Mosaic versus Melting Pot?: Immigration and Ethnicity in Canada and the United States

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Many Canadians believe that Canada's experience with ethnicity, at the level of both social attitudes and social reality, has been different from that of the United States. This difference is often envisioned as one between a Canadian mosaic, where ethnic groups have maintained their distinctiveness while functioning as part of the whole, and an American melting pot, where peoples of diverse origins have allegedly fused to make a new people. There is, of course, some truth to this distinction, but it oversimplifies both the American and the Canadian experiences. It ignores the fact that the mosaic approach has not always been the prevailing attitude toward immigrant adjustment in Canada. It obscures the fact that Canada and the United States have shared very similar immigration policies (particularly on the question of which ethnic, national, and racial groups were the most desirable), and it neglects the fact that, at least with regard to immigrant groups, the history of racism, nativism, and discrimination has been very similar in the two countries.

In comparing the American and Canadian experiences with immigration and ethnicity, the focus of this paper is on immigration policy, nativist (or anti-foreign) sentiment, and public attitudes toward immigrant adjustment, rather than on the degree to which immigrant ethnic groups have survived as distinct cultural entities within the two societies. An examination of public attitudes toward ethnic minorities reveals basic assumptions about ethnicity which can be traced over time. Some attempt is also made to look at the consequences of attitudes toward immigration and ethnicity by examining the influence of public opinion on immigration policy and by analysing patterns of discrimination. The actual rates of assimilation of different immigrant groups are more difficult to determine — because of the combined difficulty of defining what one means by the term assimilation and of ascertaining rates of assimilation from available historical records, and also because of the dearth of studies which compare the experiences of one particular minority group on both sides of the border. In discussing ethnicity in Canada and the United States, I have limited my attention to "immigrant" groups in the post-1867 period, thus excluding any discussion of the maintenance of

ethnicity among Canada's French and British colonists or American blacks (who were forcibly brought to America) or the native peoples.

In Canada, as in the United States, three theories of assimilation have dominated discussion of immigrant adjustment in the past century: first, Anglo-conformity (and, in Canada, its French-Canadian counterpart, Franco-conformity) demanded the renunciation of the immigrants' ancestral culture and traditions in favour of the behaviour and values of the "Anglo-Saxon" group; secondly, the "melting pot" envisaged a biological merging of settled communities with new immigrant groups and a blending of their cultures into a new Canadian type; and thirdly, "cultural pluralism" (also referred to in Canada as the "mosaic" or "multiculturalism") postulated the preservation of some aspects of immigrant culture and communal life within the context of Canadian citizenship and political and economic integration into Canadian society. These three approaches have had varying degrees of acceptance in the two countries and there have of course been shifts in public opinion. In English-speaking Canada, because of the economic, social, and political predominance of the British group and because of Canada's colonial ties to Britain, Anglo-conformity was the main approach to assimilation until the Second World War (although there were some advocates of the melting pot and of cultural pluralism during the 1920s and 1930s).

In the United States, where a "new nation" was being consciously formed, Anglo-conformity was not as powerful and the melting pot approach prevailed throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries and into the 1960s. As numerous historians and sociologists have pointed out, the melting pot did not always melt, and many of those who advocated the melting pot drew lines as to who should be included in the pot (non-whites were usually excluded, at both the level of social attitudes and social reality). Nonetheless, the melting pot idea (as envisaged by the Franco-American farmer Crévecoeur in *Letters From an American Farmer* and by the Jewish-American playwright Israel Zangwill in his epic drama, *The Melting Pot*) served as the most pervasive ideal toward which Americans should be striving. However, a variety of factors has helped to make cultural pluralism more acceptable in both Canada and the United States during the last fifteen years. New quasi-social movements have developed in each country advocating pluralism — in Canada under the rubric of multiculturalism, and in the United States under the rubric of the "new ethnicity." These movements are remarkably similar, and an attempt is made later in the paper to compare them, as well as the debate which each has provoked.

**THE IMMIGRATION BOOM AND ANGLO-CONFORMITY 1867-1920**

The central element in Canada's history and cultural development has been the existence of two cultures, British and French. The two peoples had been made co-inhabitants of British North America by the British conquest of 1759.
At has been argued that the American revolutionary movement helped to guarantee the survival of French society in North America by forcing the British government to give full recognition to existing French institutions in the Quebec Act of 1774, thus ensuring the loyalty of the French to Britain at a time when the other colonies in North America were moving toward rebellion. Consequently, the fate of French culture in British North America was to be substantially different from its fate in Louisiana, where its persistence was limited largely to isolated rural parishes. Among the several objectives of the architects of the Canadian confederation in 1867, none was more important than the effort to accommodate the needs of these two cultural communities; the political arrangement of federalism was seen as the best way of doing this. There was virtually no recognition of ethnic diversity aside from the British-French duality. This is, of course, somewhat understandable since at the time of Confederation, only 8 per cent of the population of three and one-half million were of non-British or non-French ethnic origin.

Immigration to Canada remained slight until nearly the turn of the century because the United States proved more attractive for most European emigrants. In fact, the United States was attractive for many Canadians as well, and the dominion barely maintained its net population. But with the closing of the American frontier around 1890 which coincided with improving economic conditions in Canada and an active immigration promotion campaign by Wilfrid Laurier's Liberal government, many immigrants began to come to the newly opened land of western Canada in the late 1890s.

The early years of this century were the boom years for immigration to both countries. Between 1900 and 1920, three million immigrants came to Canada, while nearly fifteen million went to the United States. Between 1901 and 1911, Canada's population jumped by 43 per cent and immigrants came to constitute more than 22 per cent of the population. Between 1900 and 1910, the American population increased by 21 per cent with immigrants representing 15 per cent of the population. A comparison of the composition of the two flows shows that the United States drew much more heavily on the "new" immigration from central, southern, and eastern Europe. Between 1900 and 1910, one-third of the immigrants coming to Canada were from central, southern, and eastern Europe while 71 per cent of those going to the United States were from these areas. Thus, by 1920 there was a much larger proportion of Jews, Italians, Greeks, South Slavs, and Poles in the United States than in Canada because these groups were more urban bound, and Canada was seeking immigrants who would farm. There was, however, a selective migration from eastern Europe to Canada of those groups most devoted to agriculture — Mennonites, Doukhobors, and Ukrainians. British immigrants formed a much larger proportion of the immigrants coming to Canada, in part because Canadian policy actively encouraged British immigrants, and also because many Britons preferred to remain in the empire. Indeed the British formed the largest group coming to Canada at this time,
followed in numbers by the over half a million Americans who came to the prairie provinces to continue farming.

The destination of non-British immigrants was different in the two countries. Non-British immigrants in the United States concentrated in the large urban centres, while those in Canada were found for the most part in rural areas of western Canada since Canadian immigration policy was geared to securing farmers. Some non-British immigrants who came to Canada did find jobs working in mines, on the railways, or doing the menial and difficult labour jobs in cities like Vancouver, Winnipeg, and Toronto. But Canada wanted farmers to settle the west, and the United States sought an industrial working class for its expanding industries. It was these needs that helped determine where the immigrants went.

Throughout the entire period of this large-scale immigration, indeed until World War II, Anglo-conformity was the predominant ideology of assimilation in English-speaking Canada. For better or for worse, there were few proponents of either the melting pot or cultural pluralism, contrary to the flood of recent political speeches and scholarly articles on ethnicity in Canada which assume that the "mosaic" approach has always been predominant. Supporters of Anglo-conformity argued that it was the obligation of new arrivals to conform to the institutions of Canadian society — which were already fixed. If the immigrant could not conform, he should be excluded. These English Canadians shared the American view of which groups could be assimilated most readily and which nationalities were cause for concern. British immigrants may have been considered more desirable in Canada than in the United States, but generally northern Europeans were welcomed in both countries since they were regarded as the most culturally similar and, hence, the most easily assimilable immigrants.

As in the United States, considerable opposition developed in Canada to Asians and to those from central, southern, and eastern Europe. There were widespread fears that these immigrants could not be assimilated. While concern about an alleged connection between immigration and slums, radicalism, intemperance, and criminality served as a powerful support for nativism, the most pervasive fear of opinion leaders was that southern and eastern Europeans would wash away Anglo-Saxon traditions of self-government in a sea of illiteracy and inexperience with "free" institutions. Many American and English-Canadian intellectuals thought that North America's greatness was ensured so long as its Anglo-Saxon character was preserved. Writers emphasized an Anglo-Saxon tradition of political freedom and self-government and the "white man's" mission to spread Anglo-Saxon blessings. Many intellectuals viewed Asians and central, southern, and eastern Europeans as a threat to this tradition and concluded that since they could not be assimilated, they would have to be excluded. Thus, the introduction in Canada of a head tax on Chinese immigrants, a "gentlemen's agreement" with Japan which restricted the number of immigrants from that country, the passing of
ers in council which restricted immigration from India, the gradual introduction of restrictive immigration laws in 1906, 1910, and 1919, and the tightening of naturalization laws were based in considerable part on the assumptions of Anglo-conformity — immigrants who were culturally or racially inferior (or at least different) and incapable of being assimilated should be excluded.

Patterns of discrimination in both Canada and the United States after 1870 paralleled preferences of immigrant sources with northern and western Europeans encountering relatively little discrimination, central and southern Europeans and Jews encountering more discrimination, and non-whites encountering an all-pervasive pattern of discrimination which extended to almost all aspects of their lives. Discrimination was one of the main factors which led to the transference (with only a few exceptions) of the same ethnic "pecking order" which existed in immigration policy to the place each group occupied in the social structure with the British at the highest levels, and so on down to the Chinese and blacks who occupied the lowest levels. The effects of such discrimination were felt not only in the economy, but also in local and national politics. Restricted access to the labour market and to political participation severely limited the social power of central, southern, and eastern Europeans and non-whites in both countries right up to the Second World War.

Although the trend toward restrictionism in Canada during the early 1900s and the existing patterns of discrimination reveal the predominance of the assumptions of Anglo-conformity, for the most part there was no explicit federal government policy between 1867 and 1945 with regard to the role of non-British and non-French ethnic groups in Canadian society. It was generally assumed, however, that immigrants would eventually be assimilated into either English-Canadian or French-Canadian society. The federal government's main concern was tied to the economic consequences of immigration. It had encouraged Mennonites and Icelanders to settle in blocs in Manitoba during the 1870s and had given them special concessions (including local autonomy for both and military exemptions for the Mennonites) to entice them to stay in Canada rather than move to the United States. This was not because of any conscious desire to make Canada a cultural mosaic, or because of any belief in the value of cultural diversity (although politicians sometimes gave lip service to pluralism). Rather, as the American railway companies had earlier discovered in their immigration settlement operations, bloc settlements, by providing social and economic stability, were a way of getting immigrants to settle in the west and remain there. The government's policy was pragmatic and concerned primarily with economic growth and nation-building; there was little rhetoric in immigration propaganda picturing Canada as a home for the oppressed.

Provincial governments were faced with the problems of assimilation more directly than the federal government since the provinces maintained
jurisdiction over the educational systems. The whole question of the varying attitudes of provincial authorities toward assimilation is much too complex to outline here; suffice it to say that with some notable exceptions (like the bilingual school system in Manitoba between 1896 and 1916 which included French-English, German-English, Polish-English, and Ukrainian-English schools and the school system which was established for Hutterites in Alberta), Anglo-conformity was the predominant aim of the public school system and was an underlying theme in the textbooks....

While Anglo-conformity prevailed in English-speaking Canada prior to World War II, Franco-conformity, or assimilation to a French-Canadian norm, was not widely promoted in Quebec. Most French Canadians did not espouse any ideology of assimilation with regard to "other ethnic groups" (as non-British, non-French, and non-native groups were later designated by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism). They were generally more preoccupied with the defence of their own status. Also, relatively few non-British, non-French immigrants went to Quebec, and a large number of those in Quebec were Jews who did not want to be assimilated into French-Canadian society and whom French Canadians did not want to assimilate. Nationalist critics of Laurier's immigration policy like Henri Bourassa did not try to urge a policy of Franco-conformity as a French-Canadian counterpart to Anglo-conformity. Their argument held that immigrants were upsetting Canada's demographic balance (because of the small numbers of French immigrants) and therefore they should all be excluded. There has been little research on the attitudes of French Canadians in western Canada towards other ethnic groups, although we do know that their clergy made special attempts to secure Ukrainian and Polish priests to ensure that these immigrants would not be assimilated into the Protestant majority. Yet while some of the French-Canadian clergy were acting out their belief in pluralism, other French-Canadian nationalists were arguing that pluralism threatened French Canada, since it would ultimately generate demands by the English-speaking majority for the assimilation of French Canadians along with other minorities in order to avoid social and linguistic chaos. These French-Canadian nationalists feared, as some still do, that non-British, non-French immigration would undermine a bicultural perception of Canada.

The more one scratches the surface of the period up to 1920, the more difficult it becomes to differentiate between the immigration histories of Canada and the United States. In Canada, the existence of French Canada, the rural destination of the majority of immigrants, the size of the different groups, and the different political system did give a different face to the immigrant experience. But once one begins to examine the two basic questions of how the host society regarded the immigrants and what was the nature of immigrant life, one must come to the conclusion that these differences are relatively minor. If one looks at the experience of immigrant groups in terms of emigration area, causes of emigration, the traffic and business of immi-
of ethnic businesses and organizations, the reasons for and the types of conflict both within individual ethnic groups and between groups, class position and areas of occupational specialization, and efforts at language and cultural maintenance, parallels keep emerging between the experiences of both groups on both sides of the border. This is not to say that the experiences were identical, but there were probably more variations between individual immigrant groups, and between different regions of the two countries, than there were between the two countries as a whole.

In analysing the development of immigration policy, the course of nativist sentiment, and attitudes toward assimilation, one is again confronted by basic similarities between Canada and the United States. Although they began in the late 1800s with basically open immigration policies, both countries gradually restricted immigration in response to nativist concern about the biological and social impact of southern, central, and eastern Europeans and Asians and in response to labour organizations worried about economic competition.

The three main strands of nativism which John Higham has delineated in his study of American nativism — Anglo-Saxon nativism, anti-Catholic nativism, and anti-radical nativism — also had considerable impact on Canada. Each nativist tradition had however a slightly different origin within the Canadian context. Fears about the decline of Anglo-Saxon "stock" were given added impetus by the colonial desire to preserve Canada as "British." Anti-Catholicism was complicated by the fact that the largest single group of Catholics in Canada was French-speaking. The existence of French Canada gave Catholics a greater sense of legitimacy in Canada; yet at the same time anti-French feelings could add additional fuel to Protestant anti-Catholicism. The American anti-radical nativist view that violent opposition to the status quo was "characteristically European and profoundly un-American" also had its Canadian counterpart. But Canadian hostility to radicalism did not stem from a "liberal" tradition as it did in the United States. Rather, it stemmed from the basic conservatism of Canadian values and politics which emphasized order rather than liberty. While in each country the timing of each of the expressions of nativism was different, nativist sentiments appealed to basically the same social and economic groups in each country and had a comparable impact on the formation of national policy, particularly during the First World War.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND POSTWAR IMMIGRATION 1940-1960

The war and early postwar years were a transitional time in both countries with respect to attitudes toward immigration and ethnicity. Although the outbreak of war brought renewed hostility toward enemy aliens, a number
of developments during the war eventually worked to undermine ethnic prejudices. Many prewar prejudices lingered and ethnic minorities encountered considerable pressure for conformity during the new wave of immigration to Canada and the United States in the late 1940s and 1950s, but economic prosperity and changing intellectual and social assumptions diminished nativism and prejudice and helped pave the way for a growing acceptance of pluralism by the 1960s.

The war period itself hardly seemed conducive to ethnic tolerance or pluralism. Patriotic groups grew quickly and many turned their attention to the loyalty of "enemy aliens." Germans and Italians, since they were now well established, did not meet the same degree of hostility in either country that the Germans had faced in World War I. But the Japanese encountered intense enmity. The irrational build-up of hostility toward the Japanese on the west coasts of both countries and their forced relocation inland indicated that in both countries there was continuing racism, a complete ignorance of the history of a group which had been in North America for forty years, and a continued willingness on the part of both governments to respond to public bigotry and violate the civil rights of ethnic minorities who were regarded as second-class citizens.

A new wave of emigration to both Canada and the United States commenced after the Second World War with the influx of refugees from war-torn Europe and the arrival of thousands of German, Dutch, and British immigrants seeking better economic opportunities. The 1950s and 1960s also brought to Canada a growing number of immigrants from Mediterranean countries—Portugal, Greece, and particularly Italy, thus serving to make the ethnic composition of Canada more like that of the United States, since the United States had previously had much larger communities from Mediterranean countries.

But the immigrants who were involved in this wave of immigration were still predominantly European. This reflected the continuing assimilationist and racist basis of postwar immigration policy in both countries which gave preference to northern Europeans and virtually excluded Asians and other non-whites. Prime Minister Mackenzie King probably spoke for the majority of Canadians in his 1947 speech outlining the federal government's postwar immigration policy when he stated that immigration should be limited to those groups that could be "absorbed." In the United States, the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 preserved the quota system based on national origin instituted in 1924 and thus upheld the view that immigration laws should be based on assimilationist and racist assumptions. Both Canada and the United States did, however, make provisions for small numbers of Asian immigrants to allow for family reunifications.

In Canada, there was much less resistance to these postwar immigrants from Europe than there had been to earlier arrivals from eastern Europe. The two principal political forces of resistance to immigration—French
Canadians and organized labour—had modified their positions by the end of the war and were favourable to immigration. Opposition from these groups had dwindled as they became convinced of the connection between immigration and economic growth, as the government promised to take greater control over the whole immigration process, and as pressures for ethnic tolerance were brought increasingly to bear. The revulsion against Hitler and Nazism had also extended to a discrediting of ideas of a superior race. Most English-speaking Canadians were favourable to immigration: the allegiance in Canada to all things British was in retreat, earlier arrivals had accustomed English Canadians to diversity, the war had enabled some previously unacceptable groups to prove their loyalty, and the tie between immigration and economic growth was firmly cemented in the public mind. Although all of these factors played their part in increasing the acceptance of immigrants, probably the most important factor in both Canada and the United States was the large proportion of educated and skilled individuals among the postwar immigrants. In a break with prewar policy, during the 1950s both countries began to seek out skilled industrial and urban-oriented immigrants capable of assisting industrial expansion and of “integrating” more rapidly than rural immigrants. The settler in a sheepskin coat and the "huddled masses yearning to breathe free" were replaced by immigrants with a slide rule. Hence the greater acceptance of immigrants in the postwar period in both Canada and the United States stems only partly from increased levels of tolerance.

It was not until the early 1960s that international pressures for ethnic tolerance and a growing realization of the inequity of the existing immigration laws finally led to the introduction of regulations which eliminated the old ethnic and racial biases in both Canada and the United States. In Canada, changing immigration regulations in 1962 eliminated the old geographic preferences while in the United States the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 removed racial discrimination as embodied in the national origins quota system. In both countries, these changes have brought an increasing number of non-whites, sparking renewed controversy over the desirability of non-white immigration, particularly in Canada (which has admitted a proportionately larger number of non-whites).

Both countries now emphasize as basic cornerstones of their immigration policy family reunification, the need for skilled and professional immigrants, the need to make immigrants fit labour market requirements, and a willingness to make special provisions for refugees.

The crucial difference between the postwar immigration policies of Canada and the United States has not been so much in which types of immigration or which nationalities were allowed to enter (though there are some important differences), but in the numbers of immigrants which have entered. In the postwar period, roughly half as many immigrants have entered Canada as the United States, although Canada has only one-tenth the population of the United States. Given the importance of immigration to the maintenance
of ethnicity, this difference is really the key fact in explaining differences in current developments in Canada and the United States. Ethnicity and immigrant life are now more visible in Canada than in the United States, particularly in the large metropolitan centres of Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver (the destinations of the majority of postwar immigrants). There are simply no American cities which now compare with Toronto as an "immigrant city." In some respects, Toronto is the successor to cities like New York, Chicago, and Winnipeg which were the "immigrant cities" at the turn of the century.

Differing government policies toward ethnic minorities already in the country did not play an important role during the 1950s and 1960s in determining this greater visibility of ethnicity on the Canadian scene. As sociologist Jean Burnet has pointed out,

Prior to 1971, the ideology concerning ethnic relations in Canada was summed up in the term mosaic, and its floral and gustatory analogues — bouquet, flower garden, salad, vegetable soup, stew. The mosaic was proudly contrasted with the American melting pot. However, less effort was expended by Canadian governments to maintain the mosaic than was spent by governments in the United States to keep the melting pot bubbling: in the public school systems and in broadcasting, to take only one example from provincial and one from federal jurisdiction, no tangible aid was given to ethnic groups in preserving their old-world heritages, and, on the contrary, considerable pressure was exerted in the direction of "integration" or "assimilation." The mosaic was lent support chiefly in speeches by governors general and by politicians.

How can we account for Canada's greater willingness to allow immigrants to enter in the postwar period? Was it primarily a result of a greater degree of tolerance and acceptance of immigrants in Canadian society? Or was it due basically to different levels of economic development in the two countries? Canada has not accepted immigrants for primarily humanitarian reasons. Throughout the postwar period, immigration has been closely linked to Canada's economic needs. Immigrants have filled skilled technical and professional jobs when the country's educational system was not producing enough people to keep pace with Canada's industrial growth. Immigrants have also filled many of the jobs which Canadians were unwilling to do — including work in resource industries in remote frontier areas as well as menial jobs and the backbreaking construction work in Canada's burgeoning metropolitan centres. The United States has also drawn on immigrants to do jobs which Americans do not want such as hand labour in agriculture, but its large urban centres have been able to draw on large numbers of migrants (both black and white) from the south to fill the jobs on the lower end of the economic scale. Public opinion in Canada has not been notably open in its attitudes toward immigration — indeed since 1952, over half of those surveyed in Gallup polls have said that Canada does not need more immigrants. Therefore it is difficult to say whether Canada's greater willingness to accept immigrants
As a question of Canadians being more open to immigration, or simply a question of politicians in Canada being less responsive to negative opinion. There is no denying, however, that proportionate to its size, Canada has accepted a much greater number of immigrants than has the United States, including a significantly larger proportion of refugees and displaced persons.

It would seem that although immigration and immigrants are more a part of the national symbolism and national consciousness of the United States, postwar Canada has had a greater sense of openness and unfulfilled expectations and, hence, has been more open to immigration. For most Americans, the basic contours of their society had already been formed, while Canadians have had a greater sense of a nation in the making. This may be one of the reasons for Canada's greater willingness to accept immigrants.

**MULTICULTURALISM AND THE "NEW ETHNICITY"**

Some of the current similarities and differences between ethnicity in Canada and the United States become apparent when we compare the development of multiculturalism in Canada with what has been called the "new ethnicity" in the United States. Both developed during the 1960s in response to changing social and political conditions in each country, and both movements are also part of an international resurgence of ethnicity. They have the same types of leaders and they share many common aims. Both movements have provoked debates in each country with a striking similarity in the arguments advanced. However most of the literature on multiculturalism and the new ethnicity is polemical rather than analytical and must be treated with caution. Any generalizations about the two movements must therefore be tentative.

Multiculturalism as a movement developed in Canada during the 1960s for a variety of interrelated reasons. It emerged from a quest for identity and acceptance among upwardly mobile second- and third-generation central and eastern Europeans. It also developed in reaction to French-Canadian nationalism and to the work of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism which was established by the Pearson government in 1963. In its hearings across the country the commission soon discovered an ethnic backlash against its terms of reference which seemed to place non-British and non-French groups into the category of second-class citizens. The term "multiculturalism" itself arose as a response to the attempt by the commission to define Canada as "bicultural." The public debate surrounding the work of the commission also necessarily raised the question: if it is valuable for French Canadians to maintain their distinctive culture and identity, why is it not so for other groups?

The feeling that biculturalism placed all other ethnic groups in a state of second-class citizenship helps explain the resistance some of these groups expressed to the policies and programmes introduced by the federal government in response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission to secure the status of the French language in Canada. The place of the "other
ethnic groups" in a bicultural society became a vexing one for federal politicians, who had originally hoped that steps to ensure French-Canadian rights, including the recognition of French as an "official" government language, would go a long way toward improving inter-ethnic relations. The partial resolution of this dilemma was the Trudeau government's introduction, in October 1971, of a multicultural policy within a bilingual framework. The policy has attempted to give public recognition of Canada's ethnic diversity through programmes of Canada's national cultural agencies and has attempted to encourage the maintenance of Canada's diversity through financial assistance for some of the activities of ethnic groups. The federal opposition parties expressed basic agreement with the policy and four provinces with large numbers of the "other ethnic groups" — Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta — have also initiated their own multicultural policies. The federal Liberal government went one step further after the 1972 election and to bolster its sagging fortunes among some ethnic groups (particularly those from eastern Europe disturbed by Canada's rapprochement with the Soviet Union) appointed Toronto member of parliament Stanley Haidasz to the cabinet with responsibility for multiculturalism.

In attempting to analyse the new ethnicity in the United States, one is faced with a difficult task, because of the largely polemical nature of the literature. Superficially at least many parallels with the Canadian experience emerge. Just as French-Canadian nationalism spurred on other groups in Canada, the civil rights movement and black power in the United States reawakened the ethnic consciousness of "white ethnics," particularly among those of southern and eastern European origin. The new ethnicity developed then partly as a response to a feeling of media and academic neglect or even hostility, and partly through the black example of how organization and political muscle could help a disadvantaged group. In the United States, the new ethnicity also drew on the sense of a need for security, identity, and rootedness in a society torn apart by war and political scandal, and a society which was questioning the value hitherto attached to upward mobility, individualism, and progress. To what extent an increased awareness of the way in which ethnicity could provide a basis for personal and cultural identity in an impersonal technological society also played some part in giving rise to multiculturalism in Canada is difficult to say; perhaps this was merely a rationalization for the idea. What is clear is that similar social forces were giving rise to similar movements at the same time.

The arguments which have been advanced both pro and con multiculturalism and the new ethnicity are remarkably similar. In Canada, academic critics of multiculturalism like sociologist John Porter argue that the policy will only serve to perpetuate the "vertical mosaic" in which class lines coincide with ethnic lines, by preserving conservative values which are detrimental to the social and economic mobility of individuals from minority ethnic groups and by diverting energy from economic advancement to group maintenance.
Assimilationists are also concerned about the stress that some pluralists place on group maintenance and belonging as opposed to individual self-development, while the latter often argue that ethnicity can provide a liberating rather than a constricting context for identity. This question of reconciling ethnicity with individualism is a greater issue, however, in the United States than in Canada since individualism is a much more deeply rooted part of the American ethos. Perhaps the basic fear about multiculturalism and the new ethnicity is that they will further fragment their respective societies. Pluralists are also concerned about national identity and unify, but see pluralism as the essence of national identity and believe that pluralist policies will contribute to the equality of all citizens, and hence strengthen national unity.

Another major group of critics of multiculturalism in Canada have been those who have argued that multiculturalism threatens the status of French Canadians. These critics, who include some of the most influential intellectuals in French Canada, argue that multiculturalism is a distortion of the realities of Canadian life, because there are in Canada only two main cultures tied to the two main language groups. In their opinion, it is contradictory to have an official government policy of bilingualism along with multiculturalism because language and culture are inseparable. Multiculturalism is viewed as being not only sociologically mistaken but politically dangerous since it detracts from the status of French Canadians. It also is seen as inconsistent with the Quebec desire to assimilate the children of immigrants to Quebec into French-Canadian society. Similarly in the United States, some blacks see the new ethnicity as a threat to them and are leery about making alliances with the "white ethnics." Just as French Canadians see the most important ethnic question in Canada to be that of English-French relations and the need to establish official bilingualism as a permanent national policy, many blacks see white racism as the most important issue and worry that the new ethnicity might detract from the fight against racism.

From an analytical point of view, the new ethnicity and multiculturalism both fit into the new view of ethnicity as described by the distinguished American sociologists Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan in a recent book, *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, Their view has been aptly summarized by Canadian sociologist Jean Burnet: "[it] stresses ethnic groups as forms of social life rather than survivals from the past, as mobilizers of interests rather than bearers of cultures or traditions, and as collectivities with which people choose to identify rather than as groups into which they are born and from which they sometimes struggle to escape." Superficially, it would seem that this view would apply more to the new ethnicity, with its emphasis
If the new ethnicity and multiculturalism are similar in origins, aims, leadership, and sociological significance, what comparisons can be drawn about their impact? This is much more difficult to assess, because so little research has been done. It is certainly becoming more acceptable to be "ethnic" in both countries, if "ethnic" buttons, T-shirts, and bumper stickers, public folklore and handicraft festivals, and parades may be taken as evidence. There has also been a boom in travel to the "homelands" by oldsters and young people alike and a growing interest among students in the languages and history of their ancestors. It is really too early to say how successful these movements will be in achieving their goals — or indeed to what extent their various goals are mutually compatible.

CONCLUSION

In summary then, how much truth is there to the melting pot/mosaic distinction? At the level of ideology, it ignores the existence of the new ethnicity and its striking parallels with multiculturalism in Canada. The comparison also distorts the intentions of native Canadians, most of whom, until the 1940s, were almost as anxious to "Canadianize" immigrants as native Americans were to "Americanize" them, although Canadians were less able to define a norm of assimilation.

The distinction between the mosaic and melting pot also implies that Canadians have been notably more tolerant toward minority groups than Americans. This is doubtful.

The contrasts between the ethnic composition and the maintenance of ethnicity in the two countries are much too complex to be adequately summed up in the melting pot/mosaic distinction. At the level of social reality as opposed to social attitudes, the comparison between the melting pot and the mosaic underestimates the degree to which pluralism has been maintained in the United States and overestimates the degree to which pluralism has been maintained in Canada among the non-British and non-French groups. The assimilating forces of the public and separate schools, of the mass media, and of intermarriage have also been at work in Canada. There has been considerable "melting" of non-British, non-French ethnic groups into either English-Canadian or to a lesser extent French-Canadian society, although the rate of assimilation has varied considerably with different ethnic groups. That ethnicity has remained a more significant aspect of Canadian life than of American is due less to the fact that Canadians have not demanded as much conformity as Americans, than to two other factors: circumstances worked to maintain a regionally concentrated French-Canadian culture; and during the twentieth century, immigrants have continued to come to Canada in substantial numbers in proportion to the total population.
Thus, attempts to present Canada as a mosaic whose attitude toward assimilation has always been enlightened as compared to the United States, where crass "melting potism" has prevailed, are on shaky historical ground. Nevertheless, there have been some differences between Canadian and American experiences with regard to ethnicity. The existence of French Canada, the absence of a strongly developed Canadian ethos due to Canada's colonial past, and economic factors in Canada which have promoted continued large-scale immigration have been basic determinants of these differences.
Uneven Development:
A Mature Branch-Plant Society

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UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN THE HISTORICAL WORLD SYSTEM

Foreign domination has distorted the Canadian economy and hence its class structure. This distortion did not begin with U.S. branch plants, although they are in part a reflection of the initial distortion resulting from dominance by the United Kingdom and a focus on resource extraction. To come to an understanding of Canada's current position, it is necessary to provide a brief historical sketch of Canada's uneven development. It will be seen that the sphere of circulation and service has been overdeveloped within Canada by the indigenous capitalist class, while there has been an indigenous underdevelopment of the sphere of production and the vacuum has been filled by U.S. capitalists in the areas of manufacturing and resources. The manufacturing sector is truncated and the resource sector geared to external requirements; both are vulnerable to the whims of metropolitan capitalists. It will be argued that a fraction of the indigenous Canadian capitalist class has benefited by the penetration of foreign capital and has struck an unequal alliance with U.S. capital, while another fraction of Canadian capital has been "squeezed out" by these two dominant fractions. It will further be argued that the distortions of the capitalist class are also reflected in regionalism and Canada's international investments. Finally, some tentative observations concerning the implications of uneven development for the Canadian state and class formation will be offered.

Until the First World War, British capitalists used Canada as an outlet for their surplus capital and manufactured products and as a source for important resources. These resources were commercial staples, such as fish, fur, timber and grain. In order to extract these resources it was necessary to create an infrastructure of roads, ports, shipping, railways, brokerage houses and financial institutions. The vehicle by which the capitalists of the United Kingdom created this infrastructure was portfolio or loan capital. This was interest-bearing capital that Canadian capitalists borrowed to invest, in turn, in the necessary infrastructure, typically under the guarantee of the Canadian state.