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**Title:** From Propaganda to "OEFFENTLICHKEIT" in Eastern Europe. Four Models of Public Space under State Socialism  
From Propaganda to "OEFFENTLICHKEIT" in Eastern Europe. Four Models of Public Space under State Socialism

**Issue:** 1+2/1990

**Citation style:** Miklós Sükösd. "From Propaganda to "OEFFENTLICHKEIT" in Eastern Europe. Four Models of Public Space under State Socialism". PRAXIS International 1+2:39-63.

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# FROM PROPAGANDA TO "OEFFENTLICHKEIT" IN EASTERN EUROPE. FOUR MODELS OF PUBLIC SPACE UNDER STATE SOCIALISM

Miklos Sukosd

In the present paper, my intention is to elaborate different models of the public sphere under state socialism. These models concern four historical types of public spheres:

1. the totalitarian propaganda state
2. "tolerant repression"
3. the "double" public sphere
4. the post-communist public sphere.

The central term of this argument is that of the public sphere. On the one hand, I would define the public sphere from a formal point of view as a system of institutionalized channels of social communications. Thus, the mass media are the central institutions of the public sphere. On the other hand, political and cultural values, viewpoints, etc. are not only transmitted through or opposed to each other in the public sphere, but the formation of such values also fit into this concept.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, group cohesion may be reinforced, and social networks may be created by the use of certain media.

The above models will include systematic sets of analytical points concerning

1. the formal structure (ownership and legal status);
2. the functions and typical contents;
3. the control mechanisms;
4. the socio-historical origins and socio-political structural environments

of the mass media institutions in the different periods.

## The Totalitarian Propaganda State

The most long-standing and influential concept guiding the study of communist societies has been that of **totalitarianism**. The creation of this concept reflected the shocking experience of Stalinist and Nazi dictatorships, of the Gulag and the Holocaust. The first formulations of the concept therefore stressed the similar characteristics of Stalinism and Nazism. Later modifications of the concept, however, focused on the post-war development of the Soviet Union and of the Eastern European countries.

I will briefly survey three versions of the totalitarianism thesis: 1) the "teleological" approach of Arendt; 2) the "morphological" system of Friedrich and Brzezinski; and 3) the vision of an "administered society", offered by Kasser. (The distinction between the teleological and morphological versions is derived from Burrowes [1969].)

1. Arendt conceives of totalitarianism in teleological terms. [Arendt, 1951] For her, totalitarianism is a system of total and permanent domination of each individual in every sphere of life. The telos, or goal of this system, is the creation of a new kind of human species, the elimination of human spontaneity and the transformation of human personalities into obedient machines. It is not entirely clear whether the new human being is created for global domination, or whether total domination is the instrument in the creation of the new human being. [Burrowes, 1969] What is crucial, however, is Arendt's idea of the totally dominated human being.

Although Arendt's concept cannot provide any precise analytical guidelines concerning the mass media, it focuses one's attention on the overwhelming character of totalitarian mass media. It also facilitates the consideration of totalitarianism as an anthropological phenomenon. Her approach has convinced me that the structure and functions of phenomena such as mass demonstrations and their media coverage, symbolization and representation of leaders and of the party's authority and often repeated mass media rituals can be profitably analyzed using such anthropological concepts as that of ritual in relation to the study of totalitarian media.

While Arendt did not indicate the place of totalitarianism within the typology of political systems, or analyzed it in systematic political terms, later conceptions of totalitarianism focused on repressive organizations that distinguish totalitarianism from other political systems, including earlier forms of autocracies.

2. Friedrich and others have defined totalitarianism in terms of six interrelated characteristics: 1) official ideology; 2) a single party, led by one man; 3) terroristic police; 4) communications monopoly; 5) weapons monopoly; 6) centrally directed economy. [Friedrich, 1954; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1956]

On the one hand, this systematic and morphological conception of totalitarianism remains rather descriptive. It neglects the functional side of the institutions, therefore the relation, for example, between totalitarian ideology and political institutions is not clarified.

On the other hand, however, I found the morphological framework helpful in building a model of totalitarian mass media. The useful aspect of this concept is that it allows one to ask relevant questions concerning the sub-systems of totalitarian oppression. For example, one might examine the relationship between the communications monopoly and other components of the regime. One might analyze how the contents of the mass messages are essentially derived or strongly biased by the official ideology. On the basis of the model, we can assume that the media is directed not only by the party, but sometimes, by the party leader, the dictator himself. Beyond censorship, media directives can also include prescription of certain newspaper articles or media programs.

In the Eastern European context, these features of the model can explain, for example, the central role of the press in the purges during the early 1950s. The morphological concept of totalitarianism can also focus our attention on the political police violence used against journalists as well as on the taboo against publishing independently created statistical data or any type of anti-governmental criticism.

3. The image of the modern "administered society", the last version of the totalitarianism concept, was offered by Kassof. [Kassof, 1964] He defined an

administered society as “totalitarianism without terror”, in which a powerful ruling group lays claim to ultimate scientific knowledge of social and historical laws. In the administered societies of the Soviet bloc, according to Kassof, communist leaderships stress not only the practical value, but “the moral necessity of planning, direction and coordination from above in the name of human progress.”

The emphasis on the switch to a scientific language focuses attention on the change to a scientific discourse in the mass media, on the greater role of scientists and, more recently, on the origins of the first dissenting voices in the scientific community. These features would, however, sign the break-up of the totalitarian media.

Using the above points derived from the different versions of the concepts of totalitarianism, my first model concerns totalitarian media institutions in Eastern Europe.

First, I would consider the formal structure of these systems. The communist takeovers in Eastern Europe after World War II created radically new political structures and concomitant uses of the mass media. Communist party-states made the state media the only channels for institutionalized social communications of these countries. In other words, the public sphere became equal to a media system which was owned and controlled by the state or directly by the party. Thus, any form of public discourse, from political debates to entertainment and theoretical debates, became defined and dominated by communist authorities. Although some publishers were formally independent from the state and the party, e.g. trade unions, closed party control determined the same results. This system had no alternative legal or illegal channels for institutionalized social communications. It was exclusive and absolute: it was meant to be total.

The second feature is the function of these systems. Eastern European states embodied the political will of the communist parties which were essentially directed from Moscow between 1945 and 56. The main function of the media in this period was to directly serve party-policy, supporting, popularizing and mobilizing for party-state political actions (including domestic as well as international ones). From another point of view, this function can be described as an overall political socialization. The media, together with the subjugated educational system, had to teach and convince citizens about the truth of the new communist policies. Propaganda did not include only indoctrination through the media, but it also required active participation of the population. It overwhelmed everyday life at the workplace as well as in private life. [Inkeles, 1950] For example, school teachers had to interpret and indoctrinate students with selected propaganda articles in the classroom. At workplaces, employees were obliged to study the party paper for 30 minutes after working time had ended. [Lendvai, 1981; to the historical background, Gati, 1986; Volgyes, 1986] Even entertainment genres were politicized, e.g. popular music, movies and literature had to express ideological truths. The main function of the media was communist indoctrination and general mobilization in the totalitarian age.

Thirdly, I want to reflect upon the control mechanisms and the main actors of this media system. I do not think that separate censorship offices were the main instruments of the control of the totalitarian media. Media control was executed by two kinds of more effective controlling institutions than censorship.

First, the Departments of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committees of communist parties directed the media by informal interventions. These party

departments nominated the media *nomenklatura* and had regular consultations with editors, journalists and other media experts. Special phone lines tied editorial boards with leading party and state institutions, including the main party leader. Through these lines, party leaders or officials often directly banned or ordered coverage or dictated the mood of coverage of certain important events. Moreover, they also often ordered the publication of materials that were previously prepared by special party organs (e.g., in the case of purges). In case of conflict with party authorities, editors and journalists had to face political police measures which could include violence as well as prison and work camp sentences or even death sentences. In this way, media control was centralized to the extreme.

The second type of structural institutions of media control were journalism schools. At these schools, according to the communist principle of the media, the media were taught to be “the sharpest weapons” of the party. [Lendvai, 1981] These schools were important screening institutions since one had to graduate from these schools in order to work in the mass media. Ideological indoctrination in these schools was made especially effective by the fact that most prospective journalists had to be party members and thus, to execute party directives.

My fourth point concerns the historical origins of this system. The initial pattern of the newly established Eastern European communist systems was Stalinist Soviet Union. Accordingly, the formation of the media as closely dependent parts of the political system also copied the Soviet Union. This Soviet media structure was created by the Bolsheviks after 1917. As a result of the “export” of the Soviet system to Eastern Europe, the structure of the media in Poland and Hungary after communist takeovers became basically the same with what the Bolsheviks created in Soviet-Russia. This sameness was, of course, a structural sameness, containing actual differences among the levels technological development (e.g., after World War II the use of the radio became general).

The rationale of the newly imported media in Eastern Europe was to politicize all the contents of the media. This tendency was rooted in the Russian Civil War period of 1917–19, when the Bolsheviks executed a propaganda campaign unprecedented in history. They did not only monopolize the press and book publishing, but also pursued oral agitation among the peasants and ordered the political use of films, posters, theater and fine arts. [Kenez 1985] These activities of what we can call the “propaganda state” were practically copied in Eastern Europe. Communist regimes also forced the introduction of Soviet-type public ceremonies – of birth, wedding and funeral rites; initiations to communist youth organizations; Remembrance Day and May 1st ceremonies; cult of the party leader, etc. The ritualistic media coverage of these events also copied the Soviet Union. [On Soviet political ceremonies, Lane, 1981]

Thus my fourth point concerning totalitarian media in Eastern Europe is that the propaganda systems were not developed organically in these societies, but their rationale was exported to Eastern Europe from the model of Bolshevik Russia. The creation of this system reflected a social environment of pre-war Soviet Union which was basically different from that of post-war Eastern European societies. My opinion is that the founding of this structure in Eastern Europe did not take into consideration such divergent factors as the actual levels of social development, different national traditions, political cultures and institutions. The structure

of the newly established totalitarian media system in Poland and Hungary reflected the fact that this system embodied Soviet Stalinist media principles.

### **The Public Sphere of “Tolerant Repression”**

Before presenting the model of “tolerant repressive” media systems, I will briefly survey two concepts of post-totalitarian state socialism: (1) interest groups’ conflict and (2) clientelism.

1. By the end of the 1960s, the growing role and visibility of certain elite groups did not accord with the totalitarianism concept. Skilling, emphasising the universality of group conflicts, made an attempt to put the communist experience into a broader comparative framework. [Skilling 1971] He separated four levels of group activities: leadership factions; bureaucratic groups; intellectuals’ groups; broad social groups such as workers, peasants and religious groups. While the totalitarianism model stressed the stability of the regime, Skilling stated that the interplay or conflicts between leadership initiatives and pressures exerted by certain groups are the main cause of social change in the communist countries.

Unfortunately, this group model fails to show the ways in which the interplay between the groups really works. Although Skilling’s analogy between a multi-party system and intra-party factionalism is not really well-established, the group concept might be relevant only to a certain degree in the context of state socialism. [Janos, 1970 and 1979] Self-interested group activities, and especially party faction tensions, erode the monolithic structure of the party. Marxism-Leninism as an official ideology views internal conflict in a negative way, so any signs of leadership splits contribute to the weakening of official ideology and thus to decreased stability.

In terms of the media under state socialism, the group conflict concept calls for special attention to visible leadership tensions or splits. Reporting homogeneity of the leadership is one of the most important imperatives for the communist media. If this taboo is broken, i.e. if intra-party splits are reported and publicly announced, it usually indicates a coming crisis of traditional communist rule.

Another useful point derived from the group model concerns the problem of supposed cohesion between group members. This problem remains unsolved in the group model, but it might assist the analysis of the media in an indirect way: The group model leads to an assumption that regular communications between group members is indispensable for group integration. The more group members communicate, the better integrated the group will be. Generally speaking, the freer the media are, the greater their role is in effective interest representation and in organization building. In other words: mediating upon the group model, one might conclude that social communications and the mass media are crucial in the pluralization and democratization of communist societies.

Both the concept of totalitarianism and of group conflict, however, are basically no more than hypotheses concerning the nature of communist political rule. Moreover, in spite of their differences, the two concepts focus on the nature of a powerful political elite, and only very abstractly, on the relation of this elite to society.

There are two main reasons underlying the abstract nature and one-sidedness of these concepts. First, Soviet and communist studies in the Western World have been essentially concerned with the ruling elite's behavior, for political reasons. And in the second place, for decades it has been very hard, and in most cases impossible, for Western scholars to conduct fieldwork or any type of empirical research in state socialist countries.

2. From the mid-1970s onwards, increasing numbers of scholars managed their fieldwork, and as sociological institutions in the communist countries were established, the sociology of state socialist countries became increasingly more empirically oriented. By the mid-1980s, Oi and Walder had provided an empirically grounded new concept concerning elite-society relations under state socialism. [Oi, 1985; Walder, 1986] Their concept of *clientelism* was based on extensive interviewing and empirical observation in China. This concept departs greatly from the totalitarian model, which viewed society as atomized, impersonal and strongly directed by the central power elite. The concept also departs from the group model, shifting the focus away from elite groups altogether.

The clientelism concept focusses on the face-to-face relationships on the shop-floor, namely, on personal contacts between peasants and workers on the one hand, team leaders and shop-level managers on the other. The conclusion is that shop-floor economic and political leaders use their power in unofficial ways, building up clientage networks. The basis of the leaders' power is their monopolistic control of goods, compensations and other advantages. Leaders also have the right to assign tasks within different working conditions. Using these resources, low-level leaders favor some employees and discriminate against others. Chinese peasants and workers, Oi and Walder argue, are closely linked to those in power positions through such personal ties. The result of these multiple ties is a "web of dependence", a network of informal links which is used for interest representation by both sides. This web of dependence is an essential dimension of control in state socialist systems.

I do not believe that the concept of clientelism can be used for Eastern European societies as an exclusive model. Free migration, free choice of labour contracts and the primary importance of salary incomes as opposed to benefits in kind may weaken personal dependence. These features have been present in most post-Stalinist Eastern European countries. Liberalizing measures and economic reforms also weaken communist clientelist tendencies, as do the increasing opening opportunities for private enterprise. (Another important question is the survival of clientage networks in a post-reform era, when communist ex-bureaucrats have the best chances to become the real owners of enterprises in the process of re-privatization. This phenomenon, however, which is present only in the recent period of re-privatization in Hungary, includes different types of networks from that of communist "neo-traditional" dependence. [On post-reform clientage networks: Hankiss, 1989; (especially the sub-chapter "The conversion of power"); Arva, 1989])

The concept of clientelism, however, might be useful if we apply it together with other concepts and explain it as a tendency. This concept makes visible a basic dimension of the Stalinist and post-Stalinist eras. In Eastern Europe, scarce resources available for clients from their patrons include housing; summer vacations spent free at the state's or the firm's property; permission for foreign travel; and

state loans. (Unlike China, grain rations, food-stuffs and other primary goods were not distributed at the shop or firm level.)

In Eastern Europe, as everywhere in the communist world, special personnel departments of firms collected information about employees, on the basis of which scarce resources were/are distributed. Journalists were no exception: advantages given by their patrons, combined with the threat of dismissal (since in case of firing, they could not get work in any media) kept them closely dependent in the post-Stalinist era. The informal dependence of journalists on the media *nomenklatura* as an essential form of media control is the analytical viewpoint derived from the clientelism concept for my second media model.

A model of the media in totalitarian states which would incorporate interest groups and clientelism as trends, can be called "tolerant repression". The change from the propaganda state to a more permissive social communications system corresponds with the repeated anti-communist revolts in Eastern Europe. These revolts (in 1953 in East Germany; in 1956 in Hungary and Poland; in 1968 in Czechoslovakia) showed the inadequacy of Stalinist regimes in Eastern European societies. Although the revolts were crushed, they changed some aspects of the political and, accordingly, mass media systems in the long run.

The Hungarian revolution in 1956 re-established the multi-party system in a few days essentially as it was when interrupted in 1948. It also dismissed the centralized propaganda system and replaced it with free press of the parties, independent trade unions and other organizations (e.g., worker's councils). Beyond the establishment of several dozens of non-censored papers and local radio stations, a Hungarian radio was reorganized after the pattern of BBC, controlled by a coalition government. Although the revolution was shortly suppressed by the Soviet Union, the new regime led by Kadar gradually introduced a new media policy from 1958 onwards.

The Prague Spring in 1968 brought another type of radical change in the public sphere. First, the communist leadership initiated an open debate and gained support from the masses. This revolutionary change, although it did not brake the frame of the one-party system and left its institutions formally intact, removed the propaganda content and replaced it with non-censored political messages from below.

In Poland, social tension in 1956 did not lead to a revolution, but to a new regime led by Gomulka. In my opinion, the political systems of Poland after 1956, of Hungary after 1958 and of Czechoslovakia after 1970 may not be described as totalitarian. They gradually moved away from totalitarianism with softening terroristic measures; with the introduction of functional equivalents of terror such as materialist privileges; with widening their social basis and in some cases, with economic reforms.

The model of "tolerant repressive" communications systems applied to these regimes is problematic in certain respects:

First, the formal structure of the media institutions remained basically the same as in the totalitarian age, but some minor changes occurred. This means that the media that are owned or closely controlled by the party-state still remained, however, the only forms of institutionalized social communications. The number of periodicals was generally growing, and the state established some new periodicals for special



social groups. For example, a number of specialized journals were established for different intellectual groups (on territorial basis, or by profession) and religious publications were also gradually allowed to appear. In several cases, the owners of some of these new periodicals became institutions that were formally independent from the state, e.g. professional associations or the church.

Other important changes in this period concerned technological modernization such as the introduction of new channels of state radios and the establishment of national televisions. I think that the extension of radio broadcasts and the spread of television contributed to the consolidation of tolerant repression regimes in Eastern Europe in an indirect way. As radio and especially, television became more and more popular, the majority of the families wanted to buy television sets during the 1960s and 70s. Since the price of a television set was relatively high as compared to salaries (equivalent with about four months' average monthly income in the 1960s in Eastern Europe), they became status symbols. Television's prestige value crystallized a social norm that one set in every family is desired. This social norm contributed to the creation of a new value-system in which material goods, including electronics (turntables and television in the 1960s; from the 1970s, stereos, color tv-s, hi-fi audio-sets and car stereos; from the mid-1980s satellite antennas and computers) became prestigious and widely desired. As a result of these consumer trends, by the late 1970s the overwhelming majority of Eastern European families had their own tv sets. In my opinion, this shift towards consumer values was an important condition in the depoliticization of societies after repeated revolts (e.g., in Hungary, during the consolidation of the Kadar regime after the crush of the 1956 revolution in the 1960s).

To sum up my first point concerning the formal structure of the media in the "tolerant repressive age", neither the introduction of new and specialized journals, nor technological modernization basically changed the formal characteristics of the public sphere as compared to the totalitarian age. Any means of institutionalized social communications remained state-controlled and state-owned, and not even illegal institutions challenged the state's communications monopoly.

The function and the contents of the media, however, changed deliberately as opposed to those of the totalitarian media. By using the term "tolerant repression", I want to focus on the fact that the new policies of the post-Stalinist regimes stopped short of the permanent mobilization and the aggressive ideological penetration into the private sphere. (The post-Stalinist Hungarian party leader, Kadar's slogan, "who is not against us, is with us" expressed this attitude remarkably.) Thus, these regimes gradually moved away from the totalitarian propaganda state.

I think that the main changes occurred on two fields: first, elite culture was liberalized to a certain extent; second, mass culture became partly de-ideologized and entertainment escaped total politicization.

As far as elite culture is concerned, a limited circle of journals and later publishing houses were permitted to review and publish the works of Western European and American writers and scientists from the mid-1960s on. Members of certain intellectual groups such as literary critics, philosophers, natural scientists were involved with the introduction of contemporary Western elite culture during the 1960s and 1970. This challenged, of course, representatives of party-minded ideological arts and sciences and created a public contest between supporters of

different values. Public debates, however, only slowly exceeded the framework of Marxism-Leninism, i.e., were conducted using mostly Marxist-Leninist phraseology. As a result of the different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism, its official character softened, and it became gradually mixed with Western terms.

Intellectual debates were conducted about the real meaning of “socialist realism” in literature, its relation to contemporary Western tendencies such as existentialism or structuralism. Other debates concerned the possible Eastern European publication of such “bourgeois” writers as Kafka, Camus or Hemingway. The sciences also had their partial liberalization. Such formerly banned “bourgeois and imperialist” sciences as computer science, non-Pavlovian psychology and sociology had sophisticated terminological reconciliations with “scientific socialism” and afterwards they were allowed to be institutionalized.

The public use of a new set of Western scientific terms in the humanities as well as in natural and social sciences contributed to the gradual withdrawal of official Marxist-Leninist ideological rhetorics from low-circulation intellectual journals, weeklies and from higher education.

In terms of popular culture, most visible was the gradual depoliticization of entertainment programs in film and in television. Such entertainment programs, for example, included musical comedies. The growing proportion of imported entertainment programs (first, from other Eastern European countries and from the Soviet Union, later, from Western countries) perhaps also contributed to the tendency of depoliticization. The import of Western rock music and the mushrooming Eastern European rock groups from the early 1960s also neglected political indoctrination and created conflicts with authorities.

While elite culture (arts and sciences) and popular culture (entertainment) were slowly liberalized and became gradually non-ideological, political journalism remained severely restricted. Political reporting was extremely centralized, i.e. newspapers and the electronic media were obliged to use the news reports provided by central wire services. Therefore, the contents of different newspapers were very similar to each other, no matter which institutions (the communist party, the government, the National Front [an umbrella organization] or local party committees) owed them formally. Some taboos could not be broken. They excluded the criticism of any central party or state political decision, of the policy of any Warsaw Pact countries and of COMECON or praising any socio-political alternatives for existing socialism. On this point, my argument differs greatly from the conclusions drawn by defenders of the interest groups and of the “institutional pluralism” approaches about the media. These theories emphasize the growing proportion of critical articles and published readers’ letter in newspapers of the post-Stalinist era. They also argue that such critical messages were signs of tendencies which could gradually lead to pluralistic democratization. [Hough, 1977: the chapter on the media] I would argue, however, that such criticisms were closely controlled and that they could not touch essential party-state decisions, but some minor problems. Thus, they did not change the structure of political reporting, which remained heavily censored in this period.

Frequent repetition of such slogans as the “leading role of the party” or “proletarian internationalism” was also required from journalists. The only sources that were allowed to be used for the coverage of socialist countries were news

that they issued about themselves. In terms of international politics, no Eastern European media could ever criticize Soviet foreign policy and had to closely follow or repeat Soviet communiqués and evaluations.

My third point is that the main instruments of the control of the media in this period were secret censorship and clientelistic dependence of journalists on the *nomenklatura*.

In the age of tolerant repression, the number of political prisoners in Eastern Europe was relatively low and few intellectuals were in prison except some periods that followed the crush of revolts (after 1968 in Czechoslovakia and in Poland; between 1956–63 in Hungary). No work-camps existed in this age either.

Political control of the media by the party-state was practiced in different, more subtle ways. One such control mechanism was organized, for example, in Poland, where censorship offices were established, at which professional censors had to read each and every politically sensitive article before publication. [Schopflin, 1983] Another type of censorship was realized, for example, in Hungary, where no censorship offices were established, but chief editors were party *nomenklatura* members with full responsibility for the publications. In this way, the institution of censorship was decentralized. In all Eastern European countries, the leaders of such media institutions as radio and television, publishing houses, record factories and cinemas were nominated by communist party leadership, especially by the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee. party and state officials also guided and advised media personnel (chief editors and journalists) at regular, weekly meetings (“consultations”) and through phone-calls ‘in case of emergency.’

I also think that state bureaucracies had a greater role in directing the media than they had in the totalitarian age. According to a common pattern in Eastern Europe, every Department of State (Ministry) established special departments for press affairs. According to the general rule, no publication concerning any affairs in the authority of the relevant Ministry could appear without the permission of its press department. In other words, no information (including news and statistics) from independent sources could be published without the permission of the relevant Ministry. For example, no report could be published about hospitals before officials at the Ministry of Health had seen it; no report about drug use was allowed to be published without the permission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Beyond censorship, press departments of state bureaucracies also published their own communiqués as guidelines of coverage of certain events. As results of this wide and effective censorship system, two types of informal conflicts appeared: Internal conflicts of authority between different members of party and state organizations, and between censorship officials and media *nomenklatura* on the one hand and journalists on the other.

I think that beyond censorship, clientelist dependence and self-censorship of journalists also played a crucial role in media control. In an age when elite and popular culture was becoming more pluralistic, year after year old taboos were disappearing from the public sphere. In reality, this process went on in face-to-face conflicts and negotiations between those who directed the media (media *nomenklatura*) and those who worked with it (journalists). On the one hand, such materialistic and symbolic privileges as housing, cars, state-subsidized vacation,

foreign travels, etc. were distributed by local media authorities for those who did not break any taboos and executed directives obediently. This led to a situation in which self-censorship became a commonly accepted behavior among journalists and intellectuals. [Haraszti, 1987] On the other hand, journalists could easily lose their jobs for reporting such a seemingly innocent event as an unofficial avant-garde art meeting, if they had no permission. The threat of being fired, of course, led journalists to observe the rules of the game.

My fourth point concerns the relationship between the media and its socio-political environment. While the totalitarian media in Eastern Europe imitated exactly the pattern of Stalinist Soviet media, Eastern European media in the tolerant repressive period slowly moved away from the Soviet pattern. Elite as well as popular culture became more Westernized, pluralistic and open to national traditions besides the Soviet media of the same age. Following repeated social revolts, some Eastern European party-states tried to reconcile with intellectual groups. In this way, several intellectuals who were no party members could get work – among other institutions – at the media, where some groups could try to slowly liberalize it from the inside. This was the case mostly in Poland and Hungary, while in Czechoslovakia, for example, liberalization was suddenly frozen after 1968.

To sum up then: Liberalization of elite and mass culture reflected the changes of internal socio-political situations (the need for the consolidation of the regimes) in these Eastern European societies rather than being an export of a Soviet rationale of the media. In this way, post-Stalinist media systems in Eastern Europe come to diverge from each other more than they had in the totalitarian age.

### **The “double” public sphere**

The third historical model that I want to outline here reflects the developments of the public spheres in some Eastern European societies, especially in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia between 1976–88.

I would choose 1976 as the beginning date of this period, because the party-state communications monopoly in these societies was broken approximately at that time. In the post-1976 period, a growing number of independent sources and channels of institutionalized (regular) social communication functioned in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. For example, in Czechoslovakia, the establishment of the group ‘Charta 77’ created such a situation. From a formal viewpoint a significant part of these independent communications networks functioned illegally, thus they created an illegal, “second public sphere”.

In order to outline a theoretical framework for the “double” public sphere, it is necessary to shortly recapitulate three versions of the “second society” concept.

1. From the late 70s, Gabor, Galasi and others described a “second” sphere of economic activities in Eastern European state socialist societies [Gabor, 1979; Galasi-Sziraczky, 1985] This sphere is neither planned nor organized by the state. It is not controlled and affected by the communist party and its ideology, either. Including both production for consumption as well as for the market, the “second economy” separates itself from the redistributive central economy. [Hankiss, 1989] Some second economy activities (e.g. self-supporting family farming or small-scale

private enterprise) are legalized and accepted as legitimate employment. Other second economy activities (e.g. large-scale private export-import trading, non-taxed repair services) are illegal and criminalized.

In terms of the media, Eastern European second economies included the private import of and created a legalized market for new communications technologies. The market opened for computers, printers, xerox machines and VCRs. Other second economy activities, such as the use of press machines out of state control (for example, in Poland during the 1980s); or large-scale, legalized private production of 'dish' antennas to get satellite-broadcasted international television programs (especially in Hungary during the 1980s) were also important in changing the structure of social communications in these societies.

2. Hankiss, using the analogy of the second economy, searched for other "second" aspects of society. A "second" culture, a "second" value-system, a "second" public sphere and a "second" sphere of political interactions, together with the second economy, constitute what he calls the "second society". [Hankiss, 1987] The "second society" provides a model for social, cultural, economic and political activities and communities beyond the institutions of the "first", official society.

In the most elaborated version of the second society model, Hankiss analyses such processes as the creation of autonomous informal networks, the regeneration of local communities and the growing potential for conflict between certain social and economic groups and state authorities. These processes were most developed in Poland and Hungary during the 1980s. The creation of a second society also included the growing importance of the migration from the first to the second economy, the control or re-socialization of lower level official institutions, and the appearance of old and new subcultures, non-communist ideologies, and religious groups [Hankiss, 1989]

The concept of the "second society" provides a truly useful point for building a model of the "double" public sphere. This concept focuses attention on the expanding range of illegal publications and on the creation of a "second" public sphere. The "second" public sphere includes autonomous networks of social communications, which are not controlled by the party-state. In Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, illegal networks of intellectuals who exchanged non-censored typewritten or mimeographed papers, turned up from the mid-1970s. From the late 1970s on, illegal publishing houses were organized in Poland and Hungary. During the 1980s, networks of independent journals and newspapers were created and the circulation of illegal publications extended in these two countries. Modern communications technologies (xerox machines, desktop publishing computers, VCR-s) also spread.

3. On the basis of his empirical findings in rural Hungary, Szelenyi provided a theoretical scheme which can be viewed as a summary of the second society concept. [Szelenyi et al., 1988] He found that ten percent of rural families participate full-time in newly expanding agricultural entrepreneurial opportunities. Looking at the family background of these entrepreneurs, he also found a strong correlation between family entrepreneurship before 1949, the communist transformation of Hungarian society, and current entrepreneurship of families. In other words, the

parents or grandparents of significant portion of today's entrepreneurs were entrepreneurs in the 1940s. The children and grandchildren of the old entrepreneurs avoided full proletarianization or communist "cadrefication" during the decades of communism. By the mid-1980s, they were creating a new bourgeois stratum, an entrepreneurial elite.

The result of the appearance of the new entrepreneurial elite was the "doubling" of the social structure. The first social structure included the two traditional strata of rural communist societies, namely 1) the *cadré* elite; 2) agricultural and industrial workers.

The second social structure included 3) peasant-workers – those workers who were involved in the second economy while also maintaining "first society" jobs provided by the state or socialized cooperatives; 4) new entrepreneurs, either part-time or full-time. The part-time entrepreneurs still held their "first-society" jobs. The full-time entrepreneurs, however, were involved only in the second economy and were accumulating capital at impressive rates. Thus they created a second elite which competed with the old *cadré* elite. [Cf. Czelenyi, 1988, p. 71.]

Szelenyi's findings showed that most full-time entrepreneurs of the 1980s had entrepreneurial family background. Similarly, many full-time illegal political and media activists had intellectual elite background, because only such a background or cultural capital could facilitate finding symbolic and financial support to create an illegal scene, an independent media network.

The scheme of a "double" social hierarchy may be also relevant in terms of the media. This scheme may be viewed as a general theory of advanced state socialist societies, in which a new, "second" elite is emerging to challenge communist leadership. This new elite also includes a new political elite (e.g., the elite of Solidarity in Poland, and the elite of the new parties in Hungary). In my last model, that of post-communism, I will reflect the situation in which illegal political and media activists became members of the new political elite. The concept of the "second society" focuses the attention on the break-up of the party-state's communications monopoly and on the creation of the independent mass media, a "second" public sphere between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s in certain Eastern European societies.

The third model of the public sphere that I want to outline here, relies heavily on the concept of "second society". In view of the period of the "doubled" public sphere, I would differentiate between legal and illegal levels of institutionalized communications. Moreover, I would also distinguish political and non-political (entertainment) spheres on both levels. In this way, my model includes four different spheres (see Figure 1).

1) Legal political public sphere	3) Legal non-political public sphere
2) Illegal political public sphere	4) Illegal non-political public sphere

Figure 1. The structure of the "double" public sphere

I think that the formal structure (legal status and ownership); the functioning and the contents; and the control mechanisms were different in each sphere. Thus, we have to face a situation in which no united, state-controlled and state-owned media system existed. Let us analyze each sphere separately.

### 1) *The legal political sphere*

The majority of the legally functioning media of the “doubled” public sphere were owned and controlled by the party-state. Gradual liberation of elite culture, however, went further. In the legal sphere, several new low-circulation elite cultural book-series, journals and newsletters were established in this period. Their owners were not only state-owned publishing houses, but also universities or different institutions of universities such as departments, dormitories or semi-institutionalized cultural groups. Moreover, several local Communist League organizations were also able to publish their own newsletters. In many cases, such publications were self-supporting or partly subsidised by foundations, i.e. were not directly dependent on the party-state. In several cases, such publications were partly self-supporting or subsidized by foundations, i.e. were not directly dependent from the state.

Accordingly, I think that the publications in the legal political sphere were more or less heavily controlled and censored according to the potential audience of the media. Namely, the higher the circulation of the media was (the more important it was), the more censored it was. At the same time, the lower the legal political media’s circulation was, the less censored it became. Low-circulation journals and weeklies, for example, could more often express critical attitudes than the mass media. In this way, some political-scientific journals could gradually turn into pluralistic opinion journals. In Hungary, for example, one could identify some 9 different political orientations in legally published periodicals. They included populists (democratic or conservative nationalists); market-oriented liberal reformers; ecologists; Euro-Communists, official communists; anti-reformist literary publicists; anti-reformist social democratic-type leftists; peace-movements activists; and a group using ‘anti-political civil society’ phraseology. [Korossenyi, 1987]

Large circulation dailies, however, preserved their official monolithic value-system, centralized structure and tight political control. This was also the case with radio and television prime-time news, for which everyday directives controlled the mode of coverage. Other electronic media programs such as late night news, talk shows, or special programs for some intellectual groups (for example, literary or social science programs) were relatively less censored. The “stratification” of the legal political media contents in terms censorship versus possible criticism, is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Stratification of the legal political sphere

## 2) *The illegal political sphere*

In the same period, new and illegal networks of social communications were formed. One can differentiate between political and non-political (entertainment) networks of the illegal scene.

Illegal political networks created a new public discourse beyond the limits of the party-states' control and thus, invalidating censorship, they challenged state-owned and state-controlled media. They also created a public sphere in which oppositional values could develop and be popularized.

Illegal political networks included clandestine publishing houses which issued non-censored books, journals, newsletters, leaflets, etc. These publishing houses were rooted in small groups of dissenting intellectuals, who distributed their own typewritten or mimeographed critical papers. Between 1976 and 1988 in Poland and Hungary, these illegal publishing houses became professional institutions.

In the late 1970s, circulation numbers grew: during the Solidarity period in Poland, some 300 independent (illegal) bulletins appeared in together 1.5 million copies. [Kaminski, 1987: 315.] The introduction of martial law in December 1981 could not break the blossoming of the independent sphere. By the mid-1980s, a serious competition appeared between the official and the unofficial publishing houses. While publishing a manuscript took 4–5 years at an official publishing house (e.g., because of the lack of paper), well-organized illegal publishing houses could do the same job in 3 months, and they could even pay the same amount as honorarium. [Szczepanski, 1987] In spite of police repression, oppositional groups formed illegal libraries, and some groups even had small radio stations. The number of activists involved in the illegal political sphere in Poland could be estimated between 10,000 and 30,000 by the mid-1980s. [Kaminski, 1987:327.]

In Hungary, circulation numbers were definitely lower (some thousands), but illegal publications became relatively well-known among intellectual and professional groups. Such groups included social scientists, intellectuals in the humanities, professors and teachers, economists, lawyers, journalists, students and young intellectuals.

The technological advancement of the illegal political sphere in both countries is also noteworthy. Communications technologies which were used illegally included mimeographs by the turn of the decade, xerox machines, computers and printers in the early and mid-1980s, desk-top publishing sets from the mid-1980s, and professional press machines during the 1980-81 Solidarity period in Poland. Relations with Western political organizations and with Polish and Hungarian emigration groups in the Western world were crucial in obtaining such instruments as well as symbolic and political support.

In Czechoslovakia, permanent and heavy repression following the crush of the Prague Spring did not allow such a blossoming of the illegal political sphere. 'Charta '77' activists were/are not able to use but primitive copying technologies such as typewriters and mimeographs. In spite of the low circulation of their publications, however, their regular reports of human rights violations and their independent political programs became well known among wide social groups by the late 1980s. [Bugajski, 1987] Western radio broadcasts (especially U.S.-backed Radio Free Europe) and more liberalized Polish and Hungarian television broadcasts in the late 1980s often repeated such oppositional reports, thus they reinforced the influence of the illegal political sphere in Czechoslovakia.



Despite their differences, the publicity provided by independent publications – including publicity in the Western world – helped the crystallization of oppositional activities in all three societies. Illegal publications expressed critical attitudes against party-state policies and contributed to the formation and elaboration of non- and anti-communist ideologies and of oppositional viewpoints. The possibility of horizontal communications beyond the limits of the party-state was crucial in popularizing oppositional values and in building oppositional organizations from small informal groups.

There also developed important new communications between the legal and the illegal public spheres. The state-censored legal media could not neglect the illegal publications for a long period of time. I would differentiate between four stages of interplay between the legal and illegal political spheres.

First, official communiqués criticized “counter-revolutionary” activities in each country. As a second step, in Poland and Hungary the less censored (most pluralistic) journals at the lower segment of the stratified legal sphere increasingly reflected the illegal papers in a positive way. Legal papers “pumped up” democratic values and opinions without quoting the illegal sources. The third step would be the direct quoting of the illegal papers in the legal ones. The fourth step occurred when illegal papers emerged from illegal status to legal publications. In Poland, a journal called *Respublica* set a precedent for state socialism in legalizing formerly banned publications in 1987. (Since then, hundreds of publications followed its example in the region.)

Another important passage between the legal and the illegal political spheres was the network of clubs, circles, semi-legal movements and organizations. Their programs were discussed in both spheres; thus, they provided a field for permanent political communication.

### 3) *The legal non-political sphere*

In the age of the “double” public sphere, the import of Western popular culture overwhelmed the popular culture scene in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland and Hungary. While in the age of tolerant repression the de-politicization and Westernization of popular culture proceeded slowly, from the late 1970s on American mass culture flew into these Eastern Europe in unprecedented quantity. In Hungary, for example, Columbo, Charlie’s Angels, Starsky and Hutch and their Western European counterparts were most popular among tv-viewers; ET, Jaws, Rocky, Mad Max and Police Academy were the favorites in movies. In book publishing such mysteries as those of Agatha Christie and such comics as Tarzan had highest circulation. Since this type of Western mass culture was imported by state institutions, the above changes did not concern the formal status of these media: they remained state-owned and legal.

This sphere was censored: although censorship norms became slowly liberalized, such mass culture genres as X-rated pornography or violent action movies were excluded from the entertainment sphere. This, of course, created a need for such genres. People who have seen Rocky, wanted to see Rambo as well, and the same was true with the Max Max series. Moreover, fans of the soft sex of Lady Chatterley also wanted to see some X-rated pornography: in this way, the legal import of Western popular culture resulted in the need for its continuation into the illegal sphere.

#### 4) *The illegal non-political sphere*

In the age of the “double” public sphere, Eastern European social communications also had an illegal non-political sector. Its structure, function, contents and control were different from those of the three other sectors of the public sphere.

The illegal non-political sphere included the profit-oriented smuggling, copying and distribution networks of those popular culture products which were not available in the legal sphere, i.e. were not imported by the state. Thus, illegal networks circulated such banned genres as hard pornography, horror-, vampire-, zombie and action movies, especially on video-cassettes. In view of the facts that the number of VCRs was estimated at more than a million in the region by 1987 (700,000 in Poland, 300,000 in Hungary, 150,000 in Czechoslovakia) and it exceeded 1.5 million by 1989 (1 million in Poland, 0.5 million in Hungary, no new data on Czechoslovakia), the circulation of the illegal non-political sphere was high enough to view it as a serious economic and social phenomenon. [Video, 1987; 15, 27, 7.] The illegal video business was especially lively in Poland and Hungary. Its main actors were entrepreneurs of the second economy, who were also involved in other businesses such as fashion industry or small-scale export-import trade. In both (political and non-political) illegal spheres private ownership was dominant and these spheres were controlled by market rules.

The borderline between the two illegal spheres, of course, was not that sharp in reality as my theoretical model would suggest. Both privately and state-owned VCRs were used for watching illegal political tapes such as Wajda's Iron Man about Solidarity (when Solidarity was banned) or Western-made interviews and documentaries concerning the 1956 revolution in Hungary.

Another borderline between the legal and the illegal entertainment spheres was also softened by such semi-legal activities as video-cassette renting, the presentation of illegal copies or videoclips in such public places as clubs, discos, pubs, etc.

My last point concerns the social origins of the “double” public sphere. I think that it closely reflected the structural changes of Eastern European societies, i.e. the emerging “second societies”, especially in Poland and Hungary. While the totalitarian media systems of each Eastern European societies were rather similar, “tolerant repressive” systems developed in different paces and diverged from each other. The emergence of and the differences between the “doubled” public spheres of certain societies continued the trend of differentiation. While the system of totalitarian propaganda state was basically exported to Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union, the creation of tolerant repressive and “double” public spheres reflected the different social structures and political developments of each country.

These systems grew out of the temporary solutions for such internal conflicts as those in 1956, 1968 and 1980–81. While totalitarian and tolerant repressive systems were characterized by overwhelming state control, the model of the “double” public sphere emphasizes the active and acting character of these societies and the process in which civil societies are transformed into political societies.

The media in its four sub-spheres functioned in different ways. In the first sphere, its main function was to secure political consolidation, to support and advance the party and government in power. The stratification of this sphere, however, partially changed this function and let some pluralistic values to appear. In the second sphere, the main function of the media was to express criticism and to

crystallize political alternatives. In the third and fourth spheres, its purpose was entertainment.

Actors, ownership relations and control mechanisms were also rather different in the four spheres. The legal media were basically state-owned, state-controlled, subsidized and censored. The illegal media, however, were basically privately owned, non-censored and market-oriented.

Figure 3 demonstrates the model of the "double" public sphere.

1) Legal political sphere mass media pol. news daily newspapers cult.-pol. weeklies opinion journals	2) Legal non-political sphere depoliticized entertainment imported Eastern European, later Western mass culture
clubs, circles, semi-legal movements and organizations	discos, pubs, coffee-houses, video-cassette rentals
3) Illegal political sphere clandestine publ. houses: illegal journals, news- letters, bullet., leaflets	4) Illegal non-political sph. smuggling, multiplication, distribut. of porn, horror, vampire, zombie

Figure 3. The model of the "double" public sphere

### **Post-Communist Mass Media**

In view of recent socio-political changes in Poland and Hungary, none of the above mentioned concepts (totalitarianism, group model, clientelism, second society concept) provide entirely satisfactory theoretical foundations for sociological explanation. They might be relevant in explaining the historical roots or origins of recent changes. In these two societies today, the validity of even the "second society" concept is highly limited. The last years, especially 1989 brought a growing significance of independent political organizations, an open competition with the communist party for power, free elections, broken censorship and a gradual liberalization of private enterprise.

The recent competition between oppositional forces and the communist party in politics and between private firms and state-run production units cannot be described sufficiently on the basis of the second society model. In this situation, political as well as economic activities previously belonging to the "second" society, became legalized and legitimate in both countries. The "two societies" have

converged to a point where their distinction is no longer relevant. In this situation, activities that created “first” and “second” society, have become parts of the same political and cultural scene.

The new concept I am proposing here for the analysis of this situation is “post-communism.”

As far as I know, the term “post-communism”, although increasingly used in oral academic discussions, has not yet been explained in a detailed fashion. In his use of the term, Brzezinski had an overwhelmingly policy-oriented definition<sup>1</sup> which considered mostly the world political arena. [Brzezinski, 1989]

I will use this term to denote the social conditions of countries in which communist parties exercised one-party dictatorships for a substantial period of time (thus, I would exclude African socialism and Nicaragua) and to which the following conditions apply.

- a) The level of political pluralism reaches a point at which pluralistic elections can be organized. Any potential organizations may enter the elections, and non-communist organizations may possibly oust communist parties from power.
- b) Private enterprise is not restricted by law; private firms may employ at least 500 employees. The (re)privatization of the economy, including large-scale production units and services, is underway.
- c) Official communist ideology and political indoctrination are abolished. They are replaced by a pluralistic value-system in education, arts, sciences and popular culture.

The term “post-communism”, as I am using it, does not denote any more specific meaning. “Post-communism” is not a positive or prescriptive term. It is a negative term, i.e. it stresses the commonly shared past socio-political structure of the societies concerned. Reaching the phase of post-communism, different societies may enter divergent roads of development. For example, their social class and stratification systems may differ more substantially than they did earlier. After they have dismissed their similar institutional orders, political and economic systems as well as cultural orientations might diverge according to trends that have already shown some signs in different “second society” developments.

Theoretically, post-communist political systems can also range between the extremes of conservative authoritarianism to social democratic welfare state. After the first post-communist elections, non-communist organizations may form a coalition government with the communist party. They might also form a government themselves, forcing the communist party into opposition. The economic development of the post-communist societies may also run on different roads. High economic growth rates are one possible scenario; deepening debt crisis, high inflation and dependence are another.

Applying the above conditions, there are only two societies, Poland and Hungary, which closely approach post-communism. Certain aspects of “post-communist” development can be observed in recent years, especially in the last two years in both countries. Although this time period is rather short, the structural changes in this period in both countries cry out for sociological and historical explanation. One of these changes is that in the last year, a new rationale of the mass media is at work.

First, the formal structure of the post-communist media is different from the media structures of earlier periods. In the post-communist era, state-owned and privately owned media freely compete with each other, with no legal restrictions. The establishment of any type of media, including radio and television stations is legally free. The opening of legal opportunities is bringing a boom in the number of newly established media.

According to my present-day data from Hungary, since January 1988, 300 (sic!) new publishing houses were established in the country. (The data is provided by Mrs. Katalin Lengyel, an editor at Editorg, a private publishing house. I interviewed her in August, 1989). In the first six months of 1989 130 new periodicals were also established. [Magyar Nemzet, Aug. 8, 1989] Most of them are weeklies which cover local politics. In only one county, Bekes, 14 new periodicals and 4 local cable television networks were established. (Hungary includes 19 counties.) Other periodicals were founded by new parties and independent political organizations. In Poland, Solidarity owns a high circulation daily newspaper and several other papers, and independent periodicals are also mushrooming. In both countries, all the book-series, journals, newspapers, etc. which were published illegally earlier have a legal status by now. In Hungary, beyond some new non-partisan daily papers, 3 new commercial radio stations were established. There are about 50 applications for permission to establish radio and tv stations, including those of oppositional political organizations.

There are indications that all types of financial sources can be found on the scale of those which invested in the new media. Such investors include parties, private entrepreneurs and cooperatives as well as foreign (especially German) investors. From the very beginning of the post-communist period, the media is a buyer's market as a consequence of the boom of publications. Competition is extremely strong, and we might expect some new publications failing soon.

Second, in terms of functions and contents, the post-communist media – including partisan, local and commercial media – are pluralistic, similar to Western media systems. The most important new political function of the media in this period is to popularize the new political parties and independent organizations. No oppositional forces had any chance for legal appearance for about a decade, except the Solidarity period in Poland in 1980–81. Therefore, the media are crucial in making political alternatives widely known and in obtaining mass support and membership for the independent organizations.

Another special function of the mass media in this period is to serve the political campaigns before the first post-communist elections. (Such elections occurred in June, 1989 in Poland and are scheduled to occur in Hungary in the next 6 months.) Official and semi-official organs of parties and other political organizations as well as the national media have crucial role in campaigning. Main issues are the concept of human rights, and of constitutional state. These values are central in the democratizing transition period from communist to post-communists regimes. Popularizing these values, the media are contributing to the reinforcement of the legitimation of the coming post-communist regimes.

In the post-communist era, national media institutions, especially national telecommunications gradually approach the Western European rationale of non-party information policy. Roundtable negotiations between communist parties and

oppositional organizations (in April–May, 1989 in Poland; from June 1989 on in Hungary) seem to be turning points in national media policy. Among other purposes, such negotiations aim at agreements about national mass media. As the events in both countries show, following such agreements communist ideological directives and political taboos are disappearing rapidly. This process, of course, followed by numerous intra-institutional power conflicts, in which main representatives of communist media nomenclatura are ousted.

My third point concerns media control in the post-communist age. Partisan, national and non-partisan (independent) media have different control mechanisms. In the first case parties, in the second case, government committees, in the third case, owners and managers control their media.

In the post-communist period, centrally directed ideological censorship is being dismissed. In the recent post-communist media system, no such censorship exists in Hungary. Legal actions might be executed if X-rated pornography or fascist materials were published. In Poland, censorship offices were still working by the summer of 1989. Their effectivity, however, is lessened and even changed to the opposite by the publicity they receive when its decisions are legally ruled against. This happened in several cases during the May–June 1989 electoral campaign.

Finally, concerning the place of the media in the context of post-communist transition of Eastern European societies: the post-communist transition proceeds faster in communications than in other spheres of society, faster especially than economic changes. The reason is that the centrally planned and directed system of the media was eroded by gradual liberalization in the age of tolerant repression and undermined by independent communications networks in the period of the “double” public sphere. These long processes crystallized a pluralistic political and cultural value-system, a democratic discourse, which could later turn into the post-communist public sphere. In economics, however, the centrally planned and directed system formed a more stable one, the structural change of which would need long-term programs. According to the experiences of contemporary Polish and Hungarian societies, it is easier to make deep changes in the structure of social communications and of politics than of economics. Thus, my conclusion is that the media are among the forerunners of post-communist change in Eastern Europe.

#### NOTES

1. “A post-Communist system will be one in which the withering away of communism has advanced to the point that neither Marxist theory nor past Communist practice dictate much – if any of ongoing public policy. Post-Communism, very simply, will be a system in which self-declared “Communists” just do not treat communist doctrine seriously as the guide to social policy.” [Brzezinski, 1989, p. 252]

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