

Human Beliefs and Values

*A cross-cultural sourcebook based
on the 1999-2002 values surveys*

Edited by

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Introduction

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Implications of Modernization Theory and Human Development

The central claim of modernization theory is that economic, cultural, and political change tend to go together in a coherent pattern, with modern societies showing fundamentally different characteristics from those of pre-modern societies. The two most influential proponents of modernization theory, Karl Marx and Max Weber, agreed on this point. They disagreed profoundly on why economic, cultural, and political changes go together. For Marx and his disciples, they are linked because economic and technological change determines political and cultural changes. For Weber and his disciples, they are linked because culture helps shape economic and political life.

Modernization theory gave rise to heated debate that stimulated influential subsequent work by Deutsch, Lerner, Inkeles and Smith, Bell, Toffler, Nolan and Lenski and many others. Still more recent work analyzing evidence from the Values Surveys, suggests that the central claim of modernization theory is largely correct: economic change, cultural change, and political change are closely linked (Inglehart, 1997, Inglehart and Baker, 2000). More specifically, Welzel (2003), Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) and Inglehart and Welzel (2004) demonstrate that the common theme underlying all these economic, cultural and political changes is "human choice," which tends to > grow as people gain more material and intellectual resources, place more emphasis on self-expression and obtain democratic rights. Economic prosperity, rising emphasis on self-expression values and the strengthening of democracy, form a coherent syndrome of Human Development. Though we cannot predict exactly what will happen in a given society at a given time, major trends in Human Development are predictable in broad outline. When given processes of change reshape one aspect of this syndrome, other aspects are likely to emerge in the long run. Growing human choice in economic, cultural, and political aspects of life tend to go together.

While conceding an important role to cultural factors, modernization theorists such as Bell (1973) viewed changes in the structure of the work force as the leading cause of cultural change. For Bell the crucial milestone in the coming of "Postindustrial society" is reached when a majority of the work force is employed in the tertiary sector of the economy, producing neither raw materials, nor manufactured goods, but offering services. This is paralleled by a massive expansion of formal education, driven by the need for an increasingly skilled and specialized work force. Other writers such as Lerner (1958) and Inkeles and Smith (1974) and Inkeles (1983) emphasized the importance of mass communications and formal education as key factors shaping a "modern" worldview. Still others, such as Ember and Ember (1994) and Nolan and Lenski (1998) see the key factor as the individualizing trend in postmodern service economies, based on the fact that service professions require individual judgment, self-reliance, initiative and intellectual creativity—factors linked with human autonomy and choice. And Inglehart (1971, 1977, 1990, 1997), Welzel (2003), and Inglehart and Welzel (2004, forthcoming) emphasize the role of economic security in reducing existential constraints on human choice, giving rise to emancipative values that emphasize human self-expression.

Though any simplistic linear version of modernization theory has long since been refuted, we do find strong empirical evidence that some scenarios of social change are far more probable than others. The Values Surveys show coherent and far-reaching cultural patterns that are closely linked with economic development. In the long term, across

many societies, once given processes are set in motion, certain important changes seem likely to happen. Industrialization, for example, tends to bring increasing urbanization, growing occupational specialization and higher levels of formal education in any society that undertakes it. These are core elements of a trajectory called "Modernization."

This trajectory also tends to bring less obvious but equally important long term consequences, such as a shift from traditional religious values toward rational-bureaucratic norms; an increasing emphasis on economic achievement; rising levels of mass political participation and major changes in the types of issues that are most salient in the politics of the respective types of societies.

The modernization trajectory is linked with many other cultural changes. As this sourcebook shows, a wide range of cultural values are closely linked with a given society's level of economic development. For example, the sharply contrasting gender roles that characterize all preindustrial societies tend to give way to increasingly similar gender roles in advanced industrial societies.

The Postmodern Shift

Economic development is linked with social change—but the process is not linear. Though a specific modernization syndrome becomes increasingly probable when societies move from an agrarian mode to an industrial mode, no trend goes on in the same direction forever. It eventually reaches a point of diminishing returns. Modernization is no exception. In the past few decades, advanced industrial societies have reached an inflection point where they begin moving on a new trajectory that Inglehart (1997) describes as "Postmodernization." Inglehart and Welzel (2004, forthcoming) find that this stage brings a pervasive shift in value orientations linked with increasing emphasis on human choice in all aspects of people's lives—including mate selection, gender roles, child rearing goals, working habits, religious orientations, consumer patterns, civic action and voting behavior.

The process of economic development leads to two successive trajectories, Modernization and Postmodernization. Both of them are linked with economic development but Postmodernization represents a later stage of development that emphasizes very different beliefs from those that characterize Modernization. These belief systems are not mere consequences of economic change, but shape socioeconomic conditions as well as being shaped by them, in reciprocal fashion. At the heart of the postmodern shift lies a change of value orientations linked with increasing emphasis on human choice and self-expression. This reflects a change in which authority shifts from religious to secular institutions and ideologies, but authority remains external to the individual. At the peak of modernity, rational science has almost the same absolute authority as religion in pre-modernity. Postmodernity erodes the absoluteness of all kinds of external authority, whether religious or secular: authority becomes internalized.

Why Is the Postmodern Shift Occurring?

This is not the first major cultural shift in human history. The transition from agrarian society to industrial society was facilitated by a Modernization shift, from a worldview shaped by a steady-state economy, which discourages social mobility and emphasized tradition, inherited status, communal obligations, and absolute religious norms—to a

worldview that encourages economic achievement, individualism and innovation, with increasingly secular and flexible social norms. Today, some of these trends have reached their limits in advanced industrial society, where change is taking a new direction.

This change of direction reflects the principle of diminishing marginal utility. Industrialization and modernization required breaking the cultural constraints on accumulation that are found in any steady-state economy. In West European history, this was achieved by what Weber described as the rise of the Protestant Ethic. If it had occurred two centuries earlier, it might have died out. In the environment of its time, it found a niche: technological developments were making rapid economic growth possible and the Calvinist worldview complemented these developments beautifully. These elements created a cultural-economic syndrome that accelerated the rise of capitalism and eventually, the industrial revolution. Once this had occurred, economic accumulation (for individuals) and economic growth (for societies) became top priorities for an increasing part of the world's population, and are still the central goals for much of humanity. Economic growth came to be equated with progress and was seen as the hallmark of a successful society. But eventually, diminishing returns from economic growth lead to a Postmodern shift.

Advanced industrial societies are now changing their basic value systems in a number of related ways. Growing material wealth reduces the basic existential constraints on human choice. The rise of a knowledge-based economy makes people intellectually independent, widening the areas in which people have to rely on their own choices. In that sense, the broadening of human choice is the most pervasive undercurrent of postmodern society.

In postmodern society, the emphasis on economic achievement as the top priority is now giving way to an increasing emphasis on the quality of life. In a major part of the world, the disciplined, self-denying and achievement-oriented norms of industrial society are yielding, leaving an increasingly broad latitude for individual choice of life styles and individual self-expression. The shift from "Materialist" values, emphasizing economic and physical security, to "Postmaterialist" values, emphasizing individual self-expression and quality life concerns, is the most amply documented aspect of this change, but it is only one component of a much broader syndrome of cultural change.

The theory of an intergenerational shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist value priorities is based on two key hypotheses (Inglehart, 1977):

1. A Scarcity Hypothesis. An individual's priorities reflect the socioeconomic environment: one places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply.

2. A Socialization Hypothesis. The relationship between socioeconomic environment and value priorities is not one of immediate adjustment: a substantial time lag is involved because, to a large extent, one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's preadult years. This gives rise to substantial differences between the values of older and younger generations—so that cultural change largely takes place as one generation replaces another in the adult population.

The recent economic history of advanced industrial societies has significant implications in the light of the scarcity hypothesis. For these societies are a striking exception to the prevailing historical pattern: they still contain poor people, but most of their population does not live under conditions of hunger and economic insecurity. This has led to a gradual shift in which needs for belonging, esteem, and intellectual and esthet-

ic satisfaction became more prominent. Other things being equal, we would expect prolonged periods of high prosperity to encourage the spread of Postmaterialist values; economic problems, stagnation and welfare state retrenchment would have the opposite effect, re-strengthening Materialist values.

The socialization hypothesis implies that neither an individual's values nor those of a society as a whole will change overnight. For the most part, fundamental value change takes place as younger birth cohorts replace older ones in the adult population of a society. Consequently, after a long period of rising economic and physical security, one should find substantial differences between the value priorities of older and younger groups: they have been shaped by different experiences in their formative years.

Materialist/Postmaterialist values have been measured in every wave of the Values Surveys. Materialist priorities are tapped by emphasis on such goals as economic growth, fighting rising prices, maintaining order and fighting crime; while Postmaterialist values are reflected when top priority is given to such goals as giving people more say on the job or in government decisions, or protecting freedom of speech or moving toward a less impersonal, more humane society. Analyses by Abramson and Inglehart (1995) indicate that these items tap a meaningful and comparable dimension across virtually all types of societies.

The shift toward Postmaterialist values is only one aspect of a much broader Postmodern trend toward values that emphasize human choice and emancipation. This shift from survival values towards self-expression values involves changing political, religious, sexual, and other norms. The rise of Postmodern values manifests itself in a gradual intergenerational shift, as younger, more Postmaterialist birth cohorts replace older, more Materialist ones in the adult population. The orientations that are linked with this Postmodern shift are characterized by their age-related differences and their linkages with Materialist/Postmaterialist values, both of which are shown in the following tables.

Changing Moral Orientations, Gender Roles, and Sexual Norms

Postmaterialist values developed in the environment of the historically unprecedented economic growth and the welfare states that emerged after World War II. And they are part of a Postmodern shift that is reshaping the political outlook, religious orientations, gender roles, and sexual norms of advanced industrial society.

The Postmodern shift involves an intergenerational change in a wide variety of basic social norms, from cultural norms linked with ensuring survival of the species, to norms linked with the pursuit of individual well being. For example, Postmaterialists and the young are markedly more tolerant of homosexuality than are Materialists and the old. This is part of a pervasive pattern. Postmaterialists have been shaped by security during their formative years, and are far more permissive than Materialists in their attitudes toward abortion, divorce, extramarital affairs, prostitution, and euthanasia. Materialists, conversely, tend to adhere to the traditional societal norms that favor child-bearing, but only within the traditional two-parent family—and that heavily stigmatized sexual activity outside that setting.

Traditional gender role norms from East Asia to the Islamic world to Western society discouraged women from taking jobs outside the home. Virtually all preindustrial societies emphasized child-bearing and child-rearing as the central goal of any

woman, her most important function in life, and her greatest source of satisfaction. In recent years, this perspective has been increasingly called into question, as growing numbers of women postpone having children or forego them completely in order to devote themselves to careers outside the home. The sharply differentiated gender roles that characterize virtually all preindustrial societies, give way to increasingly similar gender roles in advanced industrial society.

As Table C001 in the data section demonstrates, we find enormous differences in attitudes toward equal employment opportunity for women. In Egypt, 90 percent of the public agrees that men have more right to a job than women, while in Sweden only 2 percent agree. The publics of rich countries are much more supportive of gender equality than the publics of low-income societies. Outside of advanced industrial societies, much of the world still takes it for granted that practically everyone lives in a traditional family, with a male as their principal provider. People who see the world from this perspective are willing to accord men preferential employment opportunities. Thus in Africa, Asia, and above all, the Islamic countries, pluralities or even absolute majorities of the public feel that men have more right to a job than women. In Catholic Europe and Latin America, by contrast, solid pluralities of the public feel that men do not have more right to a job than women; in the U.S., Canada, and Northern Europe, support for gender equality is overwhelming: less than one in five agree that men have more right to a job than women.

The differences linked with Materialist/Postmaterialist values are also strong: Materialists are more than twice as likely as Postmaterialists to feel that men have more right to a job than women. The more educated, and the upper income groups are also more supportive of gender equality than the less educated and lower income groups. The overall picture strongly suggests that economic development is conducive to increasing support for gender equality (see Inglehart and Norris, 2003).

Not surprisingly, women are more likely to favor equal employment opportunity than are men—the only surprising finding is the fact that the overall gender gap amounts to only 6 percentage points. Across these societies, 38 percent of the men feel that their sex has more right to a job, while only 32 percent of the women agree. But we find relatively large gender differences in the less developed societies. In the ten richest societies, on the other hand, there is a broad consensus favoring equal rights, and a gender gap of only two points.

Changing Values and Changing Political Cleavages

The pervasive cultural changes linked with Postmodernization have brought about a gradual shift in the issues underlying political cleavages in advanced industrial society.

The political agenda is moving it away from an emphasis on economic growth at any price, toward increasing concern for its environmental costs. The shift toward Postmodern values has also brought a shift from political cleavages based on social class conflict toward cleavages based on cultural issues and quality of life concerns. Economic conflicts are likely to remain important. But, while in the past they dominated the scene to such a degree that many influential thinkers accepted the Marxist view that economics was virtually the whole story, this now seems much less plausible. Today, economic conflicts are increasingly sharing the stage with new issues that were almost invisible a generation ago: in advanced industrial societies, environmental protection.

abortion, ethnic conflicts, women's issues, and gay and lesbian emancipation are heated issues today—while the classic Marxist prescription, nationalization of industry, is virtually a forgotten cause.

As a result, a new dimension of political conflict has become increasingly salient. It reflects a polarization between modern and postmodern issue preferences. This new dimension is distinct from the traditional Left-Right conflict over ownership of the means of production and distribution of income. A new Postmodern political cleavage pits culturally conservative, often xenophobic parties, disproportionately supported by Materialists; against change-oriented parties, often emphasizing environmental protection, and disproportionately supported by Postmaterialists.

A Cultural Map of the World

Figure 1 below shows where each of the 81 societies examined here falls on the two main dimensions of cross-cultural variation just discussed, which are linked with the processes of "Modernization" and "Postmodernization" respectively (for a detailed discussion of these dimensions and how they were derived, see Inglehart and Baker, 2000; for a similar type of analysis applied to the European context, see Hageaars, Halman and Moors, 2003).

These two broad dimensions reflect a large number of the key values examined in the Values Surveys. Since hundreds of questions were asked in these surveys, it would not be feasible to compare the values of each public on each topic separately. Figure 1 compares the orientations of these publics on two important dimensions that sum up the cross-national variation on scores of narrower values. These two dimensions tap:

1. Traditional authority vs. Secular-Rational authority. This dimension is based on a large number of items that reflect emphasis on obedience to traditional authority (usually religious authority), and adherence to family and communal obligations, and norms of sharing; or, on the other hand, a secular worldview in which authority is legitimated by rational-legal norms, linked with an emphasis on economic accumulation and individual achievement.

2. Survival values vs. Self-Expression values. This reflects the fact that in postindustrial society, historically unprecedented levels of wealth and the emergence of the welfare states have given rise to a shift from scarcity norms, emphasizing hard work and self-denial, to postmodern values emphasizing the quality of life, emancipation of women and sexual minorities and related Postmaterialist priorities such as emphasis on self-expression.

The two respective phases of modernization—industrialization, and the emergence of the knowledge society—each give rise to a major dimension of cross-cultural variation. This makes it possible to locate any society in the world on a two-dimensional map of cross-cultural variation. Figure 1 show this map. The Traditional/Secular-rational values dimension constitutes the vertical axis: as one moves from south to north, one moves from societies that emphasize Traditional values to those that emphasize Secular-rational values. The Survival/Self-expression values dimension constitutes the horizontal axis: as one moves from left to right, one moves from societies that emphasize Survival values to those that emphasize Self-expression values.

Figure 1 sums up an immense amount of information. It reflects the responses to scores of questions, given by over 200,000 respondents in 80 societies. There is a great




Figure 1. Cultural map of 81 societies, with economic zones superimposed. Cultural locations reflect each society's factor scores on two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation. Economic zones are from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2002.

Source: R. Inglehart and C. Welzel. 2004. *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. (forthcoming).

deal of constraint among cultural systems. The first two dimensions that emerge from the principal components factor analysis depicted in Figure 1 account for over half of the cross-national variation among ten key variables. Additional dimensions explain relatively small amounts of variance. And these dimensions are robust, showing little change if we drop some of the items, even high-loading ones.

The Traditional/Secular-rational values dimension reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is not— but deference to the authority of God, Fatherland and Family are all closely linked. In traditional societies, a main goal in most people's lives is to make their parents proud; they idealize

large families, and have large numbers of children. They also have high levels of national pride, favor more respect for authority, and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all of these topics.

The Survival/Self-expression dimension taps a syndrome of tolerance, trust, subjective well-being, political activism and self-expression that emerges in postindustrial societies with high levels of existential security. People in societies shaped by insecurity tend to emphasize economic and physical security above all, and feel threatened by foreigners, by ethnic diversity and by cultural change—which leads to intolerance of gays and other outgroups, insistence on traditional gender roles and an authoritarian political outlook. Societies that emphasize survival values show relatively low levels of subjective well-being, report relatively poor health, are low on interpersonal trust, relatively intolerant of outgroups, and low on support for gender equality. They emphasize economic and physical security more than autonomy and self-expression, have relatively high levels of faith in science and technology, are relatively low on environmental activism, and relatively favorable to authoritarian government. Societies high on Self-expression values tend to have the opposite preferences on all of these topics.

Each individual's score on the Traditional/Secular-rational values dimension and on the Survival/Self-expression dimension is included as a variable on the accompanying CD ROM (they appear near the end of the file, with the names "Tradrat5" [factor score on Traditional/Secular-rational values] and "SurvSelf" [factor score on Survival/Self-expression values]).¹ Each person's score on Materialist/Postmaterialist values is also available.

Economic development and cultural change

As modernization theory implies, these two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation are strongly linked with a society's level of economic development. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the value systems of richer countries differ dramatically and systematically from those of poorer countries. All of the "High Income" societies (as defined by the World Bank), rank relatively high on both dimensions, falling into a zone near the upper right-hand corner. Conversely, all of the "Low Income" societies, without a single exception, fall into a cluster at the lower left of Figure 1. All of the Middle Income societies fall into an intermediate cultural-economic zone. One rarely finds such a striking and consistent correspondence between an objective independent variable such as GNP per capita, and subjective values and attitudes as is found here. Economic development seems to push societies in a predictable common direction, regardless of their cultural heritage.

¹ If one of the ten questions used to construct them was not asked in a given country, these dimensions can not be constructed for that sample. The individual-level scores are not directly equivalent to the national-level scores shown on Figures 1 and 2. If one wishes to plot given groups on these maps, the individual-level scores can be converted into a close approximation of the national-level scores by multiplying Tradrat5 by 1.56 and by multiplying Survself by 1.76.




Figure 2. Cultural map of 81 societies, with cultural zones superimposed. Cultural locations reflect each society's factor scores on two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation.

Source: R. Inglehart and C. Welzel. 2004. *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence*. (forthcoming).

The persistence of Cultural Traditions

Figure 2 shows the location of these same 81 societies on our two main dimensions of cross-cultural variation. But this time, instead of showing their economic zones, we show how they fall into coherent cultural-historical zones. The boundaries around groups of countries in this figure are drawn using Huntington's (1993, 1996) cultural zones as a guide. This cultural map resembles an earlier one by Inglehart (1997:334-337) based on the 1990-1991 Values Surveys. Although Figure 2 is based on a factor analysis that uses less than half as many variables and almost twice as many societies as were analyzed by Inglehart (1997), the locations of the respective societies are strikingly similar to

those on the cultural maps he generated from earlier surveys. The same cultural zones appear, in similar locations, but some of them now contain many more societies. The similarity between this map and the earlier ones reflects the fact that these two key dimensions of cross-cultural variation are robust.

The maps show consistent cultural clusters based on religion. For example, the historically Protestant societies tend to rank higher on the Survival/Self-expression dimension than the historically Roman Catholic societies. Conversely, all of the former communist societies rank relatively low on the Survival/Self-expression dimension. The historically Orthodox societies form a coherent cluster within the broader ex-communist zone—except for Greece, an Orthodox society that did not experience communist rule, and ranks substantially higher on Self-expression values than the other communist societies. The Islamic societies fall into two clusters: a larger group containing the main-line Islamic societies (Indonesia, Iran, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Egypt) constitutes a relatively compact group in the Southwest quadrant of the map; while the Islamic societies that experienced communist rule (Azerbaijan and Albania) are much more secular than the rest of the Islamic societies. Differences in levels of economic development have important influences on prevailing worldviews, as Figure 1 demonstrated, but historical cultural influences persist. The classic version of modernization theory must be supplemented by taking into account the persistence of cultural factors.

This is evident even within European context, where a rich variety of cultures exist. This variety reflects the distinctive religious, cultural, economic and social heritage of each society. Countries and their populations have remained unique in many ways and nation states remain important sources of differences in people's attitudes, values, beliefs and behaviors (Arts and Halman, 1999; 2004 forthcoming; Hagenaars, Halman & Moors, 2003)

The influence of colonial ties is apparent in the existence of a Latin American cultural zone. The Philippines could also be placed in this zone, reflecting the fact that despite their geographical remoteness, the Philippines and Latin America share the imprint of Hispanic colonial rule and the Roman Catholic Church. Former colonial ties also help account for the existence of an English-speaking zone containing Britain and the other English-speaking societies. All seven of the English-speaking societies included in this study show relatively similar cultural characteristics. Geographically, Australia and New Zealand are half-way around the world, but culturally they are neighbors of Great Britain and Canada. The impact of colonization seems especially strong when reinforced by massive immigration from the colonial society—thus, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina are all relatively near each other on the border between Catholic Europe and Latin America: the populations of Uruguay, Chile and Argentina are largely descended from immigrants from Spain and Italy.

These maps indicate that the U.S. is not a prototype of cultural modernization for other societies to follow, as some postwar modernization writers assumed. In fact, the U.S. is a deviant case, having a much more traditional value system than any other advanced industrial society. On the traditional/secular dimension, the U.S. ranks far below other rich societies, with levels of religiosity and national pride comparable to those found in some developing societies. The phenomenon of American Exceptionalism has been discussed by Lipset (1990, 1996), Baker (2004) and others. The U.S. does rank among the most advanced societies along the Survival/Self-Expression dimension, but

even here, she does not lead the world. The Swedes, the Dutch and the Australians are closer to the cutting edge of cultural change than the Americans.

Religious traditions have an enduring impact on the contemporary value systems of these societies, as Weber, Huntington and others have argued. But a society's culture reflects its entire historical heritage, including its colonial history. We have already noted the existence of Latin American and English-speaking cultural zones. The impact of another type of colonial empire is also evident. A central historical event of the 20th century was the rise and fall of a communist empire that once ruled a third of the world's population. Communism has left a clear imprint on the value systems of those who lived under it. All of the societies that experienced communist rule, fall into a larger cluster in the upper-left quadrant of the map. East Germany remains culturally close to West Germany despite four decades of communist rule, but her value system has been drawn toward the communist zone. And although China is a member of the Confucian zone, she also falls within a broad communist-influenced zone.

→ The ex-communist societies tend to emphasize secular-rational, rather than traditional-religious authority. This is far from surprising. Their people have lived for decades under regimes that systematically repressed religion, and in which it was natural to consider the state important because it dominated economic life, cultural life, and even one's chances of survival. Thus, almost all of the ex-communist societies fall into the upper left-hand quadrant: these societies are characterized by (1) survival values, and (2) a strong emphasis on state authority, rather than traditional authority. Poland is an exception, distinguished from the other socialist societies by her relatively strong traditional-religious values. Adherence to the Catholic church has been a mainstay of the Polish struggle for independence from Russia since 1792. The church continued to play a vital role in this struggle throughout the 1980s, revitalizing religion in the national culture.

The most secular societies in the world are Japan, China, Germany, Sweden and Norway. This seems to reflect a combination of three historic factors: (1) The relatively secular-bureaucratic Confucian tradition; (2) the secularizing impact of communism; and (3) the secularizing impact of affluent postindustrial societies when they are accompanied by an advanced welfare state.

China and the other Confucian-influenced societies have had predominantly secular cultural systems for many centuries; and bureaucratic authority developed within the Confucian system long before it reached the West. Thus China and the Confucian-influenced societies of East Asia have had one major component of modern culture for a very long time. Until recently, they lacked the emphasis on science and technology, and the esteem for economic achievement that are its other main components; but their secular, bureaucratic heritage may have facilitated rapid economic development once these were attained. China's traditional low emphasis on religion and high emphasis on the state was almost certainly accentuated by four decades of socialism. Japan, another Confucian-influenced society, and both East and West Germany are also characterized by relatively strong emphasis on secular-rational authority.

Institutional Determinism?

As we have seen, the historically Protestant countries of both Northern Europe and North America tend to cluster together to form one large group; similarly, the historically Ro-

man-Catholic countries of Western Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Islamic world, South and East Asia tend to cluster together, forming another broad but reasonably cohesive cluster. Despite the enormous recent changes linked with economic and social modernization, and despite the tremendous sociopolitical changes brought by communist domination of five of these societies throughout the Cold War, the historically Catholic societies still manifest cultural values that are relatively similar to each other in global perspective—as do the historically Protestant societies.

If institutional determinism is taken to mean simply that a society's institutions are among the factors that help shape its culture, the claim is undoubtedly correct. But institutional determinism is often pushed to a much more extreme claim than this: it is taken to mean that institutions alone determine a society's cultural values, so one needn't really take cultural factors into account; if one changes the institutions, the culture automatically changes accordingly. If one examines the evidence more closely, it is clear that this position is untenable.

The former West German and East German regions of Germany were still independent states when they were first surveyed, and they were sampled separately even after reunification, to examine the degree to which they continue to display distinctive cultures. Though West Germany falls into the upper right-hand quadrant of Figures 1 and 2, with the other West European societies, and East Germany is somewhat more secular and lower on Self-expression values, the two societies are relatively close to each other on the two main cultural dimensions. This is significant. From 1945 to 1990, the communist regime made a massive effort to reshape East German culture to support a Marxist and atheistic authoritarian regime; while the Western powers launched an equally massive effort, continued by the West German authorities, to remake political culture to support a market-oriented Western liberal democracy. The evidence indicates that 45 years under radically different regimes had some impact: in 1999, the two societies were still rather distinct. But even more impressive is the fact that, in global perspective, the basic cultural values of the two societies were still relatively similar. This natural experiment indicates that, even when it makes a conscious and concerted effort to do so, the ability of a regime to reshape its underlying culture is limited. Though they can reshape it to a limited extent, institutions do not determine culture. After 45 years under diametrically opposite political and economic institutions, East Germany and West Germany remained more similar to each other than the United States and Canada.

There are tremendous cultural differences between Protestant and Catholic societies, but for the most part they do not reflect the direct influence of the Catholic and Protestant churches today. For the direct influence of the church today is very slight in many of these countries. Though church attendance remains relatively high in Poland and Ireland (and the United States, to a lesser degree), it has fallen drastically in most of the historically Catholic countries of both Western and Eastern Europe; and it has fallen even more drastically in most of the historically Protestant societies—to the point where some observers now speak of the Nordic countries as post-Christian societies. Traditionally Catholic and Protestant societies still show very distinct values—even among segments of the population who have no contact whatever with the church. But these values persist as part of the cultural heritage of the given nations, and not through the direct influence of the religious institutions.

This point becomes vividly evident when we examine the value systems of such societies as The Netherlands and Germany—both of which were historically predomi-

nantly Protestant societies, but (through the effects of different birth rates and different rates of religious erosion) now have about as many practicing Catholics as Protestants. Despite these changes in their religious makeup today, both The Netherlands and Germany show typically Protestant value systems. Furthermore, the Catholics and Protestants within these societies do not have markedly different value systems: the Dutch Catholics are more Dutch than Catholic in most of their social norms, and have very distinctive values from those of Catholics in traditionally Catholic societies.

There is a remarkable degree of coherence. As we have seen, all of the high-income societies rank relatively high on both of our two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation, and all of the low-income societies rank relatively low on both dimensions. Furthermore, the 80 societies fall into compact and historically meaningful clusters, such as Protestant Europe, Catholic Europe, Latin America, the ex-communist zone, sub-Saharan Africa or the Confucian zone. As the reader examines the following tables, he or she will find that again and again, across scores of variables, the societies that are located near each other on Figures 1 and 2 show relatively similar values and beliefs; while those that are far apart on this figure show dissimilar values and beliefs.

The foregoing provides only a brief overview of the complex but coherent pattern of cross-national differences revealed in the Values Surveys. The tables in the data section enable one to delve into the rich body of evidence provided by these surveys in much greater detail, and to explore the implications of cross-cultural variations and their linkages with economic development and education; one can also explore the extent to which men and women have different beliefs and values; the intergenerational differences or life cycle differences linked with age groups, and the many cultural differences linked with Materialist/Postmaterialist values.

Human beliefs and values are not just an epiphenomenon that is shaped by a society's economic infrastructure. The fact that the Values Surveys cover more than 80 societies, makes it possible to carry out statistically significant cross-level analyses, examining the impact of individual-level values and beliefs on societal-level phenomena such as fertility rates or political institutions. The results indicate that cultural factors play a major role in shaping the societal-level characteristics of given societies.

Moreover, an analysis of the empirical linkages between culture and democracy demonstrates that democracies have strikingly different political cultures from authoritarian societies. Almost without exception, stable democracies rank high on self-expression values, and authoritarian societies rank low on them. These linkages persist when we control for economic level and social structure: a pro-democratic political culture seems to play an important role in sustaining democratic institutions over the long term (Inglehart, 1997).

Welzel (2002), Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003), and Inglehart and Welzel (2004) have demonstrated that economic development, rising self-expression values, and democratic institutions are so closely linked with each other that these three phenomena reflect a common underlying dimension—human development—to which each of these three components contributes in improving people's ability to exert autonomous choices. These three components occur in a specific causal sequence in which economic development tends to give rise to self-expression values, which in turn tend to promote democracy. Thus, self-expression values were a decisive factor in the Third Wave of Democratization, influencing significantly to which extent formerly non-democratic societies changed into full-fledged democracies. Self-expression values help to

strengthen democracy in a number of ways: for example, they lower elite corruption, fuel "good governance" and have a strong tendency to promote gender equality.

The evidence suggests that the remarkably strong linkage found between political culture and democracy is more a matter of culture contributing to democracy, than of democracy determining culture. With economic development, cultural patterns tend to emerge that are increasingly supportive of democracy.

This Introduction is followed by the tables section, which is the heart of this book: it presents hundreds of data tables, interspersed with graphs that place these detailed tables in their broader context. Next, is a section that discusses survey methodology and cross-cultural comparisons, followed by the technical section, which provides information about the dates of fieldwork, sample sizes, data cleaning and archiving procedures, and the people who conducted the surveys in the respective countries. The English-language version of the questionnaires used in the 1999-2001 Values Surveys appears next, providing the exact text of the questions asked in the surveys. The variable numbers from these questionnaires (WVS and EVS) appear near the upper right-hand corner of each table. The text of the questionnaires used in each country can be found in the CD ROM at the back of this book. Finally, the appendix lists variables on the CD ROM, but not in the Source Book, and the Index section helps finding tables easier by a variety of entries.

The authors hope that this sourcebook will be a useful tool to anyone concerned with the role of human values and beliefs in contemporary society. Those who wish to carry out more detailed analyses can analyze the original data, which is provided on the CD ROM that accompanies this sourcebook.

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