transversals

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Introduction
TRANSVERSALITY AND ROMANTICISM

In Euclidean geometry, the transversal is most often a line intersecting two parallel lines and delineating two sets of corresponding angles equal in measure. This, however, does not yet establish a relationship of *transversality*, since the distinctive feature of the transversal, the equal measure of corresponding angles is given by the parallelism of the intersected lines, which is a quality of *universality*: the distance of the parallel lines is the same everywhere (as far as infinity). This universality of transversals still exists in the case of non-Euclidean, curved planes, where the parallel lines intersect in the limit of infinity, while the ultra-parallel lines do not even intersect in this limit. Even some approaches in Riemannian geometry, which inspired Einstein's theory of relativity, work with the notion of "invariant transverse measure."[1] In theories of chaos dealing with the synchronization of chaotic systems, "transverse stability" or "perturbations" are determined against the "synchronization line," "invariant synchronization subspace" or "linearly stable synchronous motion."[2]

The connection between the transversal and transversality emerges in the theory of sets as applied in combinatorics and graph theory where the transversal is a "system of distinct representatives" (SDR) of finite subsets included in a given set

[1] See, e.g., Etienne Ghys, "Gauss-Bonnet theorem for 2-dimensional foliations," *Journal of Functional Analysis*, 77.1 (1988): 51.

[2] See, e.g., Reggie Brown and Nikolai F. Rulkov, "Synchronization of chaotic systems: Transverse stability of trajectories in invariant manifolds," *Chaos*, 7.3 (1997): 407, 395; Woochang Lim and Sang-Yoon Kim, "Destruction of Chaotic Attractors in Coupled Chaotic Systems," *Journal of the Korean Physical Society*, 38.5 (May 2001): 536.

(e.g., Hall's and Gale-Shapley's marriage theorems).[3] In these theories, transversality is a limit of connectivity among the vertices of a graph.[4] In computer programs transversal processes systematize connections among nodes in data structures (e.g., the "tree traversal").[5] In bioinformatics, transversality describes "complex functions" characterizing "broader biological processes" among products of different gene clusters.[6] In all these cases, transversality is a degree of structuredness or functionality of a system and its representations or products.

Rather than mere opposites of universals, transversals are relations constituting structural features and the functioning of systems.[7] From this perspective, the interpretation of signs is a transversal process. As Gilles Deleuze has pointed out, "each sign has its privileged temporal dimension," but "each also straddles the other lines and participates in other dimensions of time."[8] In Deleuze's reading of Proust's novel *In Search of Lost Time*, transversality is first approached as a specific function of "involuntary memory [...] *the internalized difference*" supplanting

[3] Joseph Malkevitch, "Mathematical Marriages," http://www.ams.org/featurecolumn/archive/marriage.html (accessed on 12 November 2007). Nonetheless, even the Gale-Shapley model conceives the SDR as an algorithm producing a closed stable system.

[4] "The transversal number is [...] the minimum cardinality [the measure of the number of elements in a set] of a set of vertices that intersects all edges [of a graph]." Noga Alon, "Transversal Numbers of Uniform Hypergraphs," *Graphs and Combinatorics* 6.1 (1990): 1.

[5] See, e.g., Joe Celko, *Trees and Hierarchies in SQL for Smarties* (San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann-Elsevier, 2004).

[6] In bioinformatics, transversal networks of genes are studied to describe "complex biological functions" which "emerge from interactions between gene products." These functions "can collaborate in broader biological processes," such as "antibiotic resistance." In such processes, the genes "can be differentially expressed": the emphasis is laid on the "functional relationships between gene products when they belong to different expression clusters." See Julie Chabalier, Jean Mosser and Anita Burgun, "A transversal approach to predict gene product networks from ontology-based similarity," *BMC Bioinformatics*, 8.235 (2007) http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2105/8/235 (accessed on 12 November 2007).

[7] Cf. Louis Armand, *Literate Technologies* (Prague: Litteraria Pragensia, 2006) 161-62: As a "broadly cybernetic conception of signifying structures," transversality may be understood as "a form of *global agency* [...] a mechanism inherent to structuration that both 'constitutes' and *operates the relation* in a network of potential signs." Among others, Armand refers to Donald Favareau's understanding of semiosis in neurosemiotics, which envisages "the processes enabling signification across the meta-systems of biological organization (cell, pathway, network, organ, system, body proper) and across the levels of awareness (network signification, body signification, mental signification)" as "systemic parts in a lawful interactive continuum" and "allows us to transcend the intransigent dualism" of mind and body. "Beyond Self and Other: On the Neurosemiotic Emergence of Subjectivity," *Sign System Studies* 30.1 (2002): 80.

[8] Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* (Proust et les signes, 1964 1970 1976), trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) 24.

"an image of eternity"[9] and later identified as a network of fragments representing "different wholes" and in general "no whole at all."[10] As Deleuze shows elsewhere, the transversal is no mere characteristic of the "style" of the modern work of art. It is the convergence of individual series constituting a structure toward a "differentiator" a "paradoxical element" that "belongs to no series" and, at the same time, "has the function of articulating the two series to one another, of reflecting them in one another, of making them communicate, coexist, and be ramified."[11] Instead of preconceived totality, "there is a step-by-step, internal, dynamic construction of space which must precede the 'representation' of the whole as a form of exteriority."[12]

As a result, the notion of "Antilogos" used by Deleuze to characterize the functioning of heterogeneous systems in general and modern artworks in particular, does not necessarily signify the world that "has become crumbs and chaos."[13] Rather, the term implies a displacement of "the entire problem of objectivity." As Deleuze believes, objectivity "can no longer exist except in the work of art; it no longer exists in significant content as states of the world [...], but solely in the signifying formal structure of the work, in its style."[14]

In spite of Deleuze's assertions of the universal nature of the "objectivity" of style ("the [transcendent] viewpoint valid for all associations" constituting "a 'modern' fashion, essential to modern literature"[15]), the path in which the style is constituted is not universal but *transversal*, a chain of substitutions of singularities of one order for those of another order: "style [...] substitutes for experience the manner in which we speak about it or the formula that expresses it, which substitutes for the individual in the world the viewpoint toward the world, and which transforms reminiscence into a realized creation."[16] And Deleuze puts it explicitly in the chapter on Style in the well-known example of watching the landscape from the windows of a moving train:

[9] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 20, 60.
[10] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 115.
[11] Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* (Logique du Sens), trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) 50-51.
[12] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (Différence et repetition, 1968), trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 26.
[13] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 111.
[14] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 110-11.
[15] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 110-11.
[16] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 111.

> But the whole problem is to know on what this formal structure rests [...]. It is transversality that permits us, in the train, *not to unify the viewpoints of a landscape but to bring them into communication according to the landscape's own dimension*, in its own dimension, whereas they remain noncommunicating according to their own dimension. [...] The new linguistic convention, the formal structure of the work, is therefore transversality [...].[17]

As Deleuze points out further, transversality is not only a framework of reference but also an agency by means of which "a work of art communicates with a public and even gives rise to that public."[18]

In the wider context of Deleuze's philosophy and recent scientific thought, the "problem of objectivity" is connected with the emergence of transversality as a *general framework of reference* for complex, dynamic structures and as an *agency* for their transformation. In other words, instead of a mere negation of the preconceived universal order (Logos), there is a positive, transversal movement, characterizing dynamic structures and their study. This approach is now being adopted and developed even in some fields of the humanities.[19]

The present book attempts to extend the transversal approach to the study of discourses in diverse texts subsumed under a traditional cultural historical and aesthetic notion of Romanticism. In contrast to Deleuze who, rather metaphysically, locates the birth of transversality in Proust's modernist art, connecting it with the philosophical operation of the "reversal" of Platonism,[20] I trace

[17] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 168 (emphasis added). There is a distinct link between Deleuze's example and the combinatoric definitions of the transversal as "a SDR (system of distinct representatives) of finite subsets" (views from individual windows) "in a given set" (landscape) and of transversality as "a limit of connectivity among the vertices of a graph." See above, footnotes [3] and [4].

[18] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 169.

[19] For an account of an interdisciplinary "transversal theory" and "methodology" in literature and theatre studies see, e.g., Bryan Reynolds, *Performing Transversally: Reimagining Shakespeare and the Critical Future* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) 2-23. Reynolds uses his approach for explaining performance as the way of generating "transversal movements" which in turn open up "a transversal territory" generating "transversal power" and "movements" important for creating alternative patterns of subjectivity, responsibility and social integration. A corrective to Deleuze's and Guattari's notions of the dissociation of subjectivity into singularities is presented in Reynolds's forthcoming collaborative book *Transversal Subjects: From Montaigne to Deleuze after Derrida* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan): "Subjectivity emerges experientially, often out of mechanisms of subjectivation, and is always transversal to subjects and not, like Deleuze and Guattari argue, exclusively implicated with an aleatory outside and understood via retrospective implication" (quoted with the permission of the author).

[20] Cf. Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 108-11, and *Logic of Sense*, 253-66.

emerging transversal links and structures in Romanticism, the first art movement that no longer depends on universal rules, norms and styles, is no longer based on a single central canon of aesthetic and other values, cannot be defined by a mere contrast with such a canon (typical of Classicism) and, last but not least, emphasizes diversity and difference as the only *universal* features.[21]

Apart from being the structural and thematic feature of romantic art, transversality characterizes the structure of this book as a network of nodes of different complexity, function and significance, from verbal signs, through quotations, texts, intertextualities and discourses to various cultural systems and spatiotemporal or representational orders. This network provides alternative referential frameworks for discussing a set of major problems characteristic of Romanticism as the first pluralistic project of modern culture. This set includes the questions of the purpose of and responsibility for history, the relations between freedom and subjectivity, nomadic existence and segmentation of social spaces, cultural boundaries and hybridities, artistic representations and simulacra, aesthetic objects and "literary machines,"[22] traditional aesthetic categories ("imagination," "organic form," the picturesque"), national identities and "imagined communities."[23]

The first chapter Inscribed on Imperial Ruins traces the transversal movement in the last canto of Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* from the ruinous centre of the global empire and the crisis of the subject (both individual and absolute), to a "secret of European responsibility,"[24] which involves the understanding of a discrepancy between religious ideas of responsibility and notions of the end of history. Although Byron's epic seems to conclude with the celebration of the powers of nature represented by the

[21] See for instance the well-known *Athenäum* fragment no. 116 on "universal progressive poetry" by Friedrich Schlegel, where the value of universality is paradoxically given by the dynamic and transversal nature of Romanticism which opens "the prospect of boundlessly developing classicism" and links "all that is poetic, [...] from the greatest art system [...] to the sigh, the kiss uttered in the artless song by the child creating its own poetry." *European Romanticism: A Self-Definition*, ed. Lilian Furst (London and New York: Methuen, 1980) 4. This argument is further developed in Friedrich Schlegel's essay commenting on the *Athenäum* fragments "On Incomprehensibility" (Über die Unverständlichkeit, 1800): "And has not this infinite world itself been constructed by the understanding out of incomprehensibility and chaos?" Friedrich Schlegel, "On Incomprehensibility," in *Theory as Practice: A Critical Anthology of Early German Romantic Writings*, gen. ed. Jochen Schulte-Sasse (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) 126.

[22] See Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 103-89.

[23] See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition (London and New York: Verso, 1991).

[24] See Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, trans. David Wills (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), chapter I.

unbounded Ocean, the transversal path opened by the discourse of ruins connects diverse interpretive frameworks, leading the reader beyond Heidegger's existentialism, Patočka's humanism and Foucault's anti-humanism to the possibility of a new history, no longer understood as a movement towards a revelation of truth or a panoptical machine but as a process in which human existence is constantly at stake and subject to responsibility.

The discourse of the *end* of history (the end meaning the endpoint, *telos* or revelation) is a powerful transversal link between European and American uses of the past. The second chapter on Ruins in the New World finds a new function of ruins in American culture: subversion of the finalist notions of history and of the simplistic belief in technology as a power conquering nature and less developed civilizations. The totalizing discourses of religious, social or technological utopias are subverted by the transversal power vested in ruins as "heterotopias,"[25] linking their spatial and temporal differences and creating networks of other spaces and their alternative histories, such as Lyotard's "ghost towns by abandonment or anticipation"[26] haunting the U.S. conurbations. As the chapter points out, these networks of heterotopias and historical narratives connect the violent beginnings of American colonization not only with the post 9/11 traumas, but also with ironic visions in Hawthorne's and Melville's prose, extinct mining settlements of the West and contemporary development of urban areas and their transportation systems. This transversal perspective "despoils the New World of the mythical meaning of the land of wonder and the 'marvelous possessions.'"

Intertextual links, such as the quotation of the famous Ocean stanza in Canto IV of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, are transversals, which may "interrogate philosophy beyond its meaning."[27] This is the case of interpretations focused on the philosophical issues of Byron's epic poem, namely freedom and subjectivity, and of R.W. Emerson's philosophical project questioned and parodied in Melville's *Moby Dick*. The Byron-Melville transversal in the chapter entitled Addressing the Ocean establishes a perspective in which *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* or *Moby Dick* emerge as "another text, a weave of differences of forces without any present centre of reference," a network in which a philosophical text "overflows and

[25] Michel Foucault, "Des espaces autres," (1967), *Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité*, 5 (Octobre 1984): 47.

[26] Jean- François Lyotard, "Le Mur du Pacifique," in *The Lyotard Reader*, ed. Andrew Benjamin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) 64

[27] Jacques Derrida, "Tympan," in *Margins of Philosophy* (Marges de la philosophie, 1972), trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982) xxiii.

cracks its meaning."[28] In the case of Byron's poem, this "cracked" meaning is implied in the substitution of the Ocean by the boundless Universe or God, while in *Moby Dick*, it is vested in the American myth of history as a pursuit of freedom, whose general aim is the "great God Absolute" as the "centre and circumference of all democracy" and "the just Spirit of Equality, which [has] spread one royal mantle of humanity over all my kind."[29] Both in *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* and in *Moby Dick* utopian philosophical and ideological spaces are overwritten by dynamic rhetorical structures no longer integrated by subjectivity, but by *style*: the "viewpoint [...] of the individuating world" of art.[30] In both works, however, the universality of style is disrupted by the thematic *and* structural transversal of *nomadic* movement towards "the other of humanity," the "mystery of the formless, non-human life," in the depths of the Ocean. New networks generated by the whalemen as "the vectors of deterritorialization"[31] characterize not only the alternative *nomadic spaces* between the civilized east coast of America and the exotic wilderness of Polynesia but also the space of Melville's narrative.

The transversal structure and nomadic trajectories in Byron's poetry are further pursued in the next chapter From Pilgrimage to Nomadism, focusing first on the erosion of the universal value pattern of pilgrimage or quest characterized by the movement towards a supreme, central religious or cultural value, spiritual and social law. In *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* this pattern is first supplanted by the network of "accidental meetings," typical of Mikhail Bakhtin's "chronotope of the road."[32] Apart from the loss of the pilgrimage's aim and meaning, this act implies reaching "the *limits of human speech and culture* [...], the *limits of human power*, creativity, history, and the *boundaries of the text* itself, which is finally identified with the ungraspable event of language." Nonetheless, this is not the ultimate horizon of Byron's poetry: later epic tales (*Mazeppa* and *The Island*) pursue the movements of deterritorialization as transversal links with other cultures. In Canto X of *Don Juan* this movement, skimming "The Ocean of Eternity," is expected to establish a new poetic universe as an alternative to

[28] Derrida, "Tympan," xxiii.

[29] Herman Melville, *Moby Dick*, ed. Harrison Hayford and Hershel Parker (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Inc., 1967) 105.

[30] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 111.

[31] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Mille plateaux, Le capitalisme et la schizophrénie, 1980), trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) 382.

[32] Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel," in *The Dialogic Imagination. Four Essays*, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981) 243.

the Newtonian cosmos revealing the limitations of scientific rationality and reductive views of technology.

Chapter 5, The Tale of Two Orders, is a study of a nonsensical word, a distorted Chinese expression "sharawadgi," functioning as a transversal between two widely different aesthetic orders and cultural patterns: eighteenth-century European landscape design and traditional Chinese gardening. Apart from a mere sign of otherness, "sharawadgi" denotes a specific lifestyle and a cultural agency developing along with the aesthetics of the picturesque and the refinement of landscape gardening. Apart from mere attractions of exotic designs, "sharawadgi" comes to express "*the possibility of a different representative order*" based on the "heterogeneous, mobile distribution" of singularities, where their "random similarities depend on general diversity." The deterritorializing effects of this order are soon contained in the political discourse of nationalism, which reterritorializes the English landscape garden as a quintessential nexus of local landscape, national economy and traditional culture. In spite of this, the transversal once marked by "sharawadgi" still persists, though in a different form, as a link between the two incompatible features of the postmodern age: "the playful, illusionist creativity and the grim triumph of global powers."

The transversal function of the discourse of the picturesque is further explored in Chapter 6, The Neutral Ground of History, analyzing the representations of history in Walter Scott's *Waverley* (1814) in the context of recent notions of the "force and signification" in dynamic structures. Rather than as a specific representation of history, *Waverley* is read as a "history of the meaning of the work itself, of its *operation.*"[33] The transversal between the picturesque and romance establishes the metatextual dimension of Scott's novel, opening up hierarchical structures of cultural memory and intensifying the political as well as aesthetic potential of specific signs and discourses of cultural identity. This affects the representation of the Scottish identity, which is not based on a central historical narrative or other principal value but has features of a "heterotopia," a contact zone between different cultures (of the Highlands and the Lowlands). Scott's narrative and historical irony mock all attempts to idealize this borderline space in terms of specific features of picturesque aesthetics or nationalist ideology. Apart from this, they problematize "a structural model where a central, impartial observer and his overall perspective view give unity to landscape and/or history" and reveal "the importance

[33] Jacques Derrida, "Force and Signification," in *Writing and Difference* (L'écriture et la différence, 1967), trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) 14.

of fortuitous [...] links between disjointed, fragmentary events for the formation of cultural memory."

The concluding section of the book approaches transversality as an agency transforming central romantic concepts of imagination and organic form and the very notion of Romanticism. Chapters Between Hoax and Ideology and Imagining the Difference discuss the theory of imagination in a different perspective: no longer as a principal component of romantic aesthetic but as a discursive strategy characterized by a transversal movement from philosophical concepts to simulacra and phantasms, a movement "by which the ego opens itself to the surface and liberates the a-cosmic, impersonal and pre-individual singularities which it had imprisoned."[34] The major effect of this movement is "the intensity of unifying visions," which is "given neither by individual perceptions, nor by their sum but rather by 'difference in general,' distinguished from mere 'diversity or otherness.'"[35] In both key English accounts of romantic imagination, Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria* (1817) and Wordsworth's *Prelude* (1799 1805 1850), the transversal working of this creative power is arrested and transformed into an aesthetic (and, ultimately, political) ideology, or, in Wordsworth's case, into a mystified genealogy of individual subjectivity seen as a process of symbolic substitutions (imagination, spiritual love, God) for a series of moral, erotic or political dilemmas.

A binary opposition of romantic aesthetics between mechanical fancy and organic imagination, based on the model of organic form, is deconstructed in Chapter 9, Mechanic?—Organic? Hawthorne's Machines of Art. Despite the "surviving idiom of romantic idealism," Hawthorne's tale "The Artist of the Beautiful" presents the artwork as an assemblage of functioning parts "producing truths" about itself, the artist and even the audience. The transversal movement of Hawthorne's artificial butterfly opens a new space for human emotionality and creativity transforming romantic symbols and structural models into "signs of art" and "literary machines" discovered by Deleuze in Proust's writing.

The decline of Romanticism in the present-day global world and consumerist society has become a major theme in Milan Kundera's novel *Immortality* (1988) discussed in the last chapter, Imagined Communities Revisited. Kundera's emphasis on novel form as a transversal network, based on a matrix similar to a computer program, and evolving across individual cultures and languages presents an alternative to romantic visions of culture as a dynamic

[34] Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 213.
[35] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 54, 30.

unity. Despite its central role in Kundera's thought, the novel can be seen only as a specific case of transversality, based on a schematized notion of temporality, the "homogeneous empty time [...] marked [...] by temporal coincidence," contrasted by Benedict Anderson with "simultaneity-along-time,"[36] typical of imagining sacred, religious communities. This binary opposition reducing the notion of transversality to the framework of Newtonian space and time as "absolute and immutable entities that provided the universe with a rigid, unchangeable arena,"[37] is overcome in the art of the picturesque based on "a mixed economy of design and land use to mirror a similar diversity of human existence."[38] In contrast to the novel, the picturesque combines different objects and products of different temporal and value orders: natural sceneries with volatile effects in art, domestic habits, local economies and signs of cultural memory. Thus it forms transversal links seminal for the transformation of Romanticism, which, as I conclude, is "vital for imagining the culturally diversified Europe."

[36] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 24.
[37] Brian Greene, *The Fabric of the Cosmos* (New York: Vintage, 2004) 8.
[38] John Dixon Hunt, *The Picturesque Garden in Europe* (London and New York: Thames and Hudson, 2003) 76.

1. Inscribed on Imperial Ruins

THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY IN *CHILDE HAROLD'S PILGRIMAGE*

There is no doubt that Italy, called by Byron *Italia* (a name with both Latin and Italian, ancient and renaissance connotations), is a major theme of the fourth canto of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*. It gains prominence in several ways: it is a site of an *exemplary intellectual history* characterized by strong emancipatory and idealizing features (the "still unquenched 'longing after immortality,'—the *immortality of independence*" IV, Preface, *104-105*; emphasis added[1]) and also by distinct mythical undertones (J.J. McGann, for instance, mentions Tasso's *Jerusalem Delivered* and Milton's *Paradise Lost* as the two most important epic predecessors of Byron's poem).[2] It is also a *political domain*, a former centre of an empire and the birthplace of many urban republics. Lastly, Italy and its history exemplify a specific *educational project*: the *Grand Tour* as a traditional conclusion of the education of a young, wealthy aristocrat. It is not accidental that Byron's notes often take the form of a detailed tourist guide which attempts to show Italian culture from a different—republican—position than that of conventional Grand Tour guides. While the first two cantos of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* may be interpreted as an act of posing a geographical, as well as cultural alternative to current Grand Tours, the second two Cantos almost seem to return to the conventional routes of aristocratic educational travel.

[1] All quotations from *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* follow the text of *The Complete Poetical Works* by Lord Byron, ed. Jerome J. McGann, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). Numbers in parentheses indicate the canto, stanza and line, respectively.

[2] In his commentary in *The Complete Poetical Works,* 2: 317, Jerome J. McGann suggests that "especially Canto IV is made into a particular analogue and poetic parallel of Tasso's *Jerusalem Delivered*, as that poem was conceived by Byron in his romantic mythology of Tasso's life and work." Milton's influence is discussed in McGann's *Don Juan in Context* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1976) 23-50.

Strategies of intellectual history, political philosophy, and educational practice combine in Canto IV in the *converging discourses of emancipation and ruin*. These discourses define the field of Byron's historical, political, and educational project. Already in Canto III the emancipatory rhetoric of Rousseau and his "compeers" is said to incite revolutionary violence. French revolutionaries "made themselves a fearful monument" and overthrew "good with ill [...] leaving but ruins" (III, 82, *770-75*). In both discourses, a specific form of power plays a decisive role: "Mankind have felt their strength, and made it felt" (III, 83, *780*). This "bio-power" (which, according to Michel Foucault, leads to a reflection of biological life in political existence, and vice versa),[3] or rather, the failure of its government-controlled deployment, despoils the state of the mystery and mystique of the 'living' tradition ("things which grew [...] from the birth of time" III, 82, *772*), and poses a menace of uncontrollable violence and massive destruction which accompanies with every hope of emancipation:

> and they who war
> With their own hopes, and have been vanquish'd, bear
> Silence, but not submission: in his lair
> Fix'd Passion holds his breath, until the hour
> Which shall atone for years; none need despair
>
> (III, 84, *791-94*)

The discourse here is a good example of Bakhtinian heteroglossia: on the one hand, the oppressed are compared to a bloodthirsty beast (the metaphorical structure includes allegory as a sign of the elevated style), on the other hand, the stanza contains rhetoric of popular resistance and retaliation.

While in Canto III the rescue from the threat of revolutionary violence is still found in the imagined fullness, coherence and harmony of Alpine nature, which seems to offer a possibility of transcendence, in Canto IV, this transcendence—supported by "natural human powers," including those of the senses—begins to appear illusory:

[3] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1978) 140, 142. Foucault speaks of bio-power chiefly as a manifestation of the "techniques of power" emerging in the course of the 18th century ("the family and the army, schools, the police, individual medicine, administration of collective bodies" 141). Contrary to this, in Byron's text the emergence of this theme indicates the collapse of government control over the population in the course of the French Revolution, Napoleonic wars and working-class riots.

We wither from our youth, we gasp away—
Sick—sick; unfound the boon—unslaked the thirst,
Though to the last, in verge of our decay,
Some phantom lures, such as we sought at first—
(IV, 124, *1108-11*)

Similarly, imagination loses its emancipatory, prophetic function both in individual and in collective terms. While the lyrical hero still believes in the existence of creative potential in myth and in art, which can make humanity equal to the gods (cf. Stanzas 49-53 dedicated to the Medici Venus), his imagination can embody mere *ghosts of the past*: "Forms from the floating wreck which Ruin leaves behind" (IV, 104, *936*).

The hope of the lyrical hero that he may be able to "repeople" the scene of present decay "with the past" (IV, 19, *163*) is baffled when he faces the stupendous ruin of the tomb of "[t]he wealthiest Roman's wife" (IV, 103, *927*) of whom nothing is known save her name. In the context of the discourse of power and with respect to missing historical facts the imaginative projections of the tomb's "inmate" seem to have no more weight than the hero's troubled recollections of his own past. Despite this, the hero's mysterious sympathy with the entombed Roman wife matters, though it does not extract a promise of emancipation from the terrors of the past and menaces of the future. It matters because it redirects the hero's meditation towards the present: "There woos no home, nor hope, nor life, save what is here." (IV, 105, *945*)

Hence, the present is no longer important as a matter of sensuous experience: it is given neither empirically nor in the immanent forms of our perception of space and time. It becomes an emancipatory promise *in itself*, but not because of its empirical or phenomenal nature. Rather, by virtue of its *historicity* sought both in individual and collective terms:

But my soul wanders; I demand it back
To meditate amongst decay, and stand
A ruin amidst ruins; there to track
Fall'n states and buried greatness
(IV, 25, *217-20*)

Here, the traditional figure of eighteenth-century topographical poetry[4]—"a ruin amidst ruins"—acquires a new meaning. The ruin

[4] Robert Aubin, *Topographical Poetry in XVIII*th *Century England* (New York: Modern Language Association of America, 1936) 256.

becomes a sign of the "finitude of Dasein" which, according to Heidegger, "is more primordial than humankind."[5]

Unlike Heidegger (and before him Nietzsche), Byron does not directly connect the emerging theme of historicity with *authenticity.* Dasein's ability-to-be (*Seinkönnen*) is implied in the anxiety of the lyrical hero revealed in a specific "mood" (*Befindlichkeit*)[6]

> Which out of things familiar, undesign'd,
> When least we deem of such, calls up to view
> The spectres whom no exorcism can bind,
> The cold—the changed—perchance the dead—anew
> (IV, 24, *212-15*)

This "mood" subverts the notion of reality based on consensus (common sense) and habitual ways of perception but does not engender Heidegger's "authentic historicity," linking Dasein's own life with the "co-historizing [...] of the community, of a people."[7]

Contrary to Heidegger's emphasis on the predestined, collective nature of communal life, Byron's references to communal being imply its indeterminacy and plurality. For instance, "we's" in Canto IV either point to individual expressions of imaginary collective experience ("We gaze [...] dazzled and drunk with beauty, till the heart/Reels with its fullness;" IV, 50, *442-44*) or to a generalized human creative potential ("We can recal[l] such visions, and create, [...] things which grow / Into thy statue's form" IV, 52, *466-67*). They also ambiguously refer to the existence of the oppressed ("What of this barren being do we reap? / Our senses narrow and reason frail" IV, 93, *829-830*) as well as—sceptically—to the general 'human condition.' Moreover, Byron's rhetoric, nourished

[5] Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, 1929), trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962) 237.

[6] "Heidegger's concept denotes how *we sense ourselves in situations.* Whereas feeling is usually thought of as something inward, Heidegger's concept refers to something both inward and outward, but before a split between inside and outside has been made. We are always situated, [...] living in a certain way *with others*." (Eugene T. Gendlin, "Befindlichkeit: Heidegger and the Philosophy of Psychology," *Review of Existential Psychology & Psychiatry*, 16.1 [1978] http://www.focusing.org/gendlin_befindlichkeit.html, visited 17 July 2007).
Spectres mentioned in the passage are hardly compatible with the "others" implied in Heidegger's "Being-with-one-another" (*Miteinandersein*) but become a major theme in Derrida's criticism of Heidegger's philosophy of time and the other discussed below. See Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx, the State of Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International* (Spectres de Marx, 1993), trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York and London: Routledge, 1994).

[7] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (Sein und Zeit, 1927), trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1962) 436.

by the Baroque poetry of decay and ruin,[8] reminds us of the gap between the extinct political and social power and of "[t]he fatal gift of beauty" (IV, 42, *371*) of the country and the people.

The ambiguous representations of historicity and communal life prepare ground for further problematization of Italy as an absolute ideal of political and cultural life ("The master-mould of Nature's heavenly hand, / Wherein we cast the heroic and the free [...] The commonwealth of kings, the men of Rome!" IV, 25-6, *223-26*). The beauty of this ideal is a "fatal gift," which is also "the gift of death": "a funeral dower of present woes and past" (IV, 42, *372*).

According to Derrida's reading of Jan Patočka's *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History* (1990), the acceptance of death as a gift includes the *incorporation* and *repression* of "orgiastic mystery."[9] In the fourth Canto of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* this orgiastic mystery is directly implied in the themes of ideal beauty, and of the intense feeling which cannot be expressed in language; in other words, of the absolute autonomy and self-sufficiency of the sensuous. As the stanzas dedicated to the Medici Venus show, ideal beauty is connected with "speechless love" which makes gods assume a sensuous shape and "become as mortals" (IV, 52, *460, 463*).

In Byron's poem, historicity neither leads (as we have already seen) to a problematic concept of authenticity, nor does it become "the basis for [...] political engagement" (in this way Heidegger attempted to explain his commitment to the Nazis).[10] Rather, it is related to an indestructible secret of the individual ("there is that within me which shall tire / Torture and Time, and breathe when I expire; / Something unearthly" IV, 137, *1228-30*) metaphorized as *the trace of the sensuous phenomenon in the memory* ("[l]ike the remembered tone of a mute lyre").

Though this elegiac image introduces a traditional *exegi monumentum* theme, its representation is paradoxical and subversive. Introduced by the famous oxymoron—"That curse shall be Forgiveness" (IV, 135, *1207*)—the passage points out that the identity of the individual, measured against *adikia* which constitutes every historicity, consists in his *responsibility for the*

[8] Stanzas 42 and 43 adapt a sonnet of a Tuscan Baroque poet Vincenzo da Filicaja (1642-1707). See Byron's note (*The Complete Poetical Works*, 234).

[9] See Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, trans. David Wills (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), chapter I.

[10] Charles Guignon, "History and Commitment in the Early Heidegger," in *Heidegger: A Critical Reader,* ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1992) 141.

other, articulated in terms of "*offering-one's-death,* that is, *one's life*, in the ethical dimension of sacrifice."[11]

[11] Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, 48. Anaximander's word *adikia* (from fragment B1 from Simplikios: "διδοναι δικην και τισιν άλληλοιςτης άδικιας"—"to conjoin harmoniously and to set right which has gone wrong") plays an important role in Jan Patočka's interpretation of "the origin of history" in his *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*:

> Man's being, his entrance among individuals in the immensity of the Universe, cannot be the same as the being of these existences [the elements, natural objects, things which were not created by the human hand], which is unable to touch itself in its core and 'does not matter' (i.e., it is neither indifferent nor a matter of concern; it simply does not have any meaning for them). It [Man's being] is non-indifferent from the very outset, that is, 'feels' its alien nature and 'un-right,' 'injustice' (άδικια), requires 'right' (δικη) and finds it in the welcoming attitude of the closest ones who had accepted the new being before it was here in the full meaning of the word, having accepted it already by their co-existence and having spanned a vault in the space under which the new being may be introduced. (Jan Patočka, *Kacířské eseje o filosofii dějin* [Prague: Academia, 1990] 45-46)

But this is not yet all. The acceptance of the individual in the world implies that he must partake in the process of labour. This labour is always forced and hard, it is a burden. In view of this, *adikia* always means both the impropriety of human entrance into the world and the burden of life itself, its hardships which are due to the nature of work. For Heidegger's interpretation of the same passage see "Der Spruch von Anaximander," in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt/M: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950) 326-30. See also "Anaximander's Saying," in *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 266f.Heidegger explains *adikia* as the general "disjointedness" of the present "lingering awhile" (*Vom je-weilig Anweseden*): "If we resist our own juridical-moral notions [*juristisch-moralischen Vorstellungen*], if we restrict to what comes to language, then we hear that wherever adikia rules all is not right with things [daß es, wo sie waltet, nicht mit rechten Dingen zugeht]. That means something is out of joint [etwas ist aus den Fugen]" (Derrida's translation quoted in *Specters of Marx*, 26; cf. Heidegger, "Anaximander's Saying," 267). In *Specters of Marx*, 26-27, Derrida comments on this reading in the following way:

> Heidegger thus removes such a gift from any horizon of culpability, of debt, of right, and even, perhaps, of duty. He would especially like to wrest it away from that experience of vengeance [...] Has not Heidegger, as he always does, skewed the asymmetry in favor of [...] the accord that gathers and collects while harmonizing (*Versammlung, Fug*), be it in the sameness of differents or of disagreements, and before the synthesis of a sys-tem? Once one has recognized the force and the necessity of thinking justice on the basis of the gift, that is, beyond right, calculation, and commerce, once one has recognized therefore the necessity (without force, precisely [*justement*], without necessity, perhaps, and without law) of thinking the gift to the other as the gift of that which one does not have and which thus, paradoxically, can only come back or belong to the other, is there not a risk of inscribing this whole movement of justice under the sign of presence, be it of the presence of meaning of the *Anwesen*, of the event as coming into presence, of Being as presence joined to itself, of the proper of the other as presence? As the presence of the received present, yes, but appropriable as the same and therefore gathered together? Beyond right, and still more beyond juridicism, beyond morality, and still beyond moralism, does not justice as relation to the other suppose on the contrary the irreducible excess of disjointure and anachrony [...], a disjointure that, in always risking the evil, expropriation and injustice (*adikia*) against which there is no calculable insurance, would alone be able to do justice or to render justice to the other as other?"

In Byron's famous "testament" (Stanzas 130-137) "justice" is connected with Nemesis (personifying the "inexorable equilibrium of human condition" as well as the anger and vengeance of the gods; cf. e.g. *New Larousse Encyclopaedia of Mythology*,

Historicity, Derrida writes, "is difficult to *acknowledge.*" Moreover, since the ethics of responsibility "often claims to

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ed. Felix Guirand, trans. Richard Aldington [London: Paul Hamlyn, 1968] 164). Ancient Nemesis is called from her death and non-existence ("I call thee from the dust" IV, 132, 1187) to revenge the grievances done to the lyrical hero. This revenge is ambiguously connected with the ancient adikia—the vengeance of Orestes for Clytemnestra's murder of his father Agamemnon—referred to as "unnatural retribution" (1185) and transferred to the unspecified other, in Derrida's words, "as the gift of that which one does not have and which thus, paradoxically, can only come back or belong to the other" (Derrida, *Spectres of Marx*, 27). Also, the temporality of the passage (the hero's vengeance was not taken and "shall yet be sought and found" IV, 133, 1195) and the disjointedness of the hero's accepted roles (he identifies himself both with the dead Agamemnon and the suffering Orestes) reveals the "irreducible excess of a disjointure and an anachrony" (Derrida, *Spectres of Marx*, 27).

Although Patočka does not develop his interpretation of Anaximander's fragment in the direction taken by Heidegger and Derrida (mainly because he leans on the notion of the "natural life-world"), he points to another important implication of adikia as the burden of work. Byron's text is not concerned with work as it is commonly understood. As the hero's attitude in the first part of the Coliseum sequence (Stanzas 128-38) is archetypally aristocratic, the discourse of work is virtually replaced by those of fight and lineage: "It is not that I may not have incurr'd / For my ancestral faults or mine the wound / I bleed withal, and, had it been conferr'd / With a just weapon, [...]" (IV, 132, 1189-92). Instead of physical work necessary for survival, the lyrical hero performs the work of mourning: "Among thy [Time's] mightier offerings here are mine, / Ruins of years" (IV, 131, 1173-74), that is, localizes his ruined youth in the ruin of ruins. Simultaneously he posits this work as the future task for others ("— shall they not mourn?" IV, 131, 1179). In *Specters of Marx* Derrida comments on this "work":

> The one who has disappeared appears still to be there, and his apparition is not nothing. It does not do nothing. Assuming that the remains can be identified, we know better than ever today that the dead must be able to work. And to cause to work, perhaps more than ever. There is also the mode of production of the phantom, itself a phantomatic mode of production. As in the work of mourning, after a trauma, the conjuration has to make sure that the dead will not come back [...] the work of mourning is not one kind of work among others. It is work itself, work in general, the trait by means of which one ought perhaps reconsider the very concept of production—in what links it to trauma, to mourning, to the idealising iterability of exappropriation, thus the spectral spiritualization is at work in any *tekhnē*. (Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 97)

It is not by chance that the hero finally welcomes the death as the force establishing a new 'sense' of the scene. The work of mourning has thus accomplished the transformation of his subjectivity into the otherness typical of the specters: the "we" of the dwellers of another time and spirits of the place: "That we become a part of what has been, / And grow unto the spot, all-seeing but unseen" (IV, 138, 1241-42).These "spirits" produced by "sense so deep and clear" are indistinguishable from spectres, because they look at us: "This spectral someone looks at us [...] outside of any synchrony, [...] according to an absolute anteriority [...] and assymetry, according to an absolutely unmasterable disproportion. Here anachrony makes the law." writes Derrida, commenting on the apparition of the ghost of King Hamlet in Shakespeare's tragedy, and on the "visor effect" which determines the spectre's gaze (*Specters of Marx*, 7). The ruins in Canto IV *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* cause a similar "visor effect" which only develops the spectral self-determination of the speaker made already at the beginning of Canto III. This spectrality characterizes the new creative attitude of the speaker his relationship with the imaginary other: "What am I? Nothing; but not so are thou/Soul of my thought! with whom I traverse earth,/Invisible but gazing" (III, 6, 50-52).

separate itself, as ethics, from religious revelation, it is even difficult to tie it closely to a history of religion."[12] Despite this "historicity must be *admitted to*," which implies that it must remain the "problem of history," a problem that is never to be resolved. History, says Derrida commenting on Patočka's *Heretical Essays*, "can be neither a decidable object nor a totality capable of being mastered, precisely because it is tied to *responsibility,* to *faith*, and to the *gift.*"[13]

In Byron's poem this "problem of history" seems even more complicated than in Patočka's philosophical text. This is mainly because of the disparate contexts in which it appears: the invocation of Time personifying it simultaneously as the aesthetic agency ("the beautifier of the dead"), the only wisdom ("sole philosopher") and the power of justice and law ("the avenger," IV, 130, *1162, 1169*), the representation of history as successive cycles of growth and decay, the investment of the discourse of history with controversial rhetoric of emancipation and oppression, and last but not least the reference to the *exegi monumentum* theme in Stanza 134: the "prophetic fullness" of the hero's verse conjures the past injustice in the act of *forgiveness*. Does it mean that history is finally left alone to its own futility and violence, as the final stanzas, in which the hero identifies himself with the 'other power' of the Ocean, may suggest? Where then can we look for responsibility, faith and the gift? Prior to any attempt at answering these questions, the "problem of history" in the fourth Canto of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* has to be examined together with the figurations of wholeness in the poem.

There are different figures of totality in the canto—the first is Italy itself:

> a land
> Which *was* the mightiest in its old command,
> And *is* the loveliest, and must ever be,
> The master-mould of Nature's heavenly hand,
> (IV, 25, *220-23*)

This totality belongs to the *world of ideas*, understood as a matrix of all cultural forms ("master-mould of Nature's heavenly hand"). Its authority is established by an imperative rhetorical gesture ("must

[12] Derrida, *The Gift of Death,* 5. Derrida comments on the conclusion of Patočka's essay "Is the Technological Civilization a Civilization in Decline, and If So Why?" in *Heretical Essays on the Philosophy of History*: "It may also be that the question of the decline of civilization has been badly put. Civilization does not exist in itself. The question would rather be if historical man wants yet to acknowledge history" (Patočka, *Kacířské eseje o filosofii dějin*, 126).

[13] Derrida, *The Gift of Death,* 5.

ever be") which inscribes the figure of eternity on temporal, historical and empirical, meanings of Italy ("*was* the mightiest," "*is* the loveliest"). This gesture of supreme authority introduces related metaphorical representations of Italy as a complete *vision* of time, all epochs or ages, and simultaneously, as the *writing* of time, *the Scripture*, or any other book of sacred history ("Full flashes on the soul the light of ages [...] To the last halo of the chiefs and sages, / Who glorify thy consecrated pages; III, 110, *1023-25*). Because of some of these attributes Italy can be (quite traditionally) represented as the matrix of all (western) empires, or (more in Byronic vein) as the model of global systems of power *and* knowledge:

> Thou wert the throne and grave of empires; still
> The fount at which the panting mind assuages
> Her thirst of knowledge, quaffing there her fill,
> Flows from the eternal source of Rome's imperial hill.
> (III, 110, *1027-30*)

This authoritative notion of totality is first introduced in a playful gesture which interrupts the apparently unending development of the last stanzas of *Canto III*. As a gesture of discourse it introduces the theme of the interrelatedness of power, knowledge and beauty in the last Canto. It also functions as the *incitement* of the new discourse concerning history of western civilization, its decline and possibilities of emancipation. Even today, discourse needs such incitements: for instance Jean-François Lyotard and other thinkers take up Los Angeles.[14]

The authoritative gesture in Stanza 25 of Canto IV ("must ever be") no longer incites discourse about history. Rather, it establishes history as the *master discourse*. This discourse imposes history as the imperative, the necessity, the revelation of truth, the reason for a specific political action and the aim of our future existence. Against this strategic, ideological *deployment of history* Patočka posits *the problem of history* in his interpretation of one of the basic notions of Husserl's phenomenology—that of the *epokhē* (the disclosure of a phenomenon in its totality):

> What is, from this perspective, Husserl's *epokhē*? It is one of the deeply negative acts of our consciousness which show the depth of the understanding for *no*, for the negative deeper than all logical negatives. This negativity as such is possibly that phenomenon which must be taken for our point of departure, if we are to grasp the basis of consciousness, the basis which is not the

[14] Jean-François Lyotard, *Le Mur du Pacifique* (1979), Chapter 2, quoted from Andrew Benjamin (ed.), *The Lyotard Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) 64.

> consciousness, but the being of mankind. The consciousness is the consciousness due to the fact that *something* is shown to it. If the *showing itself is to be shown*, it is in a sense necessary to cross the sphere of things that can be captured by the consciousness. Why? Because the radical *no, nothing* does not exist and never can be an object, and yet all the power necessary for appearance and showing is drawn from it: even Husserl's *epokhē* testifies it. Showing can show itself only on the background of *nothing*. But nothing is never given as our object, that is, in our presence: we can only *outrun* us to reach it. In this outrun we relate ourselves to death as the last possibility, the possibility of the radical impossibility of being. This impossibility overshadows our whole life, *but also makes it possible, gives it the possibility of being whole.*[15]

Patočka's reading of Husserl is partially influenced by Heidegger's analysis of care and "being-towards-death" in *Being and Time*, but it also anticipates Derrida's "problem of history," which implies further questions of gift, faith and responsibility. Moreover, it excludes any possibility to establish a positive "history of the senses." Patočka's analysis directs us back to the discourse of ruins grasping the death of the subject and the whole culture as a *gift* and thus establishing the possibility of life.

The following two figures of totality in Canto IV of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* are complementary to the first. One of them is the well-known image of the Ocean dominating the final section of the poem. The force of this figure is supplementary to the non-meaning of the "interviews" of the lyrical hero with Nature, in which he desires to "steal / From what I may be, or have been before" and to lose his identity in mingling "with the Universe" (IV, 178, *1599-1601*). In other words, the image of the Ocean introduces *and* eliminates, the possibility of absolute freedom as well as the hopes of full sensual pleasure and unlimited play ("I wantoned with thy breakers—they to me / Were a delight; and if the freshening sea / Made them a terror—'twas a pleasing fear" IV, 184, *1651-53*). This freedom, pleasure and play cannot be appropriated or assimilated, save in an ironical gesture using childish imagery: "And laid my hand upon thy mane—as I do here" (IV, 184, *1656*). All this foregrounds the sublimity of the Ocean as an immense *power* reducing mankind, its hopes and history into nothingness of death without a grave (IV, 179, *1610-11*). In spite of its horrors, this death seems less terrible than the marks of "ruin" and "decay" left on the earth as an outcome of the human domination and "control." This strategy implies an *absolute dissolution of history* and demands the figure of totality as a

[15] Patočka, *Kacířské eseje o filosofii dějin,* 157.

dynamic, uncontrollable equilibrium, which does not give to us a chance to discover the possibility of the wholeness of our existence. At the same time it does not introduce the essential problem of the disjointedness of the present, since the Ocean represents an ideal, eternal continuum. In other words, the final representation of the Ocean in *Canto IV* can be read as a vigorous, violent *erasure* of the "problem of history," of the essential "disclosedness"[16] of human existence.

Another figure of totality in the fourth canto is developed in Stanzas 153-59 on St. Peter's Cathedral in Vatican. The sublime representation of human "hopes of immortality" (IV, 154, *1392*) is analyzed by the "gradual grasp" of the "outward sense." Only in combination with intellectual powers can the senses reveal the building's "eloquent proportions" which tell metaphorically about the "glory of God" and function in a way similar to the Kantian moral sublime, yet instead of the authority of moral law they reveal the power of "great conceptions" born in the human mind (IV, 159, *1431*). This vague phrase may imply the artist's ideas and architectonic design, but also the assimilation of the absolute Other, God, and his transposition to a Protestant, or, more specifically, Hegelian, design of history as a process of a gradual yet necessary revelation of truth in nature. Thus, the present loses all disjointedness and becomes a manifestation of God's presence in the world guaranteed by the moral "worth" of the believers:

> and thou
> Shalt one day, if found worthy, so defined,
> See thy God face to face, as thou dost now
> His Holy of Holies, nor be blasted by his brow.
> (IV, 155, *1392-95*)

In other words, the totality represented by the "mighty graduations" of the architecture of St. Peter's, is a *closure* eliminating the problem of history by means of a strategy which identifies the manifestation of God with a full grasp of the *structural relationships constituting the whole*.

The last important figuration of totality in Canto IV is the inscription of Man on the Roman ruins, the remains of the palaces on Mt. Palatine. Why are these ruins so important? First, because they are the remnants of the imperial palace—a centre of global power. At a more abstract level, they are significant as the ruins of Rome, which as a former cultural centre still informs and moulds Western notions of history, law and government. In contrast to this

[16] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 171.

accumulation of abstract meaning, the observation of Roman ruins or even their archaeological study do not reveal any specific meaning. Byron's note to Stanza 108 is quite explicit:

> The Palatine is one mass of ruins, particularly on the side towards the Circus Maximus. The very soil is formed of crumbled brick-work. Nothing has been told, nothing can be told, to satisfy the belief of any, but a Roman antiquary. (253)

The gap between the fullness of the abstract meaning and the absence of a specific meaning is bridged by an important message referring to all histories whether fictitious or not: "There is the moral of all human tales" (IV, 108, *964*). According to it, history can be reduced to "one page" full of endlessly repetitive cycles of the surge and decay of civilization. Despite this reduction, the lines "History with all her volumes vast / Hath but *one* page" (IV, 108, *968-69*) do not imply any fixed, authoritative meaning of history. Rather, they are a negative gesture pointing out the ground for any *responsible* understanding of life as the gift in relation to death and to faith. We have to paint first, in Derrida's words, the black picture of the world on the blackboard.[17] And Byron's figuration of Man as "one page" of history inscribed on the ruins is one of the first attempts to paint this picture.

In a contrasting movement, Stanzas 108 and 109 represent the ruins as traces of the effort to amass and intensify sensuous pleasures and to make them, in the form of fetishes and simulacra, support the strategies of power. ("Of Glory's gewgaws shining in the van / Till the sun's rays with added flame were fill'd!" IV, 109, *979-80*). An interesting signature of this complex meaning is the word "van" which can imply a strategic advantage (now only in tennis) and a military formation ("vanguard"), but also refer to search for gold ("van" is a special shovel used for sifting the ore), and to the attractions of the marketplace ("van" could mean a covered wagon of a trader filled with "gewgaws").

Lastly, the ruins of the centre of Roman power achieve a specific political meaning in the context of the discourse of *translatio libertatis* typical of the eighteenth-century Whig ideology. According to this ideology Britain was the inheritor of the best features of the Greek *polis* and Roman republic, and most importantly of the greatness and world-wide power of the Roman Empire. This optimistic glorification of the "historical mission" of Britain as the "third Rome" was viewed sceptically by some historians who studied the "decline and fall" of the Roman Empire, for instance by Edward

[17] Derrida, *Specters of Marx,* 78.

Gibbon, who profoundly influenced Byron's representation of Rome in Canto IV. In keeping with this critical attitude to imperial ideology, the note to the stanza written by Byron's friend John Cam Hobhouse quotes another British historian and theologian Conyers Middleton reflecting on the analogy between the historical cycles of the Roman and the British Empire:

> From the railleries of this kind, on the barbarity and misery of our island, one cannot help reflecting on the surprising fate and revolutions of kingdoms, how Rome, once the mistress of the world, the seat of arts, empire and glory now lies sunk in sloth, ignorance and poverty [...]: while this remote country, the jest and contempt of polite Romans, is become the happy seat of liberty, plenty and letters; flourishing in all the arts and refinements of civil life; yet running perhaps the same course which Rome itself had run before it, from virtuous history to wealth; from wealth to luxury; from luxury to an impatience of discipline and corruption of morals: till by a total degeneracy and loss of virtue, being grown ripe for destruction, it fall a prey at last to some hardy oppressor, and with the loss of liberty, losing every thing that is valuable, sinks gradually into its original barbarism. (254)

The discourses of empire and *translatio libertatis* which are still fundamental to the idea of Western civilization are deconstructed in Byron's inscription of Man on Roman ruins. If "Ages and realms are crowded" in the "span" of the historical "pendulum," the discourse of *translatio libertatis* has lost its meaning. Similarly, history as a master discourse has lost its telos: "'Tis but the same rehearsal of the past" (IV, 108, *965*). This ominous sentence opens the possibility of the interpretation of historical master discourse as the theatre of the absurd which will be explored towards the end of this chapter.

Let us now return to the central figure of Man. It is now clear that it represents the extreme abstraction and generalization of human existence: a totality of history. However, the figurative representation of this abstraction as a swing of the pendulum ("Man! / Thou pendulum betwixt a smile and tear" IV, 109, *974-75*) covers the difference between changeable and transitory moods and passions ("betwixt smile and tear") and between the changing emotions typical of the response of the reader ("Admire, exult—despise—laugh, weep" IV, 109, *973*). These moods, which, by the way, repeat the stages of the historical cycle outlined in the previous stanza ("freedom," "glory," "wealth and corruption," "barbarism"), are by no means mere ephemeral "passions." Nor can they be interpreted as symptoms of some "internal state of mind." Rather, they indicate that the moralizing meditations typical of the

Enlightenment are inserted into a new, *existential* context. This becomes evident when we read crucial passages of Canto IV referring to ruins in connection with the hero's mood (Stanzas 22-25) with the section of Heidegger's *Being and Time* devoted to the analysis of care (*Sorge*) as the being of Dasein. According to a recent analysis of Heidegger's *Being and Time* "care unifies various structural aspects of Dasein's way of being" and "describes Dasein's most basic structure as thrown into making its being an issue."[18]According to Heidegger, the being of our Dasein is revealed in moods which make us feel it either as a burden, or allow us to shake off its heaviness for a short time. The structure of Canto IV with its rapid alterations of moods seems analogous to this notion of the being of Dasein.

As it now appears, mood plays the most important role in the analysis of the existential motives in the whole poem. Heidegger calls this existential mood "foundness" (*Befindlichkeit*): "Dasein [...] finds itself in the mood that it has."[19] Thus, mood appears as the original mode of being of Dasein, disclosed to itself before all knowledge and volition and to the extent which exceeds their own ability to disclose. This, in other words, is the meaning of Heidegger's dictum "Mood reveals thrownness (*Geworfenheit*)."[20] But thrownness also suggests another feature of Dasein's being, its "facticity of being delivered over"[21] (*überantwortet*). This "being delivered over" is closely related to the nature of life as a burden (Byron's "fardels of the heart" IV, 166, *1494*) and to our anxiety about our situation in the world which has lost its meaning (where history is "the same rehearsal of the past"). But because this anxiety brings us to thrownness as something which may also be repeated, it opens the way to authenticity as the possibility of being (*Seinkönnen*). This is also one of the initial themes of Canto IV:

> Existence may be borne, and the deep root
> Of life and sufferance makes its firm abode
> In bare and desolated bosoms:
>
> (IV, 21, *181-83*)

But what about the relationship of this existential theme to the activity of writing? Thrownness of Dasein is inscribed in the ruins of the Empire in the abstract figure of Man which disfigures in different modes of temporality, namely mechanical, linear time measured by

[18] Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's* Being and Time*, Division I* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991) 240, 242.
[19] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 174.
[20] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 174.
[21] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 174.

the pendulum, periods of historical cycles and political regimes ("ages and realms") and also existential temporality signified by the change of moods. Thus the figure of Man is not just *inscribed* on the ruins of Mt. Palatine: it disfigures *into* them in a sequence of metaphors or rather *catachreses* ("Man! Thou pendulum [...], This mountain, whose obliterated plan / The pyramid of empires pinnacled" IV, 109, *975, 977-78*) which eliminate the possibility of re-establishing the figure of mankind as the structure and *telos* of history.

In Byron's draft of Canto IV (MS *BA*), this gesture is anticipated by boisterous, carnivalesque laughter: "Oh ho ho ho thou creature of a man" which despoils the abstract notion of Man of its authority.[22] In the final version Byron uses a complex figurative language, which however, does not construct a totality as for instance in the sequence on St. Peter's cathedral, but, on the other hand deconstructs it, leaving the problem of history open, since it is "better written" (IV, 108, *969*) in Roman ruins.

But this is not all: from the ruins of the centre of the empire we must proceed to another important Roman ruin, the "Coliseum" which is the figure of the Roman *orbis terrarum,* of the sphere or the field of Roman military, religious, and cultural power: "'While stands the Coliseum, Rome shall stand; / When falls the Coliseum, Rome shall fall; / And when Rome falls—the World.'" (IV, 145, *1297-99*) Here Byron quotes Gibbon, who refers to the ancient belief of Anglo-Saxon pilgrims. This figure of the coherence of imperial power is, however, undermined in Byron's poem by the previous description of the building as the circus in which the Gladiators recruited from the oppressed nations on the periphery of the empire were "Butchered to make a Roman holiday" (IV, 141, *1267*), or in other words to create a festive mood by means of the orgiastic and demoniac. The demoniac orgiasm and boredom are, according to Patočka's *Heretical Essays,* the main moods characterizing the social existence in technological civilization.

In Canto IV the Coliseum is represented as a traditional figure of the *theatrum mundi*. However, instead of the stage on which the action can teach us to live by its self-evidence supported by our senses, the Coliseum offers a scene on which the hero is unable find authenticity in his relationship to the oppressed, because they appear to him only as victims of a bloodthirsty ritual or as a degenerated mob.

The figure of *theatrum mundi* disfigures still in another context: in relation to one of the previous meditations about the futility of all

[22] Originally the laughter was introducing the appeal to the readers: "Oh ho ho/Approach—behold."

revolutions. In Stanzas 88-98 the vain struggle for freedom is compared to the mutual slaughter of gladiators: "Bleed gladiator-like, and still engage / Within the same arena where they see / Their fellows fall before" (IV, 94, *844-46*). Later on, in Stanza 139 the Coliseum is metaphorized as a symbolic battlefield of history and simultaneously as a *stage*. In this way, the oppression and unnecessary deaths of whole generations are connected with the authoritative metaphor of history as *theatrum mundi*. And Byron's poem deconstructs this metaphor by disconnecting it from the traditional, humanist representation of history as the gradual revelation of truth (*veritas filia temporis*) and linking it with a massive, yet absolutely futile, deployment of power which causes deaths of individuals and exterminates whole generations: "Both are but theatres where the chief actors rot. [...] And thus they plod in sluggish misery, / Rotting from sire to son, and age to age, and so die, / Bequeathing their hereditary rage / To the new race of inborn slaves, who wage / War for their chains" (IV, 139, *1251*; IV, 94, *837-43*).

The deconstruction of the *theatrum mundi* figure not only subverts the authority of history as a totality of meaning. It also makes impossible the coherent subject-position of the speaker of the poem whose visions can no longer act as the source of his authority. It can also be interpreted as a gesture of resistance against the "carceral system" which according to Michel Foucault's history of the prison (*Discipline and Punish*) had started to build up its discursive formations especially in the post-Napoleonic world. Similar to *theatrum mundi*, the carceral system works on the basis of temporal simultaneity and a unified perspective which, however, no longer reveal truth, but become the means of control and power: "Visibility is a trap."[23]

Before I proceed beyond this point, let me return to the notion of history as the theatre of the absurd. Such a notion applies to Byron's visions of history only when the disintegration of the personal identity of the speaker or lyrical hero of the poem poses an urgent question about the *responsibility* of the author for his apocalyptic scenarios of history. Once the suffering of the social others is introduced it requires from Byron's speaker a different view of the event: the view from the bottom of the society which would separate the author's subjectivity from the carceral mechanism that even works in the grammatical structure of his

[23] See Michel Foucault's analysis of the "Panopticon" in *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison* (Surveiller et punir, 1972), trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Random House, Inc., 1977) 307-308, 200.

speech: "I stood in Venice, on the Bridge of Sighs; / A palace and a prison on each hand" (IV, 1, *1-2*).

"Visibility is a trap."—This does not mean that other senses can emancipate us from the predicament of visibility, because even hearing, smell, taste and touch function in technological society within similar strategic distributions of power which determine our subject-positions. In his recent examination of our notions of historicity, and the history of religion Derrida went beyond Foucault's account of the predicament of visibility. He linked this enforced visibility with the "secret of responsibility." Leaning on the prior analysis made by Patočka (who examined the movements of "incorporation" and "repression" of the "orgiastic mystery" in Western culture by Platonism and Christianity) Derrida has demonstrated how this development is related to the change of the function of visibility in Western religious consciousness. This change has a formative meaning for our notions of responsibility and of the meaning of history. In *The Gift of Death* Derrida shows how the Christian notion of the inaccessibility of the central metaphysical authority, the personal God who *sees everyone* but remains invisible, comes to bear on the main issue of European politics and morals. It removes us from the ideal of equality (the vision of Platonic ideas was potentially accessible to any citizen of the Greek *polis*) and derives the uniqueness of an individual from the moment of its demise (Heidegger's "no one can die instead of you"). The understanding of this asynchrony, displacement, and disjointedness between our religious ideas of responsibility and our visions of the *telos* of history (liberal society, 'repeating' the ideal of the Greek polis on a 'higher level') seems to pose a *general* condition of any new history in which the life of the human species does not develop toward the revelation of truth but is at all times at stake, threatened by the civilization which may seem to have made liberal society possible, but also, as Foucault says, saturated its political mechanisms by strategies of war, or, as Patočka claims, has generated the "metaphysics of force" shaping a late modern figure of Being as its "most extreme withdrawal."[24]

[24] Patočka, *Kacířské eseje o filosofii dějin,* 125.

2. Ruins in the New World

USES OF THE PAST IN THE U.S. CULTURE

The U.S. Relationship to the Past: the End of History?

> [W]e represent a new race of men, living no longer in the past, scarcely in the present—but projecting our lives forward into the future. Ceasing to model ourselves on ancestral superstitions, it is our faith and principle to press onward, onward! [...] We are no longer children of the Past![1]

These words of the first U.S. Governor of Massachusetts John Hancock are addressed to Esther Dudley, an ancient keeper of the Boston Province House, the former seat of colonial power. They do not evoke "reverence" and "courtesy" with which the representative of the new government reportedly treated the old royalist lady. Having been called "a symbol of the past" (*H* 676) the old woman is so scared and bewildered by Hancock's tirade that she dies no sooner than he has finished. "She has done her office" (*H* 677), says the governor after she has sunk down.

Although the narrator of "Old Esther Dudley" is described as "the old loyalist," the irony towards the close of the last of Hawthorne's "Legends of the Province House" is aimed at the insensitivity and inane rhetoric of the former revolutionary leader. Moreover, the words of the authorial narrator in the introduction to the preceding "legend," "Lady Eleanore's Mantle," indicate that Hawthorne's target is closer to that of much later criticism of capitalist society. The "forgotten mansion" representing the colonial past is "brought [...] into public view" despite the general

[1] All quotations from Nathaniel Hawthorne's tales follow Roy Harvey Pearce's edition of *Tales and Sketches* in the Library of America (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1982). The quoted passage is on pp. 676-77. Subsequent page references appear in the text in parentheses prefixed by *H*.

growth of consumerism: "as if we had thrown down the vulgar range of shoe-shops and dry-good stores, which hides its aristocratic front" (*H* 652).

This rhetorical strategy seems quite significant not only because of the ironical antithesis it produces ("vulgar stores" of the present vs. the "aristocratic front" of the monument of the past), but also due to subsequent mentions of "any democrat now upon the stage" (*H* 653) and of the "transmission" of the old loyalist's tale "to the reader through the medium of a thorough-going democrat" (*H* 667-68). These references may make us aware of Hawthorne's allegiance to the Democratic Party, but the pervasive irony also suggests the association of democracy with booming consumerism represented by "the vulgar range of shoe-shops and dry-good stores."

One is reminded of Francis Fukuyama's book *The End of History and the Last Man*[2] in which "[t]he universal and homogeneous State, the State of the end of History"[3] is based on "the twin pillars of economy and recognition."[4] Jacques Derrida has shown that Fukuyama's false prophecies are fashioned after the Hegelian speculations of Alexandre Kojève who saw in American post-World War II consumerism a feature of "classless society" where "all the members [...] can appropriate [...] whatever they like" and "Man's return to animality" seems "an already present certainty."[5] Ironic representations of the consumerist nature of economy and the absence of recognition in Hawthorne's text indicate that there is something wrong with the bright future towards which the Governor commands his listeners to march.

The eschatology based on the "universalization of Western liberal democracy" [6] as the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of human government,"[7] would be impossible without a radical and often violent *separation from the past*. This has also been one of the major traits of the ideology of Americanism since the *Declaration of Independence*.[8] For many of

[2] New York: The Free Press, 1992.

[3] Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International* (Spectres de Marx, 1993), trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York and London: Routledge, 1994) 61.

[4] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, 204.

[5] Derrida, *Spectres of Marx*, 72.The quote is from Kojève's *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel: Leçons sur 'La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit'* (Paris: Gallimard, 1947) 436-37.

[6] Derrida, *Spectres of Marx*, 78.

[7] Fukuyama, *The End of History*, ix.

[8] In the *Declaration of Independence* the "laws of nature and nature's God" creating the new political identity of the U.S. are contrasted with "*the history* of the present king of Great Britain ... a history of repeated injuries & usurpations" (Thomas Jefferson, *Writings*, ed. Merill E. Peterson, The Library of America [New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1982] 19, emphasis added). Though the "history" in question

Hawthorne's contemporaries (as well as successors) the only value of the past consisted in demonstrating the inevitability of history as an *incessant progress* removing them daily from the realm of "ancestral superstitions" to a supposedly enlightened and free future.

Conventional mid-nineteenth-century American thinking about history—or rather the end of history—ironized or disputed in Hawthorne's writings[9] seems entrapped between two contradictory demands. On the one hand, discontinuity with the past has to be proclaimed in order to define America as the origin of the world to come. On the other hand, continuous progress must exist to make the attainment of the future ideal believable.

As David Loewenthal points out, the American attitudes towards the past are "perhaps more sharply polarized than any other"—oscillating between the idealization of historical and cultural heritage and the "dismissal of the past" justified by

> [t]hree interrelated ideas [...]:
>
> —a belief in the autonomy of the birthright of each successive generation [that is, that autonomy and freedom are always rooted in the present and redefined according to the present events, needs, desires, ideologies, family relations etc.]
>
> —an organic analogy that assigned America a place of youth in history [beliefs that America and its population were only in the first stage of the life cycle], and
>
> —a faith that the new nation was divinely exempt from decay and decline.[10]

For many nineteenth century Americans, this dismissal was often contrasted with nostalgia for the art and institutions of the Old

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seems to correspond with tradition ("the ties of our common kindred," 23) and thus to represent older, tribal, feudal, etc., notions of the unity of the people, it can be interpreted in a radically different sense. According to Jefferson's draft of the *Declaration*, the unity of the British and the American colonists was based on the *voluntary acceptance* of the supremetraditional political authority, a "common king," by the latter ("that in constituting indeed our several forms of government, we had adopted one common king, thereby laying a foundation for perpetual league & amity with them," 23). Therefore also "the history of the present king of Great Britain" with its "injuries & usurpations" is no mere catalogue of the monarch's violations of the "laws of nature and nature's God." It is also the narrative of the relations between the colonies and the mother country, and consequently, a history in the modern meaning of the term. See my article "*Declaration of Independence* and American Utopias. Creativity and Technology," *Litteraria Pragensia*2.3 (1992): 65-73. Cf. also Gilbert Chinard, *Thomas Jefferson. The Apostle of Americanism* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1957).

[9] The most important polemical text is the tale "Earth's Holocaust" (1844) collected in *Mosses from an Old Manse* (1846).

[10] David Loewenthal*, The Past Is A Foreign Country* (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1985) 105

World. According to Loewenthal, "Cooper scorned European ruins and celebrated wilderness virtues, but royalties from the *Leatherstocking Tales* let him gothicize and castellate his family home and play at being an Old World country squire." In Hawthorne's *English Notebooks* we find such exclamations that "the whole past might be swept away" and that the Parthenon marbles should be "burnt into lime" but his novel *Marble Faun* celebrates Roman ruins as the soil for "romance and poetry."[11]

Another contrast in the American attitude to the past emerged between the assertion of the independence of every successive generation from their fathers and the respect for the Founding Fathers and their inheritance. This contrast made them relegate heroism to the past, and give the present the role of merely preserving the values established by the founders of the Republic. In this way, the idealized history of the American Revolution was haunting the society—to use Lincoln's words as "a *living history*" bearing the witness to the War of Independence."[12] And it was Lincoln again, who on the eve of the Civil War (in a speech given at Edwardsville in 1858) claimed that the politicians must "restore the government to the policy of the fathers."[13]

And finally, in the 1890s, for many Americans disillusioned with the industrial civilization and the life in ugly cities, the past accrued a higher value than the present. John Brinckerhoff Jackson and Ruth Elson sum up the reflections of historians on the occasion of the U.S. centenary in 1876: "Initially virtuous and high-minded, America had become corrupt, acquisitive, imperialistic."[14] Here we cannot but remember Ezra Pound's "Usury Cantos," which started to appear more than half a century later, and his idealization of Thomas Jefferson's agrarian America.

The Importance of Originary Past: Nature or Culture?

The above statements imply that, in spite of their currency, the representations of the U.S. as a country oriented towards the future need some reconsideration. In the early stages of the U.S. history the emphasis on "the tradition of progress that seems absolutely central to the community's evolution,"[15] was a response to the former visions of America as a land of natural cataclysms resulting in large-scale degeneration. In *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1787) Thomas Jefferson rejected the theories of the

[11] Loewenthal, *The Past Is A Foreign Country*, 115.
[12] Loewenthal, *The Past Is A Foreign Country*, 119.
[13] Loewenthal, *The Past Is A Foreign Country*, 120.
[14] Loewenthal, *The Past Is A Foreign Country*, 121.
[15] Michael Kamen, *Mystic Words of Memory* (New York: Knopf, 1991) 14.

French Enlightenment (represented by Buffon) that America was a land of a permanent regress where neither biological evolution nor social organization could proceed to higher perfection. With the arrival of Romanticism this simple binary opposition (progress vs. regress) was modified, if not neutralized, by the representations of America as a land of ruins and magnificent natural sceneries. In his *Researches* (1814) Alexander von Humboldt published the etchings of Mexican and Peruvian ruins along with picturesque representations of American landscapes. Searching for similar patterns in natural and cultural—chiefly architectural—structures he was quite explicit about the aim of his research. While in the Old World, the ruins of ancient civilizations flourishing before the Greeks and the Romans belonged to a very remote past, America was providing excellent structural equivalents of the oldest ruins which were of much later date. According to Humboldt, Mexican temples with their "shapeless idols" almost corresponded to "the most ancient monuments on the banks of the Euphrates," but, at the same time "belong[ed] to times so near to our own."[16] In other words, Humboldt saw the monuments of Mesoamerican Indians as a structural device making the originary past of the human species present in the modern times.

Some extreme aspects of Humboldt's theories can be found in a haphazard antiquarianism of Josiah Priest. His book, *American Antiquities and Discoveries in the West* was published in Albany, N.Y. in 1833. Priest focuses on "the ages preceding the discovery of America by Columbus," and continues:

> here are the wrecks of empire whose beginnings are older than any of these [pyramids or ruinous cities of the Old World], the mounds and the works of the West towering aloft as if their builders were preparing against another flood.[17]

Priest contends that all types of Old World ruins can be found in North America: the remains of a Roman *castrum* allegedly discovered near Marietta, Ohio,[18] and the vestiges of ancient cities with "pyramids" on the Mississippi.[19] The copiousness and diversity of the monuments described by Priest gives the

[16] Alexander von Humboldt, *Researches Concerning the Institutions and Monuments of the Ancient Inhabitants of America*..., trans. Helen Maria Williams (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme & Brown, J. Murray & H. Colburn, 1814) 1:38, 101.

[17] Josiah Priest, *American Antiquities and Discoveries in the West* (Albany, N.Y.: Hoffmann and White, 1833) iii.

[18] Priest, *American Antiquities*, 42-55.

[19] Priest, *American Antiquities*, 187-88: "With respect to the stages, or landing places of these pyramids, we are reminded of the tower once standing in old Babylon, which had eight stages from its base to the summit, making it six hundred feet high."

impression of a cabinet of curiosities, but, at the same time, one is clearly aware of the central purpose of the book, which is to demonstrate the richness of American past. In contrast to those who described America as a land of natural and historical cataclysms Priest seems to reclaim all the ancient cultures—the Greeks, Romans, Babylonians, Hebrews, Celts, Vikings, and even "the lost ten tribes of Israel"[20]—for the U.S. history. In this way, he converts the past of the Old World into a cultural capital working for the future of the New World.

An example of the orientation of the U.S. sense of history towards the past, which is much more problematic than Priest's antiquarianism, is the landscape painting and essays of Thomas Cole. Cole who studied landscape details (especially the rugged, gnarled trunks of trees) and the subtleties of landscape representations in the 1820s (such as tonal gradation, aerial perspective, or palettes for various types of light and atmosphere in the landscape) was also influenced by the late eighteenth-century English theories of the picturesque, especially by the notions of Uvedale Price. While in Britain the picturesque was identified—as Alan Wallach shows—with the state of land untouched by modernization,[21] in Cole's early paintings of American wilderness, especially in the famous *Lake with Dead Trees in the Catskill Mountains* (1825), it is the ruggedness of American nature that bears the imprint of time immemorial. In his later journal entry of July 6, 1835, Cole is quite explicit. While the ruins of European cultures have become since Lorrain, Poussin, and, above all, Salvatore Rosa, the clichés of European landscape painting, "all nature here [i.e., in America] is new to art [...] virgin forests, lakes and waterfalls feast the eye with new delights [...] because they have been preserved untouched from the time of creation [...]."[22] It is interesting to notice that Cole's notes on European ruins accentuate the same features. Cole's description of the Colloseum is rather telling: "it looks more like a work of nature than of art [...], and the luxuriant herbiage completes the illusion."[23] One of

[20] Priest, *American Antiquities*, 55.

[21] Alan Wallach, "Thomas Cole: Landscape and the Course of American Empire," in *Thomas Cole: Landscape into History*, ed. William H. Truettner and Alan Wallach (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994) 30. In the opening part of his *Essay on the Picturesque*... (1796) Price argues against the modernization of the landscape garden design represented by the work of Lancelot (Capability) Brown destroying two main features of the picturesque, "variety" and "intricacy" including ageing and "decay" (Uvedale Price, *On the Picturesque*, Otley, Washington, D.C.: Woodstock Books, 2000) 25, 32.

[22] Quoted in Wallach, "Thomas Cole," 51.

[23] Thomas Cole's notes on the Colloseum of May 1832 quoted in Louis Legrand Noble, *The Life and Works of Sir Thomas Cole* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, 1964)

Cole scholars, Matthew Baigell, pushes this parallel between wild nature and European ruins even further, stressing the essential correspondence of the "cosmic dimensions" in Cole's representations of American spaces and his pictures of the monuments of European past. Baigell's comment on Cole's painting called *The Roman Aqueduct* (1832) is worth quoting:

> like the pathless, endless American forest the aqueduct continues beyond the picture space back into history. [...] Spatial contrast is here substituted for a temporal contrast, the immensity of time, substituting for the immensity of American space.[24]

However, Cole's glorifications of American nature can also be interpreted in a different key, stressing the value of the nature as a *preceding* and *remote, primordial* American past. David Loewenthal shows that "precedence" and "remoteness" establish the value of the past as "antiquity" that existed before the remembered and sometimes even recorded history.[25] In the nineteenth-century America it was common to dismiss European history as a tale of violence and barbarism "the echo of roofs that a few centuries since rung with barbaric revels," and give preference "to the silence which has reigned in these dim groves since the first Creation."[26]

In his "Essay on American Scenery" (1836) Cole rejects the analogies made between Roman ruins and American nature, and his rejection is based on the familiar ideological pattern: as a land of the future and of freedom, America does not need any "ruined tower to tell of outrage," nor any "gorgeous temple to speak of ostentation."[27] Nonetheless, Cole's refusal was not consistent enough: in the same essay Cole insisted that "American scenes [we]re not destitute of historical and legendary associations,"[28] and even pointed out the possibility of the intensification of the sense of the past in the contemplation of American sceneries:

> He who stands on Mont Albano and looks down on ancient Rome, has his mind peopled with gigantic associations of the storied past; but he who stands on the mounds of the West, the most venerable remains of American antiquity, may experience the emotion of the sublime, but it is the sublimity of the shoreless Ocean un-islanded by the recorded deeds of man.[29]

[24] Matthew Baigell, *Thomas Cole* (New York: Watson Guptill Publications, 1981) 66.
[25] Loewenthal, *The Past Is A Foreign Country*, 52-53.
[26] Charles Fenno Hoffman, *A Winter in the West. By a New Yorker* (New York: Harper and Bothers, 1835) 1:196.
[27] Thomas Cole, *The Collected Essays and Prose Sketches*, ed. Marshall Tynan (St. Paul, Minnesota: The Collett Press, 1980) 11.
[28] Cole, *The Collected Essays*, 15.
[29] *The Collected Essays*, 16.

In this passage, another effect of the U.S. relationship to the past is clearly evident: the past is no longer separated from the present, but from the history of the Old World. Even this is not a period at the end of Cole's message.

In the famous cycle of five allegorical land—and townscapes, the *Course of the Empire* (1834-36), Cole—in Wallach's words—"recombined landscape and history themes" to rehearse "the seemingly inevitable fall of a garish, materialistic civilization, passing from pastoral calm to terrifying ruin."[30] As early as 1955 Perry Miller connected this theme with the fears of the technological nature and inevitable decay of American civilization ("[t]he suspicion that we are being carried on some massive conveyor belt, such as Cole's 'Course of Empire,' is hard to down"[31]). It can be argued that Cole's Empire Cycle has still wider resonance. The motto of the cycle is taken from Stanza 108 of the fourth canto of Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* claiming that history, which "is the same rehearsal of the past," has but "one page" that is "better written in ruins."[32] From this we may infer that Cole's ruins are proleptic by the sheer way of showing the future of America as "the same rehearsal of the past." Thus, the past in Cole's allegorical representations of ruins is not, in fact, separated from history. Instead, a spectral effect is created: the final destruction of the empire is coming from the future in the semblance of the perennial materiality of the wild American nature. The once busy and populous capital city has sunk into "wild, depopulated nature" and the isolated column in the foreground stands "amidst the encroaching waters"[33] like a trunk of a dead tree. This spectrality of ruins and of the past in general is intensified in modern and postmodern reflections.

In an essay entitled "The Necessity for Ruins," John Brinckerhoff Jackson argues that for the modern American attitudes to history the relationship to ruins nourished by the aesthetic of the picturesque is no longer important. The aura of the originary past has yielded to "the preservation of the reminders of a bygone existence and its environment."[34] People prefer material monuments enacting or representing a chronicle of everyday life. In this way, future prosperity of a small midwestern town may

[30] Wallach, "Thomas Cole," 19.

[31] Perry Miller, *Errand into the Wilderness* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), 216. The original essay entitled "Nature and the National Ego" was published in 1955.

[32] Lord Byron, *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, IV,108, 965, 970, in *The Complete Poetical Works*, ed. Jerome J. McGann (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) 2:160.

[33] Wallach, "Thomas Cole," 92.

[34] John Brinckerhoff Jackson, "The Necessity of Ruins," in *The Necessity of Ruins and Other Topics* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980) 90.

depend on creating a spectral effect, or a simulacrum of the past, a fake pioneer village, for instance, or a parade in supposedly historical costumes, to attract people from far off. In this way, Jackson argues, historical memory is being replaced with "the historical-theatrical make-believe"[35] which may cover-up another, more disturbing spectrality, the ghastliness of ghost towns. Is this, as Jackson claims, "the end of history,"[36] or the end of culture? Or does all this invention of the past give the present generation an opportunity to reflect on their own identity, in order to see "the revised past" altering it?[37]

The Quasi-Religious Meaning and Subversivity of Ruins: Europe vs. America?

Prior to answering these questions, some important theoretical aspects of European and American representations of ruins have to be discussed. It appears that most European accounts of ruins stress different temporal and existential aspects of historical time than the traditional U.S. notions of the past. Instead of separating the past from the present and launching the latter into the battle for the future, European representations of ruins establish a close link between all the three phases of time:

> our imagination paints the buildings we now inhabit in ruins. [...] We are the last people of an extinct nation. The yet unwritten poetics of ruins may begin somehow like this.[38]

The connection implied in the quoted passage (from Denis Diderot's review of Hubert Robert's painting *Ruined Triumphal Arch and Other Monuments*, 1767) does not depend on a continuity of linear time nor on any notion of totality or closure of history. On the contrary, it is made possible by the openness of historical time. This openness means the uncertainty or loss of the *telos* of history and later also of the aim of individual existence (for instance, in Canto IV of Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*). Nevertheless, similar approaches to the past can now be found even in the U.S. For instance, a Colorado author, Reg Saner, writes in his book of essays *Reaching Keet Steel: Ruin's Echo and the Anasazi* (1998)

[35] Jackson, "The Necessity of Ruins," 102.
[36] Jackson, "The Necessity of Ruins," 102.
[37] Loewenthal, *The Past Is A Foreign Country*, 411.
[38] Denis Diderot, *Salon de 1767* "Hubert Robert. Tableaux. Ruine d'un arc de triomphe et autres monuments":"notre imagination disperse sur la terre les édifices mêmes que nous habitons. [...] Nous restons seuls de toute une nation qui n'est plus; et voilà la première ligne de la poétique des ruines." In: *Œuvres Esthétiques*, ed. Paul Vernière (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1959) 641 (translated by the author).

about "a complete reversal" in the attitude to the desert landscapes and the ruins of Indian settlements claiming that we are no longer conquering deserts but the empty desert landscape, in fact, "chooses us," to become its inhabitants, and that "through Anasazi vestiges we perhaps pay our respects to what is missing in us thus honoring the ancient ones."[39]

Thus, the past searched for in European, and recently also American, ruins is a trace exercising a considerable power. Though the past world has sunk into oblivion, our relation to its relics persists and has a quasi-religious nature, since it refers us to something as inaccessible as the Christian God. This quasi-religious relationship is characterized in a monologue of the protagonist of Byron's *Manfred* recapitulating his experience from the contemplation of the ruins of the Colloseum:

> the place
> Became religion, and the heart ran o'er
> With silent worship of the great of old!—
> The dead but sceptered sovereigns, who still rule
> Our spirits from their urns.—[40]

In contrast to religious belief, this dissymetrical power relation[41] precludes any revelation. Instead, the contemplating gaze meets mere illusions, ghosts or spectres. Therefore the themes of sacredness, desecration and transgression in European discourses of ruins are modified in comparison to religious texts. A significant modification occurs in Diderot's commentary on another painting in the Salon of 1767 where the mood in which ruins are contemplated is characterized as "sweet melancholy" leading to seduction and the transgression of moral laws.[42]

Because of their quasi-religious connection with the past ruins are, like cemeteries, "other places," *heterotopias*. According to Foucault, heterotopias "are most often connected with sequences of time, which means that they are open to what could be [...]

[39] Reg Saner, *Reaching Keet Steel: Ruin's Echo and the Anasazi* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988) 10, 91.

[40] Lord Byron, *Manfred*, III.IV.37-41. *The Complete Poetical Works,* ed. Jerome J. McGann (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 4: 98.

[41] See Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death,* trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) especially chs. 1 and 3.

[42] Diderot, *Salon de 1767*. "Hubert Robert. Tableaux. Ruine d'un arc de triomphe et autres monuments": "L'effet de ces compositions, bonnes ou mauvaises, c'est de vous laisser dans une douce mélancolie." "Hubert Robert. Tableaux. Grande galerie éclairée du fond": "Sous ces arcades obscures, la pudeur serait moins forte dans une femme honnête; l'entreprise d'un amant tendre et timide, plus vive et plus courageuse. Nous aimons, sans nous en douter, tout ce qui nous livre à nos penchants, nous séduit et excuse notre faiblesse." *Œuvres Esthétiques*, 641, 644-45.

called *heterochronia*. Heterotopia starts to function fully only when one gets into conflict with traditional time." The nature of heterochronia is derived from "the loss of life, a quasi-eternity whose permanent effects are decay and disappearance."[43] In this heterochronia, the past, present and the future are interchangeable, and the "quasi-eternity" is never closed by a teleological pattern, be it revolutionary ideology, supreme divine design, or even both, as in the case of American utopias. In other words, the heterotopia (and heterochronia) of ruins may not be a mere sign of a nostalgia for the past. They may also be read as *an ironical, subversive figure*, opposed not only to the religious notions of eternity, revolutionary notions of "new age," utopian ideas of the "new world," but also to any revelations of historical truth (the ruin as a 'stage,' or a 'theatrum mundi,' or just a historical show).

Returning now briefly to Hawthorne's tale "Old Esther Dudley" discussed at the beginning of this chapter we can see that the uneasiness implied in dealing with the heterotopia and heterochronia of the old Province House (symbolically separated from *Washington Street* by a line of stores and keeping the atmosphere of colonial times) is foregrounded in the confrontation of the representative of the American ideology with the old royalist woman who lives in the past. The subversivity is heightened by the absence of the quasi-religious relationship to the past, and the working of *modern power* vested in ideological discourse is revealed in all its absurdity.

The Demise of Power: Ghost Towns instead of Ruins?

Before discussing the hypothesis of subversivity in greater detail, another feature of American ruins must be mentioned: the ghost town as the witness of the failure of colonization, or, later, of the mere exploitative nature of the settlement. Surprisingly enough, the literature on U.S. ghost towns is quite rich. It started to appear as early as the 1930s, and includes fiction (e.g., novels by Wright Morris—*The Fork River Space* Project, 1993—or by Robert Coover—*Ghost Town*, 1998), tourist guides or maps, travelogues and essays of regional writers, as well as full-length academic monographs, such as Joseph V. Hickey's interesting history of "ghost settlement on the prairie" dealing with the eight decades of

[43] Michel Foucault, "Des espaces autres," (1967), *Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité* 5 (Octobre 1984): 47.

the existence of a Kansas "post-office settlement" called Thurman.[44]

An amateur Kansas historian, Daniel Fitzgerald, the author of a remarkable three volume compendium *Ghost Towns of Kansas*,[45] distinguishes several types of ghost towns. All of them have much to do with economic or technological progress, as well as recession, or in some cases, local or nationwide political conflicts. Fitzgerald labels ghost-towns as "boom towns," "agriculture towns," "mining towns," "trail towns," "railhead towns," "county seat towns," and—what is specific of the local history of Kansas—the so-called "Free-State towns" or "Pro-Slavery towns," i.e., towns destroyed or deserted during the fights for the future status of the Territory of Kansas (1856-60). To Fitzgerald's classification another category can be added, namely former "canal towns," whose death has been caused by the substitution of the canal network by railroads. These ghost towns exist for instance in the northwestern Ohio along the Erie-Miami canal. The most interesting categories are ghost towns built as resorts, whose reputation was based on an allegedly medicinal virtue of local water springs, or the so called "paper towns" that existed only in the stage of blueprints used by clever contractors to cheat gullible Eastern investors out of large sums of money.

If ghost towns were not mere hoaxes, their decline was most often caused by natural, economic or political factors, such as the exhaustion of gold or mineral sources, indebtedness, new developments in farming technologies, a failure to attract a railroad or to become seats of county government. Fitzgerald's straightforward comment returns us to the already discussed teleological scheme of U.S. history: "The killer of agriculture towns is progress [...], you either keep going or die."[46] This is repeated, in a somewhat more cultivated way, by William F. Robinson, the author of *Abandoned New England*,[47] a study on ruins and ghost towns recording the impact of the settlement of the Midwest on New England's economy and landscape. Robinson points out the loss of purpose of buildings and technological equipment ("they served their purpose and were discarded"), and looks back—one could say almost to the Founding Fathers—for the explanation:

[44] Joseph V. Hickey, *Ghost Settlement on the Prairie: A Biography of Thurman, KS* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995).

[45] Daniel Fitzgerald, *Ghost Towns of Kansas*, vol. 1-3, 1976, 1979, 1982 (bound offset print). Published in one volume in 1988 by the University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, KS.

[46] Fitzgerald, *Ghost Towns of Kansas*, 1:37.

[47] Boston: The N.Y. Graphic Society, 1976.

> Human nature dictates that time must distance us from the days of their use, and uniqueness of the few must arise from the wholesale destruction of the many. [...] Only scarcity of these relics will make them worth preserving. They become a part of the heritage.[48]

What is interesting in Robinson's argument is not only the recourse to the category of "human nature" which seems to be interpreted—very much in the eighteenth-century way—as the universal law of history, but also the emphasis on the transformation of ghost towns and remains of technological equipment into "the heritage" by the sheer fact of their disappearance and resulting scarcity. Significantly, this is not what happens to ghost towns. Despite their great numbers in certain regions they are being preserved, restored or built anew to attract tourists. In many cases, this is no mere preservation but an economically motivated activity.

It is very difficult to find the origins of the term ghost-town, no American dictionary gives the date of its first use. We can only speculate that the term is somehow connected with the excess and collapse of boomerism, and could have appeared as early as in the 1860s with the death of the first mining camps and cities in the Sacramento valley and the trail camps and pro-slavery towns on the prairies.[49] From its first appearance the term is of a metaphorical nature: it is based on an analogy between the dying of an individual and of the community. The metaphor does not emphasize materiality or ideality but spectrality and liminality. Lambert Florin in *Western Ghost Town Shadows*[50] makes this quite explicit. He divides ghost-towns into three categories: "very dead," "not-so dead," and "lively." The "most satisfying" ghost towns are those of the second category,[51] that is, those who create a genuine spectral effect, a semblance of life in the vestige of an incipient decay. This also implies another important feature of ghost towns' existence: tottering between trash and curiosity, refuse and monument.

[48] Robinson, *Abandoned New England*, 167.

[49] Despite the early occurrence of extinct towns, already mentioned in Mark Twain's Western travelogue *Roughing It* (1871), the first use of the term "ghost city" is documented as late as September 1915, "when *Saturday Evening Post* author Charles Van Loan used that term to describe Bodie." The term "ghost town" prevailed even later, in 1922, together with a nostalgic representation of these communities as "paragons of Western virtue," the places where the "miner's law" was the "best law." See Didia Delyser, "'Good, by God, We're Going to Bodie!': Ghost Towns and the American West," in Gary J. Hausladen (ed.), *Western Places, American Myths: How We Think about the West* (Reno and Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 2003) 278, 280.

[50] Seattle: Superior Publishing Co., 1964.

[51] Florin, *Western Ghost Town Shadows*, 6-7.

Ghosts at the Origin

Although ghost towns seem relatively recent products of American civilization, we may be surprised to find them at the very outset of North-American writing: in John White's journal of 1587 describing the search for the fifteen men left in the first settlement on the island Roanoke, and again in White's report of his fifth voyage to America (in 1590) published by Richard Hakluyt in the second edition of *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques & Discoveries of the English Nation* (1598-1600). John White is well known as the governor of the second Roanoke colony and the author of many drawings documenting the life of local Indians.

White's accounts should be read along with the text of Thomas Harriot published in 1588 under the title *A Brief and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia.* Harriot, a prominent scientist of the time, tries to make up for all failures of the Roanoke scheme. He emphasizes the extraordinary fertility of the land and the technological advantage of European civilization over the Indians. To conquer this earthly paradise[52] the colonists should only persuade the natives by their technology and reasoning that the Christian God was omnipotent and that they were his chosen people sharing his divine power (*L* 270-72). Stephen Greenblatt has explained the subversive power of this scheme which consisted of the imposition of the religion on others merely for the *secular* sake of the survival of the settlers and the further development of colonial power.[53]

Though Harriot might have succeeded in "the testing upon the bodies and minds of non-Europeans [...] of a hypothesis about the origin and nature of European culture and belief,"[54] the power strategy suggested by him remained utopian. The real subversion was never contained in the power structure outlined by Harriot (and theorized by Greenblatt) but in the contemporary reports of John White, describing the first and the second Roanoke colonies as ghost-towns from which the settlers mysteriously disappeared.

While in the first report (in the Journal of 1587) the search for the settlers and the investigation of the causes of their

[52] Harriot himself does not use the word "paradise" for the description of the colonized land. But the expression occurs in the anonymous report on Sir Richard Grenville's voyage to the first Roanoke colony in 1586: "this paradise of the world." All reports on Roanoke are quoted from Stefan Lorant (ed.), *The New World. The First Pictures of America* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1965). The quote is from p. 152. Further page references appear in the text in parentheses prefixed by *L*.

[53] Stephen Greenblatt, "Invisible Bullets," in Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield, eds., *Political Shakespeare* (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1985) 23-27; also in *Shakespearean Negotiations. The Circulation of Social Energy in Shakespeare's England* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988) 32-35.

[54] Greenblatt, "Invisible Bullets," 22.

disappearance are successful, in the second report (printed in Hakluyt's volume) the population of more than a hundred colonists, including women and even babies vanishes without a trace.[55] The information system invented by the settlers for the sake of emergency fails.[56] The only things found in the deserted fort are the remnants of "superior technology": "some iron bars, four iron fowling guns, iron cannon shot, and other heavy things" (*L* 176).

These features reinforce the subversive power of White's account in the context of the early utopian discourse of the New World. The new Eden is difficult to conquer despite the deployment of technology and military power, despite the excesses of violence and insidiousness of treachery. According to an anonymous report from Sir Richard Grenville's voyage of 1586 the colonists were so scared of their own atrocities that "they abandoned all their goods in the greatest confusion and raced to the boats [sent by the homeward-bound ship of Sir Francis Drake] as if a mighty army was on their heels" (*L* 151). The writer then imagines that "God Himself stretched his hand against them because of the cruelties and outrages they had committed against the natives" (*L* 152).

In later accounts of ghost-towns the demise of technological power often becomes a crude fact, unredeemed by divine intervention. Hence, it is not only the degree of dilapidation that distinguishes a ruin from a ghost-town, but also the absence of the quasi-religious relationship to the past and increased subversivity implied in the demise of western civilization and its power over the Indians. Yet this subversivity gets easily translated into harmless pop-culture categories of macabre or ludicrous, making the decline of the settlement "satisfying," that is, ready for consumption. Only some writers, for instance Wright Morris in *Fork River Space Project*,[57] notice the otherness of ghost towns existing sometimes a few miles from busy shopping malls.[58] Instead of reducing the otherness of American ghost towns to their status of material objects or popular culture representations, the following section will deal with their emergence as discursive objects in American literature.

[55] According to Myra Jehlen ("The Papers of Empire," in *The Cambridge History of American Literature, vol .1 1590-1820*, ed. Sacvan Bercovitch and Cyrus R. K.Patell [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994] 30), "the [...] colony met with a catastrophic event, to this day unknown."

[56] In the event of emergency, the colonists should cut the name of the place they have moved to in the bark of the trees of which the palisade of their fort was built and add a cross as a sign of distress.

[57] In *Three Easy Pieces* (Santa Rosa, CA.: Black Sparrow Press, 1993).

[58] See Morris, *Fork River Space Project*, 37.

Colonial Ruins: the End of History as the End of Warfare?

Hawthorne's sketch "Old Ticonderoga," published in 1836 in the *American Monthly Magazine* (and collected in 1852 in *Snow Image and Other Twice-told Tales*) is quite a rare work of American Romanticism since it contains a fully developed meditation on ruins in the New World. Other American romantics, for instance J.F. Cooper, mention or even briefly describe ruinous colonial fortresses (e.g., Fort William Henry at the beginning of Chapter 16 of *The Last of the Mohicans,* 1826), but their texts never feature ruins as a major theme. Another difference consists in the fact that Hawthorne—like many European romantics—connects the reflections on Fort Ticonderoga with a more general representation of historic events: the sketch has a subtitle "A Picture of the Past."

Indeed, Hawthorne seems to treat the ruins of the colonial fort mainly as a background for his evocation of different wars of the past, including the famous siege in October 1775 when the two militia corps, the "Green Mountains Boys" of Vermont (led by Ethan Allen) and the Massachusetts volunteers led by Benedict Arnold, had succeeded in capturing it and seizing sixty cannons which were later used in the siege of Boston. But the imaginative recreation of the past is not the most important aspect of this sketch.

Old Ticonderoga is contemplated chiefly as "a place of ancient strength" (*H* 386) and its history, imagined by the narrator is the tale of a demise of military power. Romantic irony that permeates the pictures of historical events distances them from the present. Military glamour is also ironized in the emphasis on the absence of any quasi-religious relation to the past. Dead military chiefs are transformed into a crowd of spectres in the imagined narrative of an old veteran:

> A survivor of the long-disbanded garrisons […] might have mustered his dead chiefs and comrades—some from Westminster Abbey and English churchyards, and battlefields in Europe—others from their graves here in America—others, not a few, who lie sleeping round the fortress; he might have mustered them all, and bid them march through the ruined gateway, turning their old historic faces on me as they passed. (*H* 386)

The bizarreness of the image consists in the interplay of the figurative and literal meanings of the verb "muster." The imaginary old veteran *metaphorically* musters his commanders and comrades in his narrative but his mustering implies also the subversion of military hierarchy: a former private commands his superiors to march in front of the fictitious narrator standing like a general at a military parade. Contrary to the "dead but sceptered sovereigns" of

Byron's *Manfred* these spectres cannot reign: they only turn "their old historic faces" (*H* 386) as they march past the narrator, as soldiers on parade must do. A ghastly military machine created (and subverted) by romantic imagination has replaced the quasi-religious relation to the past. Hawthorne's sketch of "a place of ancient strength" thus tells more of the demise of military power than of the glories of revolutionary history.

Yet the description of the fortress reminds us of European romantic accounts of ruins. The beauty of nature seems to be much more powerful than military architecture, and the profuse growth of vegetation wipes out the marks of decay as well as all harsh traits of army life:

> There were a few particles of plastering near the chimney, scratched with rude fingers, perhaps by a soldier's hand. A most luxuriant crop of weeds had sprung up within the edifice and hid the scattered fragments of the wall. Some spicy herb diffused a pleasant odor through the ruin. (*H* 387)

Even the evocation of historic events which follows after this prelude, starts very much in the romantic way: "a dream-like glance" of the solitary narrator is cast "over the pictures of the past" (*H* 387). All seems to be the work of imagination inspired by natural growth and fragrance. No wonder that a wild bee that "found much sweetness among the weeds" (*H* 387) becomes a metaphor of the narrator's playful imagination.

Nonetheless, as we have already seen, instead of establishing the quasi-religious relationship to the imaginary scenes of the past, the play of the narrator's imagination distances these events by means of romantic irony. The narrator cannot picture any battle-scenes, being "at a loss how to order a battle." The imaginary scene from the British barracks vanishes "in a puff of smoke from the chimney." Not even the revolutionaries and their ideology are saved from irony: Ethan Allen's exclamation "In the name of the great Jehovah and of the Continental Congress!" summoning the British garrison to surrender is commented on by the enemy commander: "Strange allies! thought the British captain." (*H* 388) And in the last scene from the British siege in 1777 under the command of John Burgoyne the disordered powers of the new republic are mocked:

> Forth rushed the motley throng from the barracks, one man wearing the blue and buff of the Union, another the red coat of Britain, a third a dragoon's jacket, and a fourth a cotton frock; here was a pair of leather breeches, and striped trowsers there; a grenadier's cap on the head and a broad-brimmed hat, with a tall feather on the

> next; this fellow shouldering a king's arm, that might throw a bullet to Crown Point, and his comrade a long fowling piece, admirable to shoot ducks on the lake. (*H* 389)

The fragmented description of the patriotic army deliberately confuses the identification signs of the two warring parties. Thus, one of the important battles of the revolutionary war fought between Mount Defiance and Mount Independence ("familiar to all Americans in history"; *H* 385) is distanced as a dance of buffoons.

However, in the last paragraph the subversion connected with the heterotopia and heterochronia of the ruin is neutralized. The past connected with a faltering military machine is definitely separated from the peaceful, progressive and prosperous present in which no wars can happen. The narrator is awakened from his reverie by the bell of the steamboat Franklin. He immediately notices the ordered nature of the landscape: "The whole country was a cultivated farm." The insecure sway of wars over the spot struggled for by three nations has been replaced by the unwavering peace based on the legal power of private property. The "neat villa" of the owner of the fortress stands "within a musket shot of the ramparts." The subversive potential of romantic irony and of the heterotopia of the ruins is thus finally contained in the affirmation of the present power structure. This gesture is made with the certainty of the end of history which has come together with the end of warfare: "Banner will never wave again, nor cannon roar, nor blood be shed [...] in this old fort of Ticonderoga." (*H* 389)

In Hawthorne's sketch, romantic idealization and irony combine in order to efface the harsh, ghost-town features of the ruinous colonial fortress. The demise of military power is connected with the failure of the mathematical rationality of modern Western thought. Indeed, the narrative strategy at the beginning of the sketch contrasts "poetry that has clustered round" the "decay" of the building with "a description [...] as accurate as a geometrical theorem" given to the narrator by a young West Point graduate of "a great military genius" who showed him through for the first time (*H* 385-386). While the young, brilliant officer is sensitive only to the abstract and strategic meanings of the fortification as a closed structure based on binary relations ("defence within defence, wall opposed to wall, and ditch intersecting ditch," *H* 385), the narrator searches for quite different poetical meanings, which, however, cannot be found since the text does not establish a quasi-religious relationship of the place with the past. Despite the romantic idealization of its ruins, Ticonderoga is ironically distanced as a locus of military power, a historical monument of military strategy,

and even as a theatre of historic events. Moreover, the sought-after poetry of nature and human heart is also subverted with a surprising celebration of the neatness of private property at the end. Not even the heroic implications of the names Mount Defiance and Mount Independence are saved from ironizing. The historicity of the place is dissolved, and the only 'positive' value—the peacefulness of private property—can be projected onto the future.

The Demise of Eschatology and Utopia:
Ghost-town as Quasi-Eternity

In later Hawthorne's works, as for instance in the tale "The New Adam and Eve" (1843; collected in 1846 in *Mosses from an Old Manse* and inspired by the prophecies of Father Miller, who expected that the Last Judgement would come between March 1843 and March 1844), the projection of 'positive' values onto the future is even less successful. The heroes, newly created parents of future humanity, walk through the streets of Boston depopulated by recent eschatological events. What they see testifies to the colossal demise of Western civilization: most buildings and things which the former inhabitants left behind, including money, appear completely useless and meaningless to the new people, like heaps of rubbish. With no great simplification we can say that the new Adam and Eve experience the whole place as a ghost-town.

Yet they are no disinterested observers, being dimly sensitive to the appeal of individual monuments, places, or objects. Their sensitivity, however, reveals the futility of history, since the new Adam and Eve are seduced to repeat old civilizational patterns. Fascinated with printed pages in the deserted library of Harvard University Adam seems to be very close to discovering that, but the narrator still hopes in the ability of the new race to create new things and produce "a melody never yet heard on earth, and intellectual forms unbreathed upon by our conceptions" (*H* 762). Despite these expectations, the history *will* repeat itself even though Adam is led by his spouse out of the reading room "to talk with one another, and the green earth, and its trees and flowers," and the library roof will eventually "crumble down upon the whole" of accumulated knowledge. Even the destruction of the library will not prevent the ghost-town from exercising its weird influence on the new race. The "second Adam's descendants" will collect "as much rubbish of their own" (*H* 762) as the extinct humanity, so that the age of archaeology searching of the sense of the past may begin anew.

The ghost-town as the evidence of the demise of power looms large in Hawthorne's American utopia. It represents a quasi-eternity

as an ideological, political or technological closure depriving history of its openness and indeterminacy[59] and excluding even any quasi-religious relationship to the past. The Harvard library will become ruinous, but only in order to seal off the cumulative record of human errors in "the *already* abortive experiment of life" (*H* 761). Under the spell of ghost-town, ruins are exorcized to testify to the moral condition of the present time.

Ruins in *Moby Dick*: Breaking the Ghost-town Spell?

In the chapter that bears the same title as the novel, readers are invited to explore the "larger, darker, deeper part"[60] of Captain Ahab's character. What is hidden behind the surface appearance of Ahab's "monomania"? The answer is most surprising. Melville first uses the metaphor of French late Gothic architecture (L'Hôtel de Cluny in Paris) to describe the basic tension in the character of the main hero, "his great natural intellect" that became a "living instrument" of his "special madness" (*M* 161). But this metaphor does not suffice. Under the Gothic structure there is a vast subterraneous vault hiding the ruins of ancient Roman baths. These ruins are at the origin of all the greatness of the human species, at "[man's] root of grandeur" (*M* 161). They, however, are no mere figures of what, according to Derrida, "happens to the image from the moment of the first gaze"[61] They metaphorize not only the decay of anti-democratic powers, namely romantic individualism, pride and exclusiveness ("that proud, sad king! [...] he did beget ye, ye young exiled royalties" *M* 161), but also, and predominantly, the destructive and corrupt nature of power in general ("the old State secret" *M* 161). This dilapidated 'essence' of Ahab, or rather, the *difference* between individual fragments no longer belonging to any wholeness ("an antique buried beneath antiquities") has to bear patiently, "like a Caryatid," "the piled entablatures of ages" (*M* 161). The impersonal, age-old power structure is stronger than the character of the defiant individual.[62] Moreover, the ruinous

[59] See also a posthumously published tale by Mark Twain, *The Voyage of Captain Stormfield to Heaven*, and his, likewise posthumous, *Letters from the Earth* (1962). In both tales, the Heaven is represented as a quasi-eternity devoid of any religious relationships where only boring ceremonies and rituals take place.

[60] Herman Melville, *Moby Dick*, ed. Harrison Hayford and Hershel Parker (New York: Norton, 1967) 161. Further page references appear in the text in parentheses prefixed by *M*.

[61] Jacques Derrida, *Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins,* trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1993) 68.

[62] This passage shows the limitation of the interpretation of Ahab as a "demonical" character. See for instance Leon Howard, *Herman Melville. A Biography* (Berkeley:

'essence' of Ahab resembles the quasi-eternity of Hawthorne's ghost-town.

Because of Melville's use of European references these metaphors could be interpreted as a mere negative background to the ideals of American democracy. But there is no such simple, black-and-white contrast in *Moby Dick*. On the other hand, Ahab's self-representation emphasizes the power of technology conquering America:

> The path to my fixed purpose is laid with iron rails, whereon my soul is grooved to run. Over unsounded gorges, through the rifled hearts of mountains, under torrents' beds, unerringly I rush! (*M* 147)

It is this power of technology, which in *Moby Dick* replaces the quasi-religious power of European ruins, giving a new dimension to the discourse of ruins and fragmentation. The aim of this power is to eliminate otherness which appears to Ahab as "some unknown but still reasoning thing" that "puts forth the mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask" (*M* 144) of the ruins of empirical world, or "all visible objects" that are as "pasteboard masks" (*M* 144). This otherness implies a radical openness of the world, time, and history and its emergence is closely connected with the demise of the power of the subject, and the gaze, as well as the collapse of the totality. Ahab's "pasteboard masks" are affiliated to Derrida's originary ruins: "[t]here is nothing of the totality that is not immediately opened, pierced or bored through: the mask of this impossible self-portrait whose signatory sees himself disappearing before his own eyes the more he tries desperately to recapture himself in it."[63]

The body of the white whale is not only a facet of this mask and these ruins but also a sign of the limits of Ahab's subjectivity: a "prison wall" through which Ahab vainly hopes to break in order to conquer the otherness of the new world. Instead of this, his ship, before its final destruction, leaves behind only heaps of waste, white wrecks of the bodies of caught and 'processed' whales.

The processing of the "blanket" (the layer of whale fat under its very thin skin) is a different representation of the originary ruins

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University of California Press, 1951) 162-79. Howard points out the influence of Arbaces from Bulwer-Lytton's *The Last Days of Pompeii* and of Carlyle's Teufelsdröckh but only to show how Melville transformed "temperamental moodiness into a describable mutilation of intellect."

[63] Derrida, *Memoirs of the Blind,* 69.

contrasting the power of writing as "trace"[64] with the violent and demonic representation of technology.[65] The latter power precludes the very possibility of historical memory. It destroys peculiar marks on the whales' bodies resembling inscriptions on historic ruins both in the old and in the new world: "mysterious cyphers on the walls of pyramids" as well as "the old Indian characters chiselled on the famous hieroglyphic palisades on the banks of the Upper Mississippi" (*M* 260).

The whiteness of Moby Dick—marked by the absence of this mysterious script—is compared among others to the spectral ruins in the new world: the city of Lima, often afflicted by earthquakes is "[old] as Pizarro" but its "whiteness keeps the ruins for ever new" (*M* 167). Despite Melville's synthetic use of the figures of European and American ruins, despite the emphasis on their most general implications, the spell of ghost-town has not been broken in *Moby Dick*. But instead of the solidity of structures and objects, spectrality resides in volatile figures of language, especially in the chapter on "the whiteness of the whale."

Post-modern Ruins: Los Angeles as a Ghost Town?

In a section of *Le Mur du Pacifique* (1979), which can be read as a philosophical travelogue, Jean-François Lyotard sees Los Angeles as a shining white skin of an impenetrable female body, an "excess of whiteness" arousing male sexual desire of penetration. Moreover, he describes the city as a "capital that is not locatable,"[66] that is, which does not have a permanent location for a centre. Therefore, another—structural—metaphor of the Los Angeles area emerges in Lyotard's text: "a game of chess whose squares are drawn by its highways and forty-mile long boulevards, squares which are occupied only temporarily, as in the game" (*LR* 64). The white female body and this chessboard are the emblems of this ever-changing labyrinth which becomes "the impossible centre of the Empire (a centre which is not at the centre, but at one of the foci of an ellipse continuously stretching itself towards the West)" (*LR* 63). In this centre "there is no supreme authority, there is jointing of surfaces, white, ephemeral, labyrinthine, purposeless" (63).

[64] See, e.g. Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) 62-63.

[65] In Chapters 95 and 96 of *Moby Dick*, the processing of the whale's fat in the "try-works" is described as desecration—a black mass from which Ishmael turns in horror.

[66] Jean- François Lyotard, *Le Mur du Pacifique* (1979), quoted from Andrew Benjamin (ed.), *The Lyotard Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) 64. Further page references appear in the text in parentheses prefixed by *LR*.

The labyrinth of the white body—and of Los Angeles—is not, in Lyotard's understanding, "an intricate building." "[I]t is a power (*puissance*) of the body to undo its apparent voluminousness and to expel itself (*s'évaginer*)." Lyotard compares this self-unfolding moment to "the ruse of the fox-fish" which can turn all its organs inside out and thus vanish "under the fisherman's hands" (*LR* 64). A similar ruse seems to work, claims Lyotard, in the highway system of Los Angeles. There are exit signs pointing to nowhere: beyond "48th Street" there is no specific destination.

> At the end of the street perhaps you will find a deserted canyon ready to be developed. [...] These empty lots are like the ghost towns [...] that you meet in the desert at twilight and which frustrate your hope of ever finding a place to stop. Ghost towns by abandonment or anticipation: both belong to the vast white stretch of space that no one ever manages to occupy. Both attest to the excess of desire at the heart of whiteness, an excess of desire over time and space, an excess of potency (*puissance*) which renders every point in this continuum undecidable, which outrages every possible construction of coordinates. (*LR* 65)

In Lyotard's reflection the ghost town is no longer a ruin or a relic that can be contemplated, it is a junction and (dys)function of the traffic network which does not allow a traveller to stop. Being a metaphor of "an excess of desire over time and space" it is no longer a heterotopia or heterochronia, nor can it tell of any specific relation to the past. Nonetheless, the apparent futility of life which fills this ghost-town ("white bodies [...] run in vain on the coastal skin of California," where "journeys lead to nothing and everything leads to journeys" *LR* 65) does not seem to mark the final collapse of culture. It only demonstrates—as Roman ruins do—the vanity of the imperial effort to organize, divide, and, above all, to centralize. Vanitas vanitatum! Does the future of the western culture belong to nomads? This is what Lyotard's text seems to imply.

Epilogue: The World Trade Centre and Its Ruins

Apart from marking a new era in the U.S. and world history characterized by the global warfare against terrorism, the remains of the WTC became a symbol of numberless meanings and implications, both a nightmare and a cause of optimism. In other words, the sense of the past present in this largest ruin in the world has been entwined with the desires for and expectations of a *different* future projected onto the scene of death and destruction. A week after the disaster, Maney T. Epperson sent an e-mail message to the website which later became

www.thewtcmemorial.com. Repeating the "most motivating words" uttered during the crisis, he stressed that "We can make a difference by being optimistic [...] by not allowing our minds to be contaminated by boredom and anxiety. [...] We can choose to be a richest person alive by investing ourselves in people." In this message, the most important—apocalyptic and eschatological—meaning of the WTC ruins is clearly spelled out. The landmark of a new era, which should bring us from the egotism of capital investments to the altruism of Christian love, based on hope and self-sacrifice. Not surprisingly, Epperson added the words about Divine Providence, and the Puritan "calling": "God has called you and me to make a difference." Despite the emotional appeal of these words, one is prompted to ask: Is there really any difference between this message and the former versions of the American Dream?

Other voices heard at the same time make us aware that the apocalyptic meaning can be expressed in a much less optimistic way. What if this disaster is just a *revelation* (one meaning of the Greek word *apocalypsis*) of "the truth" that "hasn't hit us yet," wrote Kimmi Warrington, a high-school student from Pennsylvania, in one of the first poems received by the Memorial website among about 400 e-mails per day. Kimmi's response is sceptical to the possibility of changing a society haunted by violence, where, even in a school-bus, "[t]wo kids know[n] as buddies" are seen "struggling to the ground" and the ominous question offers itself: "Does one have a knife or a gun [?]." To Kimmi, the 'apocalypse' of the WTC revealed the alienated "world of today" where "nobody seems to belong" and no one is safe, where "[f]or every new house we are building / We lose something else," and where we must learn to suppress our sorrows and anxieties in order to survive: "Dry our tears today" / To live on without fear."[67] As a result, even the symbolic meaning of the WTC ruins does not mark a difference in the U.S. relationship to the past. Rather it seems to evoke the ominous shadow of the quasi-eternity, haunting some of the nineteenth century representations of American ruins.

To understand the "ambiguous" symbolic functions of the WTC (as Tess Taylor wrote in *The Architecture Week*,[68] a brief excursion must be made into the history of the buildings and the institution of World Trade Center(s). At the beginning there was a vision of prosperity and success achieved by developing a decayed urban area and spreading into the whole world. Guy F. Tozzoli, under

[67] Kim Warrington, on www.thewtcmemorial.com, visited 25 March 2002.

[68] Tess Taylor, "Rebuilding in New York," www.architectureweek.com, 68 (September 26, 2001), visited 15 April 2002.

whose leadership the World Trade Center Association, a network now connecting about 300 centres in 97 countries was established, saw the project as the chief moment in the progress of the globalization of trade and information exchange, establishing "a higher level of harmony and peace among the nations of the world," and transcending "narrow nationalism as well as ethnic and political barriers of the past."[69] Yet even before the twins were built, the symbolic function of skyscrapers as signs of prosperity and global economic power had been disputed. For instance, Richard Wright, saw skyscrapers as fragile markers of the instability of American society. In his novel *The Native Son* he wrote: "Who knows when some slight shock, disturbing the delicate balance between the social order and thirsty aspiration, shall send the skyscrapers in our cities toppling."[70] Tozzoli's and Wright's statements seem to repeat with some variations both the main apocalyptic meanings of the WTC ruins.

Designed to revitalize the neighbourhoods of Lower Manhattan,[71] the WTC was expected to bring together "the private and public entities involved in international trade." Over decades it has developed into a knot of a world-wide network of trade which, however, is not centralized. According to Tozzoli, the major function of World Trade Centers is to operate on the basis of bilateral relations: to "encourage reciprocal programs from one world trade center to another."[72]

This may be understood to imply that the major purpose of the New York WTC buildings was not economic but symbolical. They were not the administrative centre of the system but the marker of its global power. This was most eloquently expressed by their Japanese architect, Minoru Yamasaki: "because of its importance [...t]he World Trade Center should [...] become a living representation of man's belief in humanity, his need of individual dignity, his belief in the cooperation of men, and through this

[69] Guy F. Tozzoli's address at the WTCA General Assembly in Geneva (1989), quoted in "Ideology Bites," in New York's World Trade Center: A Living Archive, http://ericdarton.net, visited 15 April 2002 (now accessible under http://ericdarton.net/a_living_archive/html/ideobite.html).

[70] Richard Wright, *Native Son* (1940) (New York: HarperCollins, 1993) 469.

[71] David Rockefeller, the chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, contacted—with the help of his brother Nelson, who was the Mayor of New York—a public institution, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which helped him to locate and develop the WTC site. Cf., e.g., David Johnson and Shmuel Ross, "World Trade Center History: Magnificent buildings graced skyline," http://www.infoplease.com/spot/wtc1.html, visited 17 May 2002.

[72] "Guy F. Tozzoli's Concept," http://ericdarton.net, visited 15 April 2002 (now accessible under http://ericdarton.net/a_living_archive/html/ideobite.html).

cooperation his ability to find greatness."[73] As the monument of the combined efforts of humanity in the service of general progress, the WTC buildings have been claimed by the United States as the symbol of the supremacy of their technological civilization. Here is the official response of the Editor-in-Chief and Managing Editor of the journal *Architecture Week* published a day after the attack: "The skyscraper targets were prominent symbols of our civilization, buildings of American invention that all over the world expresses the spirit of a will to soar above the earth in creations of steel, concrete and glass."[74] Interestingly enough, one of the most prominent American architects, Frank Lloyd Wright, was very sceptical of the overinflated symbolic meaning of skyscrapers. In *The Future of Architecture* (1953, 164) he wrote: "The skyscraper's envelope is not ethical, beautiful or permanent. It is a commercial exploit or a mere expedient. It has no higher ideal of unity than commercial success."[75]

Surprisingly, one of the most interesting approaches to the symbolic meaning of the WTC buildings has pointed out that before their destruction they started to lose their business function. According to Tess Taylor, "the loss of the financial district might itself be primarily symbolic, since some analysts have been predicting the demise of the lower Manhattan financial district for some time. For years, financial firms have been moving north to midtown." and "the neighborhood of the financial district had been steadily becoming more residential. Corporate office towers, especially on such a scale, might no longer be the best fit for the place." This proleptic vision sees the destruction of the WTC as a moment preventing the emergence of the hugest ghost town that might haunt the nascent residential area. But the nostalgia for the monument has not disappeared: "Architects Gustavo Bonnevardi and John Bennett paired with artists Paul Myoda and Julian LaVerdiere to design a scheme for two laser towers 'built' of light." "Perhaps," continues Taylor, "the pale twins, shimmering as they light up the sky, will be a fitting tribute to this strange in-between time, while New Yorkers live in the presence of many ghosts."[76] To sum up: the ghastliness of the hugest ruin may become the indicator of a rupture in time which definitively despoils the New

[73] Quoted in Paul Heyer, *Architects on Architecture: New Directions in America* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1993) 194-95.

[74] Michael J. Crosbie, quoted by Kevin Matthews and B.J. Novitski, "World Trade Center Destroyed," *Architecture Week* 66 (September 12, 2001), http://www.architectureweek.com/, visited on 15 April 2002.

[75] Frank Lloyd Wright, *The Future of Architecture* (1953) (New York: Plume, 1970) 164.

[76] Taylor, "Rebuilding in New York," www.architectureweek.com, 68 (September 26, 2001), visited 15 April 2002.

World of the mythical meaning of the land of wonder and the "marvelous possessions."[77]

[77] See Stephen Greenblatt, *Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

3. Addressing the Ocean

FREEDOM AND SUBJECTIVITY IN *CHILDE HAROLD'S PILGRIMAGE* AND *MOBY DICK*

Although there are not many Byronic allusions in *Moby Dick*, one of them is important, if not crucial. It is a parody of the opening lines of Stanza 179 of Canto IV of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* which introduce the famous apostrophe of the ocean, generally understood as the climax of Byron's epic:

> Roll on, thou deep and dark blue ocean—roll!
> Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain;
> Man marks the earth with ruin—his control
> Stops with the shore;—upon the watery plain
> The wrecks are all thy deed, nor doth remain
> A shadow of man's ravage, save his own,
> When, for a moment, like a drop of rain,
> He sinks into thy depths with bubbling groan,
> Without a grave, unknell'd, uncoffin'd, and unknown.
> (IV, 179, *1603-11*)[1]

At first sight Melville's parody seems almost infantile. It destroys the pathos and rhythm of Byron's lines by substituting a compound based on a funny, onomatopoeic word, which is also a basic whaling term—"blubber," or whale fat from which whale oil is made:

> Roll on, thou deep and dark blue ocean, roll!
> Ten thousand blubber-hunters sweep over thee in vain.
> (*MD* 139)[2]

[1] All quotations from Byron's poetry follow the text of Jerome J. McGann's edition, *Lord Byron*: *The Complete Poetical Works,* 7 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980-93) [hereinafter referred to as *CPW*].

Nevertheless, Melville should not be slighted, even if he appears at his most trivial. From the immediate context of the lines it is clear that the parody is not aimed at Byron's poem but at the superficial readers of Byron and romantic poetry in general. In Melville's time, young Byronists, given to romantic contemplation and imitation of Byronic heroes, became, at least in Europe, a target of irony and satire. Even Melville's Ishmael makes it clear that these youths pursue their pleasures of imagination in the wrong place. Their activities become ridiculous compared with the dangers and economic pressures of the whaling trade. Instead of watching out for whales, these young men are "disgusted with the carking cares of earth, and seeking sentiment in tar and blubber":

> Childe Harold not unfrequently perches himself upon the mast-head of some luckless disappointed whale-ship and in moody phrase ejaculates [...]. Very often do the captains of such ships take those absent-minded young philosophers to task, upbraiding them with not feeling a sufficient "interest" in the voyage; half-hinting that they are so hopelessly lost to all honorable ambition, as that they would rather not see whales than otherwise. (*MD* 139)

Apart from contrasting the two forms of power—military in Byron's poem and economic in Melville's novel—this passage takes its irony still further, beyond Byron's refusal of human violence, wars and empires. In *Moby Dick*, philosophizing Childe Harolds are not granted freedom. They cannot escape from social pressures and keep a distance from the reality they contemplate. They are no longer dark, mysterious heroes, but mere odd, uncooperative individuals indifferent to commercial interests and jeopardizing by their behaviour the success of a business venture. Thus the seekers of freedom become enemies of the system whose major device is the freedom of enterprise.

But Melville's irony does not yet stop at this point: the odd phrase "they would rather not see whales than otherwise" does not only contrast with the romantic vision, invoked in the opening stanzas of the Third Canto of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*,[3] and the watching out for whales, necessary for the commercial success of

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[2] All quotations from *Moby Dick* and other Melville's writings follow the Norton edition by Harrison Hayford and Hershel Parker (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1967) [hereinafter referred to as *MD*]. Page numbers are in parentheses in the text.

[3] What am I? Nothing; but not so art thou,
Soul of my thought! With whom I traverse earth,
Invisible but gazing, as I glow
Mix'd with thy spirit, blended with thy birth (*CPW* II, 78; III, 6, *50-54*)
In these lines the otherness of the romantic vision is validated and assimilated by a formal dialectical device of double negation.

any whaling voyage, but it also anticipates the famous replica, "I would prefer not to," of Bartleby the Scrivener, the hero of Melville's eponymous later tale, subtitled "A Story of Wall Street" and published in 1853. Bartleby's formula of refusal, or rather "non-preference,"[4] is infectious (it is, willingly but also unwittingly, repeated by other characters), and disruptive: it not only gives the hero the chance to escape the compulsions of his job, but also the demands of human communication, and thus completely hide his inner self from the narrator of the tale and other characters.

The parody of Byron in *Moby Dick* is halfway between Childe Harold and Bartleby. It stops short of creating a non-representative character based on a verbal formula, like those in the drama of the absurd. But the narrator, the multi-faceted Ishmael, still looks back and relishes in the abuse of what he imagines to be a romantic contemplative mind:

> lulled into such an opium-like listlessness of vacant, unconscious reverie is this absent-minded youth by the blending cadence of waves with thoughts, that at last he loses his identity; takes the mystic ocean at his feet for the visible image of that deep, blue, bottomless soul, pervading mankind and nature; and every strange, half-seen, gliding, beautiful thing that eludes him; [...]. In this enchanted mood, [his] spirit ebbs away to whence it came; becomes diffused through time and space like Wickliff's sprinkled Pantheistic ashes, forming at last the part of every shore the round globe over. (*MD* 140)

This passage indicates that Ishmael may not in fact parody the conclusion of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* but rather the romantic pantheism of Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey" or of the final stanza of Coleridge's "France: an Ode." More importantly, however, Melville's text challenges the optimistic doctrine of Emerson's essays based, among others, on English romantic Pantheism. For example, in *Nature*, the romantic vision, resembling that invoked at the beginning of Canto III of *Childe Harold*, becomes an origin of the new "self-reliant" individual:

> —all mean egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eye-ball. I am nothing, I see all. The currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of God. [...] To be brothers, to be

[4] Cf. Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical* (Critique et Clinique, 1993), trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) 69.

> acquaintances,—master or servant, is then a trifle and a disturbance.[5]

It is a paradoxical feature of Emerson's argument that the complete absence of "mean egotism" is directly connected with an extreme individualism viewing all relations of the self to others as "a trifle and a disturbance." Not accidentally, this stance is mocked by Ishmael already in the first chapter of *Moby Dick* in the well-known reference to the myth of Narcissus:

> And still deeper the meaning of that story of Narcissus, who because he could not grasp the tormenting, mild image he saw in the fountain, plunged into it and was drowned. But that same image, we ourselves see in all rivers and oceans. It is the image of the ungraspable phantom of life, and this is the key to it all. (*MD* 14)

According to Ishmael, the Emersonian attitude (as well as all romantic idealisms seeing Nature as a symbol of the spiritual essence of the world that can be grasped in a vision of a contemplative individual) suffers from a delusion in which it substitutes the individual's projection onto nature, "the ungraspable phantom of life," for a true, and ultimate reality. This is all the more dangerous, since Emerson presents all his teaching as a new form of knowledge, based on the instinct and fresh experience, and unburdened by European bookish learning. What if the self-reliant attitude expresses the hopeless self-centeredness and self-love of the white race? If we consider all these aspects, Melville's Ishmael appears to be an ironic counterpart of Emersonian self-reliant man. Thus, the meaning of Byronic references in *Moby Dick* is transformed in a specifically American, Transcendentalist context which opens to other discourses than *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage.*

In this context, Ishmael ironically stresses the importance of human relations, despite the fact that they are based on authority, power and even violence threatening the life of an individual ("make me jump from spar to spar, like a grasshopper in a May meadow," *MD* 14). Even bondage and slavery are preferable to the delusions of romantic visionaries, since they may bring more authentic knowledge of human situation and the functioning of human society. Obviously, we are not invited to take Ishmael's rhetoric at face value, as the colloquial beginning of the following quote indicates. Rather, Melville's text functions as a fluid interface between a philosophical reflection on the master-slave relationship

[5] R.W. Emerson, "Nature," in *Nature and Selected Essays*, 3d edition, ed. Larzer Ziff (New York: Penguin, 1982) 39.

and a violent political discourse suffused with pro-slavery demagogy[6]:

> Who aint a slave? Tell me that. [...] [E]verybody else is one way or other served in much the same way—either in the physical or metaphysical point of view, that is; and so the universal thump is passed around, and all hands should rub each other's shoulderblades, and be content. (*MD* 15)

To this global denial of freedom Ishmael later opposes "[t]he great God Absolute! The centre and circumference of all democracy! His omnipresence [...] thou just Spirit of Equality, which hast spread one royal mantle of humanity over all my kind." (*MD* 105) Unlike in Emerson's philosophy, this ideal unity does not bind the humans to nature and the Over-soul. Rather, it refers to a new, democratic society, thus anticipating a radical vision of equality in Whitman's poetry. Yet not even this statement has a universal validity in *Moby Dick*: first, because it is an excuse for Ishmael's idealization of the poor and mean (endowing their cruel life with elevated dramatic qualities and touching "the workman's arm with some ethereal light," that is, "tragic graces" 104), and second, because it echoes the political rhetoric and struggles of Melville's time, especially the arguments used against the segregation of the Blacks in the North, and against the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.[7]

As a result, the complex relationship between *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* and *Moby Dick* cannot be explained away using a facile, ideological antithesis of 'democratic Realism' versus 'aristocratic Romanticism' and its supposed American progeny, 'self-delusive Transcendentalism.' Melville's critique of contemporary American Byronism and Transcendentalism has more specific reasons than those discussed so far.

Chapter 35 of *Moby Dick*, which contains the parody of Byron's lines, is interspersed with references to J. Ross Browne's book *Etchings of a Whaling Cruise* (1846) whose review Melville published in 1847 in the New York journal *The Literary World*. This story of a whaling voyage to the Southern Seas and of "a Sojourn on the Island of Zanzibar" was accompanied with many descriptive engravings and woodcuts. It was praised by Melville, together with

[6] According to James Duban, the passage refers to the split in the Democratic Party which produced the Free Soil Party. The conservative Democrats supporting the Fugitive Slave Law and other pro-slavery acts were called Old Hunkers and also "hunks." This is the word of abuse used by Ishmael for cruel, authoritarian captains ("old hunks," 15). See *Melville's Major Fictions* (DeKalb: Northern University of Illinois Press, 1983) 110, and Alan Heimert, "*Moby-Dick* and American Political Symbolism," *American Quarterly*, 15 (Winter 1963): 498-543.

[7] Duban, *Melville's Major Fictions*, 112.

Richard Henry Dana's book *Two Years before the Mast* (1840) as a work that "tends [...] to impair the charm with which poesy and fiction have invested the sea" (*MD* 529). The "plain, matter-of-fact details connected with nautical life," such as the "brutal tyranny of the captain" and "the outrageous abuse to which seamen are actually subjected" are at odds with "the relish with which we read Byron's spiritual 'Address to the Ocean'" (529). According to Melville,

> when the noble poet raves about laying his hands upon the ocean's mane (in other words manipulating the crest of a wave), the most vivid image suggested is that of a valetudinarian bather at Rockaway, spluttering and choking in the surf, with his mouth full of brine. (*MD* 529)

This confirms what has already been said about the priority given to the issues of human freedom in Melville's book in contrast to the individual's freedom resulting from transcendence. However, it also makes clear that Melville's text does not respond to the irony in Byron's Address, which points out a problem of its interpretation. Should we read Stanza 184 as a nostalgic, autobiographical reference, more specifically, as an attempt to restore the pleasure of child's play—the feeling of unity with dynamic nature—and to transpose it to the present moment of writing?

> And I have loved thee, Ocean! and my joy
> Of youthful sports was on thy breast to be
> Borne, like thy bubbles, onward: from a boy,
> I wantoned with thy breakers—they to me
> Were a delight; and if the freshening sea
> Made them a terror—'twas a pleasing fear,
> For I was, as it were, a child of thee,
> And trusted to thy billows far and near,
> And laid my head upon thy mane—as I do here.
>
> (*CPW* II, 186; IV, 184, *1648-56*)

Or should we contrast the Platonic recollection (αναμνησις), involved in the speaker's reminiscences of childhood and its plays, the movement away from the temporal existence to the timeless origin (referring to the speaker as "the child" of the Ocean), with the movement of creation, which, according to Gilles Deleuze, reaches the point

where the associative chain breaks, leaps over the constituted individual, is transferred to the birth of an individuating world.[8]

Describing this movement in Marcel Proust's novel *In Search of Lost Time* Deleuze stresses the role of style that creates "the viewpoint valid for all associations [...] all images" replacing "the experience by the manner it is spoken of."[9] In other words, the experience of the artist is replaced by the dynamic structure of the work of art, ungraspable as Byron's ocean. Thus, the individual's absolute freedom is transmuted into the freedom of figurative language and style. In this respect, the references to childish plays and the ocean's "mane" are ironical, because they stress the illusoriness of the speaker's identification with the ocean.

More generally, the conclusion of *Childe Harold IV* does not postulate any unity of being or meaning, which could become the goal of the speaker's transcendence. On the contrary, it dissolves the wholeness and sublime power of the ocean, "the glorious mirror, where the Almighty's form / Glasses itself in tempests" (*CPW* II, 185; IV, 183, *1639-40*) in the play of figurative language. It can be objected that the passage anthropomorphizes the Ocean as a supreme authoritative individual ("each zone / Obeys thee"), but the meaning of this individuality cannot be determined because of its sublimity (the Ocean is "dread, fathomless"). Similar to Melville's whale Byron's ocean is a substitute for God's otherness, "[t]he image of Eternity—the throne / Of the Invisible" (*CPW* II, 185; IV, 183, *1644-45*) but it lacks any specific features of Moby Dick (for instance, its "vast wrinkled forehead" *MD* 449).

This all implies a different status and use of rhetoric in Byron's poetry than those criticized in Melville's review. Alerted by the delusions of Emerson's noetic optimism, especially by the assumptions that natural objects correspond with words that are "signs of natural facts," that "natural facts" in turn are "symbols of spiritual facts," and that the whole of Nature is "the symbol of spirit."[10] Melville approaches Byron's figurative language as a mere

[8] Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* (Proust et les signes, 1964 1970 1976), trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) 111.

[9] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 111.

[10] Emerson, "Nature," 14. The basis of these relations is the metaphorical character of language given by the correspondence between words and things of nature. In "The American Scholar" Emerson contends that "the law of nature" can be discovered in the spirit of every self-reliant individual. His statement, however, does not deny the universal validity of the law of nature. Since "nature is the opposite of the soul answering it part for part" (R.W. Emerson, "The American Scholar," in *Nature and Selected Essays*, 52), the mind of the scholar is believed to be able to grasp the wholeness of nature by degrees. This wholeness is incomprehensible in the purely empirical or mystical forms of a "great spectacle," "the web of God" or "the circular power returning into itself" (51), because only the mind of God corresponds to the

plausible fiction which falls short of the dreadful realities of the sea and the seaman's life. Reading Byron's apostrophe of the ocean as a symbol of the individual's absolute freedom from destructive powers of mankind Melville ironically relates Byron's text to the manipulation of freedom in the U.S. political rhetoric of his time. In the review he dwells on an "irresistibly comic" scene from Browne's book, in which a deceitful shipping agent, in order to decoy young men into the bondage of whale trade, uses stock phrases, delivered in "the style parliamentary" and representing the whaler in the same way as the U.S. was represented by contemporary politicians—as "the asylum of the oppressed" and the country of almost ideal political freedom.[11]

Melville's use of Byron's lines in the review of Browne's book clearly shows the problems of contemporary readings of the conclusion to *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*. Evidently, Byron's poetry can neither be read in the same key as a Transcendentalist vision of nature, nor is it easy to transform into a political allegory. To understand the irony of the conclusion of *Childe Harold* means to be sensitive to the dissolution of the romantic subjectivity in the poem which, from the beginning of Canto III, becomes an important structural feature.

Let me recapitulate briefly the major stages of this process, which I have discussed elsewhere.[12] Stanzas 9 to 16 of Canto III reveal that Harold has been summoned mainly in order to distance, sometimes with evident irony, the autobiographical content and confessional tone of the poem. For instance the "wild" metaphors of Stanza 7

> till my brain became
> In its own eddy boiling and o'erwrought
> A whirling gulf of phantasy and flame
> (*CPW* II, 79; III, 7, *56-58*)

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infinity of nature, while the mind of a scholar always finds the finitude in the world. However, this finitude is never a mere appearance, a kind of Plato's shadow, since nature gradually becomes 'humanized' corresponding more and more to the soul, which in this process merges with the Over-Soul. In this way, the problem of the infinitude and openness of the system is ruled out, and nature is totalized by the growth of human knowledge. "Undoubtedly we have not questions to ask which are unanswerable" asserts Emerson at the beginning of *Nature* (1).

[11] A whaler is "the home of the unfortunate, the asylum of the oppressed,' &c., &c., &c." (*MD* 532). These stock phrases characterize the specificity of the U.S. as the country of asylum chosen freely by the oppressed people from all over the world.

[12] See my essay "'But he was phrenzied': Rousseau's Figures and Text in the Third Canto of Byron's *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*," in Michael Gassenmeier, Petra Bridzun, Jens Martin Gurr, Frank Erik Pointer (eds.), *British Romantics as Readers. Intertextualities, Maps of Misreading, Reinterpretations. Festschrift for Horst Meller*, Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Carl Winter, 1998) 171-82, and Chapter 1 of this book.

are reshaped in Stanza 11 and given another referent:

> Harold, once more within the vortex, roll'd
> On with the giddy circle, chasing Time,
> Yet with a nobler aim than in his youth's fond prime.
> (*CPW* II, 80; III, 11, *97-99*)

However, this ironic strategy cannot be sustained for a long time, mainly because of the negativity and instability of Byron's hero. Harold is doomed to fail in his attempts to transcend, by means of imagination, the limits of human nature, and to attain the ideal, cosmic form of being. In Canto III the figure of Harold is discarded and reappears only as a nameless, belated Pilgrim at the end of Canto IV, left behind in the progress of the poem from a parody of chivalrous quest to the limits of romantic visions of nature and history. The character of Harold has lost his purpose in the development of the poem's rhetoric strategies from a veiled or subdued self-expressive mode to a direct appeal to the reader. From the Drachenfels song onward, Harold is no longer needed to "uphold" the poem.[13] He becomes a fit metaphor of the fictitious nature and evanescence of the author's self in the text. Since this fiction has never aspired to verisimilitude, it finally turns into a mere "shadow" or "phantom" which "fades away into Destruction's mass" (*CPW* II, 179; IV, 164, *1476*). Harold's superfluity also becomes evident with the poem's growing emphasis on the historicity of individual life and social existence. Towards the end of Canto IV, his vanishing shadowy form untouched by past wrongs and future hopes is contrasted with the spectral[14] appearance of Princess Charlotte appealing to the remembrance and destiny of the whole nation.

It may be argued that with the disappearance of Harold the autobiographical self comes into prominence. Canto III, and especially its Alpine part, seems to thematize the reciprocating movement between the self and phenomenal nature as the freedom of the subject still attainable in this life, in the intense, creative vision of natural scenery:

[13] "A fictitious character is introduced giving some connexion to the piece;" ('Preface' to Cantos I and II, *CPW* II, 4).

[14] Spectrality depends on the illusion of corporeality and bodily functions: "She clasps a babe to whom her breast yields no relief" *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* IV, 167, *1507*). The paradoxical nature of spectres and ghosts—their "non-sensuous sensuousness" mentioned in Marx's *Capital*—is confronted with traditional ontology in Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning & the New International* (Spectres de Marx, 1993), trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York and London: Routledge, 1994) 6ff.

Are not the mountains, waves, and skies, a part
Of me and of my soul, as I of them?
(*CPW* II, 104; III, 75, *707-708*)

But this vision of the freedom of the subject, which resembles the romantic self mocked by Melville, is subverted by a rhetorical strategy. The reference to the reciprocal relationship of the self with natural objects is made in the form of a rhetorical question. Like most figures of speech, rhetorical question does not have a single meaning. It can function both as the emphatic assertion of the statement ("Yes, these mountains, etc., are a part of me...") and as the locution which requires neither assertion nor any answer whatsoever. In the case of a yes-no question this means a suspension of the truth value of the statement.[15] As we learn from the following stanza, the answer to the rhetorical question is suspended: it is not the poet's "theme" (*CPW* II, 105; III, 76, *716*). As a result, Byron's rhetorical strategy maintains *the illusion* of reciprocity of the self and natural objects which depends on the progress of reading. Nevertheless, towards the end of Canto III, the necessity to give to the ever-evolving series of lyrical reflections some conclusion leads, together with Shelley's and Wordsworth's influences, to the assertion of the unity of the self with nature represented as a Pantheistic universe. But the unifying power of Universal Love makes all individuals, including the autobiographical self, superfluous: "we lose our individuality and mingle in the beauty of the whole."[16]

Abstracting from the complex relationship between the autobiographic self and history in Canto IV,[17] I proceed to the conclusion of this canto. Here, the force of the figure of the ocean is supplementary to the inexpressible meaning of the "interviews" of the autobiographical self with Nature, or to the failure of the speech to give meaning to feelings and emotions. In this discourse the self desires to step out of time, to "steal / From what I may be, or have been before" and to lose his identity when mingling "with the Universe" (*CPW* II, 184; IV, 178, *1599*, *1601*). In other words, the image of the Ocean introduces *and* eliminates, the possibility of absolute freedom as well as the hopes of full sensual pleasure and unlimited play ("I wantoned with thy breakers—they to me / Were a delight; and if the freshening sea / Made them a terror—'twas a pleasing fear" (*CPW* II, 186; IV, 184, *1650-53*). This freedom, pleasure and play cannot be appropriated or assimilated, save in an

[15] Cf. Paul de Man, *Allegories of Reading. Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and Proust* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1979), 151.
[16] *CPW* II, 312.
[17] For a detailed analysis see Chapter 1 of this book.

ironic gesture using childish imagery: "And laid my hand upon thy mane—as I do here" (IV, 184, *1656*). All this foregrounds the sublimity of the Ocean as an immense power reducing mankind, its hopes and history into nothingness of unremembered death, disappearance without a grave (IV, 179, *1611*). In spite of its horrors, this death seems less terrible than the marks of "man's ravage," "ruin" and "decay" on surface of the earth (IV, 179, *1607*, *1604*). This strategy implies the dissolution, not only of individual subjectivity but also of humanity and its history, in the totality of the universe, represented as a dynamic, uncontrollable equilibrium, absolutely incompatible with human hopes in eternal life or any human ideas of the wholeness of existence.

In contrast to Byron's poem, Melville's novel more distinctly separates the sublime based on the immensity and infinitude of the universe from human images and ideas of eternity. Moby Dick is not just Leviathan, a monster created by Jehovah and obeying his command. It is the representative of the *other world* which is not the realm of the divine power, but the power and life of the Ocean. Unlike Emerson who sees nature as the necessary means of expanding the narrow limits of human existence, as a system of stages which is destined to lead self-reliant individuals to their spiritual unity in the Over-soul, Melville thematizes nature's absolute otherness representing it in several ways: as an abstract, mathematical infinitude of time, rhythm and movement ("infinite series of the sea" *MD* 136), as an immense depth of the ocean comparable only to the depths of the unconscious, and finally, as the limit of human history. When all empires collapse, the whales will be swimming over the Tuilleries and Hampton Court.

The last image is perhaps the most important, since it is source of literary authority in the novel. The location of the source of this authority can be identified in Ishmael's figure of speech which is called metalepsis: "I have swam through libraries and sailed through oceans" (*MD* 118). In contrast to Emerson's approach to nature where the source of all authority is the mind of the self-reliant individual, Melville's novel ironically appeals to the authority of the Other, the Ocean, the "Grand Armada" of whales and to Moby Dick, as the "ungraspable phantom" of the Other. The human representation of this otherness is treated ironically as well, and the irony stresses the openness of Melville's writing:

> But I now leave my cetological System standing thus unfinished, even as the Great Cathedral of Cologne was left. [...] God keep me from ever completing anything. This whole book is but a draught—nay, but the draught of a draught. (*MD* 127-28)

Contrary to this ironical perspective, the hero of the novel, the demonic and monomaniac captain Ahab sees nature as the limit of his powers, a serious obstacle in the violent expansion of his individual self. Moreover, Ahab identifies his will and aim to kill Moby Dick with the power of technology conquering America: "The path to my fixed purpose is laid with iron rails [...]. Over unsounded gorges, through the rifled hearts of mountains, under torrents' beds, unerringly I rush" (MD 147). The aim of this power is to eliminate otherness represented by Moby Dick and the whole world of the ocean. In Chapter 36, "The Quarter-deck," Moby Dick appears to Ahab as a symbol of "some unknown but still reasoning thing" that "puts forth the mouldings of its features from behind the unreasoning mask" (*MD* 144). Because of this rift in the empirical reality, "all visible objects" seem to Ahab as "pasteboard masks" (*MD* 144).[18] As a result, the otherness of Moby Dick is the very otherness of nature erasing the Emersonian correspondence between words and things, nature and spirit. Instead of nature, Ahab sees a phantasm of reality behind which the ungraspable and subversive power is hidden. This power is epitomized in the mythological image of the White Whale which becomes the substitute of the hidden "angry God" of the Old Testament and Puritan theology.

In Chapter 41, which sums up what Moby Dick means for Ahab, the whale is called a "murderous monster" and is linked with the whalemen's fantasies of extreme and lethal power. It stands for the horror of death that is no longer Christian—devoid of all mystique of resurrection or damnation, no longer understood as the passage to eternity. Eternity and the instant of cruel death are identified: those who attempt to kill Moby Dick are killed, "torn into quick eternity" (*MD* 157). The whiteness of Moby Dick's body is of "shrouded hue" which also indicates the concealed horrors of death. The symbol of shroud covering the decay of the dead body also recalls the "shrouded figure" at the end of Poe's *Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym* (1839) which seems to represent the mystery of the Other World.

Contrary to Chapter 41, the following chapter presents Ishmael's reading of the chief attribute of Moby Dick, its whiteness. The greatest horror of whiteness is the emptiness of nature: "the heartless voids and immensities of the universe" and "the thought of annihilation, when beholding the white depths of the milky way" (*MD* 169). Whiteness is not a quality of the empirical nature, but "the visible absence of color," that is, the emptiness, the non-meaning of the signs of nature. This absence of

[18] Cf. Chapter 2 of this book.

meaning is later revealed as the true nature of the universe: "the concrete of all colors" (*MD* 169). The horror of "the Albino whale" is the "universal symbol [...] of all these things" (*MD* 169)—it substitutes our ideas of God. Similar strategies stressing the fears of the emptiness of the universe can be detected as early as in the work of the early German romantic Jean Paul, the father of romantic irony.

Nonetheless, in contrast to Jean Paul's "The Speech of the Dead Christ" where the horrors of the godless universe are ultimate, the deadly symbolism of the white whale does not determine all meaning of nature in *Moby Dick*. Some chapters dealing with the life of whales indicate that the life of other sperm whales is a positive value threatened by whaling as an economic activity. In Chapter 87, "The Grand Armada," the whalers break into the wondrous world of the animal generation and gestation. They are intruders who attempt to catch a newly born sperm whale and disturb the "eternal mildness of joy" of the whales. And the whales respond as an organized power, as "marching armies" (*MD* 320). Further on, especially in Chapters 95 and 96, the processing of the whale's fat in the "try-works" is described as desecration—a black mass from which Ishmael turns in horror. Some chapters earlier, in Chapter 69, the "desecrated" body of the processed whale becomes a huge piece of industrial refuse which, however, is no mere bulk of inert matter but scares the bypassing ships by spectral horrors: "the vast headless phantom," "that great mass of death" (*MD* 262). In fact, the cruelty and death caused by the technological procedure are more ominous than the whiteness of Moby Dick. In addition to the horrors of death they represent the effacement of the symbolic hieroglyphs of nature, of the analogy between words and things, and also of the other culture, the Native Americans and their records.[19] This loss is ultimate because the meaning effaced by the economic operation cannot be recalled even in poetry. In one of the final essay-chapters of *Moby Dick*, "The Bower in the Arsacides" (Chapter 102), the narrator tries to integrate the whale into mythical poetry. But the whale is not alive, it is a mere skeleton converted into a temple of some native tribe. Due to these circumstances the image of utopian natural harmony in the other world becomes suspicious. It could have become a theme of a poem written directly, like tattooing on Ishmael's body, but this poem has never been written. This also implies that nature

[19] In Chapter 68, "The Blanket," the processing of fat destroys the "linear marks" on the whale skin. "These are hieroglyphical" and resemble the oldest characters on the walls of Egyptian pyramids or "the old Indian characters chiseled on the famous hieroglyphic palisades on the banks of the Upper Mississippi" (*MD* 260). Cf. Chapter 2 of this book.

in *Moby Dick* resists every totalization, including its transformation into a poem imitating the fabric of life woven by the sun, a text liberated from the power of the Scripture.

What then remains? Let me outline an alternative reading of *Moby Dick* by Deleuze and partly also by Félix Guattari. This reading has a powerful utopian tendency since it attempts to formulate the ultimate conditions of human equality. According to Deleuze, the outside, the other of humanity, may exist as the "mystery of the formless, non-human life, a *Squid*." Facing this aspect of nature, the subject loses its texture "in favor of an infinitely proliferating patchwork,"[20] an evident counterpart of the web of sun in Melville's utopian Chapter 102. In Deleuze's reading, Ahab's pursuit does not mean the imitation of the whale: it happens along "the irresistible line of flight,"[21] and in its course Ahab *becomes* Moby Dick. He will make the nothingness symbolized by the whale the object of his will. And through this nothingness, radical brotherhood, radical equality between humans (as well as between men and animals) can be approached.[22] This radical equality is not determined by belonging to a group or a nation but by the loss of all "particularities."[23]

In a certain sense, the whalemen of the Pequod may be said to represent the multicultural society. By means of his "black magic" Ahab attempts to efface the particularities of races, cultures, nations, and individuals, moulding them into a multiplicity, "the becoming-animal of men."[24] In contrast to Deleuze, I do not think that Ahab has ever managed to transform the crew by "contagion" and to become a leader of a pack of predators.[25] For instance, in Chapter 31, "Queen Mab" (relating a dream of Stubb, one of

[20] Deleuze, "Bartleby; or, The Formula," 77.

[21] Deleuze, "Bartleby; or, The Formula," 77.

[22] This theme, which seems to develop from Nietzschean sources of Deleuze's thought, can be referred back to Socrates's reflections about the "straight" (ορθος) in the dialogue *Phaedo* which deals with the philosopher's acceptance of death and his faith in the world of Ideas. Not accidentally, *Phaedo* is also mentioned in *Moby Dick* in relation to the romantic, Pantheistic dreamer who "offers to ship with Phaedon instead of Bowditch [the author of a navigation manual used in Melville's time] in his head" (*MD* 139). According to Socrates, the ideas of straightness and equality must have first existed in our minds. This is the evidence of the existence of the world of Ideas which precedes the empirical world. This is also one of the origins of Emerson's Platonism (the order of the world reflects itself in the mind of the romantic visionary), mocked by Melville in the same chapter (see above). My reading is based on Jan Patočka's Husserlian interpretation of *Phaedo* in his *Platón* [Plato] (Prague: SPN, 1991) 227-86.

[23] Deleuze, "Bartleby; or, The Formula," 74.

[24] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Mille plateaux, 1980), trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) 243.

[25] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 241, 245.

Ahab's officers), the captain's figure is split into two complementary symbolic images: "the merman" representing the otherness of the ocean and "the pyramid" signifying the stability and perennial nature of power. When Stubb attempts to kick the pyramid, to attack the eternal power, in order to revenge himself to Ahab for his cruel treatment, the merman starts yelling at him "Stop that kicking!" (*MD* 116) In other words, the mechanisms of power, control and obedience in *Moby Dick* are not characteristic of the human society alone; they seem to exist in the unconscious and interfere with its transformation into intensities.[26] Therefore also Ahab cannot materialize the utopia of radical equality and efface the marks of racial and cultural differences in the crew of the Pequod.

The status of the crew is closer to another notion of Deleuze's and Guattari's, that of the *nomad*. Like all Nantucketers the men of Pequod "reside and riot" at sea that becomes an alternative space to the inland prairies. What does this "reside and riot" imply? The whalemen do not have any permanent dwelling, and they enjoy it: they live at sea like a "landless gull." This also means that the global expansion of the U.S. whaleboats so much celebrated by Ishmael resembles drifting rather than a resolute spread of economic or technological power. The ships do not even sail on accustomed naval routes—the "highways of the sea." Their sailors are close to the world of fish and sea animals: "walrusses and whales rush under their pillow" (*MD* 63). Deleuze and Guattari point out that

> [t]he life of the nomad is the intermezzo. Even the elements of this dwelling are conceived in terms of the trajectory that is for ever mobilizing them. The nomad is not the same as the migrant, for the migrant goes principally from one point to another, even if the second is uncertain, unforeseen, or not well localized. But the nomad goes from point to point only as a consequence and as a factual necessity, in principle, points for him are relays along a trajectory. [...] The nomad distributes himself in a smooth space; he occupies, inhabits, holds that space; that is his territorial principle. With the nomad [...] it is deterritorialization that constitutes the relation to the earth [...The nomads] are vectors of deterritorialization. They add desert to desert, steppe to steppe, by a series of local operations whose orientation and direction endlessly vary.[27]

[26] "A degree, an intensity, is an individual, *Haecceity* that enters into composition with other degrees, other intensities to form another individual" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 253).

[27] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 380-82.

Melville's *nomadic space* spreads between the civilized east coast of America[28] and the homeland of Ishmael's friend Queequeg, the exotic wilderness of Polynesia. The gaps between these are the western prairies or deserts and the Ocean. In this way, *Moby Dick* can be read as an alternative to the two great North American myths of colonization: the Virgin Land and the Wild West.

As a result, irony in *Moby Dick* more explicitly refers to those utopian ideologies representing the U.S. as the expanding nation made of those who pursue their happiness according to "the law in the nature of man" and are "free in the choice of place as well as mode."[29] While in the conclusion of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* Byron only dissolves the meaning of the individual's freedom in the sublimity of nature, Melville's novel subverts the authority on which certain notions of this freedom are based: the assumption that the individual's "pursuit of happiness" (whatever it may mean) is granted by divine law. Though for Melville, the "great God Absolute" is "[t]he centre and circumference of all democracy" he can be so only as "the just Spirit of Equality, which [has] spread one royal mantle of humanity over all my kind." And, as we learn from one of Melville's letters (to Nathaniel Hawthorne, on 16 April 1851), even this is an ironical fiction:

> As soon as you say *Me*, a *God,* a *Nature,* so soon you jump off from your stool and hang from the beam. Yes, that word is the hangman. Take God out of the dictionary, and you would have Him in the street. (*MD* 555)

One can wonder whether God "in the street" is the "just Spirit of Equality" invoked in *Moby Dick*, or whether this word is only another "hangman."[30] The rest is silence…

[28] See, for instance, the description of New Bedford in Chapter 6 of *Moby Dick*.

[29] According to Gilbert Chinard, the following text is quoted from Jefferson's preparatory drafts to *The Declaration of Independence*: "[If God] has made the law in the nature of man to pursue his own happiness, he has left him free in the choice of the place as well as mode; and we may safely call on the whole body of English jurists to produce *a map on which Nature has traced the geographical line which she forbids him to cross in pursuit of happiness*" (*Thomas Jefferson. The Apostle of Americanism* [Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957] 72-73; emphasis added).

[30] Even Father Mapple, the chaplain praised by all whalemen, who finds the "delight" in individual independence *and* righteousness, in the courage to stand forth "against the proud gods and commodores of this earth" and in the ability to support oneself when "the ship of this base and treacherous world has gone down beneath him," acknowledges death as the most powerful force of individuation. "[H]ere I die," he says at the end of his moving sermon, "[…] I have striven to be thine [i.e., God's], more than to be this world's, or mine own. Yet this is nothing; I leave eternity to Thee; for what is man that he should live out the lifetime of his God?" (*MD* 51)

4. From Pilgrimage to Nomadism
BYRON'S POETRY ON THE ROAD

Having characterized *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* as a "highly moralized travelogue very much in the tradition of eighteenth-century topographical poetry," Jerome McGann soon adds that Byron only borrowed this form in order to translate it radically by "personalizing [it] both more completely and more dramatically than had ever been done before," and turning it "from a series of loosely connected descriptive and reflective set-pieces [...] into a dramatic personal record of the growth of the poet's mind—to sorrow, even despair."[1] In this chapter, I will explore other transformations of eighteenth-century travelogue than the changes of genre and style which led to the formation of the romantic autobiographical poem. I will first attempt to 'depersonalize' *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* reading it as a work deeply concerned with diverse aspects of political, religious and cultural power. These features range from the vanishing traces of greatness of ancient empires and cultures to a pastiche of contemporary clichés and discourses. I will then explore the movement of "deterritorialization" in Byron's poetry from its beginning in the first two cantos of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, and discuss its effects on Byron's later poetry—in *Childe Harold IV*, *Mazeppa, The Island* and *Don Juan*.

Conceived first as a parody of a chivalrous quest and an ironic version of a sentimental journey, and later as a critical alternative to the educational and ideological programme of the Grand Tour, *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* challenges established spiritual values, notions of inwardness, humanity and culture, as well as the past and present ideas of power, history and time. As a result, romantic

[1] Jerome J. McGann, "Commentary," in Lord Byron, *The Complete Poetical Works*, ed. Jerome J. McGann, 7 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980-1993) 2:271-72 (hereinafter referred to as *CPW*). All references to Byron follow this edition and are given in parentheses in the text.

pilgrimage is more than a theme of Byron's poem. It is an instance of a general structural pattern of narrative epic, which Mikhail Bakhtin called "the chronotope of the road."[2]

According to Bakhtin, the structure of narrative fiction is determined not only by the relations between the sounds of speech, words, speech figures, themes, etc., but also by specific *chronotopes*—sets of relations between the representations of space and time. In Bakhtin's view, these relations are not purely spatial and temporal, but they may imply *values of emotional intensity* relating the work to the value-patterns of the time of its origin and reception.[3]

Defining the chronotope of the road as a "privileged space of accidental meetings" of "people of all classes, social positions, confessions, nationalities and ages," Bakhtin stresses the specificity of the representations of time in the intersections of divergent trajectories of human lives: "[a]s if the time was flowing into and through the space, making its own channels in it."[4] Bakhtin's "accidental meetings" thus have a great metaphorical potential, referring the events of human lives to the complex notions of time, history and myth.

The chronotope of the road informs the structure of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*, but here the rhythm of fortuitous meetings with people, customs, monuments and landscape sceneries unsettles the didactic structure of the Grand Tour and the already conventionalized emotionality of sentimental travel. A good example are stanzas 29 and 30 of Canto II where "sweet Florence" becomes "a new Calypso," a mortal who "holds the dangerous

[2] Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel," in *The Dialogic Imagination. Four Essays*, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981) 243-45.

[3] Cf. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 243. Though inconsistent in its revaluation of Kant's critical philosophy, Bakhtin's thought here approaches Gilles Deleuze's notion of *intensity* as "both the unsensible and that which can only be sensed" (*Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton [London: Athlone Press, 1994] 230)produced by "a virtual and implicated order of constitutive differences" that are, however, cancelled "in the extended order in which they are explicated" (Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality," in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, ed. Paul Patton [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996] 36-37).

[4] Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 243 (English translation adapted). The flow model used by Bakhtin to describe the fortuitous nature of the chronotope of the road approaches Deleuze's and Guattari's notions of heterogeneous structures based on the flows of energies and desires and on the movement of turbulence. Cf. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (L'anti-Oedipe. Le capitalisme et la schizophrénie, 1969), trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983) 1-8; *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Mille plateaux. Le capitalisme et la schizophrénie, 1980), trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) 361-63.

throne" (*CPW* II, 54; II, 30, *266*, 2*65*, *264*) of the nymph who appears in the *Odyssey*. Here the inscription of classical mythology on ancient and modern geography[5] does not first serve a didactic or descriptive purpose as it would in the Grand Tour narratives or topographical poetry. The encounter reveals the duality of Harold's character, his passionate, even demonic, traits, and the sceptical rationality curbing his passion. At a different time level, the narrator brings the emotional intensity of the meeting under his control, turns the scene back to mythological allegory (due to Harold's restraint Cupid's "ancient sway was o'er" *CPW* II, 54; II, 31, *279*), and even appends a moral lesson approved by Time (*CPW* II, 55; II, 35, *307-15*). To summarize, the scene interrelates and contrasts the topography and time of ancient myth with the linear time of Harold's trajectory in the Mediterranean, the narrator's account of it, and still another temporal dimension, the "event"[6] of an accidental meeting full of subdued erotic attraction. In this way, the poem can rather be said to reveal the complexity of its time structure than to provide a stable representation of the hero and a clear-cut description his travels.

Against such a reading objections may arise. Irrespective of its satirical aspects, Byron's poem is not about a mere journey, but about a pilgrimage.[7] The latter differs from the former by the importance of its destination, a dominant value, significant both in individual and collective terms. As John Bossy shows, for the medieval Christianity, pilgrimage had a distinct *judicial* meaning. It was an act of "common penance [...] imposed not only by a priest in confession" but also by secular courts "as a satisfaction acceptable to the victims of violence and their friends." Reaching a sacred place most often amounted to overcoming considerable hardships. This was identified with undergoing a trial and accepting

[5] Byron "accepts the supposition [of Strabo] in order to associate Goza and Malta [...] with Calypso" (*CPW* II, 287).

[6] According to Gilles Deleuze, "the event is the identity of the form and void. It is not the object as denoted, but the object as expressed and expressible, never present but always already in the past. [...] The event is not what occurs (the accident), it is rather inside what occurs, the purely expressed. It signals and awaits us [...] in is what must be understood, willed and represented in that which occurs. [...] With every event, there is [...] the present moment of its actualization, the moment in which the event is embodied in the state of the affairs, an individual or a person." Since the event "has no other present than the mobile instant which represents it," it is "always divided into past-future [...] forming what must be called the counter-actualization." This aspect of the event is expressed by Deleuze's notion of time as "the unlimited Aion, the becoming which divides itself infinitely in past and future and always eludes the present." *The Logic of Sense* (Logique du sens, 1969), trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) 136, 149, 151, 5.

[7] Nonetheless, pilgrimage and, even more specifically, chivalric quest, are discussed by Bakhtin as forms of the chronotope of the road (*The Dialogic Imagination*, 244).

a punishment redemptive from sins and even crimes. Physical penance was often imposed even after reaching the place (for instance, kneeling up to the neck in the icy water of some holy spring). To increase physical suffering, collective flagellation was introduced in the fourteenth century, representing "the patience of Christ in the hands of his enemies" and attempting "to effect the subjugation of the passions of hostility and to procure peace and reconciliation among Christians."[8] To sum up, the dominant values to be attained by the medieval pilgrimage were not only the purification from sin, crime or illness, but also the achievement of peace through penitence and sacrifice. All this was frequently understood as the execution of heavenly, as well as temporal, justice.

Similar to medieval quest narratives, in *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* this value pattern is interwoven with the chronotope of the road. The best examples are the themes of Time and Nemesis, revenge and sacrifice in the famous 'testament' passage of Canto IV (130-37). In the *traditional sense*, the hero has reached the destination of his pilgrimage, an old symbol of the empire, which served as not only as a model of all succeeding states, but also as the paradigm of the power structure and the intellectual framework of the "World" (*orbis terrarum*—the lands under the control of the Roman empire): "'While stands the Coliseum, Rome shall stand; / When falls the Coliseum, Rome shall fall; / And when Rome falls—the World.'" (*CPW* II, 173; IV, 145, *1297-99*).[9] His meditations are not concerned only with his fate but also with the general course of history and the meaning of its lessons.[10] Despite all this, the fortuitous chronotope of the road prevents the pilgrimage from stopping in the symbolic ruins of the Roman Empire: there are still other destinations, like the dome of St. Peter's Cathedral, but there is also the loss of all destinations in the spectral labyrinth and "[c]haos"of Roman ruins which has deprived the present as well as the past of their meanings: "who shall trace the void,/O'er the dim fragments cast a lunar light,/And say, 'here was, or is,' where all is

[8] John Bossy, *Christianity in the West 1400-1700* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) 52-53.

[9] For the modern version of this alleged belief of Anglo-Saxon pilgrims to Rome see John Cam Hobhouse's *Historical Illustrations to the Fourth Canto of Childe Harold* (London: John Murray, 1818) 49: "The education which has qualified the traveller of every nation for that citizenship which is again become, in one point of view, what it once was, the portion of the whole civilized world." In other words, classical education is a basis of modern Roman "citizenship," which entitles a 'gentleman' to partake in the execution of power on a global scope. Cf. Malcolm Kelsall, *Byron's Politics* (Brighton: The Harvester Press and Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1987) 59.

[10] For a detailed analysis of these passages and their philosophical implications see Chapter 1 of this book.

doubly night?" (*CPW* II, 151; IV, 80, *718-20*) The ending of the pilgrimage on a nameless seashore is symptomatic of the radical change of the sense of its destination, heralded already in geographical terms in Childe Harold's 'Good Night' in Canto I and in religious terms in the Parthenon stanzas at the beginning of Canto II.[11] It is no longer a central place, a crucial moment in time, a highest value: the pilgrim has reached the *limits of human speech and culture* (in the "interviews" with Nature *CPW* II, 184; IV, 178, *1599*), but also the *limits of human power*, creativity, history, and the *boundaries of the text* itself, which is finally identified with the ungraspable event of language,[12] the feeling of the inexpressible, and the play of the child: "I wantoned with thy breakers [...] / And laid my hand upon thy mane—as I do here." (*CPW* II, 186; IV, 184, *1651*, *1656*). It is not by accident that this fundamental transformation of the aim of pilgrimage marks a paradoxical 'unfulfilled fulfilment' of the hero's "task" (*CPW* II, 186; IV, 185, *1657*).

The fulfilment of a task in reaching a destination, which is also a central aim of the hero's pilgrimage, is one of the main features of chivalrous narratives, especially in those dealing with the quest for the Holy Grail. Here the healing of the Fisher King (or his redemption from sin) and the restoration of his vigour and power are directly connected with the return of his kingdom (The Waste Land) to life, fertility and prosperity. Nonetheless in some narratives, the devastation of the kingdom is not caused by natural or supernatural powers but by the hero himself, who condemns the

[11] In contrast to St. Augustine's comparison of Christians to pilgrims, whose destination is not merely Heaven but their (unattainable) resemblance to God ("We must fly to our beloved fatherland. There is the Father, there our all. What fleet or flight shall convey us thither? Our way is to become like God." *The City of God* [De civitate dei], IX.xvii, trans. Marcus Dods [New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1948] 296; Augustine uses a quote from Plotinus), Canto II of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* puts an emphasis on the devaluation of earthly life by the religion. Byron's lines are also sceptical of the principal destination of Christian pilgrimage: "Bound to the earth, he lifts his eye to heaven— / Is't not enough, unhappy thing! to know / Thou art? Is this a boon so kindly given, / That being, thou wouldst be again, and go, / Thou know'st not, reck'st not to what region, so / On earth no more, but mingled with the skies?" (*CPW* II, 45; II, 4, *28-32*)

[12] "From these our interviews in which I steal / From all I may be, or have been before, / To mingle with the Universe, and feel / What I can ne'er express, yet can not all conceal (*CPW* II, 184; IV, 178, *1599-1602*). Cf. my discussion of this passage in Chapter 3 of this book and in my essay "Byron and Romantic Nationalism in Central Europe: the Case of Czechs and Slovaks, in Richard Cardwell (ed.), *Lord Byron the European. Essays from the International Byron Society*, Studies in British Literature, vol. 31 (Lewiston, Kingston, Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998) 55-74. Cf. also Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 3: "it is language as well which transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited becoming" of events and surface effects (see also here footnote [24]).

king and his subjects to sufferings or war due to his inability to ask the right question concerning the power and purpose of the Grail or merely because of his lack of compassion. Thus, in contrast to the set of values implied in the practice of medieval pilgrimage where suffering and penitence are supposed to lead directly to the reinstatement of justice, some Grail romances problematize the moment of the hero's fulfilment of his task (the achievement of justice) by admitting the failure of the knight to understand the purpose of his quest.[13]

It may be said that the value structure of some quest romances is halfway between the chronotope of the road stressing the accidental nature of encounters and the strict value paradigm of the pilgrimage subordinating it to the ruling principle of justice and to the achievement of the destination, which is simultaneously of the highest value. The errancy of the hero, his inability to understand and reach his goal is a structuring pattern of Lancelot, Percival and Gawain romances as well as of Ariosto's *Orlando Furioso*, a poem which had a significant influence not only on Byron, but also on Spenser and his eighteenth century imitators, especially James Thomson's *Castle of Indolence*.[14] The transformation of Harold into "a phantasy," "a shadow" that "fades away into Destruction's mass" (*CPW* II, 179; IV, 164, *1474*, *1476*) means the absolute loss of destination and indeed structural function of Byron's "vagrant Childe," invented, as Byron himself

[13] Jessie L. Weston has pointed out several important Grail narratives where the hero's failure to ask the right question changes the course of his quest and the fate of the king and his country. Among these there are: *Perceval* by Chrétien de Troyes, where the hero fails to ask about the purpose of the Grail; a Perceval narrative in prose, whose protagonist does not enquire about the meaning of the desolation and suffering in The Waste Land; *Perlesvaus*, a prose compilation, in which the knight fails to ask to whom the Grail serves; *Peredur*, a Welsh romance belonging to *The Mabinogion*, where the restoration of the king and his land are connected with the prediction that the hero should avenge a murder of his cousin; and in the *Parzival* by Wolfram von Eschenbach, whose protagonist is not able to enquire about the cause of the king's disease and fails to pity him. Contrary to these, Galahad, the hero of "the final form assumed by this story" is "the predestined winner" and no failure on his part occurs. (*From Ritual to Romance* [1920], rpt. [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957] 14-20).

[14] In neither of these cases, however, does the pattern of errancy completely prevail. The protagonists of *The Faerie Queene* fulfil their tasks in spite of many temptations. As Patrick Murdoch writes in his "Memoir of Thomson" (1762), the poet started to write *The Castle of Indolence* as "a few detached stanzas in the way of raillery on himself and on some of his friends who would reproach him with indolence [...] but he saw very soon that the subject deserved to be treated more seriously and in a form fitted to convey one of the most important moral lessons." (*The Complete Poetical Works of James Thomson*, ed. J. Logie Robertson [London: Henry Frowde, 1908] 306) The first canto of Thomson's poem represents the idyll of leisurely country life as a welcome alternative to the city life debased by the profit-making, political factions, wars, etc. Only the second canto, which is of later date, attempts to give the British "Industry" a distinct moral, religious and political meaning.

claimed, in order to give "some connexion to the piece" (*CPW* II, 4). The superfluity of Harold, which becomes manifest in the two later cantos, does not imply that the autobiographical persona becomes the central and integrating theme of the poem. Apart from the paradoxical 'unfulfilled fulfilment' of the speaker's "task" (*CPW* II, 186; IV, 185, *1657*) the question of the destination in Byron's mock-chivalrous narrative remains open.

The most universal destination might be "Man" but this central figure of the Enlightenment thought appears in Canto IV as a mere mirage, a visual effect of the chaos of ruins on the Mount Palatine and the abstract schemes of the poet's imagination: "Thou pendulum betwixt a smile and tear, / Ages and realms are crowded in this span, / This mountain, whose obliterated plan / The pyramid of empires pinnacled" (*CPW* II, 160; IV, 109, *975-78*). As in Bakhtin's chronotope of the road, the encounter with this phantasm is the moment of great emotional intensity ("Admire, exult—despise—laugh, weep" IV, 109, *972*) transforming the abstract figure of Enlightenment philosophy and ideology into a "matter for all feeling" (*973*). In this way the poem definitely dissolves the universalist perspective of the Enlightenment, which may be said to regulate the accidental pattern of encounters in the eighteenth-century descriptive poems and travelogues (for instance in *The Traveller* by Oliver Goldsmith).

Reading *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* in this key we can observe that the first marks of the disintegration of this universalist perspective appear fairly soon, even in the song "To Inez" added to the first canto possibly in January 1811 during the first revision of Canto I and II (*CPW* II, 266, 268). The "unpremeditated lay" (*CPW* II, 39; I, 84, *835*) seeks an alternative to the haunting of the past—"many a retrospection curst" (*CPW* II, 40; I, "To Inez" 8, *866*)—and strives to make the pilgrimage more meaningful than the futile, restless, Ahasuerian wandering led by the vain effort to escape "the settled, ceaseless gloom / The fabled Hebrew wanderer bore" and "the blight of life—the demon, Thought" (I, "To Inez" 5, *853-54*, 6, *860*). This alternative appears to be finding a "solace" in the knowledge of "the worst," discovering "the Hell" in the human heart (I, "To Inez" 8, *868*; 9, *872*).

In this context, Harold's negativity does not have to be understood as a mere *ressentiment*,[15] an outcome of over-satiation,

[15] According to Nietzsche, in ressentiment reactive forces prevail over active ones, which leads to inaction. In his critique of Hegel's dialectic of the master and the slave Nietzsche shows that the master accepts the morality of the slave not because of the necessity of survival but because of the erroneous conception of the will to power. In the master-slave dialectic, "power is conceived not as will to power but as representation of power, representation of superiority, recognition by 'the one' of the

boredom, spleen, and the internalization of suffering and pain, typical of the Byronic hero. Contrasted with the narrator's reflections of history, it directs the reader's attention to a specific "mental geography" and to shifting "internal, immanent boundaries"—"Zones [...] more and more remote" ("To Inez" 1.6.858)—separating history and the unhistorical.[16] As a result, Harold's negativity in Cantos I and II creates an opening for an unhistorical "event" which can be interpreted in a Deleuzean way (cf. above, footnote 6). According to the second of Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations* ("Use and Abuse of History"), this event may result in life-generating action.[17]

Similar to the works of other romantics, for instance to Novalis's *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*, where (in the unfinished Part II) the aim of the hero's pilgrimage is finally found in his mythopoeic imagination ("for me, imaginative invention [Fabel] is the general means of producing my present world as a wholeness"),

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superiority of 'the other' [...]. This is the slave's conception, it is the image that the man of *ressentiment* has of power. *The slave only conceives of power as the object of recognition, the content of representation, the stake in a competition, and therefore makes it depend, at the end of a fight on a simple attribution of established values*." One of the most important effects of ressentiment is the transformation of consciousness, its "invasion by mnemonic traces," and "the ascent of memory into consciousness itself." The man of ressentiment is "like a bloodhound," he reacts only to "traces in his memory," which is "full of hatred in itself and by itself." This metamorphosis of consciousness results, among others, in the "inability to admire, respect or love," and ultimately in the formation of the "bad conscience" which multiplies pain by "the interiorization of force" (Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* [Nietzsche et la philosophie, 1962], trans. Hugh Tomlinson [New York: Columbia University Press, 1983] 111, 10, 114, 117, 128, 129; Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* [Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 1886], trans. R.J. Hollingdale [Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973] 261, 260; *On the Genealogy of Morals* [Zur Genealogie der Morale, 1887], trans. W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale [New York: Random House, 1967] 84-85, 87, 118, 124 and elsewhere).

[16] Cf. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* [Qu'est-ce que la philosophie, 1991], trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia Univesity Press, 1994) Part 1, Chapter 4: "the unhistorical element resembles the atmosphere which alone can generate life that again perishes as soon as this atmosphere is destroyed." The quote is from Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations* (II, "Use and Abuse of History").

[17] In contrast to Nietzsche's philosophy, where the outcome of this action is "the man emancipated from the law" (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 137), the romantics identify this action with imagination and mythopoeia. Nonetheless, most romantic concepts of imagination and mythical poetry, for instance Shelley's "unacknowledged legislator," Keats's "negative capability," or Blake's prophetic vision, can be explained in the Nietzschean key. The same feature characterizes the thought of many German romantics: for Friedrich Schlegel the romantic "progressive universal poetry" is "alone infinite, just as it alone is free, recognising as its *prime law that the poet's caprice brooks no law*." (*Athenaeum* Fragment no. 116, in Lilian R. Furst [ed.], *European Romanticism: A Self-definition* [London: Methuen, 1980] 5; emphasis added) In contrast to these, Kant, Coleridge, and even Wordsworth, try to subordinate the creation of the unconscious genius to the power of moral or philosophical laws.

supplanting a moral and theological perspective with the "event" of romantic creation ("the spirit of the universal poem, the event of the eternal romantic togetherness, of the endlessly changing collective life"),[18] in *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* this "event" or "becoming" are identified with the power of "one vast realm of wonder" where "all the Muse's tales seem truly told" (*CPW* II, 73, II, 88, *830-31*). The Marathon stanzas towards the close of Canto II celebrating the loveliness and permanence of Greek nature may thus be said to accomplish the territorialization—and deterritorialization[19]—of romantic imagination as a power working against destructive forces of history: "Each hill and dale, each deepening glen and wold / Defies the power which crush'd thy temples gone" (*CPW* II, 73; II, 88, *834-35*); "When Marathon became a magic word; / Which utter'd, to the hearer's eye appear / The camp, the host, the fight, the conqueror's career" (II, 89, *843-45*).

Although the latter two cantos of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* may be read as attempts at reterritorialization and historicization of the imaginative power,[20] the stanzas introducing the Mount Palatine sequence (*CPW*, 159; IV, 104-105), connect the ruin theme with the loss of the pilgrimage's aim and of the sense of history ("There woos no home, nor hope, nor life, save what is here." IV, 105, *945*). Together with the Ocean stanzas at the end of Byron's poem, this passage can be interpreted as a moment of radical deterritorialization which opens the way for the movement of Byron's later poetry towards nomadism.

According to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,

> [t]he life of the nomad is the intermezzo. Even the elements of this dwelling are conceived in terms of the trajectory, that is, for ever

[18] Novalis, *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*, in *Werke in einem Band* (Berlin und Weimar: Aufbau Verlag, 1980) 258-59: "für mich die Fabel ist das Gesamtwerkzeug meinen gegenwärtigen Welt"; "der Geist des Weltgedichts, der Zufall der ewigen romantischen Zusammenkunft, des unendlich veränderlichen Gesamtlebens." In Novalis's work, this romantic notion of creation is contrasted with the hierarchical process of the "creation of the sense of this present world" accomplished by subsuming its order under a general divine law ("heavenly conscience/consciousness"—"himmlisches Gewissen").

[19] The terms used in many Deleuze's and Guattari's texts are based on Lacanian psychoanalysis. While "territorialization" means the organization ofthe surface ofa baby's body into erogenous and non-erogenous zones by the emotional investment made in the course of parental care and nourishment, "deterritorialization" means freeing the emotional energy (libido—in psychoanalytic terms) "from the pre-programmed objects of investment" (Cf. Eugene W. Holland, "Schizoanalysis and Baudelaire," in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, 241-42).

[20] Especially in Canto IV the narrator's subjectivity is extended to include internalized history—"But my soul wanders; I demand it back / To meditate amongst decay, and stand / A ruin amidst ruins; there to track / Fall'n states and buried greatness" (*CPW* II, 132; IV, 25, *217-20*).

> mobilizing them. The nomad is not the same as the migrant, for the migrant goes principally from one point to another, even if the second is uncertain, unforeseen or not well localized. But the nomad goes from point to point only as a consequence and as a factual necessity, in principle, points for him are relays along a trajectory. […] If the nomad can be called the Deterritorialized par excellence, it is precisely because there is no reterritorialization afterward as with the migrant […]. With the nomad, on the contrary, it is deterritorialization that constitutes the relation to the earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorializes on deterritorialization itself.[21]

After *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* Byron's poetry oscillates between the repudiation and affirmation of nomadism. In *Mazeppa*, the deterritorialization of the hero[22] is a severe punishment which causes terror and suffering, and ends in a protracted agony, somewhere between life and death, in a "dream […] of the cold, dull, swimming, dense / Sensation of recurring sense, / And then subsiding back to death, / And then again a little breath, / A little thrill, a short suspense" (*CPW* IV, 198; 18, *783, 786-91*). A reterritorialization occurs only in the epilogue of the poem, but as a Cossack chief, the hero still preserves some nomadic traces.[23]

A different aspect of deterritorialization can be seen in *The Island*: Neuha, the vital heroine of Byron's tale does not have any fixed identity. In the second canto she is represented as a series of "events" or "surface effects":[24] "a billow [of southern seas] in her energies," her beautiful form "[l]ike coral reddening through the darken'd wave." She does not have any experience or memory, and her "smiles and tears […] as light winds pass / O'er lakes to ruffle, not destroy their glass" (*CPW* VII, 37; II, 7, *142, 139, 151-52*). In Canto IV, however, Neuha escapes with Torquil "like a corpse-light from a grave" and becomes reterritorrialized in the

[21] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 380-81. Cf. the discussion of this passage in Chapter 3 of this book.

[22] In the process of deterritorialization, as in the wild ride of the horse to whose back Mazeppa was tied, neither destination, nor the movement itself seem to matter: "I felt as on a plank at sea, / When all the waves that dash o'er thee / At the same time upheave and whelm, / And hurl thee towards a desert realm" (*CPW* IV, 191; 13, *553-56*). Since the "desert realm" is no destination, but resembles the surface of the tempestuous ocean, the most important features of deterritorialization are "immobility and speed." This speed is "intensive" (like the increasing pains the hero must endure) and it "*constitutes the absolute character of the body*" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 381).

[23] "All Scythia's fame to thine should yield" says King Charles to Mazeppa, who rides his horse "[a]ll Tartar-like" (*CPW* IV, 177; 4, *105*; 3, *71*).

[24] In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze characterizes events as "surface effects": "They are not things or facts, but events. We cannot say that they exist, but rather that they subsist or inhere […]. They are neither agents nor patients, but results of actions and passions" (4-5).

fulfilment of their love. Yet the site of her reterritorialization, a submarine cavern called "a chapel of the seas," which Nature built to itself in her play "with stalactites," offers surface effects of imagination (*CPW* VII, 65, 67; IV, 4, *86*, IV, 7, *159*) instead of profound religious symbolism, typical, for instance, of Wordsworth's poetry.[25]

Only in the latter part of *Don Juan* (from the siege of Ismail in Canto VIII) the tendency towards the affirmation of nomadism is more evident. Take for instance the opening stanzas of Canto X where Byron repudiates the Newtonian system for different reasons than Blake or Keats did. He does not accuse Newton of killing the beauty of the rainbow and the poetry of the old myths, nor does he want to create a system protecting against the repressive sway of modern rationality and religion. He simply says that Newton has organized the universe so that it became accessible by means of *technology*:

> Sir Isaac Newton could disclose
> Through the then unpaved stars the turnpike road,
> A thing to counterbalance human woes;
> For ever since immortal man had glowed
> With all kinds of mechanics, and full soon
> Steam-engines will conduct him to the Moon.
>
> (*CPW* V, 437; X, 2, *11-16*)

After the establishment of this new cosmos, based on the central force of "Gravitation" and intended to redeem the fall of man, the function of poetry must be to map a different, chaotic, but much richer universe, to sail "in the Wind's Eye," to shun "the common shore," and "leaving the land far out of sight," to "skim / The Ocean of Eternity" (*CPW* V, 438; X, 4, *25*,*27-29*).[26] This is a

[25] Cf. e.g., Wordsworth's prologue to the unfinished long poem *The Recluse* (included in *The Excursion*; *The Poetical Works*, ed. Thomas Hutchinson [London: Oxford University Press, 1908] 755, *51-55*) and especially M.H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism* (New York, W.W. Norton, 1971) 19-32, 37-46.

[26] McGann points out a possible allusion to Shelley's "famous phrase for Byron, 'the pilgrim of eternity'" (*CPW* V, 742). Shelley's phrase derives from *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* "wanderers *o'er* eternity" (*CPW* II, 103; III, 70, *669*; my emphasis), developing the contrast between "[t]he race of life which becomes a hopeless flight," encumbered by "fatal penitence [...] the blight of our own soul," and the approach to life as nomadic drifting of the "wanderers o'er Eternity / Whose bark drives on and on, and anchored ne'er shall be." (III, 70, *666*, *663*, *669-70*). However, the evolution of the pilgrimage motif in *Adonais* does not confirm that Shelley was even remotely aware of the 'nomadic' implications of Byron's stanza, and especially of the meaning of the preposition "over" which rules out the possibility that the wanderers should ever arrive in Eternity, or pursue it as their destination. It is difficult (though not futile) to relate Byron's phrase to Satan's characterization of the "intellectual being" of the fallen angels in *Paradise Lost* II, *148-51*: "[t]hose thoughts that wander through

poetry of "events" and "surface effects," a poetry, whose deterritorialization does not consist of the transcendence of the limits of human existence and experience but in *the immanence of the process of writing* "taking up this paltry sheet of paper" and starting to write, "just now" (*CPW* V, 437; X, 3, *18*, *17*).

The affirmation of nomadism in the later cantos of *Don Juan* is connected with the tendency of Byron's poetry to become independent of the power of the State and its apparatus, including the political and legal system, institutionalized religion, and science;[27] and the repudiation is conditioned by the tendency to historicize the represented events and to ground their representation on facts (*CPW* V, 391; VIII, 86, *681-85*).

Some later romantics embraced nomadism with much greater eagerness than Byron. Melville satirized Byron's oscillation between nomadism and nostalgia in the Ocean stanzas of *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage IV*.[28] For the Czech romantics, Karel Hynek Mácha (1810-36) and Jan Neruda (1834-91), the deterritorialized nomadic existence of the Gipsies became a "line of flight"[29] from the crises of romantic subjectivity and national identity. In Mácha's novel *The Gipsies* (Cikáni, 1835) the heroes travel endlessly on their erratic routes not only because they are the romantic outcasts but also as they wish and desire to do so. One of them is Italian by his origin, and the other, who after his death resumes his pilgrimage, is a young Czech aristocrat. Consequently, Mácha's heroes are not true Gipsies, they are "becoming-Gipsies" as Deleuze would put it. In Neruda's verse tale *Divoký zvuk* (Wild Notes, 1868) the hero, a Czech violin virtuoso, a symbol of national identity, is so irresistibly attracted to the "wild sounds" of Gipsy music that he decides to

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Eternity, / To perish rather, swallowd up and lost, / In the wide womb of uncreated night, / Devoid of sense and motion." (*The Poems of John Milton*, ed. Helen Darbishire [London: Oxford University Press, 1961] 205) as Timothy Webb does in his commentary to *Adonais* (Percy Bysshe Shelley, *Poems and Prose*, ed. Timothy Webb [London: J.M.Dent—Everyman Library, 1995] 439).

[27] According to Deleuze and Guattari, the nomadic "*war machine is exterior to the State apparatus*." This apparatus consists of "great collective bodies [...] differentiated and hierarchical organisms," which "have a special relation to families, because they link the family model to the State model" (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 351, 366). In addition, the State apparatus also functions as a model of thinking which stresses the unitary, hegemonic power of the law and represses creativity: "The State does not give power (*pouvoir*) to intellectuals or conceptual innovators; on the contrary, it makes them a strictly dependent organ with an autonomy that is only imagined yet is sufficient to divest those whose job it becomes simply to reproduce or implement of all of their power (*puissance*)" (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 368).

[28] See Chapter 3 of this book.

[29] Deleuze and Guattari point out that the line of flight is an effect of deterritorialization, the intense desire which launches the individual into the process of "becoming" thus extricating him from a fixed, determining system: "the line of flight [...] traverses something and puts what it traverses to flight" (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 277).

join their troop and accepts their nomadic ways of life. The Gipsy musicians, who first mock his art for half-heartedness, teach him to play with so intense emotional expression that he can compete with the power of the elements and find a new, passionate, self-ironic, but ultimately tragic identity in love and art.

In the denouement of Neruda's tale, the drawbacks of these attempts at deterritorialization are evident: though the "the ironist" may, in Kierkegaard's words, be "constantly on the pilgrimage," traversing "a multitude of determinations in the form of possibility, poetically lived through them, before he ends in nothingness," he still remains "the eternal ego for whom no actuality is adequate."[30] According to Deleuze, the integrity of this person (or perhaps *persona*) is

> threatened by an intimate enemy who works on [it] from within, the undifferentiated ground, the groundless abyss [...] that represents tragic thought and the tragic tone with which irony maintains the most ambivalent relations. [...] It is the chaos that brings about the undoing of the person.[31]

The deterritorialization is completed only when "[t]he tragic and the ironic give way to a new value, that of humor" being "the art of the surfaces and the doubles, of nomad singularities and of the always displaced aleatory point."[32] This cumbersome yet comprehensive definition of humour seems to match far better with the lightness emerging in *Beppo* and especially in the later cantos of *Don Juan* than with the nomadic madness of some late romantics.

[30] Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Irony, with Constant Reference to Socrates* (Om Begrebet Ironi med stadigt Hensyn til Socrates, 1841), trans. Lee M. Capel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968) 298-300.
[31] Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 139.
[32] *The Logic of Sense*, 141.

5. A Tale of two Orders

A WORD AS A GO-BETWEEN?

"Sharawadgi" (or sharawaggi), a distorted Chinese compound word, or rather phrase, has a meaning which is difficult to express in English. Y.Z. Chang has interpreted it as "the quality of being impressive or surprising through carelessness or unorderly grace."[1] When it rather unexpectedly appeared in England at the end of the seventeenth century, it functioned as a sign of wonder at the alien culture of Chinese gardens, represented in the accounts and drawings of (mostly French) Jesuit missionaries. Like the images of American natives, this obscure language sign, to use Stephen Greenblatt's words, had been "caught up in a complex system of mimetic circulation,"[2] which, after some time, ceased to refer it to mimetic qualities, and generated ideological features.

Similar to the New World conquest, there was "no authentic reciprocity" between the Chinese and the Europeans, and the new style had asserted itself against "an imaginary order of exclusion,"[3] namely against the conventions of the geometric, formal style of gardening prevailing in Europe at the end of the seventeenth century. The appearance of the word was an indication of the fact that the order of reality (later called by Michel Foucault the Classical Episteme) was less universal and stable than it appeared. "Sharawadgi" seemed to subvert the basic principle of this order, the transparency of the sign in the system of representation.[4] It can even be said that it introduced an "aporia" (implying the radical

[1] Quoted in Isabel Wakelin Urban Chase (ed.), *Horace Walpole: Gardenist* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1943) 189.

[2] Stephen Greenblatt, *Marvelous Possessions: A Wonder of the New World* Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 119.

[3] Greenblatt, *Marvelous Possessions*, 121.

[4] Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (Les mots et les choses, 1966) (London, Tavistock Publications, 1970) 65

incompatibility and incommensurability of European and Chinese cultures) as a certain "strategy," which later "impose[d] a certain way of life."[5] This was described by another neologism, namely "gardenist," meaning a cultivated designer and planter who, in contrast to the gardener able to work only according to his skill and training, could imaginatively transform the landscape and even change the social relations of local inhabitants.

The word "sharawadgi" was first used by a seventeenth-century diplomat and man of letters, Sir William Temple, in his essay "Upon the Gardens of Epicurus: or Of Gardening, in the Year 1685," published in 1692. While the first part of the essay looks for the model of garden architecture in Biblical and Classical descriptions of Paradise, represented as a multicultural (Persian, Greek, Hebrew, Latin) rather than exclusively Biblical place, the second part of the essay points out other sources of contemporary gardening than the French geometric style. These are the pre-revolutionary English pleasure grounds at Moor Park, near Farnham in Sussex, which Temple attempted to revive in his own garden. For Temple Moor Park became a symbol of continuity and harmony of diverse artistic styles. Its owner, the Countess of Bedford, was the patroness of the founder of English Classicism Ben Jonson, a Baroque poet John Donne, but also of the late Renaissance poets Michael Drayton and John Chapman. Similarly, the garden at Moor Park had both Renaissance and Baroque features: cloisters, summer houses, and "the Grotto embellished with figures of Shell-Rock-work, Fountains and Water-works."[6] It also combined geometrical regularity with irregular distributions of plants, the so-called wilderness, confined by straight rows of fruit-trees.

William Temple's ideal garden is, no doubt, a representation of cultural continuity disrupted at that time by frequent imitations of French models. However, the structural principle of this traditional garden is the same as that of those contemporary imitations of French art—symmetry, rectangularity and geometric design. In his famous essay on *The History of Modern Taste in Gardening* (1771), Horace Walpole ironically compares Temple's ideal to the taste of his French contemporaries: "How many Frenchmen are there who have seen *our* gardens, and still prefer *natural* flights of

[5] Greenblatt, *Marvelous Possessions*, 127.

[6] Sir William Temple, "Upon the Gardens of Epicurus: or Of Gardening, in the Year 1685" (1692), in John Dixon Hunt and Peter Willis (eds.), *The Genius of the Place* (Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1988) 1:98-99. Subsequent page references are in parentheses in the text.—The first grotto is described already in Alberti's treatise *De re aedificatoria*, 1452, but waterworks initially appear in grottos in Italian Baroque gardens, such as that of Villa Aldobrandini (See May Woods, *Visions of Arcadia: European Gardens from Renaissance to Rococo* [London: Aurum Press, 1996] 18, 61).

steps and shady cloisters covered with lead!"[7] Nonetheless, even Temple can imagine something beyond the regular order: "for there may be other Forms wholly irregular that may, for aught I know, have more beauty than any of the others" (98-99). The only reasons justifying this otherness are either "some extraordinary Dispositions of Nature" or a striking cultural difference, articulated in terms of creative faculties: "some great Race of Fancy or Judgement in the Contrivance" (99).

Both these conditions are explicable in the context of the contemporary theories of poetic inspiration: the *je ne sais quoi*. The French Classicist critic René Rapin claims that "in *Poetry* as in other *Arts*" there are "certain *things* that *cannot be expressed*" and their beauty is "a pure effect of *Nature*."[8] Nonetheless, there is still a significant difference: contrary to Rapin or his English followers, such as Alexander Pope and his editor William Warburton, Temple did not ascribe these graces to the infinite, bounteous mercy of God or to the "natural genius," who, according to another influential English Classicist critic and essayist Joseph Addison, was believed to compose "by the meer Strength of natural Parts,"[9] but to the *difference* existing between Chinese and European patterns of thought: "a People, whose Way of Thinking seems to lie as wide of ours in *Europe*, as their Country does" (99). This difference is no mere oddity—it is a general feature of Oriental art: "and whosoever observes the Work upon the best *Indian* Gowns, or the Painting upon their [Chinese] Skreens or Purcellans, will find their Beauty is all of this Kind (that is) without Order" (99).

Here, the cultural difference between the Europeans and the Chinese is represented as *the absence of order in the structures of art*, or, to be more exact, as a *presence* of *another, hidden*, or imperceptible *order* and the possibility of structuring the world in a different way. This is, according to Temple, is the most important feature of Chinese art: "their greatest Reach of Imagination is employed in contriving Figures, where the Beauty shall be great, and strike the Eye, but without any Order or Disposition of Parts, that shall be commonly or easily observ'd" (99). Moreover, the structural difference of regular European and irregular Chinese "Figures" (patterns) causes the feelings of wonder: Chinese gardens are, almost like Greenblatt's interpretation of Shakespeare's Caliban, "a fragment of a world elsewhere, a world of difference," which is "not present" but at the same time it is

[7] Horace Walpole, *The History of Modern Taste in Gardening*, in Chase (ed.), *Horace Walpole: Gardenist*, 20.

[8] Quoted in M.H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp* (1953) (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1960) 194.

[9] Quoted in Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp*, 195.

marked by, and assimilated through, the mediated "experience of wonder in the presence of the alien."[10] This is the moment when "sharawadgi," an obscure word representing a supreme cultural value, starts to function as a go-between: the wonder experienced by European observers ("we have hardly any Notion of this Sort of Beauty") is identified with the Chinese expression of esteem for the works of art: "where they find it [the irregular beauty] hit their Eye, they say the *Sharawadgi* is fine or is admirable, or any such expression of esteem" (99).

In this setting, very much resembling Deleuze's *Logic of Sense*, where the sense is traced back to the nonsensical word in which several series of signs intersect, "sharawadgi" functions in a twofold way. On the one hand, it is a qualifier designating the supreme aesthetic value and the surprising, powerful impact of the object to which this value has been ascribed, on the other hand, it signifies the cause of this aesthetic effect and value, a structural quality traced back to the "Order" that cannot "be commonly or easily observ'd." In other words, "sharawadgi" expresses *the possibility of a different representative order*, which is ascribed a higher status than the valid representative order of Classicism and the early modern knowledge. Compared to the perfection of "sharawadgi," geometrical regularity appears as a childish play. Temple puts this in a very sophisticated way which deserves a commentary: "The *Chineses* scorn this [regular] way of Planting, and say a boy, that can tell an Hundred, may plant Walks and Trees in straight Lines, and over against one another, and to what Length and Extent he pleases" (99).

The Europeans seem to be represented as naïve children unable to imitate the profound order of the Chinese art. Temple warns "any common Hands" against attempting to repeat these "Adventures of too hard Achievement" (99). Moreover, the structural difference between the Classicist garden design and "sharawadgi" mainly consists, as Temple's also text indicates, in the *different use of numbers and numbering*. In the Western civilization numbers are used to express geometrical and astronomic space and its structure: namely, the "striated"—layered, divided, segmented—space of cities, gardens, civilized countries, and above all, the structure of archaic, as well as modern states, where everything is organized on numerical basis.[11] In contrast to this distribution, the structure designated by the

[10] Greenblatt, *Marvelous Possessions*, 122.

[11] See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Mille plateaux. Le capitalisme et la schizophrénie, 1980), trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) 474-500.

word "sharawadgi" may be said to point to the "hidden" pattern of "an autonomous arithmetic organization" that "implies neither a superior degree of abstraction nor very large quantities." According to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, this organization, in which the "number becomes a subject" and is not used chiefly for measuring, is typical of the nomadic "smooth space," which only *appears* to be "without any order or Disposition" (99).[12]

Fifty years after William Temple's essay, this was confirmed by William Chambers, who travelled to China twice. He noticed, among others, that in Chinese gardens "multiplicity of scenes" may be viewed "from different points" to "produce different representations; and sometimes, by an artful disposition, such as have no resemblance to each other."[13] In Deleuzean terms, the landscape in Chinese gardens is "deterritorialized" (that is, its direct connection with a certain territory is severed[14]), and restructured by the power of "numbering numbers" which mobilize and dynamize the movement, both real and imaginary, through the smooth space.[15] In contrast to Deleuze's and Guattari's nomadic space, the space of Chinese gardens is a *representation* of "a natural and wild View of the Country," yet even this representation can articulate the heterogeneity typical of the mobile distributions of elements in the smooth space: "I have not yet observed any Two of the little Palaces in all the grand Inclosure which are alike [...] You would think that they were formed upon the ideas of so many different countries; or that they were built at random, and made of Parts not meant for one another."[16]

These mobile and nomadic distributions start to influence the advanced picturesque garden design towards the end of the eighteenth century. A good example is Thomas Whately's authoritative and widely influential book *Observations on Modern Gardening* (1770), which was also translated into French by François Paule de Latapie (1771). Describing the replanting of the Claremont Park by Lancelot (Capability) Brown, Whately pays a lot of attention to the planting of irregular groups of trees, unified only by a similarity of "style":

[12] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 388-89, 474-500.

[13] William Chambers, *Designs of Chinese Buildings, Furniture, Dresses, Machines, and Utensils* (1757), in Hunt and Willis (eds.), *The Genius of the Place*, 1:284-85.

[14] For a more detailed discussion of "deteritorialization" see Chapters 4 and 3 of this book.

[15] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 389.

[16] Jean-Denis Attiret, *A Particular Account of the Emperor of China's Gardens near Pekin*, trans. Sir Harry Beaumont [Joseph Spence] (London: Dodsley, 1752); rpt. in Joseph Spence, *Fugitive Pieces* (London: Dodsley, 1761) 82-83.

> Each of these clumps is composed of several others still more intimately united: each is full of groupes, sometimes of no more than two trees, sometimes of four or five; and now and then in large clusters: an irregular waving line, issuing from some little croud, loses itself in the next; or a few scattered trees drop in a more distant succession from the one to the other. The intervals, winding here like a glade, and widening there into broader openings, differ in extent, in figure, and in direction; but all the groupes, the lines and the intervals are collected together into large general clumps, each of which is at the same time both compact and free, identical and various.[17]

Rather than subsuming this multiplicity to unity, Whately's text attempts to negotiate between the two organizing principles, while at the core of his description we find a heterogeneous, mobile distribution, where the random similarities of elements depend on their general diversity.

This structure, or, to be more precise, *assemblage*, is very close to Deleuze's notion of "literary machine" as a dynamic heterogeneous setup.[18] The work of art may be understood as a machine, since it has no fixed purpose, no predetermined sense (logos). Its sense is decided by our desire. Such a work is also a heterocosm: all is prefigured in it. According to Deleuze, Proust's novel has multiple identities and purposes, it is a sonata, septet, opera buffa, cathedral, clothes. All this heterogeneity is left to function, and it functions, no doubt.

In contrast to the *logos*, the rational language, whose sense must be derived from the whole to which it belongs (namely, the wholeness of the world constructed by the Reason), the landscape garden is "*antilogos*"[19] whose sense does not depend on an overall meaning but on the functioning of singularities and fragments, severed, disconnected pieces. Why should it be called machine? Because the work of art understood in this way is productive, or rather, responsible for the production of certain truths. These truths are produced in us by sets of organ machines. They are made out of our impressions, deepened in our lives and delivered in the work of art. Thus, the truth is never one but there are multiple orders of truth analogous to the orders of production. While the rhythmic aspect of planting described by Whately articulates the visual as the place of individual freedom and mobilizes the gaze of the spectator, the play of colours provides "perpetual amusement"

[17] Quoted in Walpole, *The History of Modern Taste in Gardening*, 68-69.

[18] Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* (Proust et les signes, 1964 1970 1976), trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) 146-49.

[19] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 105-15.

and the pervading "style" of planting constructs "a locus amoenus," in Whately's words, "a place wherein to tarry with secure delight."[20] All these "places," however, are deterritorialized in a smooth space, and their existence depends on the actual and imagined movements of the observers through it. As a result, in Whately's account of the picturesque gardening the terrifying monster of Asian nomadism lurking underneath the enthusiastic descriptions of Chinese gardens like Coleridge's "ancestral voices, prophesying war," is made trim, elegant and European: in other words, it becomes *assimilated*.

The way to this assimilation is quite complex and the most important landmarks on it are the two dissertations by William Chambers, which can be said to have adapted the representations of the Chinese gardens to European taste. The most important, though unnoticed, feature of Chambers's descriptions, first printed in *Designs of Chinese Buildings* and later rewritten with some small changes in *A Dissertation on Oriental Gardening* (1772), is *the comparison between Chinese gardens and the landscapes in old romances*: "Their enchanted scenes, answer, in great measure, to what we call romantic."[21] The wonder characterizing the encounter of two widely different cultures is assimilated and toned down, into a pleasant "surprise." The alien order of Chinese representations is homologized with the not yet forgotten order of chivalrous narratives, which at that time just returned into fashion. An interesting document is a period illustration (1751) to Spenser's *Faerie Queene*, with a surprising Chinese detail. At that time, Spenser's Renaissance epic was considered the representative specimen of what was thought to be the medieval romance.

Chambers's descriptions of Chinese gardens also point out their *analogies to Baroque gardens* full of miraculous automata, water-jets, light and sound effects:

> Sometimes they make a rapid stream, or torrent, pass under ground, the turbulent noise of which strikes the ear of the new-comer, who is at loss to know from whence it proceeds: at other times, they dispose the rocks, buildings, and other objects, in such a manner as that the wind passing through the different interstices and cavities, made in them for that purpose, causes strange, uncommon sounds. They introduce into these scenes all kinds of extraordinary trees, plants, and flowers, form complicated echoes, and let loose different sorts of monstrous birds and animals. [...] They frequently erect mills, and other hydraulic machines, the motions of which

[20] Thomas Whately, *Observations on Modern Gardening* (1770), quoted in Walpole, *The History of Modern Taste in Gardening*, 69.

[21] William Chambers, *A Dissertation on Oriental Gardening* (1772), in Hunt and Willis (eds.), *The Genius of the Place*, 1:284.

> enliven the scene: they have also a great number of vessels of different forms and sizes.[22]

Many of these features could have been found at that time in Italian gardens, for instance in the famous grottoes of the Villa Aldobrandini. A whole village of automata was constructed in the gardens of Lunéville in France.

Another comparison made by Chambers in the process of assimilating the otherness of the Chinese gardens, was between them and *the modern 'picturesque' gardens in continental Europe*, especially in France:

> Their regular buildings they generally surround with artificial terrasses, slopes and many flights of steps; the angles of which are adorned with groupes of sculpture and vases, intermixed with all sorts of artificial waterworks, which, connecting with the architecture, serve to give it consequence, and add to the gaiety, splendour and bustle of the scenery. [...] and they never fail to scatter antient inscriptions, verses, and moral sentences, about their grounds; which are placed on large ruinated stones, columns or marble, or engraved on trees and rocks; those situations being always chosen for them as correspond with the sense of the inscriptions; which thereby acquire additional force in themselves, and likewise give a stronger expression to the scene [...].[23]

The last sentence in particular clearly shows how Chambers applies the contemporary aesthetic of intensity to the Chinese scene, and how he tries to explain this scene in terms of the European iconography of the 'gardens of virtue' and 'gardens of pleasure,' which to a great extent depended on the connection between the scenery and inscriptions (most often quotations from well-known literary works).

Chambers's dissertations as well as his style of gardening are represented by his refashioning of the royal gardens at Kew, where he built a high pagoda in 1758 next to the Turkish pavilion called Alhambra. He introduced a style the French called *la jardin anglo-chinois*, which became a standard of picturesque gardening in continental Europe between the 1750s and the 1790s. The style was popularized by pattern books, the most famous of which was Georges-Louis Le Rouge's series of 21 collections of engravings *Détails des nouveaux jardins à la mode*, or with an alternative title, *Jardins anglo-chinois* (1776-87). Le Rouge's "Cahiers" are a loose collection of plans of gardens including buildings and pavilions, vedutas and some descriptive texts, the most important of which is

[22] Chambers, *A Dissertation on Oriental Gardening*, 1:284.
[23] *A Dissertation on Oriental Gardening*, 1:320.

the French translation of Chambers's *Designs of Chinese Buildings*. Almost every style present in the late seventeenth and eighteenth-century gardening is included: from Le Nôtre's gardens at Versailles and the designs of parterres in the Schwarzenberg gardens of Český Krumlov, to the advanced English picturesque designs at West Wycombe. Most important German developments at Steinfurt, Schwetzingen, Potsdam, and Bayreuth are also represented. The Chinese orientation of contemporary gardening is illustrated by Cahiers 14-16 composed exclusively of the vedutas of Chinese gardens. Le Rouge's pattern book, which could then be found in almost every larger aristocratic library, widely influenced the landscaping and garden architecture on the continent. Some of the designs had established the convention of the *jardin anglais* as a heterogeneous space with meandering paths leading to buildings of very different architectural styles.

In the heyday of the exotic picturesque, another work was published, containing a devastating criticism of the practices introduced by Chambers. Its author was Horace Walpole, who surprisingly admired and even imitated chinoiserie in the 1750s. At that time he wrote a Chinese romance called "Mi-Li" and published it in the collection called *Hieroglyphic Tales* (1785). The love-story is set in the environment of an English landscape garden surpassing the beauty of imperial Chinese gardens. The hero is the son of an Oriental emperor. Although Walpole originally wavered between rebuilding his country house at Strawberry Hill in a Chinese manner or in a Gothic style, two decades later he became a fierce critic of the exotic fashion. His essay *The History of the Modern Taste in Gardening* had a weighty influence in Germany (on Christian Ludwig Hirschfeld and Goethe) and may be said to have stimulated a new approach to the picturesque even in France. An influential design book (and also a guide book on the new French gardens published in three languages), Alexandre de Laborde's *Description des noveaux jardins de la France et ses ancients chateaux* (1808), demonstrates that the French and the English gardening around 1800 were almost identical in style. Despite the influence of Whately's *Observations*, the French were proud of their own traditions of the picturesque. Latapie, the translator of Whately's work into French, emphasized the early beginnings of the French picturesque gardening (its founder, Charles Dufresnay, was a contemporary of William Kent, the first important artist of English landscape gardening), and he also pointed out that the Chinese connection was established by the French Jesuits who made and published the first pictures of Chinese gardens.

In the context of pre-Napoleonic Europe, where gardening had become exceedingly tolerant to a great variety of approaches,

Walpole's text appeared as an ideological, patriotic, or even nationalistic discourse. According to the essay, the most ancient gardens, represented by the garden of Alcinous in Homer's *Odyssey*, were very close to nature, and to the principal law of utility. Here Walpole took up the argument of Pope's descriptive poem "Windsor Forest" to demonstrate that infinite variety and simplicity go well together: in Pope's pastoral, all nature is represented in the forest, and one does not have to travel to India and beyond to see marvels of nature. In the same way, the simple beauty of the garden of Alcinous is depicted by Homer as "a scene of delights more picturesque" than contemporary exotic Edens, such as Crusoe's island Juan Fernandez.[24] While the Babylonians and the Romans have departed from the Greek simplicity (Walpole criticizes the unnaturalness of Semiramis's elevated gardens and of Pliny's gardens at Tusculum), the English gardening seems to be the true inheritor of the originary Greek simplicity and beauty. Everything that may "contradict utility" is excluded: "fountains," as well as "canals measured by line" or "balustrades."[25] It is no wonder that the major English poet, Milton, is invoked as the prophet of the true style of national gardening: Walpole quotes his descriptions of the Paradise in the fourth book of *Paradise Lost* and compares them to the finest contemporary landscaping at Stourhead and Hagley. In this way, the modern English poet is represented as the inheritor of the Greek ideal of perfection, illustrated at the end of the essay by Whately's previously quoted description of the planting in the picturesque style.

Walpole searches for a middle ground between "regular formality" and "fantastic sharawadgis."[26] This means to follow William Kent who saw all landscape as a garden. Significantly, for Walpole, Kent is both a representative of the English common sense based on the understanding of the specific utility of the place, and the restorer of the Greek ideal, taking possession of the highest value of European culture. Against this style of gardening Chambers is contrasted as a superficial, fashionable architect serving the tyrannical King George III, and his Tory government. In this respect, Walpole represented himself as the spokesman of the 'country movement' opposing the power of the king and the London court. He even suggested to the poet William Mason writing a satire on Chambers in the style of Pope's *Dunciad*. The poem appeared in 1773, and described Chambers as a fallen fashionable bard, who, "like old Orpheus" came "from Hell" to

[24] Walpole, *The History of Modern Taste in Gardening*, 4.
[25] Walpole, *The History of Modern Taste in Gardening*, 10.
[26] Walpole, *The History of Modern Taste in Gardening*, 23.

"*warble truth at Court*." The achievements of his visionary, inspired art are horrifying:

> "A work of wonder, or perhaps a" Kew.
> Nor rest we here, but, at your magic call,
> Monkies shall climb our trees, and lizards crawl;
> Huge dogs of Tibet bark in yonder grove,
> Here parrots prate, here cats make cruel love;
> In some fair island will we turn to grass
> (With the Queen's leave) her elephant and ass.
> Giants from Africa shall guard the glades,
> Where hiss our snakes, where sport our Tartar maids;
> [...]
> Join we the groves of horror and affright;
> [...]
> Thy gibbets, Bagshot! shall our wants supply;
> Hounslow, whose heath sublimer terror fills,
> Shall with her gibbets lend her powder mills.
> Here too, O King of Vengeance, in thy fane,
> Tremendous Wilkes shall rattle his gold chain;
> And round that fane, on many a Tyburn tree,
> Hang fragments dire of Newgate history.[27]

In Mason's view, Chambers's style is typical of a corrupt Oriental despotic state, which has features of the British Empire, whose metropolis (and surrounding country) is devastated by the government of terror. The predicted future is even more sombre: Chambers's gardening will be responsible for the expansion of the corrupt capital into the yet unspoilt English countryside. In this way the balance between the English microcosm and the macrocosm of imperial policy is put at stake, but the King does not know about this, since he lives in the "Asiatic dream" of Oriental tyrants.

> The Eastern feature, Art must next produce,
> Though not for present, yet for future use,
> Our sons some slave of greatness may behold,
> Cast in a genuine Asiatic mould:
> [...]
> The Court have crost the stream, the sports begin;
> [...]
> Be these the rural pastimes that attend
> Great Brunswick's leisure: these shall best unbend
> His Royal mind, whene'er, from state withdrawn,
> He treads the velvet of his Richmond lawn;
> These shall prolong his Asiatic dream,
> Tho' Europe's ballance trembles on it's beam.[28]

[27] William Mason, "An Heroic Epistle to Sir William Chambers" (1773), in Hunt and Willis (eds.), *The Genius of the Place*, 1:324.

In Mason's satire and in Walpole's essay, the heterogeneous order of Oriental gardening is assimilated as a political, social, moral and aesthetic menace of Asiatic tyranny, presently unleashing its dark powers in a global scale on the British Empire. Walpole bluntly comments on the Chinese Emperor's gardens: "his majesty returns to Pekin, persuaded that he has been in the country."[29] In contrast to these attitudes typical of the "patriotic movement" of the latter part of the eighteenth century, French picturesque gardeners prefer to create a multicultural heterogeneity of styles. For instance, Louis Carrogis, called Carmontelle, the stage-designer who created the Jardin Monceau for the Duke of Chartres and wrote its description (*Jardin Monceau, près de Paris*, 1779), called his work a "quantity of curious things" and "a simple fantasy, bringing together all times and places." In his design, "sharawadgi" is assimilated as *an illusion of globalism*. Not surprisingly he calls the picturesque garden "a land of illusions."[30]

Unlike Carmontelle, Walpole restricts the use of illusion to specific "improvements" of landscape. Moreover, it is the English landscape that is the major source of the infinite variety of sceneries in English gardening. And according to Walpole's patriotic ideology, gardening can be used to support the stability of the traditional social order: it should be practiced by the owner of the estate, and should also create harmonious relationships between him and other owners, as well as his dependents, who take a share in his creative activity. However, since the most important condition of the excellence in gardening is the economic "opulence of a free country" produced by the capitalist enterprise,[31] gardening may be said to create only an illusion of social harmony, an illusion, whose chief nationalist value is the variety of local landscape and the freedom of the landowners. It is highly ironical that Walpole's essay appears almost simultaneously with Oliver Goldsmith's *Deserted Village* (1770) and its later edition (1785) follows the appearance of George Crabbe's *Village* (1783). Both poems deal with the drastic changes of the English countryside caused by the development of capitalism.

While for Walpole, "sharawadgi" is a disruptive sign in the universal, unchanging order of nature represented by the English landscape, for Chambers and his followers this sign marks the opening of the traditional zones of landscape (fields, orchards/vineyards and forests) as they had been represented in

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[28] Mason, "An Heroic Epistle to Sir William Chambers," 1:325.

[29] *The History of Modern Taste in Gardening*, 22.

[30] Quoted in John Dixon Hunt, *The Picturesque Garden in Europe* (London: Thames and Hudson / Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 2003) 121.

[31] *The History of Modern Taste in Gardening*, 38

gardening since the Renaissance. In this tradition, "sharawadgi" signifies the art of gardening as a free play, in the course of which the fixed hierarchical structures of representation are de-sedimented, and the garden is opened to the neighbouring landscape. Though Walpole may appear as a traditionalist, his refusal of "sharawadgi" is caused by a deep disbelief in British imperialism, and the accompanying fears that the empire may change into an Asiatic tyranny. As we can see, the Other implied by "sharawadgi" has two incompatible aspects: the playful, illusionist creativity and the grim triumph of global powers. Both these features may be said to haunt our present time.

6. The "Neutral Ground" of History?
THE PICTURESQUE IN *WAVERLEY* AS HETEROTOPIA

In *The Implied Reader* Wolfgang Iser uses Scott's phrase "neutral ground" to point out that Scott's historical fiction poses an alternative to conventional fiction and historiography, since it presupposes the sharing of linguistic practices and everyday manners between the past and the present. He also contends that history "can be best captured by aesthetic means," that is, by imagination, which allows the reader to grasp the reality beyond mere historical facts.[1] These assumptions do not take us far beyond Aristotle's concepts of mimesis and metaphor, humanist notions of history as the *theatrum mundi* and Lukács's view that in Scott's novels the representation of social conflict is the source of aesthetic value and the main criterion of aesthetic judgement. Instead of continuing in the exploration of "the problem of history," traced to the complex relationship between epistemology and

[1] Wolfgang Iser, *The Implied Reader* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974) 96. Cf. Paul A. Davies, "Scott's Histories and Fictions in *Waverley* and the 'Fictional Essays,'" in *Real: Yearbook of Research in English and American Literature*, ed. Herbert Grabes, Winfried Fluck and Jürgen Schläger, vol. 9 (Tübingen: Günther Narr Verlag, 1993) 31; Davis quotes Scott's paradoxical statement from the Postscript to Waverley that "the most romantic parts of this narrative are precisely those which have a foundation in fact" (340; All quotations from *Waverley* follow the text of the World Classics paperback edition by Claire Lamont [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986], the page numbers are in parentheses in the text). Cf. also Joseph Valente, "Upon the Braes: History and Hermeneutics in *Waverley*," *Studies in Romanticism*, 25.2 (Summer 1986): 271. Valente maintains that Scott's historical novel becomes "a prototype of the standard history," which is not primarily based on the faithfulness to facts but on the production of social authority by "competing histories," rather than by narratorial comments ("Upon the Braes," 271). In this way, Scott's novels are intepreted as aesthetic products of a play of various discourses orchestrated by the author and the (implied) reader. This Bakhtinian notion of "heteroglossia" establishes the fact of our identity as a product of the play of differences (Cf. Mikhail M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist [Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981] 132).

hermeneutics or between facts and romance,[2] this chapter places the "neutral ground" in *Waverley* in different structural relations typical of contemporary theories of the picturesque and also of the poststructuralist concept of other spaces, or "heterotopias."[3]

Scott did not use the term "picturesque" consistently, which nonetheless seems a general feature of its usage, marked by a great degree of "mobility and slipperiness." According to Gavin Budge, the word may indicate "a vicious habit, a principle of stylistic variety, piquancy in female beauty," or "a quality of discourse itself." It has often been connected with the authority and taste of a painter, that is, with "specialized experience" or an educated mode of perception, but also linked with the *intuition* common to professional artists as well as to amateurs, and contrasted with the generalized perspective of a philosophical observer.[4] Moreover, the term was politically ambiguous: on the one hand it was used to defend the authority of landed gentry against the subversive influence of the French Revolution,[5] on the other hand it was believed to represent individual freedom connected both with Epicurean hedonism and a high degree of professionalism, characterized by "the mind's active engagement with particular objects."[6] As a result, the word "picturesque" could be used to refer both to radical and conservative political stances, to discourses as well as discursive objects, to oddities of appearance and behaviour as well as to the professional refinement of taste. It may be said to have functioned as a "neutral ground," which, nonetheless, was a zone of contact and a battlefield.

Furthermore, the use of the term implies, as Andrew Ballantyne has shown in his analysis of Hogarth's influence on Uvedale Price's conception of the picturesque, the avoidance of naming any *general, abstract essence* of picturesque effects.[7] Ballantyne has

[2] Cf. Valente, "Upon the Braes," 251, and Davis, "Scott's Histories and Fictions," 31.

[3] Michel Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," trans. Jay Miskowiec, *Diacritics*, 16 (1986): 22-27.

[4] Gavin Budge, "Introduction," in William Gilpin, *Three Essays*, Richard Payne Knight, *The Landscape*, ed. and intro. Gavin Budge (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001) v-xii.

[5] As Stephen Daniels shows, Uvedale Price claimed that landscape gardens were a better protection against "democratic opinions [...] than twenty-thousand soldiers arm'd in proof" ("The Political Iconography of Woodland in Later Georgian England," in Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels [eds.], *The Iconography of Landscape* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988] 61).

[6] Budge, "Introduction," xiii.

[7] Andrew Ballantyne, *Architecture, Landscape and Liberty: Richard Payne Knight and the Picturesque* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 79-80: "The avowed genealogy of Price's conception of the picturesque begins with Hogarth's *Analysis of Beauty*of 1753 [...] 'Written with a view of fixing the fluctuating IDEAS of TASTE.' He isolated 'a line of beauty': a graceful serpentine curve which he believed to be characteristic in all beautiful objects an images. [...] Where Hogarth's influence was felt, the serpentine curve was understood to be beautiful in itself and if a beholder

pointed out the affinity of Price's approach to the picturesque with the treatment of Plato's concept of essence in Nietzsche's and Deleuze's philosophy: "Essence, being a perspectival reality, presupposes a plurality. Fundamentally, it is always a question of 'What is it *for me*?' (for us, for everyone that sees etc.)."[8]

Though Scott was apparently interested in both the theoretical and practical aspects of the picturesque, from the time he was writing *Waverley* there is hardly any evidence proving his familiarity with recent debates about the meaning of the term between Price, Richard Payne Knight, William Marshall, Humphry Repton and others.[9] Only later Scott referred to Price's *Essays on the Picturesque*[10] in the 1823 preface to *Quentin Durward*.[11] Afterwards he wrote a review-essay "On Landscape Gardening"[12]

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could not see the beauty in the line it was because of some bluntness of the senses. For the idea to be plausible we need to see that the cultural climate in which Hogarth's thought took shape was influenced decisively by Plato and Newton. Hogarth's suggestion of an 'essence' of beauty made sense because of the form of questioning pursued by Socrates in Plato's dialogues, which produces the illusion that there is such an essence to be found [...]. Ironically Price's lasting influence was effective precisely in so far as he escaped giving abstract answers about the 'essential' picturesque: his iteration of concrete examples, embodied in the particular and the contingent, actually communicated his vision and taste, and did so very effectively."

[8] Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) 77. Cf. Ballantyne, *Architecture, Landscape and Liberty*, 79.

[9] See e.g., Uvedale Price, *An Essay on the Picturesque as compared with the Sublime and the Beautiful* (1794-98),Richard Payne Knight, *The Landscape: A Didactic Poem* (1794), "Introduction and Postscript to the Second Edition" (1795), in William Gilpin, *Three Essays on picturesque beauty, on picturesque travel, and on sketching landscape* (1808), Richard Payne Knight, *The Landscape*, ed. and intro. Gavin Budge (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001); William Marshall, *A Review of "Landscape: A Didactic Poem" by Richard Payne Knight: also an essay on the picturesque* (1794), ed. and intro. Gavin Budge (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001),Humphry Repton, "A Letter to Uvedale Price," in *The Landscape Gardening and Landscape Architecture of the Late Humphry Repton, Esq.*, ed. and intro. J. C. Loudon, F.L.S. (1840) (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001) 104-109.

[10] A three-volume edition of Price's essays and other writings published in London in 1810.

[11] Walter Scott, *Quentin Durward*, ed. J.H. Alexander and G.A.M. Wood (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001) 9. Scott criticizes the style of gardening introduced by Lancelot (Capability) Brown, namely his overuse of "grass and gravel," which obliterated "some more ornate embellishments" of French pleasure grounds. The preface quotes Price as the authority on the picturesque who also strongly objected to Brown's approach, reclaimed in Scott's time by Humphry Repton. Scott's reference to Price is interesting, since it identifies the latter's concept of the picturesque with the attraction of antiquated styles of gardening ("sequestered garden with yew hedges, ornamental iron gates and secluded wilderness" *Quentin Durward*, 9), which, similar to the 'wild' scenes in contemporary picturesque gardening, could provide spaces for solitary, melancholy musings.

[12] *Quarterly Review* 37.24 (1828). Scott reviewed Henry Steuart's book *Planter's Guide* (1828). Later John Murray offered Scott a contract for a book on landscape gardening.

and practised this art at Abbotsford.[13] These activities, however, did not have much influence on the use of the term in his later novels. For instance, in *The Fair Maid of Perth* (1828), "picturesque" is used as a synonym for "romantic."[14] This does not differ from the well-known passage in the conclusion of the fifth chapter of *Waverley*, which documents one of the first uses of the word "picturesque" in Scott's fiction.

Having apologized to the readers of romances for inviting them to a ride by "a humble English post-chaise" instead of a flight in (Ariosto's) magic chariot "drawn by hyppogriphs [sic!]," the narrator promises to the readers to arrive "into a more picturesque and romantic country" after a few regular stops on "his majesty's highway" (24). Here, the term is used along with the word "romantic" to designate not only the tourist scenery of the Scottish Highlands, but also the romance of which the Highlands, and, in more general terms, the Scotland of the last Jacobite rebellion, were a privileged territory. This is confirmed in Chapter III, where "picturesque" refers to "many interesting passages from our old historical chronicles," (14) and in Chapter XV where the hero calls Scotland "the land of military and romantic adventures" (72). Though the first chapter of *Waverley* refuses to identify the work with any contemporary varieties of romance as a literary genre,[15] romance and its picturesque qualities remain the key items on the

[13] See Edward Malins, *English Landscaping and Literature* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 154. According to Malins, Scott's "grounds at Abbotsford witnessed the love of Price's theories," nonetheless, he also admired the conservative garden design of Sir Henry Steuart, who had "attacked the Picturesque followers." The passage from Lockhart's biography quoting an amusing explanation of the picturesque by Scott's gamekeeper Tom Purdie ("see ye there now, the sun glinting on Melrose Abbey? It's no aw bright, nor it's no aw shadows neither, but just a bit screed o'light—and a bit daud o'dark yonder like, and that's what they ca' picturesque") has only a very indirect relationship to the passage on variety and uniformity in Price's *Essay* exemplifying "very picturesque circumstances of [Milton's] sublime representation of the deity" in *Paradise Lost* as the clouds darkening a sunlit hill (Uvedale Price*, An Essay on the Picturesque*, in J.D. Hunt and Peter Willis (eds.), *The Genius of the Place* [Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1988]1:355). If Scott really was a supporter of Price's theory of the picturesque, his reasons might have been political. See footnote in this chapter.[5]

[14] "The *most picturesque* if not the highest hills, are also to be found in the county of Perth. The rivers find their way out of the mountainous region by the wildest leaps, and through the *most romantic* passes [...] the traveller finds what the poet Gray, or some one else, has termed Beauty lying in the lap of Terror [...]" (*The Fair Maid of Perth*, 16). Though the latter part of this passage may be read as a reference to Gilpin's and Price's definitions of the picturesque as a middle term between Burke's categories of the sublime and the beautiful, the style of the passage is definitely closer to that of contemporary tourist guides.

[15] Davis ("Scott's Histories and Fictions," 22) elegantly sums up these varieties: "Gothic romances, German romances [that is, tales of terror and suspense, and tales of horror], sentimental romances and 'silver-spoon' romances." Cf. *Waverley*, 3-4.

agenda until the very end of the book, where the reader learns that "the most romantic parts of this narrative are precisely those which have a foundation in fact" (340).

To understand this paradox it is helpful to consult Scott's essay on romance written for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* in 1824. Here Scott opposes the opinions of several representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment that histories, though composed in a similar way to works of literature, must be founded on "real" facts, while any inherent fictionality must be justified by a didactic purpose.[16] He shows instead that both "romance and real history have the same common origin," that is, they grow up from narratives of the destiny of families, tribes and nations:

> The father of an isolated family, *destined to rise from thence into a nation*, may indeed narrate to his descendants the circumstances which detached him from the society of his brethren, and drove him to form a solitary settlement in the wilderness, with no other deviations from truth, on the part of the narrator, than arises from the infidelity of memory, or the exaggerations of vanity. But when the tale of the patriarch is related by his children [...] the facts it contains are apt to assume a very different aspect. The vanity of the tribe augments the simple annals from one cause—the love of the marvellous, so natural to the human mind, contributes its means of sophistication, from another—while, sometimes the king and the priest find their interest in casting a holy and sacred gloom and mystery over the early period in which their power arose. And thus [...] the real adventures of the founder of the tribe bear as little proportion to the legend recited among his children, as the famous hut of Loretto bears to the highly ornamented church with which superstition has surrounded and enchased it.[17]

While history and romance have an identical origin and purpose, they are differentiated by the degree of exaggeration, hyperbolization, or sophistication, by the intervention of "the love of the marvellous" and mystery, which, nonetheless, are "so natural to human mind." Later on, Scott even admits that despite all this "romances exhibited the same system of manners which existed in the nobles of the age,"[18] denying that the fictional manipulation and transformation of 'real histories' can have any momentous effect on the search for historical truth.

[16] See Davis, "Scott's Histories and Fictions," 4-7. Davis quotes David Hume's *An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748), James Moor's "Essay on Historical Composition" (1752), Hugh Blair's *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* (1785) and Adam Smith's work with the same title (1762-63).

[17] Walter Scott, "Romance," in *Essays in Two Volumes* (Paris: A. and W. Galignani, 1828), 148-49 (emphasis added).

[18] Scott, "Romance," 187.

Though Waverley's preoccupation with romance has lead him to very dangerous situations, the narrator insists that it was not madness, but fantasies and subjectivism: not a "total perversion of intellect as misconstrues objects actually presented to the senses, but that more common aberration from common judgement, which apprehends occurrences indeed in their reality, but communicates to them a tincture of its own romantic tone and colouring" (18). It is, however, important that this subjectivism is not typical of Edward only, being shared by other heroes, as an exception confirming the commonly accepted, consensual truth, or, in Scott's words, "a more common aberration from common judgement." This pun (called *antanaclasis*) is not only an ironical figure (indicating that common judgement and sense are less common than the aberrations from them). It can also be interpreted as introducing the 'essence' of romance (indistinguishable from that of history) in a similar way to the 'essence' of the picturesque, "a perspectival reality," which "presupposes a plurality."

Scott's crucial remark may also lead to reconsidering the narrator's role in the novel. What if he is not primarily a historian but of a *historical ironist*? *Waverley* can be read as an attempt showing both the positive and the negative roles of misunderstandings not only in the hero's imaginative, "romantic" responses to historical events, but also in the reactions of other characters, be their initial motifs sincere love (as in the case of Rose Bradwardine) or political intrigue (as in the case of Fergus Mac-Ivor). The importance of historical irony and its closeness to the romance and the picturesque is confirmed by the narrator's comment made when Edward, eagerly listening to Rose Bradwardine's tale about the impending danger of the raid of the Highlanders, realizes that the tale bears "so much resemblance to one of his own day-dreams" and that Rose "had witnessed with her own eyes such a scene as he had used to conjure up in his imagination, as only occurring in ancient times" (72).

Here, the narrator compares the hero to Malvolio, who mistakes bizarre phrases in a forged letter for reality and thus becomes the victim of a practical joke. Dramatic irony in *Twelfth Night* serves in *Waverley* as a metaphor for something that cannot be so easily pinned down as the fooling of Malvolio: the irony of history. When Waverley quotes Malvolio's words "I do not now fool myself, to let imagination jade me,"[19] readers may take them for granted: only *later* they learn that Waverley's tour of the Highlands was a part of Fergus Mac-Ivor's strategy to renew the alliance with the

[19] *Twelfth Night* II, 5, 143-44. The quotation follows the text of *The Norton Shakespeare*, gen. ed. Stephen Greenblatt (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1997).

Bradwardine family, and that Fergus "took advantage of the foray of Donald Bean Lean to solder up the dispute in the manner we have mentioned" (93). *Still later* it is revealed how Donald Bean kept Waverley as a hostage, misusing Mac-Ivor's authority, how the Chevalier planned to use the hero, and how confused he was about his affections. What the readers witness is more than an "epistemological delay,"[20] the postponement of the knowledge of "historical facts" or rather their fictional representations. The problem connected with this delay is, that it leads to different interpretations, exemplified by the two reconstructions of Waverley's career made by Major Melville and Mr. Morton.[21]

All this means that unlike romance and history in Scott's encyclopaedic essay, the plot of *Waverley* does not have any unity of "origin" or "destiny." As the narrator explains in the Postscript, the only means of unifying the fictional history is the realization of the progress Scotland has made since 1745, but even this is possible only by imagining the *difference* between now and then. In doing so, the past shrinks to the vanishing point of the perspectivist scheme: "like those who drift down the stream of a deep and smooth river, we are not aware of the progress we have made until we fix our eye on the now-distant point from which we set out" (340).[22] The only way of reclaiming the past in its assumed factualness is in the form of the hypothetical *pre-cultural unity* of *human nature*.

But even this assumption differs, at least in this case, from the unifying gesture of the Enlightenment thought and comes closer to the theories of the picturesque, stressing not only the simplicity but also the infinite variety of nature.[23] Towards the end of the opening chapter the narrator declares his intention to throw "the force of my narrative upon the characters and passions of the actors" (5). This statement can also be interpreted in Derridean terms: what matters in the structure in *Waverley* is neither the closure implied in the assumption of the essential identity of human passions, nor the unity of social progress based on a common perspective and a dominant idea of the purpose of history.[24] It is the realization of

[20] Cf. Valente, "Upon the Braes," 268.

[21] See *Waverley*, Chapter 32. Cf. Davis, "Scott's Histories and Fictions," 26

[22] Cf. Valente, "Upon the Braes," 270: "Change and development only become apparent at some considerable retrospective distance from their source, yet they occur steadily and even rapidly. Thus the surface manifestations of life are misinterpreted as being stable until they come into a perspective which leaves them inevitably subject to other distortions."

[23] Cf. e.g., William Gilpin, "Essay on Picturesque Travel," in *Three Essays*, 59.

[24] See *Waverley*, Chapter 23. The "revolution" in the manners of Lowland gentry, representing the Scottish culture, is the subject of Flora Mac-Ivor's prophecy. Though the ironic narrator makes us immediately aware that this transformation will happen

meaning as an internal and unfinished history of a specific structure: "the history of the meaning of the work itself, of its *operation.*"[25]

The scope of this chapter does not allow an adequate analysis of this complex subject. Out of several approaches I have chosen Foucault's theory of the change of the status of representation, marking the end of the so-called Classical Episteme. It may be useful to begin by pointing out the significance of the distinction between Don Quixote and Edward Waverley made at the beginning of the novel. While Don Quixote is the object of representation which itself is a representation (the redoubling of representation), Waverley, not unlike de Sade's Juliette, becomes the subject of desires generated by representations (first his reading and then the events of his story) and giving force to the scenes of the novel. In Foucault's words, "it is no longer the ironic triumph of representation over resemblance; it is the obscure and repeated violence of desire battering at the limits of representation."[26] Accordingly, adolescent Waverley prefers the violence of private punishment ("any punishment short of ignominy" 19) to "the necessity of giving a cold and composed account of the ideal world in which he lived the better part of his days" (19).[27] Instead of displaying the full transgressive potential of this "*operation*" of meaning, Scott's historical irony in *Waverley* contains it by defining

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"in manner very different from what she had in her mind" (111), he does not reveal that the purpose itself will change. This is made clear only in the concluding chapter, where he envisages "the innovation" of Scotland strictly in economic terms: "the gradual influx of wealth, and extension of commerce, have since united to render the present people of Scotland a class of beings as different from their grandfathers, as the existing English are from those of Queen Elizabeth's time. The following reference to *Observations on the Present State of the Highlands of Scotland* (1804) by Thomas Douglas, Earl of Selkirk, also implies that the major purpose of Scott's "innovation" is the economic, rather than cultural, improvement of the Highlands.

[25] Jacques Derrida, "Force and Signification," in *Writing and Difference* (L'écriture et la différence, 1967), trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) 14.

[26] Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences* (Les mots et les choses, 1966) (London: Tavistock, 1970) 210. According to Foucault, the Modern Episteme is marked by the discontinuity, rupture and mystery, which stresses the meaning of history. This has an impact on the whole surface of knowledge. The general field of knowledge is no longer given by identity and difference but by the relations between the elements. As a result, the structure constituted by these elements (the history constituted by individual events) is determined functionally (by their "*operation*") and not epistemologically.

[27] Even later, when Waverley watches Flora in the picturesque scenery (reference to Claude Lorrain's paintings) of the Highland glen, and listens to her song, he experiences "the wild feeling of romantic delight" which "amounted almost to a sense of pain" (107). Not accidentally, Flora's Ossianic song refers to the arrival of Charles Edward to Scotland and the beginning of the rebellion. The transgressive power of Waverley's erotic imaginings is thus connected with the transgression of law.

the force of human passions as "the birthplace of the empirical,"[28] the reality, which is given a place by the historical narrative.

This also accounts for the connection between the picturesque and romance in the novel. In the 1830 introduction to *The Monastery* Scott is quite explicit, comparing his novel to Cooper's Leatherstocking Series: "We sympathise with his Indian chiefs and backwoodsmen, and acknowledge, in the characters he presents to us, the same truth of human nature by which we should feel influenced *if placed in the same condition*."[29]

The connection between the picturesque and romance is also evident from Scott's poetical works. For instance, the first canto of *The Lady of the Lake*, which rehearses—though in a different framework—the Highland excursion theme so prominent in *Waverley*, describes the "wondrous wild" and rugged valley of Loch Katrine overgrown with luxuriant vegetation. Here the colours of widely different flowers and trees are harmonized, and "the weather-beaten crags" heave above the quivering foliage of "grey birch and aspen." The picturesque effect is both that of romance ("a fairy dream") and that of the presence of history in the form of ruins ("[t]he fragments of an earlier world"). These fragments do not primarily refer to the geological past of the earth, but to the architectural symbols of *other cultures*. These appear in a playful passage in Stanza XI, comparing the rock formations in the basin to a "pyramid." the Tower of Babel ("Shinar"), a "cupola," "minaret" or "mosque." Visionary fragments of other cultures are signs similar to the exotic buildings and artificial ruins in landscape gardens, effecting a historical "operation" of meaning which gives location and sense to the empirical landscape. Apart from the otherness of cultures, *The Lady of the Lake* emphasizes, similar to *Waverley*, the otherness of the cultural memory itself: *its liminal position in time, between history and eternity*. In the introduction to Canto III, those who are able to tell legends of the past are compared to fragments, though of a different form and force than the architectural symbols in Canto I: "stranded wrecks" waiting

[28] Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 219. The "more common aberration from sound judgement," mentioned in Chapter 5 of *Waverley* and considered by Scott as typical of the conflation of history and romance, is not at the least variance with empirical reality: "apprehends occurrences indeed in their reality" (18). As it was demonstrated above, this "empirical reality" is created only in the process of the narrative by the technique of suspense.

[29] Cf. Alexander Welsh, *The Hero of the Waverley Novels* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963) 84 (emphasis added). Welsh is mistaken when he maintains that "history and geography in the Waverley Novels converge with a topography of mind" and that "the chief interior conflict" in the novel is that of "passion and reason" (88). Rather, the empirical reality of passions is placed in a discontinuous historical process including the misconceptions and errors of the heroes.

"on the verge of dark eternity" before they are washed away by the "ceaseless course" of the waves of time.[30] As a result, in *The Lady of the Lake* the picturesque effect is connected with the erasure of the signs of cultural memory and their transformation into more complex symbols, products of both nature and culture, both eternity and a specific historical time.

In *Waverley* this strategy of containing the transgressive potential of the picturesque by the relativization of cultural memory is not repeated. Instead, two different uses of the picturesque are evident: one intensifies the emotional and transgressive effect of the narrative, and the other deals with the picturesque in an ironic and parodical way.

The former use is exemplified by the scene in a Highland glen, where Flora Mac-Ivor sings to the hero about the arrival of Charles Edward to Scotland. The picturesque effect of this scenery is created by careful landscaping, and augmented by the theatrical power of Flora's beauty[31] as well as by her moving performance of

[30] Walter Scott, *The Lady of the Lake*, I, 12, 11, 14; III, 1, in *The Poetical Works of Sir Walter Scott*, ed. J. Logie Robertson (London: Henry Frowde, 1904) 210-11, 229.

[31] "Mossy banks of turf were broken and interrupted by huge fragments of rock, and decorated with trees and shrubs, some of which had been planted under the direction of Flora, but so cautiously, that they added to the grace, without diminishing the romantic wildness of the scene" (106). The scene resembles the mixture of the sublime with the picturesque described in Uvedale Price's *Essay*. Price argues that in these cases "the scale only, not the style of the scenery" are changed (*An Essay on the Picturesque*, in *The Genius of the Place*, 357). In *The Landscape* Richard Payne Knight claims that the picturesque effect may be achieved only by "cherishing the beauties of wild nature; by judiciously arranging them, and skilfully combining them with each other." The effect so achieved is "much superior" to painting, it relates to imitations of natural beauties "as the acting of a Garrick or a Siddons [...] to the best representation of it in a portrait" (*The Landscape*, 47n-48n). The connection between the picturesque and theatrical effect was emphasized by Knight in his controversy against those who were convinced that the picturesque was produced only by visual means ("even in painting [...] scenes not distinguished by any beautiful variety of tints and shadows, please through the medium of the imagination" *The Landscape*, 23n). In contrast to Humphry Repton, Knight believed that the greatest art should produce an "appearance of neglect and accident" which is evident in the performance of the best actors, allowing the viewer to "mistake, for a moment, the play for reality" (*The Landscape*, 48n-49n). In a later work, *An Analytical Inquiry into the Principles of Taste*, Knight is more explicit: "The English word [picturesque] refers to performance, and the objects most suited to it: the Italian and French words have their reference to the turn of mind common to painters" (4th ed. [London: Luke Hansard & Sons,1808] 148. Cf. Andrew Ballantyne, *Architecture, Landscape and Liberty*: Richard Payne Knight and the Picturesque [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997] 203-204).As Gilles Deleuze points out, acting allows us to grasp a different time, called the Aion ("the essentially unlimited past and future, which gather incorporeal events, at the surface, as effects"): "God and actor are opposed in their readings of time. What men grasp as the past and future, God lives it in its eternal presence. [...] The actor's present, on the contrary, is the most narrow [...] It is a point on a straight line which divides the line endlessly, and is itself divided into past-future [...] an unlimited past-future rises up here in an empty present which has no more thickness than the mirror.

the Ossianic adaptation of an old Highland war song. The cultural memory of the Highlands is also evoked by a reference to Roderick Morison ("Rory Dall" 106), called "the blind harper" (an clàrsair dall), [32] and thus linked with the image of Ossian. This powerful evocation does not allow any loss of cultural memory: the humorous interruption of the song by Fergus's greyhound is immediately compensated by Flora's passionate retelling of the passage Edward has "lost" (108-109). All this serves to persuade the reader that the purpose of the scene is not the gratification of the lover of the picturesque, but a forceful, transgressive assertion of Highland traditions. The mention of "Fin's [brand] in his ire" (109)[33] in the closing stanza transforms the poem, which has been identified with the picturesque scenery and Flora's beauty, into a declaration of war.

In contrast to this, another picturesque scenery in the novel, that of Tully-Veolan, does not allow a straightforward reading. This seems to correspond with Price's definition of picturesque objects which are "interesting to the cultivated eye" not because of their "smoothness or grandeur" but due to their "intricacy, [...] sudden and irregular deviations, [...] variety of forms, tints and shadows."[34] Though the overall view from the balcony of Rose's room reveals a number of picturesque details and "scenes,"[35] such as the "wooded glen" with a river, the rocks, including "an

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[...] The actor thus actualizes the event [...] delimits the original [...] and keeps from the event only its contour and splendor, becoming thereby the actor of one's own events—a *counteractualization*" (*The Logic of Sense* [Logique du Sens, 1969], trans. Mark Lester, ed. Constantin V. Boundas [New York: Columbia University Press, 1999] 61, 150). In Knight's poem the connection between different forms of time and the theatrical nature of the picturesque is only hinted at when he mentions the "accidental character" of a country evident "from the style of husbandry, building and planting of its inhabitants" (*The Landscape*, 44n). This can be interpreted as being sensitive to individual events, instead of tracing general historical features of a culture.

[32] In the "Song to MacLeod of Dunvegan" (Oran do MhacLeòid Dùn Bheagain; Oran Mór Mhic Leòid) Roderick Morison (?1656-?1714) bitterly satirized the son of his deceased patron, Roderick MacLeod for living in London and spending his fortune on French fashions. See Roderick Watson, *The Literature of Scotland* (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1984) 154-55, and Derick Thomson, *An Introduction into Gaelic Poetry* (1952) rpt. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001) 152-53.

[33] Cf. *Fingal*, Book III: "Fingal, burning in his wrath [...] whirled the lightning of his sword." *The Poems of Ossian and Related Works*, ed. Howard Gaskill (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996) 77.

[34] Uvedale Price, *An Essay on the Picturesque*, in *The Genius of the Place*, 1: 356.

[35] According to Joseph Heely's *Letters on the Beauties of Hagley, Envil and the Leasowes* (1777), "scenes must be 'organized from one particular point,' in this imitating a painting and ignoring the wide-angle, wrap around experience of the human gaze" (John Dixon Hunt, *The Picturesque Garden in Europe* [London: Thames and Hudson, 2003] 64). In contrast to Heely's expectation that while approaching picturesque objects every step will excite pleasure, in *Waverley*, the curiosity is often connected with disillusionment, as in the description of the architecture of the Manor-House at Tully-Veolan.

impending crag" called St. Swithin's Chair, a "noble though ruined tower," rising "from the dell with massive or spiry fronts," the lake and a distant prospect closed by "a ridge of [...] blue hills" (59), the village itself, its inhabitants and even the manor house of the Bradwardines, present not only an ironic, but a "depressing" (33) *parody of the picturesque*. The chaotic dispersion of huts, "miserable in the extreme," the rough road where almost naked, howling children "lay sprawling" among a pack of barking dogs, the enclosures overgrown with nettles, hemlock and thistles and called, ironically, "the hanging gardens of Tully-Veolan," and many other details (32-34), do not allow the perception of any "beautiful or striking manner" in which "trees, buildings and water, &c., may be disposed, grouped and accompanied."[36] The only detail resembling the models of the picturesque, "Italian forms of landscape" are a few "village girls, returning from the brook or well with pitchers and pails," but here again the narrator ironically collapses the difference between the decorative figures and the bleak landscape. He also ridicules the vain search of the English lover of the picturesque for some "*comfortable*" features (33) of the rough scenery. The passage refers to William Gilpin's essays, mentioning "roughness" as the principal feature of the picturesque but immediately adding that this roughness should not be "squalid."[37] This is certainly the case of Tully-Veolan and its dwellers.

Though the hero tries to see all this chaos and misery in a positive light, discerning the "rough, but remarkably intelligent" features of the villagers and realizing that "poverty and indolence, [...] were combining to depress the natural genius and acquired information of a hardy, intelligent and reflecting peasantry" (33), he is surprised over and over again by unexpected grotesque and incomprehensible features and events. The bewildering complexity of his experience is epitomized in the character of Davie Gellatly, whose "wild, unsettled and irregular expression" does not remind Edward of the picturesque, despite its natural beauty, but reveals a "compound of [...] idiocy [...] with the extravagance of crazed imagination" (38). In other words, the "happy union of simplicity and variety" characteristic of the picturesque,[38] is replaced by a

[36] Price, *An Essay on the Picturesque*, 1:351. Though Gilpin contends that "even barren country may be picturesque," he refers mainly to the colours of the vegetation, the play of light and shadow, or the dispersion of grazing cattle ("Essay on Picturesque Travel," in *Three Essays*, 55), which imagination may find beautiful.

[37] William Gilpin, "Essay on Picturesque Beauty," in *Three Essays*, 8

[38] Gilpin, "Essay on Picturesque Beauty," In *Three Essays*, 28. According to Knight, though "filth and tattered rags" may "give pure delight, and please without offence" in paintings, still "art and nature love the same," that is, "the tints of beauty and the forms of grace" (*The Landscape*, 18-19).

problematic, irrational heterogeneity of expressions, manners, opinions, styles and cultures.

The absence of a unifying order that would interpret the natural and social landscape of Tully-Veolan attracts our attention to the specific nature of this place which is no mere location or limit but a place similar to those, which Michel Foucault calls "heterotopias." According to John Joughin,

> heterotopias are places at which the dislocated fragments congregate, and as such they are clearly implicated in re-mapping an epistemological space where discontinuity prevails—facilitating the (counter)histories and the doubled and divided identities to which Foucault's essay alludes. Such counter-sites can be most productively viewed as a history of crises [...] or as Terry Eagleton puts it "a particular set of articulations of that history."[39]

As a heterotopia, Tully-Veolan is close to the modern concept of garden as a site of contested meanings, subject to the pull of numerous discursive fields, or as a zone of contact between antagonistic landscapes, wild and agricultural.[40] Moreover, it is a zone of contact between the widely different cultures of the Highlands and the Lowlands, and later between Scottish and English culture. It is a space, in which the real sites and features of these cultures—picturesque landscapes, Gothic ruins, manor houses, hermits' caves, pastoral sceneries, old Scotch ditties and ballads, Renaissance chivalrous epic, Shakespeare's plays, Jacobite songs and toasts, witch-trials, the *creaghs* of the Highlanders and even the grandeur of a Highland chief[41]—"are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted."[42]

Evidently, the subversive potential of this heterotopia is difficult to contain. Although the narrator denounces the world calling it an "admirable compound of folly and knavery" (56) he soon attempts to solve the situation making a seemingly positive, ironic gesture:

[39] John J. Joughin, "Shakespeare's Other Spaces: the Counter-sites of *Measure for Measure*," *Litteraria Pragensia*, 12.23 (2002): 151. Terry Eagleton, *Walter Benjamin, or, Toward a Revolutionary Criticism* (London: Verso, 1981) 81.

[40] See John Dixon Hunt, *Greater Perfections: The Practice of Garden Theory* (London: Thames and Hudson, 2000) 76. Hunt refers to the Italian Renaissance notion of garden as "terza natura" (third nature), a space different from "the first nature" (wilderness), and "the second nature" (agricultural land). At the same time he points out that modern gardens (since the Renaissance) represent all these natures in zones (*Greater Perfections*, 32-33, 55).

[41] Though Evan Dhu Maccombich speaks "good English," the beginning of his description of Fergus Mac-Ivor is grotesque: "Ah! if you Saxon Duinhé wassal (English gentleman) saw but the chief himself with his tail on!" "With his tail on? " echoed Edward in some surprise. "Yes, with all his usual followers, when he visits those of the same rank" (75).

[42] Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," 24.

for Baron and Edward history becomes a subject of pleasant, amusing conversation, "a neutral ground" where they meet as the representatives of the past and the present, Scotland and England. Their chat hardly makes any sense: it can only gratify Baron's "self-respect" and nourish Edward's daydreaming. Nonetheless, the metaphors of "sketch" (important in William Gilpin's theory[43]) and "painting" (used for instance by Uvedale Price[44] and others), characterizing Baron's and Edward's approaches to history, refer the problematic theme of history back to the aesthetic of the picturesque. As a result, in Tully-Veolan the picturesque is inverted and contested: the misery of the village cannot be redeemed by the dreamy paintings of Waverley's imagination, and the sketch, as the main means of the picturesque representation, is degraded to "cool, dry and hard outlines" of Bradwardine's memory.

Moreover, the link established between the picturesque and the representations of history has another, overtly political and social implication voiced in contemporary discussions about the term. In Tully-Veolan the "neutral ground" of history does not signify aristocratic (or gentlemanly) *impartiality* based on unshaken *political authority*.[45] This attitude often connected with the picturesque was problematized by William Marshall,[46] and,

[43] Gilpin, "Essay on Sketching Landscapes," In *Three Essays*, 61. According to Gilpin sketching is analogous to scholarly writing, one of his major purposes being to catch "the characteristic features of a scene in general shapes" (64). Though Scott does not coincide with Gilpin in all points he still describes the "matter of fact" approach of Baron Bradwardine as "the cold, dry, hard outlines, which history delineates" (57).

[44] Price, *An Essay on the Picturesque*, 1:351: "we may look upon pictures as a set of experiments of the different ways in which trees, buildings, water, &c. may be disposed, grouped and accompanied in the most beautiful and striking manner [...] many of those objects, that are scarcely marked as they lie scattered over the face of nature, when brought together in the compass of the small space of canvas, are forcibly impressed upon the eye [...]." In contrast to Price, who discusses composition as a significant distribution of singularities, the narrator of *Waverley* sees painting romantically as an analogue of the work of a dramatist (and also of the notion of history in Foucault's Modern Epistheme as the process giving place to empirical realities), which "gives light and life to the actors and speakers of the drama of past ages" (57). While Price and most other theorists of the picturesque (with the exception of Richard Payne Knight—see footnote[31] in this chapter) envisage the distribution of singularities mostly in spatial terms, Scott sees it in the temporal, dramatic terms so typical of Romanticism.

[45] John Barrell shows that "the prospect view," connecting the person of authority with his inferiors, was linked "to contemporary justifications of the landed gentleman's political authority" (*English Literature in History 1730-1780* [London: Hutchinson, 1983] 153. According to Gavin Budge, the impartiality of the gentleman was guaranteed by the *natural* origin of the gentleman's revenue (from the land, and not from trade). "Introduction," in William Gilpin, *Three Essays*, vi-vii.

[46] See Budge, "Introduction," viii. Marshall argued that the picturesque writers require a gentlemanly amateur to look on the landscape with a "professional eye," but professionalism in general was inconsistent with the status of a gentleman. As a

philosophically, by the Scottish School of Common Sense (Thomas Reid).[47] In this framework, the "neutral ground" of history in *Waverley* can be made significant both in aesthetic and social terms, since it problematizes the structural model where a central, impartial observer and his overall perspective view give unity to landscape and/or history.

Accentuating the temporal dimension and historical implications of picturesque variety and heterogeneity may also reveal the importance of fortuitous, "transversal" links between disjointed, fragmentary events for the formation of cultural memory which does not unify and synthesize but confirms the difference of singularities.[48] This is manifested in some later novels, where Scott invents a number of interlocutors who not only discuss the relation between historical facts and imaginative fiction, but are also credited to have written parts of some novels, or their imitations, or even the whole series.[49] The wrangling fictitious voices of Rev. Dr. Jonas Dryasdust, Peter Pattieson, Jedediah Cleishbotham, Jonathan Oldbuck of Monkbarns, Captain Cuthbert Clutterbuck and Laurence Templeton do not merely relativize the hierarchy of fact and fiction, but they also point out the importance of "transversal" links of fragmentary "little stories" in Scott's earlier historical novels.

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result, the specialization of taste required by the picturesque theorists may also lead to the decay of taste.

[47] According to Budge ("Introduction," xiii), the central feature of the approach of the Common Sense School was the refusal to privilege the position of a philosophical observer and the emphasis on the mind's active engagement with particular objects.

[48] See Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* (Proust et les signes, 1964 1970 1976), trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) 144.

[49] In the introduction to *The Betrothed* Laurence Templeton, a fictitious antiquary, has the intention to form a joint-stock company which would write and publish "the class of works called the *Waverley Novels*." Quoted in Davis, "Scott's Histories and Fictions," 16n.

7. Between Hoax and Ideology
PHANTASMS AND SIMULACRA IN COLERIDGE'S THEORY OF IMAGINATION

In the introduction to the thirteenth chapter of *Biographia Literaria* Coleridge indicates that his philosophical approach is different from traditional metaphysics. Metaphysics explains the unity of the world in two ways: either on the basis of a single spiritual essence ("intelligence"), which is the origin and primary cause (God), main principle and final purpose (Good),[1] or as an interplay of two principles—matter and entelechy (final cause, or the power determining the forms of individual creatures and things) according to Leibniz,[2] or Descartes's matter and motion.[3] While these thinkers assume "intelligence already existing and complete," the approach typical of what Coleridge calls "transcendental

[1] Cf. the first epigraph to Chapter 13 of *Biographia Literaria* from Book V of Milton's *Paradise Lost* (l. 469ff.) The single spiritual essence is connected with individual things and creatures by the Great Chain of Being, thanks to which they can ascend from material to spiritual forms of existence. In this system, the spiritual essence is self-sufficient: A.O. Lovejoy maintains that according to Milton's tract *De Doctrina Christiana*, God is perfect in Himself, not through His creation, and that humans can approximate his perfection only when pursuing their spiritual self-improvement. "[T]he original act of creation was not merely belated but also extremely restricted," at first only to "spiritual essences" (e.g., angels), and only later, after their fall, to Man and beings of lower orders. The relation of Man to God, angels and even to lower creatures is strictly hierarchized and regulated. (*The Great Chain of Being* [Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1964] 164-65; cf. 160-63). As a result, Milton's notion is an example of a radical monism, a unity which does not need plurality for its own materialization. This concept of unity of the world as the Absolute Subjectivity of God was carried to extremes (the absurd and evil nature of this unity) by Byron in his mystery *Cain* (1821).

[2] Coleridge quotes Leibniz's books *De Ipsa Natura* (On Nature Itself, 1698) and *Specimen Dynamicum* (An Essay in Dynamics, 1695).

[3] Coleridge's free paraphrase of Schelling's reference to Descartes's treatise *Le Monde* (The World, 1629-33). Coleridge substitutes Descartes's concept "extension" by the term "matter."

philosophy" (and derives from Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism*) may represent intelligence's "history to the mind from its birth to its maturity."[4] A dialectical nature of this history is evident from Thesis VIII in the preceding chapter:

> Since the spirit is not originally an object, and as the subject exists in antithesis to an object, the spirit cannot originally be finite. But neither can it be a subject without becoming an object, and, as it is originally the identity of both, it can be conceived neither as infinite, nor finite exclusively, but as the most original union of both. In the existence, in the reconciling and recurrence of this contradiction consists the process of the mystery and production of life.[5]

Despite this rather consistent monism (manifesting itself in Coleridge's emphasis on the origin of the whole process in the Absolute Subjectivity of God),[6] the opening reflections on imagination in Chapter 13 of *Biographia Literaria* may be read in a different, pluralistic key. Let us start from Coleridge's assumption that he will make "the world of intelligences" appear "with the whole system of their representations."[7] This can also imply that the unity of the world is the result of its innumerable projections. Contrary to Leibniz, this unity is not granted by the freely creating God, whom other spirits resemble as true copies, and by the harmony of this centralized, "state-like" organization with the innumerable worlds existing in the perceptions of monads.[8]

[4] S.T. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria* (1817), ed. John Shawcross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907) 1:196.

[5] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1:185.

[6] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*,, 1:183 and footnote: "But if we elevate our conception to the absolute self, the great eternal I AM, then the principle of being, and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality; the ground of existence, and the ground of the knowledge of existence, are absolutely identical: Sum quia sum; I am, because I affirm myself to be; I affirm myself to be, because I am." "[I]ndeed, in the very first revelation of his absolute being, Jehovah at the same time revealed the fundamental truth of all philosophy, which must either commence with the absolute, or have no fixed commencement; that is, cease to be philosophy." Importantly, Coleridge's tautological explanation refers not only to "a WILL, or primary ACT of self-duplication" (185), but also to the notion of sign as an unproblematic unity of a signifier and a signified. The problem of representation as a possibility of existence is a theme of following Coleridge's considerations, which accept Kant's hypothesis about the possibility of the existence of sensuously unrepresentable concepts (in a treatise entitled *De mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma et principiis*—On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World, 1770). While Coleridge only substantiates Kant's notion of "intuition" (Ansicht), Kant's reflection is deeper, pointing out the error leading to the confusion of the "incapacity in the nature of man" for "an incongruity or impossibility of the object" (Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 190n; cf. Thesis X, 189-90).

[7] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 196.

[8] See G.W. Leibniz, *Monadologie* (1714), trans. Heinrich Köhler (Frankfurt / M. and Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 1996) 86-87 (§§ 84 and 86): These "spirits" originate in God's

Instead of subordinating the multiplicity of worlds to the unitary system of representation, Coleridge attempts to explain it by means of speculative genealogy, which shows Schelling's influence. He postulates the existence of "two contrary forces, the one of which tends to expand infinitely, while the other strives to apprehend or *find* itself in this infinity."[9] The dynamic unity of these forces, called by Coleridge "one power," can be understood by us only "intuitively." This unity is neither a universal principle nor a central concept (neither Kant's Pure Reason nor his moral Law): it has a *differential* nature. The two forces constituting it do not work in a determined and limited space and time. Being the *a priori* "conditions of all possible directions" as well as "infinite" and "indestructible," they cannot neutralize one another. Their interplay causes what Coleridge terms "a tertium aliquid, or finite generation."[10]

The finite generation consists of beings and things, which are no mere sensuous ideas. They seem to be the "effects" (Deleuzean term) of unconsciously operating (and, indeed, only speculatively suggested) forces, or concretizations of differential relationships between them in diverse spatio-temporal relations.[11] According to

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election of "some common or sensitive souls" and in their elevation to "the level of reason." As a result, these souls "are no longer machines," but God's "subjects." They "create the most perfect state, possible only under the reign of the most perfect prince." Cf. an annotated English translation: *G.W. Leibniz's Monadology*, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Chicago: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991).

[9] *Biographia Literaria*, 196. Coleridge's rather clumsy opposition should be understood as a relationship of *infinitely divisible* quantities: if one of the forces is infinitely expanding, the other is "finding" itself in an infinite number of permanently dividing points, since neither the direction nor the orientation of this expansion are given in advance. Kant's treatise *An Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Quantities into Philosophy*(Ein Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen, 1763), referred to by Coleridge, is based on the understanding of these quantities in terms of differential calculus and emphasizes their importance for the solution of problems of "space, motion and infinitesimal quantities" (*Biographia Literaria*, 196, 197).

[10] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 197-98. Traditionally oriented scholars interpret Coleridge's forces as energy (life force, creative power) and reflecting consciousness as the highest product of organic growth (cf. M.H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp* [New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1961], Chapters VII and VIII). This concretization, however, neglects an important fact about the differential nature of the relation. According to D.W. Smith, in such a relation the quantities "have no determined value but [...] nevertheless are determined reciprocally in that relation." From the identification of elements one must advance to the determination of the nature of their structural relationship. This relationship then determines "the topological space of a given structure" ("Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality," in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader,* ed. Paul Patton [Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1996] 52 n).

[11] D.W. Smith has demonstrated, that, as early as 1790, Salomon Maïmon suggested (in his *Essay in Transcendental Philosophy*—Versuch über die transzendentale Philosophie) "an essential revision of Kant" consisting of the return to Leibniz's theory of "les

Gilles Deleuze, these effects can be interpreted as *signs*, which are not "a sensible being, nor even a purely qualitative being (*aistheton*), but the being *of* the sensible (*aistheteon*)." This "being *of* the sensible" poses a question of its own limits as "an immanent Idea or differential field beyond the norms of common sense and recognition."[12]

The problematic nature of Coleridge's concept of imagination, the clash between its declared monism and "enveloped" or "implicated"[13] pluralism, is evident in the central part of Chapter 13 of *Biographia Literaria*. This part does not take the form of a philosophical text. It is a literary hoax, a letter from an invented friend or reader, who advises Coleridge to delete from his book the chapter on imagination, having more than one hundred pages. The letter gives weighty and practical reasons for this action: the chapter would not only confuse readers but also make the book much longer, more expensive and thus inaccessible to the wider public. The fictitious friend therefore recommends Coleridge to print only his theses, and incorporate the chapter into his "announced treatises on the Logos or communicative intellect in Man and Deity."[14] However, Coleridge never wrote these books.

The position of Coleridge's fictitious friend is ambiguous. On the one hand, he refers to Coleridge's theory as "so directly the reverse of all I had ever been accustomed to consider as truth." On the other hand, he admits to have been as enchanted by Coleridge's treatise as by mythical poetry inspired by divine power:

> —An orphic tale indeed,
> A tale *obscure* of high and passionate thoughts

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petites perceptions" and its substantial revaluation. According to Maïmon, these "unconscious perceptions constitute the 'ideal genetic elements' of perception" or "the differentials of consciousness." These differentials were later called by Deleuze "Ideas" or "Essences" (D.W. Smith, "Deleuze's Theory of Sensation," 35). Maïmon was not the only philosopher who had returned to Leibniz after the publication of Kant's Critiques. Schelling also wrote about the necessity of this return in 1797, in his *Ideas of the Philosophy of Nature*, which Coleridge knew and quoted in *Biographia Literaria*.

[12] Smith,"Deleuze's Theory of Sensation," 34. Smith emphasizes Deleuze's reading of Kant's Analytics of the Sublime (see Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgement* [Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790], trans. James Creed Meredith [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952] 119 (§ 29):The sublime "is an object [of nature] the representation of which determines the mind to regard the elevation of nature beyond our reach as equivalent to a presentation of ideas"). Cf also the concept of "the signs of art" in Part I of Deleuze's book *Proust and Signs* (Proust et les signes, 1964, 1970, 1976), trans. Richard Howard, second edition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) 39-51.

[13] See Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 16: "[…] the only profound meaning is the one that is enveloped, implicated in an external sign."

[14] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1:200.

To a *strange* music chaunted![15]

In Coleridge's hoax, the signs of an unwritten philosophical treatise, which should deduce the unity of imagination from the unity of the Absolute Idea, become, to use Deleuze's phrase, "the signs of art." The fictitious reader is forced to interpret something that "*is communicated violently from one faculty to another, but does not form a common sense*." In this way Daniel W. Smith characterizes Deleuze's reading of the "Analytic of the Sublime" in Kant's Third Critique. The signs of art cannot be explained empirically, but they can be "felt or sensed [...] from the transcendental point of view" as "the differential limit[s]" of human sensibility.[16]

Consequently, Coleridge's hoax does not have to be interpreted as a mere trick, performed in order to avoid the philosophical elaboration of the notion of imagination. Rather, it is a liberating gesture, giving art a position above philosophy, and a different dimension to the preceding metaphysical reflections and the following definition of imagination. This gesture is also an "involuntary sign,"[17] which forces us to seek a deeper meaning of the imagination.

The fictitious reader does not characterize Coleridge's treatise on imagination only by an extract from a poem. The verse passage is preceded by another (and entirely invented) quotation, allegedly from pp. 52 and 53 of the manuscript. This quote is an expanded figure of speech, a sequence of symbolic metaphors, comparing the inside of one of "our light airy modern chapels of ease" to the dark and vast interior of a monumental Gothic cathedral seen on a tempestuous night through flashes of moonlight. This sublime architecture evokes feelings of grandeur and reverence and also "a chilly sensation of terror,"[18] since its structure and ornaments lose their fixed religious and historical meaning in the spectral play of lights and shadows. Moreover, the building itself becomes spectral in the play of "surface effects" and "phantasms"[19]:

[15] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1:199-200. Coleridge has used a slightly modified passage from his own poem "To a Gentleman" (1807; often published under the title "To William Wordsworth") celebrating Wordsworth's *Prelude*.

[16] Smith, "Deleuze's Theory of Sensation," 34. See Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 52, 113. Only art can give us a real unity, the unity of non-material signs and wholly spiritual meaning. This unity of sign and sense "appearing in the work of art" is called "the Essence" by Deleuze. This essence is "the highest and absolute difference."

[17] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 15 (cf. footnote [13] in this chapter).

[18] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1:199.

[19] Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* (Logique du Sens), trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) 4-5, 256-57.

> suddenly emerging into broad yet visionary lights with coloured shadows of fantastic shapes, yet all decked with holy insignia and mystic symbols; and ever and anon coming out full upon pictures and stone-work images of great men, with whose *names* I was familiar, but which looked upon me with countenances and an expression, the most dissimilar to all I had been in the habit of connecting with those names. Those whom I have been taught to venerate as almost super-human in magnitude of intellect, I found perched in little fret-work niches, as grotesque dwarfs; while the grotesques, in my hitherto belief, stood guarding the high altar with all the characters of Apotheosis. In short, what I had supposed substances were thinned away into shadows, while everywhere shadows were deepened into substances.[20]

In contrast to the Kantian sublime, whose purpose is to find the certainty of the moral law in human beings, Coleridge's passage produces a feeling of indistinct terror referred to in Edmund Burke's theory of the sublime. This terror obscures the rational implications of Coleridge's symbolic image, darkens the common sense and shatters the values formed by traditional education: religious sentiment and reverence to spiritual authorities. As a result, the sense, attributed to imagination in Coleridge's hoax is clearly subversive.

Yet the passage describes nothing other than the action of what Coleridge, in the conclusion of the chapter, calls "a secondary imagination." This power "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and unify. It is essentially *vital*, even as all objects (*as* objects) are essentially fixed and dead."[21] Nonetheless, even in the invented letter, where the lifeless stone statues are transformed into grotesque dwarfs, and equally grotesque creatures acquire features of divinity, imagination may be said "to idealize and unify." However, this idealization and unification is incompatible with the existing notions of greatness and sacred values. Instead of the world of bodies and objects and of generally accepted values, imagination creates a new world of *events and surface effects*. Starting from Lucretius's atomism, these effects are called simulacra and phantasms.[22]

[20] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1:199.
[21] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1:202.
[22] Cf. Gilles Deleuze, "The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy," in *The Logic of Sense*, 274, 275, 260. While bodies are, according to Lucretius, composed of atoms, simulacra are "second-degree compounds" emitted by bodies in a time "smaller than the minimum of sensible time." Therefore they cannot be directly perceived, only when they create a sensuously perceptible image, called phantasm, which then "stands for the object itself" that originally emitted it. Simulacra and phantasms therefore do not depend on objects, they are not signifiers with fixed signifieds. They

The grotesqueness of phantasms in the letter of Coleridge's fictitious friend is not arbitrary. The event which appears in the phantasm "is the movement by which the ego opens itself to the surface and liberates the a-cosmic [that is, unintegrated in the order of the universe], impersonal and pre-individual singularities which it had imprisoned." These phantasms are of symbolic nature and "have only an indirect and tardive relation to language." They can be verbalized only after they happen and by means of ready-made grammar structures.[23]

Nonetheless, even this verbalization—that is, Coleridge's text—can reveal changes in the relations between signifiers and signifieds. Fixed signifiers, "nouns," are replaced by floating signifiers. Not even signifieds have a clear identity, they are what Deleuze calls the "*floated signified*."[24] The structure based on consensual relationships between perception and language, between concrete signifiers and abstract signifieds, is substituted by a dynamic field of images. This field is an integrating component of the work, its unifying "point-of-view," its style and essence.[25]

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are independent, non-material signs, the "signs of art" (cf. *Proust and Signs*, 50), which, at the same time, are the *intensities* of sensuous perceptions. They are signs, whose meaning is based on the differences of imperceptible stimuli, and may be said to unify the duality of aesthetics: the contradiction between "the theory of sensibility as the form of possible experience" and "the theory of art as the reflection of real experience." Deleuze points out that phantasms represent neither an action nor a passion, but the results of action and passion, that is, pure events. Though he distinguishes between phantasms as "surface effects" and simulacra as "the objects of depth," this distinction functions rather in terms of values than in terms of space: the simulacra on the surface appear as if in depth in contrast to the deified "idols" that are "the objects of heights." None of these "objects," however, resemble things in the natural world. (*The Logic of Sense*, 210, 216).

[23] Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 213, 216.

[24] Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 49-50: "And then there is on the other side a kind of *floated signified*, given by the signifier 'without being thereby known,' without being thereby assigned or realized." In this way, Lévi Strauss shows, the word "mana" functions, but also common pronouns, such as "this" or "something." These signifieds represent "a value in itself void of sense and thus susceptible to taking on any sense, whose unique function would be to fill the gap between the signifier and the signified." Here Deleuze quotes Lévi-Strauss's preface to the writings of Marcel Mauss ("Introduction à l'œuvre de Marcel Mauss," in Marcel Mauss, *Sociologie et anthropologie* [Paris: P.U.F., 1950] 48-49).

[25] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 110-11: The explicated Essence is neither the Logos revealing itself in the world, nor "the seen ideality that unites the world into a whole and introduces the perfect mean into it," but "a kind of a superior *view-point*, an irreducible view-point that signifies at once the birth of the world and the original character of a world. It is in this sense that the work of art always constitutes and reconstitutes the beginning of the world, but also forms a specific world absolutely different from the others and envelops a landscape or immaterial site quite distinct from the site where we have grasped it. [...] objectivity can no longer exist except in the work of art; it no longer exists in significant content as states of the world, nor in ideal signification as stable essence, but solely in the signifying formal structure of the work, in its style." See also Chapters 3 and 9 of this book.

The shift from chaos, where a "substance" cannot be distinguished from a "shadow," to this aesthetic integration, is marked by two quotations from poems. The first is from Milton's *Paradise Lost* and describes how Satan saw a strange "Fantasm" at the gate of Hell, a being of a substance "that shadow seem'd" and a "shape [...] that shape had none / Distinguishable in member, joynt, or limb." When the indistinct spectre haughtily answered his question, Satan started a fierce fight with him. They were separated only by a monster called Sin, which explained to Satan that the spectre was his "only son" begotten with her and named Death.[26] While in Milton's story the phantasm of Death is identified with dark, chthonic forces of chaos[27] and the with dissolution of moral and cosmic order, in Coleridge's allusion, the phantasm signifies a moment of crossing a boundary between the world

[26] John Milton, *Paradise Lost*, Book II, ll. 742, 669, 666-68, 728, 765, 804. *The Poems of John Milton*, ed. Helen Darbishire (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) 217-20.

[27] Milton's "Sin" has the form of Scylla in Homer's *Odyssey*. According to Greek myths, Scylla was a daughter of Phorcis or Hecate and Charybdis. (Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths* [Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961] 2:368). According to Lévi-Strauss's analysis of the Oedipus myth, the opposition "chthonic—autochthonous" has a crucial importance for the formulation of an analogy between the order of microcosm (kinship and social relations) and the order of macrocosm: "The inability to connect two kinds of relationships [the chthonic, that is, the dependence of the humans on the earth from which they were born, and the autochthonous, in which they can free themselves from this dependence] is overcome (or rather replaced) by the assertion that contradictory relationships are identical inasmuch as they are both self-contradictory in a similar way" (Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* [Anthropologie structurale, 1958], trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke C. Schoepfe [New York: Basic Books, 1963] 216).

Although the contradiction between the chthonic and the autochthonous origin of mankind cannot be solved in itself, Lévi-Strauss shows that a logical correlation, depending on an analogy can be formed: "the overrating of blood relations is to the underrating of blood relations as the attempt to escape autochthony is to the impossibility to succeed in it. Although experience contradicts theory, social life validates cosmology by its similarity of structure. Hence cosmology is true (216)." This is, according to Lévi-Strauss, "a provisional formulation of the structure of mythical thought" (216). In contrast to Milton's poem, where the analogy between the two oppositions (chthonic—autochthonous; Satan's misrule—God's order) functions exactly according to Lévi-Strauss's structural theory as the verification of the divine cosmic order, in Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound* and in some poems by Blake the correspondence between macrocosm and microcosm is represented subversively as the relationship imposed by an usurper of sacred power (Shelley's Jupiter and Urizen in several Blake's prophetic poems). The shapeless phantasm of Death in Milton's *Paradise Lost* can be understood as a precursor of Demogorgon in *Prometheus Unbound*. As Tilottama Rajan shows, Shelley's representation of Demogorgon as a thinking being is made empty in order to show his "active" existence as "a linguistic constitution" ("Deconstruction or Reconstruction: Reading Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*," in *Romanticism: A Critical Reader*, ed. Duncan Wu [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1995] 205). This "constitution" is closer to Foucault's discourse than to de Saussure's *la langue*, distinguished by a fixed structure of rules. Both Shelley's and Blake's works can be read as projects of liberation of a creative potential of language and universal creative forces active in humans.

ordered by authoritative representations and the world of created by the imagination. The second quotation from Coleridge's own poem addressed to Wordsworth expresses the feelings of wonder at this new world, caused by the reading of *The Prelude*. The extract thematizes the author's vision as "[a]n orphic tale," which has an obscure meaning. This meaning emerges as an effect of intensities of individual phantasms (emotional ideas or, in Coleridge's words, "passionate thoughts"). Rather than a representation of a certain thought or activity, it is a music.[28]

Coleridge's hoax thus becomes an important parable of the nature and working of the imagination. The invented letter is a fragment searching a new form for its fulfilment, a form that "mobilizes—renders mobile—the whole, even while interrupting it in various ways."[29] In this respect it comes close to the most daring romantic visions of the new art, especially to the notions of fragment and romantic irony in the work of Friedrich Schlegel.

However, the closing part of Chapter XIII of *Biographia Literaria* does not confirm this tendency at all. Instead of an ambitious romantic vision of art the text gives a formalized definition, whose main purpose is to eliminate all relations of imagination to simulacra and phantasms. Here Coleridge returns to the traditional metaphysical method described in the introduction of this paper. His definition is strictly hierarchical, and it does not raise any doubts about what is the original and what is its true copy: "all human Perception" is "a repetition in the finite mind" of the only lawful representation, "the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM." The "secondary Imagination [...] co-existing with the conscious will," is an identical copy of the primary: its "echo," which does not differ qualitatively from its model, but only "in degree and in the mode of its operation."[30]

Another hierarchical feature of Coleridge's definition, which excludes the existence of simulacra and phantasms, is the strict separation of imagination and fancy. Here Coleridge uses the distinction of mechanism and organism. While imagination is

[28] Cf. the closing part of "Kubla Khan" (ll. 42-47):"Could I revive within me / Her symphony and song, / To such a deep delight 'twould win me, / That with music loud and long, / I would build that dome in air, / That sunny dome! Those caves of ice!" (*The Complete Poetical Works of S.T. Coleridge*, ed. E.H. Coleridge [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912] 1:298). Cf. also Novalis's fragment: "Music, plastic art, and poetry are synonyms. [...] Painting, plastic art are therefore nothing but figurations [*Figuristik*] of music. [...] Painting, plastic art—objective music. Music—subjective music or painting." (*Romantische Welt: Die Fragmente*, ed. Otto Mann, [Leipzig, 1939], 300. Quoted according to M.H. Abrams's translation in *The Mirror and the Lamp*, 94.)

[29] Maurice Blanchot, "The Athenaeum," trans. Deborah Esh and Ian Balfour, *Studies in Romanticism*, 22 (summer 1983):171.

[30] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1:202.

creative and organic, fancy is "no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space" and subordinated to the law of the association of ideas and the choice based on experience and will. To prevent their uncontrolled development and transformations, the images of fancy are conceived as "fixities and definities," specific ideas combined empirically as components in the process of assembling some machinery.[31]

The distinction of "*vital*," organic, imagination from the "dead," mechanic, fancy is not the last manoeuvre in Coleridge's campaign against the subversive power of simulacra. As Kathleen M. Wheeler has shown, one of the most important themes of Coleridge's reflections and symbolic poetry (especially "Kubla Khan") is the process of "thingifying": the objectification of subjective dreams or visions *and* of the process of thinking.[32]

In the preface to "Kubla Khan" Coleridge mentions "images," which "rose up before him as *things*," and in the poem's coda the music symbolizing the harmony of the subject and the world changes into the lofty structure of the Khan's palace. The result of the creative process is its externalization and objectification: the work as an aesthetic object, revealing, in a fixed and stable form, "its principles of organization and construction." Such a work, however, is no longer alive: it is a dead object used to verify the dogmatic law of imagination, the unity of the absolute subject. The paradox of Coleridge's approach consists in the fact that the work objectified in this way is a mere premise that can never be materialized. On the contrary, this assumption "reflects the schism in experience between the conscious and the unconscious, or the unconscious and the self-reflection," and the fact that the unity and beauty of the work of art can be grasped only intuitively.[33]

This also seems to be confirmed by Coleridge's subsequent reflections contrasting the products of the imagination with phantasms or simulacra. To distinguish between a work of art and a simulacrum is "the prerogative of poetic genius," which can differentiate "by parental instinct its proper offspring from the changelings, which the gnomes of vanity or the fairies of fashion may have laid in its cradle or called by its names." A similar distinction exists, continues Coleridge, between the material or outer form of the literary work of art (its "words") and imagination, whose "*rules* [...] are themselves the very powers of growth and production."[34]

[31] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1:202.
[32] Kathleen M. Wheeler,"'Kubla Khan' and the Art of Thingifying," in *Romanticism: A Critical Reader*, 132-35.
[33] Wheeler, "'Kubla Khan' and the Art of Thingifying,"143.
[34] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 2:64-65.

In contrast to Plato's understanding of the relationship between the true copy and the simulacrum, Coleridge puts an emphasis on the specificity and autonomy of the work of art given by creative powers which correspond to the powers causing the organic growth. In his reflections, the position of Plato's Idea is occupied by the dynamically developing organic form, realizing itself in its uniqueness only in the work of art by means of "modifying powers," by which "the genius of the poet had united and inspirited all the objects of his thought."[35]

As a result, in Coleridge's understanding, inspiration is not the originary cause of the work of art. It becomes one of the features of artistic creation, a force shaping an "inspirited" whole out of the fragmented contents of consciousness, produced by the "mechanical" eighteenth-century rationalism. This is the reason why Coleridge understands the copy as something incompatible with artistic creation, a product of "mechanical" imitation, a skill determined by rules, and identifies it with a traditionally understood simulacrum: a "deceptive counterfeit of the superficial form."[36]

A similar understanding of the difference between an imitation (a true copy) and simulacrum can be found in Kant's Third Critique. Article 42 develops an analogy between our immediate interest in the beauty of nature (and our feeling for this beauty) and our interest in the beauty of art: "It must be nature, or be mistaken by us for nature, to enable us to take an immediate interest in the beautiful as such." As soon as people find out, continues Kant, that the song of a nightingale, imitated by someone hidden in the shrubs, is "a fraud" none of them will "long endure listening to this song that before was regarded as so attractive"[37] The immediate interest in the beautiful can only be aroused by the products of nature or their true copies created by human art which affect us in the same way as nature does.

In contrast to Kant's determination of beauty in art by means of an analogy based on the human interest in nature as a beautiful form, Coleridge emphasizes the common cause of the origin of natural products and works of art: the process of organic growth. Even this seems to have an analogy in Kant's concept of the genius, which gives "the rule as nature" to its creation.[38] This rule "must be abstracted from the act, that is, from the product"—from

[35] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 2:68.
[36] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 2:65.
[37] Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, 162 (§ 42).
[38] Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, 169 (§ 46).

the work of a genius which becomes a model (functioning like Plato's Idea) "not for imitating but for following."[39]

However, Kant's reflection has an entirely different basis to Coleridge's concept: while Coleridge *identifies* the creative process with the organic growth in nature, Kant insists that the comparison is based on an *analogy*, which is not even too illustrative, since the artist does not exist outside nature.[40] Therefore, Kant's thought on the organic form in art is not based on the artist's subject, the genius, which creates *like* nature, but on the teleological concept of the organic form, understood as "intrinsic natural perfection," which is "unthinkable and inexplicable on any analogy to any known physical, or natural, agency [...], not even excepting [...] the suggestion of any strictly apt analogy to human art."[41] Nonetheless, farther on Kant admits that "we may regard even natural beauty from [the point of view of] a vast system of natural ends," adding that this analogy depends on human love of and reverence for nature.[42]

This is, according to Max Blechman, the point of contact between Kant's philosophy and the statement of Friedrich Schlegel that the purposefulness of nature and the highest purpose of humanity find their unity in the human feeling of beauty. However, Schlegel's subsequent conclusions substantially differ from Kant's approach. Schlegel assumes that Kant's teleology of nature, nature's "internal perfection," has its analogue in a peculiar causal order: "the causality of love" leading humans to imitate nature, its organization and structures. According to Schlegel, love is the human equivalent of the mysterious principle of organic form. Due to this assumption, structural unity can be understood as a never contained, constantly developing multiplicity: "the eternal becoming, the eternally living movement, making an endless fullness and variety out of constantly changing forms."[43]

In this understanding, organic form directly depends on the heterogeneity of ideals, "inspirations," which express "the eternal higher life of the human being [that] relates to the whole." This whole, however, is not given in advance: it can originate only from the love of individuals, whose relation to the infinite variety of nature gives a sense to creation, to human relations and even to

[39] Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, 171 (§ 47). The German word "Nachmachung" (imitation) can also be translated as "forging" or "forgery."

[40] Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, 269 (§ 65).

[41] Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, 269-70 (§ 65).

[42] Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, 276 (§ 67).

[43] *Friedrich Schlegels philosophische Vorlesungen aus dem Jahren 1804 bis 1806*, hrsg. von C.J.H. Windischmann (Bonn, 1846) 1:111-12. Cf. Max Blechman, "The Revolutionary Dream of Early German Romanticism," in *Revolutionary Romanticism*, ed. Max Blechman (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1999) 18-20.

politics. In contrast to the determining role of Plato's Ideas, here the idea (the sense) of the whole is being gradually composed of the feelings and "inspirations of individuals."[44]

In opposition to Schlegel's individualizing romantic Pantheism, Coleridge's concept of imagination is focused on the general teleology of organic form, whose principal feature is the existence of a single creative power which gives universal laws to itself: "The spirit of poetry, like all other living powers, must of necessity circumscribe itself by laws, were it only to unite power with beauty. It must embody in order to reveal itself; but a living body is of necessity an organized one [...]."[45]

It may seem that thanks to the identification of the creative process with the organic growth, Coleridge's theory of imagination can overcome the uncertainty connected with the possibility of the confusion of simulacra for true copies. An ingenious artist gifted by God is always able to distinguish real art from a "deceptive counterfeit;" only "*children*," who think they can eat "the marble peach," can confuse them.[46]

Despite this, the challenging question of simulacra and phantasms soon returns: not only in an aesthetic but also in a political context, in relation to the taste of the contemporary public. When Coleridge searches for the reasons of the unusual success of the numerous plays inspired by Schiller's *Robbers* and Gothic fiction, he asks whether the taste of his contemporaries has not been poisoned by "atrocious events and characters" of the time to the extent that his contemporaries have lost the capacity to distinguish between the good and the bad art.

In an almost literal paraphrase of the lines from Wordsworth's Preface to *Lyrical Ballads* he points out that the cause is the emotional stupefaction of people who are "craving alone for the grossest and most outrageous stimulants." In this way, he argues, "the shocking spirit of Jacobinism" seems "not confined to politics": it has become a general moral and aesthetic phenomenon. The fact that people prefer the phantasms of popular authors confusing and subverting "the natural order of things in their causes and effects" is allegedly caused by a conviction that "our *very self*" is "not *made up* of our qualities and relations, but [is] itself the supporter and substantial basis of all these." This opinion

[44] Cf. Friedrich Schlegel, "Vorlesungen über die transzendentale Philosophie." Quoted according to the English translation "Lectures on Transcendental Philosophy," in *The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics*, trans. and ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 145, 146, 149

[45] *Coleridge on Logic and Learning*, ed. A.D. Snyder (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929) 110; cf. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp*, 225.

[46] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 2:65.

originates from the human desire for power: from the temptation to "be as Gods in knowledge."[47]

While the older drama (the plays on Don Juan, but also Shakespeare's great tragic characters: Macbeth, Iago or Edmund) has represented this desire in its emptiness and perversion, modern popular plays make "clumsy copies of these showy instrumental qualities" become "*substitutes* of virtue" and pass for admirable human qualities, "in order to *reconcile* us to vice and want of principle." Thus they suffuse the audiences with mere supernatural effects "without even a hint of any supernatural agency;" miracles "without a ground;"[48] in other words: with simulacra and phantasms, which have acquired power over the "true" representations, "true copies" of human qualities.

Coleridge is convinced that the imitation of the human action in drama must have a unifying moral sense. This sense does not exist in simulacra and phantasms, whose purpose is to satisfy individual desires of unnatural excitement producing the deceptive feeling of freedom and power.[49] Therefore, when in the final phase of his career Coleridge turns from the fragment, visionary poetry and romantic irony to the compact dramatic form, he also turns from the principles of romantic aesthetics. In contrast to him, early German romantics see the way to the absolute world of the beauty of art in the fragmented form of literary communication. According to Novalis, the universal work of romantic poetry, the new Bible, is *the novel* as the art of fragment, and not a closed, "objective" dramatic form.[50]

[47] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 2:202, 193, 188, 189.

[48] Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 2:192, 193.

[49] See in detail in my article "Imaginative Geographies Disrupted? Representing the Other in English Romantic Dramas," *European Journal of English Studies*, *EJES*, 6.2 (2002): 207-20.

[50] "All art today is based on the novel, and not on the drama," wrote Friedrich Solger. Novalis identified the closure and intentionality of dramatic form with mechanism: "[T]he Schlegels overlook, when they speak of the purposefulness and artistry of Shakespeare's works, that art belongs to nature, and is similar to self-contemplative, self-imitative, self formative nature [...] Shakespeare was no calculator, no scholar [...] Nothing more senseless can be said [of his works] than that they are works of art in that confined, mechanical sense of the word" (*Romantische Welt: Die Fragmente*, 355-56; English translation quoted according to Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp*, 370).

8. Imagining the Difference
TRANSPORTS AND REVELATIONS IN *THE PRELUDE*

In romantic thought, the Pantheist God or Deity is often identified with Nature as the overflowing fountain of goodness and creative energy. In the first version of *The Prelude* (1799) Wordsworth confesses that in his youth this "soul" of Nature became an inspiration for his poetry enabling him to search for emotional flows and intensities:

> From Nature and her overflowing soul
> I had received so much that all my thoughts
> Were steeped in feeling. I was only then
> Contented with bliss ineffable
> I felt the sentiment of being spread
> O'er all that moves, and that seemeth still,
> O'er that all, lost beyond the reach of thought
> And human knowledge, to the human eye
> Invisible, yet liveth to the heart
> O'er all that leaps, and runs, and shouts and sings
> (1799, II, *446-55*)[1]

In the 1799 version of *The Prelude*, the notion of the unifying creative power ("one life [...] joy [...] / One song" II, *460-61*) greatly differs from the preceding ideas of the Neoplatonic "Soul of the World." The highest Idea and its emanations establishing a hierarchy of the forms of existence are substituted by the all-penetrating *feeling*, which does not originate in nature alone but is also *the intensity of experience* and the projection of the individual's joy into the animate as well as inanimate world.

[1] All quotations from the three texts of *The Prelude* follow The Norton Critical Edition: *The Prelude 1799 1805 1850*, ed. Jonathan Wordsworth, M.H. Abrams and Stephen Gill (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1979).

This joy is generated by perception, "resembling more / Creative agency" (1799, II, *431*), of "affinities / In objects where no brotherhood exists / To common minds" (1799, II, *432-34*). The intensity of unifying visions, the "transports" (1799, II, *460*) which do not have to be interpreted as mystical extases,[2] is neither given by individual perceptions, nor by their sum but rather by "difference in general," which, according to Deleuze, is a primary quality, "light, aerial and affirmative" distinguishable from mere "diversity or otherness."[3] This "creative disorder or inspired chaos"[4] is metaphorized as a song heard only when the ear can no longer cope with the plethora of voices of nature. It is a cumulative *effect* of sensuous impressions of as well as emotional relations to creatures and things in nature, a sentiment spread

> O'er all that leaps, and runs, and shouts, and sings,
> Or beats the gladsome air, o'er all that glides
> Beneath the wave, yea in the wave itself
> And mighty depth of waters.
>
> (1799, II, *455-59*)

In the first version of Wordsworth's poem imagination is not a power unifying differences as Kant's or Schelling's *Einbildungskraft* or Coleridge's "essemplastic power." Rather it is an "effect"[5] of the difference in nature. Nature "speaks" to the poet "[b]y quaint associations" (1799, I, *421*), which are stored in memory in a disconnected form. Their involuntary connections emerge in the traces of memory activated by repeating emotional impulses "[b]y the impressive agency of fear / By pleasure and repeated happiness— / So frequently repeated—" (1799, I, *433-35*). Despite the autobiographical intent of *The Prelude* it seems that the subject of its first version, to quote Deleuze's reading of Proust, is "the localized essence of time,"[6] rather than "the growth of the poet's mind."

Similar to modern art, imagination in the early version of *The Prelude* is a synthesis, which, however, does not produce a

[2] See, e.g., M.H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp* [1953] (New York: W.W. Norton, 1960) 66.

[3] Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (Différence et répétition, 1968), trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 54, 30.

[4] Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 54.

[5] Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* (Logique du Sens, 1969), trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) 4.

[6] Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* (Proust et les signes, 1964, 1970, 1976), trans. Richard Howard, second edition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) 61. The passage quotes *A la recherche du temps perdu* III, 872: "a morsel of time, in the pure state."

continuity of subjective consciousness but transforms the material of art (figures of speech and complex syntactic structures) into specific feelings and emotions. From the differences in nature, memory and speech an artistic style originates "affirming an irreducible difference [...] an individuating viewpoint superior to individuals themselves."[7] And this style creates, by means of complex and opaque sentence structure, surprising "transversals"[8] linking emotional experience and reflexive passages of the poem, which puts an inexhaustible multitude of nature and imagination against "[t]his melancholy waste of hopes o'erthrown" (1799, II, *479*) of post-revolutionary Europe.

Later texts of *The Prelude* attempt to control this open and non-hierarchical structure of imagination by means of a subject, which resembles God from Milton's *Paradise Lost*, representing the unity and infinity of space and time. In the central passage of Book VI, the chaos of experiences from Alpine nature is ordered by a dominant symbolic metaphor:

> Tumult and peace, the darkness and the light—
>
> Were all like workings of one mind, the features
> Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree;
> Characters of the great Apocalypse,
> The types and symbols of Eternity,
> Of first, and last and midst, and without end.
>
> (1850, VI, *635-40*)[9]

The heterogeneity of natural objects, impressions and figures of speech in the 1799 text contrasts with this identification of the multiplicity of nature with apocalyptic Eternity, represented as the absolute personality with one mind and face and connected with a model of hierarchical organic form (the tree). Hence, the presence of God (as a single being and at the same time as a structuring power) is the only explanation of imagination and the organic metaphor. Later this was theoretically formulated by Coleridge in

[7] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 161-62. See also Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality, in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, ed. Paul Patton (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996), 48.

[8] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 168-69. Deleuze points out that "transversality" is "the formal structure of the work" which in the process of communication establishes "unity and totality [...] for themselves, without unifying or totalizing objects or subjects" (169). See also the Introduction to this book.

[9] In comparison with the 1805 text it is evident that the authoritative nature of the concluding lines is emphasized by graphic means, by separating the concluding lines with semi-colon and capitalizing the word "apocalypse."

his learned definition of the symbol: "forma formans per formam formatam translucens."[10]

The quoted passage from the text of 1850 differs from the text of 1805, which does not yet confirm the synthetic, structuring and hierarchizing nature of imagination. In contrast to the 1850 text where imagination is first referred to as an "awful Power" inexpressible in human language and rising "from the mind's abyss" (VI, *594*), in the text of 1805 the principal figure describing imagination is the catachresis "unfathered vapour" (VI, *527*) which seems to undermine the dominant, hegemonic and organizing role of imagination:

> Imagination!—lifting up itself
> Before the eye and progress of my song
> Like an unfathered vapour, here that power,
> In all might of its endowments, came
> Athwart me. I was lost as in a cloud
> Halted without a struggle to break through,
> And now, recovering to my soul I say
> 'I recognise thy glory.'
>
> (1805, VI, *525-32*)

Whereas in the 1850 text the catachresis "unfathered vapour" is dissociated from the subject (it "enwraps [...] some lonely traveller" VI, *595-96*) and becomes almost a rhetorical ornament produced by the "sad incompetence of human speech" (VI, *593*), in the text of 1805 it is thematized as an obstacle impairing the vision of the subject and checking further progress of the poem. Only when its paralyzing intensity weakens, can the speaker identify its ungraspable power with the "glory" (1805, VI, *532*) of his soul, appropriating, or rather usurping, the immense multitude of previous experiences and proclaiming the effects of their differences products of this unconscious and suprasensuous force, which can no longer be connected with the "Nature's soul" but reveals—in the moments when our senses fail—the greatness of "the invisible world" (VI, *536*).

In the quoted passage of the 1805 text there is only a trace of Wordsworth's early notion of imagination, transforming the multiplicity of nature and emotional experiences into a poetic style. No longer a power effecting this transformation, imagination is an obstacle of poetic creation and a discontinuity in time and space, as well as in the subject's experience. Its difference is absolutized as the Other, an unknown counterpart of God and his "infinitude,"

[10] S.T. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, ed. John Shawcross (London: Oxford University Press, 1907) 2:187.

which in turn is identified with Christian Eternity—"[o]ur destiny, our nature, and our home" (1805, VI, *539*, *538*). The difference between the "awful promise" of imagination and the infinitude of God can be overcome only by "hope that can never die" (1805, VI, *534*, *540*). In the text of 1850 the latter mentioned aspect is reinforced, since instead of "the flashes" showing us "the invisible world" (1805, VI, *535-36*), we have a single "flash" of revelation (1805, VI, *601*)[11] merging the "awful power" (no longer "promise") of imagination and the "infinitude" of God. In brief, in the text of 1805, imagination is still heterogeneous, but is no longer linked with Nature's "soul." It has neither an origin, nor a fixed position in the universe created and ordered by God. It is evident that this difference cannot be an integrating component of the poetic style.

Despite this imagination is integrated in the poem's thematic structure, where it becomes an analogue of what Kant called "the dynamic sublime." Similar to *The Critique of Judgement*, in the latter texts of *The Prelude* the unknown and infinite power of nature must be subordinated to the moral nature of man, the soul, which is experienced as "an indeterminate, suprasensible unity of all [human] faculties."[12] It can be said that in this part of Book VI of *The Prelude* imagination produces neither images nor style, but a certain *schema*, whose "*spatio-temporal relations* [...] *embody or realize relations, which are in fact conceptual*."[13]

This is confirmed by some well-known interpretations, such as Hartman's *Wordsworth's Poetry* and even Wordsworth himself who in his outline of March 1804 had preceded the passage on imagination with the lines which appeared in a completely different place in the final text of 1805, as a part of the description of the poet's impressions after his arrival in London in Book VIII (*677-711*). The text which originally strove to express the otherness of imagination refers in the new context to the frightening and repulsive atmosphere of the unknown city, which, at the same time is an important centre of historic events and global, imperial power, determining "the destiny of the earth itself" (1805, VIII, *748*). Moreover, it is also a place, where the speaker himself "craved for power," which he "found / In all things" (1805, VIII, *755-56*). The former context of the passage, the sublimity of the Alps, can be

[11] See *The Prelude 1799 1805 1850*, 217n, where the editors suggest that "the lines" of the text of 1850 "can be read as referring to a single apocalyptic event," "available" only to the speaker of the poem.

[12] Gilles Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy* [La Philosophie Critique de Kant, 1963], trans. H.R.E. Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: The Athlone Press, 1984) 51. See *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952) 127 (§ 29, "General Remark").

[13] Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, 18.

substituted by the vulgar ugliness of the huge metropolis only on the basis of an abstract reflection, a kind of generalizing commentary on the reminiscences of the speaker's youth: "That aught *external* to the living mind / Should have such mighty sway" (1805, VIII, *701-702*). This substitution is made possible by a conceptual structure, which, similar to the passage on imagination in Book VI, roughly corresponds to the definition of the dynamic sublime in Kant's Third Critique. Similar to Book VI, the experience of the sublime and its subsequent conceptualization are also described here as "a thing divine" (1805, VIII, *711*). In this way, the passage is singled out as more meaningful and valuable than other parts of the book.

The lines Wordsworth transposed from the outline of the passage on imagination in Book VI describe impressions from a visit to a cave explored by torchlight. This parable does not follow well-known philosophical models, such as Plato's *Republic*, Porphyry's *De Antro Nympharum* or Bacon's *Novum Organum*. After entering the dark cavern our view is attracted by the stalactites on the ceiling:

> a canopy
> Of shapes, and forms, and tendencies to shape,
> That shift and vanish, change and interchange
> Like spectres—ferment quiet and sublime,
> Which, after a short space, works less and less,
> Till every effort, every motion gone,
> The scene before him lies in a perfect view
> Exposed, and lifeless as a written book.
>
> (1805, VIII, *721-28*)

Here, the motif of the Apocalypse as the end of time and history in Book VI has an ironical analogue in the symbol of "a written book," which is neither a sacred Scripture, in which the destiny of the world is revealed, nor a "Book of Nature" written in mystical hieroglyphs. It is a transitory fixation of the dynamic, heterogeneous multitude, produced by the fermentation of natural forms and the traveller's images, which, however, are no realities but mere "spectres," or, to use Deleuzean terminology, "effects." The fixation is reversible, since the 'letters' of the "book" soon start moving again, changing themselves in a new multiplicity, a mixture of ideas of memory, projecting onto the chaos of rock formations characteristic images of reality in its spatial and temporal—historical—dimensions, related to the spiritual and secular power:

forests and lakes,
Ships, rivers, towers, the warrior clad in mail,
The prancing steed, the pilgrim with his staff,
The mitred bishop and the thronèd king—
A spectacle to which there is no end.

(1805, VIII, *737-41*)

The metaphorization of the cave's vault with stalactites as "a written book" and the preceding and subsequent play of the effects of imagination may be understood as two different "readings" of time pointed out by Deleuze.[14] The time called Chronos, "the living present," "the time of bodies and states of affairs" which "embraces the entire universe,"[15] is arrested in the closure of the book metaphor. As a consequence, a different, "unlimited" time, called Aion, is foregrounded, "which divides itself infinitely in past and future and always eludes the present,"[16] It is this time which is the process of imagination, metaphorized in Book VI of *The Prelude* as "unfathered vapour," the paralyzing emptiness, the loss of meaning of the romantic pilgrimage and of the present, the absolutization of difference in time as the Other, which is the opposite of the Cosmos created by God.

Whereas Wordsworth's 1804 draft of Book VI contrasts these two "readings" of time, their contrast is eliminated in the text of 1805 and still further in the text of 1850. In this way, imagination is excluded from the sphere of Pantheist inspiration. It ceases to be a play of effects, a multiplicity of natural forms animated by human emotion, and can no longer grasp the dynamic nature of existence, called "pure becoming" by Deleuze.[17] It is a negative expression of a metaphysical concept—"*the idea of Nature itself teaching travellers to transcend Nature*"[18]—a scheme for a rational construct, which can give a new, authoritative and centralizing meaning to space, time and history. Effects, phantasms and simulacra must then be excluded from the sphere of imagination as well as from nature.

Their new domain is the globalized civilisation with the depressive maze of the imperial metropolis at its centre, which is the London of Book VIII of *The Prelude*. Nonetheless, since the power accumulated in the centre of this structure corresponds to the philosophical definition of the sublime, it can be said that Wordsworth's London is a strange substitute for the wild sceneries

[14] Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 162.
[15] Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 4.
[16] Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 5.
[17] Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 1.
[18] Geoffrey H. Hartman, "A Poet's Progress: Wordsworth and the *Via Naturaliter Negativa*," *Modern Philology*, 59 (1962): 224.

of the Lake District or rugged Alpine cliffs: an interesting development of the catachresis "unfathered vapour." However, in contrast to the Simplon Pass veiled in mist, London represents a real threshold in the process of the speaker's maturing. Crossing it, the imagination revives and acquires a new vivifying role. It can transform the alienated waste land of civilisation and express the desire of the spiritual community amidst the anonymous crowd.

The concluding books of *The Prelude* (XI-XIII in the text of 1805 and XII-XIV in the text of 1850) can be interpreted as attempts to fulfil this desire, to find "[o]nce more in man an object of delight, / Of pure imagination, and of love;" (1805, XII, *54-55*) and to gain

> A more judicious knowledge of what makes
> The dignity of individual man—
> Of man, no composition of the thought,
> Abstraction, shadow, image, but the man,
> Of whom we read, the man whom we behold
> With our own eyes—
>
> (1805, XII, *82-87*)

The original text of this passage in the so-called MS Y from October 1804 started with lines which in the resulting text of 1805 occurred in Book VIII describing the speaker's stay in London. They introduce a new topic: the unity based not only on the traditional values, such as knowledge and goodness but also on the "becoming" of the nomadic existence: "the unity of man / One spirit over ignorance and vice " (1805, VIII, *827-28*), and "the highest joy" of "the soul" which "passing through all Nature rests with God" (*834*, *833*, *836*).

Against the Platonic concept of emanation, which can be seen as the point of departure for Wordsworth's genealogy of imagination, the latter part of the poem sets the notion of imagination as a synthetic "intellectual power" (1805, XI, *43*). Nonetheless, this faculty cannot deal with the reality of London. From MS Y it is evident that the first topic of the London section was the life of ordinary people in the city. Yet in describing it, the poem does not display a sufficient symbolic potential, an evidence of the synthetic function of imagination. This is for instance the case in the scene in which an artisan (or "artificer," as Wordsworth calls him 1805, VIII, *854*) holds a "sickly babe" (*849*) on his knee, bending over it "[a]s if he were afraid both of the sun / And of the air which he had come to seek" (*857-58*) and gazing at it "with unutterable love" (*859*).

In the subsequent part of MS Y the speaker turns to nature again, invoking it as a power of inspiration: "breezes and soft airs that breathe / The breath of paradise [...] find your way / To the recesses of the soul" (1805, XI, *416*). Nonetheless, the focus of the passage are no longer animals and natural objects, nor even diverse marginalized people, reminiscent of the characters of *Lyrical Ballads*, but the emotional unity of the individual inspired by nature.

This is especially confirmed by the earliest version of the text in MS Y, which first recapitulates the emotional and intellectual development of the individual, seen as the dialectical process based on the clashes between the positive influences of nature and the negative impact of culture and civilization. The result is a self-conscious attitude based on the correlation of the two infinite magnitudes—the "insatiate" desire of the mind striving to encompass an "inexhaustible" universe (MS Y [a] "We live by admiration" *174*). This paradigm closely resembles that in the introductory passage of Chapter XIII on imagination in Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria*.[19] While Coleridge develops this paradigm to demonstrate the creative power of imagination, Wordsworth's text postulates a visionary unity of the poet with other poets-prophets and the whole of humanity based on the traditional Platonic model of divine love: "God, who feeds our hearts / For his own service, knoweth, loveth us, / When we are unregarded by the world" (1805, XII, *275-77*).

In the concluding books of *The Prelude* this notion of imagination is further transformed. Let us focus on the well-known part describing the speaker's nocturnal ascent of Mount Snowdon, during which a "universal spectacle" opens in front of him. The multitude of shapes of mountains and clouds resembling ocean waves has an immaterial emptiness at its centre: "a blue chasm, a fracture in the vapour [...] / That dark deep thoroughfare" into which "Nature [had] lodged / The soul, the imagination of the whole" (1805, XIII, *55*, *64-65*). It may appear that the intensity of a vision in expressed by this symbolic image of difference, still seen as something absolutely other, "the homeless voice of waters" (1805, XIII, *63*), an analogue of "unfathered vapour" from Book VI. However, in the following meditation, this difference is subordinated to unity as a manifestation of the synthetic, sublime power present in the speaker's unconscious as well as in the whole world:

> The perfect image of a mighty mind,
> Of one that feeds upon infinity,

[19] Cf. Chapter 7 in this book.

That is exalted by an under-presence,
The sense of God, or whatoe'er is dim
Or vast in its own being—

(1805, XIII, *69-73*)

The text of 1850 calls this opaque force "transcendent power" (XIV, *75*) which can be understood in the context of Kant's notion of the sublime as the way to the discovery of the moral purpose of nature and humanity. In contrast to this, the text of 1805 emphasises "the express / Resemblance" (XIII, *86-87*) between the power of nature transforming the world of the senses and imagination, "the glorious faculty / Which higher minds bear with them as their own" (XIII, *89-90*). This resemblance is not Kant's analogy, which is defined as a cause-effect relationship abstracting from specific differences among things.[20] It is the reason justifying the existence of imagination. As an activity of imagination, poetry is legitimized only when it is an evident replica of Divine Creation, or in Coleridge's phrase "a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM."[21] Unlike Coleridge, who points out the unity of the creative and receptive nature of imagination as the capacity of human beings to resemble God, Wordsworth's text puts an emphasis on the power of the resemblance between poetry and creation "the fullness of its strength" (1805, XIII, *87*). This power is the *intensity* in the world of the senses and simultaneously the *identity* of individual and absolute spirit. The mind is not subdued by sensuous impressions but activated and stimulated by them "[t]o hold communion with the invisible world" (1805, XIII, *105*). Despite all Kantian features and Coleridge's influence the unity created by imagination in the conclusion of *The Prelude* is given a firm Platonic framework.

Imagination represented in this way is not only the source of the soul's self-sufficiency but guarantees its "sovereignty within and peace at will" and "cheerfulness in every act of life" (1805, XIII, *114*, *117*). It is the only "genuine liberty" (1805, XIII, *122*), even in the political sense. All these certainties are based on the faithfulness of the individual to the "divine and true" world, whose condemnable antithesis is "a universe of death, / The falsest of all worlds" (*143*, *141-42*), a simulacrum confused with reality only when one relies on the "laws of vulgar sense" (*140*).

Whereas the purpose of imagination is to liberate humans from this pseudo-world, the aim of the Neoplatonic spiritual love, the "love more intellectual" (1805, XIII, *166*) which is an indivisible

[20] See Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, § 90.
[21] S.T. Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1:189.

part of imagination and "the prime and vital principle" is "to complete the man, / Perfect him" (*194*, *202-203*). Rather than fostering a free, organic community, which, as Friedrich Schlegel wrote, is "a higher life of the human being, which is related to the whole," and creating the only Book, "the Eternal Gospel,"[22] this "feeling intellect" (1805, XIII, 205) leads to the emotional cultivation of individuals and also to the overcoming of gender differences.[23] As a result, the aim of Wordsworth's project is not a romantic utopia, building a new society by means of romantic art, but the deployment of poetry as a power transforming the human psyche and anticipating Foucault's "technologies of the self."

This hypothetical conclusion is verified by one of the most important programmatic texts by Wordsworth, the fragment of *The Recluse* included in *The Excursion*.

> the discerning intellect of Man,
> When wedded to this goodly universe
> In love and holy passion, shall find these
> A simple produce of the common day.
> —I, long before the blissful hour arrives,
> Would chant, in lonely peace, the spousal verse
> Of this great consummation:—, and, by words
> Which speak of nothing more than what we are,
> Would I arouse the sensual from their sleep
> Of Death, and the vain
> To noble raptures; while my voice proclaims
> How exquisitely the individual Mind
> [...] to the external World
> Is fitted:—and how exquisitely, too—
> [...] The external world is fitted to the Mind.[24]

M.H. Abrams, who has pointed out the fundamental meaning of this text for the interpretation of Wordsworth's work and Romanticism as a whole, has noted mainly the links between its erotic symbolism and the mystical idea of the apocalyptic marriage.

Were this mystical interpretation absolutized, as it happened in Abrams's *Natural Supernaturalism*, another, and, in my opinion,

[22] Friedrich Schlegel, "Lectures on Transcendental Philosophy," in *The Early Writings of the German Romantics*, trans. and ed. Frederic C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 145, 140; "Ideen" (Nr. 95, *Athenäum*, Bd. 3, 1800), in *Werke in zwei Bänden*, ed. Wolfgang Hecht (Berlin und Weimar: Aufbau Verlag 1980) 1:274.

[23] "And he whose soul hath risen / Up to the height of feeling intellect / Shall want no humbler tenderness, his heart / Be tender as a nursing mother's heart; / Of female softness shall his life be full, / Of little loves and delicate desires, / Mild interests and gentlest sympathies" (1805, XIII, *204-10*).

[24] William Wordsworth, "Prospectus of *The Recluse*," in *Poetical Works*, ed. Thomas Hutchinson (London: Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press, 1908) 755 (*52-66*).

more important, contextual relation would disappear, namely the link between Wordsworth's poem and Plato's notion of inspiration as extasis or madness (*maniā*). As Foucault pointed out, in Plato's *Phaedrus*, *maniā* is linked with the dominant theme of problematization of erotic desire and the necessity of its regulation by means of spiritual struggle, which leads to the self-knowledge as the realisation of "active freedom."[25] In this context, *The Prelude* can be read not only as a genealogy of imagination, but also as a history of emotional life, where the relations to nature and their symbolic substitutions (imagination, spiritual love, God) cover up the principal autobiographical themes, namely the erotic and political dilemmas.

[25] See Michel Foucault: *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 2, *The Use of Pleasure* (L'Usage des Plaisirs, 1984), trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1985) 86-92.

9. Mechanic? — Organic?
HAWTHORNE'S MACHINES OF ART

Traditionally, Hawthorne's tale "The Artist of the Beautiful" is read as a parable based on some oppositions typical of romantic aesthetics. The initial contrast between reason and feelings or sensitivity is further elaborated in the ironic confrontation of the eighteenth century-rationalist and the romantic artist. While the retired clockmaker, Peter Hovenden, believes in the supreme power of reason and in the identity of its order with the divine arrangement of the universe, evolving (and revealing itself to humanity) in the course of time, his daughter Annie finds in the person of his antagonist, a young, unpractical, "erring" clockmaker Owen Warland, "delicate" senses and intuition connected with invention and creativity.

On her first glimpse of Owen working in his shop Annie says: "He is inventing a new timekeeper" (907).[1] In the allegorical mode of Hawthorne's writing Annie's words indicate that Owen's invention represents an alternative, if not a threat, to Hovenden's rational order of the world.[2] Despite the subversivity of his invention, Warland is portrayed as a harmless, unstable individual. The toy-like machinery he builds is microscopic and oversensitive, like its inventor: his artificial butterfly can be destroyed by a small quantity of vapour or by a snatch of a child's little hand.

Another important contrast is the opposition between art and craft, or between the artistic creation and mechanical artistry. Its

[1] All quotations from Hawthorne's tales follow the Library of America selection of *Tales and Sketches,* ed. Roy Harvey Pearce (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 1982). Page references are in parentheses in the text.

[2] Though Hovenden refers to Warland's invention slightingly ("he has not the sort of ingenuity to invent anything better than a Dutch toy" 907), he also hyperbolizes it as the subversion of the cosmic order ("[h]e would turn the sun out of its orbit and derange the whole course of time" 907).

formulation in Kant's *Critique of Judgement* became one of the sources of the romantic distinction between the mechanic and the organic. In Kant's thought, the unconscious power of genius regulating the creative work of art is analogous to the power of nature.[3] While this analogy is based on the semblance of nature's free creativity produced in the work of art by the free play of human cognitive powers,[4] many eighteenth—and early nineteenth-century thinkers write of the "vegetable genius" whose inventive power is compared with the biological process of growth.[5]

The dialectic of natural and human freedom underlying the organic analogy plays an important role in the Kantian distinction between art and craft. Although art is created freely, it is given rules by the unconscious power of genius who obeys nature and whose working resembles natural creation. Even though craft is mercenary and enforced, it supplies rules and mechanisms supporting every artistic creation.

It can be argued that Hawthorne's tale lacks both the sophistication of Kant's distinctions, and the consistent emphasis on the organic nature of the work of art. Nonetheless, it goes far

[3] See Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Judgement* (Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790), trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952)168-69 (§ 46): "gives the rule as *nature*.Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius, he does not himself know how the *ideas* for it have entered into his head [...]."

[4] Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, 167 (§ 45): "the finality in the product of fine art, intentional though it be, must not have the appearance of being intentional."

[5] M.H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co. Inc., 1953), 203-206. Abrams mentions, among others, Edward Young, J.G. Sulzer, Herder, Goethe, Friedrich Schlegel and Schelling. He also makes a clear distinction (quoting § 68 of Kant's Third Critique) between the use of the analogy between organism and artistic creation in Kant and some of the above thinkers:

> Kant warns us repeatedly that this concept of an organism as a natural purpose is merely a philosophy of as-if; that is, in his terms, not a "constitutive," but merely "a regulative concept for the reflective Judgement, to guide our investigation about objects of this kind by a distant analogy with our own causality according to purposes." [...] But to Goethe and to other aesthetic organologists it proved irresistible to make such a purely internal teleology a constitutive element in living nature, and then to go beyond Kant and identify completely the unconsciously purposeful process and product of "nature" in the mind of genius with the unconsciously purposeful growth, and the complex interadaptation of means to ends, in a natural organism. (*The Mirror and the Lamp*, 208)

Organic theories which, according to Abrams, were going "beyond Kant," were in fact retreating from the main tenets of his critical philosophy. They were returning *before* Kant, replacing his analogy between art and nature with an essentialist notion of an organic process. The work of art was supposed to have a natural, as well as a *supernatural*, character. See *The Mirror and the Lamp*, 279, mentioning Goethe's dialogue "Über Wahrheit und Wahrscheinlichkeit in der Kunstwerke" (On Truth and Probability in the Works of Art). Cf. Abrams's sequel to *The Mirror and the Lamp* entitled *Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1971).

beyond the mere organic analogy and the concepts of talent and genius.

The opposition between art and craft in Hawthorne's tale may evolve from the Kantian distinction between the playfulness of the former and the usefulness of the latter. Yet while Kant differentiates both activities with respect to the freedom of play and (economic) enforcement,[6] Hawthorne's contrast between art and craft is based on different ways of perception and understanding of time as a specific temporality of social existence epitomized by the timekeeping function of the clockwork.

Hovenden's opinions and straightforward attitudes of Robert Danforth, the blacksmith who later becomes the watchmaker's son-in-law, represent the point of view of utility. Timekeeping, and indeed the very existence of time, are useful, since they regulate human occupations and lives in the name of work, production and reality. The status of reality is directly conditioned by the efficiency of production[7] and this in turn by the successful regulation of power. The power in a blow of Danforth's sledge-hammer is controlled by his skill and craft to produce objects and rude mechanical devices whose utility is evident.

Despite its straightforwardness, this understanding of time and reality reveals a strange emptiness and produces aesthetic side-effects (of a sublime and picturesque character) that have nothing to do with utility. Even in the first emblematic description of Danforth's forge, the "vagueness of the unenclosed space" is left to the "picturesque" play of "light and shade" (908) that seems to be activated by Danforth's strength but in fact only dissipates it and neutralizes his will to power transforming it into a dialectical movement.[8]

However, neither Danforth, nor Hovenden are aware of this reserve of meaning which presents itself to the narrator of the tale as another, "vague" and playful, reality. For the former, reality is the effect of the application of his "main strength," regulated by his craft and affirmed by his senses. For the latter, reality is an order that depends on the regulation of time, which has a most serious, secular as well as sacred, purpose. It "is not to be trifled with, whether considered as the medium of advancement and

[6] Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, 164 (§ 43). Kant remarks that this criterion does not allow him to determine whether clockmakers should be called artists and blacksmiths artisans, since it does not distinguish their activities according to the required degree of talent.

[7] "He spends his labor upon a reality. […] it is a good and wholesome thing to depend upon main strength and reality, and to earn one's bread with the bare and brawny arm of a blacksmith." (908)

[8] "[T]he bright blaze struggled with the black night as if each would have snatched his comely strength from each other."

prosperity in this world, or preparation for the next" (910). While Danforth's notion of reality is empirical, Hovenden's rationalism is ideological. It stresses the identity of time as both the economic and the spiritual (ethical) order of society.

In contrast to Danforth's work and Hovenden's views, Warland's activity is not determined by any empiricist or rationalist, common-sense or ideological assumption. It shows order, unity and objectivity (reality) as the essential problems of modern literature. According to Deleuze's reading of Proust's novel *In Search of Lost Time*, in modernity "order has collapsed, as much as in the states of the world that were supposed to reproduce it as in the essences or Ideas that were supposed to inspire it." In addition therefore

> objectivity can no longer exist except in the work of art; it no longer exists in significant content as states of the world, nor in ideal signification as stable essence, but solely in the signifying formal structure of the work, in its style.[9]

This inverts the Platonic model of inspired creation where the reminiscence of the eternal and unchangeable Ideas gives meaning to the work of art. The movement of recollection (*anamnesis*), turning away from the temporal existence to the timeless origin, is substituted by the movement of creation reaching the point

> *where the associative chain breaks, leaps over the constituted individual, is transferred to the birth of an individuating world.*[10]

Describing this movement Deleuze stresses the role of style that creates "the viewpoint valid for all associations [...] all images" replacing "the experience by the manner it is spoken of."[11] Similarly, in Hawthorne's tale the experience of the artist is replaced by the dynamic structure of the work of art which speaks not only of his experience and creation but also of his dreams. Owen Warland not only attempts to "imitate" the "beautiful movements of nature" (909) but also dreams

> to spiritualize machinery; and to combine with the new species of life and motion, thus produced, a beauty that should attain to the ideal which Nature has proposed to herself, in all her creatures, but has never taken pains to realize. (922)

[9] Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs* (Proust et les signes, 1964 1970 1976), trans. Richard Howard (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 110-11.

[10] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 111.

[11] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 111. Cf. Chapter 3 of this book.

Though Owen is said to have achieved "the purpose of his life" (924), his art cannot be reduced to a mere purposive activity. Carrying his work beyond the limits of nature and experience ("reality") as well as beyond the visions of his dreams, his art breaks away from him, having transformed his individuality. Annie's question ("Is it alive or have you created it?") is answered by Owen in a symptomatic way: "It absorbed my whole being into itself" (927).

Therefore it can be argued that Owen's butterfly is more than a symbol in which the organic form of artistic creation has reached its totality. Though being called "this Mystery of Beauty," "Nature's ideal butterfly [...] in the pattern [...] of those which hover across the meads of Paradise" (926), it is also an anticipation of the Proustian *reminiscence*, the transformation of the hero's early day-dreams in the work of art: "Yes I created it," says Owen, "but this butterfly is not now to me what it was when I beheld it afar off, in my day-dreams of my youth" (927).

The conclusion of Hawthorne's tale contrasts two concepts of the sign: the butterfly as a microcosm referring to the wholeness of the macrocosm,[12] and the butterfly representing the individual, "the intellect, the imagination, the sensibility, the soul of *an* Artist of the Beautiful" (927; emphasis added). Though the first concept (to "symbolize a lofty moral by a material trifle—converting, what was earthly to spiritual gold" 928) is implied as a secret of Owen's creation, it becomes "of little value in his eyes" (931), and is nothing more than a curious piece of handicraft for the others. The final sentence of the story speaking about the self-possession of Owen's spirit "in the enjoyment of the Reality" (931) may still imply the Platonic reminiscence. However, for Owen the ultimate "enjoyment of Reality" is possible only when his work has been destroyed, when it has ceased to exist as a sign ("symbol").

As a result, the temporality of the Proustian reminiscence as well as the symbolic meaning of Owen's butterfly do not have much to do with purposeful and reflected creation (the 'unconscious' dream becoming a 'consciously' made artefact) but with the "explication," the unfolding of the complexity of the Essence, "the only profound meaning is the one that is enveloped, implicated in an external sign."[13] This complexity and its explication is the condition of the existence of signs. The explication of signs

[12] "In its perfect beauty, the consideration of size was entirely lost. Had its wings overarched the firmament, the mind could not have been more filled or satisfied" (926).

[13] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 16.

coincides with the development of their meaning, and therefore "the truth [is] always a truth of time."[14]

The explicated Essence is neither the Logos revealing itself in the world, nor "the seen ideality that unites the world into a whole and introduces the perfect mean into it,"[15] but

> a kind of a superior view-point, an irreducible viewpoint that signifies at once the birth of a world and the original character of the world. It is in this sense that the work of art always constitutes and reconstitutes the beginning of the world, but also forms a specific world absolutely different from the others and envelops a landscape or immaterial site quite distinct from the site where we have grasped it.[16]

Roaming in the woods Owen Warland does not see the actual landscape. He has transformed it into the flight of a butterfly: "his eyes followed a winged vision" (919). He strives to capture the *idea of motion* in individual living things rather than to reproduce the functions of organisms and their organs.

An important feature distinguishing Owen's art from Danforth's or Hovenden's craft is the "viewpoint," the way of unfolding the complexity of Essence enveloped in living things as signs of the Beautiful. While Danforth does not recognize this complexity because of his empirical stance, Hovenden regards it in purely mechanical terms. He finds it dangerous, since it can lead to the loss of a clear purpose or of a rational judgement: "[a] watchmaker gets his brain puzzled by his wheels within wheels" (908).

Neither Hawthorne's art, nor Deleuze's philosophy allow an interpretation of the unfolding of the Essence in terms of romantic

[14] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 17.

[15] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 110. According to Deleuze, the Platonic "Idea, as the goal of reminiscence is the stable Essence, the thing in itself separating opposites, introducing the perfect mean into the whole [...] the disjunct use of the faculties is merely a 'prelude' to the dialectic that unites them in a single Logos. [...] the Intelligence always comes 'before' (109).—In Hawthorne's tale Owen does not "imitate" the beautiful "Idea" but the "beautiful movements of Nature." His "sense of beauty" (909-10) does not aim at "a constant Essence." His art connecting "a musical operation with the machinery of his watches," which is "[o]ne of his most rational projects" (910), does not produce "the ideality unifying the world." Although "the harsh dissonances of life may be rendered tuneful" Owen's art, it stresses the temporality of human life which denies the duration of the present. It lets "each flitting moment fall into the abyss of the Past in golden drops of harmony" and "arranges a *dance or a funeral procession* of figures [...] representing twelve *mirthful or melancholy hours*" (910; emphasis added) across the dial of a family clock that used to measure "the lifetime of many generations" (910). Owen's representations of time do not unify the world; they grasp the Beautiful as *the difference* (the discontinuity of time, the impermanence of qualities in time).

[16] *Proust and Signs,* 110.

organic aesthetics, where the plant represents the unity of a central origin/purpose and structure whose growth gradually makes this central purpose evident.[17] The purpose revealed in Warland's butterfly is not the general structure of an organism, but the Essence of his maker's life. Hence, the butterfly is no structural model (as Goethe's or Coleridge's plant) but the *explication*, *unfolding* of Owen Warland's life.

This explication occurs in the form of a specific *machine* which erases the differences between matter and spirit, mechanism and organism. This poses the problem of the reading of Owen's work as *a sign* for the other characters assembled in the final scene of the tale. Owen Warland refers to the complexity of the little system of his butterfly, which is identified with beauty unfolded in his life: "the intellect, the imagination, the sensibility, the soul of an Artist of the Beautiful" (927). But these qualities are not essentially present in the work of art: they exist in the *differences* from its conventional readings as a sign (privileging either the mechanic, or the organic interpretation).

This understanding of the work of art differs from the organic aesthetic theory in another respect as well. It does not stress the resemblance of the working of imagination in art to the "creative," structuring power in nature (Coleridge's distinction of "primary" and "secondary" imagination in *Biographia Literaria*). As a result, Owen Warland is not a romantic artist of genius, but he prefigures an avant-garde or post-modern artist who can no longer feel the binding power of the analogy between divine creation and the making of the work of art.[18]

Despite this, natural processes and aesthetic production are never completely separated in Hawthorne's tale. On the other hand, Owen's "intuitive comprehension of mechanical principles" is

[17] Deleuze's concept of "Antilogos" returns to the plant model but in a totally different way, characterizing *the style* of Proust's novel, the "work having for subject time itself," which makes enough folds "in the meanders and rings of an anti-Logos style that it makes requisite detours in order to gather up ultimate fragments, to sweep along at different speeds all the pieces, each one of which refers to a different whole, to no whole at all, or to no other whole than that of the style" (*Proust and Signs*, 115).

[18] On parallels between the organic metaphor and the idea of Divine creation see M.H. Abrams's *The Mirror and the Lamp*, 281-82. Abrams quotes the Berlin Lectures of A.W. Schlegel: "[...] art must imitate the productive power of nature. 'This means it must—creating autonomously like nature, itself organized and organizing—form living works which are not set in motion through an alien mechanism, like a pendulum-clock, but through an indwelling power [...]'" While A.W. Schlegel's poet resembles Prometheus imitating Divine creation (this analogy is influenced by Shaftesbury's concept of the poet as "a second *Maker*; a just Prometheus under Jove"), in Hawthorne's tale there is neither a model creative personality mediating between Nature (God), Owen Warland, and his works, nor any (totalizing) identification of creative personality and the organic form.

closer to nature than the "unnatural" contemporary technology characterized by the "terrible energy" and "utilitarian coarseness" in the monstrous mechanism of the steam engine (909). Nonetheless, the important feature of Owen's butterfly is not its *likeness* to living things. Danforth's initial confusion of Warland's creation with an ordinary butterfly may be an ironic joke: later Danforth partially understands the *difference* of Owen's work from natural butterflies, but he cannot name it unequivocally—he refers to Owen's butterfly as a "pretty plaything" but also as something "that does beat all nature" and "goes beyond" him (928).

Here, the possibility of transcendence in the work of art is indicated, though only in an ironical form. This transcendence is no longer Emerson's "Over-soul," nor M.H. Abrams's "natural supernaturalism," nor even the Platonic vision of the Eternal Truths. The actual development underlying the symbolic process (the butterfly is referred to as a "symbol") is the progress of Owen's desire and its satisfaction—his aspiration to higher "Reality," and its "enjoyment" (931).

Despite the Platonic overtones in its conclusion, Hawthorne's tale refers genealogically to the life-process of its hero. This relation is not based on analogy between the individual soul and the general Idea but on the difference between *the sign* (the butterfly) and *the object* (the artist's creative life or "the Beautiful"). The transcendental nature of signs consist in the fact that those who encounter them are forced to think of their meaning. Deleuze says that arbitrary signs exercise violence on us by making us seek truth. In contrast to a philosophical system which always already determines our search by its method, signs are encountered arbitrarily with no method at hand to help us interpret them.[19]

This, of course, is a different understanding of a sign than in a Saussurean theory or in romantic aesthetic. According to Coleridge, symbol is a representation of a central philosophical truth—the dialectical unity of a system.[20] In Hawthorne's tale, the butterfly is encountered as a sign of something that must still be discovered, as an arbitrary beginning of the search for truth. Can we agree with the narrator that the butterfly represents "lofty moral by material trifle" (928)? I do not think that this allegorical interpretation is so important, perhaps only in the Deleuzean way: pointing to the challenge of the search for truth implicit in any sign. Premeditated system and deductive approach are dangerous for this enterprise: therefore the butterfly loses its vitality close to Hovenden's finger

[19] *Proust and Signs*, 16.
[20] See S.T. Coleridge, *The Statesman's Manual* (London: 1816), 34.

and under his cynical gaze. The destruction of the butterfly is not simply the effect of the brute power in the child's grasp: it is prepared by the infant's "sagacious" expression resembling Hovenden's ironic look.

All this may imply distrust in the philosophical interpretation of the signs. According to Deleuze, this interpretation does not attain *necessary* truths.[21] Hawthorne's symbolic strategy forces us to encounter signs and we are neither sure of their meaning, nor can get an assurance from the mostly ironic comments of the narrator. In contrast to this strategy, Hovenden's view of reality is based on prefabricated religious and philosophical concepts. His 'philosophy' is a mere application of the doctrine of common sense and his theology a development of Thomas Paley's idea of God as a 'divine clockmaker.'

The beauty of Owen's butterfly is not supported by such notions of time and reality. It depends on the way Hawthorne's text represents the complexity of aesthetic creation and the reception of the work of art. The genealogical and symbolic nature of this complexity points to other forms of time and perception than those typical of 'good citizens' thinking in terms of the materiality of the world, and the direct, empirical utility of production. In contrast to romantic aesthetic which also makes this distinction (for instance, in the figure of the Philistine), Hawthorne does not postulate the superior nature of Warland's production on the basis of its resemblance to the works of God or Nature, but because of its autonomy and close relationship to the creative life of the artist. This brings us closer to a late romantic and symbolist interpretation of the artist and the work of art.

The question still remains, whether it is really necessary to use the term "the machine of art" interpreting "The Artist of the Beautiful," or whether the machine-like nature of the butterfly is a mere "freak" (910).

Let us first examine the machines mentioned or described in Hawthorne's tale. The first examples, *watermill* and *steam engine* (909), illustrate the utilization of the two major sources of power in Hawthorne's time (912). These machines are contrasted with the irregular machinery imitating "the beautiful movements of Nature" (909). Unlike usual machines propelled by "steam and waterpower" (912) Owen's machines exploit "fine, ethereal power," which is Owen's desire, his "passion for the Beautiful" (912). This passion

[21] In *Proust and Signs* (16) Deleuze states that philosophical truths do not have a necessary character and are not as important as those revealed by the interpretation of signs, since they depend on the assumption of the good will to philosophize, while the truths of signs are forced upon us by an accidental encounter.

is not a sublimated erotic desire for Annie: even in her ideal aspect of "an Angel," Annie does not enter Owen's inner world, the "processes so sacred in his eyes" (918). What, then, is the purpose of Owen's machines? It is the revelation of their "hidden mysteries" linked with the "grace" (unpremeditated beauty) in nature (909). This may vaguely resemble Kant's notion of "Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck" which characterizes, among other things, the existence of the work of art as an autonomous beautiful object. However, in Hawthorne's understanding, "grace" has wider meaning than the Kantian 'purposiveness without purpose' or the "je ne sais quoi" of the Classicists (the unintended beauty of the work of art).[22] It is "a new development in the love of the Beautiful" which is not only "refined from the utilitarian coarseness" but also bound to understand the truth of machines and the beauty in nature (909).

The second type of machine with which Owen's products are contrasted are the traditional *automata*. These are introduced when the protagonist fattens, seems to lose the purpose of life, and talks incessantly—or babbles, people say—about the "marvels of mechanisms," such as The Man of Brass constructed by Albertus Magnus, or the Brazen Head produced by Friar Bacon, the mechanic coach and horses made for the Dauphin of France, the mechanic insect buzzing round an ear, and the mechanic duck quacking as the real one (922). This series of machines is an interesting figure ironizing the "mystery" and "wonder" of automata, and representing them as trivial jokes. "[A]ll these accounts [...] are mere impositions [i.e., deceptions, or hoaxes]" (922) says Owen, and his argument shows that the problem of automata is not solved by finding an alternative source of their movement. This has been demonstrated earlier in Owen's talk with Danforth, when the chief feature of the automaton, the "Perpetual Motion," was touched upon. Owen argued that the discovery of alternative power would not change the utilitarian nature of technology: it would just lead to "another cotton-machine" (912). As a result, the main problem of automata is not the source of their power, but their imitative character, their impossibility to go beyond a mere semblance, or simulacrum of life. Owen's desire is to transcend this restriction: "to spiritualize machinery; and to combine it with the new species of life and motion, thus producing a beauty that should attain to the ideal which Nature has proposed to herself in all her creatures, but has never taken pains to realize" (922). In other words, Warland longs to explore the potentiality of

[22] On "grace," "felicity," and "mystery" in Classicist literary criticism (Bouhours, Rapin, Boileau, Pope), see M.H. Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp*, 193-94.

artistic creation, its possibility to attain an ideal of beauty which is *not* present in nature. This desire clearly goes beyond the limits of mimesis: if there is anything to be 'imitated,' it is the *potentiality* never realized in nature. Therefore, the creation of the unrealized ideal can be understood in an innovative way as the production of certain truths in the work of art that functions *outside the totality of Nature* as a machine. This understanding again foregrounds *the problem of use* but in a different sense than in the machinery exploiting available sources of energy, and built for a specific purpose.

> To the *logos*, organ and organon whose meaning must be discovered in the whole to which it belongs, is opposed the anti-logos, machine and machinery whose meaning (anything you like) depends solely on its functioning, which, in turn, depends on its separate parts. The modern work of has no problem of meaning, it has only a problem of use.
>
> Why a machine? Because the work of art, so understood, is essentially productive—productive of certain truths. No one has insisted more than Proust on the following point: that the truth is produced, that it is produced by orders of machines that function within us, that it is extracted from our impressions, hewn out of our life, delivered in a work.
>
> […] All production starts from the impression because only the impression unites in itself the accident of the encounter and the necessity of the effect, a violence that it obliges us to undergo. Thus all production starts from a sign and supposes the depth and darkness of the involuntary.[23]

Similarly, Owen's desire is not aimed at a mere development of the Nature's potentialities but at the *production* of nature's truths, unfolding, or explicating, its signs in the work of art.

This production of truth is not a physical process: it consists of creating a "spiritual equivalent" of a remembrance or an impression. The sense is neither in Owen's impressions of living things nor in his remembrance of his day-dreams but only in *the machine of art.* But the sense of the machine of art is to be found only in its functioning, in the course of which it replaces Warland's desire and his relations to all other heroes of the tale.

Owen's butterfly may be interpreted in relation to all three forms of literary machines described by Deleuze in Proust's novel. The first type of machine produces "*partial objects* […] fragments without totality, […] partitioned scenes."[24] In this way we learn about the subsequent phases of the construction of the butterfly

[23] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs,* 146-47.
[24] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 150.

and about most events of Owen's life. Significantly, all previous mechanisms, with the exception of that seen by Hovenden during his first visit (the first butterfly still seems to resemble the structure of the insect's body—"a mechanical something as delicate and minute as the system of a butterfly's anatomy" 915), are destroyed or represented in the form of fragments.

The second form of machine, the machine of Eros, produces "resonances" which connect "two remote objects," for instance the beauty of the finished butterfly and the butterflies of Owen's day-dreams, or the very different characters of the tale assembled in its last scene. The most interesting effect is the radiance of the butterfly's colours, or the loss of its vitality close to Hovenden's finger. In these fragmentary impressions, resonances produce what Deleuze calls "the singular essence, the Viewpoint superior to the two moments that set up a resonance, breaking with the associative chain that links them."[25] The finished butterfly tends to become the machine of resonance in its specific movement in transversals, which is the movement of desire. All characters, with the exception of Owen, want it to fly in the same loop, but it never follows the desired trajectory. Moreover, it reveals the characteristic features of the protagonists in the form of epiphanies. But these are understood neither by Hovenden, nor by Danforth, nor by Annie, since they fail to see the changes produced in their *relations* by the transversal of Owen's butterfly.

The last form of machine is the machine of Thanatos, producing "the effect of withdrawal or the idea of death." Time is made perceptible when its movement "from past to present, is doubled by a *forced movement of greater amplitude*, in the contrary direction, which sweeps away the two moments asunder, emphasizes the gap between them, and pushes the past still farther back into time."[26] This is the movement in which the reminiscence of Hovenden's rationality returns in the "odd expression of sagacity" in the face of the infant who crushes the butterfly. But the loss of the machine of art is not absolute, since it becomes instrumental to Owen's liberation and certainly introduces Nietzschean themes of the revaluation of values, the will to power and the eternal return germinal for Deleuze's thought.

It may certainly be argued that the three types of Deleuzean machines are inscribed on Hawthorne's text by this intertextual reading. The major problem of the Deleuzean interpretation of "The Artist of the Beautiful" is the surviving idiom of romantic idealism, which does not always allow the reader to realize the potentialities

[25] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 152.
[26] Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 160, 159.

of this text, but never establishes a homogeneous aesthetic ideology. The alternative to the all-encompassing idea of the Beautiful as the Platonic "Reality" are the "machines of art" in Hawthorne's tale: neither mechanisms, nor organisms, but functioning assemblages of fragmentary parts. The work of these parts is regulated by the principle of minute differences symbolized by the tiny and extremely fragile pieces of machinery whose individual meaning (like that of the "whirligig" Annie asks about; 917) remains unclear. Similar to Proust's machines they are distinguished by producing *the truths of art* rather than mere flows of energy or desire.[27] Thus it can be said that Hawthorne's machines of art still presuppose the truth as the Essence but also that "The Artist of the Beautiful" stages the problem of the interpretation of signs in a way that does not allow the metaphysical assertion of the truth's essence.

[27] See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (L'anti-Oedipe. Le capitalisme et la schizophrénie, 1969), trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983) 1-8.

10. Beyond Romanticism?
IMAGINED COMMUNITIES REVISITED

This chapter attempts to approach the study of myths from a different angle than usual. Rather than as obsolete or anachronistic cultural forms, constituents of cultural heritage or semiotic structures, myths are discussed as discursive practices shaping collective memories and influencing social behaviour, especially identifications with certain values, however mundane, commercial, trite or dangerous they may seem. Similar to Clifford Geertz[1] or Roland Barthes[2] I do not think we can now reliably distinguish between the traditional symbolism of myth or rituals on the one hand, and ideologies, advertising strategies or patterns of pop culture on the other. The questions I am trying to answer are to what extent these discursive practices can produce what Benedict Anderson has called "imagined communities," that is, communities which "are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined,"[3] and to what extent Europe can be imagined as such a community, however heterogeneous and incomplete it may appear. Although this view of collective imagination may be tempting, I am also aware of its risks especially at the time of resurgent nationalism, racism and religious fundamentalism.

Despite these menaces, Anderson's emphasis on the "style" of imagining communities seems a salient pre-requisite for understanding contemporary cultural as well as political differences. It points out the advantages of functionalism over

[1] Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 143-69, 193-234.

[2] Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (1957), trans. Anette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972) 111-59.

[3] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition (London and New York: Verso, 1991) 6.

essentialism in the comparative study of cultures and prevents the student from absolutizing the values of one's own culture, or of a general "affirmative culture,"[4] such as Shakespeare's universal humanism.[5]

Another, equally important and closely related question is how myths can be grasped in the flux of time: not in their hypothetical evolution from their ancient oral forms to ambiguous symbolic patterns of modernist art, but in their social functioning as "machines": "fuzzy aggregates" whose operation resembles musical "synthesizers," which do not merely repeat (or represent) sounds of individual instruments but "unite disparate elements" (tones and noises) and transpose "the parametres from one formula to another."[6] This approach prevents reducing myths to a mathematical formula, a set of general rules of combination for narrative elements and value patterns.[7] In contrast to Deleuze and Guattari, who sharply distinguish between the mass media as "machines for reproduction [...] that effectively scramble all terrestrial forces of the people" and modern artistic creation open to cosmic powers and anticipating as its audience some deterritorialized "cosmic people" of the future,[8] I see a link between these two activities in *myths functioning as machines*, for instance, in the form of historical movies, TV adaptations of well-known novels, travel films and commercials. These machines do not merely *reproduce* sentiments, desires or values, they also *produce* them, making people imagine their communities, cultural identities, and their diversities from others.

A good example of this production is a recent Czech TV commercial transposing a generally known narrative about the arrival of the tribe of the Czechs to their homeland, first told by the chronicler Kosmas at the end of the eleventh century. With a good deal of humour and irony the story of the origins of the Czechs is told in a characteristic dialect (*hantec*) spoken in Brno, the capital of Moravia, a distinct historical and cultural region of the Czech Republic (or, historically, of the Kingdom of Bohemia). Together with a language shift, there are also shifts in place names and

[4] Herbert Marcuse, "The Affirmative Character of Culture" (Über den affirmativen Charakter der Kultur, 1937), in *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968) 95.

[5] Michael Bristol, *Shakespeare's America, America's Shakespeare* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990) 39-41.

[6] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Mille plateaux, 1980), trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) 343-47.

[7] Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (Anthropologie structurale, 1958), trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke G. Schoepfe (New York: Basic Books, 1963) 228.

[8] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 345-46.

references, making the narrative a typical Brno anecdote. Its cultural otherness is emphasized by using subtitles, translating the local dialect into literary Czech. This "fuzzy aggregate" of mythical travesty, oral culture and cinematic technique, is used both to sell an allegedly 'local' beer, and to express (as well as control) patriotic sentiments. It is a "machine" producing desire and consumption, cultural identity and diversity.

As a consequence, the understanding of myths as "machines" does not only emphasize their heterogeneous and fragmentary nature (earlier described by Lévi-Strauss as *bricolage*[9]) but also their capacity to produce desires or affects[10] and to give rise to economic processes, such as production or consumption,[11] along with cultural processes, such as the formation and dismantling of stereotypes, identification or disidentification with certain values.

Combining the continuity of processes with a structural and functional heterogeneity, myths as "machines" do not exist in a temporal continuum. This is also true of "imagined communities," but, as Anderson shows, some ways of imagining assert or even impose continuity in time, while others focus on the unity of a present moment, no matter how ephemeral it may be. Recent analyses of time, especially those by Deleuze or Derrida, have shown that no fundamental distinction can be made between these approaches: they are two versions of the same philosophical problem, namely, whether the essence of time is continuity, or a radical, irreducible difference.[12] Similarly, in cultural studies, especially when tracing the development of modern nationalism, these two ways of imagining are often found to intermingle and the "style" of imagining of a community resembles the Deleuzean "machine."

Given all this, the main problem of Anderson's approach seems to consist in the radical, fundamentalist separation of the two ways of imagining. This strategy is not of Anderson's own making: it can be traced to Walter Benjamin's notion of "art in the age of

[9] Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (La pensée sauvage, 1962) (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966) 17.

[10] Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 399-400.

[11] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (L'anti-Oedipe. Le capitalisme et la schizophrénie, 1969), trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983) 20.

[12] See, e.g., Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense* (Logique du sens, 1969), trans. Mark Lester, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) 5, 61-65, 162-68; Jacques Derrida, *The Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International* (Spectres de Marx, 1993), trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York and London: Routledge, 1994) 27.

mechanical reproduction,"[13] and even to Auerbach's two concepts of temporality in Homer's epic and the Old Testament.[14] What connects these two approaches is nostalgia for a strong, central power organizing collective imaginings in a temporal continuum.[15] The primary aim of the present critique is not to point out the schematic nature of Anderson's "styles" in which communities are imagined, but to overcome this hereditary yearning of the lost spiritual power of myths.

According to Anderson communities are imagined either in a temporal continuum, which can be described as "simultaneity-along-time," or in "transverse, cross-time" linkages between fragmentary and disparate discourses in heterogeneous historical and social circumstances.[16] The former way of imagining is typical of religious communities based on the existence of a sacred language, a canon of sacred texts, which can be interpreted as a sacred history. The latter way is symptomatic of the rise of modern nations, caused, as Anderson points out, by the simultaneous expansion of administrative vernacular languages, the printing press and newspapers.

A rather problematic aspect of Anderson's approach consists in his belief that modern nations as imagined communities are articulated by mostly technological forces of "democratic anonymity" which produce a semblance of cultural homogeneity. In contrast to this assertion it can be pointed out that under the influence of Romanticism, nations are often imagined, and invented, as religious communities, and the printing press (and mechanical reproduction in general) may be used to monumentalize their (often invented) oral mythologies.

This is certainly the case of the graphic design made circa 1857 by Josef Mánes (1820-71). The woodcut (Fig. 1) represents a scene from an allegedly medieval Czech epic poem entitled "Záboj, Slavoj and Luděk." This text is a part of a monumental literary forgery, *The Manuscript of Dvůr Králové*, 'discovered' by Václav Hanka in 1817. The empty space in the engraving was reserved for the printed text of the poem, which, together with the graphic design, facilitated the imagining of the nation as an archaic, almost entirely male community, similar to Ossian's *fianna*. From the design it is clear that the two ways of imagining, let us call them *romantic* (referring obliquely to Hegel's comparison of Romanticism

[13] Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (Illuminationen, 1955), trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969) 263-65.

[14] Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953) 4-23.

[15] Auerbach, *Mimesis*, 542 and *passim*.

[16] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 24.

and Christianity), and *technological*, are interlinked by specific discursive strategies. The assemblage of a visual image and a monumentalized, printed version of an (invented) oral epic functions as a Deleuzean "machine," synthesizing the semblance of an old myth, with militant as well as erotic sentiments (the poem's text was meant to touch the seductive body of a young woman, the only female in the picture) and the nostalgic desire for the primitive life in the bosom of nature.

Apart from a good deal of schematism, Anderson's approach still has other disadvantages. Homi Bhabha has alerted us to the duality between the "pedagogy" of the narratives engendering the "cross-time" imaginings in individuals, and the performative act of speech in which the individual identifies herself with the imagined "inscribed in a sudden primordiality of meaning that 'looms up *imperceptibly* out of the horizonless past.'"[17] To cover up this difference between the "modern" construction of imagined communities, and the "primordialist"[18] approach to language, signification, and—indeed—national identity, Anderson invokes "the selfless [...] unisonance" in language and poetry (in ritual utterances, popular songs, national anthems) as the power responsible for the emergence of the imagined communities. As Bhabha points out, in doing so Anderson confuses the *act of imagination* with the *act of will* unifying "historical memory" and securing "present-day consent," thus making individuals forget the history as the past violence.[19] In other words, Anderson does not recognize the actual heterogeneity of myths in time, which is not "empty" but exceedingly complex, integrating fragmentary discourses, representations, desires, affects and intensities, into assemblages or machines whose parts move as if at different speeds, that is, in different temporal regimes. Moreover, he does not consider what Bhabha points out, namely that the imagining of the homogeneity of modern nations has for a long time been disrupted by "a more instantaneous and subaltern voice of the people, minority discourses that speak betwixt and between times and places."[20]

This is especially important for the imagining of Europe, the process which may be said to have a similar dynamism as the imagining of individual nations. I will first demonstrate the aspects of this process which resemble the imagining of sacred

[17] Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994) 159; cf. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 144.

[18] See Anthony D. Smith, *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000) 4,5.

[19] Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 160.

[20] *The Location of Culture*, 158.

communities. Then I will discuss an example of the *technological* way of imagining. In both cases I will focus on the transformative power of myths functioning as "machines" in two canonical works of modern European literature: Novalis's essay "Christianity or Europe" (Christenheit oder Europa, 1799)[21] and Kundera's novel *Immortality* (1990; Immortalité, 1989; Nesmrtelnost, 1993).[22] The choice of these texts is motivated by their relationship to the central spiritual values of the Christian myth—the sacrificial love and the unity of the church in Christ—and by their transformation of these values into individual desires and sentiments, used, as Kundera shows, not only for the assertion of individual identities, but also in advertising and forms of contemporary popular culture. In this way, the "minority discourses that speak betwixt times and places," described by Bhabha, are not merely repressed but also articulated.

In Novalis's essay, medieval Europe is united by "a great communal interest": the Christian faith supported by the papal authority. The church, represented by the elite of "holy men" is imagined as an all-inclusive corporation, "a guild to which everyone had access" (327). Its unity, however, does not consist of a sacred language and texts known only by its elite, but in an originally homogeneous organization based on love, spiritual authority, beauty of rituals and ceremonies, and also on the economic as well as cultural power of the new centre—Rome, which had supplanted the destroyed Jerusalem.

It is not surprising that Novalis's imagining of European unity initially uses the body-metaphor developed already in the First Letter of St Paul to the Corinthians:

> For Christ is like a single body with its many limbs and organs, which, many as they are, together make up one body. For indeed we have all been brought into one body by baptism. [...] A body is not a single organ but many [...] God appointed each limb and organ to its own place in the body, as he chose.
>
> (1 Corinthians12.12-13, 18-19)[23]

But Novalis soon moves beyond this representation. Though the unity of Europe seems initially given by the simultaneity of spiritual time, represented by the collective body of believers kept together

[21] Novalis, "Christenheit oder Europa," in *Werke in einem Band* (Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau Verlag, 1980) 327-46. Subsequent references to this edition are in parentheses in the text. All quotations are in my translation.

[22] Milan Kundera, *Immortality*, trans. Peter Kussi (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991). Subsequent references are in parentheses in the text.

[23] The quotation follows the text of *The New English Bible. Standard Edition* (London: Oxford University Press and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) 220.

by the power and purpose of a sacred ceremony (baptism), the secular process of amassing riches and concentrating power disrupts the coherence of the corporation. The simultaneity of the spiritual time gives way to the disintegration caused not only by economic and political forces but also by the internal dynamism of culture, where the "immortal sense" ("unsterbliche Sinn") of the Invisible is "obscured, paralyzed" and "suppressed by other senses" (329-30). This is the case of the Reformation, which replaced religious fervour and authority with the power of the vernacular biblical text imposing "the raw abstract scheme of religion" (333) and converting Protestantism into a secular ideology of territorial fights and a manifestation of the independence on Rome. Although Lutheranism and its sequel "the secular Protestantism" (339) of the French Enlightenment, had threatened to destroy Christian spirituality, in Germany, enjoying a short period of peace, they produced a reversal, marked by "a higher religious life" (340) in all branches of the arts and sciences.

This dialectical process of growth and perfection seems to lead to the restitution of Christianity as the integrating power of Europe. However, here Novalis emphasizes the cultural diversity, instead of identity: while other European nations are absorbed in "war, speculation and factions," the Germans make all effort to become a new community establishing "the higher epoch of culture." No wonder that this progress must ultimately lead to the "great preponderance" of Germany and its culture over European countries ("muß ihm [Deutschland] ein großes Übergewicht über die anderen [Ländern] im Lauf der Zeit geben" 340). The new Christian Europe is imagined as German cultural hegemony based no longer on generalizing structural and value patterns but on the "holy particularity" and individuality ("den heiligen Eigentümlichkeit") and on the "omnipotence of inner humanity" (340). As a result, Novalis's imagining of Europe is characterized by surprisingly divergent tendencies: apart from the integrating power of national culture there is also the diversifying force of individual creativity.

At the end of Novalis's essay this diversifying force is substituted by the individualizing love, which has some features of erotic desire but also a spiritual dimension: the unity of Europe no longer resembles that of a collective body, a corporation or a fraternity. The "brother" to whom Novalis wishes to lead the representatives of the Enlightenment universalism ("Philantropen und Enzyklopädisten") is the feeling of the "pulse of the new age" which creates a "new community of apostles" (342). Apostles of what? Of the new spirituality blending in the infinity of imagination the erotic desire and the mystical mute language, or rather "music"

of secret symbols ("Chiffernmusik" 342) of the Annunciation. This mysterious "music" is represented in a complex image of "an endless play of the folds" ("das unendliche Faltenspiel" 342) of a semi-transparent veil stretched tight over a face of a virgin. In symbolical terms, the folds of the veil do "not conceal the formal element,"[24] "the structure of her heavenly body" (340), but they effectively prevent its attainment, since it can appear fully only "with infinity."[25]

In Deleuzean terms, the unity of the new Europe in Novalis's essay emerges in a typical Baroque manner, being invented as "the infinite work or process," which "moves between matter and soul," between "the high and the low," and includes "unfolding" in its constant play of folds, making the new object inseparable from "the different layers that are dilating," due to which "matter becomes a matter of expression."[26] However, in other (and also Deleuzean) terms Novalis's imagery can be read as a heterogeneous aggregate, which comprises "a desiring machine," processing (in the metonymical connection between "brother," "heartbeat" and "bride") the relations of kinship and bodily feelings into erotic drives, and "a literary machine"[27] able to create a unity out of fragments, a unity of style, which is fundamentally different from the organic unity of the body of a medieval church.

This Baroque and hallucinatory form of European unity evidently differs from Novalis's description of the revived Christianty as a cultural as well as political power: "a visible church" reaching beyond the boundaries of individual countries and organizing a peaceful reform of European states (346). From other writings of Novalis, for instance, his *Blütenstaub* fragments, it is clear that this new community is conceived as a totalitarian, state-like organization, whose integrating force is "the instinctive global policy" of the German *Volk* leading to the hegemony of Germany as a country, which has justly succeeded Rome in its imperial mission.[28] Here, the discourse of nationalism with its pretence to universal power seems to have swallowed up the individualizing "minority discourses" of Baroque philosophy and Romantic poetry. Both of them can be understood as attempts to integrate the

[24] Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (Le pli, 1988), trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 37.
[25] Deleuze, *The Fold*, 38.
[26] *The Fold*, 34-37.
[27] Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, trans. Richard Howard, second edition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 146-49 and *passim*.
[28] Novalis, *Blütenstaub* (1798; Fragment 64), in *Werke in einem Band* (Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau Verlag, 1980) 289.

"subaltern voice of the people"[29] in the thought and art of the elites.

Contrary to Anderson, who deals with the emergence of modern nations only as the result of the "cross-time" simultaneity of imagining,[30] the present reading of Novalis's essay on imagining Europe has shown both the importance of the interplay between the traditional representations of sacred community and its modern transformation, and also between universalism and nationalism.

The next step is a reading of a novel which takes the "homogeneous empty time [...] marked [...] by temporal coincidence"[31] as its point of departure.

Unlike in Anderson's assumptions, the time at the outset of Kundera's *Immortality* seems "empty" with respect to two sign systems of different orders. The emptiness of time appears when the temporality of human existence is contrasted with the aesthetic value, the "charm and elegance" of a human gesture that seem to exist "outside of time" (4). Kundera's gestures are signs which make sense only in contrast to the homely, trivial meanings of other signs in the context of which they appear. Despite their randomness, they are not unique because they can be repeated by different individuals almost identically and have constant qualities or values. In this way, the relationship between the signifier and the signified gets inverted: individuals become signifiers and gestures signifieds: "it is gestures that use us as their instruments, as their bearers and incarnations" (7). The other sign system representing the emptiness of time is, rather ironically, characterized by "a harmonious combination of uniformity and freedom" (6) typical of the modern media and globalized consumerism. In contrast to the previous one, it privileges the diversity and proliferation of signifiers at the expense of the relative value of signifieds. The system does not make a difference between informing and entertaining and its signs may not even function as units of communication, since they are easily converted into dreamy associations, as occurs at the outset of Kundera's book. Despite the variety based on the play of its signifiers the system's effects are uniform. The narrator makes this clear when he observes that all the radio stations say "at precisely the same time [...] the same thing about the same things" (6).

According to Anderson, this understanding of signification and time derives from the belief in the unifying and homogenizing power of technology, trade, capital and media. Anderson explicitly

[29] Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 158.
[30] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 24ff.
[31] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 24.

connects this *technological* time with the new imagining when he says that "the novel and the newspaper [...] provided the technical means for 're-presenting' the *kind* of imagined community that is the nation."[32] Though *Immortality* seems to develop this idea both in its theoretical sources and its global implications, it uses different and more sophisticated patterns of temporality. In contrast to the "mechanical reproduction" attributed to the technological media by Benjamin and Anderson, Kundera uses the central metaphor of "the Creator's computer" where all complexities of human existence are generated at random as "a play of permutations and combinations within a general program, which is not a prophetic anticipation of the future [that is, does not reveal any simultaneity of communal life 'along time'] but merely sets the limits of possibilities, within which all power of decision has been left to chance" (11-12).

This computer metaphor does not point to any specific social formation or technological condition. Its use partially resembles Homi Bhabha's critique of Anderson's hypothesis. Bhabha demonstrates that it is the basic feature of any sign system—the arbitrary nature of sign, "its separation of language and reality"—that "enables Anderson to emphasize the imaginary or mythical nature of the society of the nation." In "the separation of language and reality—in the *process* of signification [...] there is no epistemological equivalence of subject and object, no possibility of the mimesis of meaning."[33] Translated into Kundera's terms, on the one hand, there is the sign language of the computer program and, on the other hand, there are specific events generated by the program's iterations.

In order to resist the reductive pressure of the computer metaphor Kundera strives to "make reflection or meditation a natural part of the novel, and to create the way of thinking specific of the novel (that is, no abstract reasoning, but reflection connected with the situations of individual characters, no serious, theoretical thought, but ironic, provocative, questioning leading eventually to a comical way of thinking)."[34] In simplified terms, Kundera combines reflections about reality with fictions (his "play of imagination") in the architectonic space of the novelistic world, where individual dreams, the delusions of the masses and diversely constructed realities reveal and mock one another.

[32] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 25.
[33] Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 158.
[34] Milan Kundera, "Poznámka autora" (Author's Note), in *Nesmrtelnost* (Immortality) (Brno: Atlantis, 1993) 347 (my translation).



Josef Mánes (1820-71), "Záboj v úvalu" (Záboj in a Ravine), ca. 1857

For this purpose, he does not rely on the story and its development, but on the formal unity of the novel. "[T]he idea of the overall architecture," claims Kundera "is a part of my original idea from which the novel is born; though it is not a product of a formal calculation but of a compulsive, involuntary vision."[35] In

[35] Kundera, "Poznámka autora," 348.

other words, *Immortality* attempts to restructure the narrator's self and his perception of the world, while disclaiming the fabricated postmodern reality and supplanting it with a balanced aesthetic form. However, this process is not quite deliberate, being based on an involuntary formal drive, an "archetypal" formal pattern common to most of Kundera's fictions. The main purpose of this pattern is to supplant the causal unity of the story with the interplay of the main *themes* of the novel, or, to accomplish a synthesis of the reflection and the plot.

This synthesis does not lead to unification. Its main device is the diversification of narrative time and strategies. While the former allows Kundera to alternate between the microscopic images of moments in individual lives, and the telescopic panoramas of the historical development, the latter tend to produce a unity of individual stories despite the fortuitous character of individual events. This is especially evident in the fifth part of the novel, called "Chance." Although the three stories cannot be combined on the basis of probability, their random combination integrates the three different levels of the plot: 1. the fictional tale of Agnes and her life, 2. the parallel story of a young suicide as a part of the image of the world created by the media (the author heard it on the radio), 3. the 'metafictional' level where author tells his friend, Professor Avenarius, about his heroine. While in the former part of the novel, the levels of fiction, non-fiction (historical narrative and essay) and metafiction are more or less distinctly separated, in the latter parts, after the 'crisis' in the plot, they converge, which is evident in the description of the love affair between Rubens and the lute-player, later identified as Agnes.

Apart from transforming the initial computer metaphor into a reflection of the narrative structure of *Immortality* Kundera makes another daring claim. In the afterword to the Czech edition he implies that his effort was "to expand radically the time of the novel, so that it might grasp 'the time of Europe.'"[36] This rather cryptic statement needs some elucidation. The section of the novel most preoccupied with this *longue durée* of European modernity (starting, according to Hegel's definition of Romanticism, with the rise of Christianity), is the fourth part, entitled "Homo Sentimentalis." The problem of Europe is the problem of love in Christianity: in Europe, the criterion of good and evil ceased to be objective:

> Christianity turned this criterion inside out: love God, and do as you wish! said Saint Augustine. The criterion of good and evil was

[36] Kundera, "Poznámka autora," 347.

> placed in the individual soul and became subjective [...] true love is always right, even when it is in the wrong. (192)

Kundera proceeds to quote Luther:

> love precedes everything, even sacrifice, even prayer. From this I deduce that love is the highest virtue. Love makes us unaware of the earthly and fills us with the heavenly; thus love frees us of guilt. (192)

Therefore, Kundera argues, the *homo sentimentalis* is defined "as a man who raised feelings to a category of value" (193). But how is the authenticity of feelings demonstrated? As a result, Kundera claims, "as soon as we *want* to feel [...], feeling is no longer a feeling but an imitation of feeling, a show of feeling. That's why *homo sentimentalis* (a person who has raised feeling to value) is in reality identical to *homo hystericus*" (193). This irresolvable dilemma between sentiments as *emotional expressions* and as *signs (or representations) of certain values* is an important feature of European identity, starting with King Lear and Don Quixote, and culminating in Romanticism.

As Kundera shows in the case of Bettina Brentano, romantic love is "extra-coital." It does not identify the emotion with the intensity of feeling but rather with specific signs or representations, namely, abstract and absolute concepts, such as Eternity, Immortality, and so on. This is an oblique reference to all utopias of romantic nationalism and universalism (including Novalis's essay on Christianity), relying on love as the chief principle of imagining and shaping the new community.

What, however, is more important in the context of Kundera's novel, is the fact that this 'high' romantic love has been trivialized in the illusions and phantasms of pop-culture, including commercials. Contemporary society is using sentimentality as an aggressive power. An important outcome of this, claims Kundera, is that no one seems to be interested in reflecting on the relationship between one's self and one's own image any longer. This, of course, is one of the main themes of the novel, articulated in the story of Agnes. To what extent is our image really a part of our own identity? Is it not composed of impersonal and repeatable gestures generated by some structural model or matrix, some general program running on the "cosmic computer"? Instead of asking these questions, most individuals are intent on imposing violently the phantasms of one's own self, produced by the media, advertising, fashions, etc., on others. In this respect, their imaginings are generated by the means of technical reproduction.

As Kundera indicates, this degenerate world cannot be resisted by aggressive acts. Professor Avenarius, who entertains himself by cutting car tyres, is more nauseating than comical. So are Bettina Brentano and Agnes's sister Laura. The only reliable way of dealing with the world's decay is its aesthetic transformation into a novel. The novel which is no longer a representation of this world but a self-contained musical structure producing different feelings than those of the *homo hystericus* (typical of Romanticism) and balancing them with rational impulses, thus leading us to discover structuredness in fiction as well as in reality. "The magic of art is the beauty of form," claims Kundera, "transparence, and clarity, explicability and understandability."[37]

By privileging music as the model for all arts, Kundera continues in the romantic tradition, but by stressing the architectonic, structural value of music, he avoids the frequent romantic error identifying music with passionate emotionality. The feelings produced by music are of a different kind: the aesthetic pleasure of harmonious forms. In this pleasure, Kundera seems to seek the antidote against the decayed Romanticism, hysterical sentimentality, which threatens to undermine the grounds of European culture.

When *Immortality* was finished in 1988, the Czech draft text was not yet completed. According to Kundera it had been abandoned

> in such a condition that it would require at least a month to put it in order. It was necessary to read it slowly sentence after sentence and to incorporate all the corrections and changes made in the process of my work on various translations.[38]

If this is true, the temporal hierarchy of the original text and its translations has been unsettled: the alleged 'original' was completed only after several translations had been published. As a result, the final version of this 'original' is no longer original: it incorporates a number of revisions made to the previous translations. In this way, Kundera's novel can be said to have no original text: it is an *intertext composed of drafts and translations*. The Czech text then, is similarly derivative as the French or English 'translations' are.

This establishes a different standard of novel writing and a different vision of Europe. No longer as a *site* of competing national cultures (as imagined in the age of Romanticism and also

[37] Kundera, "Poznámka autora," 350.
[38] Kundera, "Poznámka autora," 345.

throughout the rest of the nineteenth and in the twentieth century), but as a *process* of a horizontal, or transversal, integration, in which fairly remote cultures (French, Czech, English, German) are interlinked by a text. This text is no longer a unity of meaning in one language, but rather a multiplicity of meanings based on different cultural resonances of the story, of Kundera's reflections, and of the novel's aesthetic form. While the Czech reader may identify the novel with a vague notion of "cosmopolitanism," the French will be looking for the echoes of the *esprit* of the Enlightenment, or for metafictional features, German readers may reflect on Schiller's distinction between "naive" and "sentimental" in culture, and so on.

As a result, *Immortality* displays an effective aesthetic way of imagining Europe, reaching beyond the *romantic* and the *technological* ways of imagining communities. It should be noted, however, that Kundera's specific perspective of an expatriate, based on his admiration of the international "Republic of Letters" created by the French Enlightenment, can hardly work as the universally valid model for such imagining. The *aesthetic of the picturesque*, which changed the attitude towards landscape at the close of the Enlightenment period, is another and perhaps more feasible way of imagining Europe. Taking the regional specificity and local variety as a point of departure, it succeeds in integrating both the local and the universal, mythological, literary and artistic *topoi* into a specific landscape design. The aesthetic of the picturesque is based on "accidental" (irregular, mobile or ephemeral, yet locally and temporally specific) distributions of singularities—natural as well as cultural objects.[39] It also asserts the general importance of "those bonds of union by which the different parts of landscape are so happily connected."[40] According to John Dixon Hunt, these connections are based on "a mixed economy of design and land use to mirror a similar diversity of human existence."[41] In this respect, the picturesque scenes combine volatile effects of art with domestic habits and local (not necessarily agricultural) economies as well as with rich references to European cultural heritage (in painting, poetry, music and mythology). These transversal links are vital for imagining the culturally diversified Europe.

[39] See, e.g., Richard Payne Knight, *The Landscape: A Didactic Poem* (1795) (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001) 42.

[40] Uvedale Price, *An Essay on the Picturesque ...* (1796) (Ottley: Woodstock Books, 2000) 263.

[41] John Dixon Hunt, *The Picturesque Garden in Europe* (London and New York: Thames and Hudson, 2003) 76.

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