

2 Cleavages

In Tocqueville's interpretation of civil society, or the private sector in the twentieth-century conception, when people live above a certain threshold of affluence they naturally start engaging in collective action. Groups form free associations, which connect men and women. Without collective action, the emphasis on formal equality in a democratic society would lead to anomie or alienation. Tocqueville underlined the importance of free associations to democracy more than any other of the classical theorists, stating:

Among the laws that rule human societies there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased. (Tocqueville, 1990: II, 110)

What kinds of collective action would these associations engage in, one may ask in relation to Tocqueville? He mentions churches, leisure associations, interest organizations and neighbourhood associations. Here we take a step back and focus first upon those social groups whose operations may result in political activities.

Political sociology has employed the concept of cleavages to identify groups in society with an actual or potential impact upon political life. Thus, we ask: can we arrive at a systematic description of collective action in civil society if we employ modern cleavage theory? Various cleavage bases may be identified, and there is a real variation in the extent of social heterogeneity in West European societies whether measured by one or the other index of social fragmentation.

It is important when one refers to the structure of West European societies to specify how cleavages as well as social fragmentation are to be measured. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how cleavages structure civil society and create collective action opportunities.

Cleavage theory

As early as in the 1950s influential political sociology theory emphasized the implications of the structure of society, arguing that social fragmentation was conducive to political instability. One scholar stated:

What I propose to do in this brief paper is to suggest how the application of certain sociological and anthropological concepts may facilitate systematic comparison among the major types of political systems operative in the world today. (Almond, 1956: 391)

Almond set out to classify political systems by means of a conceptual schema that focused on political stability. To Almond it was obvious that there were vital differences between four types of political system: the Anglo-American, the continental European, the pre-industrial or partially industrial, and the totalitarian. Implicit here is a fifth type of political system comprising Scandinavia and the Low Countries. Almond was uncertain how to relate these systems to the fourfold classification (Almond, 1956: 392-3).

Almond wanted to introduce a conceptual system that could justify his fourfold classification and he elaborated a number of concepts which were sociological in character to get away from the legalist bias so common in the field of comparative politics (Figure 2.1). Almond was deeply affected by the Parsonian vogue in theoretical sociology in the 1950s. Talcott Parsons and his associates introduced a number of new concepts which proved applicable in cross-country comparative research. As a matter of fact the Parsonian conceptual schemes (Parsons, 1951; Parsons and Shils, 1951; Parsons and Smelser, 1956) became popular in both sociology and political science during the 1950s, provoking a sharp reaction against Parsonianism in the late 1960s.

According to Almond the Anglo-American political systems are stable, because there is a high degree of consensus among the population about political means and ends and because political institutions are clearly defined and separated from each other as well as from other social institutions. The other types of political system are more or less unstable, because either the groups and organizations of these systems are divided into mutually exclusive political cultures or political roles are not differentiated into a set of separate, organized and specific institutions.

Classifications and typologies are not the end of comparative political analysis; they are tools for the creation of models by which fundamental processes of interaction may be analysed. Though the Almond typology has been challenged — as explicitly excluding a group of the Scandinavian

Political cultures	Homogeneous	Fragmented
High degree of differentiation	Anglo-American	Continental European
Low degree of differentiation	Totalitarian	Pre-industrial

FIGURE 2.1 *Almond's typology*

countries and the Low Countries and crudely classifying a number of countries as totalitarian and pre-industrial — the implicit model in Almond's article relating degrees of political stability to political culture and role structure stimulated research into the conditions that promote or operate against stability. It encouraged efforts to understand the social conditions that affect politics.

Stein Rokkan was much in line with a seminal trend in political sociology: that political systems are to be interpreted in terms of how they relate to structures of social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967a; Rokkan et al., 1970; Rokkan and Urwin, 1983). The growth of an industrial society out of a rural one constitutes a process of nation-building, which is heavily influenced by factors that create or may create dissension between people in the form of cleavages; how people at large orientate to cleavages constitutes voter alignments. Rokkan was typical of the political sociology tradition which aimed to understand political phenomena in terms of their social correlates. Social and political phenomena may be interpreted synchronically or diachronically. Rokkan focused on the time dimension, on how crucial aspects of political systems and party systems arise from their historical roots. In particular Rokkan dealt with the interpretation of the emergence of West European democracies. These political systems are characterized by mass politics, which implies the operation of political parties openly competing for the votes of the citizens in secret ballots, based on universal suffrage; the electorates in these countries are fully mobilized along cleavage lines and the development of cleavages and voter alignments are vital aspects of the building process of these nations. If the concept of social cleavages is made central to the interpretation of West European politics, then it is vital to identify the main cleavages in Western Europe.

Rokkan identified the relationship between cleavages in society and voter alignments as expressed in the party systems of each nation at the time of the breakthrough of democratic criteria of government. He developed a model of the variety of nation-building processes by making distinctions between how different cleavages occurred in alternative combinations in various countries:

This is a task I shall try to tackle, first for the eleven smaller polities, later for all the fifteen competitive systems in Western Europe: I shall suggest, in crude outline, a model for the explanation of variations in the sequences of democratization and in the structuring of the party systems in these countries. (Rokkan et al., 1970: 78)

The Rokkan model of nation-building relates the process of democratization to election rules, representation criteria, cleavage structures and voter alignments. Rokkan constructed an elaborate classification system to cover the variety of election and representation rules and the different cleavage and alignment structures typical of democratic regimes diachronically.

Cleavage	National-Centre	Local and regional periphery
Interest-Economy	1A	1B
Ideology-Culture	2A	2B

FIGURE 2.2 Types of cleavage: culture and economy versus centre and periphery (based on Rokkan et al., 1970: 97)

Rokkan's models concern how democratic institutions and party systems developed in West European political systems. Processes of democratization may occur in various ways and party systems may differ from one country to another. To classify these variations is a valid task, but it is not a substitute for the systematic analysis of party systems and political phenomena today. It is vital to distinguish between questions about the *origin* of political phenomena and questions about the *persistence* of political phenomena. Both types of problem are valid objects for scientific inquiry, but they concern different matters of fact. Rokkan described the variety of party systems that arose along with the process of democratization in West European societies. Using Parsonian concepts Rokkan constructs a figure which covers the basic lines of cleavages political parties orientated themselves towards during the process of democratization (Figure 2.2).

Four fundamental processes of historical transformation of Western civilization form the bases of the party systems in Western Europe. First there is the Reformation; then national revolutions created unified nation-states, breaking local and regional affinities; the industrial revolution then replaced the diffuse loyalties of the agrarian society, particularly religiously orientated ones, with economically specific lines of interest between various classes; finally, the Communist power seizure in 1917 expressed the international revolution (Heidar and Bertelsen, 1993). The basic cleavages are thus: (1A) workers versus employers/owners, (1B) primary versus secondary economy, (2A) church(es) versus government, and (2B) subject versus dominant culture. Cleavage (2B) refers to the conflict between the central nation-building culture and resistance by provincial cultures – be they ethnic or religious ones. Cleavage (2A) covers the contention within the expanding nation state, setting standards and mobilizing resources, and the traditional privileges of the church(es). The first two cleavages are related to the industrial revolution: (1B) covers the conflict between landed interests and the industrial entrepreneurs whereas (1A) refers to the conflict between the owners of capital, business and employers on the one hand and the tenants, labourers and workers on the other.

One may ask how relevant Rokkan's analysis is for the understanding of today's realities concerning the social sources of political phenomena, for example the structuring of the electorate behind political parties (see Chapter 4).

We will first attempt to measure the occurrence of cleavages. What is the meaning of 'cleavage'?

The concept of cleavage

In cleavage theory a cleavage is considered to be a division of individuals, groups or organizations among whom conflict may arise. The concept of cleavage is thus not identical with the concept of conflict; cleavages may lead to conflict, but a cleavage need not always be attended by conflict. A division of individuals, groups or organizations constitutes a cleavage if there is some probability of a conflict. Cleavages occur in society, in party systems and in government. They operate in the social structure, dividing it into various collectivities; sometimes such structural cleavages become the target of conscious orientation and a variety of interests are defined.

Political parties may organize themselves on the basis of identification of cleavages. Cleavages crop up in the political system as issues to be dealt with by the decision-making structures of government. Interest organizations tend to identify themselves along cleavage lines.

We use the concept of cleavages to describe and analyse *latent* and *manifest* patterns of conflict within our 18 nations; we deal with cleavages at three levels: society, party system and government. We investigate what cleavages exist at the various levels, how they interact at each level, and the interrelationships between the levels. The crucial problem is: what cleavages are to be identified? How many? Can one measure their occurrence as well as strength?

A concise treatment of cleavages is presented by Rae and Taylor, who identify cleavages in the following manner:

Cleavages are the criteria which divide the members of a community or subcommunity into groups, and the relevant cleavages are those which divide members into groups with important political differences at specific times and places. (Rae and Taylor, 1970: 1)

Which cleavages are politically important? The problem is similar to that of the forest and the trees, because to understand politics some cleavages setting groups and organizations apart from each other must be identified, but when these cleavages are to be identified it is not enough to talk about criteria that divide people into groups, because there are many such criteria and groups may be amalgamated in myriad ways.

Rae and Taylor must find the criteria among several alternative sets of criteria since cleavages are to be employed to identify 'important political differences'. They suggest that there are three types of cleavage worthy of study: (1) ascriptive or 'trait' cleavages: race or caste; (2) attitudinal or 'opinion' cleavages: ideology or preference; and (3) behavioural or 'act' cleavages: those elicited through voting and organizational membership. If

the typology proposed is illuminating it does not solve a key problem in research on cleavages: which cleavages are to be singled out for description and analysis? Rae and Taylor state: 'A cleavage is merely a division of a community - into religious groups, opinion groups, or voting groups, for example. Formally, we define a "cleavage" as a family of sets of individuals' (Rae and Taylor, 1970: 23). A large community such as the United Kingdom or France may be divided into an unlimited number of groups. The problem remains: which cleavages are to be picked out as the significant ones (Pesonen, 1973; Zuckerman, 1975, 1982; Knutsen, 1989; Aardal, 1994)?

Flanagan proposes another typology of cleavages, as 'potential lines of division within any given society' which can be classified in the following way: segmental cleavages: racial, linguistic or religious differences; cultural cleavages: young-old, urban-rural, traditional-modern, authoritarian-libertarian; economic-functional: class, status or role differences (Flanagan, 1973: 64). It is often considered that classifications should be mutually exclusive, i.e. the entities to be classified should fall into one and only one of the classification boxes. It may be argued against the Flanagan classification that linguistic and religious cleavages may be classified as cultural ones and that the urban-rural cleavage and the traditional-modern cleavage could be placed under economic-functional cleavages. Segmental cleavages 'tend to divide a country into exclusive communities' (Flanagan, 1973: 64). This may be true: if so, class cleavages may certainly be segmental cleavages.

Social science concept formation is often considered ambiguous and the amount of intersubjective agreement on the employment of words is low; compare the use of terms between Flanagan and Eckstein. Eckstein makes a distinction among three types of cleavage, one of which is the segmental one: 'A third kind of division is segmental cleavage. This exists where political divisions follow very closely, and especially concern, lines of objective social differentiation' (Eckstein, 1966: 34).

As examples of 'objective social differentiation' Eckstein mentions tribe, race, region, rural-urban, sex, young-old, language, religion and occupation. While Flanagan reserves the word segmental for a very special set of cleavages Eckstein seems to include almost all kinds of cleavage, because there may exist many lines of objective social differentiation. Perhaps it is appropriate to mention the other two political divisions that Eckstein refers to: one kind is composed of disagreements over policy issues and the other kind refers to cultural divergences in general belief and value systems (Eckstein, 1966: 33). Could it not be the case that segmental cleavages like religion and language often concern cultural lines of division, and that segmental cleavages are often identified through their appearance at the policy level?

If it is difficult to construct valid typologies of cleavages, then perhaps it is better simply to enumerate them. Hans Daalder turns to historical inquiries to arrive at a list of cleavages, where the most important dividing lines in Europe have tended to be (a) class or sectional interest: parties representing sections of industry or commerce, labour or agriculture; (b) religion:

modernists, fundamentalists, Catholics, Protestants, clericals, anti-clericals, Anglicans, and Nonconformists; (c) geographical conflict: town versus country and centre versus periphery; (d) nationality or nationalism: ethnic parties and nationalist movements; and (e) regime: status quo parties, reform parties, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary parties (Daalder, 1966a: 67-8). What are the criteria for deciding what is an important dividing line? How is importance measured? Are there perhaps other kinds of cleavage that should be mentioned? What about ideologies? Or the cleavage young-old or modern-traditional? The problem concerning cleavages remains even if a procedure of enumerating kinds of cleavage is resorted to: how many are to be listed? And what procedure guarantees that some cleavages are not neglected?

Cleavages may be distinguished on the basis of a typology identifying different kinds of cleavage; but a seminal theme in the study of comparative politics is that it is equally important how cleavages occur. On the one hand there is the hypothesis about the differential impact of mutually reinforcing cleavage structures as against the effects of cross-cutting patterns of cleavages; Blondel speaks of sectionalism in relation to the former type (Blondel, 1969: 52-8). On the other hand we have hypotheses about the implications of intensity of cleavages for the structuring of political life; what Lorwin and McRae refer to as segmented pluralism (Lorwin, 1974). According to McRae segmented pluralism requires that the cleavage in question should be sufficiently intense and durable to give members of the respective groups a distinctive and persistent outlook or cultural orientation that is different from that of other sectors, a *raison d'être* for maintaining organized segmentation (McRae, 1974: 6). But how do we measure the intensity and duration of a social cleavage?

There is no agreement on either the necessary and sufficient conditions for a cleavage or what a fruitful typology of cleavages would look like. A cleavage necessarily involves a line of division; but not all lines of division are cleavages. Some scholars demand that the line of division become the focus of value and belief systems. Others add criteria that are difficult to operationalize like 'important political difference' or 'meaningfully structured' or 'sufficiently intense'. The difficulties inherent in the concept of a cleavage reflect a deeper problem which is our concern here: how to justify one set or type of cleavage being selected for inquiry to the exclusion of any other. We do not believe that there is valid justification for one criterion that would identify the set of lines of division which would comprise all cleavages.

The identification of the cleavages to be studied depends upon theory or theoretical assumptions. The concept is used as a construct to summarize forces that are conducive to conflict. What forces tend to cause contention and dissension among people and organizations cannot be specified for all times, places and levels. The choice of cleavages to be included in the analysis may be justified not on the basis of a typology or on the basis of an enumeration of types of cleavage found, but on the basis of theoretical

arguments about interrelationships between cleavages and the other properties to be studied. Whether a proper choice of cleavages has been made depends on the amount of understanding provided of factors which are assumed to be interrelated to cleavages.

It is vital to distinguish between latent and manifest cleavages, because belief, value or action are not by necessity properties of cleavages. In consequence we distinguish between cleavages in the structure of societies and cleavages in the consciousness of societies. In our framework to be applied to 18 countries in Western Europe today we assume that we can shed some light on crucial political phenomena if we identify and describe the following types of cleavage:

- Religion
- Ethnicity
- Class

Whether our choice is correct cannot be decided a priori: the test of a selection of theoretical constructs lies in the explanation of phenomena singled out. If we choose these cleavages, can we learn something about society, parties and issues? When we speak of political parties and political issues, then we will refer to structural parties and structural issues corresponding to the traditional social cleavages portrayed below.

Religious cleavages

During the twentieth century West European societies have passed through a process of secularization, meaning that church attendance has declined considerably (Mol, 1972; Martin, 1978; Verweij et al., 1997). Although the attendance has decreased and membership of the churches has diminished as reflected in a decline in the frequency of church baptisms, weddings and burials, it does not follow that religion has lost its importance as a cleavage among people in society, the party system or the government. The religious cleavages established in Europe by the Reformation and the French Revolution persist in today's society even though modernization and secularization have made them less conspicuous. Religion still plays a significant role in the politics of several countries (Rose and Urwin, 1969). The existence of religious cleavages, it has been argued, works against political stability, as there is a linkage between democratic instability and Catholicism, accounted for by the nature of Catholicism as a religion. Democracy is founded upon a universalistic belief system, meaning that it accepts various religions as long as a strict separation between state and church is maintained, or between worldly and spiritual matters (Lipset, 1959: 84).

Besides the influence on the party system and the state it has been assumed that religion has special effects on the development of society. It is unnecessary to enter into the unending battle concerning Max Weber's

argument that Protestantism has a positive influence on the development of capitalist institutions (Tawney, 1938; Samuelsson, 1961; Weber, 1965). It seems possible to demonstrate that different religions are coupled with differences in attitudes to the development of society. Are the words of Lenski from the 1960s still valid today? He stated that 'socio-religious group membership is a variable comparable in importance to class, both with respect to its potency and with respect to the range, or extent, of its influence' (Lenski, 1963: 326).

Interesting problems for research concern the existence of religious political parties. What is the significance of religious cleavages in society for the electoral success of religious parties? Is the formation of religious parties facilitated by the existence of a large Catholic population (Rose and Urwin, 1969: 221)? Under what conditions could religious parties lose in importance and become marginal parties (Yinger, 1970: 430)? Now let us describe in more detail just how important religious cleavages are in society.

Religious structure

A religious structure is composed of groups, whose sizes are measured by means of the number of members. There is a large variety of religious groups of differing size and official status. Our description of the religious structure of West European democracies takes account of a few major groups and their relationships: Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox, other religions, and persons explicitly adhering to no creed. We neither cover the varieties of Protestantism nor measure the extent of secularization, because the size of the group of persons explicitly adhering to no creed at all cannot be used as an indicator of real secularization, which process has also occurred among persons who are formally members of Christian churches (Table 2.1).

It appears from Table 2.1 that all religions have lost members, especially Protestantism, though in some countries it operates in the form of a state church into which people are born. But it should be pointed out that many people remain members of some church though they refrain from religious practice except on a few major occasions during their lives. Data concerning the extent of religious heterogeneity appear in Table 2.2, where an index on religious fragmentation has been computed from these data which shows the likelihood that two random persons belong to different religious creeds or do not adhere to any creed.

The religious map of Western Europe has not changed in basic structure since the end of the religious wars in the middle of the seventeenth century. Northern Europe as well as Southern Europe has a religious structure that is homogeneous, the North adhering to Protestantism and the South to Catholicism. Between these two blocks there is a set of countries which display a heterogeneous religious structure, having substantial portions of both Protestant and Catholic populations. This set includes the Netherlands,

TABLE 2.1 Confessional structure in Western Europe

	1900				1995				
	RC	Prot- estant	Ortho- dox	Other NON	RC	Prot- estant	Ortho- dox	Other NON	
Austria	91.8	2.7	2.3	3.1	0.2	78.0	4.9	0.0	8.6
Belgium	98.8	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.9	90.0	0.0	0.0	10.0
Denmark	0.2	99.4	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0	88.2	0.0	11.8
Finland	0.0	98.3	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	86.7	0.0	13.3
France	97.1	2.2	0.0	0.4	0.3	73.9	0.0	0.0	10.5
Germany	36.1	62.5	0.0	1.2	0.3	35.3	40.2	0.0	2.1
Greece	1.8	0.1	83.3	14.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	97.6	2.4
Iceland	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	92.1	0.0	7.9
Ireland	89.4	10.5	0.0	0.1	0.0	93.1	0.0	0.0	6.9
Italy	99.6	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2	83.1	0.0	0.0	0.7
Luxembourg	98.7	0.8	0.0	0.4	0.0	94.2	0.0	0.0	5.8
Netherlands	35.5	61.0	0.0	2.1	1.5	33.0	23.0	0.0	5.0
Norway	0.1	99.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	87.9	0.0	12.1
Portugal	99.9	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	94.5	0.0	0.0	5.5
Spain	100	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	94.9	0.0	0.0	5.1
Sweden	0.1	98.8	0.0	0.1	1.1	0.0	88.2	0.0	11.8
Switzerland	41.0	58.4	0.0	0.4	0.2	46.1	40.0	0.0	13.9
United Kingdom	6.6	90.8	0.0	0.6	1.9	13.1	72.0	0.6	4.8

Columns denote estimates of percentages of the population adhering to different creeds as of 1900 and 1995; NON stands for non-religious groups

Sources: Barrett, 1982; EB (Encyclopaedia Britannica), 1995

TABLE 2.2 Religious fragmentation index 1990-95

	1990		1970		1995	
	1990	1970	1990	1970	1995	1995
Austria	0.16	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.38	0.38
Belgium	0.02	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.18	0.18
Denmark	0.01	0.08	0.08	0.21	0.21	0.21
Finland	0.03	0.07	0.07	0.23	0.23	0.23
France	0.06	0.33	0.33	0.42	0.42	0.42
Germany	0.48	0.59	0.59	0.66	0.66	0.66
Greece	0.28	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05
Iceland	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.14	0.14	0.14
Ireland	0.19	0.09	0.09	0.13	0.13	0.13
Italy	0.01	0.17	0.17	0.28	0.28	0.28
Luxembourg	0.03	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.11
Netherlands	0.50	0.59	0.59	0.68	0.68	0.68
Norway	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.21	0.21	0.21
Portugal	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.10
Spain	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.10	0.10	0.10
Sweden	0.02	0.41	0.41	0.21	0.21	0.21
Switzerland	0.49	0.52	0.52	0.61	0.61	0.61
United Kingdom	0.17	0.41	0.41	0.45	0.45	0.45

Sources: Barrett, 1982; EB (Encyclopaedia Britannica), 1995

Switzerland, Germany, Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The religious fragmentation of Western Europe has remained almost unchanged over the last century. What has really changed is the coming of a broad process of secularization.

The Nordic countries score low on the fragmentation index, all having a Lutheran state church. The majority of the population in these countries are members of the state church and the proportion of those not adhering to any creed is small. There are, however, many varieties of Protestantism in these countries that are not covered by the index. Revival movements during the nineteenth century resulted in regional variety in the religious structure. In Norway the revival movements were particularly strong in Vestlandet around Bergen, in Denmark in West Jutland around Limfjorden and in Sweden on the west coast and in the province of Småland.

The countries in the South do not score as low as the Nordic countries, because there are groups that do not belong to the majority of Roman Catholics. The population of Greece is Orthodox Catholic whereas Spain, Portugal, France, Austria, Italy and Belgium have a predominantly Roman Catholic population. France and Austria score around 0.40 on the 1995 index, because they have substantial minorities of Protestants and non-religious groups.

In Austria the Protestants are dispersed throughout the country and in France they live mainly in the Alsace area and around Paris. In these countries there is no formal state church, but the connection between the state and the church has been close during certain periods in Spain (Franco), Portugal (Salazar), Ireland, Italy, Austria and Belgium. The opposite is true of France, where these relations were broken off at the beginning of the twentieth century. Between 1934 and 1938 the church of Austria was a state church, but since the war this relation has been broken. The position of the church in Greece is peculiar, as there is neither a state church nor a complete separation of state and church.

Between the North and the South there is a group of countries which show a heterogeneous structure. There are Roman Catholics, Lutherans and above all Calvinists and Presbyterians in the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany, but to a certain extent also in the United Kingdom. In some of these countries the difference between the North and the South is reflected, as the Protestants are found in northern provinces and the Catholics in the southern ones.

The most heterogeneous country is the Netherlands, the probability that two persons belong to different religions being 0.68. The two major groups, the Catholics and the Protestants, are about equal in size. The Catholics dominate in southern Holland, close to the borders of Belgium. Up to the end of the nineteenth century they constituted a rejected minority, because they were regarded with suspicion by the non-Catholic part of the population and a number of restrictions had been placed on Catholic practices. At the end of the century these restrictions were abolished. The Protestants are Reformists, but there are two different groups. The Reformed Church of the

TABLE 2.3. Religious structure in the Netherlands, 1971 (percentages of the population)

Province	Roman Catholics				Other religion				No religion
	Catholics	Hervormde	Gerformeerde	Other religion	Catholics	Other religion	No religion		
Groningen	7	28	15	11	11	39			
Friesland	8	30	22	9	9	31			
Drenthe	9	42	13	9	27	20			
Overtijssel	32	30	8	10	14	20			
Gelderland	38	35	6	7	14	23			
Utrecht	31	29	7	10	23	41			
Noord Holland	30	15	5	9	29	29			
Zuid Holland	24	30	8	9	13	13			
Seeland	27	37	11	12	3	5			
Noord Brabant	84	6	2	3	2	3			
Limburg	91	3	1	2	8	23			
Total	40	23	7	8	8	23			

Source: Lepsey, 1979: 38f

Netherlands (Hervormde) was founded during the Reformation and its position was that of a semi-state church up to the end of the nineteenth century. In 1892 the Reformed Church (Gerformeerde) was founded in fundamentalist opposition to the Church of the Netherlands as a reaction against the liberal development of the latter. The religious distribution of the Netherlands appears in Table 2.3.

Almost as heterogeneous as the Netherlands is Switzerland, scoring 0.61 on the 1995 index. It is not clear whether Protestants or Catholics are in the majority in Switzerland. Among those living in the country the Catholics outnumber the Protestants, whereas the Protestants constitute a majority among Swiss citizens. The Protestants are concentrated in the cantons in the north and the west; it should be remembered that Calvin was active in Geneva and Zwingli in Zurich. The Catholics predominate in the southern and eastern cantons on the borders of Italy and Austria (Table 2.4).

From Table 2.4 it appears that the extent of religious domination varies from canton to canton. In some of them the ratio between the two groups is almost even, whereas in others one of the groups dominates substantially. The federal structure of Switzerland dates back to the federation that was agreed upon in 1848 by the cantons, which resulted from a short civil war between the Protestant and the Catholic cantons. Today there is no connection between the churches of Switzerland and the federal state. However, there is a close relationship between state and church in the Catholic cantons (Campiche, 1972: 511ff.). Two more countries score significantly on the index, Germany and the United Kingdom. The religious structure of the Federal Republic of Germany appeared in Table 2.5.

In 1970 the Protestants outnumbered the Catholics in West Germany, but this was no longer the case in 1987. Yet, in the new Germany there is again a Protestant majority, while the Islamic population is no longer merely

TABLE 2.4. Religious distribution map of Switzerland, 1980 (percentages of the population)

Canton	Protestants		Roman Catholics	
	Population	Citizens	Population	Citizens
Zürich	54.7	63.1	35.4	29.2
Bern	76.8	82.3	17.5	12.9
Luzern	12.9	13.3	82.4	83.7
Uri	5.9	5.8	91.0	92.6
Schwyz	10.0	10.3	86.6	88.1
Obwalden	5.3	4.9	92.1	94.1
Nidwalden	11.0	10.9	86.1	87.3
Glarus	51.7	61.5	43.0	36.8
Zug	18.4	18.9	75.3	78.0
Fribourg	13.6	14.2	83.2	83.7
Solothurn	36.5	40.7	54.9	53.0
Basel Stadt	44.4	51.2	35.5	31.3
Basel Landschaft	54.3	61.1	36.3	31.5
Schaffhausen	60.5	70.1	27.7	22.6
Appenzell A.Rh.	64.1	71.4	28.7	24.0
Appenzell L.Rh.	6.8	7.1	90.5	91.8
St Gallen	33.5	37.2	61.0	60.0
Grubünden	45.2	50.0	51.0	47.8
Aargau	45.1	51.3	46.5	42.8
Thurgau	53.1	60.8	41.0	36.0
Ticino	7.6	8.6	87.1	86.8
Vaud	55.7	67.1	35.7	25.9
Valais	4.7	4.8	92.8	93.5
Neuchâtel	53.0	63.1	36.2	26.5
Geneva	30.6	40.2	51.1	43.7
Jura	13.3	14.4	83.6	83.0
Total 1980	44.3	50.4	47.6	43.6
Total 1990	40.0	47.3	46.1	43.3

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz, 1983: 42-3; 1997: 365

marginal in size. The Protestants are concentrated to the north and the east, while the Catholics dominate in the south and in the west. There is a Protestant church in each of the Länder of the republic and they are all united in the EKD (Evangelische Kirchen in Deutschland). The churches have the status of corporations in public law; they are entitled to state subsidies as recompense for the confiscation of their possessions in 1806, and they also have the power to raise church taxes, some of them having concluded 'state treaties' with the Länder.

What makes the United Kingdom score high on the index is the existence of Catholics in some parts of the country. Protestants dominate the kingdom, but there are varieties of Protestantism. England and Wales belong to the Church of England, the episcopal church, whereas Scots belong to the Presbyterian Church of Scotland. The Church of England is a state church, whereas the Church of Scotland is independent of the state. Catholics live

TABLE 2.5 Religious structure of the former Federal Republic of Germany, 1987 (percentages of the population)

State	Protestants	Roman Catholics	Islam
Schleswig-Holstein	73.3	6.2	1.3
Hamburg	50.3	8.5	3.8
Niedersachsen	65.2	19.2	1.4
Bremen	60.9	9.8	3.6
Nordrhein-Westfalen	35.2	42.2	3.4
Hessen	51.7	30.4	3.1
Rheinland-Pfalz	37.2	54.5	1.6
Baden-Württemberg	40.7	45.3	2.9
Bavaria	23.9	67.2	2.0
Saarland	21.6	72.7	0.8
Berlin West	48.3	12.7	6.3
Total 1987	41.6	42.9	2.7
Total 1970	49.0	44.6	-

Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1996

mainly in English and Scottish cities where the number of immigrants from Ireland is large, for example in Liverpool. Northern Ireland is the part of United Kingdom that is religiously most divided (Table 2.6).

The Catholics have their strongholds in the southern and western counties. One may note the moderate rise in the number of Catholics over the years. Estimates suggest that their proportion was 37.6 in 1981 and 38.4 in 1991 (Smith and Chambers, 1991: 31; Macourt, 1995: 598). The Protestants are not all of a kind, as they are divided into Presbyterians and Anglicans, who are orientated towards the episcopal church. There are also some fundamentalist groups (Hight, 1972: 250ff.; Martin, 1972: 229ff.; Ward, 1972: 295ff.; Rose, 1976: 126ff.).

TABLE 2.6 Religious structure of Northern Ireland: proportion of Roman Catholics, 1951, 1961 and 1971 (percentages)

Area	Proportion Roman Catholics		
	1951	1961	1971
Belfast	26.1	28.2	27.4
Antrim	22.1	24.9	28.1
Armagh	46.5	47.9	47.5
Down	30.3	28.9	28.5
West	52.8	53.3	54.1
Londonderry	-	-	42.9
Fermanagh	-	-	52.9
Tyrone	-	-	54.5
Northern Ireland	34.5	35.2	34.9

Sources: 1951, 1961(a), 1971: Compton, 1976: 437; 1961(b): Rose, 1971: 90

Religious awareness

Religious cleavages may be latent or manifest. Manifest cleavages are those cleavages which become a focus of orientation for citizens. Religious structure is by definition a latent, or unconscious, structure which can be transformed into a manifest structure through a process in which religious cleavages become tied to some kind of religious awareness. Religious awareness operates on religious structure in such a way that the higher the religious awareness, the more likely that the cleavages will become conspicuous.

How to measure religious awareness is problematic. What indicator is to be used? We use data showing frequency of attendance at church during a certain period and we assume that the greater the frequency, the greater the religious awareness. The data we set out from are of different kinds: we use data from a Gallup poll on attendance at church in a number of Western countries in 1968 (Social Compass, 1972), data from interviews conducted in 1970-71 in the countries belonging to the EEC (Inglehart, 1977) and estimates made in more recent investigations (Eight Nation Study, 1979; World Values Survey, 1981 and 1990-91).

Data on church attendance must be interpreted with caution. Church attendance is a sign of religious devoutness, but devoutness may imply different patterns of attendance in different churches. To be a Catholic may mean that attendance once a week shows devoutness, whereas to a Protestant attendance once a month may be enough to qualify as a devout Protestant. Not only is the validity of data concerning church attendance questionable, but so is their reliability. There is a clear tendency among people when questioned to state too high a frequency of attendance at church. In reality the frequency is lower. Data are not available to the same extent for all the countries. Table 2.7 presents data on church attendance. We have constructed two scales, one for attendance once a week and the other for attendance once a month, and computed values from the above-mentioned sources.

A comparison of the data available shows marked differences between the countries. The Nordic countries and the United Kingdom have the lowest degree of religious awareness. Two types of country present a high degree of religious awareness: those with a heterogeneous religious structure and those with a homogeneous Catholic population. To the former group belong Switzerland and the Netherlands. To the latter group belong Italy, Austria and Belgium. The United Kingdom is an exception to the relationship between heterogeneity and church attendance; France, Portugal and Spain do not quite exemplify the close relation between Catholic homogeneity and church attendance. In the last three countries there are some regional variations. By tradition religion has a stronghold in Brittany, Vendée, Alsace-Lorraine, in French Flanders and in south-west France; church attendance is low in the Paris area. In Spain and Portugal church attendance is high in the northern provinces. In the southern provinces, Andalusia and

TABLE 2.7 Religious awareness: church attendance (percentages)

	Monthly								
	Weekly				Monthly				
	1960s	1970s	1980s	1980s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1980s	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Austria	38	-	32	-	26	68	50	-	44
Belgium	-	54	-	31	27	-	-	38	35
Denmark	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	11	11
Finland	5	-	3	4	4	33	10	13	11
France	25	22	-	11	10	47	-	17	17
Germany	27	29	23	19	17	54	36	35	30
Greece	28	-	-	-	-	88	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	10	9
Ireland	-	-	-	82	81	-	-	88	88
Italy	-	51	36	32	38	-	53	48	51
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	42	38	43	26	20	55	56	40	31
Norway	14	-	-	5	5	37	-	14	13
Portugal	-	-	-	-	39	-	-	-	48
Spain	-	-	-	40	29	-	-	53	40
Sweden	9	-	-	6	4	28	-	14	10
Switzerland	30	36	24	-	24	60	43	-	43
United Kingdom	-	14	16	15	15	23	20	24	26

Sources: (1) Social Compass, 1972; (2) Inglehart, 1977; (3) Eight Nation Study, 1979; (4) World Values Survey, 1981; (5) World Values Survey, 1990-91

Alentejo, there is a strong anti-religious tradition (Querido, 1972: 428; Duocastella, 1975; Martin, 1978: 272; De Franca, 1980; Isambert and Terrenoire, 1980).

Conclusion

Religious fragmentation and religious consciousness do not correlate. The extent of fragmentation in the religious structure of a country neither affects nor is affected by the degree of religious consciousness typical of the various denominations constituting the religious structure. Our data corroborate the null hypothesis: religious awareness is not heightened by the existence of competing or conflicting denominations. Actually, this finding is somewhat surprising as it could have been expected that the existence of a diversified religious structure would stimulate religious consciousness. Perhaps the lack of a significant relationship between these two variables is typical of societies where there has occurred a profound secularization process covering all creeds?

There is a strong connection between the type of denomination and religious awareness: Catholics and Greek Orthodox tend to have a high degree of religious consciousness whereas the opposite is true of Protestants. Thus, what conditions religious awareness is not whether a country is split between various denominations - religious fragmentation. Religious awareness is a function of the size of the Catholic denomination, whether religious

consciousness is measured by weekly church attendance ($r = 0.73$) or monthly church attendance ($r = 0.75$). Since the relationship is stronger for monthly church attendance it may be concluded that the high correlation indicates a higher level of religious awareness in countries where the Catholic Church dominates rather than simply that the Catholic Church tends in fact to demand more formal religious practice.

Ethnic cleavages

The 1970s made it clear that ethnic cleavages constitute a powerful source of change and contention in societies. Perhaps the implications of ethnic cleavages for a society and its political system have been neglected, as one scholar states: 'Social science theorists have until recently paid little attention to enduring ethnic or cultural identity as a primary social force comparable to nationalism or class affiliation' (De Vos, 1975: 7).

Today it is generally believed that ethno-linguistic cleavages are just as important as religious or class-based cleavages for the development of society (Ragin, 1979). Perhaps ethnicity was neglected because its role was underestimated or misunderstood? Some scholars believed that the modernization of society implied that functional cleavages such as those of class or economic structure would replace traditional cleavages such as ethnicity and religion (Geertz, 1963). The variety that stems from language and culture would disappear as a result of growing communications.

Theories of modernization, reviewed in Chapter 1, were popular during the 1960s and they implied that ethnic cleavages and ethnic mobilization would decrease rather than increase in importance. Lipset and Rokkan argued that ethnic cleavages belong to a category whose importance will decrease as societies become fully mobilized or modernized. What happened in Western Europe during the 1970s proved that these theories were out of touch with reality in Northern Ireland, the Basque provinces, and the Flemish provinces (Anderson, 1978). As ethnic cleavages have proved their relevance to politics the interest in ethnicity has grown, scholars talking about 'ethnonationalism' (Connor, 1977), and 'minority nationalistic movements' (Birch, 1978); others speak of 'ethnic political mobilization' (Ragin, 1979), 'peripheral nationalisms' (Gourevitch, 1979) and 'territorial identities' (Rokkan and Urwin, 1982). The basic problem is to understand and account for this resurrection of ethnicity (Allardt, 1979; Blaschke, 1980; Krejci and Velimsky, 1981; Smith, 1983; Meadwell, 1989; Rudolph and Thompson, 1989; Zariski, 1989; Newman, 1991; Dogan, 1994; Koelble, 1995; Safran, 1995).

One explanation is a version of the modernization theme: if modernization is not successful it will result in a revitalization of ethnic cleavages and ethnic conflict. Already one of the prophets of modernization, Deutsch, has pointed out that modernization 'may tend to strain or destroy the unity of

states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life' (Deutsch, 1961: 501).

No doubt, there is a core of truth in this since attempts at modernization tend to bring about a disruption of ethnic structure and ethnic loyalties – a development which may offset successful counter-tendencies to strengthen ethnicity (Ragin, 1979). However, the nucleus of the problem remains: under what conditions do efforts at modernization fail and result in a resurrection of ethnicity? More complex explanations of ethnicity point out that the revival of ethnic loyalties depends on economic diversification (Ragin, 1979), on regional differences (Mughan, 1979), and on the balance between the centre and the periphery (Hechter, 1975). These explanations employ some kind of theory of relative deprivation. The cause of the revival of ethnicity is not that ethnic structures are threatened in modern society, but the combination of a break-up of ethnic structures and an uneven economic development to the disadvantage of ethnic groups. Some speak about the need for a balance between transaction and integration (Lijphart, 1977b: 55; Birch, 1978: 334). As societies modernize there must come about a balance between the transactions among various groups in society and the institutions that integrate these groups. If the development is too rapid and the transactional pattern moves too far away from the integration pattern the solidarity and consensus of society will be hurt (Hechter, 1971: 42).

These explanations emphasize the interregional development in a society; the important issue is not the level or the stage of the modernization process but, decisively, how the various regions develop in relation to each other. What matters is the problem of congruence, i.e. whether regions develop more or less evenly in relation to each other. If the modernization process is congruent with the regions, then the prospects for peripheral nationalism are not as bright as when the process results in non-congruent situations where an ethnic potential may become exploited (Gourevitch, 1979: 306). To Connor (1977: 37) economic factors have been overemphasized. Ethno-nationalism in Europe has a long tradition and may be interpreted as a continuation of the nationalistic tendencies that are so strong in Europe. Today it is a commonplace that ethnic cleavages affect politics and political stability. Ragin states that they constitute 'a potentially disintegrative force in the modern polity' (Ragin, 1979: 619). According to Rose and Urwin, cleavages and the size of ethnic parties affect the party system of a country (Rose and Urwin, 1969: 41; 1970: 308).

Ethnic structure

An ethnic group or an ethno-linguistic group is a collection of people who share the same language or have a common culture based on language. We start our analysis of the occurrence of ethnic cleavages in the social structure by distinguishing between ethnic structure and ethnic consciousness. A society is ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous if its citizens belong to one and the same cultural tradition in language or if there is a division of the

TABLE 2.8 *Ethnic structure and fragmentation*

	Ethnic fragmentation		Dominant ethno-linguistic group	
	1920	1990	1920	1990
Austria	0.08	0.12	96	94
Belgium	0.55	0.54	51	59
Denmark	0.02	0.06	99	97
Finland	0.20	0.13	89	93
France	0.15	0.24	92	87
Germany	0.04	0.13	98	93
Greece	0.08	0.08	96	96
Iceland	0.00	0.12	100	94
Ireland	0.16	0.10	91	95
Italy	0.08	0.12	96	94
Luxembourg	0.24	0.44	87	74
Netherlands	0.08	0.15	96	92
Norway	0.02	0.06	99	97
Portugal	0.00	0.02	100	99
Spain	0.50	0.34	67	80
Sweden	0.02	0.17	99	91
Switzerland	0.45	0.55	71	64
United Kingdom	0.04	0.06	98	97

The 1920 scores have been calculated from Tesnière, 1928; the 1990 scores are based upon EB (Encyclopaedia Britannica), 1995.

population into two or more different cultural groups in point of language. Societies may be classified on the basis of their degree of ethnic heterogeneity by means of indices that measure the distribution of the population on ethno-linguistic fragmentation measured through an estimate of the likelihood that two random persons in a society belong to different ethno-linguistic groups. Another way of presenting the data is to look at the percentage of the population that uses the dominant language or belongs to a dominant ethno-linguistic group. A picture of ethno-linguistic fragmentation in the social structure appears in Table 2.8, which also presents estimates of the percentages of the population belonging to the dominant ethno-linguistic group.

Two countries display a high ethnic fragmentation: Belgium and Switzerland; Spain, Luxembourg and France also score high on the index. This in particular is true of Spain which is almost as ethnically diversified as Switzerland and Belgium. Some countries – the Netherlands, Finland, Greece and Austria – score high on the index because they have relatively large ethnic minorities within their borders. Other countries – Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Germany – are more or less homogeneous.

Belgium There are two major ethnic groups in Belgium, the Flemings who speak Dutch and the Walloons who speak French. In addition, there is a

TABLE 2.9 Language groups in Belgium (percentages of the population)

Year	French	Dutch	German
1846	42	57	1
1910	45	54	1
1920	46	53	1
1930	45	54	1
1947	44	55	1
1961*	41	58-9	1
1970*	39-40	59-6	1

*Estimations computed from Rayside. There are no official data later than 1947 because of the political delicacy of the ethnic cleavage in Belgium.

Sources: Zolberg, 1977: 107; Rayside, 1977: 103

small group of German-speaking people. The distribution of the population of these groups appears in Table 2.9. The Flemings have remained somewhat more numerous than the Walloons, and they have increased their numbers since the Second World War, although the relationship between the two remains intact. The Flemings are concentrated in the northern parts of the country, more specifically in the provinces of Oost Vlaanderen, West Vlaanderen, Antwerp and Limburg. The French-speaking Walloons are found in the provinces of Hainaut, Namur, Liège and Luxembourg, i.e. the south of Belgium. The German-speaking groups live in the east, in the provinces of Liège and Luxembourg.

The capital city of Brussels has a special position, being situated within Flemish territory but having a majority of French-speaking inhabitants. The French-speaking make up roughly two-thirds of the population of Brussels and they live in the central parts whereas the remaining third, Flemings, live in the suburbs. Ethnic fragmentation is high in Belgium, the probability being more than one half that two randomly selected persons do not belong to the same ethnic group.

Switzerland The basic data on the ethnic structure of Switzerland are given in Table 2.10. There are two ways of describing ethnicity in Switzerland, by using data either on the Swiss population or on the Swiss citizens. These data are not entirely congruent, because the proportion of *Gastarbeiter* makes a difference. The ethnic structure has remained stable for the last 100 years, though there have been some small but important changes during the last 20 years.

Three major languages are spoken in Switzerland. The predominant language is German, spoken by roughly 65 per cent of the population. It is the majority language in 19 out of the 26 cantons. French is spoken by somewhat more than 19 per cent. It is the majority language in five cantons, those situated in western Switzerland, closest to France. The third major language in Switzerland is Italian, spoken by barely 12 per cent of the

TABLE 2.10 Language groups in Switzerland (percentages of the population)

Year	German	French	Italian	Romansh	Others
1850	70.2	22.6	5.4	1.8	-
1900	69.7	22.0	6.7	1.2	0.4
1930	71.9	20.4	6.0	1.1	0.6
1950	72.1	20.3	5.9	1.0	0.7
1970	64.9	18.1	11.9	0.8	4.3
1980	65.0	18.4	9.8	0.8	6.0
1990	63.9	19.2	7.6	0.6	8.9

Sources: Almanach der Schweiz, 1978: 29; *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz*, 1997

population. Only in the canton of Ticino in the south is Italian the majority language, and the size of the Italian group has increased since 1945. Besides these languages, Romansh is spoken by a small minority, barely 1 per cent. Several cantons have a mixed population as regards language, which in the canton of Bern has been conducive to conflicts among the various language groups. Within Bern there was a minority of French-speaking people constituting 15 per cent of the population of the canton, concentrated in the seven districts forming the Jura region. However, in the Jura region there is a German-speaking minority, making up somewhat more than 20 per cent of the population, to be found in larger numbers in the southern districts. In addition to the ethnic cleavage there exists a religious cleavage between the northern and the southern districts in Jura, as in the north the majority are Catholics, whereas in the south the majority are Protestants. In 1978 the northern districts broke out of the canton of Bern and formed the canton of Jura (Steiner, 1974; Bassand, 1976; McRae, 1983). Switzerland is only slightly less fragmented than Belgium, the probability being one half that two persons do not belong to the same ethnic group.

Spain The boundaries of present-day Spain have remained very much the same since the beginning of the sixteenth century, yet Spain is a multi-ethnic society. Spanish, i.e. the Castilian dialect, is the predominant language. The other big language groups are Catalan, Galician and Basque. Table 2.11 contains the data on ethnic structure in Spain. People in the eastern coastal areas speak Catalan, which is the dominant language in the provinces of Gerona, Lérida, Barcelona, Tarragona, Castellón, Valencia and Alicante as

TABLE 2.11 Language groups in Spain (percentages of the population)

Spanish	72.5
Catalan	17.2
Galician	7.8
Basque	2.2

Source: Haarmann, 1975: 65

well as in the Balearic Islands. The Basque language is spoken in the north of Spain on the borders of France, in the provinces of Alava, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa but also in Navarra. Finally, Galician is spoken in the north-west corner of the country: the provinces of La Coruña, Lugo, Orense and Pontevedra (Stephens, 1976: 605). Spain is ethnically diverse to a considerable extent (0.34) but it is not a bilingual society in the way Belgium and Switzerland are. It is composed of several language groups and the differences between the languages are pronounced.

The United Kingdom Great Britain and Northern Ireland, six of the northernmost counties in Ireland, form the United Kingdom, which comprises three different language groups. The Anglo-Saxon dialects, which form the basis of Modern English, predominate. There are Celtic language groups; on the one hand we have the Q-Celts: Irish, Manx (spoken in the Isle of Man) and Scottish Gaelic; on the other hand there are the P-Celts: Welsh and Cornish; and Breton is spoken in Brittany in France (Rose, 1976: 121). The Celtic language groups are small today. The use of the Celtic languages in present-day Great Britain is shown in Table 2.12. In Wales Welsh is spoken by a fairly large proportion of the population, which may constitute the basis for national identification. Language does not play the same role in Scotland and in Northern Ireland, because national identification is based more on the patterns of communication that have developed in these areas and which separate them from other parts of Great Britain (Kellas, 1975: 10). In Northern Ireland differences survive between the Irish and the descendants of the Scottish and the English colonists who immigrated in the early seventeenth century. On the whole these differences coincide with religious differences, the colonists being Protestants and the Irish Catholics (Rose, 1971: 18). Overall ethnic fragmentation is low in the United Kingdom (0.06), but its relevance for identification and political action has increased during the last decades.

TABLE 2.12 Celtic language groups (percentages of the population)

	1891	1911	1931	1951	1971
Wales: Welsh	54.0	43.0	37.0	28.9	20.8
Scotland: Scottish Gaelic	5.2	3.1	2.7	1.6	1.8

Source: Stephens, 1976: 51f. 145f.

France The ethno-linguistic minorities in France are found in the periphery of the country, where other languages besides French are spoken (Table 2.13). In Brittany groups speak Breton, a Celtic dialect. On the borders of Spain there are in the south Basque-speaking clusters and in the south-east, Catalan-speaking clusters. In Corsica Corse is spoken, which is in reality an Italian dialect. German is spoken in Alsace (das Elsass) on the borders of Germany, an area that has been French since the end of the First World War,

TABLE 2.13 Language groups in France (percentages of the population)

Language group	According to Haaman	According to Stephens
Bretons	2.1	1.4
Basques	0.2	0.2
Catalans	0.4	0.6
Corsicans	1.6	0.4
Alsacians	2.4	2.5
Flemings	0.4	0.2
Occitans	21.8	19.8

Sources: Haaman, 1975: 58; Stephens, 1976: 298ff.

the years of German occupation excepted. (Alsace was French from 1648 to 1871.) Flemish is spoken by small groups living near the borders of Belgium, in the north-west. These ethno-linguistic minorities constitute in all slightly more than three million out of a total population of 50 million people. A special case is Occitania, in the south-eastern part of France. It covers the provinces of Languedoc, Provence, Limousin, Auvergne, Gas-cogne, Guyenne and Dauphiné. There are those who claim that the people in this area form an ethno-linguistic unit, however it is doubtful whether the language is to be regarded as a dialect or as a language of its own. Le Roy Ladurie comments: 'The Occitanian language has reconquered an active and seductive minority. It has not quite been able to persuade the silent and still francophone majority of the land of Oc' (Le Roy Ladurie, 1977: 30; cf. Hobsbawm, 1977: 19-20).

TABLE 2.14 Swedish minority in Finland

Year	Percentage of total population
1880	14.3
1900	12.9
1920	11.0
1940	9.6
1960	7.4
1970	6.6
1980	6.2
1990	5.9

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Finland

Finland There is still a sizeable Swedish-speaking minority in Finland, though it has decreased in the past 100 years, as shown in Table 2.14. The Swedish minority is concentrated in the province of Österbotten, to the coastal area between Åbo and Helsingfors and to the island of Åland. During the last 90 years the Swedish minority has decreased to half its size and it has maintained a majority position only in the island of Åland.

TABLE 2.15 Language groups in Austria (percentages of the population)

Year	Slovenians in Kärnten	Croatians in Burgenland
1951	8	13
1961	5	10
1971	4	9

Source: Stephens, 1976: 3ff.

Austria is less ethnically diversified than Finland. The Dual Monarchy of Austria and Hungary was a nation deeply troubled by ethnic diversity. Compared with this Great Power of the past, today's Austria has a homogeneous population. Most people speak German, but there are ethnic minorities. A Slovenian minority lives in Kärnten and there is a Croatian minority in Burgenland, areas that are situated on the borders of former Yugoslavia (Table 2.15).

In some countries which score low on the measure of ethnic diversity there are small but important minorities. Italy is one instance. A number of minorities in Italy use languages other than Italian. They constituted roughly 4 per cent of the population in 1970 and their size is shown in Table 2.16. The Sards live on the island of Sardinia, where Sardish, an old version of Italian, is the dominating language. In the region of Friulia-Venezia on the borders of Austria some people speak Friulish, which comes close to the Romansh language. The Slovenian language is spoken in the area of Trieste on the borders of present Slovenia. The Trieste area has long been a source of contention between Italy and Yugoslavia. Trieste went to Italy after the First World War. During the years 1945-54 the area was under the mandate of the UN, but has subsequently been Italian territory. In the extreme north, in South Tyrol on the borders of Austria, there is a minority of German-speaking people. As was the case with Trieste there have been divergent opinions about where South Tyrol should belong. It became Italian territory after the First World War, but in 1939 an agreement was made between Hitler and Mussolini according to which the German-speaking population of South Tyrol was to be transferred to the German Reich. The status of the

TABLE 2.16 Language groups in Italy (millions)

Groups	
Sards	1.0
Friulian	0.4
German	0.2
Slovenian	0.1
French	0.1

Source: Haarmann, 1975: 51

TABLE 2.17 Percentages of German-speaking people in South Tyrol (Bolzano-Bozen)

Year	Percentage
1910	89
1921	76
1961	62
1971	63
1981	65
1991	65

Source: ASTAT (1997)

area was again debated after the Second World War, but South Tyrol remained Italian. Austria and Italy have negotiated treaties which provide for certain guarantees concerning the status of South Tyrol within Italy. The first agreement was concluded in 1946 and the one now in force dates from 1972. In the same year the Italian government granted South Tyrol autonomy within the state of Italy (Katzenstein, 1977). The percentage of German-speaking people in South Tyrol or the province of Bolzano has declined during the twentieth century, but has stabilized since 1960 at around 65 per cent (Table 2.17). In the west on the borders of France and Switzerland there is a minority of French-speaking people in Valle d'Aosta, an area that has been Italian ever since the country was united in 1860; the proportion is diminishing. In 1901 roughly 92 per cent spoke French, whereas in 1971 the proportion amounted to 65 per cent; these people live mainly in the countryside, while most Italian-speaking people in this area live in the urban areas (Janin, 1975: 79; Stephens, 1976: 508, 514).

Denmark Another example of a country that cannot be classified as ethnically diversified but still contains a minority is Denmark. The area of Schleswig has been a cause of conflict between Denmark and Germany. From 1866 up to 1920 the whole of Schleswig was part of Prussia, and later Germany. The referendums that were held in 1920 as a result of the Versailles peace treaty led to a new solution: the area was divided into two parts, and North Schleswig was integrated into Denmark. This solution is still in force, though there were different borders during the Second World War. A consequence of the division of Schleswig was the creation of a German-speaking minority in North Schleswig and a Danish-speaking minority in South Schleswig. The German minority has remained about 20,000 and their proportion of the population of the south of Jutland is about 10 per cent. It is not easy to estimate the size of the Danish minority living in the province of Schleswig Holstein, but it could amount to 50,000, which means roughly 2 per cent of the population (Elklit et al., 1972: 386; Stephens, 1976: 233, 421).

Ethnic consciousness

Ethnic diversity may cause conflict and even civil war. The relation between ethnic structure and action orientated towards ethnic conflict is, however, by no means a simple one. In order that action may be taken on behalf of the interests of ethnic groups an ethnic consciousness must exist. The mere occurrence of various languages within a political system is not in itself a threat to political stability. When the ethnic structure becomes the object of serious and sustained identification, then ethnic contention is close. It is by no means evident that ethnic diversity will carry over into ethnic ideologies or ethnic consciousness. Ethnic fragmentation creates the potential for conflict. In some cases during certain intervals of time such potential may be turned into actuality, dividing a nation into groups with separate national identifications.

An ethnic consciousness cannot be described as existent or non-existent. There are degrees of ethnic identification. In some countries and for some groups, ethnic identification may even outweigh national identification. When this occurs the step to action is not far away. Let us look at the data. The three countries that are most diversified ethnically are Belgium, Switzerland and Spain. To what extent is there some kind of ethnic consciousness in these countries? It should be stressed that it is difficult to measure the attitude dimension of ethnic and national identification.

Table 2.18 shows that national identification in Belgium is, indeed, a questionable matter, as only 41 per cent of the population display such an identification. The country faces a severe ethnic cleavage in both extension and intensity. The Flemings have seemed to identify considerably with Flemish culture, whereas the Walloons appeared to be more split between an ethnic orientation towards Walloon culture and an orientation towards Belgium as a nation. The problem about ethnic identification is further complicated by the geographical area of Brussels, where people's orientations cover both an ethnic cleavage and an urban-rural cleavage. Besides the ethnic dimension there is the identification with the metropolis of Brussels, which for people living in that area is almost as strong as national identification. Belgium is a country where ethnic diversity has poured over

TABLE 2.19 *National identification in Switzerland (percentages of the population)*

Groups	Identification		
	Nation	Language group	Canton
German-speaking	53	16	31
Romance-speaking	40	40	31

Data based on samples.
Source: Kerr, 1974: 21

into a crisis of cultural and national identity. In the 1995 figures also the Walloons display a weaker national than ethnic identification.

Switzerland is somewhat different from Belgium, because ethnic fragmentation is not paralleled in the consciousness of the Swiss population. Data concerning the German-speaking population show that national identification is stronger than ethnic loyalties (Table 2.19). Although the Romance-speaking population identifies less with the nation, they do as a group identify more with the nation than with any other competing object.

The data concerning ethnic identification in Spain present a picture that is different from both Switzerland and Belgium. There is nothing comparable to the general lack of national loyalty among all groups in Belgium, because some regions display a highly positive orientation towards the nation (Castile), whereas other regions show at least somewhat of a national identification (Andalusia). Conversely, there are regions in which ethnic identification is greater than that typical of Switzerland (Table 2.20). National loyalties are a fragile matter not only within the provinces of Galicia, Vasco and Navarra – the Basque provinces – but also in Catalonia,

TABLE 2.20 *Identification in Spain (percentages of the population)*

Region	Spanish identification	
	in 1976	Very attached to Spain in 1995
Asurias	93	89
Casilla la Nueva	83	84
Madrid	81	71
Castilla la Vieja-León	77	100
Valencia	72	62
Extremadura	70	74
Andalusia	68	66
Barcelona	66	46
Cataluña-Balcares	65	39
Murcia	65	62
Aragón	61	71
Canarias	44	28
Vasco-Navarra	43	50
Galicia	38	54

Sources: Blanco et al., 1977: 47 (for 1976); Reif and Marlier, 1995

TABLE 2.18 *National identification in Belgium (percentages of the population)*

Group	Belgian identification	
	c. 1980	Very attached to Belgium in 1995
All Belgians	41.5	41.3
Flemings	32.5	38.5
Brussels	56.5	44.0
Walloons	50.3	45.1

Sources: Computed from Delbecq-Vosswinkel and Frogner, 1980: 9 (for the 1980s); Reif and Marlier, 1995

TABLE 2.21 Identification in the United Kingdom (percentages of the population)

	British identification in the 1970s	Very attached to the United Kingdom in 1995
Scotland	29	27.5
Wales	15	52.5
Northern Ireland	29	57.1

Sources: Rose, 1976: 127 (for the 1970s); Reif and Marlier, 1995

according to the 1995 data. Ethnic diversity in Spain has no parallel as far as ethnic consciousness is concerned, but there are minorities in the ethnic structure which are very much orientated towards their own groups.

The United Kingdom does not score high on the index of ethnic fragmentation, but there are regions in which separate ethnic identification seems to be as high as it is in Belgium and Spain (Table 2.21). The British identification is very low in Scotland. It also seems to have decreased sharply in Wales and Northern Ireland although not to the level in Scotland. Whereas those in Scotland and Wales who do not share deep loyalties to the British nation are united in a peaceful quest for a greater English acceptance of separate historical legacies, ethnic identification in Northern Ireland involves a most violent clash between a British orientation and an Irish one.

France and Finland have ethnic minorities, but data concerning identification are almost totally lacking. It is difficult to state anything about ethnic consciousness in these countries. Efforts have been made to survey the orientations of the people in Occitania, but they show that only a tiny portion of the population has some kind of ethnic identification. Perhaps it is not too daring to hypothesize that the same weak ethnic identification recurs within the other areas of the French ethnic structure. However, matters are probably not quite the same in Finland, because the ethnic identification among the Swedish minority can be expected to be substantial. Their language is different from that of the Finnish majority and they have a culture of longstanding. There is an ethnic identification among the Swedish Finns, but there are no data available to tell us how strong the identification is (Allardt and Miemois, 1979).

Data are available for some minorities within countries that are not particularly diversified ethnically. Among the German-speaking minority in North Schleswig there is a high ethnic identification (Elkjit et al., 1972). It seems as if the ethnic identification within minorities is strong to the extent that they speak a language different from the national one and to the extent that they may identify themselves with the majority of the population of a bordering nation. This means that ethnic consciousness should be rather strong among the German-speaking in South Tyrol, among the French-speaking in Valle d'Aosta, and among the Slovenians and the Croatians in

Austria. Available data on Austria only measure the extent to which the population is orientated towards Austria or Germany (Bluhm, 1973: 220).

Migration in Western Europe

To give a more complete picture of the ethno-linguistic cleavages of Western Europe it is necessary to supplement the preceding account with data on migration. Uneven economic development in Europe paved the way for a large migration process after the Second World War, the countries in the South providing the countries in the North and the West with labour. At the same time the countries that used to be colonial powers have had to receive immigrants from their former colonies; this applies primarily to the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands. Let us first look at migration in Western Europe beginning with the early 1970s (Table 2.22). Although migration tends to vary over time, we note clear differences between the various countries. In Finland, Greece and Portugal emigration was larger than immigration whereas the opposite is true of the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. In the 1990s no countries except Ireland, Portugal and Iceland display a negative migration balance and the positive migration balance is rather small in the other countries. Even if these data are to be interpreted cautiously it is evident that Ireland remains the major emigration country. The migration waves have in many countries had political consequences reinforcing ethnic cleavages, as ongoing trends have resulted in sizeable foreign resident populations (Table 2.23). Admitting that these estimations are shaky, we find a national pattern that agrees

TABLE 2.22 Migration (per thousand in relation to the population)

	1970	1980	1985	1990	1994
Austria	2.3	1.2	1.1	3.0	1.7
Belgium	0.4	-0.4	0.1	2.0	1.9
Denmark	2.4	0.2	1.8	1.6	1.9
Finland	-7.8	-0.6	0.6	1.8	0.8
France	3.5	0.8	-0.1	1.4	1.6
Germany	9.3	5.1	1.5	17.8	3.9
Greece	-4.4	5.0	1.1	5.9	2.6
Iceland	-7.3	-2.2	-2.1	-3.9	-2.6
Ireland	-1.0	-0.3	-7.3	-8.8	-2.2
Italy	-0.9	0.1	1.5	2.3	2.7
Luxembourg	3.2	3.6	2.5	12.8	9.9
Netherlands	2.6	3.7	1.4	4.0	1.2
Norway	-0.3	1.0	1.4	0.5	3.0
Portugal	-16.5	-12.9	2.3	-3.3	1.5
Spain	-0.6	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.7
Sweden	6.1	1.2	1.3	4.1	5.7
Switzerland	-1.0	2.7	2.2	8.5	4.1
United Kingdom	0.5	-0.9	1.3	0.3	1.6

Net migration = immigration minus emigration; the figures for Germany refer to FRG.

Sources: OECD, 1985a, 1995c; Labour Force Statistics

TABLE 2.23 *Foreign resident population as a share of total population*

	1950	1970-71	1982	1991-92	1991	1992
Austria	4.7	2.8	4.0	7.1	6.5	6.6
Belgium	4.3	7.2	9.0	9.2	9.1	9.2
Denmark	-	-	2.0	3.3	3.3	3.3
Finland	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.8
France	4.1	5.3	6.8	6.3	6.4	6.3
Germany	1.1	4.9	7.6	8.4	8.4	7.3
Greece	0.4	0.2	0.7	2.0	2.9	2.6
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	2.3
Ireland	-	4.6	6.7	2.5	0.8	2.7
Italy	0.1	-	0.5	-	1.4	0.9
Luxembourg	9.9	18.4	26.4	29.6	29.4	32.2
Netherlands	1.1	2.0	3.9	4.8	4.8	4.8
Norway	0.5	2.0	2.2	3.5	3.5	3.5
Portugal	0.3	0.4	0.6	1.2	1.1	1.2
Spain	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.3	1.1	0.9
Sweden	1.8	5.1	4.9	5.7	5.7	5.7
Switzerland	6.1	17.2	14.7	17.6	16.9	17.4
United Kingdom	-	-	3.9	3.3	3.2	3.5

Sources: 1950-1991/92: Fassman and Münz, 1994: 6; 1991: Salt et al., 1994: 175; 1992: *Eurostat Yearbook '95*

with earlier observations. The following countries have a large proportion of immigrants: Luxembourg, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, Austria, France, Sweden and the Netherlands. On the other hand, the countries with a large proportion of its population living abroad include: Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Finland and Spain. Actually, the exact size of these groups is not easily established as it depends upon the various definitions of citizenship in different countries (Layton-Henry, 1988, 1990). Yet post-war immigration waves are large enough to present severe problems to political parties and governments in several West European countries.

Conclusion

The ethnic cleavage may be separated into three dimensions: ethnic structure, ethnic consciousness and migration. Whereas ethnic structure may adequately be described by the fragmentation index or a measure of the percentage of the population that speaks the dominant language, it is far more difficult to arrive at a measure of the extent of ethnic consciousness typical of a nation. Ethnic identities belong to ethnic groups, not to nations. For the national level the relationship between ethnic fragmentation and ethnic consciousness may be summarized thus: a high degree of fragmentation is conducive to the existence of highly conscious groups, but it is not a sufficient condition. A high level of fragmentation does not automatically produce intense ethnic awareness, as Switzerland shows, and it is not that the higher the fragmentation the more intense the awareness. Ethnic consciousness in parts of the United Kingdom is probably as high as it is in

Spain and in Belgium, although the fragmentation is much lower in the United Kingdom. Intense ethnic identification may occur in a country that is not highly fragmented ethnically. Ethnic awareness may be found in France, Finland and Denmark even though these countries are not highly fragmented. To make more detailed comparisons between ethnic structure and ethnic awareness detailed regional data should be consulted and one needs to take into account the long-term effects of huge migration waves, resulting in considerable foreign resident populations or numerous individuals who have recently been naturalized.

Class-based cleavages

There is unanimity among scholars that class is an important cleavage between people in industrialized societies in Western Europe (Goldthorpe et al., 1969). Class seems to be an important explanatory variable (Korpi, 1983), as the class a person belongs to affects his or her pattern of action (Lane, 1965: 220). The concept of class has not only an individual dimension but above all a social dimension; for instance Korpi argues that it helps in understanding how privileges and chances in life are distributed in society as well as how conflict between groups arises and how society changes (Korpi, 1978). Divergent opinions in the theoretical debate concerning class deal not with whether class is an important cleavage but with the relative importance that is to be attached to class compared with other types of cleavage. These differences recur in the approaches to the concept of class (Carlsson, 1969). Outlooks differ in the debate concerning the extent to which conflicts based on class cleavages decrease or increase in importance as industrial societies are transformed into welfare societies or 'the post-industrial society'. Above all among American scholars the view may be found that class conflicts would lose in importance in these societies. Another line of reasoning akin to such statements is that ideologies based on class cleavages were or would be fading away, the slogan being the end of ideology (Tingsten, 1955; Aron, 1957; Shils, 1958; Bell, 1960; Lipset, 1964; Di Palma, 1973; Dogan, 1995).

Dahrendorf maintained as early as in 1958 that class conflicts were declining at the same time as they proved to be easier to solve in welfare societies. Developments during the late 1960s and early 1970s have made the opposite interpretation more common: the salience of class conflict had increased in industrialized societies. Matheson writes that 'the May 1968 events in France and the turbulent reaction of labor to the world economic crises of the 1970s, particularly in Italy but also in other European countries, like Finland' indicate that the working class is not 'passive and accommodating to the established order' (Matheson, 1979:12-13).

Class-based cleavages - whether latent in the class structure or manifest in class consciousness - are assumed to be influenced by the socio-economic

development of a society, although opinions are divided about the magnitude and direction of the influence. The question is an old one: in 1844 Engels, in his description of the situation of the English working class, considered that it had deteriorated as a consequence of industrialization (Hobsbawm, 1964). In later discussions the positive effect of industrialization on the decrease of class distinctions is stressed. Lenski holds that both the process of industrialization and the rate of economic growth lead to reduced class distinctions (Lenski, 1966; Curright, 1967). However, opinions are divided about whether the connection is a linear or a curvilinear one (Jackman, 1975: 43). Too rapid economic growth may have the opposite effect and lead to increased class distinctions (Olson, 1963: 536). When attempts have been made to clarify these connections, weak connections have been found in some cases (Jackman, 1975: 128), and stronger ones in others (Hewitt, 1977: 459; Dryzek, 1978: 407).

Another related set of problems focuses on how class consciousness changes. Does class consciousness diminish as societies become increasingly modern and achieve higher levels of economic growth? – that was the theme of the 'end of ideology' debate. So far we have looked upon class structure and class consciousness as a dependent variable. But class-based cleavages should also be regarded as a causal variable, as an independent variable which influences party and politics in different respects. A general model of politics in Western Europe has to take into account the implications of class-based cleavages for society, the party system, as well as for government. It is not necessary to adhere to orthodox Marxism to justify the inclusion of class-based cleavages (Crouch and Pizzorno, 1978).

Class structure

The main problem when describing class structure is the operationalization of the concept of class. To be able to describe class-based cleavages in societies comparatively we must choose some measure or indicator. We take the distribution of income in society as our starting point, assuming that societies which have an uneven distribution of income present a class-based stratification system, whereas societies with a more even class structure display a more even income distribution. We measure class structure by income distribution because of the availability of various kinds of data. Although the data on income structure are plentiful, the quality varies, which often renders comparisons between countries difficult. This has led some scholars to repudiate this type of data altogether (Therborn et al., 1978: 27f.). We believe, however, that income data used judiciously can give a picture of the class structure of today's societies. Data that admit historical comparisons are not available.

Another circumstance is that the measures used to describe income distribution are not indisputable (Allison, 1978). In order to catch something of the variation between countries in the degree of inequality in the distribution of income we employ measures that may be derived from the

so-called Lorenz curve. On the one hand we have the Gini index which is an overall measure of the extent of income inequality. On the other hand we also use a measure of the proportion of the total disposable household income that goes to the top quintile.

Several data series on income distribution among households and individuals have been presented from the 1970s through to the 1990s (Paukert, 1973; Roberti, 1974; Uusitalo, 1975; Sawyer, 1976; Cromwell, 1977; Bomschier, 1978; Deutsch, 1980; Lecaillon et al., 1984; OECD, 1986; Atkinson et al., 1995; Tabatabai, 1996). The quality varies and it is not always clear what has been included; some of the series are inadequate as a basis for comparisons between countries. The best of these series and the best overview up to now that we know of is the one made by Sawyer in 1976 and the 1996 OECD survey, which does not present comparable data for all the countries in Western Europe; however, they may be complemented by other sources, rendering reasonable estimates possible. Household incomes are compared and there are comparable data based on similar definitions of both income and household. The data collected are not based on income tax statements but on survey investigations concerning after-tax income.

Table 2.24 gives these data on income distribution in Western Europe from the 1960s to the 1980s. The Gini index goes from 0 to 1, where 0 implies equality and 1 the opposite, i.e. a few have a very large amount of the resources, whereas the many have a very small share. The higher the

TABLE 2.24 *Income distribution: Gini indices*

	1960s		1970s			1980s		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Austria	–	0.37	–	–	–	–	–	–
Belgium	–	0.34	–	–	–	–	–	0.24
Denmark	0.37	0.37	–	0.38	–	–	–	–
Finland	0.46	–	–	0.37	0.30	0.21	–	–
France	0.50	0.39	0.42	0.41	0.43	0.30	–	–
Germany	0.45	0.37	0.40	0.38	0.31	0.25	–	–
Greece	0.38	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Iceland	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ireland	–	0.30	–	–	–	–	–	0.33
Italy	0.40	0.38	–	0.40	0.37	0.31	–	–
Luxembourg	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.24
Netherlands	0.42	0.30	0.39	0.35	0.31	0.27	–	–
Norway	0.35	0.30	0.35	0.31	0.32	0.23	–	–
Portugal	–	0.40	–	–	–	–	–	–
Spain	–	0.36	–	0.36	0.39	–	–	–
Sweden	0.39	0.34	0.35	0.30	0.33	0.22	–	–
Switzerland	–	0.40	–	–	0.29	0.32	–	–
United Kingdom	0.38	0.31	0.34	0.32	0.33	0.30	–	–

The Gini index ranges from 0 to 1 with 0 as maximum equality and 1 maximum inequality. See Sawyer (1976) and OECD (1986) for a discussion of methodological problems. Sources: (1) Paukert, 1973; (2) Simpson, 1990; (3) Sawyer, 1976; Uusitalo, 1975; (5) OECD, 1986; (6) OECD, 1996c.

value of the index, the more unequal the distribution. When the different series are compared, there is an acceptable agreement with regard to the ranking order of the countries. Sawyer often shows lower values, which is probably because he consistently uses data on after-tax income.

In the ranking order of the countries clear differences appear between countries with high values (those which are above 0.40) and countries that have low values (those which are below 0.35). The countries in between are more difficult to distinguish from each other, as the difference between Austria and Belgium is small (and uncertain) and so is the difference between Belgium and the Netherlands. It appears from Table 2.24 that the class cleavage is most conspicuous in southern Europe including France whereas Northern Europe, in particular the Scandinavian countries, is characterized by a more even income distribution. The case of Switzerland illustrates the lack of consistency between various estimates. Actually, the different estimates for Switzerland result in a weak association between index (2) and index (6) ($r = 0.25$). Let us turn to an alternative measure of income distribution.

Another measure of the amount of income inequality in a country is the top quintile, which states the share of total income that goes to the 20 per cent most well off. The association between the various estimates of the share of the top quintile is higher ($r = 0.55$ for index (2) and index (7)) meaning that the top quintile measure is a more robust indicator. Table 2.25's data complement Table 2.24. Here we find the same pattern of country

TABLE 2.25 *Income distribution: income share of top 20 per cent of the population*

	1960s			1970s			1980s		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Austria	—	—	44.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
Belgium	—	—	39.8	—	—	—	—	—	36.0
Denmark	43.2	47.6	43.2	—	—	—	—	—	38.6
Finland	49.3	49.3	—	—	—	37	37.6	—	—
France	53.7	53.7	46.6	47.0	46.9	47	41.9	—	—
Germany	42.9	52.9	44.7	46.8	46.1	38	40.3	—	—
Greece	49.5	49.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Iceland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Ireland	—	—	39.4	—	—	—	—	—	—
Italy	48.4	48.4	46.5	—	46.5	44	46.5	—	—
Luxembourg	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Netherlands	48.4	48.5	40.0	45.8	42.9	37	36.9	—	—
Norway	40.5	40.5	37.3	40.9	37.3	37	36.7	—	—
Portugal	—	—	49.1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Spain	—	45.7	45.2	—	42.3	42	36.6	—	—
Sweden	44.0	44.0	40.5	40.5	37.0	39	36.9	—	—
Switzerland	—	—	46.0	—	—	37	44.6	—	—
United Kingdom	44.0	39.0	39.6	40.3	38.7	39	44.3	—	—

Sources: (1) Palkert, 1973; (2) Musgrave and Jarrett, 1979; (3) Simpson, 1990; (4) and (5) Sawyer, 1976; (6) OECD, 1986; (7) OECD, 1996c.

variation, as the extent of income inequality is higher in the southern parts of Europe.

Class consciousness

After considering the class structure in Western Europe let us look at the consciousness dimension of class-based cleavages. We choose to do so by describing the degree of class consciousness within the working class, which can be done in various ways. We select two indicators to describe class consciousness: the Afford index on class voting as an expression of class identification; and the degree of trade union organization or trade union membership in a country as an expression of how class consciousness manifests itself in concrete action.

Table 2.26 contains the Afford index measures for four time periods, from 1945 to the 1980s. It should be pointed out that the overall degree of class voting is lower in the 1980s than in the 1950s, but the country variation persists over time to a considerable extent ($r = 0.73$). Class voting tends to be low in Southern Europe, for example France, Central Europe, for example Switzerland, and Western Europe, for example Ireland; whereas it tends to be high in Northern Europe, i.e. Finland, Norway and Sweden.

The second indicator on class awareness shows how large a proportion of the economically active population is organized in trade unions. The data in Table 2.27 represent various estimates of the trade union density from the 1950s to 1990. There appears to be a strong agreement between different

TABLE 2.26 *Estimates of class voting: the Afford index*

	1945-60			1961-70			1971-80			1981-90		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	
Austria	—	—	27.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Belgium	—	—	25.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Denmark	39.8	52.0	28.1	20.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Finland	48.4	50.2	36.9	35.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
France	24.4	18.3	17.0	11.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Germany	36.0	24.8	14.9	13.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Greece	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Iceland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Ireland	—	—	14.1	7.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Italy	—	—	14.5	17.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Luxembourg	26.6	—	—	24.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Netherlands	—	—	14.0	14.7	21.8	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Norway	—	—	52.5	32.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Portugal	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Spain	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Sweden	—	—	51.0	40.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
Switzerland	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
United Kingdom	37.3	38.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	

Source: Nieuwbeerta, 1996: 356

TABLE 2.27 Trade union density

	Trade union density (1)			Trade union density (2)			Trade union density (3)		
	1970	1980	1989	1970	1980	1990	1970	1980	1985
Austria	54.9	50.4	46.2	62.2	56.2	46.2	62	63	58
Belgium	41.3	55.8	54.8	45.5	55.9	51.2	37	48	58
Denmark	60.2	76.3	74.4	60.0	76.0	71.4	53	60	83
Finland	51.9	70.3	71.9	51.4	69.8	72.6	33	35	81
France	21.5	17.6	10.2	22.3	17.5	9.8	31	19	15
Germany	33.0	34.3	30.8	33.0	35.6	32.9	36	39	38
Greece	-	-	-	35.8	36.7	34.1	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	68.1	75.2	78.2	-	-	-
Ireland	49.8	52.7	41.6	53.1	57.0	49.7	39	45	48
Italy	33.4	44.1	33.5	36.3	49.3	38.8	44	26	51
Luxembourg	-	-	-	46.8	52.2	49.7	-	-	-
Netherlands	37.5	32.8	24.5	38.0	35.3	25.5	36	42	28
Norway	51.0	55.7	53.8	51.4	56.9	56.0	46	58	64
Portugal	-	-	-	60.8	60.7	31.8	-	-	-
Spain	-	-	-	27.4	25.0	11.0	-	-	-
Sweden	66.2	78.0	82.9	67.7	79.7	82.5	68	72	91
Switzerland	28.9	31.1	26.6	30.1	30.7	26.6	40	39	32
United Kingdom	44.6	48.6	38.3	44.8	50.4	39.1	44	44	44

Sources: (1) Visser, 1993; (2) OECD, 1994; 184; (3) Western, 1993

estimates of unionization as the association between the estimate for 1985, 1989 and 1990 is $r = 0.99$ and $r = 0.98$, respectively.

The trade unions organize a high percentage of the workforce in the Scandinavian countries in particular. Austria, Belgium and the United Kingdom also have strong unionization. Most interestingly, the data indicate that it was not until the 1990s that the rate of unionization began to decline in the advanced capitalist countries in Western Europe (Western, 1995).

Summing up

The class cleavage constitutes the most coherent of the three types of cleavage that we consider, as class structure and class consciousness interact to a considerable extent. The correlations in the 1990s between the income distribution of a nation (the Gini-measure) or the quintile measure and our measures of class consciousness – an estimate of trade union density and of class voting – tend to be consistently strong: -0.65 and -0.74 as well as -0.34 and -0.37 respectively. The unambiguous finding is that the more higher the income distribution between various strata in the class structure the higher the class consciousness and the degree of unionization.

Moreover, the high correlation between class voting and trade union organizing ($r = 0.74$) is another finding which is not entirely unexpected, as a firm organization, especially of blue collar-workers, has constituted the foundation for Social Democratic power in governments. But what is a good

explanation of the relationship between class structure and the two measures of class consciousness? First, we may conclude that it is hardly true that a more equal income distribution between economic strata softens class awareness. Class consciousness as measured by two different kinds of indicators, class voting and unionization, is not necessarily higher in nations characterized by a hierarchical distribution of income. Secondly, we explain the findings by reversing the relationship: a high level of class consciousness results in an equalization of incomes; and a high level of class consciousness may persist for a long time even though the income distribution is no longer as unequal as it used to be. The explanation fails to account for the origin of a high level of class consciousness: if a high level of class consciousness explains the evenness of income distribution, what explains the low level of class consciousness in unequal countries? Perhaps a diachronic interpretation of each of the countries could account for the origin of the levels of class consciousness. Since our interest lies in the synchronic interpretation of data we note the coexistence of a high level of class consciousness in countries with a more even income distribution; and we suggest that class consciousness operates against economic inequalities.

Conclusion

According to a major theory in political sociology social heterogeneity and cleavages have a profound impact on politics, including political stability. The concept of social fragmentation may be applied to the structure of West European societies by the employment of indicators on cleavages. In this chapter we described the three major cleavage bases: religion, ethnicity and class. In addition we portrayed the socio-economic structure of the societies in Western Europe. The findings may be partly summarized in two indices on social fragmentation, which refer to the latent dimension of cleavages. Table 2.28 gives one broad index on social heterogeneity consisting of an average for the ratings of the various nations on religious structure, ethnic structure and class-based cleavages as well as one narrow index on social fragmentation consisting of an average for the scores on religious and ethnic cleavages – what has been referred to as constituting a segmented society. The table also contains the scores on the various dimensions.

The two indices on social fragmentation – the broad one and the narrow one – give a somewhat different picture of West European societies, although the various country scores are related, $r = 0.86$. When people speak of divided societies, reference is usually to the religious or ethnic structures. Divided societies in this sense are first and foremost Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands. Perhaps one should also mention Germany and Spain in this context. Socially heterogeneous in a broader sense, including other types of cleavage as well, are: Switzerland, Portugal, Greece and France. When we also consider a cleavage basis such as class, then the

TABLE 2.28 Cleavages and social fragmentation (T-scores)

	Cleavages			Fragmentation	
	Rel	Ethn	Class	Narrow	Broad
Austria	54.5	45.9	47.5	50.2	49.3
Belgium	44.5	70.6	40.0	57.5	51.7
Denmark	46.0	42.4	47.5	44.2	45.3
Finland	47.0	46.5	32.5	46.7	42.0
France	56.5	52.9	55.0	54.7	54.8
Germany	68.5	46.5	42.5	57.5	52.5
Greece	38.0	43.5	60.0	40.8	47.2
Iceland	42.5	45.9	45.0	44.2	44.5
Ireland	42.0	44.7	62.5	43.4	49.7
Italy	49.5	45.9	57.5	47.7	51.0
Luxembourg	41.0	64.7	40.0	52.9	48.6
Netherlands	69.5	47.6	47.5	58.6	54.9
Norway	46.0	42.4	37.5	44.2	42.0
Portugal	40.5	40.0	62.5	40.3	47.7
Spain	40.5	58.8	60.0	49.7	53.1
Sweden	46.0	48.8	35.0	47.4	43.3
Switzerland	66.0	71.2	60.0	68.6	65.7
United Kingdom	58.0	42.4	55.0	50.2	51.8

The indices are standardized measures derived from Tables 2.2, 2.8 and 2.24. The narrow index consists only of the indices for religious and ethnic structures whereas the broad index includes all three indices. Values on class for Austria and Greece are estimates.

most socially fragmented nations are not quite the same as the typically 'deeply divided societies'.

It is pertinent here to contrast Tocqueville with Rokkan. The former never conceived of society as structured in the sense that deep-seated long-lasting cleavages are passed on from one generation to another, as in the latter's interpretation. Tocqueville spoke much about the possibility of anomie or alienation when people left the aristocratic society with its firm status distinctions classifying persons in legally identified groupings. In the democratic society with its formal equality people would live in a more floating society with changing identities – a theme developed by Riesman in *The Lonely Crowd* (1950). Yet, Rokkan's insistence upon cleavages seems well taken when one examines the seminal relationships between society and politics in the twentieth century. But how valid is the Rokkan model as we approach the twenty-first century? One important theme in research on Western European politics today is whether *new* cleavages have emerged beside or are replacing the *old* ones, which is once more partly a question about the meaning of the term 'cleavage', again to be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

Cleavages are either manifest or latent. When cleavages become manifest it is often because political parties are highly instrumental in mobilizing people to take action on the basis of their identification with a cleavage. We now ask how connected the political parties in Western Europe tend to be in

relation to the three classical cleavages of ethnicity, religion and class. What is the support in the electorate for so-called structural parties over and against non-structural parties? This is a basic question when examining the traditional alignment and the ongoing realignment of the electorates in Western Europe.