

Nationalism and Intellectuals in Nations without States: the Catalan Case

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This paper aims to provide a theoretical framework for the study of the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in Western nations without states. The first part sets up a theoretical framework which includes a definition of the concepts of nation, state and nationalism and also introduces the concept of nations without states. It then establishes a distinction between 'state nationalism' and nationalism in 'nations without states'. The second part analyses the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in the work of Elie Kedourie, Tom Nairn, John Breuilly and Anthony D. Smith. The third part considers the specific context within which intellectuals operate in nations without states. It concentrates on the study of the role of Catalan intellectuals in protecting their vernacular language and culture during Franco's regime (1939–75) together with the processes which, in the 1960s and 1970s, turned Catalan nationalism from an elite into a mass movement. Particular attention is given to the cultural resistance activities carried out by Catalan intellectuals during this period, the reasons why some intellectuals may feel attracted to nationalism, and the rational and emotional arguments employed by intellectuals as mobilizing agents.

I. What are Nations without States?

A basic conceptual distinction between nation, state and nationalism has to be made. By 'state', taking Weber's definition, I refer to 'a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory' (Weber, 1991, p. 78), although not all states have successfully accomplished this, and some of them have not even aspired to accomplish it. By 'nation' I refer to a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself. Thus, in my view, the 'nation' includes five dimensions: psychological (consciousness of forming a group), cultural, territorial, political and historical. By offering this definition, I distinguish the term nation from both the state and the nation-state, and I shall be using this distinction later when considering what I call 'nations without states'. By 'nationalism' I mean the sentiment of belonging to a community whose members identify with a set of symbols, beliefs and ways of life, and have the will to decide upon their common political destiny.

But still another term needs to be defined and distinguished from the ones I have just mentioned the nation-state. The nation-state is a modern phenomenon which emerged around the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century. It is characterized by the formation of a kind of state which has the monopoly of what it claims to be the legitimate use of force within a demarcated territory and seeks to unite the people subjected to its rule by means of homogenization, creating a

common culture, symbols, values, reviving traditions and myths of origin, and sometimes inventing them.

The distinctive character of this paper derives from its aim to provide a theoretical framework for the study of the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in 'nations without states'. By 'nations without states' I refer to nations which, in spite of having their territories included within the boundaries of one or more states maintain a separate sense of national identity generally based upon a common culture, history, attachment to a particular territory and the explicit wish to rule themselves (Guibernau, 1999). At present, most thriving nationalist movements in Western nations without states emerge within nations which once enjoyed a separate political and/or cultural identity which is now being invoked, revitalized and adapted to the new socio-political circumstances in which the nation lives and evolves.

Self-determination is sometimes understood as political autonomy, in other cases it stops short of independence and often involves the right to secede. Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, the Basque Country and Flanders represent but a few nations without states currently demanding further autonomy. It could be argued that some of these nations already have some kind of state of their own since a substantial number of powers have been devolved to their regional parliaments. But political autonomy or even federation differ substantially from independence since they tend to exclude foreign and economic policy, defence and constitutional matters, and this is why it continues to make sense to refer to them as 'nations without states'.

I argue that a specific distinction between 'state nationalism' and nationalism in 'nations without states' is necessary in order to understand some of the key specific features of nationalism in both cases. It should be stressed that what distinguishes both types of nationalism has nothing to do with issuing a value judgement and claiming that one type of nationalism is 'good' while the other is 'bad', one is 'ethnic' and the other 'civic'. Rather the two fundamental differences between 'state nationalism' and nationalism in 'nations without states' concern their different access to power and resources, and the fact that while the former seeks to consolidate and strengthen the state, the latter challenges its legitimacy and often, but not always, seeks to construct a new state.

When considering the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism, I shall be following Smith's definition of intellectuals as those who create artistic works and produce ideas. In so doing I distinguish them from the 'wider intelligentsia or professionals who transmit and disseminate those ideas and creations and form a still wider educated public that "consumes" ideas and works of art' (Smith, 1991, p. 93), although in practice, the same individual may fulfil all these different roles.

II. Intellectuals and Nationalism

Before turning to the specific study of the task of intellectuals in nations without states, this paper reviews the theories of Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith since they all have devoted some sections of their work to the analysis of the relationship

between nationalism and intellectuals. But it should be stressed that their theories do not address the specific role of intellectuals in nations without states. On the contrary, they neglect the need to establish a clear-cut distinction between those intellectuals operating within the nation-state and contributing to create 'state nationalism', and those evolving within nations lacking a state of their own. An exception to this is represented by Kedourie's analysis of intellectuals in colonial societies.

Elie Kedourie: On 'Marginal Men'

... I began to rebel against the glory I could not be associated with.
(Quoted by Kedourie in *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, p. 88).

Kedourie sustains an hostile attitude towards nationalism and defines it as a sort of politics which is not concerned with reality, rather 'its solitary object is an inner world and its end is the abolition of all politics' (Kedourie, 1986, p. 85). He sees nationalism as a disease which originated in the West and then spread to other parts of the world. In his view, intellectuals are to be blamed for the generation of a doctrine based on the assumption that nations are obvious and natural divisions of the human race as history, anthropology and linguistics prove. According to Kedourie, alienated and restless intellectuals marginalized from politics under the impact of Enlightenment rationalism turned to Romanticism and generated nationalism as a doctrine that would have the capacity to grant them a major role within society.¹ He is extremely critical of Romantic intellectuals such as Herder or Fichte and fully identifies nationalism with Romanticism.

Kedourie focuses on the role of intellectuals in colonial societies. He describes how some Western educated indigenous people became completely alienated from their traditional societies and identified with the culture and manners of the colonizers only to discover that indigenous elites were excluded from positions of honour and responsibility reserved for the white colonizers. He writes:

an Indian could be admitted to the civil service only if he had become so completely Europeanized as to be really and practically on the footing and imbued with the character of an English highly educated gentleman. But it did not prove to be the case that an Indian who had become 'imbued' with such a character would be easily or automatically treated like an English gentleman. (Kedourie, 1971, p. 84)

In fact, what Kedourie writes about indigenous elites in colonial societies is highly relevant to the analysis of some indigenous elites in nations without states, specially where some specific regional affiliation acts as a barrier for promotion within the state's socio-political and economic structure.

One of the main objections to Kedourie's theory is that it fails to account for the nationalism defended and generated by 'official' intellectuals who already have secured honour and status within the state. In doing so he ignores the nationalism espoused by the colonizers which included their own intellectuals and political

leaders. It could be argued that the colonizers' nationalism was to be blamed for the exclusion experienced by indigenous elites who, in spite of being culturally homogenized and integrated, were never viewed as 'belonging' to the colonizer's nation.

Kedourie's theory presumes a wide gap between active intellectual elites and inert and disoriented masses. In his view, the only way to persuade the people to support the nationalist movement is through propaganda and control over education. To mobilize the people, elites must 'appeal to the indigenous beliefs and practices, invoke the dark gods and their rites, and transform purely religious motifs and figures into political and national symbols and heroes – which is all part of the "ethnicization" and nationalization of previously universal and transhistorical religions' (Smith, 1998, p. 113).

Kedourie concedes that an elite of intellectuals captures the main injustices endured by the mass of the population and constructs a nationalist doctrine whose aim is to eliminate the unjust situation shared by all those belonging to the same nation, thus uniting elites and masses under a single banner. But, for him, the objective of these fanatical intellectuals goes well beyond the wish to end the unjust situation that their fellow country men and women are enduring. The intellectuals' objective is to gain power in society and halt their alienation and exclusion from positions of honour and privilege.

Tom Nairn: the People's Mobilizers

The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood. (*The Break-up of Britain*, p. 340)

Nairn approaches the study of nationalism from a Marxist perspective. He considers nationalism as a bourgeois phenomenon which can be derived from the class consequences of the uneven diffusion of capitalism (Nairn, 1977, pp. 98–9). Nationalism generates and, at the same time, requires the exploitation of peripheries whose deprived elites have no alternative but to turn to the masses and engage them in the nationalist project. In this context, nationalism's main objective is to fight against a concrete form of 'progress' promoted by the colonial capitalist while at the same time embracing a distinctive idea of progress generated by the intellectuals capable of leading their struggle against capitalist oppression (Nairn, 1977, p. 339).

Nairn explains the emergence of nationalism in deprived areas as a reaction against the uneven spread of capitalism. But he also acknowledges the existence of some exceptions to the connection he establishes between nationalism, backwardness and periphery. To mobilize the masses and gain their support for the nationalist cause, the new intellectual elites have to work towards the construction of a 'militant inter-class community' sharing a common identity even if, as Nairn stresses, they only share this identity in a mythical way. Nairn, as well as Hroch and Peter Worsley, envisages a chronological progression in the spread of nationalism from elite into mass involvement.

In Nairn's theory, the support of the masses is crucial if a nationalist movement is to succeed. But, what are the implications of turning to the people? He points at three main implications: (1) speaking their language; (2) taking a more kind view of their general 'culture' which had been relegated by the Enlightenment and (3) coming to terms with the enormous and still irreconcilable diversity of popular and peasant life (Nairn, 1977, p. 101).

John Breuilly: the Creators of Ideology

Nationalist ideology has its roots in intellectual responses to the modern problem of the relationship between state and society (*Nationalism and the State*, p. 349).

Breuilly understands nationalism as a form of politics, principally opposition politics. In his view, 'the term "nationalism" is used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments' (Breuilly, 1982, p. 3). In line with Kedourie and Nairn, he stresses the ability of nationalism to attain mass support and confers a pre-eminent role to intellectuals and members of the professions as key figures in the construction of nationalist ideologies. But, according to him 'nationalism cannot be seen as the politics of any particular social class...[and] neither can it be regarded as the politics of intellectuals', although most nationalist leaders are drawn from the professions (Breuilly, 1982, p. 332).

In his view, the idea that 'nationalism should be seen primarily as the search for identity and power on the part of displaced intellectuals is a gross exaggeration, even if that is what it means to many intellectuals in nationalist movements' (Breuilly, 1982, p. 332). Breuilly admits, however, that the exclusion from expected positions suffered by some intellectuals and members of the professions may contribute to their support for nationalism as an ideology able to provide a new identity containing 'images of an ideal state and an ideal society' in which they will have a secure, respected and leading position (Breuilly, 1982, p. 329).

Breuilly points at two set of arguments to explain the intellectuals' attraction to nationalism. First, although he portrays nationalist intellectuals as unsuccessful professionals, he argues that their failure is relative, since it involves both failing to obtain certain positions, and not getting the financial and social status expected from the position attained. Here the argument echoes that of Kedourie's theory about indigenous intellectuals being excluded from top positions in colonial societies and how this made them turn to nationalism. Second, he argues that the excessive number of intellectuals produced by some societies and the inability to 'absorb' them, may also contribute to explain why some intellectuals turn to nationalism.

He perceives nationalist politics as elite politics in politically fragile states, or as a form of politics which can arouse mass support without having to tie itself too closely to the specific concerns of that support. The compelling character of the nationalist ideology stems from the connection between the intellectuals' portrayal of the nation and the common beliefs and often widespread political grievances shared by large sectors of the population. He argues that symbols and ceremonies award nationalist ideas a definite shape and force in two major ways: they project

certain images of the nation, and enable people to come together expressing some type of national solidarity.

Anthony D. Smith: 'In Search of Identity'

There is, in fact, an 'elective affinity' between the adapted model of a civic, territorial nation and the status, needs and interests of the professionals (and to a lesser extent of the commercial bourgeoisie). (*National Identity*, p. 121)

In his early work Smith confers pre-eminence to political and religious, rather than social and cultural factors in the emergence of what he refers to as ethnic nationalism. He argues that the modern era is characterized by the rise of what he calls the 'scientific state', this is, 'a state whose efficacy depends on its ability to harness science and technology for collective purposes' (Smith, 1998, p. 189). In his view, the emergence of the 'scientific state' challenges the legitimacy of religious explanations and favours situations of 'dual legitimation', in which rival grounds of authority dispute for the allegiance of humanity. Intellectuals, as the equivalent of pre-modern priests, are particularly affected by this dispute.

According to Smith, the rise of a secular intelligentsia within the framework of the 'scientific state' has encountered several obstacles, among them: the overproduction of highly qualified personnel, the opposition on the part of entrenched hierarchical bureaucrats to the critical rationalism of the intelligentsia, and the use of ethnic or other cultural grounds for discrimination in admitting sections of the intelligentsia to public high-status positions. He emphasizes the crucial role of intellectuals as generators of ideology and leaders of the nationalist movement in its early stages, although he is more sceptical about their function once the nationalist movement develops. He rejects those who define intellectuals as fanatical power-seeking individuals, though he accepts that, in some instances, it is possible to point at some excluded and resentful intellectuals especially in colonial societies.

Smith concludes that the beneficiaries of nationalism are the members of the mobilized *ethnie* at large, since nationalism favours both, the activation of the masses and the end of their role as passive objects of external domination, and the elevation of popular culture into literary 'high' culture performed by intellectuals. Against those who stress the invented nature of nations and nationalism (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), Smith highlights the 'ethnic origins' of most of the cultural elements selected by intellectuals in the construction of modern nationalism.

To explain the attraction that many intellectuals in different parts of the world have felt for nationalism and their influential imprint on the ideology and language of nationalism, Smith invokes the 'identity crisis' experienced by people in general and the intellectuals in particular stemming from the challenges posed to traditional religion and society by the 'scientific state'. He argues that the 'nationalist solution' allows individuals to draw their own identity from the collective identity of the nation. In so doing, 'she or he becomes a citizen, which is, a recognized and rightful member of a political community that is, simultaneously a cultural

"community of history and destiny" (Smith, 1991, p. 97). Here Smith stresses the relation between national identity and citizenship thus emphasizing the cultural and political aspects of nationalism.

The writings of Kedourie, Nairn, Breuille and Smith firmly place intellectuals as the generators of nationalism. In so doing, these scholars coincide in defining nationalism as a modern political ideology which, to be successful, requires the support of the masses, however, they regard the relationship between intellectuals and the masses in very different ways. Kedourie underlines the wide gap between intellectual elites and the masses. In contrast, Nairn accepts the need to create an inter-class community united by a common objective and, Breuille describes what we could refer to as an 'interactive' relationship between intellectual elites and the masses. Smith highlights the shared character of national identity among members of the same nation.

Kedourie, Nairn, Breuille and Smith agree on the significance of mass support if a nationalist movement is to succeed. They also emphasize the power of culture, language, symbols and ceremonials as key constituents of nationalism. What is lacking from their analysis is a specific theory considering whether the task of intellectuals in nations without states is different, and if so, to what extent, from the task of intellectuals in nation-states. Apart from Kedourie who studies the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in colonial societies, neither Nairn, Breuille or Smith specify the context within which the intellectuals they analyse live and develop their theories.

There is considerable literature on the role of intellectuals in oppositional nationalisms, however, most of it concerns the study of underdeveloped countries (Hobsbawm, Gouldner, Kautsky). An exception to the considerable literature devoted to the study of nationalism and intellectuals in colonial societies is exemplified by the work of Pinard and Hamilton who study the participation of intellectuals in Quebec nationalism (Pinard and Hamilton, 1984). But their work has a primarily empirical focus and fails to provide a theoretical framework for the study of the relationship between intellectuals and nationalism in stateless nations. In what follows, I address this particular task.

III. The Case of Catalonia: Intellectuals in Nations without States

The third part of this paper offers a theoretical analysis of the socio-political context within which intellectuals operate in nations without states. In particular, it focuses on the role of intellectuals in the maintenance of the Catalan language and culture during Franco's dictatorship (1939–75). First, I offer a brief account of the cultural resistance activities carried out by Catalan intellectuals. Second, I analyse the processes that saw Catalan nationalism transformed from an elite into a mass movement. In conclusion, the paper examines a number of the rational and emotional arguments that intellectuals invoke as they pursue their role as mobilizing agents in contemporary Catalan nationalism.

I am aware of the existence of substantial differences between the role of intellectuals at the birth and the re-emergence of a nationalist movement that has been

dismantled. I am justified, I believe, in selecting the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Franco's dictatorship because of its devastating effects on Catalan language and culture (Benet, 1973). In that context, only small circles of intellectuals and clandestine political activists engaged in the maintenance of key components of Catalan identity and primarily devoted their efforts to the cultivation of Catalan high culture. To begin with, I turn to the issue of the discussion of the specific context within which intellectuals develop their activities in nations without states.

The Socio-political Context

I argue that the study of nationalism in nations without states requires a specific approach which should take into account two key factors. First, that sub-state nationalism emerges within already established nation-states and second, the need for an 'alternative elite' ready to challenge the state, construct a nationalist ideology and lead the nationalist movement.

(1) The nationalism of nations without states emerges within already established nation-states endowed with their own national education system, a specific media system, a constituted power elite and a set of institutions forming the state and defining its territorial, political, social and economic framework. Nation-states embody a cluster of institutions which both define and govern the country while stateless nations may or may not enjoy some kind of cultural or political autonomy, as a result of the state's decision. Often, more than one nation live under the umbrella of a single state. Almost invariably, one nation prevails above the others and plays a leading role in the governance of the country and also in defining its identity through the promotion of a specific culture and language, which generally involves the marginalization of minority cultures and languages. In Spain, Castile turned to be the dominant nation to the detriment of Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and other regions.

The mere existence of a community which considers itself to be a nation other than the one the state seeks to promote poses a threat to and questions the legitimacy of the state wherever it is defined as a unitary political institution. Democratic states recognize internal diversity, however, they are often reluctant to employ the term 'nation' when referring to their national minorities since the political consequences which this may entail, for instance the recognition of a nation's right to self-determination, are usually quite problematic. For this reason, the state tends to regard minority nationalisms as dangerous, or at least, as an uncomfortable phenomenon to deal with. The ways in which the state responds to the demands of the national minorities included within its territory depend upon the state's own nature, the specific character of the nationalist movement, and the international support this is able to secure.

(2) The emergence of a nationalist movement in a nation without state requires the existence of some intellectuals prepared to build up a nationalist discourse different from, and often opposed to, that of the state. In contrast, intellectuals indigenous to the nation-state develop their work within already established frameworks created and supported by the state. As the nation-state was in the process of being created, intellectual discourse was structured by the culture and language

employed in the homogenization of its citizenry and the simultaneous marginalization of regional languages and cultures. As a result, such intellectuals are often critical and even dismissive of regional nationalist movements.

The 'Potential Elite'

Crucial to the development of nationalism in nations without states is the existence and position occupied by the 'potential elite'. By this I refer to those educated individuals who, if the nationalist movement succeeds, are likely to become its leaders. The potential elite includes:

(a) Individuals who feel dissatisfied with the state's treatment of their community. The degree and strength of their dissatisfaction may vary. In some cases, it is connected to the intensity of the state's repressive and discriminatory measures which may range from cultural and socio-political measures to the use of force. Catalan intellectuals who engaged in resistance activities against Franco's regime are a case in point.

(b) Individuals who have been excluded from the state's 'official' elite because of their regional origin. In such cases, individuals are unable to develop their work within the state's circles of power and influence, and have to circumscribe their activities to their region. This could be exemplified by the widespread Castilian adverse attitude towards Catalans which lead to their exclusion from influential positions in the Spanish economic and political power structure during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century.

(c) Individuals who decide to prioritize their allegiance to the nation without state instead of aspiring to be integrated within the state's official elite. This involves their commitment to the advancement of a national cause opposed to that of the state, which often translates itself into their automatic exclusion from the state's selected elite. In these cases, it is the individual's choice rather than the state's systematic exclusion of some people because of their regional origin that leads to the inclusion of these individuals in the category of potential elite. In contemporary democratic Spain, the choice of some Catalan intellectuals to develop their work exclusively in Catalan automatically excludes them from Spanish speaking intellectual circles, unless their work is translated into Spanish. It has been argued that this is a strategy by means of which some educated people who would otherwise be unlikely to achieve a prominent position within the state's elite – because of fierce competition – would easily obtain a prominent position within a nation which is smaller and where competition is bound to be less intense. This argument emphasizes the self-interest of some individuals in promoting regional forms of nationalism in order to gain access to privileged positions.

In my view, although self-interest may in some cases play a substantial part in explaining why some intellectuals support sub-state forms of nationalism, it is misleading to explain all nationalist allegiances through economic motivation and the desire for power. A genuine love for the nation and a desire for its flourishing inspires many nationalists in nations without states, especially in those cases where the nation feels culturally, politically or economically oppressed by the state.

Devoting one's life to the defence and enhancement of the specific character of one's own nation may act as a potent force. It provides meaning to the individual's life whilst setting a concrete and clear-cut objective to his or her actions. Because individuals usually embark upon nationalist projects as part of a group, they are bound to experience some kind of moral support and solidarity as members of a movement with a common goal. The sense of belonging to a nation can somehow be lived through the experience of comradeship arising within the nationalist movement or party.

In spite of this, differences amongst nationalist leaders are not to be ignored since fierce confrontation between them is a common phenomenon. Jealousy and competition amongst intellectuals are also commonplace. They struggle to become more influential, obtain more recognition or be offered a better job.

Intellectuals and Nationalism in Catalonia

During Franco's regime, the Catalan intellectual elite was divided between those who supported Francoism and those who stood against it and took upon themselves the task of maintaining the vernacular language and culture. Yet, while some of the former were incorporated into mainstream Spanish elite, the latter were automatically excluded and often persecuted by the regime. When considering the initiatives to preserve Catalan culture and language, which rose during that period we should distinguish between: initiatives rising from particular individuals and groups, and those emerging from some sectors of two powerful institutions: the Catholic Church and the University.

Individual and Collective Initiatives: The Institute for Catalan Studies (*Institut d'Estudis Catalans*), dismantled in 1939, was reorganized in 1942 by Josep Puig i Cadafalch and Ramon Aramon. Their clandestine activities involved the publication of books and articles on medicine, science and other subjects in Catalan. *Omnium cultural*, a semi-clandestine institution from 1964, was legally recognized in 1967 and then saw a dramatic increase in membership (from 639 in 1968 to 11,000 in 1971). Among the activities of *Omnium Cultural* were the teaching of Catalan and the sponsoring of the Prize of Honour of the Catalan Letters (*Premi d'honor de les lletres catalanes*) (Vilar, 1989, p. 358). The organization of cultural clandestine groups such as *Amics de la Poesia*, *Estudi* or *Miramar*, together with the holding of Literary competitions such as the *Nit de Santa Llúcia* (St. Lucy's evening) and the *Cantonigrós*, and the publication of journals in Catalan (Fabr , Huertas and Ribas, 1978, pp. 156 ff), were some of the major activities organized by intellectual elites (Casassas, 1999).

The Catholic Church: The Catholic Church and the University also contributed to sustain Catalan culture. The position of the Catalan Church was not homogeneous. Thus, while some sectors supported the Francoist regime, others were reluctant to adopt an attitude that could undermine the strong relationship between religion and Catalan culture sustained since the Middle Ages. Some sectors of the Catholic Church assumed a crucial role by preaching and teaching religion in Catalan and employing it as an instrument of culture and communication. In 1942, the first book legally published in Catalan after the Civil War appeared. It was a religious book produced under the auspices of the Catholic Church.

Amid other activities, the Abbey of Montserrat played a remarkable part in continuing to publish in Catalan. They created and promoted, among others, some children's publications (*L'Infantil, Tretzevents*) and some cultural and religious journals (*Serra d'Or, Qüestions de vida cristiana*). In 1958, the Abbey founded the *Estela* Press to promote religious books in Catalan (Masot i Muntaner, 1986) and in 1971 the PAM Press (Publications of the Montserrat's Abbey) became official (Faulí, 1999, pp. 35–9). The Abbey was also active in providing shelter to intellectuals and clandestine political activists from a wide political spectrum.

The University: The official organization of student life centred around the University Students Union (Sindicato de Estudiantes Universitarios or SEU) under the control of pro-regime individuals, however, constant resistance activities developed within the university. The University Front of Catalonia (Front Universitari de Catalunya or FUC) combined people from different backgrounds. It advocated the reconstruction of Catalonia and produced a critical account of pre-war Catalan politics.

Other university organizations included the National Front of Catalonia (*Front Nacional de Catalunya* or FNC), and the National Federation of Students of Catalonia (*Federació Nacional d'Estudiants de Catalunya* or FNEC) which represented an attempt to unify efforts in fighting the SEU. The university movement received new strength in the mid and late 1950s when new associations emerged. Three major campaigns were launched by the students between 1960 and 1961: the demand for the creation of Catalan culture and language Departments; a campaign against the increasing influence of Opus Dei; and the demand of amnesty for political prisoners and those in exile.

In the late sixties and early seventies, the influence of the 1968 student uprisings in France and the 'Prague Spring' favoured the proliferation of radical organizations within the university, and nationalist claims came to be perceived as bourgeois. Nationalist groups disappeared from the university arena to return only after Franco's death.

From Elite into Mass Movement

Three main phenomena marked the transition of Catalan nationalism from an elite into a mass movement, these are: the *Nova Cançó*, the Assembly of Catalonia and the proliferation of 'solidarity actions'.

The long years of repression endured by Catalans resulted in a widening gap between intellectual elites and the masses and such a gap posed a serious threat to the survival of the Catalan language and culture. The *Nova Cançó* (New Folk Song) movement of the sixties played a key role in the regeneration of the public sphere in Catalonia. The movement was founded by a small middle-class intellectual group of amateur singers and soon developed into an entirely popular phenomenon. The more Catalan singers were banned from the media and their concerts prohibited, the more popular they became. The *Nova Cançó* contributed to 'give people – especially young people – all over the *Països Catalans*, or Catalan-speaking territories, a sense of community till then never felt nor expressed so intensely' (Giner, 1998, pp. 71–6).

The Assembly of Catalonia (*Assemblea de Catalunya*, 1971) brought together three hundred people from diverse social backgrounds and political allegiances. It was the most important clandestine unitary movement in Catalonia since the Civil War and had no equivalent in any other part of Spain. The Assembly presented a common platform based upon four demands: (1) a general amnesty for political prisoners and exiles; (2) the upholding of human rights; (3) the provisional re-establishment of the 1932 Catalan Statute of Autonomy and; (4) the co-ordination of all peninsular peoples in fighting for democracy (Batista and Playà Maset, 1991, pp. 301–2). The Assembly continued its unitary mobilizing activities until the first Spanish democratic elections (15 June 1977). From that moment onwards, the recently legalized political parties took over leadership and concentrated on emphasizing difference between them in order to obtain good results in regional and national elections. Intellectual unity was definitely broken and differing nationalist discourses emerged.

While remaining a dictatorship wedded to conservative ideology, the Francoist regime went through different stages as a number of its policies were certainly modified over time. These modifications were a response to pressures to become more acceptable to Western democracies and were reinforced by deepening technocratic influences upon the regime during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In addition, free market ideals fundamentally transformed the structure of the Spanish economy with unintended consequences on Spanish society and social structure.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, the resistance movement took advantage of all possible breaches to actively protest against the regime. For instance, the early 1970s saw an increase in the number of ‘solidarity actions’. By ‘solidarity action’ I mean an action that is usually instilled by a small elite but whose aim is to attain mass mobilization. The objective of a ‘solidarity action’ is to show the opposition’s strength by focusing upon a particular demand and presenting it as undeniable due to the massive support it receives (Guibernau, 1996, p. 105). A ‘solidarity action’ which exemplifies the moment in which Catalan nationalism had definitely shifted from an elite into a mass movement concerns the one million strong mass demonstration in Barcelona on 11 September 1977 demanding a statute of autonomy for Catalonia. Franco had died in 1975 and the Political Reform Programme presented by the then Prime Minister, Adolfo Suárez, had been ratified by an overwhelming majority. In spite of that, the status that Catalonia might achieve within the new democratic Spanish state had not been decided yet. The Constitution that would define Spain as a democratic state and confer autonomy to Catalonia was to be ratified in 1978.

Rational and Emotional Arguments as Mobilizing Agents

Rational and emotional arguments become intertwined when intellectuals seek to awaken the nation and generate a mass nationalist movement. Rationality stems from the objective reasons invoked by nationalists when defending their case. Independence or greater autonomy may mean: a better economy by encouraging regional development and the right to retain regionally generated wealth; a higher quality of life; freedom from a series of constraints imposed by the state and; even a deepening of democracy by favouring decentralization and self-determination.

Emotions are aroused when the nation is presented as a community which transcends the limited lives of particular individuals while providing them with a collective sense of identity. Belonging to a nation, which is real in the minds of its members, confers them a sense of continuity grounded upon the sentiment of being part of a group portrayed as an extended family. Individuals are born into particular families in the same way as they are placed within specific nations which act as major socializing agents. Individuals are brought up within particular cultures which define the way in which they relate to themselves, others and nature. The use of a particular language increases the sentiment of belonging to a community sharing a common history and a common set of values and practices. As in a family, membership of the nation implies a certain solidarity, in this case, with fellow nationals. It also demands sacrifices and generates sentiments of love and affection that generally become more prominent when the well being of the group is under threat.

Rational Arguments: Rational and emotional arguments have a strong presence in Catalan nationalism which is currently split between a majority movement for greater political autonomy within Spain, and a minority movement for Catalan independence. During Franco's regime, the key objective was to restore democracy and with it the right of Catalonia to develop its language and culture, and recover its autonomous political institutions. These were rational demands capable of arousing intense emotional reactions.

Here I examine some of the arguments which are currently being invoked by Catalan nationalists, including intellectuals as well as political leaders, to legitimize their demands for further autonomy for Catalonia some twenty years after the restoration of its autonomous government (*Generalitat*). In their view, Catalonia should enjoy increasing levels of self-government, be granted a fiscal regime balancing out regional inequalities and be recognized as a nation within Spain with the means to develop fully its distinct identity. Certain Catalan nationalists argue that only through independence can Catalonia thrive culturally and economically and thereby find itself considered a fully fledged political actor in the international arena. I distinguish three main rational arguments destined to convince not only those who share a strong sense of national identity but also those who are solely interested in supporting Catalan nationalism in so far as it proves capable of improving their quality of life, deepening democracy and/or dynamizing civil society.

First, the argument that Catalonia's contribution to the Spanish coffers heavily outweighs the income it receives from the central government. This is presented as an unjust situation which, if reversed, would automatically increase the Generalitat's spending power and improve the Catalans' quality of life.

Second, the argument that political decentralization tends to strengthen democracy in as much as it brings decision-making processes closer to the people. Problems are identified, analysed and resolved where they emerge. Regional politicians usually have greater awareness of the needs and aspirations of their electorates, thus the argument follows, greater devolved powers for Catalonia would strengthen Spanish democracy and encourage greater democratic participation within the region.

Third, the devolution of powers to regional institutions requires the re-allocation of resources to facilitate discrete policies and regional budget planning. These processes, in turn, contribute to revitalize civil society, encouraging local and regional initiatives that include cultural, economic and social projects. The demand for greater autonomy is connected with the wish to increase Catalonia's ability and efficiency to govern itself and be recognized as a distinct political actor within the European Union and other international institutions.

Emotional Arguments: In Catalan nationalism, these arguments emphasize the sentiment of belonging to a cultural and territorial community which has suffered and rejoiced together throughout time. Emotional arguments evolve around three major clusters: history, territory and art.

First, a considerable number of people who suffered under Francoism still hold live images of either their own or their loved one's experiences which may include: torture, imprisonment, exile, proscription, and lack of freedom to cultivate their vernacular language and culture. Memories of oppression under Franco are connected with a long list of grievances, most of them concerned with repeated Spanish attempts to eradicate Catalan language, culture and political institutions. Key historical events, invested with particular meaning and capable of arousing an emotional response when Catalans 'tell their history' include: The Revolt of the Reapers (*Revolta dels Segadors*) in 1640, when Catalans united against the harsh treatment they were receiving from Castile (Elliott, 1963) and, the abolition of Catalan rights and liberties in 1714 when on 11 September (turned into Catalonia's national day), after a massive Franco-Spanish attack, Barcelona surrendered. Philip V (*Felipe V*) ordered the dissolution of Catalan political institutions and Catalonia was subject to a regime of occupation; its language was forbidden and Castilian (Spanish) was proclaimed official (Balcells, 1996, pp. 12–17). More recent historical memories include the suppression of the administrative government of the Catalan Mancomunitat (1913–23) after the *coup d'état* of Miguel Primo de Rivera.

Second, references to the territory of Catalonia are contested. A substantial number of people refers to the so called *Països Catalans* (Catalan Countries) including Catalonia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands and territories across the Pyrenees on the French side of the border. They justify their claim by stressing that these territories which, in medieval times were included in the dominion of the Count of Barcelona, share a common linguistic and cultural background. Dialects of Catalan are currently spoken in Valencia, the Balearic Islands and the area around Perpignan (France). Particular landscapes are emotionally charged and portrayed as embodying Catalan traditions, history and culture. The monasteries of Ripoll, Montserrat and Cuixà (France); mountains such as the Canigó (France), or urban landscapes such as the Fossar de les Moreres (Barcelona) are among them.

Third, selected works of art and artists turned into symbols of Catalan identity are often portrayed as part of a corpus of Catalan high culture which has received international recognition. The work of Joan Miró, Salvador Dalí, Antoni Gaudí, Antoni Tàpies and Pau Casals, among others, stands side by side with fine examples of Romanesque (Taüll) and Gothic art (Barcelona's gothic area). The rich Catalan folklore including the *sardana* (Catalan national dance) should be added to the list of symbols of Catalan identity.

A further and powerful symbol of Catalan identity which somehow escapes the above typology concerns sport, football in particular. During Francoism, the Barcelona Football Club (*Barça*) was portrayed as a representative of the Catalan nation and exemplified resistance against the dictatorship. In Catalonia, the *Barça*'s victories were celebrated as Catalan victories and whenever Barcelona FC and Real Madrid played each other the significance of the match went well beyond sport. Emotions were and are still aroused at the *Nou Camp* (*Barça*'s stadium). At present, Catalan nationalists have launched a campaign demanding the central government the right for Catalonia to create its own Catalan Football Team able to compete in international contests. This movement has galvanized a very large section of the population and is putting pressure on Madrid to reverse its initial negative response.

The way in which people identify with and relate to history, territory and art as part of a common shared heritage which contributes to define the community they belong to is not homogeneous. It is important to emphasize that symbols are effective because they are imprecise. Symbols transform difference into the appearance of similarity, thus allowing people to invest the 'community' with ideological integrity. This, in my view, accounts for the ability of nationalism to bind together people from different cultural levels and social backgrounds.

The power of emotional arguments stems from their capacity to appeal to individuals who share the same culture, feel attached to a concrete land, have the experience of a common past and a project for the future. Intellectuals and political leaders (in some cases religious leaders should also be included) select and promote the key elements which conform national identity, and they also re-create and generate occasions in which all that unites those belonging to the nation is emphasized. In these moments, individuals forget about themselves, and the sentiment of belonging to the group occupies the prime position. The collective life of the community stands above that of the individual. Through symbolism and ritual, individuals are able to feel an emotion of unusual intensity that springs from their identification with an entity – the nation – which transcends them, and of which they actively feel a part.

Concluding Remarks

Intellectuals play a double role. On the one hand, they act as architects of the nationalist movement by providing cultural, historical, political and economic arguments to sustain the distinctive character of the nation and to legitimize its will to decide upon its political future. On the other hand, as we have already mentioned, intellectuals are subversive and construct a discourse that undermines the legitimacy of the current order of things. They denounce the nation's present situation within the state and offer an alternative to it by promoting the conditions and processes of conflict. Intellectuals are to be considered as formulators of the nationalist ideology, however, their task does not end here, since many of them do also act as agitators and mobilizers of the nationalist movement. Valentí Almirall (1841–1904), Enric Prat de la Riba (1870–1917), Jordi Pujol (1930), represent but a few examples of key ideologists of Catalan nationalism who have turned into extremely influential political leaders.

I have argued that two main factors define the socio-political context within which intellectuals operate in nations without states. First, sub-state nationalism emerges within already established nation-states with their own elites, culture, education and media systems and international recognition as political institutions. Second, to be successful, sub-state nationalism requires the existence of an alternative elite able to construct a discourse critical of the current status quo, and ready to formulate an alternative nationalist ideology. Let me attempt, in conclusion, a summary of the themes of this paper.

(a) A combination of factors explains why intellectuals turn to nationalism in nations without states. Against those who, like Kedourie, insist that intellectuals turn to nationalism for mere self-interest, I agree with Breuilly that, although this may sometimes be the case, such an assertion represents a gross exaggeration. Altruism and the genuine desire for freedom for one's own country often account for the intellectuals' fascination with nationalism. For instance, in the early stages of a nationalist movement, a certain degree of altruism and love of country act as potent forces informing the intellectuals' actions. These sentiments are bound to emerge with even greater intensity wherever, as the re-emergence of Catalan nationalism during Franco's regime shows, a national minority lives under repression. In such circumstances, endorsing the minority's nationalism often involves not only the radical exclusion from the states' elite, but a considerable risk to one's own life.

The question why some Catalan intellectuals continue to support nationalism within contemporary democratic Spain would require a more complex analysis far beyond the scope of this paper, however, some hints about this particular issue could be gathered by considering the emotional and rational arguments they employ as mobilizing agents that we have already analysed.

(b) Kedourie, Nairn, Breuilly and Smith agree on the great relevance of mass support if a nationalist movement is to succeed. During Francoism, the greatest threat to the survival of the core components of Catalan identity was the widening gap between an intellectual elite cultivating Catalan high culture and the mass of the population more vulnerable to the homogenizing policies of Franco's regime. In addition to this, the large number of Castilian-speaking immigrants from other parts of Spain, favoured by the state and combined with an absolute lack of political instruments and Catalan institutions to deal with it, contributed to the weakening of a then proscribed Catalan language and culture. Catalonia received 1,400,000 Castilian-speaking immigrants between 1950 and 1975, during that period Catalonia's total population shifted from 3,240,313 to 5,663,125.

Catalan intellectuals and clandestine political leaders, aware of the need to turn nationalism into a mass movement, emphasized the need to create an inter-class community including all members of Catalan society and united around a common objective: to oppose Franco's dictatorship. They fought for the freedom associated with the restoration of democracy and the preservation of Catalan identity. Once democracy was restored, the relationship between intellectuals and the masses became crucially influenced by the appropriation of Catalan nationalism made by the now legalized political parties.

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1 See also: Hodgkin, 1964; Trevor-Roper, 1962; Kohn, 1944.

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