CHAPTER 6

The Veil Lifting Campaign

> Behind the veil lay our political backwardness, behind the veil lay the illiteracy of the Muslim women, behind the veil lay the hard, slavish life of an unequal woman in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is why the Muslim women of Bosnia and Herzegovina are lifting their veils today.
>
> A Yugoslav activist in 1950.[1]

This chapter turns to consider the policies of the Yugoslav Communist Party towards Muslim women as they were targeted by a specific set of actions not applied to other groups. It draws on the discussion in the previous chapter concerning the concept of 'backwardness,' ever-present in Yugoslav society. Arguably, it provided the communist government and its activists with tools for making radical interventions into the lives of Muslim women, which culminated with the veil[2] lifting campaign. This chapter revisits the differences surrounding the marking of Muslim women as backward compared with other women and correlates this with their religion. Yugoslav communists found inspiration for such policies in the Soviet Union, although the aggressive veil lifting campaign started after the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict which shows that the influences of Soviet ideas remained strong. Yugoslav and Soviet rhetoric and policies had many similarities, but the Yugoslav unveiling campaign was different in several key aspects, and ultimately in its results. In examining the particularities of the Yugoslav case, this chapter will tackle the positioning of the Muslim community leadership who supported the

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new measures, the fervent attempts of activists to 'modernise' and unveil Muslim women and, ultimately, the severe punishments imposed by the legislators. All these factors contributed to the removal of veils from public space, forcing many women and men into an uncomfortable position. For the government, this campaign was considered an important success in penetrating communities previously closed to them, and imposing socialist modernisation and new gender relations.

The Idea of 'Backward' Muslim Women

After the war, the new communist government established a cultural hierarchy by classifying different groups of the population in terms of how 'advanced' or 'backwards' they were. As I argued in the previous chapter regarding the peasantry, the criteria for belonging to some of these groups was not always clear but, by controlling the available media, the Yugoslav Communist Party possessed the conceptual and rhetorical hegemony in deciding who was 'modern.' In this unequal relationship between social groups, the discourse of 'backwardness' was all-encompassing in Yugoslav society: fostered by political leaders and activists, it was commonly used to describe the peasantry, and also the Muslim population. Belonging to these groups was always collectively understood, and once they had been marked as 'backward,' that adjective was employed to justify any action by the government.[3]

Amongst those seen as 'backward,' a further social hierarchy was present in which Yugoslav communists considered Muslim women to be 'the most backward' group in the country. They were seen as the victims of unfavourable social conditions, family relations rooted within the Muslim population's traditions, and 'backward' religious practices.[4] Their 'backwardness' was seen as worse than that of other women (e.g. women living in rural areas), because the traditions of the Muslim population were deemed as foreign, timeless, and associated with the Ottoman past, which was viewed as part of the 'inferior' and oriental 'East.'[5] Furthermore, only Muslim women were defined by their religion, as the press always talked about '*muslimanke*' (Muslim women), whilst the expression '*hrišćanke*' (Christian women) was never used to describe other women.[6] Peasant women were also often criticised for their religiosity (and they were thought to be more religious than men), or superstitions, but they were still defined by their poverty and living conditions, not their religion.[7] Being described in terms of one's religion had very

negative connotations, but the newspapers also used this description when reporting on Muslim women who had managed to climb the social hierarchy, becoming highly regarded workers in the factories. In such articles, their Islamic faith was used to show that these women had succeeded in the factories *despite* their religion and background. The religious background of other workers was never mentioned.[8]

Compared to other groups in the countryside, certain 'backward' practices were more often considered a part of Muslim religious traditions, although such practices were certainly not restricted to Muslims. For example, the press frequently mentioned underage marriages, the abduction of women, a bridewealth system (which was viewed as selling women), the use of veils, and polygamy. However, apart from the use of veils and polygamy, the other practices could be found elsewhere in the countryside.[9] In fact, the 'backwardness' of Muslim families was no different to that of any other family in the Yugoslav countryside: the majority of families consisted of a patrilineal social structure in which sons were considered to be more important, as they brought wives and future children to the family, which were valuable resources for the household labour pool. There were no veils, but many Christian peasant women wore headscarves and had similar notions of shame and respect for male seniority. Communist leaders were uncertain as to how widespread polygamy was, but any cases discovered were publicised to prove a point. Furthermore, the new legislation after the war barely penetrated any communities' practices.[10]

Once the idea of 'backwardness' had become an official state-sanctioned category, as explained by Adeeb Khalid when describing a similar case in the Soviet Union, it brought with it both stigma and possible rewards—both for the entire community and for individuals who managed to use this concept to facilitate their own social mobility.[11] The discourse of backwardness was a crucial component to many subsequent policies that directly influenced the lives of many Muslim women. The reasoning was that, if Muslim communities *required* the Party's help to get out of their impoverished position, then Muslim women in particular needed a much deeper intervention. This idea was part of the Yugoslav Communist Party's modernist quest, finding inspiration primarily from the Soviet Union.[12] At the same time, such an intervention opened a space for those willing to cooperate with the new regime to advance their careers, achieving posts that had previously been unobtainable.

Models for Yugoslav Policies

Yugoslav views concerning Muslim women were not unique. Strong resemblances were present in Soviet activists' discourses in Central Asia, and also in the writings of British rulers in the Middle East, in Kemalist Turkey, in Riza Shah's Iran, and in socialist Bulgaria. Muslim women were commonly described as 'buried alive behind the veil,' as 'slaves,' and as 'their father's property' in all these regions.[13] Scholars have yet to examine how such ideas travelled from one place to another. It seems that the press played an important role as did the experience of key intellectuals with international contacts. These contacts most certainly were crucial in the Yugoslav case.

In interwar Yugoslavia, impassioned debate about Muslim women and veils began when Reisu-l-Ulema[14] Mehmed Džemaludin Čaušević (1914–1930) travelled to Kemalist Turkey and, impressed by the reforms there—particularly those regarding women's social positions—initiated a debate with 'ulama[15] and Bosnian intellectuals in late 1927.[16] Čaušević published several articles questioning the need for the use of the veil and calling for women's inclusion in public life and the economy. The discussions which took place were so polarising that Čaušević could not achieve any consensus for similar Kemalist reforms in Bosnia. This debate found its way to the pages of the national newspaper *Politika*, where Islamic scholars elaborated their views. A reformist minority amongst Muslim intellectuals disagreed with the majority of 'ulama regarding women's rights, women's public role and the question of whether veils were inherent to Islam or rather just a local tradition. They engaged in a sophisticated religious debate, one that became so inflamed with passion that Čaušević was accused of being an infidel by other 'ulama. He also had to defend his ideas from the claim that they were foreign, arguing that they consisted of his own interpretation of the Quran. Despite fierce opposition, Čaušević organised the Congress of Bosnian Muslim Intellectuals, in Sarajevo in 1928, to discuss these very issues. Once again, the attendees were unable to come to a consensus on the topic of veils and appropriate dress codes, whilst there was greater agreement on the need for women's education. Čaušević, however, retired from his post after disagreements with the Yugoslav government over the Law on the Islamic Religious Community in 1930. Over the next decade, the issue of the veil was not particularly prominent, but occasionally scholars considered the dilemma of dress codes for women.[17] For the postwar Yugoslav

communist activists, however, the Soviet literature and translations of Soviet texts published in Yugoslav magazines were their main source of information, and there was no such dilemma.[18] Furthermore, there is no evidence that Yugoslav communists ever considered the positions of Muslim women before the war. Given their strongholds in urban centres and amongst intellectuals, they probably had little if any contacts with them. Vahida Maglajlić was one of a few Muslim women close to the Party before the war, and certainly, the only Muslim woman who was declared a war hero. Even in the Partisan press during the war, they admitted that they knew very little about these 'enslaved sisters' before the Partisan struggle brought them together.[19]

The desired position for Muslim women in society is what distinguished the Soviet, and later Yugoslav, activists from other modernisers. Atheism was a crucial component of their ideology, allowing communist leadership to interfere in all religious communities with lesser scruples than other modernisers. The Soviet and Yugoslav communists launched massive and aggressive campaigns designed to bring about change in Muslim communities,[20] whilst—for example—Kemal Atatürk and Albanian interwar politicians introduced moderate reforms.[21] The Kemalist intervention was mostly aimed to promote women's skills as mothers and wives.[22] On the other hand, the objective of Soviet policies, as Adrienne Edgar argues, was not to perpetuate differences between Muslim and non-Muslim women, but to promote homogenisation and uniformity, and to 'raise' all women to achieve the same level of socialist modernity.[23] The Soviets tried to include Muslim women in the work of cooperatives, to find them jobs in which they could earn independently, to protect them from forced marriage and arbitrary divorce, to expand their educational opportunities, and ultimately to unveil these women. The unveiling of women was met with the fiercest resistance particularly in Uzbekistan, where the unveiling campaign failed, forcing the state to oppose veils with more indirect means.[24]

Another strong motive for Soviet interventions in Central Asia was to lessen the importance of traditional kin and local affiliations and to persuade the local population to identify with the newly created national and other political communities.[25] In Yugoslavia, this was only partially true over this period. The Yugoslav leadership wanted to incorporate Muslims into the larger Yugoslav project, especially in areas where the Partisans had not been well supported during the war, but in the

Yugoslav region no attempts were made at that point to create new nations as in Central Asia. The majority of the Muslim population lived in Kosovo, Southern Serbia, Macedonia, and Bosnia. The Albanians and Turks were considered to be established national minorities (*narodnosti*), but the Muslim population in Bosnia did not have a clear status. The new socialist state considered them to be a different community to the Orthodox and Catholic population, but it would take several decades for the government to decide to label them as 'Muslims' ('*in the national sense*') in the census. In the 1948 census, the government only allowed the Muslim population to declare themselves as 'Muslims of undeclared nationality,' in addition to being Serbs or Croats.[26] Nevertheless, the Yugoslav government wanted to include all Muslims in the process of building socialism, which meant creating a loyal and mobile population.

Yugoslav leadership could not have known about the troubles the Soviets had had in Central Asia with unveiling attempts, and instead, they had read about the tremendous success of the Soviet state in emancipating Muslim women. These were often stories from Soviet magazines, which described the Soviet liberation of Muslim women from 'slavery'—women who then had successful careers thanks to the chance they had finally been given.[27] For example, Mamlakat Nahangova a young Kolkhoznitsa from Tajikistan appeared in several Yugoslav articles that closely followed their Soviet originals, describing her desire to work, study and become an emancipated woman in service of socialism.[28] Yugoslav communists were equally ambitious as demonstrated by the most zealous veil lifting campaign which was launched almost two years after the break with the Soviet Union in 1948. Soviet policies towards Muslim women provided a framework which was known to Yugoslav communists via the Soviet press and their own translations.[29]

Similarities also existed in the methods that Soviet and Yugoslav communists applied. For example, in addition to the direct unveiling campaign, Soviet doctors in Central Asia organised medical lectures and check-ups for local women, disseminating the message that traditional ways of living, including traditional dress, had negative consequences for one's health.[30] The Yugoslav press wrote about these actions and their supposedly great results.[31] The largest Yugoslav health campaign was organised in Kosovo, whilst smaller scale campaigns were organised in other areas with a predominantly Muslim population. Various organisations and local governments ran health campaigns in non-Muslim areas as well, but the large-scale campaign in Kosovo undertaken at the same

as the veil lifting campaign was no coincidence. The Yugoslav leadership also viewed the veil as being very harmful to women's health, and medical discourses were widely used. Medical professionals, consequently, claimed that veils prevented women from being healthily exposed to the sun, and from breathing fresh air.[32] Furthermore, much like the Soviets, they linked death and disease directly to every aspect of rural life, and they believed that religious practices and illiteracy played a crucial role in illness. Since the veil was understood as both a symbol and a concrete result of harmful religious practices and illiteracy, a medical discourse was very useful for the campaign.[33] Similar rhetoric was in use in Soviet Central Asia but, from existing research, it seems that in practice Yugoslav communists were more thorough, possibly due to the smaller territory they governed, which made their task easier.

The Communist Party and the Islamic Community in Yugoslavia

The most important difference between the Yugoslav and Soviet cases was the relationship between the Yugoslav Communist Party and the official Islamic Community of Yugoslavia (here on IVZ—Islamska Verska Zajednica). The Islamic Community was re-established in Sarajevo in August 1947, ruled by the Supreme Waqf Council and the Supreme Islamic Seniority, and led by the elected Reisu-l-ulema. From the very beginning, the Communist Party had an excellent relationship with the IVZ. The Party provided the IVZ with state donations and installed some of its Partisans in ruling positions, whilst the IVZ returned the favour by supporting the Party's policies.[34] Zvezdan Folić argues that the IVZ supported each of the Party's campaigns not only due to monetary donations received, but also because the Party did not discriminate the IVZ as compared to other religious organisations: given the newly established state's separation from the church, the IVZ was placed on an equal footing to the previously dominant Orthodox and Catholic organisations. A more conservative line within the IVZ did exist, mostly on the local level, but those who opposed some of the Party's policies were quickly removed from their posts.[35] In the Soviet Union, during the unveiling campaigns and the most radical assaults on the *old society,* there were no religious institutions that had good relations with the Party—the 'ulama was destroyed, and the state introduced a system of

controlled 'spiritual directorates' that served as religious authorities similar to the IVZ, but that did not survive the collapse of the Soviet Union.[36]

Yugoslav interventions within the Muslim communities had several turning points which culminated in the veil lifting campaign. The Yugoslav government introduced the new legislation after the war as a first step, but it was not intended to target any religious group in particular. As explored in chapter three, the Yugoslav Law on Marital Relations, enacted in 1946, was in effect for the whole country and replaced sharia law alongside other legal practices. By defining man and woman as equal in marriage, free to choose a profession, and to initiate divorce, new legislation was very different to sharia law which gave men the unilateral power to initiate divorce proceedings, the right to have concubines, a bigger share in the inheritance, and greater weight in legal court testimony. Within the space of a year after the end of the war, the new government had eradicated marriage and family practices based on Islamic and tribal customary law and vowed to enact and enforce new legislation into everyday life.[37] By taking jurisdiction away from the sharia courts, debates that had previously unsettled the Islamic community were solved, yet in a manner that not even the most extreme modernist had imagined.[38]

The education of Muslim women was another area in which the state intervened by imposing universal laws over the entire country. In interwar Yugoslavia, only Muslim girls had been exempted from mandatory elementary education, whilst Čaušević's attempts from the late 1920s to change the law had been opposed by other Muslim authorities.[39] After the war, elementary state school became mandatory for everyone, and the newly introduced elementary education lasting seven years (extended by the federal government to eight years in the school year 1950/1951) was crucial. Girls were obliged to attend school from the age of seven to fifteen years. The usual practice within Muslim communities had been to bar girls from continuing their education once they had begun to menstruate, a time when they would also start to wear the veil. Furthermore, the new educational system was secular and planned with no gender segregation in the classroom. As elementary level education became mandatory, parents could face fines for not sending children to school. Reisu-l-ulema Ibrahim-ef. Fejić (1947–1957) supported such policies and explained his modernist views in terms of the need to reduce illiteracy amongst Muslim women. His arguments were similar to those of

interwar Muslim scholars, the difference being that there were no opposing views expressed.[40] The Party also made sure that Fejić's views were known, although their implementation faced many obstacles.

Parents continued to forbid many girls to enrol in schools, a common problem in the countryside regardless of one's religious affiliation. Often, it was the poor school facilities and the simple lack of space that convinced many parents against sending their children there.[41] Many parents' intentions to offer the better opportunities to their sons was also a common reason for forbidding girls' from attending school, whilst there was sometimes a simple unwillingness to send girls to schools due to prejudices concerning their education.[42] In many cases, if a local school could only admit a limited number of students, parents would typically send boys. In the Muslim communities, this also related to the replacement of religious schools with public ones, of which many parents did not approve. The influence of the Reisu-l-ulema's calls for education of women was not strong enough, especially in rural and isolated areas.[43] The state, on the other hand, was not able to intervene and impose fines, particularly in the areas of Kosovo and Macedonia where the state-building process was far from complete, and where the majority of these people lived.

Educating adult Muslim women was delegated to the AFŽ. However, the AFŽ's leadership crucially contributed to defining Muslim women as the most 'backwards' and as an 'exceptional case.' The reason for this was existing dominant ideas concerning Muslim women, but also practical difficulties the AFŽ experienced in approaching Muslim women. These views were particularly important in further defining the Party's policies, as not many men in the Party were willing to work with women and even fewer with Muslim women. This allowed the AFŽ significant autonomy in developing campaigns and educational programmes, designed to *elevate* Muslim women through organising different courses and reading groups. Underestimating Muslim women's abilities to deal with political topics, the educators focused on childcare and handcraft, often using alternative learning methods (believing it would help those who were 'backwards'), such as the amateur shows, and educational films. Activists also tried to organise separate lectures for Muslim women as more women would participate when men were not present.[44]

According to official data, Muslim women were one of the most illiterate groups in the country,[45] and the language barrier was a serious problem for AFŽ educators. Different dialects existed amongst the

Albanian women living in Montenegro and Kosovo whilst a significant number of Muslims spoke Turkish. The AFŽ never had enough bilingual members.[46] Without adequate learning materials, educators had to improvise and use articles from newspapers and magazines as textbooks. However, the texts, once adapted for use in Bosnia, could not be used in Kosovo, Montenegro or Macedonia due to different dialects and languages. Another problem was that only a few Albanian women were members of the AFŽ, and willing to work with the local population. The organisation's attempts to include more Albanian women were often futile, whilst those already working in the field sometimes wanted more prestigious careers.[47] Local activists' lack of experience added to the problem. Their desire to 'modernise' Muslim women as quickly as possible often entailed aggressive persuasion on topics such as unveiling, which resulted in many women keeping their distance from the courses. Nevertheless, women's positions were never taken into account, and both the AFŽ and the Youth Organisation considered conservative parents and spouses as the main obstacles to women's attendance and involvement in events organised by the AFŽ.[48]

The AFŽ leadership considered Muslim men to be the main culprits resulting in their failure to 'emancipate' Muslim women. Men were being collectively blamed as early as in 1945 at the first AFŽ Congress when the speakers indicated that Muslim women desired to change their lifestyles, but that *reactionaries* were preventing them from doing so.[49] From that time onwards, men were regularly accused of deliberately keeping women in a 'backward' state, through preventing them from attending courses, being educated, and joining collective farms or industry. The local religious authorities—mullahs—were particularly harshly criticised, especially when they used religion as an argument against the new policies. In the first few years after the war, the AFŽ continued to denounce them and to fight more or less peacefully to free women from being under 'the influence' of their husbands and fathers. This peaceful approach soon changed, and the AFŽ attacked the wearing of veils more aggressively.[50]

Reasons for Targeting Veils

The AFŽ's approach implied that Muslim women were passive victims, living in an involuntarily subjugated position to all men in their communities. The veil was, then, the main symbol of female subjugation and 'backwardness,' humiliating for women, and very often compared

with slavery, torture and inequality. The veil was also perceived as foreign, a relic of mediaeval times brought to the region by 'backward Asian tribes.'[51] However, besides its symbolic associations, the AFŽ considered the veil to be a real physical barrier that was preventing women from having a social life, in addition to creating disturbances at work. Getting rid of it was necessary in order to become a *new woman* who would accept socialist science and culture. Such ideas regarding the veil were repeated in many articles, even in poems published in women's magazines. For the AFŽ the struggle against the veil was yet another battle for a society that is 'more cultural, pleasant and [contributing to] a way of living that is worthy of a human being.'[52]

Parallels with Soviet rhetoric on Muslim women were easily made as Yugoslav communists published translations of Soviet articles. The desire to unveil Muslim women was also comparable. It was driven by high confidence in modernism and progress, supported by the belief that every woman deserved a chance to be a part of the socialist project. At the same time, the AFŽ modernisers assumed that Muslim women had the same intentions, as otherwise, they would collectively be enemies of the new system which was inconceivable for women. If some women were, nevertheless, hostile to the new policies, they were regarded as having fallen under the influence of *reactionaries* and were considered in need of being saved by the Vanguard class. The same conclusions were drawnfor those women who simply wanted to keep the *status quo* and continue with their lives as they had been before the war.[53]

The first attempts to unveil women, although not always direct, were made immediately after the war. Women who wanted to participate in the social and political life of the new state had to unveil, especially if they wanted to join any of the massive organisations ruled by the Party. The problem for the Party was that not many women expressed such a desire. Young people were expected to join the Party's Youth Organisation, but very few Muslim women joined. Only a small number of them participated in Youth Work Actions too.[54] This was not only due to the unveiling, but also due to views within the Muslim communities that joining such organisations would be inappropriate for a Muslim woman. Nevertheless, as some of the biggest projects were built next to areas with high Muslim populations in Bosnia, people who lived close to the construction sites found themselves under severe pressure to join. They had to help the volunteers and work on a building site as well, whilst the volunteers vigorously spread the teachings of the Party.[55]

Muslim women who took part in sports events arranged by the Youth Organisation were always promoted as a positive example in challenging the 'backwardness' of those communities. Consequently, the newspapers praised a few young Muslim women from Bosnia who participated in the 'Youth Relay' for Josip Broz Tito's birthday, or those who showed off their gymnastic skills at a rally in Skopje. Whilst they were small in number, they served for propaganda purposes.[56]

The idea of unveiling never ceased to dominate amongst the AFŽ leaders, who had encouraged activists in several districts of Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo to organise local veil lifting campaigns as early as 1947. The local population did not welcome these initiatives, and even some of the Muslim women who worked for the AFŽ were not eager to participate. As they did not understand the importance of the veil to these women, the AFŽ leadership believed that the resistance they experienced was due to the power of existing family relations, husbands and their relatives. One internal report quoted a local Muslim woman and AFŽ member, who commented that the organisation would need to find her a new home if she lifted her veil, as her husband would force her out of the house.[57] This and several similar cases led the AFŽ leadership to believe that Muslim women were willing to unveil, but found themselves under huge pressure from their surroundings. They concluded that the resistance to veil lifting was due to 'religious fanaticism and cultural backwardness,'[58] which only prompted the organisation to try harder.

Much like the Soviets in Central Asia,[59] Yugoslav communists used public holidays such as the International Women's day on the 8th of March, and Mayday, to encourage more women to unveil. These were always public unveilings, in front of a massive crowd, and they were considered a particular sign of loyalty. The Yugoslav press praised Nidzija Batajili and Vajda Jusufi for unveiling in front of 5000 people at a public meeting in Pristina for the March 8th celebration and emphasised that thirty-eight other women followed them.[60] At the end of 1947, the leader of the AFŽ—Spasenija Babović, claimed that more than 30,000 women had lifted their veils in Kosovo. Whilst that number was exaggerated, it was celebrated as a great victory for the government's attempt to 'elevate the most backward masses.'[61]

The final results of these first unveiling attempts were, however, not so successful. For example, in Macedonia, activists reported that women covered themselves again due to local social pressures, and in some villages, this would happen as soon as the activists left. They counted only

1592 women who had unveiled permanently out of a total of roughly 50,000 Muslim women in Macedonia.[62] Furthermore, these initiatives alienated many local women who used to participate in the AFŽ events, but who then avoided further lectures or conferences as they were afraid that they would have to unveil. Veil lifting was more easily achieved in the factories where a greater number of Muslim women worked separately from men. Some factories, such as one which produced traditional rugs in the town of Novi Pazar, employed Muslim women exclusively. They would often start working in the factory covered up before being later persuaded to discard their veils. The press praised a certain Nedžmija Adžović who unveiled after joining the factory, despite being barely literate. The factory was closely monitored and celebrated for its servery, amateur theatre hall and leisure club. Both Nedžmija and the factory were considered to be the pinnacle of the socialist dream.[63] However, the activists were unable to control the actions of women once they left a factory, with some veiling again as a number of internal reports suggested.[64]

Those who lifted their veils permanently were mostly workers or the wives of highly regarded Party members. However, there were even a certain number of Party members who were unwilling to follow the Party's policies, a fact which outraged the AFŽ leadership and activists.[65] The government only provided moral support and published a resolution in 1947 stating that no one was allowed to prevent a woman from the unveiling. A high ranking Party official named Blagoje Nesković pushed for such a resolution, explaining that the government could not ban the veil as this would be unconstitutional.[66] The government also organised a conference of 'ulama who proclaimed that the act of veil lifting was not against Islam. Reisu-l-ulema supported unveiling, but this was not enough to persuade many people. For example, the AFŽ in Macedonia was forced to admit that the veil lifting campaign failed prior to 1950.[67] The AFŽ leadership learned that they could not have a long-lasting impact without involving men in their work, and more importantly, without imposing legal sanctions against those who opposed them.

The Aggressive Veil Lifting Campaign

The AFŽ and the Party took a more aggressive stance towards unveiling from early 1950 onwards. It was only a year after the government had taken decisive steps towards collectivising agriculture, trying to push rural communities onto collective farms so as to build socialism in the

countryside. The veil lifting campaign could be seen as part of the same process. Communities which were considered to be closed to communist norms and understood as backwards were to be modernised, promoting their inclusion in public life. The communist state-building process was particularly important in areas where the new government struggled to impose its institutions due to the armed opposition in regions such as Kosovo and Macedonia. The Yugoslav secret police and army fought different paramilitary groups in this region until the late 1940s. The timing of the move to an aggressive unveiling strategy corresponds with the defeat of these groups and the establishment of People's Councils throughout the entire country. In 1950 the AFŽ Congress proclaimed a resolution in which activists were called to act and *liquidate* the veils quickly in preparation for a law that would ban veils altogether.[68]

Laws enforcing the banning of veils were passed separately in every republic with a Muslim population, starting with Bosnia in September 1950. The government did not think that such laws would be unconstitutional anymore; once the law had been passed in Bosnia, it forbade wearing the veil. Laws passed in the other republics consisted of the same text, with a preamble explaining the decision made to ban the veil being based on a desire to 'remove the age-old sign of dependence and backwardness of Muslim women, and facilitate the full use of rights won in the People's Liberation Struggle and the building of socialism in this country, and to secure full equality and wider participation in the social, cultural and economic life of the country.'[69] Those who continued to wear a veil could be punished with up to three months in prison or be charged a hefty fine. The law applied not only to women, but also to family members who forced them to wear a veil, or who put pressure on them. If a man forced a woman to wear a veil by means of force, threat or blackmail, the penalty was two years of reformatory work or an even higher monetary fine.[70]

According to the media, such measures were justified by demands made by *advanced* Muslim women themselves. The pattern was the same in every republic. First, the *advanced* women would ask parliament to pass a law repeating the AFŽ's stance and rhetoric on veils, then parliament agreed with their demands, and other women were reported on as greeting the law with joy. The media, the AFŽ and religious authorities then underlined the view that the veil as such could not convey religious or any other 'positive' feelings for Muslim women, alongside the position that society could not wait until all Muslim women had matured

enough in their acquisition of socialist consciousness to choose to unveil independently.[71]

Once the law against veiling had been passed, the veil lifting campaign became more aggressive and comprehensive, as the implementation of unveiling now depended upon the local governments—i.e. the People's Councils. The Party's massive organisations also took part in the law's implementation, particularly the Youth Organisation and the People's Front. Their members had to be the first to unveil their wives and daughters whilst the activists now had both legal and repressive means to ensure unveiling. The Youth Organisation summoned teachers and Party secretaries from the countryside to provide them with directives concerning the campaign. They formed special teams of people, who spoke Turkish, visited many villages, and put the new law into effect. These teams usually consisted of ten devoted young communists, and each group included a woman. They carefully counted the number of young women who unveiled and monitored local officials and their families. Women who lifted their veils at an early stage in the campaign were expected to help the campaign as well, and indeed, some of them agitated fiercely.[72]

Medical campaigns organised at the same time allowed activists to enter people's homes without prior notice or permission. Health campaigns in Kosovo, Sandžak and the area around Niš commenced in 1951 and were organised by the Red Cross, the newly founded Institute for Health Enlightenment in Serbia, and the AFŽ. The AFŽ contributed around 200 activists (mostly from Vojvodina, as Vojvodina was considered being the most *advanced* area in cultural terms). These activists and medical staff entered thousands of houses, giving many women their first gynaecological exams. In addition, almost all young women were enrolled in courses concerning health and hygiene. The idea was to leave a permanent mark on the local communities, transforming their 'backwardness' once and for all. Health reports proudly emphasised that women were unveiled and no longer enslaved, their superstitions broken, and amulets and notes written by local Hodjas destroyed. Lectures on health, accompanied by mobile cinemas and exhibitions followed, whilst activists counted if unveiled women came.[73] Over the next two years, the entire population of these areas was affected by these campaigns, so the AFŽ praised the fact that 142,401 women had been medically examined, being a very effective tool used to monitor who was unveiled.[74]

Resistance to Unveiling and the Aftermath

Resistance to lifting the veil was strong, and there is no clear evidence that all women welcomed the new measures. The AFŽ leadership and their activists never realised the significance of the veil for many women, nor the shock that the veil lifting campaigns produced. They never considered whether women were ready to make such a step.[75] A collection of interviews conducted by Miroslava Malešević with Didara Dukaginji Đordjević is revealing, as they describe Didara's experience once her father had decided she had to unveil. Her father was a communist, and had made a promise to the local branch of the Party. She considered unveiling to be the worst punishment—the end of the world as she knew it, and an unforgivable embarrassment. She could not understand why her father would punish her like that. Without the veil, she felt naked, afraid to leave the home, or say hello to other people in the street, whilst other women from the town she lived in did not make her life any easier. Didara, however, became a prominent AFŽ activist later on, an outspoken advocate against the veil, a high-ranking politician and even a member of the federal parliament. Yet, she clearly remembered unveiling to have been against her will. She was afraid that she would not have been able to find a husband and have a family, and that her entire neighbourhood would have ostracised her. Only later did she become aware of the new opportunities that opened up to her, particularly after taking several educational courses following which she became qualified as a teacher.[76] Didara's case was not unique, as Semiha Kačar demonstrated in a series of published interviews with unveiled Muslim women. Almost all of her interviewees claimed that they had unveiled as a result of their husband's demands, who were being pursued by the Party, and all the women had a hard time adjusting to the new situation they found themselves in.[77] From the AFŽ's meetings and public rhetoric, it seems that their activists never considered or tried to understand the personal hardships that unveiling imposed on these women.

Men were often called upon to prove their political loyalty to the regime over traditional culture, and it appears that for many, such demonstrations were easier to make than they were for women. Some men did oppose the new policies, even some Party members and members of the People's Front who were loyal as regards other political issues, but incapable of comprehending such dramatic changes to gender relations. The AFŽ pointed out the presence of such resistance, and

these men were rebuked for not supporting, and even for discouraging their wives and daughters from the unveiling. If these warnings did not successfully persuade particular individuals, the Party cells would make use of measures prescribed by the new law.[78]

Once the law had been passed and drastic measures taken, many women were locked in their houses. Once again, officials understood this as the men's decision, with women portrayed as passive victims.[79] Testimonies collected by Kačar showed that many women stayed at home because they felt too ashamed to go out in the street unveiled, rather than this being due to men's pressure. Some women simply did not possess adequate clothing. This was even a problem for men who had to show their loyalty to the new government, by demonstrating to other Party members that their wives had indeed unveiled.[80] Public resistance was broken, even in remote places, but resistance to the ideological hegemony present continued via other means. Subordinated groups usually manage to resist total domination by adapting, evading and preserving some agency through their decisions.[81] A large majority of women started to wear a headscarf and slowly adapted to the new situation. The government did not intervene with such coverings as long as the face was visible and was happy that veils had disappeared from the public sphere.[82]

The AFŽ and the Party's Youth Organisation tried to work with women who lifted their veils. The idea was to make these women economically independent from their husbands, and activists often tried to empower them by finding them jobs in some public office, or in industry.[83] Many found a job for the first time. Young people were expected to help their peers to lift the veil and to include them in the Youth Organisation. Local youth organisations arranged special reading groups and home economics courses, and there was a directive to include Muslim women in choirs and folklore groups. The criteria were lowered for women's membership, and they could postpone paying the membership fee for some time.[84] Hundreds of women who unveiled were sent on a free trip across Yugoslavia, paid for by the AFŽ, as this was believed to have been an emancipatory process. The newspapers and magazines enthusiastically reported on these excursions, stating that these women were travelling for the first time with 'their eyes wide open,' comparing their previous lives with the lives of animals. Such articles particularly criticised by husbands who followed their wives on these trips, not trusting them to travel alone and unveiled.[85]

Although the AFŽ leadership saw itself as very inclusive, it was very hard for women with Muslim backgrounds to obtain high positions. Several women who joined the Partisans during the war and who unveiled before the campaign began, were elected to the AFŽ's Central Committee at the first congress. None of them, however, became members of the inner presidency.[86] Highly regarded Muslim women who held important positions within the organisation, and who were called to AFŽ congresses to deliver speeches, were limited in the fields of work they participated in. At every congress, they would talk about issues concerning their own communities, such as the successes of the veil lifting or health campaigns, and never spoke on broader political problems.[87] The AFŽ carefully gathered biographies of many Muslim women who had unveiled, and who were considered good and loyal communists. The majority had relatives already working for the Party whilst some had lost their sons or husbands in the war when fighting for the Partisans. These women enjoyed a special status and, although the AFŽ found it easier to work with them, their biographies were mostly used in newspapers and magazines to promote unveiling. In fact, more women made political careers for themselves outside of the AFŽ, often due to the presence of quotas set by the Party. The previously mentioned Didara became a member of federal parliament, whilst the AFŽ continued to be led by Croatian, Serbian or Slovene communists.

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The aim of the Yugoslav communists' interventions into the Muslim communities was to create what they imagined to be a modern, homogenous and loyal population. Policies focused on Muslim women were both designed to emancipate these women, and to penetrate their communities. These policies included increased education and job opportunities as well as the radical veil lifting campaign. The veil lifting campaign was organised at the same time as collectivisation, the secularisation of education, and the spreading of broader anti-religious propaganda.

The veil lifting campaign resulted in turmoil and put many women and men into an unpleasant position. Veil lifting and laws regarding family relations challenged the traditions of the Muslim communities, but the Yugoslav leadership lacked the perspectives of Muslim women, and could not understand the resistance to veil lifting. Due to intensive pressure, it became impossible for women to continue wearing the veil. They risked not only social exclusion but also high fines and imprisonment.

The monitoring of veil lifting and health campaigns was conducted by all levels of government and the Party's massive organisations. As a result, veils disappeared in Yugoslavia, leaving many women unconfident on the one hand, but also opening up new opportunities to them on the other, if they were willing to participate in the Yugoslav socialist project.

The veil lifting campaign was also important for Yugoslav state-building. The government intervened in communities closed to them both in terms of politics and in terms of private life. The veil lifting and accompanying health campaigns brought the government into the homes of parts of the population where it had previously had little or no presence. In the Montenegrin town of Bijelo Polje, the AFŽ activists literally demolished the old high walls that had enclosed the houses and gardens of the Muslim homes.[88] Their gardens were converted into open classrooms for literacy courses whilst the windows were widened and opened onto the street. Activists closely monitored what happened inside and commented positively if Tito's portrait was hanging on the walls. Personal spaces became public.[89] At the same time, these campaigns were strong mobilising forces for both men and women loyal to the regime. To a certain extent, the veil lifting campaigns entailed a reconfiguring of existing political hierarchies as men could prove their loyalty to the new government and secure their positions, whilst a few women also gained high ranking political posts that would have been unimaginable previously. The high walls and veils that had earlier prevented the Party's gaze had been destroyed.

Notes

1. Dušanka Kovačević, "Govor na III Kongresu AFŽ" [Speech at the Third AFŽ Congress], 1950, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 3, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
2. The veil in Yugoslavia was called *feredža* and, together with *zar*, it meant both face and head covering. In Bosnia and Sandžak it was often light in colour, frequently pink or blue. In Southern Serbia and Macedonia it was always dark, often black. See Olive Lodge, *Peasant Life in Jugoslavia* (London: Seeley, Service, 1942), 285–86; Andreja Mesaric, "Muslim Women's Dress Practices in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Localizing Islam through Everyday Lived Practice," in *The Revival of Islam in the Balkans: From Identity to Religiosity*, ed. Arolda Elbasani and Olivier Roy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 103–21.

3. Articles on "backward" Muslim women can be found in almost every Yugoslav magazine, particularly those published by the AFŽ. For example, "Provodićemo u život zadatke Petog kongresa naše Partije" [We Will Implement the Tasks of the Fifth Congress of Our Party], *Radnica* 3 (October 1948): 1–3.
4. Spasenija Babović, "Govor na II Kongresu AFŽ" [Speech at the Second AFŽ Congress], 1948, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 2, The Archives of Yugoslavia; Vanda Novosel, "Govor na II Kongresu AFŽ" [Speech at the Second AFŽ Congress], 1948, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 2, The Archives of Yugoslavia; Additionally in the reports: "Izveštaj ekipe koja je obradila teren sreza titogradskog" [Report from a Team that Worked in the Area of Titograd], July 15, 1952, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 12, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
5. Zehira Mindović, "Govor na III Kongresu AFŽ" [Speech at the Third AFŽ Congress], 1950, 10, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 3, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
6. This was the case in all regions, and at this point it was not connected with the later recognition of Muslims as a nation in Bosnia.
7. For example, Đuro Pucar-Stari, "Govor na Drugom kongresu Antifašističkog fronta žena Bosne i Hercegovine" [Speech at the Second Congress of the Antifascist Front of Women of Bosnia and Herzegovina], July 12, 1947, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 35, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
8. The article "Među najboljima" [Amongst the Best], *Radnica* 4 (April 1950): 7–8, is a great example as it reported on the best female workers in the country. It described their lives and only emphasised the religious background of the one Muslim woman it featured.
9. Most of the Muslims had one wife even before the war. Lodge's informants in 1940 said that only the rich could afford more than one. See Lodge, *Peasant Life in Jugoslavia*, 192.
10. On the "backwardness" of the Yugoslav countryside: Olga Kovačić, "O prosvetnom radu medju ženama" [On Education of Women], June 19, 1945, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 1, The Archives of Yugoslavia; "Referat o razvoju AFŽ u Makedoniji na plenarnom sastanku Glavnog odbora AFŽ Makedonije" [Report on the Development of the AFŽ in Macedonia at the Plenary Meeting of the Head Committee of the AFŽ Macedonia], April 9, 1946, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 36, The Archives of Yugoslavia; "Zaključci savetovanja sekretara i članova sekretarijata Glavnih odbora Narodne omladine Jugoslavije po pitanju vaspitnog rada medju omladinom" [Conclusions about the Consultations of the Secretaries and Members of the Secretariat of the Head Committees of the People's Youth of Yugoslavia Regarding Educational Work Amongst

the Youth], 1946, Collection 114—SSOJ, Box 58, The Archives of Yugoslavia.

11. Adeeb Khalid, "Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative Perspective," *Slavic Review* 65, no. 2 (July 1, 2006): 238.
12. The Yugoslav press regurarly featured articles about Soviet policies for Muslim population. For example, see "Položaj žene Sovjetskog istoka" [Position of Women of the Soviet East], *Žena u borbi* 45 (November 1947): 22–23; Soviet policies towards Muslim women in Central Asia are well researched. There are many studies, including the following: Douglas Taylor Northrop, *Veiled Empire: Gender & Power in Stalinist Central Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); and Adrienne Edgar, *Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Adrienne Edgar, "Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet 'Emancipation' of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective," *Slavic Review* 65, no. 2 (July, 2006): 252–72.
13. Edgar, "Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet 'Emancipation' of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective," 256; Lenka Nahodilova, "Communist Modernisation and Gender: The Experience of Bulgarian Muslims, 1970–1990," *Contemporary European History* 19, no. 1 (February 2010): 37; Houchang Chehabi, "The Banning of the Veil and Its Consequences," in *The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society under Riza Shah 1921–1941*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 193–210; and Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).
14. The highest official within the Bosnian Islamic Community.
15. Religious scholars.
16. Čaušević was also educated in the Ottoman Empire. He graduated in law in Istanbul in 1903. See Mustafa Imamović, *Vjerske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini i Jugoslaviji između dva svjetska rata* (Sarajevo: Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Sarajevu, 2008), 55; Besides that, modernist publications, such as Sirat-i mustakim from Turkey were also read in Yugoslavia. See Sejad Mekic, *A Muslim Reformist in Communist Yugoslavia: The Life and Thought of Husein Đozo* (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2017), 4; and On how Yugoslav writers saw the Kemalist reforms regarding women's rights, see Anđelko Vlašić, "Modern Women in a Modern State," *Aspasia* 12, no. 1 (January 2018): 68–90.
17. Fikret Karčić, "The Reform of Shari'a Courts and Islamic Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina," in *Islam in Inter-War Europe*, ed. Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain (London: Hurst, 2008), 253–70; Xavier Bougarel, "Reis

i veo: jedna vjerska polemika u Bosni i Hercegovini između dva rata," *Historijska traganja*, no. 6 (2010): 69–114.

18. See "Žene Sovjetskog istoka" [Women of the Soviet East], *Žena danas* 37 (December 1945): 21–22.
19. On their encounters during the war, see Veda Zagorec, "Na pravi put sam ti, majko, izišo" [Mother, I Have Found the Right Path], *Žena u borbi*, no. 10 (September 1944): 14; Lydia Sklevicky found a document stating that the Party's agitprop blocked writing about unveiled women in Livno, Bosnia, in 1943, due to a fear of disturbing traditional feelings. Lydia Sklevicky, *Konji, žene, ratovi* (Zagreb: Druga and Ženska infoteka, 1996), 46; On Vahida Maglajlić: Petar Kačavenda and Dušan Živković, eds., *Narodni Heroji Jugoslavije* (Belgrade and Podgorica: Partizanska knjiga, Narodna knjiga, and Pobjeda, 1982), 479.
20. Edgar, "Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet 'Emancipation' of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective," 253, 262; Khalid, "Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative Perspective"; In Bulgaria the veil lifting campaign was very aggressive, and even included changing the name of women. See Mary Neuburger, "Veils, Shalvari, and Matters of Dress: Unravelling the Fabric of Women's Lives in Communist Bulgaria," in *Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-war Eastern Europe*, ed. Susan Emily Reid and David Crowley (Oxford and New York, NY: Berg, 2000), 169–88; and Nahodilova, "Communist Modernisation and Gender: The Experience of Bulgarian Muslims, 1970–1990."
21. Veils were banned in Albania in 1929, but the authorities were very cautious in applying the law and tried to convince people to unveil voluntarily. Nathalie Clayer, "Behind the Veil. The Reform of Islam in Inter-War Albania or the Search for a 'Modern' and 'European' Islam," in *Islam in Inter-War Europe*, ed. Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain (London: Hurst, 2008), 128–55; Veiling in Kemalist Turkey was not banned, although there was a campaign against the veil, see Deniz Kandiyoti, "End of Empire: Islam, Nationalism and Women in Turkey," in *Women, Islam and the State*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 22–47. It was a part of several broader political and social reforms, that amongst other things introduced voting rights for women, and recognised women as citizens of the new republic.
22. Neil MacMaster, *Burning the Veil: The Algerian War and the "Emancipation" of Muslim Women; 1954–62* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), 8.
23. Edgar, "Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet 'Emancipation' of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective," 265.
24. Many unveiled women faced severe harassment, whilst numerous other were raped and/or killed. Several high official women were also

murdered. See Gregory J. Massell, *The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919–1929*, 1974, 280–85; Also see Northrop, *Veiled Empire* for more recent analysis of limits of Soviet power in the Central Asia.

25. Edgar, "Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet 'Emancipation' of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective," 262.
26. Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 27; also see Aydin Babuna, "Bosnian Muslims during the Cold War: Their Identity between Domestic and Foreign Policy," in *Religion and the Cold War: A Global Perspective*, ed. Philip E. Muehlenbeck (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012), 184; and Sevan Philippe Pearson, "Muslims' Nation-Building Process in Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1960s: Muslims' Nation-Building Process," *Nations and Nationalism*, November 2017.
27. These articles were often direct Soviet translations, published in the AFŽ's central magazine. For example, Jurij Arbat, "Iz ropstva harema" [From Slavery of a Harem], *Žena danas* 53 (1948): 44–45 was translated from Советская женщина.
28. See "Pobediteli hlopkovyh polej" [Champions of the Cotton Fields], *Rabotnitsa*, no. 36 (December 1935): 8–9; "Mamljakat," *Žena danas* 37 (December 1945): 23–25.
29. "Uzbekistan – Zemlja bijelog zlata" [Uzbekistan—The Land of the White Gold], *Naša žena* 6–7 (July 1947): 8; Olga Eleonska, "Djevojka iz pustinje" [A Girl from the Desert], *Naša žena* 29 (July 1947): 10; and Arbat, "Iz ropstva harema."
30. See Paula A. Michaels, "Medical Propaganda and Cultural Revolution in Soviet Kazakhstan, 1928–41," *Russian Review* 59, no. 2 (April 2000): 159–78.
31. "Žene Turkmenistana" [Women of Turkmenistan], *Naša žena* 40 (August 1948): 21; "Iz života muslimanke u Sovjetskom Savezu" [On the Lives of Muslims in the Soviet Union], *Naša žena* 43 (November 1948): 16–17.
32. The importance of one's exposure to the sun was emphasised in numerous articles. For example, S Protić, "Sunce – izvor života i zdravlja" [Sun—The Source of Life and Health], *Radnica* 6 (June 1950): 21.
33. Marija Marinčević, "Počela je borba protiv neznanja i zaostalosti" [The Battle against Ignorance and Backwardness Has Begun], *Žena danas* 83 (May 1951): 6–8.
34. Radmila Radić, "Islamska verska zajednica 1945–1970. godine," *Forum Bosnae*, no. 32 (2005): 100–105; The Islamic Community had to rely on the state donations after the Waqf nationalization. See Mekic, *A Muslim Reformist in Communist Yugoslavia*, 34.

35. Zvezdan Folić, "Skidanje zara i feredže u Crnoj Gori 1947–1953," *Istorijski zapisi*, nos. 3–4 (1999): 79; For example, in the remote village of Dolgoš, in the district of Debar, a local imam tried to forbid female children from going to school. "Izveštaj Glavnog odbora AFŽ-a NR Makedonije za 1948 godinu" [Report of the Head Committee of the AFŽ in NR Macedonia for 1948], December 1948, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 15, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
36. Adeeb Khalid, *Islam After Communism: Religion and Politics in Central Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 71–73.
37. Karl Kaser, *Porodica i srodstvo na Balkanu: analiza jedne kulture koja nestaje* (Belgrade: Udruženje za društvenu istoriju, 2002).
38. For more information regarding what it meant to be a modernist in this debate see Fikret Karčić, *Društveno-pravni aspekt islamskog reformizma: Pokret za reformu šerijatskog prava i njegov odjek u Jugoslaviji u prvoj polovini XX vijeka* (Sarajevo: Islamski teološki fakultet, 1990), 238.
39. Imamović, *Vjerske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini i Jugoslaviji između dva svjetska rata*, 88.
40. For more on the position of the Reisu-l-ulema: Karčić, *Društveno-pravni aspekt islamskog reformizma: Pokret za reformu šerijatskog prava i njegov odjek u Jugoslaviji u prvoj polovini XX vijeka*, 238.
41. The government invested in a number of resources to improve schooling in Muslim areas. Compared to the situation before the war, the number of teachers increased three times, and many new schools were opened. "Izveštaj o nepismenosti" [Report on Illiteracy], 1953, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 15, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
42. Zahra Mujdović, "Govor na IV Kongresu AFŽ" [Speech at the Fourth Congress of the AFŽ], 1953, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 5, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
43. Karčić, *Društveno-pravni aspekt islamskog reformizma: Pokret za reformu šerijatskog prava i njegov odjek u Jugoslaviji u prvoj polovini XX vijeka*, 238.
44. Novosel, "Govor na II Kongresu AFŽ"; "Rezolucija Plenuma Centralnog odbora AFŽ Jugoslavije" [Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the AFŽ of Yugoslavia], October 1948, 5, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 6, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
45. In 1948, 78.4% of women in Kosovo were still illiterate. Sometimes local organisations would claim that minorities were the only illiterate group. See "Zadaci Narodne omladine u borbi za socijalistički preobražaj sela" [The Tasks of the People's Youth in the Struggle for Socialist Transformation of the Countryside], 1951, Collection 114 SSOJ, Box 95, The Archives of Yugoslavia; For more details, see: 54–56 *Statistički Godišnjak FNRJ 1955* [Statistical Annual of the FNRJ 1955] (Belgrade: Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1955).

46. "Izveštaj Glavnog odbora AFŽ za Crnu Goru" [Report of the Head Committee of the AFŽ for Montenegro], December 14, 1948, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 12, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
47. "Stenografske beleške druge sednice Izvršnog odbora" [Proceedings from the Second Meeting of the Executive Committee], April 6, 1948, 3, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 8, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
48. Lidija Jovanović, "Govor na III Kongresu AFŽ" [Speech at the Third AFŽ Congress], 1950, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 3, The Archives of Yugoslavia; "INFORMACIJA o radu organizacije Narodne omladine sa ženskom omladinom" [Information about the Activities of the People's Youth Organisation with Female Youth], 1951, 5–6, Collection 114 SSOJ, Box 69, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
49. Mevla Jakupović, "Govor na I Kongresu" [Speech at the First AFŽ Congress], June 18, 1945, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 1, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
50. "Zapisnik VI plenarnog sastanka Glavnog odbora AFŽ-a Makedonije" [Minutes from the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Head Committee of the AFŽ Macedonia], December 8, 1950, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 36, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
51. Bia Vokši, "Govor na II Kongresu AFŽ" [Speech at the Second AFŽ Congress], 1948, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 2, The Archives of Yugoslavia; Mindović, "Govor na III Kongresu AFŽ," 10.
52. These ideas were repeated on numerous occasions: Vokši, "Govor na II Kongresu AFŽ"; Kovačević, "Govor na III Kongresu AFŽ"; Also in the poems printed in the magazines: Mira Alečković, "O devojci koja je zbacila feredžu" [About a Girl Who Discarded the Veil], *Žena danas* 51 (December 1947): 43; In the reports of the local AFŽ organisations "Rad organizacije A.F.Z. Crne Gore po pitanju skidanja feredže" [Work of the AFŽ Organisation of Montenegro Regarding the Removal of Feredža], September 9, 1948, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 15, The Archives of Yugoslavia; And finally in the legislation: "Objavljen je Zakon o zabrani nošenja zara i feredže" [The Law that Prohibits Wearing of Zar and Feredža is Announced], *Naša žena*, nos. 11–12 (January 1951): 22.
53. "Rezolucija Drugog kongresa Antifašističkog fronta žena povodom pokreta muslimanki za skidanje zara" [Resolution of the Second Congress of the Antifascist Women's Front Regarding the Movement of Muslim Women for the Removal of the Veil], July 13, 1947, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 35, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
54. The importance of Youth Work Actions will be explored in the following chapter.
55. S. Marić, "Mladi graditelji na velikom delu" [Young Builders at the Grand Deed], *Žena danas* 44–45 (August 1946): 11–14.

56. Neda Krmpotić, "Fiskultura i sport dostupni su danas najširim slojevima naše ženske omladine" [Fiskultura and Sport are Accessible to the Majority of Our Female Youth Today], *Žena danas* 46 (September 1946): 26.
57. "Izveštaj glavnog odbora AFŽ-a Bosne i Hercegovine" [Report of the Head Committee of the AFŽ of Bosnia and Hercegovina], 1947, 3, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 2, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
58. "Izveštaj glavnog odbora AFŽ-a Bosne i Hercegovine."
59. See Marianne Kamp, "Pilgrimage and Performance: Uzbek Women and the Imagining of Uzbekistan in the 1920s," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34, no. 2 (May 1, 2002): 272; Also, widely reported and admired in the Yugoslav press: "Položaj žene Sovjetskog istoka"; and "Znamenite Sovjetske žene: Sara Išanturajeva" [Notable Soviet Women: Sara Ishatunayeva], *Zora* 23 (July 1947): 7.
60. "Pokret muslimanki Kosova i Metohije za skidanje feredža" [The Movement of Muslim Women from Kosovo and Metohija for the Removal of Feredža], *Žena danas* 48 (June 1947): 15.
61. Babović, "Govor na II Kongresu AFŽ," 15.
62. Ljubomirka Tomić, "Referat održan na II Plenumu Centralnog odbora AFŽ Jugoslavije" [Report at the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the AFŽ Yugoslavia], September 19, 1948, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 6, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
63. D. V., "Radnice prvog industriskog preduzeća u Sandžaku" [She-Workers of the First Industrial Firm in Sandžak], *Borba*, February 15, 1949.
64. "Godišnji izveštaj o radu Glavnog odbora AFŽ Srbije" [Annual Report on the Activities of the Head Committee of the AFŽ Serbia for 1949], December 15, 1948, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 13, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
65. "Izveštaj Centralnom odboru AFŽ" [Report to the Central Committee of the AFŽ], September 9, 1948, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 15, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
66. "Pokret muslimanki Kosova i Metohije za skidanje feredža"; Similar discussions about banning the veil went on for years in the Soviet Union, see Northrop, *Veiled Empire*.
67. "Godišnji izveštaj za rad Glavnog odbora AFŽ-a Makedonije" [Annual Report on the Work of the Head Committee of the AFŽ of Macedonia], December 1949, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 15, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
68. "Rezolucija III Kongresa AFŽ" [Resolution of the Third Congress of the AFŽ], 1950, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 3, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
69. "Zakon o zabrani nošenja zara i feredže" [The Law on Prohibition of Wearing Zar and Feredža], 33 Službeni glasnik [The Official Gazette] § (1950).

70. Zakon o zabrani nošenja zara i feredže [The Law on Prohibition of Wearing Zar and Feredža].
71. Lj A, "I muslimani Kosmeta i Sandžaka zahtevaju donošenje zakona o zabrani zara" [Muslims from Kosmet and Sandžak Also Demand Declaration of a Law to Ban the Veil], *Borba*, October 26, 1950; "Za potpuno oslobođenje muslimanke" [For Complete Liberation of Muslim Women], *Radnica* 10 (October 1950): 5.
72. Sado Hamo, "Akcija skidanja zara i feredže u Makedoniji" [Campaign for the Removal of Zar and Feredža in Macedonia], *Narodna omladina* 3 (1951): 40–41.
73. "Analiza rada na zdravstvenom prosvećivanju od 1945 do 1952. godine" [Analysis of the Work on Health Enlightenment from 1945 to 1952], 1952, Collection 36, Savet za narodno zdravlje i socijalnu politiku—Box 26, Archive of Yugoslavia; Ivka Buterin, "Sa puta po Kosmetu" [Report from the Visit to Kosovo], 1952, Collection 36, Savet za narodno zdravlje i socijalnu politiku—Box 26, Archive of Yugoslavia.
74. "Osvrt na rad organizacija AFŽ-a od III kongresa Narodnog fronta Jugoslavije do kraja 1952 godine" [Remark about the Work of the AFŽ organisations from the Third Congress of the People's Front of Yugoslavia until the end of 1952], 1953, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 4, The Archives of Yugoslavia; "Izveštaj o radu ženske organizacije" [Report about the Activities of the Women's Organisation], 1953, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 5, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
75. There are, however, a few reports which the AFŽ collected on the ground about the experiences of unveiled women. In one such report, one paragraph mentions that unveiling was so difficult for some women, they would faint when activists agitated against veils. This was, however, ignored in the meetings. "U Jugoslaviji nema više nijedne žene pod feredžom" [In Yugoslavia There Is Not a Single Woman Covered With Feredža Anymore], 1951, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 15, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
76. Miroslava Malešević, *Didara: Životna Priča Jedne Prizrenke* (Belgrade: Srpski genealoški centar, 2004).
77. Semiha Kačar, *Zarozavanje zara* (Podgorica: Almanah, 2000).
78. Tomić, "Referat održan na II Plenumu Centralnog odbora AFŽ Jugoslavije," 6; "Untitled report from the Macedonian AFŽ to the AFŽ's Central Committee," May 14, 1949, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 6, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
79. "Izveštaj ekipe koja je obradila teren sreza titogradskog."
80. Kačar, *Zarozavanje zara*.
81. As Fiske has theorised, any given hegemony's victories are never final, see John Fiske, *Television Culture* (London: Routledge, 2007), 40.

82. Mujdović, "Govor na IV Kongresu AFŽ"; The way headscarf was stigmatised, see Mesaric, "Muslim Women's Dress Practices in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Localizing Islam through Everyday Lived Practice."
83. "Rezolucija Plenuma Centralnog odbora AFŽ Jugoslavije."
84. "INFORMACIJA o radu organizacije Narodne omladine sa ženskom omladinom," 4.
85. "Prvi put sa otvorenim očima u svet" [The First Time With An Open Eyes in the World], 1948, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 15, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
86. "Pretsedništvo Centralnog odbora AFŽ-a izabrano na I Kongresu" [Presidency of the Central Committee of the AFŽ Elected at the First Congress], June 1945, Collection 141 AFŽ, Box 1, The Archives of Yugoslavia.
87. Vokši, "Govor na II Kongresu AFŽ"; Mindović, "Govor na III Kongresu AFŽ"; Mujdović, "Govor na IV Kongresu AFŽ."
88. Similar high walls were equally common in Bosnia and Kosovo. See the following ethnographic study: Lodge, *Peasant Life in Jugoslavia*, 77.
89. Danica Perić, "Nepoznati znanci" [Unknown Acquaintances], *Žena danas* 68–69 (March 1950): 29–30.