemies compelled them to redress that balance at least somewhat in the monarchy's favor. Within a month of Charles X's junction with Rákóczi, Denmark compelled Charles X to withdraw most of his forces by invading Sweden

proper. At the same time the Sultan expressed his own alarm over the ambitions of his Transylvanian tributary by dispatching Tartar auxiliaries to sweep Rákóczi's army from Poland. By July Rákóczi had concluded a separate peace with John Casimir and rushed back to Transylvania to face the Sultan's wrath. One month later Russia attacked Sweden's Baltic provinces, even though it was technically still at war with Poland. Then, in September, Frederick William switched sides in exchange for Poland's surrender of its claim to sovereignty over the Hohenzollern duchy of Prussia, and promptly attacked Swedish Pomerania. Although Leopold still hesitated to declare war formally on Sweden, these dramatic developments emboldened him to take a more active role in the war by providing John Casimir with a much larger force of auxiliaries for service against them. Although the war with Sweden dragged on for two more years, it was clear by the end of 1657 that Poland's integrity – and the monarchy's northeastern flank – had been secured.

While Poland's neighbors were moving to preserve its independence, the German electors were belatedly agreeing to perpetuate Habsburg control of the imperial crown. Victory did not come cheaply. Leopold was obliged to ply several electors with bribes raised by a combination of taxes, borrowing, and Spanish subsidies. The most costly vote belonged to Frederick William, whom Leopold paid 150,000 taler, ostensibly to compensate Brandenburg for Emperor Ferdinand II's seizure of the Hohenzollerns' Silesian duchy of Jägerndorf in 1621. In addition he was obliged to recognize Prussian independence from Poland and commit the monarchy to greater involvement in the war against Sweden. Much easier and even more pivotal was the vote of the new elector of Bavaria, who exhibited none of his late father's ambitions. By readily throwing its support to Leopold, Bavaria left France and the three archbishop-electors without a viable alternative Catholic candidate for the imperial crown, despite Mazarin's desperate attempts to promote Louis XIV.

Yet Leopold could not be sure of his election until he had won the outright support of the ecclesiastical electors and their leader, John Philip of Mainz. If anything, the archchancellor's desire to retain the Habsburgs had grown since the death of Ferdinand IV, since he saw in their Austrian and Bohemian lands the only critical mass capable of providing the empire with a *militia perpetua* to defend it against growing French and Swedish power. Four years later his only concern was the prospect of Leopold's perpetuating the Austro-Spanish alliance, especially if he were to inherit the Spanish empire on the death of Philip IV. To forestall that possibility John Philip had even queried Leopold's male Austrian relatives, including his uncle and Tyrolean cousins, about their interest in the imperial crown. The timely birth of a son to the king of Spain at the end of 1657 eased the archchancellor's concerns somewhat. Over the next six months, however, he attached a number of strings to his vote, each of which was intended to restrain Leopold from

reestablishing the Austro-Spanish alliance of old. To reduce further the chances of his inheriting the Spanish crown, John Philip compelled Leopold to forego his anticipated marriage to Philip IV's elder daughter, Maria Theresa. He was also obliged to sign a neutrality treaty with Louis XIV. The archchancellor fortified this agreement with an electoral capitulation (*Wahlkapitulation*) signed by Leopold and all of the electors, which not only placed new restrictions on imperial power, but explicitly required the empire to remain strictly neutral in the closing stages of the Franco-Spanish war. Having made all of these concessions, Leopold was duly elected to succeed his late father as emperor on 18 July 1658, just one month after his eighteenth birthday. Even then John Philip was not finished in his search for guarantees. A fortnight after Leopold's ceremonial coronation in Frankfurt the archchancellor formed the so-called *Rheinbund*, an association of German princes that ultimately came to include not only the three archbishop-electors and several Protestant princes (including Brandenburg), but also Charles X of Sweden (as duke of Bremen and Verden) and Louis XIV. Its members agreed to prevent the emperor from infringing on the princely privileges guaranteed by the Peace of Westphalia or on its neutrality by sending troops across imperial territory to assist Spain in the Low Countries. The *Rheinbund* reminded the new emperor that he was still largely isolated and was valued by his vassals only as a counterweight against the emergence of greater threats to their security.

Leopold found out how alone he stood in the years immediately following his succession. On 7 November 1659 France and Spain ended a quarter century of hostilities by signing the Peace of the Pyrenees. Six months later the war in Poland came to a close following the signing of another peace treaty at the monastery of Oliva, near Danzig (3 May 1660). Although both France and Sweden made valuable acquisitions along their respective frontiers, none of their gains posed an overt threat to the monarchy itself. Yet, in exchange for French moderation, Mazarin compelled Philip IV to wed Maria Theresa to Louis XIV. There was a certain symmetry to Mazarin's policy: a decade ago he had compelled Ferdinand III to desert his Spanish brother-in-law at Westphalia; now Philip IV was reluctantly paying Vienna back by forsaking its long-standing Austrian marriage alliance. The match gave France the chance to inherit Spain itself should its king leave no male heirs. Admittedly Philip had obliged both the French and his daughter to renounce any claim she might have to the Spanish inheritance. Nevertheless, that renunciation was made contingent upon the payment of 500,000 crowns in compensation, an indemnity that bankrupt Spain was never able to pay. There was, in any event, considerable doubt in an age of divine right monarchs whether royalty could renounce inheritances granted by God.

Philip IV hastened to make amends by betrothing his second daughter,

Margaret, to Leopold, but her claim was correspondingly weaker than Maria Theresa's and she was, at age 9, still too young to marry and bear Leopold an heir. In the meantime Philip's infant son, Philip Prosper, died on 1 November 1661. Five days later his Austrian Habsburg wife gave birth to another boy. This, however, was the sickly Charles the Sufferer, whose numerous ailments could be traced to generations of inbreeding between the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs – and perhaps to Philip's legendary sexual escapades, which had brought venereal disease into the king's family, together with thirty-odd bastards. Thus, despite having boasted four healthy adult males as recently as 1632 (to which could be added Philip's two newly born sons) the Spanish Habsburgs now stood on the verge of extinction. Remarkably, their demise foreshadowed an even more sudden and unexpected thinning of the dynasty's Austrian branch. As late as 1654 there had been no fewer than seven male Austrian Habsburgs about. But the deaths of Ferdinand IV (1654) and Ferdinand III (1657) had been followed in rapid succession by those of Leopold's uncle (1662), younger brother (1664), and the last two Tyrolean Habsburgs (1662 and 1665). When Philip IV died in September 1665, the 25-year-old bachelor Leopold and the sickly 4-year-old Charles were the only remaining male members of the once fertile dynasty. Thus, by mid-decade Leopold needed to produce an heir not only to stake a claim to the Spanish inheritance, but just to perpetuate his own line.

#### *Domestic affairs: consolidation and centralization*

The monarchy's continued isolation and the impending dynastic crisis placed a great burden on the new emperor's shoulders. Given the sad state of Spain's national economy and royal line, the old recourse to dynastic solidarity would clearly be insufficient, even if it did not inspire reflexive opposition from the German princes. For the time being he would have to rely on the monarchy's own resources for its security needs, and build on them accordingly. This remained, however, a daunting task, especially for a young and inexperienced ruler who had received no instruction in statecraft prior to his brother's unexpected death.

Leopold certainly had his gifts. He lacked neither intelligence nor intellect. He spoke five languages with an impressive degree of fluency. He was instinctively curious, an avid reader of history, science, and literature, and – like his father – a lover and gifted composer of music. A typical Habsburg, he was a man of great personal integrity and morality whose sense of duty made him a well-informed and diligent statesman. Leopold was, however, an unlikely hero. Like his cousin Charles, Leopold paid a physical price for having two Habsburg parents by being the ugliest member of his branch of the family. The outward jut of his jaw and lower lip was so exaggerated that

he could not keep water from entering his mouth when it rained. Though he was an accomplished horseman who shared his father's passion for hunting, he had no interest in soldiering nor, for that matter, in war itself. More to the point, his naturally mild temperament prompted a phlegmatism and lack of resolve that often frustrated his advisors and allies.

Leopold's religious education doubtless accentuated his inertial tendencies. Originally trained by the Jesuits for a career in the church, he derived from his religious preparation not only an intense piety but also a faith in the decisiveness of divine guidance and intervention, rather than human action. Successive generations of Habsburg Marian devotion had, in fact, borne fruit in Leopold. He once exclaimed that "I want to have the most holy Virgin Mary as my commander-in-chief in wartime and my ambassador during peace negotiations." He acknowledged her favor by giving her name to seven of his nine daughters and by making numerous pilgrimages to the shrine at Mariazell. Yet it was this same search for guidance that often encouraged Leopold to delay or refrain altogether from making difficult decisions. Before long, even papal diplomats complained of his "excessive piety and fatalism."

The emperor's piety was also reflected in the makeup of his court. Leopold readily perpetuated the favored position of the Jesuits, from whose ranks he took a series of confessors. At the same time he depended most heavily for advice on a succession of intimate friends from other monastic orders, such as the Franciscan friar Hippolito de Pergine, and the Capuchins Marco d'Aviano and Emmerich Sinelli, who later became bishop of Vienna. Yet, as influential as these men were, almost all of the highest governmental positions remained the preserve of lay aristocrats. None was more important than the emperor's Grand Chamberlain (*Obersthofmeister*), often a close personal friend, who served as unofficial prime minister. Like his predecessors, Leopold also readily appointed (and frequently ennobled) talented and industrious commoners to staff the new and increasingly important Austrian Chancery, as well as numerous subordinate positions within the highest councils of state. These trained professionals were usually jurists and always Catholic, whether by birth or conversion.

From the moment of Leopold's succession until his death nearly a half century later the government's most pressing need was to raise the level of state income. The costly imperial election of 1658 and the Polish conflict had immediately dashed any hopes that the monarchy could receive appreciable fiscal relief from the heavy burdens of the Thirty Years' War. Moreover, the series of wars and foreign threats that surfaced during the reign obliged Leopold to enlarge steadily the 25,000-man standing army that his father had retained after the Peace of Westphalia, until it had reached 65,000 men by 1664 and 100,000 by the end of the century.

The government initially visualized two ways of raising the funds to support these forces: greater administrative efficiency and higher taxation. The Polish war had exposed the inadequacy of the monarchy's fiscal and military system, which was plagued by incompetent and dishonest officials who often staffed redundant administrative agencies that operated at cross purposes with one another. Unfortunately, Leopold's mild temperament was ill suited for administrative restructuring or the dismissal of expendable, but otherwise loyal officials. That Leopold was more inclined to appoint officials than dismiss them is illustrated by his handling of the Privy Council. Since its creation by Ferdinand I the Privy Council had served as the monarchy's highest deliberative body, a select group of no more than a dozen top state officials. Within a decade Leopold's patronage had swollen the Council to about sixty members, making it too unwieldy to perform its original function. By 1669 he had formed a new, smaller policy-making body, the Privy Conference, or *Geheime Konferenz* to replace the now useless Privy Council. It was not long, however, before Leopold had named so many of his favorites to the Privy Conference that it too had outgrown its usefulness. Aside from this dubious innovation Leopold did very little to reform the highest central offices. The council that most needed overhauling, the *Hofkammer*, remained a weak collegiate body that exercised little effective control over its supposedly subordinate provincial treasuries in the Bohemian and newly reunited Inner Austrian and Tyrolean lands. Meanwhile its notorious president, Georg Ludwig Count Sinzendorf (1656–79), used his position to embezzle 2 million florins in state funds – roughly the equivalent to 40 percent of the monarchy's annual revenue – despite years of rumors and charges of corruption.


Given Leopold's inability to overcome administrative inefficiency and corruption, he was forced to rely on the extraction of more and higher taxes from the estates. The level of the Contribution in the Austrian and Bohemian lands had already soared during the Thirty Years' War. Nevertheless, like his father before him Leopold was able to induce them to increase their support. Both men continued to visualize the nobility, together with the church, as key pillars in the state-building process. Thus, in stark contrast to the French Bourbons and English Stuarts, they preferred to work closely with the estates even to the point of accepting somewhat lower revenues than they wanted, so long as they could be sure of their loyalty to the crown. The success of this approach was most evident in the wealthier and more compliant lands of the Bohemian crown, whose estates met no fewer than fifty-nine times in the half century between 1648 and 1698. Already in 1650 Bohemia had agreed to maintain a fixed number of troops in Ferdinand III's newly created peacetime standing army. To pay for them, new land and tax registers were commissioned in Bohemia (1654) and Moravia (1664). For the next century

greater Bohemia contributed between half and two-thirds of all the monarchy's income.

Ferdinand III and Leopold also achieved notable success in Silesia. Here they completed the consolidation of the semi-independent principalities that had begun with Ferdinand II's seizure of Jägerndorf in 1621. The Podiebrad dynasty sold Münsterberg to Ferdinand III, before dying out in 1647. In exchange for assisting John Casimir in his war against Sweden, Leopold reacquired the two Upper Silesian duchies of Oppeln and Ratibor that his father had pawned to Poland during the Thirty Years' War. Finally, in 1675 Leopold annexed Liegnitz, Brieg and Wohlau when the last Piast duke died (see Map 2). The central government did not retain all of the new domain lands that it acquired in Silesia, choosing instead to reward loyal aristocratic families such as the Austrian Liechtensteins (with Jägerndorf) and Auerpergs (with Münsterberg). In every case, however, it greatly reduced the extensive law-making, judicial, and other prerogatives that had heretofore rendered these principalities largely independent of Habsburg rule.

Leopold made fewer demands on the less wealthy and somewhat less compliant Austrian lands. He was especially patient with the Tyrol, which had been reunited with the rest of the *Erblände* following the extinction of its branch of the dynasty in 1665. A century of independence from Vienna had strengthened the sense of individuality that came with the Tyrol's physical and commercial isolation from the rest of the hereditary lands. Indeed, having been virtually untouched by the Reformation and the ravages of the Thirty Years' War, the Tyrolean estates offered little support for Leopold's requests for funds to rebuild the monarchy's economy and provide for its defense. Nevertheless, the emperor made no attempt to suppress the Tyrol's particularism. He scrupulously convened its estates, confirmed their privileges, and even retained the numerous administrative offices that both the Tyrolean and Inner Austrian lands had established following their separation from the rest of the monarchy in 1564. His appointment of German princes from Lorraine and the Palatinate to represent him as governor constituted another concession to their pretensions. At the end of his reign he even considered reestablishing its independence by ceding it to his second son. If Leopold respected the Tyrol's distinctiveness it was because its estates ultimately granted him some (though never more than two thirds) of the funds he requested and because both its confessional pedigree and loyalty to the dynasty were beyond question.

Indeed, if Leopold pursued one aspect of the state-building process with vigor, it was in continuing his predecessors' enforcement of religious uniformity, which he too visualized as a litmus test of loyalty to the monarchy. During his reign the Jesuits continued to tighten their grip over the monarchy's institutions of higher education. They also joined large numbers



2 The reconquest of Hungary

of Dominican and Franciscan missionaries in pastoral work among the unconverted. Like his father before him Leopold continued Ferdinand II's policy of sending Reformation Commissions into those parts of Austria, Bohemia, and Moravia where Protestant communities could be identified. Once again recalcitrant peasants were generally denied the option of emigrating and were compelled to demonstrate conversion, or at least attendance at mass and other Catholic observances.<sup>1</sup>

Within the Austrian and Bohemian lands both Leopold and his father devoted the most attention to converting Silesia's Protestant majority. At the Peace of Westphalia Sweden had not only compelled Ferdinand III to grant full religious freedom to Breslau and the semi-independent principalities, but also mandated the construction of three churches elsewhere in Lower Silesia just outside the walls of the Protestant cities of Schweidnitz, Jauer, and Glogau. Moreover, the treaty also forbade the expulsion of Protestants or their prevention from traveling to any of these locations (or across the Saxon or Polish frontiers) to worship their faith. These restrictions did not, however, forestall the reintroduction of Catholicism in areas not explicitly protected by the treaty. No sooner had the Swedes withdrawn their forces from the duchy than the Reformation Commissions made their appearance. By 1654 over 650 churches had been closed down or converted to Catholic worship, 500 preachers expelled, and their parishioners denied everything from baptism to burial services. The conversion process moved much more quickly in Upper Silesia, whose Protestants were effectively isolated from alternative places of worship. By 1675, however, the extinction of the Calvinist Piasts emboldened Leopold to extend Catholicization to Liegnitz, Brieg, and Wohlau either by expelling preachers outright or, more often, by preventing Protestant congregations from replacing their preachers when they died or retired. Over the next three decades attrition among Protestant clergy permitted him to close down over one hundred churches in the former Piast principalities. Indeed, by 1700 the entire duchy had only 220 Protestant places of worship left from among over 1,500 that had existed a century before. Meanwhile, arrayed against them were no fewer than thirty Catholic religious orders and Silesia's *Landeshauptmann* – who was invariably the bishop of Breslau!

Both Ferdinand III and Leopold I did encounter some limited popular resistance to their fiscal and religious policies within the Austrian and Bohemian lands. In Silesia so-called hedge preachers operating from hide-outs in hilly and wooded areas continued to minister to the Protestant faithful, especially the majority of Lower Silesians who resisted conversion.

<sup>1</sup> Needless to say, compliance did not necessarily equate with conversion. In one Austrian parish, an ostensibly Catholic noblewoman registered her opposition to mandatory communion services by bringing along a pack of howling hunting dogs.

Clandestine Protestant communities survived elsewhere as well, most notably in the alpine valleys of Carinthia and Lower Austria. There were also occasional peasant uprisings against the steadily rising level of the Contribution, particularly during the second half of Leopold's reign. It is worth pointing out, however, that neither ruler encountered overt opposition to either their confessional or fiscal demands among noble or urban elites.

Their acquiescence was especially evident among the recently purged, but now steadfastly loyal and Catholic Bohemian and Moravian nobility. By mid-century their assimilation had progressed beyond politics and religion. The newly installed foreign nobility, as well as most native Czech nobles, adopted German as their primary language. Their rush to affect cosmopolitan tastes also inclined them to learn other languages, such as Italian and French, and to patronize artists, architects, and musicians from western Europe. Although neither the nobility nor the government had ever viewed Czech as a symbol of disloyalty, this process of acculturation further symbolized the nobility's acceptance of integration with the *Erblände*. The destruction of their homeland even impelled many Bohemian and Moravian aristocrats to maintain homes in Vienna, where they became increasingly welcome as major players in the central government. From his new residence there, the Bohemian chancellor ultimately joined his Austrian counterpart as an intimate advisor in foreign and domestic policy. There was, in fact, a significant increase in the number of native Bohemian aristocrats in the councils of state, a rise that complemented a corresponding decrease in the presence and influence of Germans from outside the Habsburg dominions. Perhaps the most eloquent indicator of Bohemia's assimilation into the monarchy was the transformation in the meaning of the word *Erblände*. By the end of the century Leopold and his counselors used it to describe not just the Austrian, but the Bohemian lands as well. It was, of course, technically accurate to refer to greater Bohemia as a hereditary dominion following the *Verneuerte Landesordnung's* elimination of the elective crown in 1627. The change in nomenclature was, however, of more than semantic significance, representing as it did a real evolution in the way in which the dynasty now valued and trusted its Bohemian subjects, especially its ruling aristocracy.

### The Turkish wars and reconquest of Hungary

Hungary was, of course, different. While the Austrian and Bohemian lands had borne heavy tax increases with minimal complaint, the Hungarian estates had steadfastly resisted similar attempts. Their opposition was partly justified by the kingdom's smaller population and relative poverty, but they were nonetheless resented in Vienna as deadbeats. Moreover, the Magyar nobility's proud retention of its native language, customs, and dress seem-

ingly justified Leopold's tendency to treat them as outcasts at court, where they were generally denied access to key government positions outside the Hungarian Chancery. Although the kingdom's diet periodically accepted the stationing of troops from the Austrian and Bohemian lands for defense against the Turks, delegates frequently protested against the presence of such "foreign" troops on Hungarian soil. It was, however, the gentry's and masses' retention of Protestantism that did the most to undermine Leopold's confidence in their loyalty. The central government initially did little to challenge Protestant religious freedom in the decade following the Peace of Westphalia. In keeping with the treaty of Linz, Ferdinand III had immediately restored ninety of the Protestant churches that had been seized by Catholic magnates. Similarly, Leopold repeatedly confirmed the kingdom's religious liberties before its diet, albeit in the face of charges by Protestant delegates that individual Catholic magnates were still expelling pastors from their estates and compelling peasants to attend mass.

### The Ottoman conquest of Transylvania

Given the sustained Magyar resistance to the emerging Habsburg *Gesamtstaat*, Leopold began his reign with the intention of maintaining his predecessors' focus on the monarchy's western dominions and the foreign threats that lay beyond. It was not long, however, before developments beyond Leopold's control compelled him to reassess and, eventually, reverse these priorities. The pivotal event was the decision of Sultan Mehmed IV (1648–87) in September 1656 to appoint Mehmed Kiuprili to the position of grand vizier. Although the new chief minister served barely five years before his death in 1661, he used it to undertake a thorough reform of the Ottoman empire's army and finances. He was, in any event, only the first of a succession of energetic grand viziers from the Kiuprili family who pursued an expansionist policy in Europe. Already by August 1657 he had induced the sultan to tighten his control over Transylvania by deposing the brash and ambitious George II Rákóczi. After a three-year struggle the prince was killed in battle in May 1660.

By then, however, the government in Vienna had been drawn into the struggle. As troublesome as Transylvania had proven in the past, the establishment of effective Turkish control there posed an even greater threat to the monarchy's security. Thus Leopold responded positively to Rákóczi's request for Austrian military intervention. At the same time, however, he was so intimidated by the prospect of war with the Turks that he initially did little more than occupy two Transylvanian counties that Rákóczi had ceded to him in exchange for his assistance. Leopold was more helpful once the peace of Oliva had freed up the Austrian forces that had been fighting Sweden. Even

then, however, the 15,000 troops that he dispatched under Field Marshal Montecuccoli during 1661 was under orders to make “demonstrations” against the Turks in the hope that it might relieve pressure from the Transylvanians. In the end neither Montecuccoli’s army nor several raids into Turkish Hungary by Croat and Magyar magnates proved effective in slowing the Turkish occupation of Transylvania. Although the Transylvanian diet had defiantly elected a new prince, Janos Kemény, to continue the struggle after Rákóczi’s death, he too was slain by the Turks at the beginning of 1662 and the country occupied.

In the end Leopold’s timidity failed to forestall Turkish retaliation. In April 1663 the sultan formally declared war. Soon thereafter the new grand vizier, Fazil Ahmed Kiuprili (1661–78), led an army of 60,000 into Royal Hungary. By November he had seized the formidable fortress of Neuhäusel, the only obstacle that stood between him and the Habsburg capitals of Pressburg and Vienna. By itself Montecuccoli’s army was far too small to prevent the Turks from marching up the Danube. Moreover, Leopold could expect no help from the Hungarian diet, which had broken up the year before, following complaints against continued religious persecution by Catholic magnates and the recent influx of German soldiers sent to meet the Turkish threat. A desperate thrust into Turkish Hungary by the Croatian ban Miklós Zrinyi did, however, delay the Turkish onslaught until the summer of 1664. By then help had arrived from outside the monarchy. Aside from considerable Spanish and papal subsidies, the key aid came from the imperial diet, which convened in 1663 in response to Leopold’s appeals. Although Mainz and its French allies initially blocked his attempt to vote taxes, they did commit the *Rheinbund* to provide an independent force that ultimately totaled 6,000 German and French troops. Yet as the Turkish threat grew, several other German states, most notably Bavaria, Brandenburg-Prussia, and Saxony, committed additional forces. It was with this motley force of only 25,000 men that Montecuccoli crushed a Turkish army twice as large as it attempted to cross into Styria near the ruined monastery of St. Gotthard (1 August 1664).

At the very least the victory at St. Gotthard saved the *Erblände* from invasion. To many Hungarians, however, it presented a rare opportunity to go on the offensive and liberate Hungary from Turkish rule. But Leopold and his advisers saw things differently. Despite his victory, Montecuccoli was still heavily outnumbered. Nor could they be sure of retaining all the forces under his command. It soon became evident that the French and many of the German princes who had rushed to the defense of the Empire’s southeastern frontier were not interested in marching into the Balkans. They were also keenly aware that, except for the *Grenzer* provided by the Military Border and a few magnates, even Royal Hungary had contributed little to the war so far.

But they had another reason for pause. With the Spanish Habsburgs seemingly teetering on the edge of extinction, Leopold was reluctant to become deeply involved in a war with the Turks, lest it leave France free to seize the Spanish dominions after their demise. It was this combination of military weakness and interest in the Spanish inheritance that led him to sign a shameless capitulation just ten days after the greatest victory that the monarchy had ever achieved over the Turks. At the treaty of Vasvár Leopold surrendered several frontier towns, as well as the key fortress of Neuhäusel. He recognized the recently installed Turkish puppet Michael I Apafi as prince of Transylvania and even agreed to make an annual “gift” of 200,000 fl. to the sultan. In exchange Leopold received nothing more than the dubious promise of a twenty-year truce with the Ottoman empire.

#### *The magnate conspiracy*

If nothing else the latest Turkish war demonstrated the resilience of the monarchy’s geopolitical *raison d’être*. Even its erstwhile French enemy and the independent-minded *Rheinbund* princes had come to its aid when it was threatened – and then promptly left its side once their purely defensive common goals had been achieved. Yet, at the same time, the unheroic peace of Vasvár had major consequences within the monarchy. The Hungarian and Croatian nobility had long resented the way in which Leopold’s predecessors had ignored their need for greater security against the Turks. This had been especially true at the height of the Thirty Years’ War, when Vienna was preoccupied with its interests in Germany. Now they seethed at a peace treaty that had been concluded without their advice or participation and had placed the prospects of a Spanish inheritance ahead of those of the kingdom’s liberation from the Ottoman yoke. The magnates felt especially cheated because an offensive into Turkish Hungary would have afforded them the opportunity to enrich themselves, whether through plunder or the reacquisition of estates previously lost to Ottoman occupation. Several Hungarian and Magyarized Croat magnates now vented their anger by conspiring to overthrow Habsburg rule.

There was no doubting the pedigree of the conspirators themselves. The ringleaders included the Hungarian palatine Ferenc Wesselényi, the chief justice Ferenc Nádasdy, the dashing Croatian ban Miklós Zrinyi and his younger brother Peter, who expressed his contempt for the recent peace by launching a series of lucrative raids into Turkish Hungary. Other conspirators included Ferenc Rákóczi, son of the late prince of Transylvania, and Hungary’s archbishop-primate György Lippay, whose estates near Neuhäusel had been signed away at Vasvár. Yet the conspirators’ position and influence could not compensate for bad luck, compounded by their own



incompetence and indecisiveness. Death soon carried off Wesselényi, Lippay, and Miklós Zrinyi, the latter in dramatic fashion after a fight to the death with a wounded boar. Although the new Croatian ban Ferenc Frangepáni soon joined their ranks, none of the conspirators proved particularly adept at intrigue. As Roman Catholics they failed to exploit fully the underlying Protestant discontent that existed within Hungary. Meanwhile, the Croatian conspirators naïvely counted on winning over the troops from the Military Border, despite Croatia's persistent attempts to deprive the *Grenzer* of their political autonomy and personal freedom. Equally misplaced were their hopes of receiving help from foreign powers. Although the French ambassador Gremonville provided some money and encouragement, Louis XIV was hardly prepared to sustain a Hungarian *Fronde*. The plotters received even less encouragement from Venice, Poland, Sweden, and the sultan himself, who declined their offer of Turkish vassalage, if only because he was too preoccupied with his recent invasions of Venetian and Polish territory to consider breaking his truce with Leopold. Indeed, before long both Gremonville and the sultan's chief interpreter betrayed the magnates' overtures to the emperor's agents.

The conspirators themselves were hardly more resolute or trustworthy than their foreign contacts. Some of them were determined to depose Leopold and even made plans to kidnap him in November 1667 when he journeyed from Vienna to meet his Spanish bride. But decades of generous patronage gave several others second thoughts about ending Habsburg rule. It was these doubts, tinged perhaps by contrition, that led Wesselényi, Nádasdy, and Peter Zrinyi to betray details of the conspiracy to Leopold at one point or another, as did Wesselényi's widow and several loyal magnates who were aware of the plot. If Leopold chose not to take immediate action it was because the conspirators' apparent lack of resolve and competence, as well as his own ignorance of their more radical plans, persuaded him that there was little to fear. The plotters finally forced his hand early in 1670 by belatedly appealing to Upper Hungary's Protestant majority and circulating pamphlets calling for Turkish rule. The poorly coordinated attacks that followed were easily repulsed by the strong garrisons that Leopold had recently moved into the kingdom. Moreover, while the Hungarian conspirators attracted a small following among Upper Hungary's Protestants, the Magyarized Croats Zrinyi and Frangepáni received no support in Croatia, where there remained strong feelings against Hungarian domination, heresy, and the prospects of Ottoman rule.

After a vain appeal for help to the Turkish pasha of Buda, Zrinyi and Frangepáni surrendered, followed shortly by Rákóczi. Leopold and his advisors initially intended to grant the conspirators' plea for clemency, if only to retain the kingdom's loyalty. But captured documents finally exposed the

seriousness of the plot (including a plan to assassinate Leopold) and also betrayed the conspirators' continued duplicity when they tried to shift the extent of their involvement to others. Ultimately a special court composed exclusively of non-Hungarians condemned Zrinyi, Frangepáni, and Nádasdy to death, while fining Ferenc Rákóczi 400,000 fl. Still hoping for clemency, Leopold appealed the death sentences to the Privy Council. Instead, it upheld the penalty for all three men, who went to the scaffold on 30 April 1671.

#### *Confessional absolutism in Hungary, 1671–81*

The executions marked the end for Nádasdy, Zrinyi, and Frangepáni, but it was only the beginning of a much bigger crackdown in Hungary. Led by the Hungarian chancellor Tamás Pálffy and new archbishop-primate György Szelepcsényi, loyal magnates were now eager to demonstrate their commitment to the dynasty by punishing treasonous – and especially Protestant – elements within the kingdom. Pálffy spearheaded a broad investigation by a Hungarian tribunal that ultimately led to the arrest and interrogation of 2,000 nobles and the confiscation of three hundred estates worth 3 million fl. Leopold's other advisers wanted to go considerably further. Many shared Montecuccoli's opinion that the Hungarians were little more than a "nation of rebels, robbers, and restless men." No one despised them more than the Austrian Chancellor Johann Paul Hofer and the powerful grand chamberlain Prince Wenzel Lobkovic, who now spoke for the rest of the newly integrated Bohemian aristocracy in proclaiming his desire to "put the Hungarians into Czech trousers." Nor was the court's receding, but still influential German faction silent. Led by Margrave Hermann of Baden and the imperial vice chancellor Leopold Wilhelm von Königsegg, it urged that Hungary be placed under military occupation and Germanized, much as Bohemia had been a half century before. Leopold himself was hesitant to take action that violated his election oath or diverged from his predecessors' traditional cooperation with the monarchy's privileged orders. Yet, when combined with the country's widespread retention of Protestantism, the magnate conspiracy had so shaken his faith in the loyalty of his Hungarian subjects that he now attempted to introduce absolutism there.

Hungarian historians refer to the decade following the suppression of the magnate conspiracy as the "Ten Dark Years." From 1671 the emperor essentially ignored the kingdom's constitutional liberties. He left the office of palatine vacant and also failed to appoint a new Croatian ban following the execution of Frangepáni. He avoided calling the diet, which had not met since the delegates walked out in 1662. Leopold also considered, but resisted, his ministers' call for more drastic measures including the formal

elimination of the kingdom's elective crown, together with its diet, independent treasury, judiciary, and county assemblies. He nevertheless now subjected Royal Hungary to a full-scale military occupation and a fivefold increase in the Contribution needed to pay for it. Although collection remained in the hands of the noble-dominated county assemblies, the presence of troops guaranteed full compliance as never before. Moreover, in a remarkable departure from the past, the kingdom's historically tax-free nobles were ordered to share half of the fiscal burden with their peasants. Nor did Leopold miss the opportunity to move against the kingdom's Protestants. Even though they had played only a minimal role in what was essentially a conspiracy of Catholic magnates, Archbishop Szelepcsényi initiated a campaign of religious persecution that included the closing of Protestant schools and churches, and the expulsion of their ministers.

It was not long before Leopold's actions elicited a violent response. Riots broke out in several Lutheran towns, such as Pressburg, where churches had been closed and the German magistrates replaced with Catholic Magyars. More ominous was the reappearance of thousands of Hungarian nobles and Protestants who had sought refuge from Pálffy's tribunal in neighboring Transylvania and Turkish Hungary. Upon their return they were joined by thousands of unemployed Hungarian soldiers whom Leopold had replaced with German and other "foreign" troops. By September 1672 these "crusaders," or *Kuruc*, had begun launching guerrilla raids against the isolated army garrisons that Leopold had stationed in Royal Hungary.

The government made an immediate concession to popular discontent by reducing the level of peasant taxation by 30 percent. Otherwise its principal response was to strengthen its grip on the kingdom. In February 1673 Leopold appointed the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, a Hungarian-born ethnic German named Johann Kaspar von Ampringen, to govern the kingdom as head of a new *Gubernium* that would take orders directly from Vienna. Ampringen proved to be a conscientious governor who was genuinely devoted to minimizing the hardships caused by Leopold's policies. His office was, in any event, largely by-passed by the county assemblies and military garrisons that continued to communicate directly with the Hungarian Chancery and treasury. The *Gubernium* did, however, represent yet another violation of the kingdom's constitution and autonomy, as did Leopold's decision to place the Hungarian treasury under the direct control of the *Hofkammer*. Leopold also stepped up the pace of religious persecution. Backed by troops, Catholic clergy closed an estimated 800 Protestant churches and forced as many as 60,000 conversions. Protestant clergy who refused to convert were given the choice of exile or death. Whereas over two hundred agreed to leave and hundreds more converted, another ninety-three were condemned to death. Although Leopold promptly

commuted their sentences, he sent forty of their number to row as galley slaves in Spain's Neapolitan fleet.

Even Hungary's loyal, *labanc* magnates were appalled by Leopold's contravention of the constitution.<sup>2</sup> They too resented the presence of "foreign" troops, tax collectors, and officials, especially when they themselves were still being denied patronage outside the confines of Hungary's own increasingly impotent state offices. Together with Ampringen, they protested that religious persecution and excesses committed by the military were progressively alienating the country. They urged Leopold to restore the constitution, appoint a new palatine, and replace German officers and troops with native Hungarians. Their concern was echoed by the growing intensity of the *Kuruc* raids, which continued every summer after 1672. With as many as 15,000 fighters the *Kuruc* raiders committed gruesome atrocities, which begot equally inhumane Austrian countermeasures. Yet, despite the size and ferocity of the *Kuruc* forces, they could not hope to overthrow Habsburg rule without foreign assistance. Transylvania had been at least temporarily neutralized by the Ottoman conquest. So long as Leopold remained at peace with the principality's Turkish overlord and with the French and Swedes in the West, he enjoyed the luxury of ignoring the voices of moderation and going ahead with his plans to forcibly integrate Hungary into the monarchy.

#### *East versus west: The reemergence of the French and Ottoman threats*

Yet, even as Leopold tightened his grip on the kingdom, his window of opportunity was rapidly closing. In the West, the monarchy was confronted by the emerging prospect of French hegemony. The French threat was, however, greatly exacerbated by the Habsburgs' own recent failure to resolve their own succession crisis. The military collapse and imminent extinction of the Spanish Habsburgs had suddenly converted Leopold and the Austrian monarchy into the dynasty's dominant partner. The two branches had renewed their centuries-old dynastic alliance in 1666, with the marriage by proxy of Leopold and Charles II's older sister Margaret. Yet Leopold's goals were different from those of past Austrian Habsburgs. Instead of seeking the security formerly provided by Spain's financial and military resources, he was merely trying to strengthen his claim to the Spanish succession following Charles's death. At the same time Leopold was desperate to beget an heir of his own. Yet, although Margaret quickly bore two boys and two girls, only a single female, Maria Antonia, survived the empress's own death in 1673. Two daughters by Leopold's second wife, the Tyrolean Archduchess Claudia Felicitas, also died, followed shortly by their mother in 1676.

<sup>2</sup> The term presumably stems from the German word, *Landesknecht*, or foot-soldier.

Meanwhile, Louis XIV could put forward a stronger claim, backed by the birth of a healthy son, Louis, in 1661; better yet, the Sun King had the power to press his pretensions. By 1668 he had made good part of his claim by seizing several Belgian towns in the so-called War of Devolution (1667–8). Given his own weak position, Leopold decided to cooperate with France and secretly agreed to a partition of the Spanish inheritance in the same year.<sup>3</sup> The emperor likewise ignored Louis's occupation of Lorraine in 1670, which further cut off the Spanish Netherlands, but posed no direct threat either to Germany proper or the monarchy itself. Vienna's policy of appeasement continued in November 1671, when Prince Lobkovic negotiated a neutrality treaty with Louis just prior to his planned invasion of the Dutch Republic. When Louis launched his attack five months later, Lobkovic not only initially maintained Austrian and German neutrality, but actually assisted France diplomatically.

Lobkovic's stance at the beginning of the Dutch War (1672–9) belied his "eastern" bias in favor of reducing Hungary at the expense of ignoring French aggression in the West. He did, however, incur significant opposition from a growing faction of "westerners" led by the experienced Austrian diplomat Franz Lisola and supported by the Spanish and several German and Italian envoys. By June 1672 the dramatic progress of French arms did, in fact, induce Lobkovic to conclude a defensive alliance with Brandenburg-Prussia to defend Germany's frontier and to dispatch Montecuccoli to the Rhine with a small observation force. Although Dutch and Spanish subsidies helped to increase the size of Montecuccoli's force, most of the troops came from various German states, rather than from the monarchy itself. When Leopold finally declared war on Louis XIV in May 1674, he directed Montecuccoli to use his forces only as a demonstration army to distract, but not engage, the French. Even this ploy was defeated by Lobkovic who secretly reassured the French that Montecuccoli's presence on the Rhine was no more than a bluff.

Leopold immediately expelled Lobkovic from court following the discovery of his duplicity in October 1674. Nevertheless, he was as yet ill prepared to assume a "western" strategy, not only because he would have to sacrifice his Hungarian policies, but also because the threat that Louis XIV posed to European security was still not sufficiently evident to inspire a broad European coalition. Indeed, French subsidies had enlisted England and Sweden as allies, and had secured the benevolent neutrality of several German states, including Bavaria and, ultimately, Saxony and the Palatinate. Leopold's own failure to provide a male heir undercut his own ability to build

<sup>3</sup> By which France was to receive Belgium, Burgundy, Naples, Sicily, Navarre, the Philippines, and Spain's North African enclaves, leaving Spain and its American and strategic northern possessions to Leopold.

a coalition since the extinction of both the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs would remove the only obstacle to Louis's dynastic ambitions. Given the unlikelihood of defeating him, the meager anti-French coalition soon fell apart. The United Provinces opened separate negotiations at the Dutch town of Nijmegen in January 1676. By the summer of 1678 both they and Spain had concluded a treaty that ceded the Franche Comté and additional Belgian territory to France. The following February Leopold also came to terms that included the loss of the strategic Outer Austrian city of Freiburg, as well as his acquiescence in the continued French occupation of Lorraine. Leopold's capitulation enraged Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg, who was now compelled to give back most of his conquests in Swedish Pomerania. In revenge he became a French client and joined Bavaria in agreeing to vote for Louis XIV in the next imperial election. Indeed, although Leopold had just produced a son by his new wife, Eleonore, the German princes had reason to be swayed by the prospect of French leadership were Leopold to die without leaving an eligible adult male heir.

Louis's gains at Nijmegen did not slake his appetite for territory. Within a year he had created the notorious Courts of Réunion. These tribunals revived or concocted ancient territorial claims as a pretext for seizing various imperial principalities along the Franco-German frontier. Nevertheless, Leopold had no choice but to capitulate at Nijmegen and acquiesce to the subsequent piecemeal annexations of German territory. Not only had his allies' desertion persuaded him that there was no prospect of stopping France in the West, but events in the East were pushing the monarchy toward a second, far more serious security crisis. By 1678 the *Kuruc* revolt had grown under the leadership of Imre Thököly, the 21-year-old son of a Calvinist nobleman whose estates had been seized following the magnate conspiracy. From his Transylvanian exile Thököly now commanded 20–30,000 fighters, including many Catholics alienated by the suspension of constitutional government. Nor was he fighting alone. The new grand vizier Kara Mustapha (1676–83) had resumed Turkish incursions into Royal Hungary following the successful conclusion of the wars with Poland and Venice. With his blessing, Michael I Apafi had concluded a subsidy treaty with France that permitted Transylvania to assist his fellow Calvinist Thököly's Hungarian operations. Leopold tried to isolate Thököly by dispatching four successive embassies to Constantinople during 1678 and 1679 in order to extend the twenty-year truce concluded at Vasvár. But all four ambassadors died before they could complete their mission, a coincidence that many of the sultan's advisors interpreted as a divine omen against renewing the treaty. Although the Ottoman empire had only recently begun a new war with Russia, Leopold had just cause to fear that the monarchy might be next.

Caught in a vise, Vienna was faced with the prospect of having to choose

between fighting France in the West or the Turks and their Transylvanian clients in the East. Whatever the choice, both factions at court agreed that peace within Hungary was crucial. Their counsel was forcefully seconded by the monarchy's allies, especially the Dutch, whose sensitivity to Protestant persecution now became a new factor in restraining Leopold's attempts at confessional absolutism. Yet even the papacy soon began to urge restraint, fearing that the Hungarian rebellion would open the way for a Turkish invasion. As early as February 1676 Leopold responded to the beginning of Franco-Dutch talks at Nijmegen by releasing all imprisoned Protestant clergymen. At the same time Spain was induced to free the remaining forty preachers from its Neapolitan galleys, albeit with some prompting from Dutch naval forces. Over the next three years Leopold made two abortive attempts to reach a settlement by convening the upper table of the Hungarian diet and then by opening direct negotiations with Thököly.

It was the mounting international threat posed by the French and Turks that finally persuaded him to restore the kingdom's constitutional liberties. In 1680 he appointed a new Croatian ban with expanded judicial and executive powers. The following year he convened the first full Hungarian diet in nearly two decades at Sopron. Meeting with the delegates in person, Leopold abolished the *Gubernium* and permitted the diet to elect the kingdom's first palatine since Wesselényi's death fourteen years earlier. He made several tax concessions, including the removal of the royal treasury's non-Hungarian members and the restoration of its independence from the *Höfkammer*. He also confirmed Protestant religious rights laid down seventy-five years earlier in the treaty of Vienna. Protestant clergy and teachers were to be restored, together with all churches that had not already been reconsecrated for Catholic use. To replace them he permitted Protestants to build up to two new churches in any county in which they no longer had a place of worship.

In return for these concessions the Hungarian diet joined its Croatian counterpart in mobilizing the kingdom's feudal levy, or *insurrectio*, to defend against the Turks. Nevertheless, Leopold's concessions to the Sopron diet proved insufficient to appease Thököly and his partisans. They did not trust Leopold's sincerity and doubted his willingness to abide by his promises once the foreign threats had passed. Nor did the government's religious concessions go far enough, principally because of the opposition of the kingdom's Catholic magnate majority. Although the agreement confirmed the religious freedom of nobles and burghers, the magnates refused to extend it to their peasants, despite the provision made for them in 1645 in the treaty of Linz. Indeed, they ultimately used their control of much of the countryside to block the restoration of all but fifty of the 888 Protestant churches seized over the past decade. They also supported Leopold's refusal to return the estates that the Pálffy tribunal had confiscated from Protestant nobles,

especially since they had since acquired many of them from the crown. This was no small sticking point for Thököly himself, who sought the recovery of his family's lands as well as the creation of a sovereign principality for himself in northeastern Hungary.

Thököly's intransigence was also reinforced by Kara Mustapha, who had concluded peace with Russia in February and was now openly collaborating with the *Kuruc* and Transylvanian forces. Yet Leopold still hoped that he could somehow appease Thököly and the Turks. Ever since Lobkovic's fall eight years earlier, he had favored focusing on the growing French threat to Germany. He shared the view of "westerners" like Hermann of Baden who argued that land lost to the Turks could always be recovered in a future war, while territories taken by France would be lost forever. Moreover, France's seizure of the great imperial city of Strassburg in October 1681 had finally awakened much of the Empire and western Europe to the French threat. Within months several German princes, the United Provinces, Spain, and even Sweden had formed the so-called League of Augsburg to deter further Réunions. Although it was not easy for him to embrace a largely Protestant alliance and especially the Dutch, who had deserted him at Nijmegen, the anti-French coalition held forth the promise of victory in the West. It was this prospect that moved Leopold to conclude a truce with Thököly. The emperor even permitted him to wed Helena Zrinyi, the daughter of Peter Zrinyi and recent widow of Francis I Rákóczi, whose massive estates would amply compensate Thököly for the lands his own family had lost. It was, however, a short honeymoon. Thököly waited exactly nine days after the June wedding before renouncing the truce and joining forces with Apafi and the Turkish pasha of Buda. By October their combined armies had seized control of most of Upper Hungary and begun raiding neighboring Moravia and Silesia. As late as August Leopold had advised his envoy in Constantinople to intensify his efforts to extend the monarchy's truce with the Turks. By now, however, the grand vizier had left Constantinople to join the main Ottoman army. His objective was Vienna itself. Like it or not, the monarchy would have to fight in the East.

#### *The siege of Vienna and the Holy League*

Kara Mustapha and his 100,000-man army began the long march to Vienna at the beginning of 1683. Along the way he was reinforced by the pasha of Buda and the Tartar Khan, though not by Thököly, whose forces continued to pursue the conquest of Upper Hungary. With the death of Montecuccoli two years earlier the task of defending the monarchy fell to his former lieutenant, the equally talented Duke Charles of Lorraine, who had entered the emperor's service following the French occupation of his duchy. With a

field army of only 36,000 men, together with 12,000 men scattered in garrisons throughout Hungary and Croatia, Lorraine had no chance of stopping the Turkish march up the Danube. As news of their approach reached Vienna on 7 July, Leopold and his family hastily fled to Passau, 175 miles upriver. Their flight was punctuated at one point by a mob of frantic Viennese begging him to stay, and later by cursing peasants, some of whom blamed his Hungarian policies for the impending disaster. Thousands of Viennese followed Leopold westward, although their place was taken by even larger numbers of people seeking refuge from the countryside. Meanwhile, Lorraine positioned his outnumbered forces several miles to the north, on the other side of the Danube.

Appearances aside, Leopold's presence in Passau enabled him and his ministers to work for the city's relief by mobilizing a relief force. If nothing else the Ottoman threat facilitated the search for allies, especially among those neighboring countries which had the most to lose from a Turkish conquest of the monarchy. Poland's King John Sobieski had already concluded an alliance with him at the end of March, effectively reversing his pro-French foreign policy and occasional assistance to Thököly. He was now joined by Electors Max II Emanuel of Bavaria and John George III of Saxony, whose territories stood next in the Turkish path. Leopold also received commitments from the small imperial principalities of the Swabian and Franconian circles, whose own continued independence depended heavily on the protection of the Holy Roman emperor. No less valuable was the assistance that Leopold got from Pope Innocent XI, who had long dreamed of a Christian crusade in the Balkans. Innocent had played a decisive role in securing Sobieski's support by giving him subsidies and personally guaranteeing the alliance compact. He now supplemented this commitment by giving both Leopold and Bavaria's Max Emanuel the authority to raise money by taxing church property within their dominions.

While the monarchy's government in exile worked feverishly to gather a relief force, Vienna itself struggled desperately to hold out. Fighting was furious and nearly continuous. Kara Mustapha punctuated the ongoing bombardment and mining operations with no fewer than eighteen major assaults on the city walls, or about one for every three days of the two-month siege. In response the garrison made sorties to disrupt the siege operations. By August the stench of unburied bodies permeated the air of both sides of the ramparts. There was no shortage of atrocities. The grand vizier's cavalry and Tartar auxiliaries devastated broad stretches of the countryside. To demoralize the city's defenders, he had large numbers of captured peasants butchered in front of Vienna's walls. From the city's ramparts the garrison responded in kind by flaying captured Turkish soldiers alive and mounting the heads of their fallen comrades on pikes. But time was running out. The

Turks nearly took the city in a furious assault on 4 September, after their mines had breached the section of the wall nearest the Hofburg. That evening the garrison sent up flares to alert Lorraine that the city's fall was imminent. Somehow the defenders repulsed additional assaults for each of the next three days, even though only a third of the original garrison was still fit for combat. Finally, on 7 September bonfires on the Kahlenberg heights west of the city told the defenders that their deliverance was at hand.

The Christian army that attacked the Turks from the Kahlenberg on the morning of 12 September 1683 typified so many of the coalitions that played such a key role in the defense and expansion of the Habsburg monarchy. Although Lorraine's 20,000 Austrians constituted the largest single contingent, they comprised less than a third of the relief force. John Sobieski brought 18,000 Poles and, by virtue of his royal rank, won the overall command and the lion's share of the credit for the allied victory. No less important were the 11,000 Bavarians and 9,000 Saxons, led by their two electors, together with 8,000 troops from the Swabian and Franconian Circles. This considerable force was still numerically inferior to the enemy. But the Turks exhibited their customary weaknesses against disciplined troops, which were compounded both by Kara Mustapha's failure to fortify his position and by a well-timed sally from the besieged garrison. By dusk the remnants of his shattered army had fled, leaving all its supplies and artillery behind. Over the next few months the allies pursued the enemy into Royal Hungary, much of which was recovered by the end of the year. The close of the 1683 campaign also marked the end for Kara Mustapha. On orders from Mehmed IV, he was strangled and his severed head dispatched to Constantinople.

The sultan would have infinitely preferred Vienna as a trophy of war to the grand vizier's head. Yet, even had Kara Mustapha taken the city, he would probably not have been able to retain it, given the enormous difficulties in maintaining an army so far from its home base and the even greater Christian military effort that the city's fall would have likely inspired. But the Turks would have certainly made the most of their opportunity to devastate Vienna, together with much of the rest of the monarchy, and might have retained Habsburg Hungary in a subsequent peace treaty. Moreover, the monarchy's collapse would have forced Christian Europe to enlist the leadership of Louis XIV, who was eagerly waiting in the wings. With several of the imperial electors already in his pay, he would have even stood an excellent chance of being elected as Leopold's heir to the throne of Charlemagne.

The victory of Kahlenberg was no less decisive in orienting Leopold and his ministers toward expansion in the East. The day after the battle, Elector John George had returned home with the Saxon contingent, though not before personally lecturing Leopold on the evils of his religious policies. But

the other German princes who had contributed to the city's relief now expressed a willingness to continue the struggle. Though he ultimately returned with his army to Poland, John Sobieski was eager to open a second front to reverse the recent Ottoman conquest of the Polish province of Podolia. Similarly, Venice was prepared to avenge its loss of Crete by attacking the Turks in the eastern Mediterranean. By March 1684 Innocent XI helped to join the Poles and Venetians to the emperor in a Holy League that he firmly cemented with considerable financial support. Over the next decade he taxed the church's wealth throughout Europe to finance what could justly be termed the last great crusade. Within the monarchy alone the clergy contributed a third of its income. Innocent also directed it to turn over a third of all the property it had acquired in the last sixty years and subsequently authorized the transfer of the sizeable estates of Archbishop Szelepcsényi and Bishop Sinelli following their deaths in 1685. However generous these initiatives may have been, Innocent was merely paying the dynasty back for the patronage and crucial support that it had given the church since the beginning of the century.

In return, the pope lobbied hard for peace with France in the West. Louis XIV had, in fact, suspended the annexation of German territories during the siege, if only because he did not wish to ruin his chances of assuming the leadership of Christian Europe once Vienna and the monarchy had been overrun. With his hopes dashed, he now resumed the Réunions, seizing much of Luxemburg by the end of 1683 and the archbishopric-electorate of Trier in the following year. To halt further French aggression, Leopold reluctantly came to terms with Louis at Regensburg in August 1684. Although he refused to recognize the permanent cession of other imperial territories, he did recognize Louis's acquisition of Luxemburg and his right to administer all the lands that he had seized before August 1681, including Strassburg, in exchange for the return of his more recent acquisitions and a twenty-year truce.

Leopold's decision proved to be as wise as it was painful and necessary. Freed from the need to defend against France in the West, the monarchy and its allies could devote themselves fully to the war in the Balkans. The Habsburg dominions were unusually forthcoming. As early as 1684 the Hungarians fielded 8,000 men under their new palatine, Pál Esterházy. In 1686 alone Leopold extracted 3.5 million fl. from the estates of the Austrian and Bohemian *Erblande*, together with another 2 million from the Hungarian lands. Nor did he want for allies. By 1685 there were nearly 40,000 German troops fighting in Hungary, including 8,000 Bavarians and 4,500 Swabians, as well as new contingents from Brunswick-Lüneburg (11,000), the Rhenish Circle (8,000), and even the pro-French archbishop-electorate of Cologne (6,000). In the following year the imperial diet voted an additional 2.75

million fl. (two-thirds of which was actually raised). No less significant was the return of 5,000 Saxons and Frederick William's dispatch of 8,000 troops from Brandenburg-Prussia. The great elector's support did not come easily. He still resented Leopold's capitulation to the French at Nijmegen and his record of Protestant religious persecution. Nor had he forgotten the Habsburg seizure of Jägerndorf in 1621 or the more recent escheatment of the three Piast principalities of Liegnitz, Brieg, and Wohlau, to which the Hohenzollerns also had a claim. In the end, however, past grievances were overshadowed by the present behavior of his French ally, most notably the intensifying persecution of Huguenots that culminated in Louis's repeal of the Edict of Nantes (October 1685).<sup>4</sup> By 1687 the Christian crusade had embraced not only the emperor's once distant Protestant vassals but Orthodox Russia, which began its own operations on the edges of the Black Sea.

With peace in the West and allies in the East, Leopold's forces achieved a series of conquests unparalleled in the annals of the Turkish wars. Several German princes vied for the honor of humbling the infidel, most notably the Saxon and Bavarian electors, Prince Louis William of Baden (son of the new *Hofkriegsrat* President, Hermann of Baden), and Prince George Louis of Brunswick-Lüneburg (the future George I of England). Yet most of the laurels fell to Charles of Lorraine. By 1685 he had retaken all of Upper Hungary, including the formidable fortress of Neuhäusel, destroying a Turkish relief force and butchering its 3,000-man garrison in the process. By October virtually all of the *Kuruc* forces had deserted and sworn allegiance to Leopold after the pasha of Buda had seized Thököly in a clumsy attempt to trade him for peace. The next year the historic capital of Buda fell after a bloody 2½-month siege, as did most of southern and southwestern Hungary. By 1687 another crushing victory near the old Mohács battlefield yielded up much of Slavonia. By the end of the campaign Lorraine had also entered Transylvania and compelled it to supply and fund a large portion of his army. Although Apafi and the Transylvanian diet had hoped to retreat into neutrality, they had expressed as early as 1686 a willingness to accept Habsburg sovereignty in exchange for the promise of religious freedom and Apafi's retention as prince. Once Lorraine had strengthened his grip on the principality, he compelled them to accept these terms on 9 March 1688. Six months later Elector Max Emanuel captured Belgrade after a siege of only three weeks. By the end of the year his forces were marching into Turkish Bosnia and Serbia.

<sup>4</sup> Frederick William committed his forces in exchange for receiving the tiny Silesian enclave of Schwiebus as compensation for all outstanding Hohenzollern claims within the duchy. In the end Leopold avoided paying even this small price for Brandenburg's aid. Though he handed over Schwiebus in June 1686, the great elector's son, Frederick, secretly offered to return it to the monarchy after his father's death, a promise that Frederick somewhat reluctantly fulfilled in 1695, seven years after his succession in 1688.

*The two-front war*

In just five years the Holy League had helped Leopold to erase a century and a half of Turkish rule in Hungary. Yet the series of Balkan conquests came only at the sufferance of Louis XIV. The allies fully expected that the League of Augsburg and the Twenty Years' Truce that France had concluded at Regensburg would deter renewed French aggression. Louis XIV was, however, unwilling to allow the permanent destruction of the Ottoman empire as a useful ally in future wars against the monarchy. By the summer of 1688 he moved to relieve pressure from the Turks by sending his forces into Germany. In August 16,000 French troops occupied Cologne after the pope and emperor had helped thwart the seemingly certain succession of its pro-French coadjutor, Egon von Fürstenberg, as archbishop-elect. Leopold responded by joining the League of Augsburg in return for a commitment that included Dutch recognition of Austrian claims to the Spanish Succession. Leopold's accession to the League reached Versailles in mid-September, together with news of the fall of Belgrade. Ten days later his armies marched into the Rhineland, where they quickly seized the electorates of Trier, Mainz, and the Palatinate, as well as the strategic fortress of Philippsburg.

The monarchy was confronted once again with the threat of a two-front war and the agony of choosing between East and West. Leopold did not want for advice. Clerical intimates like Marco d'Aviano seconded the papal nuncio and the other envoys of the Holy League in urging Leopold to continue the crusade in the Balkans. Even Charles of Lorraine opposed opening a second front in the West, even though it offered the best hope of liberating his duchy from two decades of French occupation. Yet most of the German princes were unwilling to share in Lorraine's fate, especially now that the Turkish threat to the empire had been virtually eliminated. They soon joined the Spanish ambassador and many of Leopold's ministers in expressing the need to stop French aggression before it was too late. The emperor's decision was determined largely by the opportunities offered by the Grand Alliance now gathering in the West. With the exception of neutral Sweden, the League of Augsburg stood united against Louis XIV. Especially critical was the leadership of William of Orange, whose triumph in the Glorious Revolution had just placed him in control of both England and the Netherlands. Not only did he reiterate his earlier promise of support for Leopold's claim to the Spanish Succession, but he joined the German princes in backing the election of the emperor's 10-year-old son Joseph as Roman King. Armed with these incentives Leopold declared war on France on 3 April 1689.

During the course of the Nine Years' War (1689–97) against France the monarchy fought two wars, on two fronts, with two virtually distinct sets of

allies. Only Leopold and the German princes were committed to both conflicts, although they now shifted most of their best troops and generals to the West. Louis XIV had begun hostilities in the Rhineland, which his forces systematically devastated before being pushed back by an imperial army led by Charles of Lorraine. Yet, the war ultimately spread to the Low Countries, Catalonia, and northwest Italy, following Spain's and Savoy's entry as belligerents in 1690. It was a measure of France's great strength that almost the entire war was fought on the territory of its many enemies, who could do little more than force a stalemate.

Meanwhile, Louis XIV was also able to accomplish his objective of saving the Ottoman empire from further catastrophe, and even emboldened the sultan to spurn Leopold's peace overtures. The massive diversion of forces west had, in fact, left the emperor with only 24,000 troops in the Balkans at the beginning of 1689. Despite these losses the new commander, Louis William of Baden, was initially able to retain the initiative, marching as far south as Albania and Macedonia. The Balkan peoples welcomed the imperial army at first, especially after Leopold had promised them religious freedom, tax exemptions, and national autonomy. Yet the proselytizing of the Jesuit missionaries who accompanied it soon cooled their enthusiasm and eliminated any chance of a general uprising against Ottoman rule. When the Turks counterattacked, Louis William was forced back to Belgrade, together with well over 30,000 Serb refugees who had already committed themselves to the Habsburg cause. The death of Michael I Apafi in April 1690 also emboldened the sultan to name the exiled Imre Thököly prince of Transylvania, dispatching him at the head of an army that quickly occupied much of the principality. Louis William hastened east and retook Transylvania by defeating Thököly one last time. But his absence permitted another Turkish force to surprise Belgrade and massacre its garrison. The Balkan front stabilized only a year later, when Louis William destroyed the main Turkish army at Slankamen, killing the Grand Vizier Mustapha Kiuprili and most of his commanders in the process. Although the German princes soon pressured Leopold into transferring the *Türkenlouis* to the western front, the emperor was able to maintain a virtual stalemate in the Balkans by enticing individual princes to contribute forces. In 1692 he secured troops and 750,000 fl. from Duke Ernest August of Brunswick-Lüneburg by promising to raise him to the rank of elector. Two years later he entrusted the new Saxon Elector Frederick Augustus with command of the imperial army in exchange for his commitment of 8,000 men.

Although both conflicts dragged on for several more years, the time for peace had come. Despite France's successes in the field, the strain of war on his kingdom ultimately moved Louis XIV to negotiate a settlement, even at the cost of disgorging some of his conquests. He was, however, able to

minimize his losses by dividing his enemies, just as he had done during the Dutch War. Savoy was the first to defect in 1695, in exchange for some French territory. One year later William of Orange entered peace talks at Ryswick. Although he invited Leopold to participate in the negotiations, the emperor proved a reluctant peacemaker. Admittedly there was no prospect of recovering more German territory than Louis XIV was already willing to give back. Yet Leopold was mindful of the delicate health of his Spanish cousin. Although Charles II had somehow survived into his fourth decade, he could not be expected to live much longer and was, in any event, incapable of providing an heir. Having already benefited from the combined strength of a great European coalition, Leopold now hoped the alliance would outlast Charles and guarantee Anglo-Dutch support for his own claim to the Spanish Succession. In the end his hopes were dashed by Charles II himself, who concluded a separate peace with Louis XIV in August 1697, following the fall of Barcelona. William of Orange followed suit one month later, leaving Leopold until 1 November to adhere to the treaty. In acceding to the treaty of Ryswick, the emperor formally recognized the loss of virtually all of Alsace, including the great imperial city of Strassburg. On the other hand the French restored all other annexations since the treaty of Nijmegen, finally evacuated Lorraine, and actually returned the Outer Austrian city of Freiburg, together with the key Rhenish fortress of Breisach, which had been ceded at the Peace of Westphalia.

Peace in the West again afforded the monarchy the luxury of concentrating all of its forces against the Turks. Frederick Augustus continued to provide a considerable Saxon contingent in exchange for Leopold's help in securing the Polish crown after the death of John Sobieski in 1696. His conversion to Roman Catholicism at Baden bei Wien on 1 June 1697 guaranteed his election as King Augustus II by the Polish diet four weeks later. The king-elect's departure for Warsaw also permitted Leopold to replace a rather mediocre commander-in-chief with the brilliant young Prince Eugene of Savoy. Eugene had first served the emperor at the battle of Kahlenberg, only weeks after Louis XIV had denied him a commission in the French army. Yet, like so many of Leopold's best officers, he had eventually been transferred west, commanding the allied forces against the French in northern Italy. Now he returned east to fight against a less formidable enemy. On 11 September Eugene caught Sultan Mustapha and his grand vizier at Zenta, just as their army was crossing the Tisza River toward Transylvania. Although the sultan himself escaped, the grand vizier perished together with most of his officers and 30,000 men, a third of whom drowned trying to swim to safety.

At another time Zenta might have opened the way for a new round of Balkan conquests. Yet, once Ryswick had deprived the monarchy of its

western allies, Leopold realized that he needed peace with the Ottoman empire in order to prepare for another conflict with France over the Spanish Succession. The prospects of further successes inclined his allies in the Holy League against a settlement. Yet, in the east it was the emperor who controlled the tempo of war and diplomacy. The Turks themselves enjoyed little more latitude than picking the precise moment of the treaty of Carlowitz, which was signed at exactly 11:45 a.m. on 26 January 1699, in keeping with the instructions of the chief Turkish negotiator's astrologer. The peace confirmed the monarchy's recovery of all of the Hungarian crownlands except for a small strip of eastern Slavonia near Belgrade and the Banat of Temesvár in central Hungary.

### The legacy of Leopold I

The break-up of the League of Augsburg in the west and Leopold's decision for an early peace in the east foreclosed prospects for additional acquisitions for the empire and monarchy respectively. Nevertheless, his position in 1699 was infinitely better than the situation he had confronted in 1683. The monarchy was, in fact, more secure against outside threats than at any time in its history. Both Germany in the west and Hungary in the east were united behind the dynasty for the first time in over a century and a half. To the south, the Italian peninsula was still protected by the Spanish Habsburgs. Finally, to the north a weak, but massive Poland ruled by Leopold's Saxon vassal provided the monarchy with its most extensive *glacis*.

The monarchy had, of course, succeeded in crushing the Turks and stopping Louis XIV simply because the threats they posed were so great that they were perceived beyond the Hofburg. The Holy League was little more than a coalition of recent victims of Ottoman resurgence under the Kiupri-lis. The frustration of French aggression could not have been achieved without a catharsis in the attitude of the Protestant German princes and the two Maritime Powers, who joined Leopold in burying their mutual suspicions on behalf of common security needs. Indeed, far from being dependent on Spain and the small league of Catholic princes who had saved it in 1620, the monarchy was now part of a broad international coalition that included major Protestant powers such as England and the United Provinces, as well as all of the more powerful imperial princes. One indication of the dynasty's emergence from diplomatic isolation and its renewed acceptance by the German princes was the almost effortless election in January 1690 of Leopold's son Joseph as king of the Romans. Even though Joseph was only 12 years old at the time, the electors not only granted him a special age exemption, but negotiated an electoral capitulation with Leopold that actually strengthened certain imperial prerogatives. Both concessions



contrasted sharply with the tortuous four-year wait and humiliating capitulation that Leopold himself had had to endure three decades earlier. They also reflected more than the electors' fear of Louis XIV and the Turks. The close collaboration in the triumphant Balkan crusade had forged a strong German identity among all the German princes, especially those who had actually fought there. Whereas this spirit of patriotism was shared equally by the Protestant and Catholic princes, the dynasty's constitutional position within the empire was also further entrenched by a fortuitous shift in the confessional balance of the Electoral College. With the extinction of its Calvinist dynasty in 1685, the Palatinate had been inherited by the Catholic duke of Neuburg, whose daughter Eleonore had just become Leopold's third wife, and whose son John William was a close friend of Roman King Joseph. The recent conversion of the Saxon Frederick Augustus left Brandenburg and Brunswick-Lüneburg as the only Protestants among the nine imperial electors. The combination of Joseph's election and the overwhelming Catholic majority in the electoral college guaranteed Habsburg retention of the imperial crown for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the birth of a younger brother, Charles, in 1685 eliminated any immediate threat of the dynasty's extinction. Although Leopold owed his good fortune principally to outside support, these dynastic developments strengthened his position as a major player in European affairs. At the same time several domestic developments assisted in laying the foundations of a great power.

#### *The integration of Hungary*

After two centuries the monarchy had finally vanquished the Turks. Now it remained for Leopold to subdue his own Hungarian subjects. By the spring of 1687 the progress of the reconquest had emboldened the emperor and his Austrian and Bohemian counselors to institute constitutional changes that would bring the kingdom more into line with the rest of the monarchy. Yet Leopold had no intention of decreeing a Hungarian version of the *Verneuerte Landesordnung*. Instead he submitted his proposals to a combined Hungarian-Croatian diet. When it convened in October at Pressburg, he reiterated his intention of honoring his oath to uphold the constitution and the kingdom's liberties, including the diet's right to vote taxes, the nobility's control over local government, and the people's religious freedom. In exchange he sought only two constitutional changes. The diet readily agreed to abolish formally its right to elect its kings and to accept a hereditary succession, an innovation that it confirmed by recognizing his son, Joseph, as heir and his coronation as king. The diet also agreed to repeal the *jus resistendi*, albeit with some reluctance and only after repeated promises of religious freedom.

Leopold was no less successful in forging a new arrangement with the Transylvanian estates, which convened at Fogaras following the death of Michael I Apafi and the final defeat of Imre Thököly in 1690. His *Diplomum Leopoldinum* confirmed the privileges of the three nations represented in the diet, which agreed in return to pay a fixed annual contribution of just over 100,000 fl. (400,000 in wartime). He also recognized their right to elect a native governor, subject to confirmation by the crown. It was a measure of Leopold's moderation that he even recognized the late Michael I Apafi's son as prince until 1696, when the young man was finally brought to Vienna and induced to renounce his title in exchange for a pension and his elevation as an imperial prince. The emperor also recognized the principality's special status within Hungary by establishing an independent Transylvanian Chancery to represent it in Vienna. Finally, he confirmed religious freedom for the principality's Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, and Unitarians – though not for the Orthodox Romanian peasantry or a large Armenian refugee population that had fled there from Turkish Wallachia in 1672. Indeed, over the next decade Jesuit missionaries succeeded in convincing many of the Romanian and Armenian clergy to adhere to the Uniate (Greek Catholic) church, which recognized the authority of the papacy.

The settlements that Leopold offered the estates at Pressburg and Fogaras demonstrated that he had learned the lessons of previous Hungarian insurrections, but also that both sides recognized that future opposition would be less likely to succeed in the absence of an independent Transylvania or powerful Ottoman threat. Yet these efforts at forging a new relationship could not erase totally the mutual suspicion that continued to poison relations between crown and country. A notorious example had already surfaced in the months prior to the Pressburg diet, when Hungary's new military governor, Count Antonio Caraffa interpreted the idle gossip of some camp followers at the town of Eperjes as evidence of another plot against Habsburg rule. Although Leopold instructed Caraffa to abide by the kingdom's laws and a recently promulgated amnesty, he empowered him to establish a tribunal there to investigate and punish any treasonous activity. Over a six-month period seventeen prominent burghers and nobles were tortured into confessing to the groundless charges. In short order the unfortunate victims had their right arms cut off, were decapitated, drawn and quartered, and finally had their remains hanged from the city gate. By August the Palatine Esterházy and other magnates had prevailed on Leopold to discontinue the so-called slaughterhouse of Eperjes and eventually secured Caraffa's transfer to another position.

Moreover, in the aftermath of the Pressburg diet Leopold continued to rely almost exclusively on his Austrian and Bohemian counselors in making policy for the kingdom. Native Hungarians had virtually no voice in the

country's reorganization, or *Einrichtungswerk*, which was instead placed in the hands of a commission headed by Leopold's grand chamberlain, Ferdinand Prince Dietrichstein. They were totally excluded from the so-called Commission for Newly Acquired Lands, or *Commissio Neo Acquistica*, a panel formed by the Dietrichstein Commission to ascertain ownership rights to recovered Hungarian lands. The Commission also disposed of much of sparsely inhabited southern Hungary and Slavonia without consulting the kingdom's authorities. Even the subsequent determination of the country's borders at the peace of Carlowitz was concluded without the participation of a single Hungarian negotiator.

This anti-Magyar bias was most evident in the policies that the government adopted in resettling the country. Before returning estates to their former owners, the *Commissio Neo Acquistica* demanded proof of ownership. Unfortunately, many of the deeds had been lost during the Ottoman occupation. Even when claimants could prove their claim, they had to pay a stiff administrative fee that was set at 10 percent of the value of the land recovered. In the many instances when nobles could not establish prior ownership, their estates reverted to the crown. As had happened in Bohemia after White Mountain, the emperor often gave newly acquired lands to non-native courtiers and generals who then resold them rather than establish roots there. This was, however, small consolation to those native nobles who could ill afford to repurchase their former estates. The Dietrichstein Commission also decided to repopulate much of the Hungarian plain with non-Magyar colonists who, it felt, would demonstrate greater loyalty to the monarchy. The area between the Danube and Tisza rivers was, in fact, already inhabited principally by Serbs whose ancestors had fled the Turkish advance over the past three centuries. By 1690 the Dietrichstein Commission strengthened their numbers by resettling the latest surge of perhaps 40,000 Serb and other Balkan refugees there, granting them religious freedom and a large measure of local autonomy. It also accepted Slovak peasants who had run away from their estates in Upper Hungary. The Commission's preference was, however, for Germans; by 1699 it had attracted them in such large numbers from the Bohemian crownlands that their former landlords persuaded Leopold to ban further emigration. Yet another source of friction was the government's decision to expand the Military Border beyond Croatia, despite the diminished Turkish threat. At Pressburg Leopold had, in fact, promised to restore much of the Military Border and new areas conquered by *Grenzer* forces to civilian rule, a pledge that he repeated to the Croatian-Slavonian estates in 1693. But a combination of pressure from the *Hofkriegsrat* and Inner Austrian regime, together with violent protests by the *Grenzer* themselves, forced Leopold to reconsider. In the end he retained the existing arrangement and established two new districts in Slavonia and along the

Tisza-Mures river valleys in southern Hungary, both of which were administered independently of Croatia and Hungary by the Inner Austrian offices of the *Hofkriegsrat* and *Hofkammer*.

Although the kingdom's nobility resented its continued exclusion from policy-making and from much of Hungary's newly recovered territories, the Habsburg regime generally abided by the spirit of the Pressburg settlement. In 1689 Leopold even rejected some of the Dietrichstein Commission's more controversial proposals in the face of strong opposition from the Hungarian diet. Within a few years, however, the stabilization of the Hungarian front emboldened him to contemplate additional steps toward integrating the kingdom with the rest of the monarchy. Ironically, the principal advocate for the consolidation of royal authority was the one Hungarian minister who did eventually emerge as an influential member of Leopold's inner circle. Born to a Magyarized Croat Protestant family, Leopold Cardinal Kollonics (1631–1707) had been converted and educated by the Jesuits. He had fought the Turks for much of his career, first in two expeditions to Crete as a Maltese knight, then as the director of medical services during the siege of Vienna. It was, however, as a thoroughly Germanized clerical and civil official that Kollonics earned Leopold's confidence. He was appointed president of the Hungarian treasury in 1672 and held a succession of high church positions before becoming archbishop-primate of Esztergom in 1695.

Even before Dietrichstein's death in 1698, Kollonics had become the most influential member of the Commission. By then he had also earned the hatred of many of his fellow Hungarians through his outspoken advocacy of confessional absolutism. At one point he is reputed to have predicted that he would "first render Hungary obedient, then destitute, and finally Catholic." Although the emperor never acted on Kollonics's appeal for wholesale Catholicization, the *Explanatio Leopoldina* that he issued in 1691 did warn that his extension of religious freedom to the reconquered lands was purely voluntary and only temporary. Two years later Leopold began levying indirect taxation on the nobility in exchange for discontinuing the outmoded feudal *insurrectio*. Over the next four years the kingdom paid 2 million fl. annually, which was increased to 4 million in 1698. Noble opposition forced Leopold to reduce their contribution to 250,000 fl., instead of the 1.25 million proposed by Kollonics. As was generally the case elsewhere in the monarchy, a far greater proportion of the tax burden now fell on the peasantry (3.5 million) and the impoverished towns (250,000). Nor did the peasantry's obligations stop there. By 1702 Leopold had instituted Kollonics's call for a largely native Hungarian army by rendering them subject to forcible induction into the army. Seemingly the kingdom's integration into the Habsburg *Gesamtstaat* was proceeding apace.

### The economic recovery

In examining the half century after 1648, it is easy to focus on the crown's triumphs in Hungary, whether against the Turks or its own fiercely independent subjects. Yet, no less important for the monarchy's evolution as a great power was the recovery of the Austrian and Bohemian hereditary lands from the devastation of the Thirty Years' War. Their economic revival was, to be sure, less dramatic, more gradual, and ultimately just as incomplete. The constant turmoil in neighboring Hungary and the unwelcome succession of conflicts with Sweden, the Ottoman empire, and France deprived the peoples of the *Erblande* of any opportunity for peace. It did not, however, prevent the landed nobility from spearheading a postwar recovery and strengthening its position as the monarchy's leading entrepreneurial class. The creation of a standing army under Ferdinand III and Leopold I actually facilitated its evolution from a military caste to a capitalist one devoted to developing its estates. It was also in a better position to overcome the trials of war. Its control over local government left it free to compensate for increased wartime mortality and emigration by adding to the number and burdens of its serfs. Moreover, while the Contribution and other imposts continued to spiral, demesne land remained tax-free. The decline in rural population actually permitted the nobility to accelerate its ongoing acquisition of peasant plots by taking over deserted farmland. By the end of the century noble demesnes accounted for 20–25 percent of Bohemia's arable manorial land.

Estate owners also continued to hone their entrepreneurial skills. The second half of the century witnessed the introduction of several new crops in the Austrian lands. The two archduchies began planting tobacco after its value was brought to their attention by the Swedish invaders of 1643. Two decades later the Upper Austrian nobility was cultivating potatoes. By the end of the century a number of estates had reimported mulberry trees and silkworms from Italy to replace those that had been destroyed during the war. Italian influence was also responsible for the introduction of maize, which first appeared in Styria, but then spread to the other Austrian lands and Hungary before the end of the century. Inner Austria also made major strides in raising cattle, principally for export to Italy.

Greater Bohemia's recovery from almost constant military occupation was less immediate. Of peasant land abandoned during the war, a quarter of Moravia's was still uncultivated in the 1650s, a fifth of Bohemia's as late as the 1680s. The fish breeding and wine growing industries failed to achieve prewar levels of production. A postwar decline in export prices also forestalled a complete recovery of grain production until the end of the century. Nevertheless, the kingdom's estate owners compensated for these setbacks

by stepping into the commercial vacuum left by the kingdom's towns. Wartime population and capital losses had, in fact, sharply reduced the towns' capacity for sustaining their export trade with Germany. The kingdom's landholding nobility responded by developing their own network of contacts, not only within Silesia and neighboring Saxony, but with Hamburg and the sea beyond. Although they sold a number of other products, such as iron ore, wool, glass, and various foodstuffs, they also derived considerable income by greatly expanding the small cottage textile industry that had evolved before the Thirty Years' War. The putting-out system not only supplemented their peasants' income from agriculture, but provided the seigneurs with licensing fees that they collected both from peasant cottagers and from the middlemen who collected and marketed their cloth.

Not surprisingly, the larger and wealthier landowners benefited most from agricultural and commercial innovations. They were not only better able to weather the initial shock of the war, but were then in the position to buy out those smaller landowners who did not have the resources to survive. Whereas the size of a typical Bohemian estate increased to thirty villages following the war, the profits and wealth of the greatest Austrian and Bohemian aristocrats reached enormous proportions. The net worth of a single member of the Austrian Schwarzenberg family tripled from 1 to 3 million fl. in the two decades following the siege of Vienna. By the end of the century, the Liechtenstein and Dietrichstein families together owned a quarter of all the land in Moravia.

Estate capitalism was not without its costs. The landholding nobility's increasing reliance on forced labor may have boosted production, but was also less efficient and humane than free labor. It virtually ignored the development of more profitable export industries in favor of foodstuffs and raw materials, such as unfinished cloth, that came under the control of foreign entrepreneurs. Nor were the benefits of estate capitalism evenly distributed among the emperor's subjects. In Bohemia and Moravia the gentry's inability to compete with the great latifundia of the wealthiest nobles led to their virtual disappearance as a class. The drastic decline in the number of noble families represented in the Bohemian diet from 1,128 in 1620 to only 238 at the end of the century reflected not only the purges of the Counter-Reformation but the economic shakeout that followed. The *Erblande's* peasantry paid the stiffest price of all. A combination of increased labor obligations and sustained religious persecution led many peasants to emigrate, whether to the towns, other manors, various German states, or to the newly recovered Hungarian lands.

The towns also continued to lose ground to the aristocracy, particularly in the Bohemian crownlands. They were especially handicapped both by the

continuing spiral of taxation and by the ever present competition from noble estate owners. As a result they recovered more slowly than rural areas, or even manorial towns. Fully two decades after the Peace of Westphalia the numbers of burghers in the major textile towns of Lower Silesia were still only a fraction of their prewar levels: Schweidnitz counted only 350 out of 1,800; Löwenberg barely 200 out of 1,700; Jauer, which the Swedes had burned to the ground in 1648, still had only 150 out of 1,400 burghers. In Bohemia proper, Prague itself had only 355 artisans in 1674, compared to 1,200 in 1620. Far from compensating for the loss of burghers and artisans, the influx of unskilled peasants from the countryside merely added the unwelcome financial burden of tending to growing hordes of beggars. Indeed, unlike most estate owners, the textile and mining towns of Bohemia and Moravia experienced difficulty paying off their wartime debts, a burden that prevented them from modernizing their equipment. Religious persecution also hampered the recovery of many towns in the hereditary lands. Merchants, artisans, and miners alike reacted to the Westphalian settlement and the unremitting persecution by Ferdinand III and Leopold I by emigrating to Protestant territories such as Saxon Lusatia and the relatively tolerant frontier towns of southwestern Poland. Meanwhile, the burghers and nobles of Lower Austria joined in persecuting the archduchy's small, but commercially important Jewish population. In 1669 the Viennese blamed them for a fire in the Hofburg, while Leopold's own Spanish wife Margaret attributed a recent miscarriage to their presence in the capital. Within a year a 100,000 fl. inducement from the city government had prompted the emperor to complete their expulsion from all of Lower Austria, although interests of state compelled him to exempt two court factors and later extend exceptional privileges to the talented financier Samuel Oppenheimer.

As late as 1700 the population and production levels of several free towns in the Bohemian crownlands had still not reached prewar levels. Some, such as Jauer, never regained their former positions. Most urban centers had, however, fully recovered by then. By the 1670s Breslau was once again a city of over 30,000 and had taken the lead in reviving the Silesian towns' wool and linen production. At the end of the century greater Bohemia's towns and rural cottagers were exporting 1.5 million fl. annually in cloth and linen and had established markets as far away as London and Britain's overseas colonies. The recovery of the *Erblände's* sheep herds also keyed a rebound in the wool industry. Linz had already regained its virtual monopoly over Upper Austrian production by the 1670s, and was employing 4,000 full-time workers by 1700. As a group the mining towns were less fortunate, if only because of weaker prices and stronger foreign competition. Nevertheless, at least Inner Austrian metal exports had revived by the end of the century, principally by finding new markets in Italy.

While the *Erblände's* economy had largely rebounded during the half century after Westphalia, Hungary measured its recovery only in terms of territory regained from the Turks. Unlike the hereditary lands, it had enjoyed no respite from military conflict and occupation. The most notable exception was Transylvania, which had escaped the heaviest fighting and was still relatively prosperous. Much of Croatia was also spared, although its economy was now based on little more than supplying the Military Border garrisons and ransoming Turks captured in cross-border raids. By contrast Upper Hungary had been devastated by almost continuous hostilities. At least half of the farmland in its eastern, Ruthene-speaking districts had been abandoned; by one count over 70 percent of the 1,180 homesteads on the huge Rákóczi estate near Munkács remained uncultivated until well into the next century. The thin strip of Royal Hungary that bordered directly on the Austrian lands had also been ravaged, especially in 1683, when an estimated 10,000 residents of the massive Esterházy estates were killed by the Turks. Those communities that survived the Turkish wars relied principally on raising livestock – which now outnumbered the native population by two to one – and producing modest quantities of wine and grain. Given the lack of healthy drinking water and grain (a third of which was grown on demesne lands), many Hungarians adapted to a diet of meat and wine.

Not surprisingly it was the newly liberated districts of the Hungarian plain that fared worst of all. Like other Ottoman dominions it had suffered throughout the century from outbreaks of plague and smallpox. During the reconquest, both sides had oppressed its inhabitants, not only by taxing and requisitioning supplies, but by resorting to the wanton pillage and violence that had long been common practice in the Habsburg-Turkish wars. Many peasants responded by fleeing to the towns, where they cultivated compact plots just outside the walls. Those who remained in the countryside were often *hayducks* who, having lost much of their livestock to the war, survived only as brigands or mercenaries of the emperor, individual magnates, or Michael Apafi. By 1685 the south-central plain between the Danube and Tisza rivers had lost most of its settled population; to the southwest, Slavonia was virtually uninhabited. The reconquered territories were further reduced by a new plague epidemic that claimed 30,000 lives between 1690 and 1692. By one estimate their population (excluding Transylvania) had dropped by the end of the war to as little as 10 percent of what it had been on the eve of the Ottoman conquest.

The devastation of war and the growth of estate capitalism were two phenomena that were common to both the first and second halves of the seventeenth century. One development that distinguished these two periods was the belated efforts of the central government to promote economic development following the Thirty Years' War. The evolution of a somewhat

coherent economic policy was initially impelled by the need to raise money for Leopold's imperial election and for the wars with Sweden and the Turks. Later on it was sustained by the desire to match the economic growth of Colbertine France and, ultimately, by the need to rebuild Hungary. For the most part the monarchy was inspired by the contemporary German school of political economy known as cameralism. The emperor shared with his German vassals a compelling need to avert bankruptcy by a combination of economic reconstruction and the more efficient management of state finances. Most of the credit for the evolution of Austrian cameralism has, in fact, gone to three German émigré political economists: Wilhelm von Schröder (1640–88), whose studies of the British economic system had familiarized him with western models of mercantilism; Johann Joachim Becher (1635–82), who was the most original and influential theorist; and his brother-in-law, Philipp Wilhelm von Hörnigk (1640–1714), a propagandist whose famous tract *Österreich über Alles, wann es nur will* (*Austria above all others if it only wishes*) strove to rebuild the monarchy into an economically self-sufficient great power in the aftermath of the siege of Vienna.

Although both Becher and Schröder were already working in Vienna within a decade of Leopold's succession, theirs were neither the only nor the first voices to be raised following the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War. There were also government officials, such as the Bohemian *Kammerrat* Johann Christoph Borek and the *Hofkammer* secretary Christian Julius Schierl von Schierendorff (1661–1726), enlightened nobles and clerics like the Spanish Franciscan friar Cristóbal de Rojas y Spínola (1626–95), and numerous merchants and town magistrates, all of whom were genuinely concerned about the economic plight of monarchy's peoples. Like the cameralists in general, most struck a balance between the need to rebuild postwar levels of population and production both in the countryside and the towns. Yet, by leaning more heavily on trade and commerce they helped to shift attention to the problems of the monarchy's urban economies. Before his death Ferdinand III had already taken some remedial steps by attempting to alleviate the debts of the Bohemian towns and to limit some of the land-holding nobility's commercial privileges. Although previous Habsburgs had blamed the guilds for their restrictiveness, inefficiency, and the poor quality of the goods they produced, Ferdinand III intensified the pressure by extending privileges to independent artisans, who generally earned the protection of powerful local consumers such as nearby seigneurs, church foundations, universities, and military commanders. By 1689 a Leopoldine edict had given the government the right to control the number of masters and undercut the monopolistic effects of guild operations. Even before then Becher, who opposed all forms of monopoly, estimated that a third of the Austrian lands' 150,000 artisans were *Schwarzarbeiter* who did not belong to a guild.

Immediately after the war the Bohemian towns had petitioned Ferdinand to refine its own raw materials into more finished goods for export. Becher became the leading force in attempting this conversion. By 1666 he had inspired the creation of a Commerce Commission (*Kommerzkollegium*) in Vienna, as well as the reestablishment of the first postwar silk plantation on the Lower Austrian estates of *Hofkammer* President Sinzendorf. He subsequently helped create a *Kunst- und Werkhaus* in which foreign masters trained non-guild artisans in the production of finished goods. By 1672 he had promoted the construction of a wool factory in Linz. Four years later he established a textile workhouse for vagabonds in the Bohemian town of Tabor that eventually employed 186 spinners under his own (and later Schröder's) directorship. Although nothing ever came of Rojas y Spínola's visions of a trade concession with the Spanish empire, the treaty of Vasvár did implement Becher's plans for creating an Oriental Trading Company that used the Danube as a conduit for exporting finished goods to Constantinople from both the monarchy and western countries such as England and the Netherlands. At the same time a complementary Occidental Company was established to take over the western export of the monarchy's raw materials from foreign middlemen.

Some of Becher's projects met with limited success. In time Linz's new wool factory even became one of the largest and most important in Europe. Yet most of the government initiatives ended in failure. The Commerce Commission was doomed by Sinzendorf's corruption and indifference. The Tabor workhouse nearly collapsed after just five years owing to the lack of government funding, and was then destroyed two years later during the Turkish invasion. The Oriental Company was fatally handicapped by a combination of poor management, government export prohibitions against Turkey, the opposition of Ottoman (principally Greek) merchants, and ultimately by the outbreak of war. The *Kunst- und Werkhaus* also folded during the 1680s, partly because of the regime's unwillingness to import a significant number of foreign, Protestant teachers and skilled workers.

Government mismanagement, warfare, and religious persecution all contributed to these failures. A dramatic economic turnaround was, however, impossible in the absence of the necessary commercial infrastructure. The monarchy suffered from a dearth of banks and other credit institutions, as well as from an inadequate transportation system that was hampered by bad roads, internal tariffs, unnavigable rivers, and especially poor overland connections between the Austrian hinterland and the Adriatic coast. Whatever the underlying causes, the cameralists' mixed record emboldened their critics and cooled government support for the balance of Leopold's reign. Although they doubtless assisted in the *Erblande's* recovery from the devastation of the Thirty Years' War, the

monarchy as a whole remained an exporter of food and raw materials that it later reimported as finished goods.

Although the cameralists' agrarian programs also met with mixed results, they likewise promoted economic development, as well as greater social justice. The appeals of former Protestants Becher and Hörnigk for dramatic population growth and religious toleration bore fruit on the Hungarian plain, where the Dietrichstein Commission assisted the feverish pace of colonization with special grants of religious freedom. Schröder also played a key role in legitimizing the appeals of a growing number of public officials, nobles, and clergy who decried the suffering of the monarchy's peasantry. In one of his sermons, the prominent court preacher Abraham à Sancta Clara accused ruthless noble landlords of "sucking the blood of their peasants like leeches." Yet Schröder and numerous estate managers were motivated not only by humanitarian concerns, but also by a more sophisticated sense of enlightened self-interest: many of the German principalities had long appreciated the need to protect the peasantry as the primary source of production and tax revenue. This practice of *Bauernschutz* was an integral part of the thinking of cameralists like Schröder, who argued that a healthy and contented peasantry would be more productive and, therefore, enrich both the monarch and noble estate owners.

The government's belated inclination to protect its peasants was most evident within the *Erblände*. As early as 1657 Leopold issued a *Robotpatent* for the Bohemian lands that limited the demands that landlords could place on their serfs. Over the next two decades he ordered additional regulations which, among other things, empowered royal governors and local officials to adjudicate peasant complaints against their landlords. In 1679 he also issued a decree for Lower Austria that not only regulated and limited *robot* service, but even allowed peasants to commute service in exchange for a cash payment. Unfortunately, it proved impossible to enforce most of these initiatives at the local level against the passive resistance of recalcitrant landowners. Finally, in 1680 a major peasant uprising broke out in Bohemia and parts of Moravia. The army eventually crushed the revolt, executing more than a hundred peasants and sentencing over a thousand others to jail or forced labor. Yet Leopold also responded to its underlying causes by issuing a more sweeping *Robotpatent* on 28 June 1680. In addition to reaffirming every peasant's access to royal justice, the decree now limited *robot* to a maximum of three days per week,<sup>5</sup> and prohibited all service on Sundays and holidays, unless it was explicitly permitted by the parish priest. Finally, landlords were prohibited from arbitrarily raising rents or other fees, and even from compelling their peasants to buy products from seigneurial businesses.

<sup>5</sup> Except during harvest and other special occasions, when they could still be impressed for up to six days, but only if they were paid for their labor.

It is difficult to ascertain whether this latest *Robotpatent* proved much more effective than previous measures. Even where the three-day limit was observed, the patent may have led to an overall increase in *robot* service by establishing three days as a minimum standard for peasants who had previously enjoyed a lighter burden. Nor did a single peasant file suit against his landlord at any time over the next half century. Indeed, both the considerable emigration of colonists to Hungary after the reconquest and the outbreak of a second, smaller revolt in 1692 suggest that the *Robotpatent* was not a panacea for the Bohemian and Moravian peasantry. On the other hand, the final two decades of the century did witness a dramatic resurgence in their peasant populations, which finally reached prewar levels by 1700, despite the stream of emigrants to Hungary.

The government's attempts to improve the lot of the peasantry also extended to Hungary, though the opposition of the Magyar nobility presented an even greater obstacle to their success. As early as 1672, Leopold and his ministers had briefly considered reducing the Hungarian peasantry's manorial exactions as a means of undermining the appeal of the *Kuruc* revolt. Instead, they opted for the more conventional approach of confessional absolutism and Ampringen's *Gubernium*, perhaps because a direct attack on the nobility's privileges would have alienated even loyal Catholic magnates. After the Pressburg diet of 1687, the Dietrichstein Commission pressed for the same three-day maximum in *robot* service already in effect in Bohemia, together with a tax on noble demesne land. Yet, given the outcry that these plans raised when the diet met again in 1689, Leopold limited peasant relief to the establishment of regional, royal courts that enabled them to circumvent the seigneurial judges in filing complaints against their landlords. A short-lived peasant revolt in the eastern counties of Upper Hungary in 1697 attested to the need for greater intervention against the nobility – as well as to peasant discontent with increasing levels of royal taxation and recruitment.

#### *The beginnings of cultural assimilation*

Yet another ingredient in the monarchy's emergence as a great power was the shared identity and cultural unity that was beginning to evolve among its three most powerful institutions: court, nobility and Catholic church. Indeed, just as the crown had achieved a consensus with its foreign allies and German vassals, it had established a sense of common interest and interdependence with the ruling elites of its component lands. This was especially the case within the *Erblände*. Meanwhile, although Hungary's integration into the Habsburg *Gesamtstaat* had been both more gradual and less complete, both crown and country had grown more sensitive to each other's vital interests. The nobility had renounced the right to revolt and, as

in Bohemia, its diet had formally acknowledged the dynasty's right of hereditary succession. For his part Leopold had purposely refrained from applying a Bohemian solution to Hungary. The nobility retained formidable constitutional limitations on royal authority, especially at the county level. Most of the kingdom's non-Catholic majority preserved at least a tenuous right to religious freedom. But these limitations in no way mortgaged the potential for a greater sense of unity and loyalty to the crown. If the Magyar nobility was still not totally committed to the monarchy as a whole, it was because it was still being denied the access to patronage and power that had been extended to the loyal Bohemian nobility after White Mountain. This too, however, would come with time.

Several instruments and symbols of the consensus between crown, nobility, and church were already evident by the end of the century. None was more obvious or important than the increases in the Contribution and the standing army that it supported. During the Thirty Years' War, Ferdinand II had been compelled to rely on Spain, the Catholic League, and military entrepreneurs like Wallenstein for the monarchy's defense. A half century later the steady growth in state revenue had promoted the establishment of a 100,000-man standing army. Although foreign officers and subsidies still comprised vital components, it was increasingly staffed by native nobles and outfitted by revenue drawn from all of Leopold's dominions, including large voluntary contributions from the monarchy's ecclesiastical foundations. The Bohemian and Austrian estates had cooperated most closely with the crown in steadily increasing their levies of troops and taxes. Even the Tyrol, which had earlier accepted reunification with the monarchy with a notable lack of enthusiasm, was moved to vote extraordinary sums during the closing decade of the war. Meanwhile, for the moment at least, the Magyar nation was acquiescing to increased levels of military quartering and taxation on a scale that likely exceeded those being levied within the *Erblände*.

Another integrating force crucial to the monarchy's development was the evolution of a common culture among its ruling elites. By 1700 the triumph of the Counter-Reformation was evident in several media. The crown continued to play a prominent role in propagandizing the link between the dynasty's destiny and the True Faith. Following the victory at the Kahlenberg, Leopold secured a papal declaration making 12 September a holy day throughout Catholic Europe in Mary's name. Although the cult of the Virgin continued to enjoy a special place in Habsburg hagiography, the emperor also promoted the veneration of other saints, such as Joseph (after whom he named his first son) and Leopold, his twelfth-century Babenberg namesake and founder of the great monastery at Klosterneuburg. Perhaps his most famous devotional monument was the *Pestsäule* that he erected in the

Graben, in which he attributed Vienna's deliverance from the plague epidemic of 1679 to his appeal to the Holy Trinity. As it had in the past the Society of Jesus led the monastic orders in carrying much the same message beyond the court. The graduates of its colleges controlled not only the monarchy's schools and universities, but censorship as well. It was also masterful in utilizing public dramas as a didactic tool. Some of its plays featured hundreds of actors and impressive scenery that depicted everything from heaven and hell to earthquakes and lightning. One Jesuit writer, Nikolaus Avancini, wrote no fewer than fifty-three dramas, many with historical themes that blended narration and praise of the dynasty and the Catholic faith. The religious orders also promoted processions in Protestant areas, such as the Lutheran towns of Lower Silesia, where they distributed leaflets predicting that spectators would "watch today, stand at attention tomorrow, [and] participate thereafter."

Their success is borne out by a dramatic increase both in the number of people entering the clergy and religious orders and other church-sponsored foundations. In Vienna alone, the second half of the century witnessed the foundation of 109 religious confraternities, together with over two dozen cloisters. The Jesuits accommodated would-be converts with extensive instruction, followed by mass conversion ceremonies conducted at their *Professhaus*. Government patronage continued to provide a potent argument for conversion, not only for nobles but also for the growing number of university-educated professionals seeking employment in the bureaucracy. These included a significant number of *Reich* Germans who, like the former Austrian Chancellor Hoher and Saxony's Frederick Augustus, saw conversion as a necessary prerequisite for the emperor's favor. Indeed, the closing decades of the reign witnessed the conversion of other key German-born officials, such as the cameralist Becher and both the future grand chamberlain and Austrian chancellor of Leopold's son Joseph. More remarkable was the return and conversion of several exiled Lutheran polemicists, who now turned their pens against their former faith. Among them were the Silesian Johannes Scheffler, who henceforth wrote under the politically correct pseudonym Angelus Silesius; Ferenc Otrokoczy, who was employed by the Jesuit press at Tyrnau; and his fellow Hungarian Stabaeus, who went so far as to pen an inflammatory polemic entitled *Martin Luther, come on out! The Cat will fight and eat the Mouse!*

The church also led the way in sponsoring construction projects and patronage of the arts throughout the monarchy, whether in the countryside, in major towns, or in Vienna itself. The building program was partly intended to propagandize its triumph over heresy and Islam, but also to accommodate the increased number of worshipers and clergy entering the church. In addition to new construction many existing churches were

renovated in the new, baroque *Jesuitenstil* that became inextricably associated with the Counter-Reformation. The newly prosperous landholding nobility followed suit with building programs of its own. The Bohemian and Moravian aristocracy distinguished itself through its support of the theater, the fine arts and especially music by retaining choirs, orchestras, and individual composers at their country estates. Many also built city palaces in Vienna, together with summer edifices beyond its walls. Whereas many were attracted to the city by the prospects of government patronage, others were drawn to the glamorous and stimulating lifestyle of the court, or even by the opportunity to compose and act in the court's dramatic and musical presentations. Despite its fiscal crisis, the court spent freely from the very outset of the postwar period. Ferdinand III's and Leopold I's sustained patronage of a musical establishment initiated the city's renowned association with the medium. Even when money was short, Leopold was known to pay his musicians first, before court officers. He celebrated his nuptials with Margaret Theresa in December 1666 with six weeks of celebrations that included various musical performances and an intricate equestrian ballet at the *Hofburg*. He also committed over 100,000 fl. toward the construction of a 1,500-seat *Komödienhaus* that was completed in 1667.

By the end of the century Vienna itself had emerged as another symbol and instrument for the integration of the monarchy's component lands. Its triumph over Prague, which had begun following the return of the imperial court after Rudolph II's death in 1612 and the transfer of the Bohemian Chancery twelve years later, was sealed by the losses subsequently inflicted by successive Swedish occupations. The extinction of the cadet Habsburg lines in Graz and Innsbruck, together with the progressive transfer of several Hungarian and Transylvanian offices, further entrenched Vienna's pre-eminent position within the monarchy. With a population of 80,000 it had already become the monarchy's undisputed administrative, cultural, and population center early in Leopold's reign. The massive toll in death and destruction wrought by the Turkish siege of 1683 temporarily set back Vienna's demographic and cultural evolution. Indeed, the city and the *Hofburg* itself were so devastated that Leopold was compelled to move the court to Linz for several months thereafter. Yet Vienna quickly recovered. The extended period of postwar confidence and prosperity witnessed one of the greatest building booms in the city's history, as government buildings, churches, cloisters, and aristocratic mansions rapidly filled the cramped space within its medieval walls, frequently in the place of burgher homes that had been damaged or destroyed in the siege. By 1700 it had grown far beyond its fortifications, housing a population of at least 100,000.

Church and aristocratic patronage embraced large numbers of native artists. Perhaps the most outstanding example in the field of music was the

Czech composer Josef Vejvanovský, whom Bishop Karl von Liechtenstein of Olmütz retained at his palace at Kremsier (Kroměříž). Yet they also drew artists from all over the continent, especially from Germany and Italy. The crown was no different. Ferdinand III and Leopold had revived Rudolph II's penchant for attracting artists from all over Europe, especially Italians. Italian symphonic and operatic forms established a century-long hegemony at court. In 1667 Leopold spent 100,000 fl. to put on a single Italian opera as part of the previous December's nuptial celebrations. Nor did he hesitate to use Italian forms in his own compositions, or the language itself in his speech and correspondence.

Yet the international ambience of Habsburg culture cannot obscure the emergence of German as yet another enduring, unifying cultural force in the monarchy's evolution. At first, its growing dominance among the monarchy's elites was not consciously promoted by the government. Quite to the contrary, the agents of the Counter-Reformation had often favored other tongues, especially in their attempt to subvert the influence of the monarchy's Lutheran towns. Thus Italian had gained the upper hand over German among the ruling classes of Gorizia and other parts of the Adriatic Littoral following the emigration of German-speaking nobles and burghers and their replacement by Italian Catholics. Similarly, the Leopoldine regime promoted the advancement of Slovak, and even Magyar, office-holders in the towns of Upper Hungary by reducing the special magisterial privileges of their Lutheran German oligarchies. In order to broaden Catholicism's appeal in the countryside, the Jesuit press at Tyrnau actually moved away from German in favor of Latin and the kingdom's other, indigenous languages. Thus it reacted to an existing Calvinist translation of the Bible by publishing a Magyar edition, even though vernacular editions were normally prohibited by the Papacy. It also made some inroads among the kingdom's Lutheran Slovaks, and Orthodox Ruthenes and Rumanians by translating and distributing catechisms and other religious literature among them. Nor was the picture altogether different within the Bohemian crownlands. In Upper Silesia several monasteries and other religious foundations were Polonized. Although Ferdinand II had granted German equal status with Czech in the conduct of official business, the latter remained the language of religious instruction among the Czech majorities in Bohemia and Moravia, as well as along the southern fringes of Upper Silesia. Moreover, by the second half of the century native Czechs had generally replaced the extranational army of principally German and Italian clerics first sent there during the Thirty Years' War.

The ultimate triumph of German was not due to coercion by the church or government, but rather reflected the voluntary acclimation of nobles, burghers, and professionals to the monarchy's increasingly dominant



German culture. The process of national acculturation had a long history within the Habsburg lands. Shortly after the Turkish occupation of most of Hungary, 60,000 Croat refugees fled to Lower Austria and the German-speaking areas of western Hungary and southern Moravia, where they ultimately adopted the local language; the parallel influx of Magyar nobles into Upper Hungary led the area's Slovak-speaking gentry to adopt Magyar. As we have already seen, many nobles residing in Habsburg Croatia, such as the aforementioned Zrinyi, Frangepáni, and Kollonics families, also became Magyarized by the mid-seventeenth century. Within the Bohemian crownlands the Slavic Upper Silesian and Lusatian nobility had become Germanized long before the battle of White Mountain. Yet most important of all was the recent Germanization of Bohemia's and Moravia's foreign-born and native Czech nobility, if only because their rapid assimilation and steadfast commitment to the dynasty presented the government in Vienna with a vivid contrast to developments in Hungary. Following the unsuccessful magnate plot and Thököly revolt, Leopold and his Austrian and new Bohemian advisers concluded that the Magyar-speaking population was the least trustworthy element among the monarchy's diverse peoples. At the same time, they began to link German language and culture with Catholicism as another instrument for instilling greater loyalty to the dynasty. Hence the favor that the Dietrichstein Commission, its *Commissio Neo Acquistica*, and Cardinal Kollonics began to show German (and other non-Magyar) colonists following the recovery of the Hungarian plain.

However voluntary the process of Germanization may have been, it was effective largely because it offered nobles and other social groups greater access to wealth or power as members of the ruling elite. In this sense the regime's selective use of political privileges, patronage, and land grants was rooted in its quest for greater social control. Its noble protégés were, however, also motivated by a universal penchant for self-acclaim. Not unlike the French nobility at Versailles, their positions and very presence at court allowed them to share the limelight with the emperor, his court, and the church, especially when they joined them in patronizing builders and large numbers of fine and performing artists. The fabulously wealthy Karl Eusebius von Liechtenstein spoke for many aristocrats when he wrote a book on architecture in which he identified "the one and only reason for stately buildings: the everlasting name, fame and memory that one earns from the great edifices that he leaves behind."

This search for self-acclaim pervaded the entire ruling elite. The church used its patronage of the arts not only as a medium for religious education, but as a celebration of Catholicism's resurgence from the setbacks of the previous century. Leopold was no less driven by the need to celebrate his triumphs. Admittedly the monarchy's recent successes were due more to

aggression by Louis XIV and the Turkish Kiuprilis that had united their enemies, than to Leopold or his impotent Spanish cousin; even as he entered the fifth decade of his reign, no one referred to "Leopold the Great" or spoke of an "Age of Leopold I." Nevertheless, the emperor used his patronage of the arts to promote the dynasty's image not only at home and abroad, but in his own eyes. His decision to emulate his French adversary by projecting an Austrian Versailles for his son at Schönbrunn reflected this personal quest – just as the shortage of funds that delayed its construction exposed the residual deficiencies that still separated the monarchy from France.

Ferdinand III and Leopold I had, in fact, achieved a great deal over the past half century. By continuing to service the interests of the aristocracy and church, they cemented the symbiotic alliance that their predecessors had forged earlier in the century. As a result the monarchy was now held together by an appreciably higher tax base, a reasonably effective standing army, and an emerging common culture that reinforced the hegemony of the monarchy's Catholic and German ruling elites. It is worth noting that each of these elements constituted a powerful integrating force that helped sustain the monarchy for the rest of its history.

Nevertheless, despite the new-found prosperity and confidence that energized all elements of the ruling elite, a number of problems still precluded the monarchy's emergence as a great power. One limitation was the monarchy's material resources. Over the past half century its population had grown by at least 2 million people from a low of perhaps 7 million in 1648. The bulk of these gains had come with the demographic recovery of the Bohemian crownlands and the reconquest and colonization of Hungary. Yet, its population was still dwarfed by Louis XIV's 20 million Frenchmen, and much poorer and less productive than those of France, England, or the United Provinces. In a world in which wealth was increasingly determined by industry and commerce, only 2 percent of the monarchy's population lived in towns. Meanwhile, the weakest link of all remained Hungary, which still needed time to recover from a century and a half of Turkish occupation. Even with the steady economic recovery of the *Erblände* and the tax increases that it supported, annual wartime revenue stood at only 9 million fl., or roughly an eighth that of France.

Another limiting factor was the crown's alliance with the church and landholding nobility. Although it played a crucial role in uniting the monarchy and enhancing the dynasty's prestige, it did not come without some cost. As we have already seen, the remedial steps that Ferdinand III and Leopold had taken toward instituting a comprehensive economic program were undermined by the lingering legacy of religious persecution and by commercial privileges granted the nobility that hindered productivity among the monarchy's free towns and peasants. More important, its support for the

Counter-Reformation and feudal *Ständestaat* helped entrench values that were increasingly out of step with secular and rationalist ideas then sweeping western and central Europe. By the end of the century the Enlightenment had evolved in France and England, both as an outgrowth of the Scientific Revolution and as a reaction to the unpopular policies of Louis XIV and James II. Within Protestant Germany the growth of Pietism encouraged many states to adopt the economic, fiscal, and social policies preached by the cameral sciences.

There are at least three explanations for the monarchy's insulation from these trends. To a certain extent it was the victim of the ruling elite's own success. While the obvious shortcomings of Bourbon and Stuart regimes inspired French and English philosophers to seek different values represented by the Enlightenment, the monarchy's coalition of church, aristocracy, and crown was able to legitimize a system that had reestablished Catholicism, expelled the Turks from Hungary, and restructured and revived the *Erblände's* economy. Rather than resort to skepticism and introspection, the ruling elites spread their own values through their patronage of the various media of the baroque.

A second factor was the Catholic ruling elite's persecution and expulsion of Protestants. Religious intolerance was never as extreme as in Spain, where the dynasty's senior branch could rely on a crusading zeal rooted in the peninsula's centuries-long struggle against Islam and pursue unbelievers without concern for civil war or foreign intervention. Still, many of the monarchy's greatest writers, philosophers, and scientists had already emigrated by mid-century. Perhaps the most noteworthy figure was the last bishop of the Bohemian Brethren, Jan Amos Komenský (better known as Comenius), whose wanderings after White Mountain embraced virtually every Protestant country in Europe, including Transylvania, where he joined several Magyar exiles pursuing philosophy and the natural sciences. Some stayed a bit longer, such as the rector of Eperjes's Protestant *Lyceum*, Johannes Bayer, who taught Bacon's inductive method for a decade before dying *en route* to his own exile in 1674.

Less overt but perhaps most effective in closing off the monarchy's cultural window to the West was the ruling elite's selective utilization of patronage. Whereas it did not overtly oppose science and humanism, these disciplines received much less attention than they had enjoyed before the Counter-Reformation. Thus, while several Jesuit thinkers and even Ferdinand III conducted experiments and studied the natural sciences, both church and state focused their support on propagating public loyalty to Catholicism and the dynasty. It was easy to find devotional books like two Magyar-language collections of Marian legends edited by Pál Esterházy in 1691 and 1696, or the Latin *Triumph of the Innocents* in which Stefan Székely glorified Hungary's

past saints as the predecessors of the Habsburgs. Nor was there any dearth of descriptions, histories, and polemics devoted to the dynasty and its dominions. At the same time, however, it proved impossible for Franz Joseph Count Hoditz to find a publisher for his works on morality and law. The elder brother of the cameralist Schierl von Schierendorff even lost his judicial position in Moravia after prosecuting the Society of Jesus for violating local inheritance laws.

Some tenuous ties remained. The dynasty's retention of the imperial crown continued to serve as a magnet for German academics and other professionals – hence the valuable contribution of men like Becher, Hörnigk, and Schröder, all of whom hailed from Protestant states. The survival of at least partial religious toleration in Hungary and Silesia permitted both dominions to serve as intermediaries for the infiltration of new ideas from the empire and Western Europe. Indeed, while Catholic Hungarians and Silesians studied at Tyrnau, Olmütz, Prague, or the new Jesuit university at Breslau (founded 1702), their Protestant countrymen were exposed to rather different ideas being taught abroad at universities such as Utrecht, Leiden, Basel, Jena, Leipzig, and Frankfurt an der Oder. A century later, the German and Silesian connections would play a more significant role in the monarchy's political and cultural development. For the time being, however, the cultural hegemony of the monarchy's elite that manifested itself through self-promotion, limited persecution, and selective patronage took its toll. It is no coincidence that the monarchy did not produce a single major philosopher or scientist following the deaths of Tycho Brahe and Johannes Kepler early in the century; although the Silesian-born Christian Wolff brought the Enlightenment to an entire generation of Germans, he did so from university positions in Saxony, Prussia, and Hesse, while the Habsburg lands were initially unaffected by his teaching.

Nor is it surprising that the central government failed to take full advantage of the cameralists' attempts to reorganize its fiscal administration along more rational lines. To his credit Leopold did make limited progress in the face of constant pleas for reform. In 1680, with war looming on two fronts, he gave in to his creditors' demands for an investigation that eventually led to the dismissal of the corrupt *Hofkammer* President Sinzendorf. He not only recovered some of the 2 million fl. that Sinzendorf had embezzled, but issued a *Hofkammerordnung* in January 1681 that led to better record keeping, the drafting of roughly accurate annual budgets, and the subordination of the previously autonomous Bohemian, Silesian, and Hungarian treasuries to the *Hofkammer*.<sup>6</sup> Four years later the Capuchin friar Marco d'Aviano and the Papal nuncio urged him to reform the military's supply

<sup>6</sup> Although protests by the Sopron diet obliged him to restore the Hungarian *Kammer's* independence four months later.

system after the 1684 campaign had exposed serious shortcomings. Although Leopold did little to address the structural defects in the system, he did replace the incompetent head of the War Commissar, Sigfried Breuner, by promoting him to a higher position.

Leopold's decision to promote Breuner rather than dismiss him outright lends credence to the conventional view that he was simply too mild, desultory, and indecisive to assert effective leadership. Throughout his reign he remained faithful to numerous loyal, but incompetent and often aged ministers who usually left their positions only when they died. Although Leopold acceded to some of his advisers' demands for change, he stopped short of the thorough house-cleaning that the monarchy's administrative apparatus needed. He was especially derelict in pursuing reform at the local level, where hordes of agencies run by the central government or the provincial estates either failed to collect or siphoned off a third or more of government revenue before it could reach the *Hofkammer*. Foreign governments were so suspicious of the *Hofkammer* that they were usually reluctant to supply Leopold with subsidies without having some oversight of the processing of the monies they provided.

The retention of this supremely irrational system limited the size and effectiveness of the Habsburg military. Montecuccoli had come right to the point when he stated that warfare required three things: "Money, money, and more money." Yet, thanks to chronic shortages of funds and the supplies they provided, the officers of his and Charles of Lorraine's generation often had to rely on their own resources to equip, provision, and pay their men, just as Wallenstein had done at the beginning of the century. As a result the Habsburg military often felt compelled to make "war pay for war" by living off conquered countryside. Although this system might work in time of war, it was counterproductive in peacetime, when much of the army was obliged to make sometimes excessive demands on the monarchy's own subjects, especially in Hungary. Moreover, even with the proceeds of foreign subsidies and the military occupation of Hungary, the army was not as well-equipped and only a quarter the size of the 400,000-strong French army. Thus, although the monarchy was virtually whole for the first time since 1529, it remained dependent on the support of foreign allies. Fortunately, Louis XIV's aggression had inspired an anti-French coalition not unlike the Anglo-Dutch-Spanish-German dynastic combination that had helped to create the first Habsburg great power at the turn of the sixteenth century. Now, two hundred years later, events in Madrid would put that coalition to the test.

#### 4 Facing west: the second Habsburg empire (1700–1740)

The European powers had been preparing for Charles II's death for his entire thirty-five-year reign. Finally, at the end of the century unmistakable signs of his imminent demise encouraged a rash of diplomatic activity. Although the Austrian Habsburgs and French Bourbons were the main antagonists, all of the major, and several smaller, countries had a stake in the succession struggle. There were, in fact, initially three claims to Charles's inheritance, all based on the rights of Charles's two sisters. As the husband of the elder Maria Theresa, Louis XIV could put forward a claim on behalf of the Grand Dauphin and his three sons, especially since the Spanish government had never paid France the 500,000 crowns in compensation for renouncing its rights to the inheritance. Although Emperor Leopold had married the younger Margaret Theresa, their only surviving child was a daughter, Maria Antonia. Before her death in 1692, the archduchess had married Max Emanuel and borne a son, Joseph Ferdinand, whose rights the Bavarian elector now advanced. Leopold asserted his own rights as Margaret Theresa's widower, but his position as the head of the younger male Habsburg line gave him his strongest claim, especially in those parts of the Spanish empire where the laws of succession discounted the rights of female heirs. Moreover, as the father of two healthy sons, Leopold enjoyed the luxury of promoting the candidacy of the younger Archduke Charles, while the elder Archduke Joseph would rule the Austrian Habsburg monarchy after his death.

Bavaria's claim attracted immediate support from the Maritime Powers, who saw a Wittelsbach succession as an ideal counterweight in the balance of power. Joseph Ferdinand's candidacy was also popular in Spain, where the Austrian claim was undermined by the country's decline during two centuries of Habsburg rule and by Leopold's recent failure to send troops to prevent the fall of Barcelona. In a desire to forestall yet another war even Louis XIV was willing to recognize Joseph Ferdinand's claim, providing his dynasty received at least nominal territorial compensation. In October 1698 he concluded the so-called First Partition Treaty with William III that confirmed the Bavarian succession, while compensating Austria with Milan