MEMORY AND THEORY IN EASTERN EUROPE

Edited by Uilleam Blacker,
Alexandr Etkind, & Julie Fedor

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Introduction

Uilleam Blacker and Alexander Etkind

Since the last decades of the twentieth century, Western Europe and North America have been living through a "memory boom."[1] It is an open question whether this boom—or is it a bubble?—has spread to other parts of the globe. This volume focuses on cultural memory in Eastern Europe and its adjacent subcontinent, Northern Eurasia. To define this space, however, is notoriously difficult.[2] In the obsolete terms of the Cold War and postcolonial emancipatory movement, this was the core of what was called the Second World, which marked its difference from both the rich First World and the developing Third World.[3] Such a vision incorporates the former socialist states, from what used to be Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany all the way to Siberia (with its rich and much-ignored memory of the Gulag) and the eastern edge of the former Soviet Union. Yet the very act of stretching some kind of cultural entity from Prague to Vladivostok causes dissonance for many. The Czech writer Milan Kundera, author of the famous maxim "the struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting,"[4] wrote vociferous attacks on the "kidnapping" of part of Europe that really belonged to the West by a culture that belonged firmly in the Asiatic East.[5] In the twenty-first century, the immense space that used to be occupied by the Soviet Union and its involuntary satellites has no overarching political cohesion, cultural integrity, or even a geographical identity. The creation of an alternative, non-Soviet space by dissidents like Kundera was pursued precisely through underlining the distinctive memory culture of the victim nations of Central Europe that separated them from Russia.[6] The echoes of this separation persist, for example, in the Prague Declaration of 2008 condemning communist crimes; at the same time, however, there is no neat border between communities of memory across this region, say, between Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe. Complex mnemonic conflicts have unfolded within, as well as between states. While the memories that inhabit this phantom

space may clash and divide, the very fact that they are in constant, often antagonistic contact with one another creates a form of entanglement, which has the potential to produce both conflict and solidarity. "Knots" of memory, as Michael Rothberg has called them in this volume, often focus on the same events: on the nineteenth-century competition among the European empires; the emancipating, utopian, and ultimately enslaving revolutions; two world wars that caused these revolutions and developed out of them; the direct or indirect reign of the Soviet Union with its egalitarian, internationalist theories and undemocratic, terrorist practices; and, finally, the postsocialist transformation with its programmatic inequalities and uncertainties. It is this complex but identifiable entanglement of East European memory, as well as its dangers and perspectives, that justifies its exploration in one volume.

Our double purpose is to investigate the current state of East European memory—uneven, contested, and invariably rich—and to examine how the theoretical approaches and academic practices of Memory Studies can be applied and transformed in this region. Importing the memory boom into a new cultural context without interrogating the paradigm itself is, of course, impossible, and this has been the starting point for the current volume. While for scholars of Eastern Europe the volume will be valuable for the specifics discussed in each chapter, for scholars in Memory Studies it affords a new, different perspective on a paradigm that in recent years has become canonized in the West. Due to the regional focus of the Memory at War project, of which this volume is a product, the volume deals primarily with Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, though there are also chapters here on Latvia and Belarus.[7] The analyses provided here will also have resonance for scholars of the other former socialist states of East Central Europe and other regions, not least because a third of the chapters in fact has no single geographical focus, but operates on a consciously transnational scale.

Despite intraregional differences, contemporary Eastern Europe can be broadly characterized as postsocialist, postcatastrophic, and, as some of the chapters in this volume argue, postcolonial. Given this proliferation of "post-s," it is no surprise that issues of memory, mourning, repentance, and redemption are pertinent. Before 1989, memory was selectively suppressed by the socialist regimes of the region. The post-Stalinist periods of the Thaw and Stagnation in the Soviet Union coincided with what has gone down in global

memory as the central phase of the Cold War between the communist and Western worlds. Throughout this period, the memory of the victims of communism was preserved internationally, by American and European historians, activists, writers, and politicians, and by Soviet and East European dissidents and memoirists. As the legacies of Hannah Arendt, Isaiah Berlin, and many others can testify, the Cold War struggle against Soviet expansion was also a struggle for the historical memory of the victims of communist oppression. The Cold Warriors smuggled, translated, and published works by leading East European dissidents and writers; they produced magisterial pieces of scholarship such as Arendt's *Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951) or Robert Conquest's *Great Terror* (1968); and they gathered an amazing array of artworks, such as Norton Dodge's collection that preserved precious pieces of art from the gulag. This large-scale work of mourning and preservation makes a great example of the cosmopolitan nature of modern memory, a point that one of the contributors to our volume, Natan Sznaider, has explicated in his studies of West European and Jewish memories.[8]

When memory was booming in the West, however, it was being whispered in the East, as the Soviet Union and its satellite states invested much energy and violence into subjugating cultural memory to official history. Those who cultivated memory and mourning in divergence with official discourses found themselves in a lethally dangerous position. Take the case of Father Stefan Niedzielak, a Polish priest who campaigned for the right to mourn the victims of the massacres at Katyn and other sites in 1940, where the Soviet NKVD executed more than 20,000 Polish servicemen and civilians. After being repeatedly threatened and beaten, Niedzielak was murdered, probably by the secret police, in 1989, just months before the communist regime in Poland fell. Yet while memory activists were still being persecuted in 1989 and later, one of the most important acts of memory of the twentieth century happened in the heart of the Soviet Union, as early as 1956, when the head of the Soviet state, Nikita Khrushchev, started the de-Stalinization process with his "secret" report to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. There was nothing coercing Khrushchev to confess other than his own guilty memory of the terror, and his fear that it could continue. The autonomous character of Khrushchev's revelations makes them unique, even unprecedented in the history of twentieth-century violence.

Even after the chain of revolutions in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, many areas of historical memory remained taboo. In the vast majority of cases, no professional ban was instated for former leaders of the communist parties or the security officials of the Soviet or Eastern Bloc regimes. Only negligible compensation has been provided to those victims of Stalinist terror who have been officially "rehabilitated." Many more of those who were robbed by the socialist regimes, such as the millions of collective farmers whose fates differed little from that of those who were sent to the gulag, never saw any form of compensation whatsoever. The situation regarding legislation on lustration, compensation, and archival access is different and, usually, more advantageous for victims in the countries of the former socialist bloc than in the former Soviet Union, but the application of these laws is often a fraught and complex process that serves as much to open old wounds as to heal them.[9] Ethical problems of the postsocialist archive fever have retained their tension through two decades. Films such as *The Lives of Others* by the German director Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck (2006), novels such as *Corrected Edition* by the Hungarian writer Peter Esterházy (2002),[10] and the real-life allegations of collaboration with the state made against figures such as Milan Kundera or the former Polish president and anticommunist hero Lech Wałęsa relentlessly demonstrate the pain and power of memory in Eastern Europe. A more optimistic example is the career of Joachim Gauck: the son of a gulag survivor, a former East German civil rights activist and, after the unification, the federal commissioner of the Stasi Archives, he became the president of Germany in 2012.

With this volume, we submit that cultural memory has also "boomed" in Eastern Europe since the collapse of communism, though its peculiar forms and genres demand study in their own right. In contrast with memory in the West, this memory formation has not been dominated by the Holocaust and the Nazi conquest of Europe. The terrorist practices exercised by states against their own citizens in both the Soviet Union and its colonized domains in Eastern Europe have been just as important, often more so. The transition from the long socialist decades of secrecy and servility, to the neoliberal twenty-first century, with its mobility, crises, and corruption, has made East European memory challenging, even explosive. Not only does East European memory have its own mnemonic dynamics and foci, but the cultural material of that memory is also

different from what has become commonly accepted in Western Europe. As Tony Judt put it, "The Western solution to the problem of Europe's troublesome memories has been to fix them, quite literally, in stone."[11] In Eastern Europe and Russia, this Franco-German solution could not be adopted. Instead, memoirs, novels, films, and fast-moving public debates about the past have outpaced and overshadowed monuments, memorials, and museums. This situation persists in Russia, but Poland, western Ukraine, and the Baltic states, for example, have seen a proliferation of new memory sites.[12] Instead of giving the impression of a resolved past, however, these new museums and memorials often seem fluid, controversial, and troubling. Though energies of mourning and memory are high, there is also a widespread dissatisfaction with their realization, a feeling that memory is out of balance, though no normative description of what "balance" might look like is available. These tortured, warped memory developments have been quite different from the public and consistent narrative of the Western memory boom, which centers on German contrition for the Holocaust and the Second World War. In this sense, East European countries are closer to West European countries such as France and Spain, Israel, or to many postcolonial countries whose processes of memory and mourning have also been suppressed and convoluted.[13] The volatile nature of East European memory was dramatically underlined in the air crash that killed many of Poland's leading public figures, including its president, in April 2010, as they flew to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the massacre at Katyn. The eerie coincidence of the tragedy at the site of the massacre of Poland's elites 70 years earlier shook Polish society to the core, and transformed Russian-Polish relations, generating a wave of new contested memory sites and narratives that shows no sign of stabilizing.[14]

The chapters in this volume cover mnemonic phenomena as diverse as cemeteries and cafes, monuments and novels, works of art and social networking sites. Like a computer, cultural memory is dependent on the balance between "hardware," which is fixed in stone (monuments, museums, etc.), and "software," which exists in texts (historical, literary, cinematic, and others).[15] It is still common practice to analyze public memory via its monuments, memorials, and museums; yet printing, digital technologies, and other methods of mass reproduction of texts have largely deterritorialized cultural memory, particularly in recent years. While the Jewish Torah,

medieval manuscripts, or memorials and museums are singular, located in sacred spaces, and function as hardware monuments as well as software texts, many modern arts of memory are neutral to space. Often describing specific sites, they do not have locations themselves: mechanically or electronically reproduced, they are available in many places at once.

Still dependent on space, modern memory is also structured by time. Its temporal units are memory events, which we define as acts of revisiting the past that create ruptures with its established cultural meanings.[16] Memory events unfold in many cultural genres, from funerals to historical debates, from museum openings to court proceedings, from the erection or the destruction of a monument to the announcement of archival findings, film premieres, novels, exhibitions, and websites. These events are simultaneously acts and products of memory. They have their authors and agents—initiators and enthusiasts of memory—who lead the production of these collective events in the same way that film directors make their films. Memory also has its promoters, as surely as it has its censors and foes. Memory events are secondary to the historical events that they interpret, usually taking place years or decades later. Sometimes, a memory event attains the significance of a historical event, therefore, blurring the distinction between the two. But there are important differences. Historical events tend to be singular while memory events rarely are. Memory events repeat themselves in new, creative but recognizable forms, which circulate in cultural space and reverberate in time.

Memory events operate within relevant communities, and they change how these communities remember, imagine, and talk about the past. They are performative, and can be understood in the light of Habermas' theory of communicative action.[17] The impact of a memory event on a community depends on its truth claims—on whether the community perceives it as generating a true account of the past; on its originality claims—on whether the community perceives it as new and different from the accepted version of the past; and on its identity claims—on whether the community perceives the changing vision of the past as central to its identity. Complex relations that need more research and theorizing connect these three components—truth, originality, and relevance—though their synergies are usually evident. While relevance derives from the perceived truth and originality, we know how many documents in historical archives are authentic but irrelevant. In many uncertain cases, relevance and

originality dictate questions about truth. Though cultural memory can sometimes be activated by texts that do not claim truth, such as fictional novels or films, public judgment on historical truth largely defines reception of these texts, particularly when they are perceived as game-changing and identity-relevant. Among many examples of contested interpretations of memory events and the resulting public judgment are a series of fake memoirs of the Holocaust, starting with Binjamin Wilkomirski's book *Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood*, which caused a sensation when it was published as an authentic memoir in 1995, but was then debunked by a critical reader and is now largely forgotten; detailed arguments of the pro-Stalinist deniers of the Katyn crime, which caused active debates in the Russian press and the Duma but were largely rejected first by historians and then by the public; or multiple conspiracy theories of the causes and meaning of the Smolensk catastrophe of 2010, which have been debated in Poland. Complex genres such as the historical novel or film can have truth claims, even if they fictionalize. This is in fact what lies behind the novels of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn or Józef Mackiewicz, or the films of Andrzej Wajda or Aleksei German. Presenting fiction, they aim for truth, and in fact convince the public that they get closer to historical reality through reimagining it, effectively emancipating the task of historical memory from the cold and fragmentary nature of historical documents.

The East European memory shift from monolithic and unquestionable memorials fixed in stone to the predominance of cultural texts and complex, polemical memory sites is not unique. On the contrary, the instability or lack of memorial sites and the predominance of memory events are characteristic for the whole postcolonial world of the twenty-first century. "Provincializing Europe," a theoretical shift from sites of memory to memory events has the potential to correct the traditional Western European bias in the booming discipline of Memory Studies, alerting it to the new, global dimensions.[18] The postsocialist and postcolonial worlds tend to overlap, as Kevin Platt, Dirk Uffelmann, Michael Rothberg, and Simon Lewis demonstrate in this volume; in both, long suppressed and still painful memories come to the fore, freed from the constraints of censorship and rekindling old conflicts.

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, divergent memories of the Romanov and Habsburg empires, Stalinism, the Second World War, and the postwar period of "mature socialism" split Russia, Ukraine,

and other post-Soviet states. The countries of East Central Europe also began their memory wars with the USSR's perceived successor, the Russian Federation. Suppressed memories of interethnic violence resurfaced in relation to cases such as the Volhynia massacres of Poles by Ukrainian underground forces in 1943,[19] or the Jedwabne massacre of Jews by Poles in 1941.[20] Other national traumas also came to the fore, such as the Soviet deportations from the Baltic countries during and after the Second World War,[21] the Holodomor (the artificial famine of 1932–33) in Ukraine,[22] or the Katyn massacre, which has grown into an overwhelmingly powerful symbol of Poland's suffering at the hands of the USSR.[23] Memories of the twentieth-century man-made catastrophes continue to cause controversies inside and between the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, with no sign of the conflicts abating.[24] The pan-European controversy of the Armenian genocide, a paradigmatic case of such a catastrophe, with an imminent memory war and a cosmopolitan political response, has become a historical prototype for many Eastern European developments.[25]

The processes of reevaluating and reexperiencing the twentieth century brought into being new narratives of victimhood for the states of Eastern Europe, yet also raised the uncomfortable questions of collaboration and coparticipation. Before the recent arrival of the memory boom in Eastern Europe, the stories of Belarusians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians, and others, who had suffered during the Second World War and in its aftermath as a result of Soviet and Nazi policies, as well as of Western geopolitical games with the Soviet Union, had been left out of Western memory. These societies set about an energetic and bitter quest to correct this imbalance, culminating in recent years with the promotion by some of the new members of the European Union of the "double genocide" theory, which combines the totalitarian crimes of Hitler and Stalin into a single metanarrative of state violence.[26] However, specific histories of the Holocaust in the countries of Eastern Europe and the role their inhabitants played in the massacres of the Jews (something that had been effectively obscured by communist propaganda and wilful amnesia) are still waiting to be fully acknowledged.[27] To an even larger extent, the same bitter truth about local collaborators has been revealed in the historical and memorial work on the Soviet oppression in the region. While much has been done to develop a picture of the past that incorporates both victimhood and culpability, resistance

to recognizing the latter has often been fierce. The way these events are selectively remembered, forgotten, and contested cannot be understood through the established Western European paradigm. This paradigm needs to be adjusted, even rethought, to allow for the numerous complications that are brought to the European memory table by postsocialist countries.

As they travel through Eastern Europe, the fundamental concepts of Memory Studies are challenged and changed.[28] In North America and Western Europe, trauma theory has supplied many scholars of memory with their favorite idioms, but it does not seem to be equally applicable in the East of the continent. A subject who has suffered a trauma cannot represent the traumatic situation; this representational inability is precisely what constitutes trauma.[29] However, in many tragic situations in Eastern Europe we see that the moment of loss is in fact remembered all too well, though it has often been impossible to discuss and commemorate this loss publicly. It is not the traumatic misrepresentation that characterizes many developments of postwar, postsocialist, and postcatastrophic memories, but rather recurrent, even somewhat obsessive remembrances of the loss. In their attempt to theorize these processes, many scholars of East European memory have increasingly turned to the Freudian concept of mourning.[30] Trauma is a response to a condition that has been experienced by the self; mourning is a response to a condition of the other. Unlike trauma, mourning is an active, realistic, and healthy process. In contrast to trauma, a concept that is defined by misrepresentation of the past, mourning is all about holding on to it, remembering, representing, and reenacting. Having its limits in time and intensity, mourning has its interminable counterpart, melancholia, though the boundary between them is uncertain. Relations between private and public processes of mourning, as well as the constant danger of slipping into destructive melancholia, are central to the chapters in this volume.

Remembering its losses, a postcatastrophic culture lives on through the subsequent generations, as the survivors who struggle with their traumas give way to the descendants who mourn the victims of the catastrophe. In this context, we can understand Marianne Hirsch's influential concept of "postmemory" as part of the process of mourning, rather than of trauma or the posttraumatic.[31] The alternative idea, that trauma—with its subtle psychological dynamic—can be passed down through generations, is difficult to verify in a situation that

sees cultural means of intergenerational transmission—novels, films, Internet sites, historical debates—actively produced, easily accessible, and enthusiastically consumed.

Although the conditions of mourning and trauma involve very different relations to representation, they both involve repetition. In mourning as well as in trauma, the subject obsessively returns to certain experiences of the past, and these returns can obstruct this subject's ability to live in the present. On the stage of postcatastrophic memory, the dialectics of repetition and remembering produce warped imagery, which combines the analytic, self-conscious exploration of the past with its reverberations and transfigurations. Thus reenactments merge with remembrances in creative forms that can be naive or sophisticated, regressive or productive, influential or isolated.

Those who shape cultural representations of both the Nazi Holocaust and Stalinist Terror today often belong to the third post-catastrophic generation. They do not have their own memories of these events, and increasingly rarely have access to traumatic pasts via family stories, photographs, or artifacts. However, new generations operate within the public sphere, with its multimedia, multigeneric, and cross-generational cultural products that effectively shape our postmemories.[32] In post-Holocaust Europe, the process of mourning embraces the descendants of both victims and perpetrators, and with the passing of generations, their mutual hatred has the potential to be transformed into a coparticipation in mourning. As the chapters by Jay Winter, Aleida Assmann, and Natan Sznaider in this volume argue in their different ways, memories of the Holocaust have helped shape a new, potentially pan-European culture of human rights.[33] This worldly, cosmopolitan memory has important, though often overlooked, East European dimensions to both its historical origin and its continuing development. Memories of the gulag, famines, and other socialist atrocities have also contributed to the formation of Western ideas of human rights.[34] Less recognized than the impact of the Holocaust, these influences of the East European experience on Western thought open a new vista for transcultural studies.[35]

Cultural memory is a living realm that changes with history, and Eastern Europe is a fascinating laboratory in which to study cultural memory in action. Various cultural texts—works of history that claim truth, works of fiction that do not (e.g., historical novels), and genres with unverifiable validity (e.g., memoirs)—are crucial genres of memory. The Soviet and other socialist regimes of Eastern and Central

Europe aimed at making cultural memory, like legitimate violence, a monopoly of the state. In a democratic society, various institutions compete in patroling the borders between truth and myth in the representation of the past. With the passage of generations, these borders shift and curve, as the creative yet warped processes of intragenerational mourning take hold. These multidirectional dynamics of memory in action become important parts of cultural history, worthy of study in their own right.

Establishing a new dialogue between scholarship from Eastern and Western Europe, the chapters in this volume demonstrate that the study of memory is a crucial element of any understanding of Europe—its past and present, failures and successes, diversity and integration. Looked at from the East European perspective, the memory boom appears in a new light. The fraught memory landscapes of Eastern Europe cry out for more engagement with the critical perspectives of Western memory scholars. With its double task, this volume sets out to illuminate the specifics of East European memory struggles and breathe new life into Memory Studies through confronting the discipline with the tensions of Eastern Europe.

* * *

The three contributors who open this volume, Aleida Assmann, Jay Winter, and Natan Sznaider, have been among the most important voices in Memory Studies in recent years. Renowned for her work on German and Western European memory, Aleida Assmann here turns her attention eastward. Starting her narrative with the problems of establishing a museum of European memory, she scrutinizes two polar though indispensable parts of this future museum—memories of Nazism and Stalinism, of the Holocaust and the gulag. Though in the twenty-first-century Europe is stumbling on issues that go far beyond its memory politics, Assmann maintains that the very institution of the European Union has preserved its meaning as a great memorial construction, a monument to the human ability to transcend divisions and forgive crimes, even those as monstrous as the crimes of Nazism and Stalinism. In a series of symmetrical questions that she addresses to the Eastern and Western parts of Europe, Assmann asks whether it is possible to consolidate divergent European memories into one coherent pan-European narrative or museum. Moreover, Assmann formulates some normative conditions that define how

these memories might coexist in a productive dialogue about Europe and its future.

In his chapter, Jay Winter outlines just how important the turn toward memory has been in postwar Europe. The cultural shift that saw memory take center stage has brought about a profound shift in how European societies perceive war, and has also played an important role in the consolidation of the discourse of human rights. Today, human rights are paramount in Europe, and war is seen as an aberration; without the discourse of memory that grew up around the traumas of the twentieth century, it is difficult to imagine that this situation would have come about. Exploring the globally recurring conjunction between human rights and historical memory, Winter suggests the increasing relevance of these interrelated concerns to Eastern Europe. In countries such as Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, where human rights are precarious, their violations are historically rooted, and the campaigns in their defense are haunted by the memories of state terror. In this context, Winter's view of memory's role in underpinning the very concept of human rights takes on an extra complexity.

Natan Sznaider's chapter also deals with the role of memory in the emergence of human rights discourse. Sznaider raises the question of the paradox between the universality of this discourse and the specific nature of the Jewish experience that gave birth to the concepts of human rights, collective guilt, and crimes against humanity. While some factions in Eastern Europe may see memory politics as being dominated by the particularity of Jewish experience, Sznaider shows that it was its effacement that helped European universalizing principles to emerge. Sznaider posits the question of how far Jewish cosmopolitan memory can be adapted as a model in other cultural contexts, and how far it must be seen as specifically Jewish. This question of the acceptance and internalization of Jewish experience, its use as metaphor or model, is a key element of East European memory debates. Opened in 2012 as a result of the fruitful collaboration between Russian, American, and Israeli historians, the new Jewish Museum in Moscow, which is advertised as the largest in the world and, in fact, presents the Jewish experience in sincere, rich, and sophisticated ways, demonstrates that this cosmopolitan thinking has found its way even into some of the most resistant environments.

The chapters by Assmann, Winter, and Sznaider present a challenge to the emerging subdiscipline of East European Memory

Studies. These authors set out ideas that beg to be grasped by scholars of and from the region. How do the memory cultures of Eastern Europe interact with the ideas of European unity, human rights, and democracy, based in cosmopolitan, transnational, and universalized memories? Can the East European memory cultures be placed within these frameworks? Can they or should they consciously orientate themselves toward them? Do these ideas, born of the Western tradition of Memory Studies, require revision or adaptation in the East European context? Are they undermined or confirmed by these new encounters?

The second group of chapters in the volume brings ideas from Postcolonial Studies, which were also developed outside Eastern Europe, to bear on its memory. Not only do these chapters contribute to the still nascent East European postcolonial discourse, they also perform an important metatheoretical function. As Michael Rothberg notes, combining Memory Studies with postcolonial discourse creates a heuristic link that has not been sufficiently explored.

Michael Rothberg's chapter takes one of the most painful sites of memory in Eastern Europe as its central "knot of memory": the Warsaw ghetto. In 2013, the site of the former ghetto witnessed one of Poland's most important mnemonic developments—the opening of the large Museum of the History of Polish Jews. For decades, memory debates have been focused on the site and the narratives of the ghetto, but Rothberg demonstrates that they have resonance beyond Polish-Jewish memory. Tracing the "multidirectional" dynamics of memory that converge on the Warsaw ghetto, Rothberg shows that they integrate the story of the ghetto, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, memories of slavery and black human rights struggles, and the experience of Turkish immigrants in Germany. The result is a mnemonic dialogue across various postcolonial contexts that forces us to rethink the functions of cultural memory. Dirk Uffelmann's chapter explores the relations between Poland and postcoloniality in the contemporary academic discourse. Offering a meticulous analysis of Polish academic debates on the relevance of Postcolonial Studies to Poland, Uffelmann's chapter asks challenging questions as to what exactly Poland's place is—that of former colony, which is the more accepted view, or that of former colonizer with regard to its lost eastern territories; or perhaps both of these at once. Uffelmann also demonstrates how theory itself can become a component of memory discourse: the very question of whether and how to use postcolonial theory

in the Polish context is shown to depend on the memory politics of the theorist. In this way, theory *becomes* memory. In his chapter, Kevin Platt performs a provincialization of Europe by examining the various memory cultures that intersect in contemporary Latvia. Platt's chapter not only speaks to the intricacies of Latvian memory, but also reveals the complex histories and discursive strategies that underlie the deployment of concepts such as Europeanness, modernity, colonization, occupation, and civilization. Platt's chapter draws together the explicitly local and the supposedly universal, demonstrating through careful reference to Latvian particularity that what we assume to be universal in European memory is often merely a privileged articulation of the provincial.

As we have already discussed, the cultures of memory and mourning that are today so powerful across East Central Europe and Russia result from the unprecedented levels of violence experienced in the region during the twentieth century. Uncounted or misrepresented, the dead do not lie in peace, but are constantly invoked in political rhetoric. They appear regularly, as the undead, in films, novels, folklore, and other cultural products. Yet their return is also quite literal and physical. Exhumations of sites of mass murder that happened during the Second World War and the Stalinist "peaceful decades" are still carried out to this day, sometimes with much controversy. Mourning for these dead is often difficult, complex, and incomplete. A section of this volume deals with the issue of the dead and their absence and presence in contemporary Eastern Europe.

Andrzej Nowak reflects on the ethics of the political utilization of the memory of the dead. Scrutinizing the history of a monument built in 2009 to mark the graves of unknown Red Army soldiers from the Battle for Warsaw in 1920, Nowak explores wider Polish-Russian relations through the politics and policies of memory. Nowak's questions about the identities of the dead and the responsibilities of the living resonate with the next chapter by Uilleam Blacker, which examines how East European literature, culture, and urban life reflect the absences left by communities destroyed or displaced as a result of the Second World War. The chapter asks whether it is possible to incorporate the memory of the dead or vanished others into our own memories, or whether these others can only represent an unsettling and alien absence in a contemporary city. Exploring the cultural memory of contemporary Belarus, Simon Lewis develops a framework for understanding the legacy of nation-wide catastrophe,

including the overlapping effects of multiple waves of colonization and mass murder. A postcatastrophic literature in Belarus is developing hybrid forms that aim not so much to reclaim the lost past, which is an impossible task, but to come to terms with its infinite difference from the present by offering images of ghosts, graves, and other accessories of the dead. Creative and mournful, these forms of memory move beyond political and linguistic borders, shaping cosmopolitan memory in the heart of Eastern Europe.

The final section of the volume offers three innovative ways of approaching post-Soviet memory cultures. Offering an analysis that crosses the Russian-Ukrainian border, Ellen Rutten's chapter focuses on the Internet, reexamines the classical questions of Memory Studies, and argues that the study of memory and forgetting in Eastern Europe must engage with digital media. In Russia, for example, the digital sphere is one of the few spaces in which alternative, nonofficial memories are voiced and debated in conditions that approximate the Habermasian public sphere. Polemically, Rutten also shows how some key assumptions of digital Memory Studies, based overwhelmingly on Western experience, do not stand up to scrutiny when placed in the East European context.

In the next chapter, Andriy Portnov takes a panoramic look at contemporary cultural memory in Ukraine and explores the political and social factors that have shaped its dynamics in the post-Soviet period. Portnov challenges views that reify an image of Ukraine as split between irreconcilable differences in regional memories. He argues that the country's complex identities represent a pluralism of foundational images, which are frequently used and abused in political battles. Thanks to its inherently fractured and shifting nature this Ukrainian formation of memory resists the state monopolization more successfully than has been the case in Russia and Belarus.

Ilya Kalinin interprets the state-sponsored politics of history in Putin's Russia with the provocative metaphor of the past as a "natural resource," a limited and precious store of identities and values that the Russian authorities exploit in their zero-sum struggles with their own citizens and the West. Through a close reading of recent political discourse, Kalinin demonstrates the aggressive shift in Russian politics toward the active appropriation of the past.

The twenty-first century has revealed unexpectedly deep fissures within the European Union. Having invited its poorer neighbors in the East to join its privileged community, Europe has begun to

reexamine itself in the face of the economic downturn. As the chapters that open this volume demonstrate, Europe is a community of memory. When the European Union admitted its forgotten cousins, the former socialist states, it had not counted on the divergent memories that they would bring. For decades those cousins and their memories had been locked behind the Iron Curtain, and so Europe was safe to build itself on a selective version of its past. In the late 1980s, those eastern countries were released from confinement, and after 2004 they began to make themselves at home in the European house. In addition, new, even more distant and strange relatives appeared on the new eastern borders of the European Union, with even more fractured, frightening, and outlandish memories. This influx of memories is forcing Europe to reexamine its settled imagery and to question just how adequate its self-image really was.[36] With recent crises inside "Old Europe" itself, that reexamination has become all the more urgent. Europe needs to rethink its memory, identity, and what is called its "project"—the European past, present, and future—in the face of global economic turmoil, shifting power relations, and the embattled, and sometimes antagonistic, memories that dominate its various parts. In order to reconfigure itself, Europe will have to face the fragmented, warped mirror of its accumulated memories. While it may be held up by the countries of Eastern Europe, that mirror ultimately reflects the image of Europe as a whole. The survey of the dynamics of East European memory represented here will enhance our understanding of this process of European self-reflection.

Notes

1. Jay Winter introduced the idea of the "memory boom" in his *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (London: Canto, 1998); see also *Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present,* ed. by Meike Bal, Jonathan Crewe, and Leo Spitzer (Hanover, NH, and London: University Press of New England, 1999); Jenny Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and Present*, ed. by Duncan Bell (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*, ed. by Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); José van Dijck, *Mediated Memories in the Digital Age* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Astrid Erll, *Memory in Culture* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); *The Collective Memory Reader*, ed. by Jeffrey K. Olick,

Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, and Daniel Levy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

2. See Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994); Czesław Miłosz, *Native Realm: A Search for Self Definition*, trans. Catherine S. Leach (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988); Roman Szporluk, "Defining Central Europe: Power, Politics and Culture," *Cross Currents*, 1 (1982), 30–38; *In Search of Central Europe*, ed. by George Schöpflin and Nancy Wood (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); Mykola Riabchuk, "The Fence of Metternich's Garden," "ï", 1.13 (1998), http://www.ji.lviv.ua/n13texts/riabchuk-en.htm (accessed January 15, 2013).

3. For the history of these concepts, see Ignacy Sachs, *The Discovery of the Third World* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1976); Carl E. Pletsch, "The Three Worlds, or the Division of Social Scientific Labor," *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 23.4 (1981), 565–90; David Chioni Moore, "Is the Post- in Postcolonial the Post- in Post-Soviet?" *PMLA,* 116/1 (2001), 111–28; Alexander Etkind, *Internal Colonization: Russia's Imperial Experience* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), pp. 25–29.

4. Milan Kundera, *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981), p. 3.

5. Milan Kundera, "The Tragedy of Central Europe: A Kidnapped West," *New York Review of Books*, April 26, 1984, pp. 33–38.

6. See Richard Esbenshade, "Remembering to Forget: Memory, History and National Identity in Postwar East-Central Europe," *Representations*, 49 (1995), 72–96; Czesław Miłosz, "Looking for the Center: On the Poetry of Central Europe," *Cross Currents*, 1 (1982), 1–11; "The Lisbon Conference on Literature: A Roundtable of Central European Writers," *Cross Currents*, 9 (1990), 75–124.

7. *Memory at War: Cultural Dynamics in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine* was a pan-European research project at Cambridge and several other European universities, which was supported by the HERA (Humanities in the European Research Area) Joint Research Programme in 2010–13; see www.memoryatwar.org (accessed January 15, 2013).

8. Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006); Levy and Sznaider, *Human Rights and Memory* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010); and Sznaider, *Jewish Memory and the Cosmopolitan Order* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).

9. On some of these issues, see James Mark, *The Unfinished Revolution: Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central-Eastern Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011); Timothy Garton Ash, "Trials, Purges and History Lessons: Treating a Difficult Past in Post-communist Europe," in *Memory and Power in Post-war Europe*, ed. by Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 265–82; and Stanislaw Tyszka, "Restitution as a Means of Remembrance: Evocations of the Recent Past in the Czech Republic and in Poland after 1989," in *Performing the Past: Memory, History, and Identity in Modern Europe,* ed. by Karin Tilmans, Frank van Vree, and Jay Winter (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2010), pp. 305–34.

10. In this novel, a son finds evidence in the archives that his beloved father was a secret agent who denounced his friends and even his wife; see Peter Esterházy, *Javított kiadás. Melléklet a Harmonia cœlestishez* (Budapest: Magveto, 2002).

11. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (London: Vintage, 2010), pp. 773, 826.

12. See, for example, on Poland: Antony Polonsky and Joanna B. Michlic, eds., *The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Ewa Wolentarska-Ochman, "Collective Remembrance in Jedwabne: Unsettled Memory of World War II in Postcommunist Poland," *History and Memory,* 18/1 (Spring/Summer 2006), 152–78; Andrzej Paczkowski, "Nazism and Communism in Polish Experience and Memory," in *Stalinism and Nazism: History and Memory Compared,* ed. by Henri Rousso (Nebraska: University of Nebraska, 2006), pp. 242–61; Piotr Madajczyk, "Experience and Memory: The Second World War in Poland," in *Experience and Memory: The Second World War in Europe*, ed. by Jörg Echternkamp and Stefan Martens (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010); Robert Traba, *Przeszłość w teraźniejszości: polskie spory o historię na początku XXI wieku* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2009); Paweł Machcewicz, *Spory o historię 2000–2011* (Kraków: Znak, 2012); Antoni Dudek, *Instytut. Osobista historia IPN* (Warsaw: Czerwone i Czarne, 2011). On Ukraine, see Catherine Wanner, *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998); Serhii Plokhy, *Ukraine and Russia: Representations of the Past* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); David R. Marples, *Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine* (Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2007); Andriy Portnov, *Uprazhneniia s istoriei po-ukrainski* (Moscow: OGI, 2010); Tarik Cyril Amar, "Different but the Same or the Same but Different? Public Memory of the Second World War in Post-Soviet L'viv," *Journal of Modern European History*, 9.3 (2011), 373–96. On the Baltic states, see *Memory and Pluralism in the Baltic States*, ed. by Eva-Clarita Pettai (London and New York: Routledge, 2011); Maria Mälksoo, "Liminality and Contested Europeanness: Conflicting Memory Politics in the Baltic Space," in *Identity and Foreign Policy: Baltic-Russian Relations in the Context of European Integration*, ed. by E. Berg and P. Ehin (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 65–83; Maria Mälksoo, *The Politics of Becoming European: A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War Security Imaginaries* (London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis, 2009); A. Astrov, "Liturgiia po Bronzovomu soldatu: pamiat' i istoriia v formirovanii krizisa," *Ab Imperio*, 3 (2007), pp. 427–447.

13. See Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Tom Segev, *Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994); Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Neil Lazarus, *The Postcolonial Unconscious* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Dacia Viejo Rose, *Reconstructing Spain: Cultural Heritage and Memory after Civil War* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2011).

14. See Alexander Etkind, Rory Finnin, Uilleam Blacker, Julie Fedor, Simon Lewis, Maria Mälksoo, and Matilda Mroz, *Remembering Katyn* (Cambridge: Polity, 2012).

15. Alexander Etkind, "Hard and Soft in Cultural Memory: Political Mourning in Russia and Germany," *Grey Room*, Special Issue: Memory/History/Democracy, 16 (Summer 2004), 36–59; Alexander Etkind, "Post-Soviet Hauntology: Cultural Memory of the Soviet Terror," *Constellations,* 16.1 (2009), 182–200.

16. Alexander Etkind, "Mapping Memory Events in East European Space," *East European Memory Studies*, 1 (2010), 4–5; Etkind, *Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013).

17. Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action,* trans. by Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity, 1984–87).

18. See Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

19. See Grzegorz Motyka, *Od rzezi wołyńskiej do akcji "Wisła." Konflikt polsko-ukraiński 1943–1947* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2011); Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven and London: Yale Univerity Press, 2003).

20. See further Jan Tomasz Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), and his *Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz* (New York: Random House, 2006), and (with Irena Grudzińska-Gross) *Golden Harvest* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). See also Polonsky and Michlic, *The Neighbors Respond*; *Thou Shalt Not Kill: Poles on Jedwabne*, ed. by William Brand (Warsaw: Więź, 2001); *Wokół Jedwabnego,* ed. by Paweł Machcewicz and Krzysztof Persak, 2 vols. (Warsaw: IPN, 2002).

21. See Dovile Budryte, *Taming Nationalism? Political Community Building in the Post-Soviet Baltic States*. (London: Ashgate, 2005); *Baltic Postcolonialism,* ed. by Violeta Kelertas (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2006); Norman M. Naimark, *Stalin's Genocides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Pavel Polian, *Ne po svoei vole…Istoriia i geografiia prinuditel'nykh migratsii v SSSR* (Moscow: OGI, Memorial, 2001), http://www.memo.ru/history/deport/ (accessed February 4, 2013).

22. See further Georgiy Kasianov, *Danse macabre. Holod 1932–1933 rokiv u polytytsi, masovii svidomosti ta istoriohrafii (1980-ti-pochatok 2000-kh)* (Kyiv: Nash chas, 2010); Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "'Capital of Despair': Holodomor Memory and Political Conflicts in Kharkiv after the Orange Revolution," *East European Politics and Societies*, 25.3 (2011), 597–639; and Andriy Portnov's chapter in this volume.

23. See Etkind, Finnin, Blacker, Fedor, Lewis, Mälksoo, and Mroz, *Remembering Katyn*; *Katyn: A Crime without Punishment*, ed. by Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007); and George Sanford, *Katyn and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice and Memory* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005).

24. On some of these debates, see, for example, Polonsky and Michlic, *The Neighbors Respond* (on Jedwabne); Tatiana Zhurzhenko, "The Geopolitics

of Memory", *Eurozine*, May 10, 2007; David Marples, "Stepan Bandera: The Resurrection of a Ukrainian National Hero", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 58.4 (2006), 555–66; Oxana Shevel, "The Politics of Memory in a Divided Society: A Comparison of Post-Franco Spain and Post-Soviet Ukraine", *Slavic Review*, 70.1 (Spring 2011), 137–64; V. Kulyk, "The Media, History, and Identity: Competing Narratives of the Past in the Ukrainian Popular Press", *National Identities,* 13 (2011), 287–303; Frank Golczewski, "Poland's and Ukraine's Incompatible Pasts," and Wilfried Jilge, "The Politics of History and the Second World War in Post-Communist Ukraine (1986/1991–2004/2005)", both in *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas,* 54.1 (2006), 37–49 and 50–81; Serhii Plokhy, "The Ghosts of Pereyaslav: Russo-Ukrainian Historical Debates in the Post-Soviet Era", *Europe-Asia Studies*, 53.3 (May 2001), 489–505.

25. See *America and the Armenian Genocide*, ed. by Jay Winter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Aida Alayarian, *Consequences of Denial: The Armenian Genocide* (London: Karnac 2008); *The Armenian Genocide: Cultural and Ethical Legacies*, ed. by Richard G. Hovannisian (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 2008).

26. See further Maria Mälksoo, "The Memory Politics of Becoming European: The East European Subalterns and the Collective Memory of Europe", *European Journal of International Relations*, 15.4 (2009), 653–80; Claus Leggewie, "Equally Criminal? Totalitarian Experience and European Memory", *Eurozine*, June 1, 2006; Eva-Clarita Onken, "The Baltic States and Moscow's 9 May Commemoration: Analysing Memory Politics in Europe", *Europe-Asia Studies* 59.1 (2007), 23–46.

27. See further John-Paul Himka, "Debates in Ukraine over Nationalist Involvement in the Holocaust, 2004–2008", *Nationalities Papers*, 39 (2011), 353–70, and his *Ukrainians, Jews and the Holocaust: Divergent Memories* (Saskatoon: Heritage Press, 2009); Per Anders Rudling, "The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths", *Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies,* 2107 (2011); Omer Bartov, *Erased: Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), and "Eastern Europe as the Site of Genocide", *Journal of Modern History*, 80.3 (September 2008), 557–593; Geneviève Zubrzycki, *The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-communist Poland* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Michael Stenlauf, *Bondage to the Dead: Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997); Piotr Wróbel, "Double Memory: Poles and Jews after the Holocaust", *East European Politics and Societies,* 11.3 (1997), 560–74.

28. For the idea of "traveling theory", see Edward W. Said, "Traveling Theory", in *The World, the Text, and the Critic* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 226–47.

29. See Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History* (New York and London: Routledge, 1992); Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); *Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory*, ed. by Paul Antze and Michael Lambek

(London: Routledge, 1996); Ruth Leys, *Trauma: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); E. Ann Kaplan, *Trauma Culture: The Politics of Terror and Loss in Media and Literature* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005); Karyn Ball, *Traumatizing Theory: The Cultural Politics of Affect in and beyond Psychoanalysis* (New York: Other Press, 2007); and Ruth Leys, *From Guilt to Shame: Auschwitz and After* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

30. On the problems with applying the concept of trauma to Russian memory of Stalinism, see Catherine Merridale, *Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Russia* (London: Granta, 2000); Etkind, *Warped Mourning.* On mourning in various political and historical contexts, see Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence* (London: Verso, 2004); *Symbolic Loss: The Ambiguity of Mourning and Memory at Century's End*, ed. by Peter Homans (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000); Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning.*

31. Marianne Hirsch, "The Generation of Postmemory," *Poetics Today*, 29.1 (Spring 2008), 103–28 and *The Generation of Postmemory: Visual Culture after the Holocaust* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

32. In her research on the "postmemory" of the Holocaust, Marianne Hirsch emphasizes the relevance of personal artifacts, such as photographs and family albums, for the experience of the generation that did not experience the catastrophe; Marianne Hirsch, *Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

33. On cosmopolitan memory, see Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, *Holocaust Memory in the Global Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006) and Natan Sznaider, *Jewish Memory and Cosmopolitan Order* (Cambridge: Polity, 2011). On generations in the twentieth century, see *Generations in Conflict*, ed. by Mark Roseman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); *Generations in Twentieth-Century Europe*, ed. by Stephen Lovell (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007); Mary Fulbrook, *Dissonant Lives: Generations and Violence through the German Dictatorships* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

34. An important example is the concept of genocide, which was introduced by Raphael Lemkin, a Jew from Belarus who studied in L'viv in the 1920s, worked in Warsaw as a lawyer, and served in the Polish army during the Second World War. Lemkin developed his ideas before the Nazi Holocaust. Among many possible sources for his ideas were the Ukrainian famine of 1932–33 and the Soviet extermination of 85,000 Poles in 1937–38, which Timothy Snyder describes as "in some respects the bloodiest chapter of the Great Terror"; Timothy Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (London: Vintage, 2011), p. 103. The influence of these events on Lemkin's thinking in the 1930s has not been adequately studied, and it is not known how much Lemkin and his circle of Warsaw intellectuals and officials knew about the Soviet murders of the late 1930s. For several studies of Lemkin's thought, including his Cold War involvement, see Anton Weiss-Wendt, "Hostage of Politics: Raphael Lemkin on 'Soviet Genocide,'" *Journal of Genocide*

Research, 7.4 (2005), 551–59; Anson Rabinbach, "The Challenge of the Unprecedented—Raphael Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide," *Simon Dubnow Institute Yearbook*, 4 (2005), 397–420; A. Dirk Moses, "Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide," in *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies*, ed. by Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

35. See, for example, Jan Plamper, "Foucault's Gulag," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History,* 3.2 (2002), 255–80 and Robert Horvath, "'The Solzhenitsyn Effect': East European Dissidents and the Demise of the Revolutionary Privilege," *Human Rights Quarterly,* 29.4 (2007), 879–907. For the effect of Jacques Derrida's brief incarceration in Prague in 1981 on his thought, see Benois Peeters, *Derrida: A Biography* (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), pp. 332–41.

36. For reflections on these issues, see *A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance*, ed. by Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Stråth (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010); Timothy Snyder, "Balancing the Books," *Eurozine*, May 3, 2005, http://www.eurozine.com /articles/2005–05–03-snyder-en.html (accessed February 4, 2013); Chiara Bottici, "European Identity and the Politics of Remembrance," in *Performing the Past*, ed. by Tilmans, van Vree, and Winter, pp. 335–59.

Part I
Divided Memory

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1
Europe's Divided Memory
Aleida Assmann

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, European politicians developed the idea of a European Museum in Brussels. A group of professional experts was commissioned to plan a site that would tell the transnational citizens of the European Union (EU) who they are, where they come from, and what connects them. A team of experts, with the Polish-French historian Krzysztof Pomian as the head, started to work on the design of a European Museum in the 1990s. The opening of the museum, however, had to be postponed several times. The emblematic date 2005—60 years after the end of the Second World War and 55 years after Robert Schuman's declaration on May 9, passed without a symbolic event. In 2007, an exhibition with the title "C'est notre histoire" was opened in Brussels, featuring the visitor of the exhibition as a prominent actor. In 2008, a fresh start for the museum was made by appointing a new team and choosing a new name for the project. The central focus is to be the history of European unification after 1945 up to the present. Rather than looking back into divisive national pasts it was now decided to tell the story of new alliances and the shared resolve to look forward to a common future. The current team is working under a definite deadline; the museum in Brussels, now named "House of European History" after its model, the German "Haus der Geschichte" in Bonn, is to open in 2014.

A glance at this complicated history of creating a European museum already conveys a sense of the problems and complications that arise when the 28 member states of the EU have to agree upon a shared version of their histories. It was Marcel Proust who created the neat distinction between voluntary and involuntary memory. Following this distinction, one might have supposed that the top-down European Museum at Brussels is voluntary memory in the process of being

constructed. As we have seen, however, such a plan proved unfeasible. Given the massive and extended periods of violence in the history of Europe, this past is far from being agreed upon and mastered; on the contrary, it continues to haunt the present with periodical eruptions and controversies, scandals and taboos. Despite the scrupulous ongoing work of historians, there is as yet no end in sight to occasions for renewed collisions and contestations along national borders when it comes to interpreting, representing, and commemorating the European past. The long shadow of Europe's violent past is continued in a number of fault lines, subsumed under the heading of Europe's "memory wars." Given this troubled legacy, it makes much more sense to start in 1945 and to focus on the consolidation of Europe rather than descending into the deep and troubled well of Europe's past. Even today, 68 years after the Second World War, we have ample evidence that the traumatic events related to that war have not vanished into the past and sunk into oblivion but continue to engage and enrage European citizens in various ways. Fortunately, it is also true that there are many dimensions in which Europe has already irreversibly grown together and is becoming an unquestioned reality for its citizens who enjoy the normality of unrestricted traveling, of business transactions, of university collaborations, of study programs, tourism, and the media hype of popular song contests. The memory of the Second World War, however, is still very much present as an involuntary one and a subliminal but firm reference point for many Europeans, not for those of the older generation alone.

To illustrate the mental and emotional divisions in European memory, let me insert here a piece of everyday evidence. It is a conversation that I recently had with a Polish mathematician over breakfast in a student's residence at Madrid. He was attending a conference on mathematics, while I was involved in a conference on memory. "Memory, what is that?" he asked curiously, "Psychology? Medicine?" I explained to him that not only individuals remember but that a whole field of studies has recently evolved around dealing with the impact of (violent) pasts and the use of memories by groups and even nations. He found this difficult to believe, telling me that for his generation (born around 1970), history had completely lost its interest. In our further conversation, however, he proved to be very well informed about current Polish memory debates, from Katyn to Jedwabne, adding details about Jan Tomasz Gross' recent revelations about the "golden harvest," that is, diggings for valuables

that formerly belonged to victims of the Holocaust carried out by the Polish population in the killing fields of Treblinka and other former concentration camps after the war. He added that, in contrast to himself, his father (born shortly after the Second World War) had a worldview that was completely imbued with historical memory. This is the reason why his father would never think of traveling to Germany and is a staunch opponent of the European Union, which he perceives as just another variation of German imperialism.

The conversation related above illustrates the problem on which this chapter will focus, namely, the way in which European memory is still divided. The chapter will focus on the two core events of the twentieth century that lie at the heart of this divide, the Holocaust and the Gulag. While the memory of the Nazi genocide has been transformed into a transgenerational and transnational memory, providing the EU with a "foundation myth" and a moral yardstick for new member states since 2005, the memory of Stalin's terror has had a much more contested and fragmented history, fuelling the national narratives of victimhood of some post-Soviet states on the one hand and disappearing from Russian political memory almost entirely on the other. After sketching the different memorial histories of these core events, this chapter will discuss the status and possible future of both events as part of European memory.

The Holocaust as a foundation myth for the European Union

Given that modern Europe rose from the ashes of the old Europe, it is small wonder that the Second World War still looms large in the consciousness and memory of Europeans. The European Union was devised as a defense mechanism against internal European warfare, with the main strategic aim of neutralizing and containing the danger of German aggression. That this mission was effectively achieved is something that the members of the EU were about to forget in the broils of financial crises, nationalistic movements, and mutual stereotyping. In 2012 the Norwegian Nobel Committee, therefore, reminded the Europeans of their history, focusing on what it saw as "the EU's most important result: the successful struggle for peace and reconciliation and for democracy and human rights. The stabilizing part played by the EU has helped to transform most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace."[1]

Directly after the war, the common efforts toward an economic rebuilding of Europe served not only as a preventive measure against a new war but also as an anaesthesia of traumatic memories that had no place in the new Europe. In retrospect, we may even say that the Cold War, with its strong orientation toward modernization and the future, was an ice age of memory. In 1950s Germany, for instance, the political and social frame was dominated by a spirit of relief and renewal that was combined with a determination to let bygones be bygones. This spirit was prominently embodied by the first German chancellor Adenauer.[2] As the architect of material restitutions for Jewish victims he was invited to Tel Aviv by Israeli president Levi Eshkol, who thanked him for his initiative. As an active member of the resistance himself, Adenauer also felt entitled to a policy of forgive and forget. At a dinner party in the home of Eshkol, he shocked his host when he said: "The Nazi regime has killed as many Germans as it has killed Jews. We should now let this time sink into oblivion."[3]

Today, it has been agreed upon that the Holocaust is the founding myth of Europe; the genocide of European Jewry that was invented and started in Nazi Germany was carried into and supported in various degrees by almost all European states. From the point of view of Germany, it took 20 years for these events to resurface in the Auschwitz trials in Frankfurt, 1965; another 20 years to enter German memory through acts of public commemorations in the speech of president Weizsäcker in 1985, 40 years after the liberation on May 8, 1945; and another 20 years to be established in museums and monuments as a national and transnational lieu de mémoire, marked by the opening of the central Holocaust memorial in Berlin in 2005. In the same year, the European Parliament in Brussels declared January 27 the day of the liberation of Auschwitz in 1945, a European day of annual commemoration in all member states and passed a resolution against anti-Semitism in Europe.[4] Since this resolution of 2005, participation in the Holocaust community of memory has become part of the entry ticket to the EU.

The infrastructure of this memory community was provided by the so-called Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research (ITF), which had been promoted by Swedish president Göran Persson in January 2000 in Stockholm.[5] Two years earlier, a "Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust" had come up with the following "Stockholm Declaration": "The Holocaust (the Shoah) fundamentally challenged the foundations of civilization. The unprecedented character of the Holocaust

will always hold universal meaning."[6] Working on the premises of this statement, the task force was founded with a twofold aim:

(1) to carry the memory of the Holocaust across a temporal border, in this case, across the threshold of the new millennium, at the moment when the communicative memory of survivor-witnesses was dwindling, thus transforming it into a long-term cultural memory;

(2) to carry it across spatial borders, spreading the memory of the Holocaust across Europe by creating a supranational memory community with an extended infrastructure of social institutions, finances, and cooperative networks.

Before the activities of the ITF, Holocaust memory had already resurfaced in various ways after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The opening of numerous archives considerably enlarged the scope and complexity of Holocaust memory, challenging some firmly established national self-images. New documents about Vichy and the history of anti-Semitism in East Germany put an end to the self-image of France or the GDR as pure resistors; after the scandals about the NS-past of Austrian president Waldheim and information about a Polish pogrom in Jedwabne, Austria, and Poland were no longer able to claim the status of victim exclusively, and even the seemingly neutral Swiss were confronted with their own "sites of memory" in the form of their banks and borders. While this new archival evidence documenting collaboration or indifference toward this crime against humanity challenged dominant national narratives in the West, some sections of East European societies took a different approach. After having liberated themselves from their forced alliance with the Soviet Union, these countries often embraced new national narratives that revolved around the experience of suffering and victimhood. For some, the cultivation of victim status deepened the national spirit and created a distance from European identity, and this shift has raised questions about attitudes in these societies toward minorities past and present.

The East European memory of Stalinist terror

While the memory of the Holocaust returned in West European nations after a long state of latency of four–six decades, and has been

reconstructed as a new foundational European memory, it was the memory of Stalinism and Soviet occupation that formed the center of the national narratives of the new states that claimed political independence after the collapse of communism. These memories had also been well preserved in a state of latency through longer periods of political repression. From the point of view of Western intellectuals, this rise of the memory of Stalinism was observed with considerable anxiety and irritation, because it was seen as a challenge to the recovery and expansion of Holocaust memory. Debates about the respective status of these crimes, which confirm their incompatibility and often seek to lay a taboo on comparing them, continue to this day.[7]

Only very recently, however, have there been signs that these concerns are reopened to negotiation. My evidence for this is an invitation from a European commission at Brussels that met in May 2011 to discuss the status of the European memory of the Gulag. Participants included organizations such as Mémorial de la Shoah in Paris, Yad Vashem, the Terezin Memorial, Anne Frank House, Holocaust Educational Trust Ireland, Living History Forum Sweden, the European Shoah Legacy Institute, Yahad In-Unum, as well as organizations focusing on the crimes of Stalinism. The aim of the meeting was "to stimulate exchange of experience and ideas on how to reconcile the two memories (Nazism/Holocaust and Stalinism) and develop a European rather than national perspective on the causes and consequences of these two phenomena for modern European identity."[8]

The objective here is to move from a *national* to a *transnational* perspective on the two conflicting memories. This new initiative became necessary because former negotiations had reached a dead end. They go back to a conference in Prague in June 2008 that resulted in the so-called "Prague Declaration," which claimed the "recognition of Communism as an integral and horrific part of Europe's common history." It stated that both Nazi and communist totalitarian regimes "should be considered to be the main disasters that blighted the twentieth century." As a way of implanting and implementing this memory into the framework of European commemoration, it was recommended to establish "23rd August, the day of signing of the Hitler-Stalin-Pact, known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, as a day of remembrance of the victims of both Nazi and Communist totalitarian regimes, in the same way Europe remembers the victims of the Holocaust on January 27th."[9] A resolution was passed on

April 2, 2009 in the European Parliament to introduce August 23 as a new European day to commemorate the victims of both National Socialism and communism. So far, however, this resolution, which has met with considerable criticism, has not been put into practice. In an essay on competing memory cultures in Europe, Heidemarie Uhl has pointed out that the problematic levelling of the two forms of totalitarianism is at odds with current historical research; she also criticizes the use of national narratives of victimhood to block the recognition of other victims resulting from Nazi collaborations. According to Uhl, such practice falls back on Cold War polemics and would undermine the ethical standards of Western memory culture.[10]

These critical arguments are certainly sound and have to be heeded. At the present state, however, refuelled debates on questions of historical uniqueness and memorial incompatibility should not blind us to a manifest asymmetry in European memory. While Jewish victims have received growing public recognition for their suffering since the 1980s, the victims of Stalinism, who were deported, tortured, exploited as forced laborers and murdered en masse, have not yet been accorded a rightful place in Europe's historical memory and moral consciousness. Especially in Russia, these memories—notwithstanding the harrowing accounts of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Vasily Grossman and others—have remained largely locked up inside the victims, their families, and small sympathetic groups. While this objective of the new initiative is clear enough, the task of creating a transnational European memory of the Gulag is not an easy one. In contrast to the memory of the Holocaust, which has become a joint memory of victims and perpetrators, Gulag memory remains predominantly a victims' memory, which has been seized upon by various nations but still lacks the support of those who inflicted the violence or were responsible for the crimes.[11] A cloak of oblivion has been, and still is, cast on these crimes by the state and the institutions that were responsible for them. After brief spells of de-Stalinization in the postwar years, when a number of Russian presidents acknowledged these crimes, they have now again been successfully deleted from the country's official historical memory.[12]

The only continuous and reliable warden of this unofficial counter-memory in Russia is the network called Memorial. It is a transnational NGO that has established a unique archive of names and documents relating to Stalinist crimes, but otherwise still lacks the support of

either the Russian state or Russian society. In order to fully appreciate the enormous discrepancy in status accruing to the memory of the crimes of Hitler and of Stalin, we only need to consider the huge differences between the two NGOs, the expanding International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance on one hand and the politically and socially isolated and threatened activists of Memorial on the other.

Janusz Reiter, a former Polish ambassador to Germany, got to the heart of Europe's divided memory when he said: "As far as its memories are concerned, the European Union has remained a divided continent. The border, which used to cut off the EU from its eastern neighbours, now runs right across the enlarged continent."[13] With the continuing dissonance around its two focal points, the Holocaust and the Gulag, the divided memory of Europe presents an obstacle to Europe's cultural integration. The incompatibility of these seminal memories is affirmed from both sides: from the Western point of view it is alarming to observe "how difficult it is to anchor the extermination of the Jews in post-communist Europe."[14] The exclusive focus on one's own nation as victim of communist terror is seen as a strategy to ward off responsibility for collaboration and to block empathy for Jewish victims. From the Eastern point of view, it is alarming to observe how difficult it is to anchor the crimes of Stalinism in a European memory that is saturated with museums, monuments, and commemoration events relating to the Holocaust.

How can this impasse be overcome? I would like to draw attention to a similar problem on a much smaller scale and suggest that the solution found for that case could also be applied at the European level. We may say that the same shadow line that today divides the landscape of European memory also divided the memory of the two German states. In the 1990s, when reunified Germany started working through the memory of the GDR, a conflict arose immediately about how to place the "two dictatorships" within German memory. In the 1990s, an Enquete Commission of historians prepared a report on the crimes of the SED regime. When it came to discussing the reuse of former Nazi concentration camps such as Buchenwald or Sachsenhausen by the Soviet Secret Police for political prisoners, the group almost split over the question of how to do justice to the various layers of German history. In this situation the historian Bernd Faulenbach drafted a pragmatic formula that made it possible to overcome a memory war of mutually exclusive claims. The formula that

he found might also be applicable to obstacles blocking the path to a more integrated European memory:

1. The memory of Stalinist Terror must not be allowed to *relativize* the memory of the Holocaust.
2. The memory of the Holocaust must not be allowed to *trivialize* the memory of Stalinist Terror.[15]

Hitherto, the first principle had worked as a taboo, blocking further thinking about the problem, which was construed solely in terms of competition and mutual exclusivity. If we add the second principle, however, the situation looks rather different, transforming incompatibility into compatibility. The opinion that Europeans will have to accommodate *both* events into their memory framework and that Europe's divided memory could be transformed from a rigid, exclusivist "either-or" memory into a more differentiated and complex "both-and" memory is gradually gaining support. This could eventually imply a denationalization and re-Europeanization of both the memory of the Holocaust and that of the Gulag without thereby losing historical contexts and local specificity.

The Gulag and the Holocaust in Russian memory

Despite the ideas outlined above, we are still faced with huge differences in national memory frames. We can distinguish today between two memory policies, a traditional and a new one. The traditional one is based on pride and the fortification of a positive and heroic self-image. The new one is more complex, as it includes also the responsibility for historical crimes, thereby acknowledging the victims of former state terror. In Germany the globally recovered memory of the unprecedented crime of the Holocaust has led to the historical novelty of adopting a "negative memory" premised on guilt and responsibility. This negative memory, however, does not support a negative self-image, but is built on the positive value of human rights. Instead of insisting on continuity and identity, the negative memory emphasizes change and discontinuity, distancing itself explicitly and visibly from the former crimes.

This memory policy of regret was adopted not only by Germany after 1945 but also by various former autocratic states that recently

"transitioned" into democracies by facing their criminal pasts, and by postcolonial nations such as Australia and Canada. After the fall of the Iron Curtain and the demise of the Soviet Empire, Russia did not undergo a similar process of transition that initiated political change by working through the crimes of the past. The important transformations that were made in the 1990s evolved in a process of reasserting a heroic national self-image in the face of new challenges. What happened was a reinvention of the state under the premise of continuity and stability of national identity across a radical historical rupture, a "shift toward the conscious and energetic exploitation of the past for political and geopolitical purposes."[16] The Russian case differs markedly from the German case in that after the demise of the Soviet Union there was no external or internal pressure to radically reconstruct the political system, to change the social norms, and to face the crimes of the past. Nor was there a strong obligation to acknowledge the victims, as these had not been able to form a powerful and vocal group. Instead of going through a period of *transition* after 1990, Russia underwent a *transformation* by reasserting imperial greatness based on a memory projected into a new past.

Stalinist terror in Russian memory

After the Second World War, the victorious Soviet Union shared the moral superiority of having overcome Hitler together with the other Allies. Although many Russians fell prey to Stalin's terror, it is much more popular today to emphasize the greatness of Stalin's victory. "The cult of the war veteran and the pride taken in the victorious fighting of the Soviet Army goes hand in hand with the continuous marginalization of certain victim groups, such as forced labor workers, deportees and prisoners of war."[17] Unless the victims (and/or their descendants) manage to form a vocal group, obtaining the support of the media to claim justice and recognition in the public and to challenge the successors of the repressive system, there is no need for a society to confront and remember the dark episodes of its violent past.

What is still lacking, then, is a social discourse, let alone a movement that could support such a cause. We can only speculate about the reasons why such a discourse has not yet come about. One explanation is that in Russia the categories of perpetrator and victim are far too fuzzy to allow for a common group-memory in which political

and ethical claims could be anchored. Another reason might lie in the colliding frames of neighboring national memories. Some of the post-Soviet states have built up a solid memory of the Gulag, presenting Stalinist terror and Soviet occupation as the core of their victim identity in their national monuments. Their national museums have telling names such as the "House of Terror" in Budapest, the "Occupation Museum" in Riga, the "Estonian Museum of Occupations" in Tallinn, and the "Museum of Genocide" in Vilnius. In this way, the memory of the Gulag has been "nationalized," as it were, by the neighboring nation-states within the political arena of memory wars. Instances of scandal and open conflict have been many, such as in the case of the displacement of the Soviet monument to the Unknown Soldier in Tallinn. To join the contested memory claimed and represented by these states would be viewed within Russia as a difficult, dangerous, and certainly unpatriotic endeavor.[18] "In Russia, as in Lithuania, one's particular interpretation of 'historical truth' is used as a political tool to forge a powerful collective credo that consolidates the nation."[19]

There is a third reason why the memory of the Gulag has not established itself in Russia that I find particularly interesting. Zuzanna Bogumił has written on Gulag commemoration sites and practices in Russia, with reference to monuments, exhibitions, archives, and tourism, and looking in particular at the various forms of deployment of this memory. She reminds us of the important fact that a common memory never consists in an archive of facts and dates but in narratives that are charged with emotions and meaning, providing the citizens in the present with a meaningful (hi)story and an orientation for the future. In this respect, she registers a remarkable shift in the current narrative of Gulag memory from secular to Orthodox language. About Memorial, whose archive holds the most detailed evidence of the crimes and is thus its most important site of memory, Bogumił states: "Memorial was not able to establish a system filled with meanings, which would set the framework for a new civic community (both in terms of time—holidays, as well as in terms of space—sites of memory)."[20] While the relevant data and evidence have been laboriously assembled, what is still missing is an active, resonant discourse in society about this chapter of the Soviet past. It is only through such a discourse that the importance of the Gulag, as well as its historical, ethical, and national frame, could be established. Only within the context of such a discourse and framing narrative could these events be recalled to Russian national memory.

The Holocaust in Russian memory

Europe's memory shows not only antinomies, but also curious asymmetries. While the commemoration of the Holocaust has expanded far beyond the borders of Europe, it has also produced a strange gap within Europe. More and more nations each year commemorate the liberation of the extermination camp of Auschwitz in 1945 by the Red Army on January 27, yet the liberators themselves are paradoxically absent from this growing memory community. This is not to say that the Red Army does not have an assured place in the national culture of commemoration of post-Soviet Russia. It is accorded that place on May 9, the commemoration date of victory in the Great Patriotic War, in which Stalin routed Hitler. The fact that the Soviet Union heroically defeated evil and suffered great losses in doing so forms the core of Russia's heroic self-image and national memory. In Russia, the glorious Red Army is remembered for crushing Hitler's regime on May 9, but not for putting an end to the mass murder of European Jews on January 27. The Russians refrain from joining the Holocaust memory community that has become a distinctly Western memory, supported by American networks and connected with the process of building up a European identity.[21]

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's national memory had to be dramatically reconstructed. All references to communist history with its revolutions and internationalist visions disappeared and were replaced by a new imperial self-image based on a long-term historical continuity around the key motifs of honor and heroic suffering.[22] This self-perception of Stalin's honor and Russia's sacrifice elides the perception of Jewish victims. "Nearly 50% of the total number of Jews killed during World War II died on the territory of the former Soviet Union, and two million Jews were forced into ghettos in that region." These events, however, "occupy a minimal place in Russia's contemporary memory culture and public discourses, with their overwhelming emphasis on the Soviet Victory over Nazi Germany."[23]

This quote comes from the homepage of the Russian Research and Educational Holocaust Centre, an NGO that since 1992 has been trying to raise public awareness of the Holocaust in Russia. It was established in the aftermath of the political change from Soviet to Russian identity, which went hand in hand with a wave of ethnically motivated emigrations. Russian Jews went in large numbers to Israel and

other countries where they became members of Jewish communities and shared the Holocaust memory. Years after these waves of emigration, Israel now has an influential Russian community that comprises 20 percent of the total population. On another homepage, that of the World Jewish Congress, dated February 17, 2010, one can read that émigré Russian Jews now form the background of a new political alliance between Putin and Netanyahu. This political bonding introduces a surprising new turn in both countries' memory politics.

In the article "'Russia to Build Holocaust Museum; Israel to Erect Memorial to Soviet Army," we learn more about these new plans:

> Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has told his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu that Russia would soon build a museum dedicated to the victims of the Holocaust. Netanyahu in response said Israel would erect a memorial dedicated to the efforts of the Soviet Army in liberating Europe during World War II. Netanyahu said the gesture, which he intends to move forward, was in honour of the 65th anniversary of the victory over the Nazis later this year. "No one has the right to forget those terrible losses among the Jewish people in this disaster, though some do. No one has the right to forget the decisive role that Russia, the Soviet Army, played in defeating Nazi Germany," he said.[24]

Connected with the new political practice of transition is the great hope that a wider and more complex framework for historical memory can usher in a new form of politics that acknowledges historical victims and respects human rights. Very often, however, current memory politics works exactly the other way round: a new political constellation abruptly determines and redefines the expedient memories that support the pragmatic goals of a new alliance of power.

We may sum up by saying that there are indeed remarkable asymmetries between Eastern and Western European memory constructs and policies. According to Blacker and Etkind, in the West the memory of the Holocaust is crystallized and canonized while in the East it is salient and militant:

> When the European Union admitted its forgotten cousins, the former socialist states, it had not counted on the divergent memories that they would bring. For decades those cousins and their memories had been locked behind the iron curtain, and so Europe

was safe to build itself on a selective version of its past. In the late 1980s, those Eastern countries were released from confinement, and after 2004 they began to make themselves at home in the European house.[25]

In spite of the assertion and confidence inspired by being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the European house is under considerable pressure because of its divisive memories. There are, of course, different ways of assessing the asymmetries in European memory that have been examined in this chapter. One is to abstain from judgments altogether by registering that memory constructions relating to the Second World War are still in the process of being made and remade, and are thus part of a longer process that, above all, needs time to evolve. Another possibility would be to take a more relativistic stance toward the concept of European integration. The European Union is premised on difference, as we have heard so often, so why not accept and abide by different historical perspectives, narratives, and memories? Such relativism, however, implies a trivialization of the problem, as we are not dealing just with different historical narratives and memory policies, but also with different and irreconcilable values. Is a national memory constructed to affirm and glorify the collective or does it do justice to those who have been wronged and abused in the past? Does it exclude painful and shameful incidents in order to raise the collective self-image or does it provide room to account for historical crimes and the taking of responsibility? Does it allow complexity or does it enforce unity? Does it repress or integrate minorities? These questions show that constructions of memories are immediately tied to constructions of societies, which makes it worthwhile to observe these processes carefully and to analyze them critically.

Notes

1. "The Nobel Peace Prize 2012—Press Release," Nobelprize.org, October 15, 2012, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/press .html (accessed January 2, 2013).
2. Adenauer had lived in hiding until he was arrested, together with his wife, in the crackdown raids that followed July 20, 1944. He was interned in Brauweiler near Cologne, one of the first concentration camps and later in a secret police (Gestapo) prison. Having suffered himself, Adenauer did not have much empathy for victims and felt entitled to a policy of forgetting and forgiving; Hermann Daners and Josef Wißkirchen, *Was in*

Brauweiler geschah. Die NS-Zeit und ihre Folgen in der Rheinischen Provinzial-Arbeitsanstalt (Pulheim: Verein für Geschichte, 2006), pp. 93–95.

3. Rainer Blasius, "Der gute Wille muss auch anerkannt werden," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 11, 2009, 60, p. L21 (my translations).

4. *Official Journal of the European Union*, January 27, 2005, http://www.eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2005:253E:0037:0039:DE:PDF (accessed January 2, 2013). In the same year, Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, joined the initiative and declared January 27 an annual commemoration day for the victims of the Holocaust.

5. Jens Kroh, *Transnationale Erinnerung. Der Holocaust im Fokus geschichtspolitischer Initiativen* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2008). In 2012 the ITF was renamed the "International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance" (IHRA) and the websites were changed accordingly. The new logo was devised by Daniel Liebeskind.

6. "Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust," *Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research*, http://www.holocausttaskforce.org/about-the-itf/stockholm-declaration.html (accessed January 15, 2013).

7. Dan Diner, for instance, has opposed most emphatically such a comparison and has disqualified any such attempt as a priori ideologically warped. He suspects that such a comparison is not immune to the hidden agenda of proving that "Stalin's crimes are more reprehensible than those of the Nazis"; Dan Diner, *Kreisläufe. Nationalsozialismus und Gedächtnis* (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1995), p. 53. See also Heidemarie Uhl, who still sees these two memories as incompatible: "Konkurrierende Erinnerungskulturen in Europa: Neue Grenzen zwischen 'Ost' und 'West'?" in *Kulturen der Differenz – Transformationsprozesse in Zentraleuropa nach 1989. Transdisziplinäre Perspektiven*, ed. by Heinz Fassmann, Wolfgang Müller-Funk, and Heidemarie Uhl (Göttingen: Vienna University Press, 2009), pp. 165–77; and Stefan Troebst, "Jalta versus Stalingrad, GULag versus Holocaust. Konfligierende Erinnerungskulturen im größeren Europa," *Berliner Journal für Soziologie*, 15.3 (2005), 381–400.

8. Quoted from an email by Pavel Tychel, received March 7, 2011.

9. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prague_Declaration_on_European_Conscience_and_Communism (accessed February 14, 2012).

10. Uhl, "Konkurrierende Erinnerungskulturen in Europa," p. 172–73; and Meike Wulf, "Changing Memory Regimes in a New Europe," *East European Memory Studies*, 7 (November 2011), 15–20. Wulf focuses on the interaction of political and social memory in the Baltic States and Poland after 1989/91. She describes these East European memories as a combination of a martyrological "narrative of collective suffering" and a heroic "narrative of collective resistance." These highly ideologized narratives make it difficult to acknowledge acts of collaboration and to include also the victims of these collaborations into the national memory.

11. Jie-Hyun Lim introduced in this context the term "victimhood nationalism"; see his essay "Victimhood Nationalism in Contested Memories: National Mourning and Global Accountability," in *Memory in a Global*

Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories, ed. by Aleida Assmann and Sebastian Conrad (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 138–62.

12. Zuzanna Bogumił, "Cross or Stone? Gulag Commemoration Practices on the Territory of the former Soviet Camps" (unpublished manuscript, 2011). See also Zuzanna Bogumił, "Crosses and Stones: Symbols of Solovki in the Construction of Memory of the GULAG," trans. Simon Lewis, http://www.memoryatwar.org/pdf/Bogumil-NZ-71-eng.pdf (accessed January 15, 2013); Russian original published in *Neprikosnovennyi zapas* 3 (2010) and available at http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/2010/3/zu3.html. The most important monument of this memory is the Solovetsky stone that was transferred from the site of an infamous camp on the Solovetsky Islands in northern Russia to Moscow to commemorate the inmates of the forced labor camps; see Ekaterina Makhotina, "Vergangenheitsdiskurse zur Sowjetzeit in Russland und Litauen nach 1989," in *Erinnerung und Gesellschaft. Formen der Aufarbeitung von Diktaturen in Europa*, ed. by Wolfgang R. Assmann and Abrecht Graf von Kalnein (Berlin: Metropol, 2011), pp. 195–222 (p. 208). While there are over one thousand monuments and memorial plaques to the Gulag and terror victims across the former Soviet Union, the vast majority of these were erected at the initiative of individuals or civil society groups, or local and (more rarely) regional authorities; the Katyn memorial is exceptional in holding federal status; see further Alexander Etkind, Rory Finnin, Uilleam Blacker, Julie Fedor, Simon Lewis, Maria Mälksoo, and Matilda Mroz*, Remembering Katyn* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), p. 115. Russia still lacks a national memorial to victims of Soviet repressions.

13. Janusz Reiter, "Geteilte Erinnerung in vereinten Europa," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 7, 2005.

14. Tony Judt, *Geschichte Europas von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich and Vienna: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2006), p. 962.

15. Bernd Faulenbach, "Probleme des Umgangs mit der Vergangenheit im vereinten Deutschland. Zur Gegenwartsbedeutung der jüngsten Geschichte," in *Deutschland. Eine Nation – doppelte Geschichte. Materialien zum deutschen Selbstverständnis*, ed. by Werner Weidenfeld (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1993), p. 190.

16. See introduction to this volume.

17. Heike Karge, "Practices and Politics of Second World War Remembrance. (Trans-)National Perspectives from Eastern and South-Eastern Europe," in *A European Memory? Contested Histories and Politics of Remembrance*, ed. by Małgorzata Pakier and Bo Strath (Oxford and New York: Berghahn, 2010), pp. 137–46 (p. 139).

18. Kevin M. F. Platt has interpreted the dropping of Stalin's crimes from the Russian public agenda not as an act of "forced forgetfulness" but as "a disavowal of trauma." He further describes the compliance of Russians in averting "their eyes from the known violence and injustice of Russian history" as "a mass ritual." According to Platt, the Russian population shares a "chosen trauma" "that helps to cement together a community of sufferers, victims, and witnesses of that violence." Mass disavowal thus deepens a sense of national selfhood through collective suffering "in a ritual act of

self-subjugation to the collectivity"; Kevin M. F. Platt, "Trauma and Social Discipline: Text, Subject, Memory and Forgetting" (unpublished manuscript, 2011). The frame of this interpretation is a collectivism that has no place for individual suffering, mourning and a sense of retrospective justice.

19. Makhotina, "Vergangenheitsdiskurse," p. 196. This essay provides a very differentiated picture of the Russian memory of Stalin.

20. Bogumił, "Cross or Stone?," p. 12.

21. It should be added that this Western memory of the Holocaust is presented almost exclusively from the point of view of the "liberated". When we look at Internet sites and other popular presentations, the "liberators" are referred to rather indistinctly as "the Red Army" or "the Soviets" without ever being individualized. If we are interested in hearing personal accounts of the liberating side, we must access the website of the new Russian Holocaust Museum. Here we can find the name of General Vasily Petrenko, who wrote a book about the liberation of Auschwitz at the beginning of 1945. As it is, the memory of January 27, 1945, is being couched in a narrative without heroes. My hunch is that had the liberator not been the Red Army, we would know much more about these historical heroes. This is yet another instance of asymmetries in European memory.

22. Diner, *Kreisläufe*, p. 58.

23. Till Spanke and Cornelius Schwärzler, "The Russian Research and Educational Holocaust Center," *East European Memory Studies* 5 (May 2011), 14, http://www.memoryatwar.org/enewsletter-may-2011.pdf (accessed January 31, 2013).

24. "Russia to Build Holocaust Museum; Israel to Erect Memorial to Soviet Army," *World Jewish Congress*, February 17, 2010, http://www.worldjewish congress.org/en/news/8985/russia_to_build_holocaust_museum_israel _to_erect_memorial_to_soviet_army (accessed February 20, 2012).

25. See introduction to this volume.