"There was a Problem, and it was Solved!": Legitimating the Expulsion of `Illegal' Migrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse

2 authors:

Luisa Martín Rojo
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
119 PUBLICATIONS **2,135** CITATIONS

Teun A. van Dijk
University Pompeu Fabra
247 PUBLICATIONS **39,485** CITATIONS

Discourse & Society

"There was a Problem, and it was Solved!": Legitimating the Expulsion of `Illegal' Migrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse

Luisa Martín Rojo and Teun A. van Dijk

The online version of this article can be found at:
http://das.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/4/523

Additional services and information for *Discourse & Society* can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://das.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Subscriptions: http://das.sagepub.com/subscriptions

Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

Citations (this article cites 6 articles hosted on the
SAGE Journals Online and HighWire Press platforms):
http://das.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/8/4/523#BIBL

DⓊS

"There was a problem, and it was solved!": legitimating the expulsion of 'illegal' migrants in Spanish parliamentary discourse

Luisa Martín Rojo
UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DE MADRID

and Teun A. van Dijk
UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM

ABSTRACT. In this article we examine some discursive aspects of political legitimation by analyzing the speech of the Spanish Secretary of the Interior, Mayor Oreja, on the occasion of a military-style expulsion of a group of African 'illegal' migrants from Melilla—the Spanish enclave in Morocco—in the summer of 1996. After a theoretical analysis of legitimation, we study three levels of legitimation: (a) pragmatic: various strategies of the justification of controversial official actions; (b) semantic: the ways a discourse represents its partisan view of the events or properties of actors as 'true' or as the 'facts'; and (c) sociopolitical: the way official discourse self-legitimates itself as authoritative and delegitimates alternative discourses. For these various aspects of legitimation, several levels of discursive structure (style, grammar, rhetoric, semantic moves, etc.) are examined in some detail.

KEY WORDS: expulsion, 'illegal aliens', legitimation, migration, parliamentary debate, political discourse, racism, Spain.

1. INTRODUCTION AND AIMS

In the summer of 1996, in Melilla (the Spanish enclave in Morocco), a few dozen undocumented migrants from various sub-Saharan countries protested against their miserable conditions. With sticks and stones they marched to the office of the local Spanish government and demanded to be heard. When ensuing talks remained without results and the migrants kept up their protests, the Spanish authorities reacted by transporting the group to mainland Spain and incarcerating them in Málaga, followed by the forced expulsion of 103 'illegals' to several African countries. Aboard the military planes used for this exceptional operation, several migrants were kept quiet with drugged water.

The national and international outcry against the expulsion was enormous. The Spanish Secretary of the Interior, responsible for the operation, Mr Mayor Oreja, had to defend himself in the Committee of Justice and the Interior of the Spanish parliament (the Cortes). Prime Minister Aznar of the conservative Popular Party (which had just come to power) seemed hardly perturbed by the critique. He simply reacted by saying: 'There was a problem, and it was solved'.

In this paper, we analyze some properties of the discourse of Secretary Mayor Oreja. This analysis is conducted within the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and as a contribution to the study of the prevalent European discourse of immigration, ethnic affairs, xenophobia and racism. More specifically, we focus on the structures and strategies of *legitimation* and their role both in the political process in general, and within political (parliamentary) discourse and interaction, in particular. We demonstrate how routine procedures of the State in the management of a crisis (e.g. a challenge to its legitimacy) are expressed in justificatory political talk. We thus show how, after having 'solved' an immigration 'problem', the authorities were also able to solve a discursive and sociopolitical problem: to silence or delegitimate their critics, to persuade the (socialist) opposition and thus to obtain parliamentary support for what many saw as the violation of the human rights of migrants.

Political power and legitimacy are permanently at risk. They may be challenged by political opponents, by civil institutions, such as the media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as by the population at large. In such a crisis, acts of legitimation are crucial. Also in this case, both these challenges and the ensuing legitimation are largely discursive, and hence in need of detailed discursive analysis. Such discursive legitimation has its function within a broader, social and political, process of legitimation, in which the institutions of power, the State, the law, shared values and the social order are at stake.

The discursive and political strategies of legitimation have many dimensions, only some of which can be dealt with in this paper. One of these dimensions may be termed the 'struggle over accounts', i.e. the way the authority of the State is employed in defining and justifying the 'facts' in opposition to the critical accounts of migrants and their representatives. Another dimension is the involvement of the different players (speakers) in this game of the 'political field', both in parliament as well as in Spanish (and even European) society at large.

Thus, the sociopolitical and discursive act of legitimation may be analyzed at least at the following levels—as legitimating (a) the controversial *action itself* (the expulsion); (b) the subjective or partisan description or *representation* or *version* of that action and its actors as truthful and reliable (against the versions of, e.g. the media and NGOs); and (c) the very ministerial *discourse* (as appropriate and authoritative, thereby delegitimating alternative discourses) that accomplishes (a) and (b). We might call these three levels the pragmatic, the semantic and the sociopolitical levels of legitimation.

At least implicitly, Secretary Mayor Oreja addresses norms and values, his rights and duties as responsible Secretary, the relevance of immigration law, routines and standard procedures, and several other aspects of the moral, normative, social and political order. Because of space limitations, however, these *foundations* of the discourse of legitimation and its role in democratic society and the moral order are only touched upon briefly (see, e.g. Habermas, 1975, 1996). They need to be dealt with in a more detailed study. We are also brief about the relevant political context: current immigration and immigration policies, as well as xenophobia and racism in Spain and Europe, which have received extensive attention elsewhere.

This paper especially aims to contribute to our insight into the discursive structures and strategies of legitimation and their social and political functions in general, and their role in the reproduction of State power and ethnic domination in western European societies in particular. Within the broader framework of CDA (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Van Dijk, 1993b), it thus also intends to stimulate a more theoretical and analytical approach in the study of political discourse (for relevant earlier work on political discourse that has informed this paper, see, e.g. Carbó, 1995; Cederberg, 1993; Chilton, 1985, 1990, 1995; Connolly, 1983; Fairclough, 1989, 1995a, 1995b; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Gamson, 1992; Geis, 1987; Wilson, 1990; Wodak, 1989; Wodak and Menz, 1990; for an introduction and overview of political discourse analysis, see Chilton and Schäffner, 1997).

2. THE SOCIOPOLITICAL CONTEXT: MIGRATION

The broader context of these events in Spain is constituted by the migration to Europe of people from various African, Asian, Caribbean and Latin-American countries (Castles, 1984; Castles & Miller, 1993; Solomos & Wrench, 1993; Wieviorka, 1994). After World War II, 'guest workers' from Mediterranean countries (including Spain itself) were invited to help reconstruct the booming post-war economies of north-western Europe. At the same time, decolonization and independence generated a flow of citizens from former colonies to Great Britain, France, The Netherlands and Belgium.

When in the 1970s western European economies showed signs of diminishing growth, and increasing numbers of these migrants lost their jobs or could not find work at all, immigration patterns and policies drastically changed. While people kept coming within the framework of family reunification, official policies to hire foreign workers were discontinued. Soon increasingly harsh measures were taken to stop what was seen as an 'invasion' of foreigners and citizens of former colonies.

At the same time, in the mid-1980s, political events in several countries in Africa and Asia added a growing number of refugees to the many who kept coming to Europe. Soon redefining such refugees as 'economic' refugees, most western-European governments, supported by intensifying

popular resentment (which was partly orchestrated by official discourses and exclusionary policies), started to close their borders, to reduce services or to take other measures to dissuade potential migrants.

However, driven by violence, political oppression and poverty in their home countries, large numbers of people kept trying to enter, often without documents, the countries of a European Union (EU) that is now often regarded as 'Fortress Europe'. Exacerbated by the sometimes spectacular growth of racist groups and political parties at the extreme right, policies in the 1990s in western Europe are largely focused on identifying and expelling those who are now routinely criminalized in terms of 'illegal aliens'. Similar developments take place in the US and Canada.

Migration to Spain

Only several decades ago, poverty in southern Europe contributed to labor migration of many people from Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal to the countries of the North, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. Growing prosperity, first in Italy and then in post-Franco Spain, however, turned these countries from emigrant-sending to migrant-receiving countries. Being part of the EU, and obliged to apply EU anti-immigration measures (e.g. in the framework of the Schengen Agreement), Spain began to stem the growing numbers of refugees and other migrants, mostly from sub-Saharan countries. At the same time, immigration from the Spanish Caribbean (such as the Dominican Republic) and Latin America was severely curbed, despite the linguistic and cultural bonds that had always existed with the former colonies. Being an important port of entry, and the crucial southern 'wall' of Fortress Europe, Spain thus sought to enact its role as a reliable EU partner. In 1985 the Spanish government of socialist Prime Minister Felipe González adopted what is commonly known as the 'Ley de Estranjería', regulating these forms of restricted immigration, as well as the expulsion of 'illegals' (the law has been modified several times since 1985).

Though as yet less explicitly so when compared to the rest of the EU, such restrictive immigration policies were supported by increasing xenophobia among the Spanish population (Martín Rojo et al., 1994). The racist assassination in Madrid of a Dominican woman, Lucrecia Pérez, shocked both the authorities and the rest of the Spanish into the realization that even Spain was not immune to the nationalism, ethnocentrism and racism that were fast spreading in the rest of the EU. Since then, despite the general acknowledgement and awareness of a recent past of emigration and of the multiethnic and multicultural roots of the Spanish population, other xenophobic acts have taken place, especially in areas such as the Maresme, the hills close to Madrid or Almeria, which are the most common destinations of foreign workers (Contreras, 1994; Giménez Romero, 1993; Martín Rojo et al., 1994; Solé and Herrera, 1991).

One complication in the policing of its own and its European borders is that Spain has two enclaves, Melilla and Ceuta, in North Africa, surrounded by Morocco. Thus, besides the 'wetbacks' who at their own peril and for

high fees try to cross the dangerous waters of the Straits of Gibraltar in shaky boats ('pateras'), there are considerable numbers of Africans who try their luck to enter and remain in Melilla and Ceuta, and thus hope to be able to enter mainland Spain and Europe through these advanced 'posts' of the EU. Since the infrastructure and reception facilities in Melilla and Ceuta are grossly inadequate for receiving many migrants, tensions among nationals from different countries, sometimes rise high.

The debate in the Spanish Cortes about the forced expulsion of 103 Africans takes place in this European and Spanish context, and against the background of increasingly harsh policies against immigration and even harsher practices against 'illegals' throughout the EU. It is precisely this 'established' political practice, as well as its legal foundation in international agreements and national laws that are used as the major form of legitimation of this expulsion. Indeed, the Secretary of the Interior, as we show later, could simply claim that what he did was normal practice, within the law, and necessitated by Spanish adherence to the Schengen Treaty and other EU policies.

In order to understand how this expulsion could have led to a political crisis, we must bear in mind other aspects of the Spanish political context that contributed to the seriousness of this case as it was experienced in Spain. For the first time since the restoration of democracy, the conservative party had just come to power (Cotarelo, 1992; López Nieto, 1988; Mínguez González, 1990). The socialist defeat, after 12 years in power, was less dramatic than expected, and the socialists now constitute a strong 'opposition group' in the Spanish parliament. The conservative party had been suspected of having ideological and political links and affinities with the Spanish dictatorial past (Calero, 1985). If, once in power, these suspicions turned out to be confirmed, the party could become illegitimate and discredited as an authorized participant in the democratic system. This is why an essential part of the conservative election campaign had as its main aim the denial of the suspected affinity with the past. Thus, the first governmental intervention regarding immigration—a subject which can easily reveal racist and anti-democratic ideology—was closely watched by the opposition and Spanish society at large. Hence, Secretary Mayor Oreja had to prove that the expulsion of 'illegal' migrants was no different from similar practices by the former socialist and other democratic governments in Europe. Thus, the political predicament facing the present conservative government has its roots not only in the alleged transgression of the law, and the breach of human rights, but also in the threatening resurgence of an undemocratic past (for a linguistic study of the Spanish Right, see, e.g. Fernández Lagunilla, 1986).

3. LEGITIMATION

Since acts of legitimation are virtually always discursive, it is theoretically rather limited to talk about legitimation without considering its linguistic,

discursive, communicative or interactional characteristics. However, let us make a few general observations about legitimation as a sociopolitical act before focusing on the discourse of legitimation. Of course, this kind of abstraction from the details of interaction is quite common in sociology and political science, although contemporary micro-sociology makes a point of emphasizing precisely the relevance, also for our understanding of social life, of this micro-level analysis.

The crucial element in most forms of social and political legitimation is that a powerful group or institution (often the State, the government, the rulers, the elites) seeks *normative approval* for its policies or actions. It does so through strategies that aim to show that such actions are consistent with the *moral order* of society, that is, within the system of laws, norms, agreements or aims agreed upon by (the majority of) the citizens.

Relevant to our analysis is that the sociopolitical act of legitimation is usually accomplished by persuasive (and sometimes manipulative) *discourse*. In such legitimating discourse, institutional actions and policies are typically described as beneficial for the group or society as a whole, whereas morally reprehensible or otherwise controversial actions are ignored, obfuscated or reinterpreted as being acceptable. Or, at least, such actions are justified as morally or politically defensible in the 'present circumstances', e.g. during a crisis or an external threat. This may for instance be the case for policies of immigration restriction and even forceful expulsions of 'illegals', presented as a 'necessary' response to the 'massive' arrival of Others.

If successful, legitimation not only implies the endorsement of specific actions, but usually also extends to the dominant group or institutions themselves, as well as to their position and leadership. This means that legitimation has both a top–down and a bottom–up direction: the (dominant) group or institution seeking to legitimate itself through approval from the dominated, and the dominated group legitimating the dominant group or institution through various forms of more or less active agreement, acceptance, compliance or at least tacit consent.

In the case of the speech of Secretary Mayor Oreja we find an example of the first kind: the Spanish Government seeking parliamentary support as well as broader social acceptance (e.g. from the media and NGOs) for an act of expulsion and for its immigration policies more generally. As is generally the case, such an attempt is especially necessary when the legitimacy of the powerful group has been threatened by opponent acts of delegitimation, in this case accusations of having violated the human rights of migrants, and hence of having violated the law or the moral order. Legitimation, thus, is mostly relevant in contexts of controversial actions, accusations, doubts, critique or conflicts over group relations, domination and leadership.

The Secretary obviously does not accept such a delegitimating judgment from his political opponents and the media. In this struggle over different interpretations of the 'facts' and the application of the norms of the moral order, he primarily emphasizes the *legality* of his actions. Although legality

and legitimacy are obviously not the same (Vernengo, 1992), he thus counters attempts at delegitimation by appealing to the rule of law, the democratic order, and hence to the legitimacy of all government actions that the law permits or prescribes. What remains, however, is for him to show that not only are policies and actions such as the expulsion of (what he describes as) 'illegal' migrants legal, but also that they have been *executed* within the boundaries of the moral order. In order to invalidate the accusations, and to re-legitimate his actions and own position, he therefore also needs to emphasize that all actions which constitute the expulsion have been carried out following correct procedures.

Whereas in our example we especially examine the top–down direction of legitimation, much of the social science literature deals with its bottom–up aspect: why do people in a subordinate position often accept the status quo? Why do many people often accept or condone—and thus legitimate—inequality, domination or power abuse by one group? One explanation is given in terms of *equity* (Della Fave, 1980, 1986). This involves people's evaluation of themselves and others, and the perception of differential contributions to society: people often accept that what they get (e.g. access to material or symbolic resources) is what they deserve. In other words, what is seen to be the case is often interpreted as just, and hence as a normative ground for compliance.

However, the standards by which people measure their performance are often established by the elites, e.g. legislators, teachers, or superiors. We may expect such standards therefore to be in the best interests of these elites (classes, organizations) themselves. Despite occasional resentment, and eventually the development of counter-norms and resistance by dominated groups, social stratification may be legitimated (top–down as well as bottom–up) by strategies of hegemony, and other ways to manage the minds of people so that they see no realistic alternative to the status quo. In our case such a strategy appears in that Secretary Mayor Oreja, addressing the parliamentary opposition, emphasizes the shared responsibility for immigration legislation, and hence for the need of consensus.

However, as is also the case in the present context, the State's or the government's legitimation may be challenged, within or outside of parliament, and may even be lost. Indeed, a more general 'legitimation crisis' might be observed in contemporary society (Connolly, 1987; Habermas, 1975). Connolly argues that, as institutional practices are partially constituted by shared concepts and beliefs, the loss of identification with these institutional practices on the part of the majority of participants in the institution (i.e. the opposition), and on the part of the majority of the people, will weaken their adherence and allegiance (Connolly 1987: 61–4). Controversies over rules and social obligations, and even movements of opposition, can then proliferate. Loss of identification may even affect such institutional practices and lead to 'the erosion of institutional legitimacy, the indeterminacy of institution norms, the depletion of need motives, and the deterioration of institutional performance' (Connolly, 1987: 62).

4. DISCOURSE AND LEGITIMATION

Considering this struggle between legitimation and delegitimation, and the situation of crisis in Spain, the aims of the Secretary's speech become clear. The extra-ordinary circumstances (also in Mayor Oreja's own definition of the situation as being 'particular') demand a special kind of discourse. His speech should be able to (re)legitimate a criticized institutional practice, re-establish consensus, and avoid disenchantment with the institution (particularly with the government) and its goals.

To achieve these aims, the Secretary should attend to more than the functional pragmatics of his speech, that is, do more than merely explain or justify a controversial operation. In addition, the semantics of his discourse, i.e. the cognitive-discursive *representation* of the events as the (true) 'facts' should be legitimated and thus neutralize alternative 'versions' of the events (for the nature of 'versions' and 'descriptions', see Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996). Obviously, such a representation is functional with respect to the pragmatics of justification. For instance, it is easier to justify expulsion if those expelled are defined and represented as 'illegal' and 'violent' rather than as 'refugees'.

Besides these discursive (pragmatic and semantic) dimensions of legitimation, Mayor Oreja should also emphasize the sociopolitical and legal legitimacy of the current speech event as a whole, i.e. by highlighting its authoritative source and formal context. It is an official, institutional discourse, produced by a person who, given his professional role and duties, is authorized (and formally requested) to make a declaration in an official session of a parliamentary committee. These properties of the institutional political context (parliamentary setting, circumstances, participants, roles, aims, etc.) define the *authority* of this discourse, which in turn influences its political, social and symbolic efficacy.

Theoretically relevant for this paper is the complex interplay of the discursive and sociopolitical dimensions of legitimation. Justificatory discourse can only have a legitimating function if several contextual factors are satisfied, such as power and authority of the speaker, institutional setting, etc. However, such sociopolitical legitimacy may be lost in the struggles of the political domain, so that re-legitimating discourses are necessary to re-establish imperiled authority. In other words, our analysis provides an understanding of the relations between the micro and macro dimensions of legitimation.

Thus, the (1) institutional authority of his discourse sustains the (2) truth and credibility of his representation or version of the events, which in turn supports (3) the justification of the operation. It is the interaction of these three global strategies that defines the overall nature of the legitimation process which Mayor Oreja engages in within the current context. In fact, *two* types of context are involved here: a local or specific one constituted by the current events (the expulsion, protests by the media and the NGOs, the Secretary's appearance, etc.), and a global or structural one, constituted by ministerial authority, the Spanish political system, the law, agreements with

the EU, and democratic rules and procedures in general. The elements of these contexts are both indexed and reproduced by Mayor Oreja's speech: the power and status hierarchy of all participants, both in parliament and in society at large, in many ways condition the legitimacy of the speech. At the same time the speaker, invested with his authority as Secretary and as representative of the government, seeks to enhance the relevant power differences by discrediting his opponents and their discourses, in addition to other strategies. By thus delegitimating his opponents through the discursive strategies that authoritatively establish truth and falsity, the Secretary also monopolizes the truth.

We may speak of a legitimation crisis when (repeated) failure of legitimating discourse in the local context threatens the conditions of legitimation in the global context, and hence the symbolic efficacy of institutional discourse (Habermas, 1975). That is, official, constitutional legitimacy is vulnerable. In the more concrete terms of the present political situation in Spain this means that unless Mayor Oreja is able to reach a consensus, or to manufacture the consent of his political opponents, the current events put the conservative government at risk. In order to understand this property of the politics of legitimation, let us examine the structures of the discourse that enacts such attempts at legitimation.

The structures and functions of legitimation discourse

Legitimation is not, as such, an illocutionary act in the classical sense. Thus, unlike accusations, it is not (merely) defined in terms of conventional appropriateness conditions. Self-legitimation may be accomplished *by* various speech acts, such as assertions, questions, reproaches or counter-accusations. It may involve a complex discourse, as is the case in Secretary Mayor Oreja's speech in the Cortes Committee. Legitimation may also be accomplished by other social or political acts and events, such as elections, and is therefore not a speech act. In other words, although mostly done with words, legitimation as such is a higher level sociopolitical act. When we speak about 'legitimating discourse', this is short for 'sociopolitical legitimation accomplished by discourse'.

Pragmatically, discursive macro-acts of legitimation have the following overall appropriateness conditions: (1) Speaker (S) did A; (2) (S believes that) Hearer (H) does or may think that A was wrong; (3) S believes that A was not wrong. These pragmatic conditions are similar to those of the discursive act of defending oneself following the speech act of an accusation. A related speech act is that of denial, in which the speaker either asserts not to have done A, or at least not to have done or intended A in the way described in the accusation (for further analysis of such political denials, also in relation to immigration, see Van Dijk, 1992).

Semantically, legitimating discourse presupposes or explicitly refers to past action(s) of the speaker/actor or of others for whom the speaker takes responsibility or for whom he or she acts as representative. This means that we may expect more or less extensive descriptions of such actions, as we see

in the speech of Mayor Oreja. Furthermore, we may expect arguments that express opinions of the speaker/actor about why the action, *as described by him or her*, is/was not wrong. It is therefore crucial for the speaker that his or her *version* of the actions or events be accepted, which in turn also requires adequate stylistic (e.g. lexical) formulation of the description.

Schematically (superstructurally), the propositions of legitimation discourse are usually organized by a complex argumentative schema, with premises that pertain to the nature of the action, and conclusions that pertain to its social, moral or political acceptability.

Stylistically and *rhetorically*, the description of questionable actions and their reasons emphasize the opinion of the speaker that the action was acceptable. Whereas previous accusations may describe the actions in negative terms, legitimating discourse tends to describe the actions in neutral or positive terms or by rhetorical means that emphasize the acceptability or de-emphasize the problematic nature of the action, for instance by euphemisms or positive metaphors.

Interactionally, legitimation usually follows or expects explicit critique or accusations by others. One of its socio-cognitive functions in the interaction is to persuade co-participants or observers that the action was acceptable. Interactionally, thus, legitimation usually has two main moves: preventing, dispelling or discrediting negative opinions, and changing these in neutral or positive opinions about some action.

Socially, legitimating discourse presupposes accusations of, or doubts about whether the social or cultural norms, values or more generally the moral order are breached by the action. Accusations express opinions, and not (only) statements of facts. Challenging such opinions in a legitimating argument similarly consists of expressed opinions—about the reasons or grounds why the action was acceptable. In other words, legitimation implies that speakers/actors consider themselves to be competent and morally upright members of the social order (or the group or the institution involved).

Mr Mayor Oreja's speech, however, is not just any type of everyday legitimation, but a political speech in a specific, parliamentary and democratic context, and therefore has special, *political*, conditions, implications and consequences. Given the protests by the media, NGOs and the public, the expulsion was not (seen as) a form of unproblematic, routine action. On the contrary, it had become a major political issue, implying many and serious accusations, ranging from the violation of the law and human rights to racism. Hence, when this issue was debated in the parliamentary committee for the Interior and Justice, the responsible Secretary of the Interior felt politically and maybe morally obliged to respond to these reactions as well as to possible questions and accusations of members of parliament. In other words, the global *interactional sequence* of which this legitimation is part is itself a public, institutional event that forms part of the democratic process. This context and this sequence (and its ultimate, political goal) provide the appropriateness conditions of legitimating discourse.

This implies that the structures and strategies of legitimating discourse

should be studied also, if not primarily, as a function of this ultimate politi-
cal goal, i.e. to manage a problem of political legitimacy. Politically, Mayor
Oreja's actions as well as his arguments may be challenged in such an analy-
sis, as might also be expected from his opponents inside or outside of par-
liament. Our more special task in this paper is to assess the detailed
properties of the legitimating discursive act itself, e.g. as an explicit con-
dition for political critique of the (discursive and other) policies and prac-
tices of immigration control in Spain and the EU.

The 'grammar' of legitimation

Theo van Leeuwen (1995) developed some elements of what he calls a
'grammar of legitimation', based on four major legitimation categories:

- authorization (based on the authority of tradition, custom, law
  or persons with authority)
- rationalization (the utility of institutional action and its cognitive
  validity in accepted knowledge)
- moral evaluation (based on norms)
- mytho-poiesis (legitimation conveyed through narrative).

Each of these general categories is further specified. Thus authorization
may be based on custom (conformity and tradition), impersonal or per-
sonal authority, or expertise (leader/role models). Similarly, rationalization
may involve a specification of purpose, functions, strategies, effectiveness,
scientific arguments, and so on. Moral evaluation in turn may involve mor-
alization (by abstraction or comparison), evaluation and naturalization.
And finally, mytho-poiesis, according to Van Leeuwen, involves telling
stories about what good or bad may happen when one does (not) do what
is expected.

  We show that many properties of Mayor Oreja's speech fit in these cat-
egories of legitimation. Note that this whole system is set up as a schema
that organizes (good) reasons for action, that is, part of the normative
order: *How shall/must I act and why ... ?* Such reasons may of course be in-
ternalized by group members and then be used in motivations for future ac-
tions or as justifications of past actions, as in the case of Mayor Oreja's
justification of the expulsion. On the other hand, legitimation may also be
persuasively communicated or imposed, e.g. as indications how group
members *should* act.

  In the following sections we study the processes of discursive legitima-
tion at the micro-level. This allows us to see how, through the speech event,
both authority and legitimacy are created and enforced within discourse
itself, and how they are negotiated and disputed between interlocutors.

5. LEGITIMATING INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES AND THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION OF THE EVENTS: MAYOR OREJA'S SPEECH

After our theoretical analysis of the various levels and dimensions of legitimation and its discourses, we begin with an account of the way Mayor Oreja tries to legitimate the controversial action of the expulsion itself. Pragmatically, this means that he engages in various strategies of justification, which are accomplished by semantic strategies that focus on contexts, causes and plausible reasons for the expulsion. For instance, by referring to the relevant law, he may emphasize that the actions were legal, and thus formulate a normative basis for their legitimation. Besides these semantic strategies that aim to re-integrate controversial actions within the normative order, the events need to be *described* in a way that sustains their legitimacy. For instance, some of their aspects may be emphasized, whereas others de-emphasized, e.g. by stylistic or rhetorical moves. At the same time these semantic, stylistic and rhetorical means of legitimation are intended to discredit alternative versions of the events.

The speech from which we quote fragments was given on 29 July 1996 and published in the *Cortes Generales. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados. Comisiones. Justicia e Interior* (1996, VI Legislature, no. 44, pp. 847–70). Its length is 46 columns (of 60 lines, totalling 8431 words, 1690 different words, without function words). It is followed by a debate (pp. 870–76) which is not analyzed here.

In the following sections, actual Spanish words used in the speech are marked by double quotes in our running text, or as displayed quotes, followed by English translations in italics where the meaning of Spanish words is not obvious to readers of English). English words in the text that are translations of Spanish words are in single quotes. We only give one or two typical examples of the various strategies and other discourse properties, although most strategies we study frequently occur throughout this speech. For reasons of space some strategies are described without giving relevant examples.

5.1. Semantic legitimation strategies

Legality. Given the present context (session of the Committee of the Interior and Justice), and given Mayor Oreja's function as Secretary of the Interior, the crucial condition of the political legitimation of official practices is that these are legal. Mayor Oreja is therefore at pains to refer to relevant laws and law paragraphs during his speech, and emphasizes that the expulsion was carried out 'strictly' according to these laws:

> **(1)**
> (...) medidas estas que se adoptan con el carácter de medidas gubernativas y en cumplimiento estricto de lo dispuesto en la Ley Orgánica Reguladora de los Derechos y Libertades de los Extranjeros en España, conocida habitualmente como Ley de Extranjería. (p. 848)

> (...) *these measures were taken as governmental measures and in strict accordance with the law (...) generally known as the Ley de Extranjería.*

Having defined the operation as an "expulsión" and as "devolución", ('sending back'), Mayor Oreja is able to declare the provisions of the law applicable to the actions, thus legitimating them in terms of the law, which precisely provides for such actions. Indeed, in another passage he emphasizes not only that the expulsion was legally possible, but even necessary ("obligatoria"), thereby implying that he had no alternative but to apply the law. He thus changes the focus of attention from a possibly controversial action and from his personal decisions to the 'objective' necessities of a democratically adopted law (for which the Socialist Party was responsible).

The Secretary goes beyond this immigration law, and also appeals to the Constitution and the Law that protects the security of its citizens—in which case he is obviously referring only to Spanish citizens, and excluding migrants from the category of citizens:

> **(2)**
> No hay que olvidar que, conforme a lo señalado en los artículos 149 y 104 de la Constitución y el artículo 1 de la Ley Orgánica de Protección de la Seguridad Ciudadana, corresponde al Gobierno, a través de sus autoridades y de las Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado, proteger y garantizar la seguridad ciudadana y remover los obstáculos que la impidan. (p. 848)
> *We must bear in mind that, according to articles 149 and 104 of the Spanish Constitution and article 1 of the Organic Law for the Protection of Public Safety, the Government, by means of the proper authorities and the Police Forces, is responsible for protecting and ensuring public safety, and for removing any obstacle there may be to such safety.*

This example shows that the expulsion was not only legal, but also benefiting 'the people', a well-known move in political rhetoric: the action was for the 'common good'. The strategy of appealing to these laws and articles may seem to further strengthen the legal basis of the Secretary's decisions. However, such a strategy is vulnerable, and requires much more freedom in the interpretation of these legal provisions. What the Secretary claims here is that he (or the government) has the right, if not the obligation, to do anything that protects the safety of the citizens. Such an interpretation first of all semantically presupposes that the safety of the (Spanish) citizens actually *was* seriously threatened in the first place. This presupposition could easily be challenged if we know that the apparent 'danger' consisted in an action of a few dozen, unarmed immigrants, in a Spanish enclave outside mainland Spain, and not directed against citizens but against the authorities themselves. In other words, this argument may be defeated by a counter-argument that claims that the Secretary is seriously exaggerating the danger. That is, the implications of his presupposition are that the Secretary in fact is saying that the State has the freedom to protect itself against the 'threat' of demonstrations, and, as he later suggests, against any actions that are defined as a breach of the public order.

Legal procedures. Closely associated to the claim that the expulsion was lawful, the Secretary also details what legal procedures were followed during the whole operation. He explains which judges took which decisions, which papers were signed by whom, which other lawyers were involved, and especially that the migrants were assisted by legal counsel, so that their human rights were respected:

> **(3)**
> Efectivamente, señorías, los inmigrantes estuvieron asistidos por el letra-do de oficio designado en el correspondiente turno por el Colegio de Abogados de Melilla, que trimestralmente procede a realizarse. (p. 849)
> *In effect, Honourable Members, the immigrants were assisted by the court-appointed lawyer on duty. The Lawyers Association makes these appointments every three months.*

We have seen that legality as such may be insufficient ground for legitimation. After all, a legally permitted action may be carried out in a way that does violate the law or other general norms. Thus, the Secretary needs to spell out that all relevant procedures that together define the macro-act of the expulsion were themselves legitimate. Indeed, as is the case in Extract (3), the procedures referred to are represented in positive terms (the 'immigrants' were 'assisted' by lawyers). Moreover, spelling out these details contributes to the rhetoric of truth, as all these actions can be checked by everyone.

Authorization. The reference to the involvement of legal authorities is in fact part of a more general strategy of authorization, that is, a series of moves that details how the various agencies of the State were deployed in correctly executing the action of the expulsion. By referring to these other participants, Mayor Oreja protects himself against his critics because they would also have to denounce a large number of, otherwise possibly credible and reputable, agencies and persons (such as lawyers, police officers, the military). At the same time, he assumes and accepts his responsibility and thereby both 'covers' for (and hence sanctions and legitimates with his own authority) all possible actions of the various agencies, while at the same time sharing possible blame with them if mistakes had been made. That is, if he is perceived to be legitimate and credible as the responsible Secretary of the Interior, such an evaluation should also be made of his subordinates and these State agencies. On the other hand, by attributing the execution of the expulsion to others, he in a way disassociates himself (and his office) from the possibly illegal or immoral aspects of the operation:

> **(4)**
> Quiero decir que la decisión sobre su uso y aplicación no partió directa-mente de las autoridades del Ministerio, sino que fue decidida por los re-sponsables policiales de la operación y, sin embargo, este Ministro asume tal decisión porque, además, tiene fundamento jurídico. (p. 851)
> *I would like to point out that the decision for the use and application [of this medicine] did not come directly from the ministerial authorities, but was decided by the police responsible for the operation. Nevertheless, this ministry gives full support to the decision because, after all, it has a legal basis.*

Normality and standing procedures. Focusing on the act of expulsion and the various procedures of its execution, one major political strategy of legitimation used by the Secretary is to emphasize that this operation was not in any way new, exceptional or otherwise merely his own initiative. The Secretary does this first by emphasizing that all actions of himself and the authorities are not only legal, but also standard procedures for the expulsion of 'illegal' migrants. Next, and politically even more relevant, he stresses that it is not the new government of the (conservative) Partido Popular that is responsible for these procedures, but that the socialist government under Felipe González had also acted in the same way. He thus avoids possible critique of the socialists, now in the opposition, that the present government applies harsher policies and practices against migrants. Thus, his claim that the present operation is nothing special and nothing new is a strong reminder for the members of the committee that they in fact share the responsibility for the action. Also in his description of the treatment of the migrants he uses the words 'habitual' and 'usual' to emphasize that the action was normal, and hence legitimate.

Consensus. Mayor Oreja makes one further step in his strategy to involve and hence to share responsibility with his political opponents: by claiming that there should be no difference of opinion at all when it comes to expelling 'illegal' aliens. This consensus strategy is not merely persuasive, but in fact the core of an attempt to establish attitudinal hegemony. If we all agree about this, then alternative opinions are simply not credible and acceptable. Indeed, any critique (by the media or NGOs) is thus placed outside of the moral order, and hence deemed to be deviant. Besides a political strategy of garnering parliamentary support, a consensus strategy may thus at the same time imply a broader, moral strategy. In several other passages of his speech the Secretary thus explicitly addresses the Opposition, implying that they were the ones that made the Ley de Extranjería, and therefore have to accept the consequences. Moreover, by emphasizing that 'we' all are part of the problem (of 'illegal') immigration, he also suggests that 'we all' have to contribute to its solution.

Comparison. A well-known move in several strategies of legitimation is that of comparison, that is, the claim that (legitimate) others have engaged in similar actions. In this case, as we have just suggested, this is primarily the case for the comparison of this action of the present, conservative government, with those of the previous, socialist government. As we show in our rhetorical analysis, such a comparison may make use of a metaphor, for instance when the Secretary insists that the actions of this government should not be examined with a microscope whereas those of the previous government were only looked at with a magnifying glass. The comparison thus also takes the form of a moral attack on his critics: they are unfair, while applying double standards. Finally, Mayor Oreja compares present policies in Spain with those by democratic governments elsewhere in Europe, and thus legitimates his actions by comparative reference to other

legitimate actors. At the same time such a comparison realizes the move of Necessity: EU law forces us to act the way we did.

Special circumstances, seriousness and threat. Thus having emphasized the normalcy of the expulsion of 'illegal' migrants, the regularity of the procedures, and the continuity and shared responsibility for current policies and practices, the Secretary nevertheless needs to legitimate his specific decision for *this* action. For instance the use of a drug, and the fastness of the operation, were most certainly not 'normal'. The standard move of legitimation for special cases is putting emphasis on special circumstances, e.g. the situation in Melilla:

> **(5)**
> Convendría, en primer lugar, antes de pasar a informar sobre los extremos de la operación en particular de Melilla, recordar que en Melilla concurren un conjunto de circunstancias que, sin duda, significan y denotan una situación de carácter singular, no sólo ya porque Melilla constituye un enclave singular sino también porque nos encontramos en un año singular, un aniversario singular y por ello, al margen de todas las consideraciones que se quieren hacer sobre política de inmigración (...) (p. 848)
> *Before addressing the issue of the particular operation in Melilla, we ought to remember that there is an exceptional combination of circumstances in Melilla—not only because Melilla is a place which is already exceptional in character, but because this is an exceptional year, an exceptional anniversary, and because of this, apart from any considerations which may be brought up with relation to immigration policy (...)*

The rhetorical repetition of "singular" in order to emphasize the special circumstances eliminates any residual blame that this government might have. If general policies of immigration and expulsion are based on national and EU law, and if the laws have been applied correctly, then any remaining irregularities should be blamed not on all participants or the authorities, but rather on the special situation. Since the migrants are largely seen and explicitly represented as being partly guilty of this situation, they may easily be blamed for the special measures of the government. In the same way, the Secretary blames the previous socialist government for having created this situation in Melilla, so that, again, the responsibility of the Opposition can be legitimally assessed, thereby again putting a dent in the Opposition's argument and credibility.

From the emphasis on 'special circumstances' to displaying a concern about the seriousness of a case, is but one step. Obviously, beside the semantics of such forms of exaggeration, we may also expect the usual rhetorical moves of hyperbolic presentation. What we are here dealing with was in fact an 'emergency', and Mayor Oreja thus refers to a situation of 'utmost gravity'. Emergency rhetoric is familiar in all kinds of political discourse, and well known especially in the legitimation of special measures, as is also the case for references to 'national security'.

The final step in such an account of the events is to represent the Others in terms of a *threat* to the public order or to Us, as is common in political and media discourse about migrants (Van Dijk, 1991, 1993a, 1997b, 1997c).

In such a situation, the government is even obliged to react in order to protect the citizens, which again shows the role of the move of Necessity in the arguments of Mayor Oreja, as already seen.

Carefulness. The circumstances may have been (defined as) serious and even threatening, and the expulsion may have been found necessary, but that does of course not give the authorities carte blanche to act as they please. As we have seen, not only the expulsion must be legitimated, but also the (exceptional) way it was being carried out. Therefore, it is essential that despite the legitimacy of the expulsion, the Secretary needs to emphasize that the operation was carried out 'very carefully' and competently, with due preparation, planning and with consideration to the relevant articles of the law. For instance, he emphasizes that the countries to which the migrants were sent back were carefully selected, according to their human rights record. Obviously, such an affirmation also underlines the democratic nature of the Spanish government, a move that is part of the overall strategy of positive self-presentation we encounter later. In the same way, the Secretary extensively legitimates the use of the sedative Haloperidol by emphasizing that it is generally described (also in the US) as a normal medicine, that it is innocent (while used for 'unruly' children), and that it was carefully administered.

Negative other-presentation and positive self-presentation. One of the pervasive strategies of ingroup–outgroup discourse, and hence also in this case, in which 'we' (the government, the authorities) are placed against an outgroup of migrants, is the negative characterization of the others. Although this discourse is not blatantly and explicitly racist, it is essential that the migrants are described in terms that legitimate their expulsion. Throughout the speech, thus, the migrants are systematically described as 'illegal', a common practice in both official and non-official discourse about migrants (Van Dijk, 1993a). Moreover, besides illegal entry, the migrants are accused of destroying their documents, and hence of no longer being 'identifiable'. Apart from the fact that they are thus characterized as having entered or stayed in the country illegally, or that they do not have the required documents, such a description also associates migrants with a violation of the law, and hence with crime. Such a form of transgression, however, does not justify a military operation, and hence the Others must be described as violent and aggressive (against us, but also among each other). In addition to the African migrants themselves, Mayor Oreja also negatively describes African countries (which did not want to accept those who were expelled) and organizations that helped the migrants. The Secretary further blames all those who, according to him, have caused the 'social alarm', as he calls it, such as the mass media as well as socialist politicians, whom he accuses of having exaggerated this case.

The logic of intergroup polarization that governs this discourse about Us and Them, not only requires emphasis on the alleged negative properties of the Others, but also stresses that We are essentially good. We have seen al-

ready that throughout the various legitimation strategies, this strategy of positive self-presentation has been accomplished by emphasizing the legal and careful nature of the operation, which is turn means that those responsible for the action cannot be blamed, and in fact should rather be praised. The same is true for the officials and institutions involved in the events:

> **(6)**
> [el juez y el fiscal] se personaron inmediatamente en la comisaría de policía, hacia las once horas de la mañana del viernes y cuya presencia garantizaba el cumplimiento de los distintos derechos previstos en las leyes. (p. 849)
> *[The judge and the public prosecutor] appeared immediately at the Police station at approximately 11:00am on Friday morning. Their presence ensured that the different legal rights were respected.*

The description of official action in this example goes far beyond an emphasis of legality, legal procedure and carefulness, but refers to the 'rights' of the arrested Africans, a description that is chosen in order to challenge and counter-balance accusations that their human rights were violated. In another example, Mayor Oreja even shows (apparent) sympathy with them—a well-known move—by representing them as the victims of criminals who take advantage of them by bringing them, for a high price, to Europe. Politically very relevant in the Spanish context and for a conservative government, is Mayor Oreja's repeated reference to his *democratic* credentials: a democratically adopted law has been applied, the legal rights of those arrested have been respected, and the migrants are expelled to democratic countries.

Concession and denial. A familiar form of rhetorical *captatio benevolentiae* is a minor concession and admission of not being perfect. Thus, after the many forms of legitimation, in which the operation has been described as legal, careful, democratic, and otherwise normal and acceptable, Mayor Oreja is prepared to recognize, several times, that the action was not exactly a 'model' of solving immigration problems:

> **(7)**
> Yo quiero dejar muy claro que no he venido a presentar una operación precisamente modélica. (p. 852)
> *I want to make it very clear that I did not come here to present what you might call a model operation.*

As is usual in such concessions, however, they tend to be mitigated in many ways, so that often they become 'apparent concessions', a familiar move in much anti-migrant discourse (as in 'There are some small racist parties, but on the whole we live in a very tolerant country') (Van Dijk, 1993a). Mayor Oreja thus mitigates his concession by emphasizing that a model operation could hardly be expected in the present circumstances and with the lacking infrastructures (indirectly blamed on the previous government).

It is not surprising that in a serious case like this, and having been the object of accusations in the media and by various organizations, concessions

should be accompanied by *denials*, as we have seen. Indeed, instead of legitimating an action that has been perceived as negative, one may begin by simply denying the allegations: no human rights were violated, the migrants were not drugged (but merely 'calmed' down), etc.

Politically more fundamental is that the government emphasizes that the current action has nothing to do with intolerance or racism, an (apparent) denial that is routine in anti-migrant discourse ('We are not racist, but ...').

> **(8)**
> (...) este Gobierno no quiere caracterizarse precisamente (...), por lo que viene a significar un discurso desde la intolerancia (...) (p. 868)
> *(...) this government does not want to be characterized (...) with what is increasingly called a discourse of intolerance ...*

Here, consensus is emphasized, the political orientation of the present government declared irrelevant and adherence to democratic principles declared to be taken for granted. Again, the fundamental conditions of legitimacy are stressed in this way. Addressing the socialist opposition, he claims that nothing has changed, and that current immigration and expulsion policies are the same as before.

Concluding remark. The semantic strategies of legitimation are closely related. Credibility (e.g. by adducing proof) is used to support truth, which in turn is used to legitimate the discourse of the Secretary, who again legitimates his actions. At the same time, proof is based on declarations of the authorities, and referring to their cooperation is itself part of the legitimation of the action. Positive self-presentation not only complements negative other-presentation, but overall covers truthfulness, carefulness, the observation of human rights and democratic principles and other strategies discussed earlier.

We see that three of the four legitimation categories identified by Van Leeuwen (1995) are present in the various semantic strategies of Mayor Oreja's speech: (i) authorization (legality, legal procedures, authorization, normality, standing procedures, positive self-presentation, etc.); (ii) moral evaluation (consensus, carefulness, democracy); and (iii) rationalization (special circumstances, necessity, threat, comparisons).

5.2. Constructing the official version of the events

After the overall, functional analysis of various legitimation strategies in the speech of Mayor Oreja, we now need to pay attention to the grammatical and other discursive structures of his legitimating discourse, such as lexical style, syntax, local semantic moves, rhetorical figures, argumentative strategies, and other properties of this speech. That is, not only *what* is being said about the operation is relevant in legitimation, but also *how* it is being said at several levels of expression. Whereas the semantic strategies studied focus on the events and their legal and moral justification, legitimation also requires a trustworthy formulation, that is, an official descrip-

tion or 'version' in terms of which such a discursive justification can be accepted.

This also means that the actual formulation of legitimation discourse contributes to its persuasive functions, that is, to the formation of preferred mental *models* (Van Dijk, 1987) about the operation, and more generally to preferred attitudes about this Government, among the recipients. Such discursive model-control may involve the construction of intended new models of the event, or of course the correction of the existing negative models (interpretations) of the events as they are expressed in the accusations leveled against Mayor Oreja by his opponents. That is, as we have seen, delegitimation may involve proof that the models of the opponents 'got their facts all wrong', or that erroneous opinions or other beliefs were derived from these facts. In other words, one aspect of legitimation discourse is to correct perceived bias of mental models, and such a correction may take place by a specific (stylistic, grammatical, rhetorical) formulation of the official version of the events.

Lexical style. Lexical style is an obvious but powerful way of expressing, conveying and influencing models and their opinions. In this speech words used to describe the actions and actors involved in the operation are chosen carefully—as a function of the underlying models Mayor Oreja chooses for his discourse about the events. Moreover, lexical choice is a function of the Secretary's context model of the current communicative event—the various contextual properties of the session of a Parliamentary committee (Van Dijk, 1997a). Both types of models feature Mayor Oreja's opinions about the operation, and about his parliamentary opponents, respectively.

Describing the outgroup. The first question that may be raised about the lexical style is what words are being used to describe the Others, i.e. the migrants. Analysis of the lexical frequency tables compiled for this text shows that the words "personas" (22), "extranjeros" (21) and "inmigrantes" (19) are used most frequently. These words are virtually only used in their plural form: no individual migrants are mentioned. Although different nationalities are being distinguished, the migrants are only perceived as a homogeneous group, and not as persons who possibly might have different reasons (and rights) for having come to Spain (e.g. as refugees), as is characteristic for the description of outgroups in general, and migrants in particular. Moreover, the choice of 'immigrant' (instead of 'emigrant') expresses 'our' perspective and not that of the people who left their own countries (Portolés, 1997; for the description of migrants in the Spanish press, see also Bañon Hernández, 1996; for the description of Others in the British and Dutch press as well as in other elite discourse, see Van Dijk, 1991, 1993a, 1997b, 1997c). Spain has just changed from a country that sent 'emigrants' to a country that receives (and expels) 'immigrants'. Indeed, in the Spanish media we may even find the use of 'immigrant' when referring to people who come to other countries of the EU, thus expressing a common, European perspective on people from outside the EU. Another out-

group, the African countries to which the migrants were expelled, are simply described in terms of "país(es)", the most frequent word of the speech (occurring 35 times), or by their name or capital.

Describing the ingroup. The ingroup of this speech—Mayor Oreja himself, the ministry and the authorities—are described without evaluative terms, and they are always 'functionalized' (Van Leeuwen, 1996)—in terms of "ministro" (10 times) (to describe himself, instead of "yo", 'I'), "ministerio" (16) and the designating expressions for the police (10), and other institutions and authorities of the state. As we show here, these forms of representation play a key role in the legitimation of discourse: through these forms, differences in authority and status are emphasized, and the authority of the institution is transferred to its representative and his discourse, while others are deprived of authority and social status.

Describing official actions. The main evaluative expressions that signal underlying opinions may be found in the descriptions of the actions of the ingroup and the outgroup. Thus, the action of the government is routinely described as an "expulsión" (12) as well as with the mitigating formal expression "devolución" ('sending back')(10). In addition, the various actions of the authorities during the events tend to be described in neutral, formal terms or in positive or legitimating terms: "se procede a la comprobación de la situación" ('proceed to an assessment of the situation'), "cumplimentar trámites" ('execute formalities'), "garantizar la seguridad ciudadana" ('guarantee safety for the citizens'), "inexcusable obligación de proceder" ('the inevitable obligation to proceed'), "cumplimiento de la ley" ('enforce the law'), "respetar la ley" ('respect the law'), and descriptions of various legal acts: "dictar autos" ('issue warrants'), "asistencia letrada" ('legal assistance'), etc.

The most frequent generic word used for the description of the expulsion is the military word 'operation' (used 18 times). Where coercive actions are being referred to, their descriptions usually do not imply the use of violence, as is the case for "devolución" ('sending back'), "ingresar" ('put in jail'), "distribuir" ('spread'), "trasladar" ('transfer'), or "suministrar" ('administer'). All these actions are evaluated as "métodos (*or* procedimientos) habituales" ('habitual methods or proceedings'). Officials are described as accomplishing their functions, and most of these words are typical of bureaucratic, legal or medical registers. Instead of 'state violence' we once find the formal and hence mitigating expression "fuerza coercitiva del Estado" ('the coercive force of the State'). Here is a typical example with these formal expressions referring to actions of the State:

> **(9)**
> Seguidamente se procedió a cumplimentar los posteriores trámites para la expulsión y, en su caso, devolución del territorio nacional de aquéllos, en aplicación de la vigente Ley de Extranjería y del reglamento que la desarrolla (...). (p. 848)
> *Immediately after that, [the authorities] initiated the necessary formalities*

> *for the expulsion and, where applicable, 'returning' to their countries of*
> *those, in accordance with the Ley de Extranjería ...*

Both the bureaucratization of discourse and the use of authorized jargons contribute to the legitimation strategies of emphasizing legality, correct procedures, authorization and normality (Chartprasert, 1993). Through these terms violence and social control are disguised. The Secretary's words, however, imply disciplinary practices and coercive control, by means of which individuals become classified, confined, and expelled: "fueron detenidos" ('they were detained'), "fueron instalados en dependencias" ('they were housed in an annex'), "fueron ingresados en el Centro de Internamiento" ('they were locked up in an Internment Center'), and so on.

Using medical, legal, and bureaucratic jargon in this process of 'nomination', the Secretary is showing clearly how the agents of control and coercion (police, military, the Ministry) tend to employ the knowledge produced by the agents of treatment and rehabilitation (medicine, law, criminology, etc.) (Foucault, 1977). As the following example shows, the Secretary seems to be aware of the implications of his lexical choices. By means of a discursive strategy, intertextuality, he evokes others' discourses, which are re-elaborated by means of a systematic and explicit procedure of relexicalization:

> **(10)**
> No es verdad, por ello, que se haya producido un proceso de narcotización y que se hubiese drogado a los inmigrantes. Quiero recordarles que no hubo ni droga ni narcóticos, sino que se hizo uso de una especialidad farmacéutica autorizada. (p. 851)
> *It is, therefore, not true, that narcotics were used, and that the immigrants were drugged. I want to remind you that no drug, nor narcotics were involved, but that use was made of authorized medication.*

The representations conveyed by these alternative discourses become, in this way, neutralized. However, as we now show, these lexical choices have other functions, related to the appropriation and legitimation of discourse.

Describing the actions of the Others. The actions of the migrants (as well as their effects) are often described in negative terms, such as "ilegalmente" ('illegally'), "desorden público" ('public disorder'), "incendio" ('fire'), "violento", "destrucción", "alteración del orden público" ('disruption of the public order'), "actitud amenazante" ('threatening attitude'), "armados con piedras, palos y botellas" ('armed with stones, sticks and bottles'), "máxima gravedad" ('extreme seriousness'), and so on. That is, the lexical style of the text emphasizes the opinion of the Secretary that the migrants were violent and a threat to others—to Us. Similarly, the 'internal opposition', that is, Spanish people and organizations that opposed the expulsion, are especially described as causing an "alarma social" ('social unrest' or 'panic') and as spreading "inexactitudes", "deformaciones" and "distorsiones" ('inaccuracies', 'bias' and 'distortions').

The discursive and social functions of this lexical style in the description of Us and Them can be summarized as follows: (1) It is consistent with the overall strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. Virtually no pejorative terms are used to describe Us and many to describe Them, and the converse is true for the use of words with positive associations. Hence, also lexically, this speech contributes to the overall functions of legitimation; (2) One of its more significant effects, the bureaucratization of discourse, promotes the representation of institutional practices as a routine, as an anonymous, normalized and well-established procedure; and (3) Besides the euphemistic effect of the lexical choice when the Secretary refers to institutional actions, the resources employed in the representation of migrants contribute to the conceptualization of these actions as appropriate, logical and rational. The disciplinary mechanisms exercised by the institution are hidden through a process of lexical choice, based on the linguistic devices supplied by authorized jargons. However, their pernicious effects on individuals become evident in the representation of migrants as objects, deprived of freedom and control over their own lives. On the other hand, presenting them as a group seems to be a suitable strategy to gain support for the procedure of expulsion which was followed. This procedure has been bitterly criticized, since the law prescribes the individualized examination of expulsion proceedings.

Syntactic structures and semantic roles. A familiar set of syntactic devices for the mitigation of negative action features the use of passives and nominalizations (Cornelis, 1997; Fowler et al., 1979; Hodge & Kress, 1993). Mayor Oreja's speech is replete with this type of formal expression of diminished agency and responsibility. Thus, instead of the active forms "expulsar" ('expel') and "devolver" ('send back'), we usually find only the nominalization "expulsión" and "devolución". Similarly, instead of saying that the police used anti-mob material, the expression "se hizo necesario el uso de ..." ('the use of ... was necessary') is being used, thus blaming the victims. In this way the crucial agency and responsibility for the (execution) of the operation may also be hidden: "se solicitó del Ejército del Aire la puesta a disposición de un contingente de aviones" ('The Airforce was requested to supply a number of planes'). Another (semantic–syntactic) device to minimize negative implications of official actions is to describe these actions in clauses that are immediately preceded or followed by a clause, in the same sentence, that justifies such an action.

On the other hand, the negative actions of the migrants are usually described in active voice, or the agents of these negative actions are being expressed otherwise: "se dirigio (...) en actitud amenazante" ('they proceeded [...] with a menacing attitude'). More importantly, no reference is made throughout the whole text to the very causes and reasons of the migrants for their protest in Melilla. Indeed, by simply mentioning their 'violence', these actions become irrational, and hence associated with the threatening violence of a mob, as is typically also the case in the representation of minority in the media (Van Dijk, 1991, 1997c).

However, once the migrants' negative actions have been emphasized, in order to present them as the justification of the forced expulsion, we observe a significant shift in the way they are represented within discourse: they lose their active role, and become passivized in relation to the actions of the authorities (see Van Leeuwen, 1996: 43–5). Thus they are presented as objects in the representation ('subjected', in Van Leeuwen's terms). As we have already noted such descriptions reveal the disciplinary character of modern societies, and the mechanisms of social control.

More generally, it hardly needs to be recalled that the syntax of the Secretary's speech is very formal and complex, as may be expected in this formal (parliamentary) context. Most sentences of this speech are longer than 50 words and consist of more than five embedded clauses. Such syntactic complexity and expressions of diminished agency and responsibility have other associated values. First, they contribute to the bureaucratization of discourse, adopting the same impersonal style, by means of which actions are presented as normalized routines, and as agentless, and therefore, unavoidable processes. This strategy reinforces the legitimation strategies of legality, legal procedure, authorization and normality. Second, through them, the Secretary presents himself as not directly involved in the facts he is reporting. This strategy allows what we later call the Secretary's 'dissociation'. Third, this formal and bureaucratic style plays an important role in the evocation of authority, and in the appropriation of discourse examined later.

Rhetorical structures. Persuasive political discourse in front of representatives of the people has been the primary object of rhetorical analysis and emulation since ancient times (Corbett, 1971). Therefore Mayor Oreja's speech may be expected to have rhetorical features that are geared towards the effective accomplishments of its legitimation functions. Traditionally, one of the main rhetorical components is *elocutio*, formulating the figures of speech that in contemporary jargon would be described as specific transformative devices at various textual levels: those of sound structures, syntax and meaning.

Figures of speech. Thus, at the semantic level of these rhetorical operations, we may find irony, hyperboles, euphemisms, similes and metaphors, among others—some of which appear in Mayor Oreja's speech. We have already seen that one of the overall legitimating strategies is that of positive ingroup and negative outgroup presentation. This general principle is also rhetorically implemented—by exaggerating the threat of the migrants and using euphemistic lexical items and bureaucratic (medical, legal) jargon to describe the expulsion.

Contrary to much other political discourse (Chilton, 1995), Mayor Oreja's speech does not feature many explicit, new metaphors. He once uses the metaphor of a microscope and a magnifying glass when emphasizing the 'unfair' and close attention of his opponents for this operation, in contrast to earlier expulsions by the socialist government.

In several fragments of his speech, the Secretary also uses repetitions and

enumerations in order to emphasize the seriousness of the situation. That is, not only macro-semantically (topically) but also at the level of stylistic and rhetorical expression, his speech needs to be persuasive. The more the events are described as exceptional, serious or even threatening, the more such a description may be used to legitimate the actions of the government.

Whereas these rhetorical features have their function in the (pragmatic) justification of the actions, the discourse may also be self-legitimating, i.e. seen as true and authoritative, by a number of rhetorical devices. One of these, also in common use in the media (Van Dijk, 1988, 1991), is the so-called 'number game'. The role of mentioning many numbers or statistics is not just that of semantic precision, as one may expect from official discourse, but also to suggest factuality of the representation and hence credibility of the speaker. Thus Mayor Oreja spells out in detail how many of the arrested Africans were sent to which country. This precision contrasts sharply with the missing or vague information about the reasons why the migrants rebelled, or about some of the more doubtful actions of the officials (use of tranquillizers, etc.). This rhetorical contrast has its semantic counterpart in the variation of so-called 'levels of description' (general vs specific) and the 'relative completeness' of such descriptions (many or few details mentioned at each of these levels). These rhetorical and semantic contrasts obviously function within the overall strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. Our good actions are described at a low, specific level, with many details, whereas our controversial actions are either ignored or described at a fairly abstract level (and in euphemistic terms), and with few details. The same is true for the bad actions of the outgroup.

Argumentation. Another major feature of the persuasive devices of this speech is, of course, argumentation (Van Eemeren et al., 1996). Justifying controversial actions, and accounts more generally, requires support by various arguments, such as general moral principles or uncontrovertible 'facts' (Antaki, 1994). The elementary form of such argumentation appears in complex sentences in which one clause refers to an official act, and another clause to the necessary or sufficient reasons for such an act:

(11)
En este caso se podía proceder a su expulsión ya que se trataba de la ejecución de una orden ya dictada. (849)
In this case, the expulsion could go ahead, since the order had already been issued.

In this case the first clause expresses an opinion that has the function of a conclusion of an argument of which the second clause functions as a (factual) premise: a legal decision is a condition of expulsion. Note, though, that this is merely a necessary condition, and not a sufficient one, since not all legal decisions about the (illegal) status of migrants lead to expulsion. For this brief argument to be a formal syllogism, an implied general premise would have to be: 'Any time a judge has made a decision (about the illegal status of an migrant), the migrant will be expelled'. Since, how-

ever, Mayor Oreja uses 'the expulsion could go ahead', his formulation is formally correct. However, such a mere legal possibility of an expulsion is not what is at stake here, since the migrants were actually expelled. Obviously, the causal sentence and the implied argument and their legal basis is one way to 'argue for' expulsion, and hence to legitimate it. Let us consider a related, more complex case:

> **(12)**
> Señorías, también quiero recalcar, junto a la legalidad de la operación des-crita, otro aspecto que no puedo dejar de tener en cuenta y es el aspecto social de la operación. Estos inmigrantes es verdad que son además traí-dos por organizaciones que se aprovechan de estas personas para intro-ducirlos a cambio de dinero en países de la Unión Europea, que responden a consignas en sus comportamientos, en sus respuestas, y que todas las que se producen normalmente suelen ser, más que una respues-ta a una falta de legalidad o a un comportamiento de ilícito de la policía, consecuencia de instrucciones y consignas previamente dadas por estas or-ganizaciones cuyo objeto no es, insisto, que se queden en España siquiera, sino que puedan introducirse en los países de la Unión Europea. (p. 849)
> *Honourable members, I also wish to emphasize, besides the legality of the operation just described, another aspect which we cannot ignore, the social aspect of the operation. It is true that these immigrants who are also brought here by organizations who take advantage of them by bringing them into European Union countries in exchange for money, whose behaviour and at-titudes are usually the result of instructions previously given to them by the organizations, so that the sort of responses which appear are usually not to lack of legality or to illegality in the behaviour of the police, but a conse-quence of the instructions they have been given. What is more, the aim of these organizations is not even for them to stay in Spain, but for them to be able to enter the European Union.*

This long and complex sentence has the usual double function of com-bining positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. Mayor Oreja here basically claims (with a denial) that it is not the illicit behavior of the police that makes the migrants respond as they do, but that they are being instructed by organizations that take advantage of them. That is, he asserts that the authorities are not to be blamed, and obviously presuppos-es that this may have been an accusation levelled against the police. Instead of directly blaming the migrants, he presents them as victims. Such a portrayal functions as a well-known move of (apparent) sympathy, which in itself has a function in the overall strategy of positive impression formation about the authorities. At the same time, however, he blames (illegal) inter-national organizations engaging in trafficking of illegal migrants. The (sim-plified) argumentative structure of this sentence thus is as follows:

> (a) CLAIM (DENIAL): The behaviour of the migrants is not due to the illic-it behavior of the police.
> (b) ARGUMENT 1 (COUNTERCLAIM): Their behavior is due to the instruc-tions of international organizations.
> (c) ARGUMENT 2: These international organizations bring the migrants to Spain and Europe for money.

(d) IMPLICATION FROM ARGUMENT 2: These are criminal organizations.
(e) IMPLICIT ARGUMENT: Criminal organizations have interest in instruct-
ing illegal migrants to behave as they do.
(f) PRESUPPOSED KNOWLEDGE: (i) Illegal migrants need to hide their
identity in order to prevent their expulsion; (ii) therefore they lie to
the authorities.

This is only a small part of the complex set of propositions and their ar-
gumentative functions in this sentence. We see that, besides the explicit
propositions, many are implicit, and represent implicit arguments and pre-
supposed or otherwise implied knowledge. Indeed, in order to even under-
stand this complex sentence and its argument (i.e. the point of the denial
about the behaviour of the police), one needs detailed knowledge about the
behaviour of ('illegal') migrants and the police.

Similar arguments are being set up to enhance the democratic nature of
the government and to counter-argue claims that the Africans' human
rights were violated. For instance, Mayor Oreja emphasizes that the coun-
tries to which the Africans were expelled are democratic, so that the safety
of those arrested would be guaranteed. Of course, this may be factually the
case, but it does not imply that the expulsion was therefore legitimate.
Sending the migrants back to various African countries is further supported
with the argument that in Spain it would be more difficult to establish their
identity (after all, he implies, to us all Africans look alike). Thus, whereas
Mayor Oreja generally seems to argue on the basis of general principles
and uncontrovertible facts, most of his arguments are fallacies. This is also
the case when he argues at length that the operation was carried out fol-
lowing standard procedures, since the correct application of such pro-
cedures does not make the expulsion legitimate.

Integration. Although more levels, dimensions and structures of this
speech may be analyzed (for instance its overall organization), and others
are dealt with later, it has become sufficiently clear that discursive legiti-
mation is an act that may be accomplished by having recourse to many tex-
tual devices. If legitimation is defined as seeking normative approval for
institutional action especially in a context of accusation and crisis, then the
acceptability of such action may be enhanced in many discursive ways.
Overall semantic strategies may represent and hence justify the actions as
prescribed by law, as following legal procedures, as being carefully ex-
ecuted and so on. The same strategies may also construct a well-known
group polarization: between (good) Us, and (bad) Them, through various
devices of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation.

This overall strategy is also supported at other levels of representation
and expression, such as the style with which (our and their) actors and ac-
tions are described, the rhetoric of hyperbole or understatement, as well as
in various forms of argumentative fallacies. Justifying accounts of contro-
versial past actions thus involve all discursive levels that may positively in-
fluence the opinions of the recipients (Antaki, 1994). That is, legitimation
at this level of analysis is essentially persuasive, and oriented to what is (or

can be made) acceptable for an audience from which normative approval of institutional acts is sought. In other words, the intended or preferred mental models of the recipients should be (made) consistent with socially shared knowledge and attitudes, and hence with the moral order.

6. SELF-LEGITIMATING DISCOURSE

As Bourdieu argues, authority and legitimacy are themselves 'external' to discourse (Bourdieu, 1988). However, from the moment they permeate it, they change its social status so that a distinction is made between legitimate and illegitimate discourse. When the power and the authority of the institution and of its representatives are evoked, maintained and reproduced by means of several discursive devices, then institutional legitimacy becomes 'internal' or discursive. Conversely, institutional legitimacy may itself be reinforced by discourse. If the spokesperson is not invested with the authority of the group or the institution, or if he or she is not considered trustworthy, the legitimacy of his or her discourse may become open to question, and be subjected to radical doubt. In our case, this means that the efficacy of the justification of governmental actions will be invalidated.

In this section we examine some of the discursive strategies by means of which the discourse which conveys the intended representation is legitimated by itself. (In order to avoid the ambiguity of the expression 'legitimating discourse', we use the term 'self-legitimating discourse' in this case.)

This strategy of discursive self-legitimation is based on three correlated moves: (1) focusing on status differences within discourse, such that authority and legitimacy of the institution are transferred to the speaker; we consider this move an attempt to monopolize social legitimacy; (2) presenting discourse as a reflection of reality, that is, by a process of objectivation; we consider this move an attempt to monopolize the truth; and (3) by controlling the production, the access to, and the circulation of discourses; this move is enacted by a process of inclusion and exclusion, by means of which personal and ingroup legitimacy is transferred to discourse; we consider this move an attempt to monopolize discourse: only legitimate forces and legitimate social groups have a right to an authorized discourse, and have access to some discourse and some communicative events, in this case parliamentary debates. In order to reinforce this discursive legitimation, we find a corresponding devaluation and discrediting of other modes of expression, other discourses and a restriction of their circulation.

The previous sections have already shown that generally discourses are seen to be legitimate if three conditions are satisfied: (i) their sources (speakers, institutions, etc.) must be legitimate; (ii) their representation of events must appear to be true and trustworthy; and (iii) their linguistic and discursive forms must be socially appropriate, authorized or 'politically correct'. Mayor Oreja emphasizes that his speech has these characteristics, whereas those of his opponents do not. Acting on the social order of discourse, he thus legitimizes some discourses, while delegitimizing others, so

that the circulation and acceptance of possibly damaging, alternative versions of reality are obstructed.

The discursive management of power and legitimacy

Differences of power and authority can be increased, balanced or negotiated through language and discourse (Fairclough, 1989; Kedar, 1987; Ng and Bradac, 1993; O'Barr et al., 1984; Wodak, 1989). The interactional dimension (negotiation and vying between participants) of power and discourse, e.g. in parliament, is beyond the scope of this article (e.g., Diamond, 1996). However, in the following sections we analyze how Secretary Mayor Oreja evokes these social differences, and how, through linguistic strategies, he tries to monopolize both power and authority.

In the legitimation of the institutional action, as analyzed earlier, the attributed negative properties of the migrants are focused on as a justification of forced expulsion. In this case, this discrediting and delegitimating move is mainly directed against other sources of representation, i.e. against the opposition parties and the media. These sources produced different versions of the facts, and criticized immigration policies. To discredit these rival representations, their sources have to be undermined, thereby enhancing the authority and legitimacy of the Secretary himself.

Besides his critique of these opponents, Secretary Mayor Oreja also stresses power and status differences between the institution he is representing and the migrants. His negative description of the migrants implies their lack of social status, authority and legitimacy. This contrast is used as one of the many discursive means of reasserting his own authority.

At the same time, the Secretary often resorts to different forms of formal (third-person) self-representation which stress his authority, such as 'this Secretary', 'the authorities of the Ministry', or 'the Ministry of the Interior'. By referring to himself in terms of his function, he reinforces his identification with the institution, and emphasizes his participation in its authority. Terms such as 'Ministry' and 'Secretary' are used as synonyms, and as a consequence no fissure is shown between the institution (the Ministry) and its representative (the Secretary). The Secretary is presenting himself as a 'medium' (Bourdieu, 1988), and is not stating his independence. He speaks in the name of the institution: 'This government'. These forms of 'titulation' and 'honorification' (Van Leeuwen, 1996) function as a discursive 'process of investiture', transforming the person into a legitimate person, and assuring his presentation as the authorized representative. We can see this contrast of power and status in the following example:

> **(13)**
> El Ministro del Interior, ante estos graves acontecimientos que ponían en grave peligro el orden público y suponían una alteración grave de la seguridad ciudadana, tenía la inexcusable obligación de proceder, en nuestra opinión, a la expulsión o devolución de los inmigrantes ilegales. (p. 848)
> *In view of the serious nature of events, which put public order in severe dan-*

> *ger and seriously threatened public safety, the Secretary of the Interior had,*
> *in our opinion, the unavoidable duty to expel or return the illegal immi-*
> *grants.*

Differences of status and authority entail differences of power. In this sense, Secretary Mayor Oreja also stresses and reproduces his power when he opts for forms of presentation which highlight his function ('the Secretary' instead of 'I'). He assumes the agent role and thus emphasizes his power and his capacity of control over the migrants, but also over other institutions and authorities of the state: the army, the police, public agencies and even independent powers, such as legal authorities. These lexical and semantic choices are part of the process of investiture: the image he is creating of himself has to be in accordance with the representation of the authority. With these linguistic devices Secretary Mayor Oreja is creating a 'topology' of the positions from which he is expressing himself, and from which others are expressing themselves. In this representation, he assumes a dominant position at the top of the social pyramid, whereas migrants are located at the bottom, and deprived of any capacity of action. As we have already pointed out the intervention of the Ministry seems to neutralize any action realized by migrants. As soon as they are confronted with the institutions, they lose their active role, and they are also discursively construed as passive actors. This contrast between powerful and powerless social actors also contributes to the different appraisal of the competing discourses in this event.

In spite of the efficacy of this procedure, in a political crisis, in which the legitimacy of the institution has been challenged, Secretary Mayor Oreja needs to resort to other procedures. First, the same rules and laws which are evoked in the justification of the actions seem to have been broken, and this entails an erosion of institutional legitimacy. Second, the expulsion has been criticized by legitimate institutions, such as opposition parties and the press. Their discrediting and delegitimation demand a more elaborate process of exclusion and monopolization, in order to neutralize their views, and in order to prevent the circulation and legitimation of their rival interpretative accounts, that is, their discourses.

Thus, in order to enhance his credibility and authority and to counter the claims of his legitimate opponents, the Secretary also refers to several prestigious sources and institutions. Among them, the following stand out: (1) in the representation of the legal procedure followed, the judge and the public prosecutor provide the legal basis of the operation (which is contested by the opposition); (2) in the representation of the repression of migrants (the use of tranquilizers), the Ministry of Health, the vade-mecum, a medical report published in the US, the World Health Organization; (3) in the representation of the whole situation: the Ley de Extranjería, the Constitution and the Schengen Treatise, i.e. the EU.

The same strategy of 'authorization' we have studied is used for the self-legitimation of discourse. In this way, the Secretary is not only reproducing authoritative discourses, but even appropriating their social prestige by

adopting the medical and legal jargon associated with these institutions (see also Hurwitz et al., 1992):

> **(14)**
> No hay que olvidar que, conforme a lo señalado en los artículos 149 y 104 de la Constitución y el artículo 1 de la Ley Orgánica de Protección de la Seguridad Ciudadana, corresponde al Gobierno, a través de sus autoridades y de las Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado, proteger y garantizar la seguridad ciudadana y remover los obstáculos que la impidan. (p. 848)
> *One must bear in mind that, according to articles 149 and 104 of the Spanish Constitution and article 1 of the Organic Law for the Protection of Public Safety, the Government is responsible for protecting and ensuring public safety, and for removing any obstacle there may be to such safety.*

The delegitimation of other sources of discourse

Simultaneously, other sources of information, and other interpreters of the events are disqualified, and their authority challenged. This discrediting move is accomplished first by 'indetermination', that is, social actors are represented as unspecified, anonymous individuals and groups (Van Leeuwen 1996: 51–52). Second, these other actors are partially suppressed in discourse. Only their critiques are mentioned, but the source of this critique is not explicitly mentioned. The forms of discursive concealment and exclusion reduce the authority and hence the legitimacy of his opponents. Here is a typical example of this 'vague' reference to such criticism:

> **(15)**
> (...) alarma social, que unas veces se ha provocado interesadamente, pero que otras veces tampoco tengo ninguna duda de que se ha producido desde la buena fe. (p. 852)
> *(...) social alarm, which has sometimes been caused with a vested interest, but which has also been, undoubtedly, caused in good faith.*

Note that the Secretary's critique of those who have caused this public reaction is itself mitigated by attributing 'good faith' to his opponents. Apart from thus showing due respect to legitimate (and powerful) institutions, such mitigation at the same time functions within the overall strategies of positive self-presentation and persuasion.

In contrast with this 'depersonalization' and 'indetermination' of other sources of representation, the Secretary adopts a victimized discourse, in which he presents himself as the target of unfair critiques and accusations. As a consequence, he (referred to as 'I' or as 'us') appears isolated against a conspiracy, and he denounces the lack of objectivity and neutrality of those who criticize his decisions. His authority and legitimacy have been challenged:

> **(16)**
> Se nos ha acusado, señorías, de haber, actuado con irresponsabilidad enviando a los funcionarios policiales sin la vacunación necesaria. (p. 852)
> *We have been accused, honourable members, of acting irresponsibly by sending police officers without the appropriate vaccinations.*

This contrast between 'determination' and 'indetermination' in the form of representation of social actors plays a key role in the struggle over the account of governmental action. Every representation which differs from the one defended by the Secretary is produced by an anonymous source, completely deprived of status and authority and hence of symbolic efficacy. Furthermore, the representations of the events they produce are considered gossip, slander, deformations:

> **(17)**
> Yo he querido ser fiel al relación de los hechos, he querido actuar con la mayor transparencia posible, he querido tratar de trasladar, más que la búsqueda, como antes decía, de la operacion modélica, el conjunto de inexactitudes y deformaciones que se han ido produciendo y que han distorsionado la realidad de la misma. Esa era mi obligación y en ese sentido estoy evidentemente a disposición de las intervenciones de los diferentes grupos. (p. 852)
> *I have tried to remain faithful to the telling of the events, I have tried to act with the maximum of transparency, I have tried to try to explain, not, as I said, a picture of a model operation, but rather the set of inaccuracies and distortions which have been accumulating and which have twisted what really happened. This was my duty, and in this sense I am, of course, at the disposition of the different groups.*

Frequently, the representation of the events conveyed by these alternative discourses is systematically re-elaborated (by a process of relexicalization), or completely rejected and categorically denied: "No es verdad que ..." ('it is not the case that ...'). This strategy of systematic denial shows that the Secretary of the Interior is establishing an opposition between true and false discourses, and inside this context, he is claiming for himself the monopoly over crucial symbolic capital: the truth.

Moral legitimacy and the rhetoric of objectivity

By delegitimating the alternative versions of the events as biased or false, Mayor Oreja not only appropriates the truth, but also claims moral legitimacy, as a credible, trustworthy and reliable speaker. Such credibility and trustworthiness both derive from and confirm his power and authority (Nesler et al., 1993). In contrast to his opponents, whom he suggests to (mis)represent the events for political reasons of expediency, he therefore claims to avoid expressions of personal opinions and subjective interpretation, and to only state the 'facts'.

This opposition of true vs false and the correlated strategies of inclusion and exclusion (Foucault, 1981) underlie all the strategies studied in this section. Thus, subjective interpretations may be presented as the unquestionable truth by such devices as detailed, technical and accurate descriptions of events, the use of numbers and other means that are part of what was earlier described as the *rhetoric of objectivity*. The frequent citation of credible sources, such as health authorities, is also part of such a rhetoric of truth and objectivity.

One interesting metaphor used to contribute to the illusion of impartial observation is that of the 'moviola', which further suggests that Mayor Oreja's speech faithfully reflects and simply 'plays back' the events:

> **(18)**
> esto es como una especie de moviola posterior, donde realmente vamos observando los acontecimientos. (p. 869)
> *It is like watching a replay, in which we are really observing what happened.*

In other words, there is only one reliable representation, which is the one presented by the speaker. Sometimes the appropriation of truth and knowledge, and hence his moral legitimacy, are not merely implied by the devices mentioned here (details, numbers, etc.), but also explicitly referred to:

> **(19)**
> Yo he querido ser fiel a la relación de los hechos, he querido actuar con la mayor transparencia posible (p. 852)
> *I have tried to remain faithful to the telling of the events, I have tried to act with the maximum of transparency.*

In contrast to this example, in which the use of the first-person pronoun suggests that he vouched for the truth with his personal integrity (see later), Mayor Oreja in the first part of his speech only refers to himself by third-person expressions such as 'the Secretary'. He thus distances or *dissociates* himself from the events and from his own decisions. This does not simply mitigate his responsibilities, by detaching himself and his government from the decisions and actions that 'had' to be made. Such 'dissociation' also has a function in the rhetoric of truth, i.e. that he constructs himself as an outside, neutral and objective observer of the events, whose report is not biased by personal interests, and hence must be true.

Discourse aims

In different part of his address to the Committee of Justice and of the Interior, the Secretary spells out the aims of his speech. These declared aims are: "explicar" ('explain'), "aclarar" ('clarify'), "dejar lo mas claro posible" ('make as clear as possible'), "anular las deformaciones e inexactitudes" ('to contradict distortions and inaccuracies'). All these forms presuppose that he possesses the only authentic or authorized version of the events. The Secretary thus takes the role of someone who has special insight, of someone who is able to reveal the truth, while at the same time challenging and hence delegitimating the 'biased' or 'unfair' versions of his political opponents and the media.

Personal commitment

One crucial strategy we have encountered before is that of credibility enhancement. A credible speaker will find it easier to legitimate a controversial action than an unconvincing speaker. As a general persuasive strategy, however, credibility enhancement may go beyond the mere presentation of

credible facts, proofs, evidence or other semantic means that support the interpretation of a situation. Thus, apart from good arguments, speakers may be able to express or suggest that they are honest, principled and trustworthy by other discursive means also (see Lui and Standing, 1989; for studies of other factors of credibility, see Hovland and Weiss, 1951; Hurwitz et al., 1992).

Mayor Oreja does this by a transition, in the last part of his speech, from the use of nominal self-reference ('the Secretary') to the use of first-person pronouns. He thus represents himself first as the authoritative representative of the institution, and he does so in the detached and 'objective' manner that is expected of his office. However, he then displays his personal commitment by guaranteeing the truth of the Secretary's account, thus increasing his credibility (see also Diermeier, 1995). At the same time he shows that he has the guts to face critique and accusations, and that he does not fear getting 'involved' (Katriel and Dascal, 1989). After first sharing responsibility with other authorities, he now suggests that he has a personal stake in the present communicative situation: to be personally interested in getting at and telling the truth. Formal responsibility thus combines with personal accountability in Mayor Oreja's speech (Antaki, 1994). This is a well-known move in the overall persuasive strategy of expressing sincerity. Thus, the whole group (Spain) is encouraged to trust its official:

> **(20)**
> Señorías, yo creo que aquí hay dos formas de plantear las cuestiones: con transparencia u ocultando una realidad (...). (p. 851)
> *Honourable Members, it seems to me that there are two ways of handling these questions: openly or in a way which hides reality.*

> **(21)**
> Yo prefiero decir la verdad, no ocultar. Posteriormente se podrá producir la reflexión que se crea conveniente, pero a mí me parece que el que en estos momentos tratemos de esconder la realidad o una determinada decisión no favorecerá nunca que todos hagamos el esfuerzo necesario en la mejora de las circunstancias de esta operación que, reitero una vez más, no es en modo alguno la primera vez que se lleva a la práctica. (p. 851)
> *I prefer telling the truth, not hiding it. With hindsight, anyone may express whatever opinions they wish, but it seems to me that if now we try to cover up the facts, or a particular decision, this will never help us all to make the necessary effort to improve the circumstances surrounding this operation which, I repeat, is not in any way the first of its kind.*

Manufacturing ingroup consensus and solidarity

In addition to the previous moves, the Secretary has to promote ingroup identification, solidarity and political support, and thus tries to re-establish consensus, if not to manufacture the consent from his political opponents (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Whereas earlier he thus emphasizes his own credibility, he also needs to appeal to the responsibility of the institutional Others, as professional participants in the same (political) game, and in this case in the management of a problem shared by all: restricting 'illegal' im-

migration. We have seen that he does so first by emphasizing that the socialist party was responsible for the Ley de Extranjería, and that hence the present Opposition should be loyal in implementing their own law.

As is well known in the social psychology of ingroup and outgroup polarization, identity and solidarity may be enhanced by stressing the differences between Us and Them (see Spears et al., 1997; Turner and Giles, 1981). This is also the case in the realm of the 'social economy of discourse', so that a dichotomy is established between truthful, authoritative and hence legitimate discourses and biased, partisan and hence illegitimate versions of the events. Such a strategy also implies that the Secretary engages in the monopolization of both truth and discourse. Minorities, dissenting groups or migrants have no right to speak, and they never occur as represented speakers in Mayor Oreja's speech. Some linguistic varieties or discourse types by some social groups are given less access to the public sphere, if they are not totally excluded (Martín Rojo, 1997a, 1997b; Van Dijk, 1996). Thus, variable access to the important resource of public discourse is the basis of the management and reproduction of symbolic, social and political power. Apart from controlling truth and discourse itself, such moves also imply control over the distribution of text and talk in society— who is (not) allowed to speak, to whom, about what, in what circumstances?

One of the more effective linguistic strategies to enhance solidarity, to manufacture consensus and to rebuild allegiances is the use of first-person plural pronouns ("nosotros"), a familiar device in political discourse (Geffroy, 1985; Guespin, 1985; Wilson, 1990). Here, inclusive 'we' refers to the Secretary himself and the members of the committee, and thus to 'us' politicians who need to take joint responsibility. By using 'us', the Secretary also invites the Opposition to take his perspective on the case. This form, as Calsamiglia pointed out, marks a social self, and has 'different values related to the hierarchical position of the speaker in a continuum that goes from authority to solidarity' (Calsamiglia, 1996: 62–3). In this case, these values refer, on the one hand, to shared authority, because through this form, group representation 'adds prestige and support values, and attenuates individual responsibility'; on the other hand, these values refer to solidarity, because this form echoes group membership, and identification with a group, in this case, members of the elite, who participate in the 'political game' (De Fina, 1995; Zupnik, 1994):

> **(22)**
> No se puede resolver un problema si no somos capaces de hacer un diagnóstico común. (p. 870)
> *It is impossible to solve a problem if we are not able to agree on the same diagnosis.*

By realigning the political opposition to a common perspective, the Secretary emphasizes other oppositions between Us and Them. First, between Us politicians, who are responsible to carry out the provisions of the law, on the one hand, and Them outside of politics, such as the media and

various NGOs, who accuse Us of violating human rights although we scrupulously follow procedures, on the other hand. That is, the alternative versions of the events challenge our common legitimacy as legislators.

A more fundamental opposition between ingroup and outgroup is established between Us in Spain and Them foreigners, a nationalist if not xenophobic and racist antithesis that has been particularly effective in anti-immigration rhetoric, both in Spain and elsewhere in western Europe and North America (Billig, 1995; Van Dijk, 1993a; Verschueren and Blommaert, 1992). We have seen that this opposition is being created by many other strategies, e.g. by positive self-descriptions on the one hand, and negative other-descriptions or derogation of 'illegal' and 'violent' migrants on the other hand (for details of such political anti-immigration rhetoric, see Van Dijk, 1993a).

In this symbolic struggle, the Secretary appeals to the solidarity of all the members of the group, all of them linked by their participation in the institution and insists on a common effort to prevent the access and the circulation of rival representations which may threaten 'our' legitimacy:

> **(23)**
> Es posible que se siga creando alarma social, pero eso no solamente va a depender de las medidos del Gobierno; también va a tener una enorme importancia y una enorme trascendencia si se quiere hacer un esfuerzo en esa dirección por parte de los grupos de la oposición. (p. 869)
> *It is possible that social alarm will continue to be raised, but that will not only depend on the measures taken by the Government; it will be of great importance and great significance if an effort is to be made in that direction by the groups making up the opposition.*

At the same time, such an appeal to solidarity and 'internal' political consensus implies the establishment of a discursive order in which 'external' discourses and competing versions of reality are prevented from impinging on 'our' political order of discourse. This attempt at discursive inclusion and exclusion contributes to the self-serving circulation of 'our' discourse.

Authorized jargon

The control of the order of discourse is not only carried out by a process of inclusion and exclusion. By using authorized linguistic varieties, differences in the perception and assessment of discourse are also invoked. The use of jargons seems to play a key role in this process. By improving ingroup communication, jargons function as a force for cohesion, a way of forming a social unit. Jargons can be understood in this way as a type of territorialization. By creating an alternative vocabulary jargons function as an instrument for knowing, constructing and maintaining an alternative 'reality', with its own social actors, hierarchies, rules, values, ways of life (Martín Rojo, 1994, 1997a). In this way, jargons are an instrument of social integration (Bourdieu, 1988). At the same time, powerful professional varieties define exclusion, preventing outsiders from getting into contact with those in authority, and establishing a sharp division between 'sacred' and 'pro-

fane' knowledge. As is well-known from medical, legal and political lexical styles, jargon may also have a variety of manipulative functions—by obfuscating, concealing or mitigating disagreeable facts, for instance in political propaganda (Herman, 1992).

However, even if all varieties of jargon have almost the same functions, not all of them are evaluated in the same way. Some are considered legitimate ('healthy'), as is the case for medical jargon, and others illegitimate ('destructive'), such as the jargon of delinquents. Thus, as we have seen in our analysis of lexical style, the bureaucratic, medical, and legal jargons displayed by Mayor Oreja are prestigious and authorized varieties. They suggest the association of their own professional legitimacy with that of the Secretary and his discourse, if not with the constructed ingroup of 'us' politicians in general. In other words, together with the professionals 'we' know best what is good for this country. Similarly, in this concrete case, 'we' knew best what to do with the 'illegal' migrants:

> **(24)**
> Se les suministró un producto que habitualmente se prescribe para el uso en niños superactivos. (p. 851)
> *The product they were given is something which is usually prescribed for the use of hyperactive children.*

Besides the euphemistic effect associated with these varieties, Secretary Mayor Oreja is legitimating his discourse by encompassing other legitimate discourses. And, at the same time, he is building up a barrier between those who have a 'professional' knowledge, and those who are ignorant.

Changing political discourse in Spain

Together with the other strategies analyzed here, this strategy is an attempt to monopolize public discourse. However, it should also be understood in the broader political context. Comparing some features of this speech with the results of a preliminary study of parliamentary debates about immigration in Spain when the socialists were in power, there are some obvious differences: (1) Whereas Secretary Corcuera (Socialist Party) often resorted to a colloquial register, Secretary Mayor Oreja opts for a more formal register; and (2) Unlike Mayor Oreja, Corcuera showed a tendency to the conversationalization of public discourse. In spite of the ambivalence of both resources, they can be understood as democratizing devices, allowing popular access to political discourse. However, such discursive devices may disguise but not suppress power relationships (Fairclough and Mauren, 1997).

Secretary Mayor Oreja's discourse seems regressive, when compared to the relative openness and democratization of discourse during the past two decades in Spain. His style and genres are more formal and thus tend to exclude popular, colloquial forms. At the same time, as we have found, he tends to incorporate authorized jargons and genres as well as formal registers. This shift not only promotes the exclusion of ordinary people, but also reinforces the professionalization of the political arena. This process can be

seen as a far-reaching process of monopolization of political discourse, which seems to transcend the present crisis.

7. CONCLUSIONS

In this article, we have examined some properties of the discourse of legit-imation. Using as our example a parliamentary speech by Spanish Secretary of the Interior Mayor Oreja, in which he defends his decision to expel 103 Africans from the Spanish enclave of Melilla, our first aim was to understand the discursive strategies and functions of social and political le-gitimation. Theoretically, legitimation may first be analyzed as a social act of attributing acceptability to social actors, actions and social relations within the normative order. Top–down, legitimation involves strategies that seek to establish, maintain or restore social position and acceptable authority of a group or institution, usually the State. Bottom–up, the comp-lementary form of legitimation is the action of dominated groups (citizens, minorities, etc.) to passively accept or actively grant such hierarchy or auth-ority to dominating groups or institutions (elites, government, parliament).

In our case study, we primarily deal with the first, top–down form, in which the conservative Spanish government, represented by its Secretary of the Interior, attempts to restore its legitimacy after being challenged by popular and media critique of the expulsion of 'illegal' migrants. In our analysis, we distinguished three different but interdependent levels of dis-cursive legitimation: (a) a pragmatic act of justification of controversial ac-tions and policies; (b) a semantic representation of one's view of the events as true and reliable; and (c) a sociopolitical authorization of the legitimat-ing discourse itself.

Justification is a discursive account of past actions that aims to persuade a critical audience that such actions were acceptable within the normative order; that is, that they were in accordance with the law, with prevailing social norms or with other normative principles of adequate social conduct. Strategies at all levels of text or talk may be employed in the successful ac-complishment of such persuasive accounts. Thus, in Mayor Oreja's speech, we found overall semantic strategies that aim to support the acceptability of the expulsion, e.g. its legality, respect for legal and bureaucratic pro-cedures, its careful execution, its authorization and execution by appropri-ate state agencies and professionals, and special circumstances such as the threat to the public order. These strategies at the same time imply a di-chotomy between positive self-presentation and negative other-presen-tation, in which 'our' actions and policies were correct and beneficial, and 'their' actions deviant and threatening to the country. Also at other levels of analysis, such justifying accounts of controversial actions may be made more persuasive, e.g. by lexical derogation of the Others, syntactic empha-sis or concealment of agency and responsibility, or by rhetorically enhanc-ing positive or negative opinions.

The pragmatic and persuasive functions of justification can be successful

only when based on a defensible semantics of representation. The speaker must be seen to speak the truth, and hence represent himself or herself as well as his or her account of the events as credible, so that alternative versions of the events will be delegitimated. Again, there are many strategies to enhance the truth-effects of discourse, such as describing details, referring to reliable sources such as authoritative institutions, insisting that the facts can be verified, the use of common sense, general knowledge and inference, personal integrity and reliability, and so on.

Discourses produce knowledge. They present specific versions of reality, formulate characteristics of social actors and groups and thus sustain and reinforce ideologies and social values. However, as with people, not all discourses are equal. Some are dominant or legitimate, others are not or are less so. This paper has shown how social (contextual) and discursive factors contribute to the (de)legitimation of text and talk, such as the legitimacy and authority of the source, true or credible representation and appropriate form. Speakers have linguistic and other discursive means to emphasize the role and effects of such factors of legitimation.

Once the facts have been established as represented, and justified as being the acceptable norm, the discourse and its speaker themselves need to be legitimated, and opponents either persuaded and incorporated or delegitimated and excluded from the 'permissible' order of credible public discourse. Mayor Oreja in this case primarily self-legitimates himself and his discourse by emphasizing the authority of his office, of the state agencies as well as of independent institutions. Thus institutional power is conferred as well as supported by powerful institutional discourse, while at the same time discrediting alternative sources. Such discourse, as is obvious from the semantics of credibility, self-attributes its authority through its objective style, by the management of proof and evidence, the use of professional jargon, and especially by seeking political consensus and solidarity from its political opponents in parliament.

Throughout his speech, Mayor Oreja is trying to manage the minds of his audience in several, fundamental ways that go beyond the present debate and crisis. Justifying an expulsion in terms of the negative properties of 'illegal' migrants might after all be ad hoc, an argument tailored to the situation. Much more fundamental is his general strategy to influence the general image of migrants among the political elites in particular, and among the population in general. That is, they are persuasively represented not as poor victims who arouse solidarity and compassion, but as breaking the law, as deviants and as a threat to the nation. At the same time, Mayor Oreja is managing his own image, and that of his party through strategies of positive self-presentation. That is, he is at pains to present himself and the conservatives not as a reactionary, if not racist party, or as a group which ignores human rights, but as democrats who respect the law and scrupulously attend to decent principles of government and political action. He thus excludes the Others from Our nation and group, while at the same time including himself and the conservatives.

The fact that legitimacy is not a permanent good, but the object of social

and political struggle, explains why it cannot be preserved in conditions of free production and circulation of discourses. The intervention in the order of discourse by the imposition of restrictions on the production, access or uses of discourses, thus acts as a link between the social–political legitimation at the macro-level, on the one hand, and discursive legitimation at the micro-level.

Thus, within the discursive, social and political order of Spanish society, official legitimating discourse also contributes to the management and the reproduction of power. It does so by attempting to monopolize social and political legitimacy of the institution, by monopolizing the truth, and by monopolizing public discourse. Hence, a division is made between legitimate actors and discourse, and illegitimate ones. At the same time, such societal management of discourse involves strictures on its access and distribution. Migrants are not only excluded from 'our' country, but also excluded from 'our' discourse and from public discourse in general. Therefore, the legitimation of the expulsion and its extraordinary, military nature at the same time implies the legitimation of ethnic inequality, and a contribution to the reproduction of ethnic dominance—that is, racism.

LUISA MARTÍN ROJO is Lecturer in Linguistics at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Visiting Researcher at the IPrA (International Pragmatics Association) Research Centre (University of Antwerp), and member of the Advisory Board of *Discourse & Society*. She has studied the language of minorities in Spain (e.g. Caló and delinquents' jargon). Currently, her work focuses on three major areas of study: (1) argumentation, grammar and pragmatics; (2) gender and discourse; and (3) racism. She is active in the organization of Critical Discourse Analysis, especially in Spain, and with others took the initiative for a Spanish internet-list, CRITICAS. Besides articles in books and journals she published the following books: *La imagen de la mujer en situaciones de competitividad laboral* (Madrid: Instituto de la Mujer, 1996, with E. Gómez, J. Callejo and J.M. Delgado); *Género y discurso: las estratégias de la diferencia* (Barcelona: Ariel, in press); a book on sociolinguistics is in preparation. ADDRESS: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Facultad de Filosofia y Letras, Ciudad Universitaria de Cantoblanco, 28049 Madrid, Spain [email: luisa.rojo@uam.es].

TEUN A. VAN DIJK is professor of discourse studies at the University of Amsterdam. After earlier work in literary studies, text grammar and the psychology of text comprehension, his research in the 1980s focused on the study of news in the press and the reproduction of racism through various types of discourse. In each of these domains, he published several books. His present research in 'critical' discourse studies focuses on the relations between power, discourse and ideology. He is founder-editor of the international journals *TEXT*, and *Discourse & Society*, and editor of the 4-volume *Handbook of Discourse Analysis* and the new 2-volume *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction* (London: Sage, 1997). He has lectured widely in Europe and the Americas, and was visiting professor at several universities in Latin America. ADDRESS: University of Amsterdam, Critics, Program of Discourse Studies, 210 Spuistraat, 1012 VT Amsterdam, The Netherlands. [email: teun@let.uva.nl]

REFERENCES

Antaki, C. (1994) *Explaining and Arguing. The Social Organization of Accounts.* London: Sage.

Bañon Hernández, A.M. (1996) *Racismo, discurso periodístico y didáctica de la lengua* [Racism, media discourse and language pedagogy]. Almería: Universidad de Almería.

Billig, M. (1995) *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.

Bourdieu, P. (1988) *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Calero, J.R. (1985) La construcción de la derecha española [*The construction of the Spanish Right*]. Murcia: Procer.

Calsamiglia, H. (1996) 'Multifaceted Dimensions of Self-Reference', *Links and Letters* 3: 61–76.

Carbó, T. (1995) *El discurso parlamentario mexicano entre 1920 y 1950. Un estudio de caso en metodología de análisis de discurso* [Mexican parliamentary discourse between 1920 and 1950. A case study in the methodology of discourse analysis], 2 vols. Mexico: CIESAS and Colegio de México.

Castles, S. (1984) *Here for Good. Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities*. London: Pluto Press.

Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. (1993) *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*. London: Macmillan.

Cederberg, A. (1993) *Stil och strategi i riksdagsretoriken. En undersökning av debattspråkets utveckling i den svenska tvåkammarriksdagen (1867–1970).* [Style and strategy in parliamentary rhetoric. An investigation of the development of the language of debate in Swedish bicameral parliament, 1867–1970]. University of Uppsala: Institute of Nordic Languages.

Chartprasert, D. (1993) 'How Bureaucratic Writing Style Affects Source Credibility', *Journalism Quarterly* 70(1): 150–59.

Chilton, P. (ed.) (1985) *Language and the Nuclear Arms Debate: Nukespeak Today*. London: Frances Printer.

Chilton, P. (1990) 'Politeness, Politics and Diplomacy', *Discourse & Society* 1(2): 201–24.

Chilton, P. (1995) *Security Metaphors. Cold War Discourse from Containment to Common House*. New York: Lang.

Chilton, P. and Schäffner, C. (1997) 'Discourse and Politics', in T.A. Van Dijk (ed.) *Discourse Studies. A Multidisciplinary Introduction.* Vol. 2. *Discourse as Social Interaction*, pp. 206–30. London: Sage.

Connolly, W.E. (1983) *The Terms of Political Discourse*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Connolly, W.E. (1987) *Politics and Ambiguity*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Corbett, E.P.J. (1971) *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cornelis, L.H. (1997) *Passive and Perspective*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

De Contreras, J. (1994) *Los retos de la inmigración: racismo y pluriculturalidad* [The challenges of immigration: racism and pluriculturalism]. Madrid: Talasa.

De Cotarelo, R. (1992) *Transición política y consolidación democratica. España 1975–1986* [Political transition and democratic consolidation. Spain 1975–1986]. Madrid: CIS.

De Fina, A. (1995) 'Pronominal Choice, Identity, and Solidarity in Political Discourse', *Text* 15(3): 379–410.

Della Fave, L.R. (1980) 'The Meek Shall Not Inherit the Earth: Self Evaluation and the Legitimacy of Stratification', *American Sociological Review* 45: 955–72.

Della Fave, L.R. (1986) 'Toward an Explication of the Legitimation Process', *Social Forces* 65(2): 476–500.

Diamond, J. (1996) *Status and Power in Verbal Interaction*. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Diermeier, D. (1995) 'Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions', *American Political Science Review* 89(2): 344–55.

Edwards, D. (1997) *Discourse and Cognition*. London: Sage.

Fairclough, N.L. (1989) *Language and Power*. London: Longman.

Fairclough, N.L. (1995a) *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language*. Harlow: Longman.

Fairclough, N.L. (1995b) *Media Discourse*. London: Edward Arnold.

Fairclough, N.L. and Mauren, A. (1997) 'The Conversation of Political Discourse: A Comparative View', in J. Blommaert (ed.) *Political Linguistics*. Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins.

Fairclough, N.L. and Wodak, R. (1997) 'Critical Discourse Analysis', in T.A. Van Dijk (ed.) *Discourse Studies. A Multidisciplinary Introduction*. Vol. 2. *Discourse as Social Interaction*, pp. 258–84. London: Sage.

Fernández Lagunilla, M. (1986) 'Stéréotypes discursives de la droite comtemporaine espagnole autour de la Nation', in M. Tournier et al. (eds) *Nationalisme en Espagne. Du Franquisme à la démocratie*, pp. 65–88. Paris: Klincksieck.

Foucault, M. (1977) *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Foucault, M. (1981) 'The Order of Discourse', in Robert Young (ed.) *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader*, pp. 48–78. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Fowler, R., Hodge, B., Kress, G. and Trew, T. (1979) *Language and Control*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Gamson, W.A. (1992) *Talking Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Geffroy, A. (1985) 'Les "nous" de Roberspierre', *Mots* 10: 63–90.

Geis, M.L. (1987) *The Language of Politics*. New York: Springer.

Giménez Romero, C. (ed.) (1993) *Inmigrantes extranjeros en Madrid* [Foreign immigrants in Madrid], 2 vols. Madrid: Comunidad de Madrid.

Guespin, L. (1985) 'Nous, la langue et l'interaction', *Mots* 10: 45–63.

Habermas, J. (1996) *Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (1975) *Legitimation Crisis*. Boston. MA: Beacon Press.

Herman, E.S. (1992) *Beyond Hypocrisy. Decoding the News in an Age of Propaganda: Including A Doublespeak Dictionary for the 1990s*. Boston, MA: South End Press.

Herman, E.S. and Chomsky, N. (1988) *Manufacturing Consent. The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon Books.

Hodge, B., and Kress, G.R. (1993) *Language as Ideology*. London: Routledge.

Hovland, C.I. and Weiss. W. (1951) 'The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 15: 635–50.

Hurwitz, S.D., Miron, M.S. and Johnson, B.T. (1992) 'Source Credibility and the Language of Expert Testimony', *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 22(24): 1909–39.

Katriel, T. and Dascal, M. (1989) 'Speaker's Commitment and Involvement', in Y. Tobin (ed.) *From Sign to Text: A Semiotic View of Communication,* pp. 275–95. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Kedar, L. (ed.) (1987) *Power through Discourse*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

López Nieto, L. (1988) *Alianza Popular: estructura y evolución electoral de un partido conservador* [The Popular Alliance: structure and electoral evolution of a conservative party]. Madrid: CIS.

Lui, L. and Standing, L. (1989) 'Communicator Credibility: Trustworthiness Defeats Expertness', *Social Behavior and Personality* 17(2): 219–21.

Martin, J.N., Hammer, M.R. and Bradford, L. (1994) 'The Influence of Cultural and Situational Contexts on Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Communication Competence Behaviors', *Communication Quarterly* 42(2): 160–79.

Martín Rojo, L. (1994) 'Jargon of Delinquents and the Study of Conversational Dynamics', *Journal of Pragmatics* 21(3): 243–89.

Martín Rojo, L. (1997a) 'Jargon', in J. Verschueren, J.O. Östman and J. Blommaert (eds) *Handbook of Pragmatics*, Vol. II. Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins.

Martín Rojo, L. (1997b) 'El orden social de los discursos [The social order of discourse]', *Discurso (Mexico)*, Special issue, edited by T. Carbó & L. Martín Rojo.

Martín Rojo, L., Gómez Esteban, C., Arranz, F. and Gabilondo, A. (eds) (1994) *Hablar y dejar hablar. Sobre racismo y xenofobia* [To speak and to let speak: on racism and xenophobia]. Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.

Mínguez González, S. (1990) *La preparación de la transición a la democracia en España* [Preparation for the transition to democracy in Spain]. Zaragoza: Universidad de Zaragoza.

Nesler, M.S., Aguinis, H., Quigley, B.M. and Tedeschi, J.T. (1993) 'The Effect of Credibility on Perceived Power', *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 23(17): 1407–25.

Ng, S.H. and Bradac, J.J. (1993) *Power in Language*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

O'Barr, W.M., Kramarae, C. and Schulz, M. (eds) (1984) *Language and Power*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Portolés, J. (1997) 'Nombres, adjetivos y xenofobia [Nouns, adjectives and xenophobia], *Discurso (Mexico)*, Special issue, edited by T. Carbó & L. Martín Rojo.

Potter, J. (1996) *Representing Reality. Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction*. London: Sage.

Solé, C. and Herrera, E. (1991) Trabajadores extranjeros en Cataluña: *¿Integración o racismo?* [Foreign workers in Catalunya: Integration or racism?]. Madrid: Siglo XXI–CIS.

Solomos, J. and Wrench, J. (1993) *Racism and Migration in Western Europe*. Oxford: Berg.

Spears, R., Oakes, P.J., Ellemers, N. and Haslam, S.A. (eds) (1997) *The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life*. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Turner, J.C., and Giles, H. (eds) (1981) *Intergroup Behaviour*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Van Dijk, T.A. (1987) 'Episodic Models in Discourse Processing', in Rosalind Horowitz and S. Jay Samuels (eds) *Comprehending Oral and Written Language*, pp. 161–96. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Van Dijk, T.A. (1988) *News Analysis. Case Studies of International & National News in the Press*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Van Dijk, T.A. (1991) *Racism and the Press*. London: Routledge.

Van Dijk, T.A. (1992) 'Discourse and the Denial of Racism', *Discourse & Society*, 3(1): 87–118.

Van Dijk, T.A. (1993a) *Elite Discourse and Racism*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Van Dijk, T.A. (1993b) 'Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis', *Discourse & Society* 4(2): 249–83.

Van Dijk, T.A. (1996) 'Discourse, Power and Acces', in C.R. Caldas-Coulthard and M. Coulthard (eds) *Texts and Practices. Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, pp. 84–104. London: Routledge.

Van Dijk, T.A. (1997a) 'Context Models and Text Processing', in M. Stamenow (ed.) *Cognition and Consciousness*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Van Dijk, T.A. (1997b) 'Political Discourse and Racism. Describing Others in Western Parliaments', in S.H. Riggins (ed.) *The Language and Politics of Exclusion. Others in Discourse*, pp. 31–64. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Van Dijk, T.A. (1997c) *Racismo y análisis crítico de los medios*. [Racism and the critical analysis of the media]. Barcelona: Paidos.

Van Eemeren, F.H., Grootendorst, R., Snoeck Henkemans, F. et al. (1996) *Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory. A Handbook of Historical Backgrounds and Contemporary Developments*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Van Leeuwen, T.J. (1995) *The Grammar of Legitimation*. London: School of Printing, School of Media.

Van Leeuwen, T.J. (1996) 'The Representation of Social Actors', in C.R. Caldas-Coulthard and M. Coulthard (eds) *Texts and Practices. Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Routledge.

Vernengo, R.J. (1992) 'Legalidad y legitimidad. Los fundamentos morales del derecho [Legality and legitimacy. The moral foundations of the law], *Revista de Estudios Politicos* 77: 267–84.

Verschueren, J. and Blommaert, J. (1992) 'The Role of Language in European Nationalist Ideologies', *Pragmatics* 2(3): 355–75.

Wieviorka, M. (ed.) (1994) *Racisme et xénophobie en Europe: une comparaison internationale*. Paris: la Découverte.

Wilson, J. (1990) *Politically Speaking*. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Wodak, R. (ed.) (1989) *Language, Power and Ideology. Studies in Political Discourse*. Amsterdam: John Bejamins.

Wodak, R. and Menz, F. (eds) (1990) *Sprache in der Politik—Politik in der Sprache. Analysen zum öffentlichen Sprachgebrauch* [Language in politics—politics in language. Analyses of public language use]. Klagenfurt: Drava.

Zupnik, Y.J. (1994) 'A Pragmatic Analysis of the Use of Person Deixis in Political Discourse', *Journal of Pragmatics* 21(4): 339–83.