

Art Is Democracy and Democracy Is Art: Culture, Propaganda, and the *Neue Zeitung* in Germany, 1944–1947

In the past six years or so, the study of American cultural foreign policy has changed dramatically. For over twenty years, historians, political scientists, and sociologists sharply criticized the “imperialist” nature of U.S. cultural influences in Western Europe and the Third World.¹ Scholars interested in the interrelation among power, culture, and diplomacy have linked the expansion of American political influence to the export of American values and consumer goods. According to many historians, U.S. officials pursued this policy because they were interested in raw material and foreign markets but not in an international cultural and ideological dialogue.² Recent scholarship, however, has questioned the concept of an unabated “Americanization” of the world. Estelle Jorgensen, John Lowell, and others who have looked at individual case studies agree that local recipients of American cultural products never passively “swallowed” U.S. consumer goods and ideas. Most interestingly, they find that local circumstances often conditioned both the resistance and the adoption of U.S. culture.³

Much attention has been focused on the impact of American culture in Western Europe after World War II. Reinhold Wagnleitner concludes that although postwar American efforts to tie Austria into the Western orbit succeeded

* Special thanks to Mel Leffler, Joe Kett, Virginia Mosser, and Erica Benson for reading drafts of this manuscript and offering candid criticism.

1. John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction* (Baltimore, 1991); Charles Issawi, “Empire Builders, Culture Makers, and Culture Imprinters,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 20 (Autumn 1989): 177–96; Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “The Three Phases of American Culture Abroad: A Post-Cold War Perspective,” unpublished manuscript.

2. Akira Iriye, “Culture and Power: International Relations and Intercultural Relations,” *Diplomatic History* 10 (Spring 1979): 115–28; idem, *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941–1945* (Cambridge, MA, 1981), viif; James C. Thomson, Jr., Peter W. Stanley, John Curtis Perry, *Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia* (New York, 1981); Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890–1945* (New York, 1980); Paul Gurevich, *Dialogue of Culture or Cultural Expansion?* (Moscow, 1990); Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938–1950* (Cambridge, England, 1981), 4, 6, 74f, 165ff, 181–83; Ralph Willet, *The Americanization of Germany, 1945–1949* (London, 1989), 21f, 27.

3. Martin W. Sampson III, “Cultural Influences on Foreign Policy,” in *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, ed. Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., James N. Rosenau (Boston, 1987), 384–405; Jongsuk Chay, ed., *Culture and International Relations* (New York, 1990).

best on the material level, the identity of exported cultural signs changed as soon as they intersected with other cultures. Austrians appreciated blue jeans because they stood for liberty and progress, but Austrians did not necessarily like, let alone adopt, American culture.⁴ In the same vein, Irwin Wall states that the French accepted American subsidies but not its orders or its culture, while Richard Kuisel explains that French opposition to U.S. culture provoked French anxieties, fears, and sense of self-identity. The French underwent a process of Americanization, but they also managed to defend their “Frenchness” by extolling French national identity and Gaulic high culture.⁵

In this essay I wish to challenge the arguments by Kuisel, Wall, and others by drawing attention to a hitherto neglected aspect of U.S. cultural transfer abroad. Most scholars have focused on products and media implying that they report cultural messages.⁶ Wagnleitner, for example, is correct in stating that cultural products alter their significance once they interact with other cultural values, but he underplays the significance of “brokers.” Agents of media actually shape messages, thus making them more attractive to the recipients, although, ironically, the meaning of the message itself experiences a change.

The following article sketches the role of mediators in the process of cultural transfer in the American zone of occupied Germany between 1944 and 1947. In modern historiography, this period often resembles a sandwich, caught between interpretations as either the *post*-World War II or the *pre*-Cold War interval. In the history of psychological warfare, however, it reflects a brief moment when all parties involved struggled for direction and control. The resulting vacuum of authority yielded power to a set of flashy actors who otherwise might never have caught our attention.

At the end of World War II, U.S. social scientists and politicians agreed that the German people should be subjected to a thorough process of reeducation. Such a program would familiarize them with the institutions of a modern democracy similar to the American model as well as with the appropriate rules and values. These broad goals, often labeled the four Ds – denazification,

4. Reinhold Wagnleitner, “The Irony of American Culture Abroad: Austria and the Cold War,” in *Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of the Cold War*, ed. Lary May (Chicago, 1989), 285–301; Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, 1994).

5. Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley, 1993), xi–xii, 37–69, 231–37; Irwin M. Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945–1954* (Cambridge, 1991), 4, 96–126, 302, 307; Etienne Balibar, *Les frontières de la démocratie* [The boundaries of democracy] (Paris, 1992); Kristin Ross, *Fast Cars, Clean Bodies: Decolonization and the Reordering of French Culture* (Cambridge, MA, 1995); Henri Astier, “France and Anti-Americanism—Part Two,” *Contemporary Review* 262 (June 1993): 295–301.

6. Thomas C. Sorensen, *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda* (New York, 1968); Herbert I. Schiller, *Communication and Cultural Domination* (White Plains, 1976), 24–45; Inis L. Claude, Jr., “American Values and Multinational Institutions,” in *Moral Dimension of American Foreign Policy: Ethics in Foreign Policy Service*, ed. Kenneth Thompson (Lanham, MD, 1984), 9–1 to 9–9.

democratization, demilitarization, and decentralization – were eventually incorporated into the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1067.⁷

Officials in the U.S. Office of Military Government in Germany (OMGUS) believed that the establishment of a new and democratic indigenous media system was key to the success of reeducation. To implement this goal, OMGUS established the Information Control Division (ICD) in December 1945. This agency had control of cultural affairs, such as literature, theater, music, film, radio, and all printed media, as well as the research of political information for OMGUS. The ICD issued licenses and monitored German editors of the new press. Moreover, it distributed official OMGUS publications designed to satisfy German readers' thirst for news until a German media market had come into existence.⁸

In the fall of 1945, OMGUS launched one of its most successful information campaigns when it founded a newspaper titled *Die Neue Zeitung* (The New Daily) in downtown Munich. This paper became an extremely influential instrument of public opinion: by January 1946, it had reached a circulation of 1.6 million with some 8 to 10 million readers.⁹ Ironically, many observers in the military government believed the enterprise was a political disaster and wished it had never been established. The purpose of the *Neue Zeitung* was to inform the locals of American policy, features, viewpoints, and the American way of life and to present them "with a model of U.S. journalistic practice." The ICD distributed the paper throughout all four occupation zones (including the Soviet zone) as well as Austria under the official masthead "An American Newspaper for the German Population." The *Neue Zeitung* included sections on business, politics, sports, and, above all, a very popular style section.¹⁰

7. Helmut Mosberg, *Reeducation. Umerziehung und Lizenzpresse im Nachkriegsdeutschland* [Reeducation and licensed press in postwar Germany] (Munich, 1991), 29–42, passim.

8. Hansjörg Gehring, *Amerikanische Literaturpolitik in Deutschland 1945–1953. Ein Aspekt des Reeducationsprogramm* [American book policy in Germany, 1945–1953: An aspect of the reeducation program] (Stuttgart, 1976), 25–27; Norbert Frei, *Amerikanische Lizenzpolitik und deutsche Pressetradition. Die Geschichte der Nachkriegszeitung Südost-Kurier* [American licensation policy and German press tradition: The history of the postwar newspaper *Südost-Kurier*] (Munich, 1986), 23–25; Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, 1950), 60; Edward Breitenkamp, *The U.S. Information Control Division and Its Effects on German Publishers and Writers, 1945–1949* (Grand Forks, ND, 1953), 7.

9. OMGBY Weekly Government Report No. 38, for week ending 31 January 1946, RG (Record Group) 260, OMGBY 13/142-2/4, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich (hereafter BHStA). The general rule to estimate the number of readers is to multiply the circulation times five. But due to the shortage of print, paper, and newspapers, one may assume that in the case of the *Neue Zeitung*, the number of readers per copy exceeded this estimate. Hans Habe even claimed that circulation reached 2.5 million readers. A survey made in early January 1946 reported that the *Neue Zeitung* was read by almost half the adult population in the American zone (47 percent). "Reactions to the *Neue Zeitung*." Information Control Intelligence Summary No. 31, 16 February 1946, RG 260, OMGUS 5/234-2/3, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich (hereafter IfZ); Hans Habe, *Im Jahre Null. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Presse* [In the year zero: An essay on the history of the German press] (Munich, 1966), 95.

10. Memorandum by Hans Habe, 20 August 1945, RG 260, OMGUS/ICD 5/266-1/17, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (hereafter BArch); Captain Hans Habe, Headquarters, ICD/USFET, "Verlagshaus Amerika," 20 August 1945, RG 260, OMGUS/ICD 5/266-1/17, BArch; Habe to Commanding General ICD/USFET, "Air-Strip Plan," 4 September 1945, RG 260, OMGUS/ICD 5/266-1/17,

For historians, the *Neue Zeitung* is a very interesting example of the transmission of cultural values between Germany and the United States. The success of this paper was primarily due to the effort of a unique group of editors, consisting of both German-speaking émigrés and native journalists. These men and women had a singular understanding of how to present American values to a German audience because they themselves were deeply immersed in German and Austrian culture. They were the ideal agents for cultural transmission.

Three qualities marked the editors' relationship to German and American culture and their understanding of the mission of the *Neue Zeitung*: their place of birth; their experiences during the Third Reich; and their distinctive adherence to German culture. Since few American-born soldiers in the U.S. Army had the necessary intellectual and linguistic skills to manage a German-language venture, the paper came to be run by European – mostly Jewish – émigrés who, during their exile, had received American citizenship and joined the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) of the U.S. Army.¹¹

Some of the émigrés' names will be familiar to the contemporary reader. Stefan Heym is today a best-selling author and held a seat for the PDS (Partei Demokratischer Sozialisten) in the German Bundestag for two years. In 1933, the Jewish refugee from Saxony fled first to Prague and then to the United States, where he studied German literature at the University of Chicago. He went on to pursue a journalistic career as chief editor of a Communist newspaper in Manhattan before joining the army in 1943. Ernst Cramer was, until recently, publisher of the *Welt am Sonntag*. The son of a Bavarian cigar store owner, he barely escaped the concentration camp in Buchenwald when he decided to leave Germany shortly after the Night of Broken Glass, in 1938.¹²

BArch; Headquarters USFET to Commanding Generals, September 1945, FO 1056/57, Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO); Harold Hurwitz, *Die Stunde Null der deutschen Presse. Die amerikanische Pressepolitik in Deutschland 1945–1949* [The hour zero of the German press: American press policy in Germany, 1945–1949] (Cologne, 1972), 112f; Joseph Dunner, "Information Control in the American Zone of Germany," in *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II*, ed. Carl J. Friedrich (New York, 1948), 283f; interview with Eva Fischer, Berlin, 4 January 1993; hard copy of the *Neue Zeitung*, library of the Ludwig-Maximilian University, Munich.

11. Interviews with Ernst Cramer, Berlin, 16 December 1991 and 6 January 1993, Max Kraus, Washington, DC, 6 and 13 July 1991, Karl Löwenstein, New York City, 22 March 1993, Kurt Wittler, San Francisco, 22 July 1993, Peter Wyden, Ridgefield, CT, 20 March 1993, and Ernst L. Wynder, New York City, 19 March 1993; tape-recorded interview by Alfred Fischer with Hans Wallenberg, Berlin, 7 June 1972, courtesy of Eva Fischer, Berlin; Stefan Heym, Berlin, to the author, 31 March 1992; Hanus Burger, Peter Wyden, Ernst Langendorf, and Stefan Heym in "Sie nannten sich die Psy-War-Boys" [They called themselves psy-war-boys] TV program, Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (Germany), produced by Carsten Krüger Film- und Fernsehproduktion in 1990, videorecording courtesy of Max Kraus; Stefan Heym, *Nachruf* [Obituary] (Munich, 1988), 384–91; Peter Wyden, *Stella* (New York, 1992), 120, 243; Max Kraus, *They All Come to Geneva* (Cabin John, MD, 1988), 4–9; Habe, *Im Jahre Null*, 103–40; Dunner, "Information Control," 291; Robert Murphy, *Diplomat among Warriors* (Garden City, NY, 1964), 249; Edward C. Breitenkamp, *The U.S. Information Control Division and Its Effect on German Publishers and Writers, 1945–1949* (Grand Forks, ND, 1953), 95.

12. Heym, *Nachruf*, 1–243; Peter Hutchinson, *Stefan Heym: The Perpetual Dissident* (Cambridge, England, 1992), 7–32; Reinhard K. Zachau, "'Gute Europäer in Uniform': Hans Habe und Stefan Heym in der Psychological Warfare," in *Der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Exilanten. Eine literarische*

Other editors of the *Neue Zeitung* revealed a similar profile. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Hans Wallenberg was the consultant of famous publisher Axel Springer. Wallenberg, part of a renowned Jewish journalist family and a former student of law and philosophy, had been trained as an editor in the famous Ullstein publishing house in Berlin. His emigration in 1938 had prematurely terminated his career. In the United States, Wallenberg turned from a first-rate journalist into a third-rate printer, located in a shop somewhere in Manhattan. Upon entry into the army, Wallenberg received U.S. citizenship. According to his coworkers, however, he always wanted to prove that he was not an American at heart; above all, a strong Berlin accent colored his English pronunciation. Several times, the U.S. military police arrested the thirty-eight-year-old for cruising around in a German Mercedes that supposedly had belonged to Adolf Hitler. "Where are you from?" a military policeman inquired once. "From New York," the editor answered, making no effort to hide his accent. "What are the subway stops between 125th Street and Borough Hall on the IRT?" the policeman continued curiously, suspicious that the driver might be a German spy in U.S. uniform. But the Jewish émigré listed the stations like a shot, then added, "I can also tell you all the stops from Berlin to Potsdam."¹³

And there was the Hungarian Hans Habe, the *Neue Zeitung's* first editor-in-chief, no doubt one of the most resplendent personalities of the occupation period. Habe, whose given name was Janós Bekessy, was born in 1911 in Budapest as the only son of a well-to-do Jewish-Hungarian publisher. After the family moved to Austria, his father earned notoriety as publisher of a Viennese sensational daily titled *Die Stunde* (The Hour). Having studied law, literature, and German, Hans Habe at the age of twenty-one became Europe's youngest chief editor while working for the Viennese paper *Der Morgen* (The Morning). In 1935, he discovered and widely publicized the fact that the "Führer's" original name was not Adolf Hitler but, in fact, Adolf Schicklgruber. This sensational

Antwort [World War II and the exiles: A literary response], ed. Helmut F. Pfanner (Bonn, 1991), 177–86; Guy Stern, "The Exiles and the War of Minds," in Pfanner, ed., *Der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Exilanten*, 311–24; interview with Ernst Cramer; Wyden, *Stella*, 72–73.

13. "Profiliertes Publizist und rühriger Organisator. Gespräch mit Hans Wallenberg" [Distinguished journalist and busy organizer: An interview with Hans Wallenberg], *Allgemeine unabhängige Wochenzeitung*, Düsseldorf, 24 December 1971; interview by Alfred Fischer with Hans Wallenberg; Herbert A. Strauss and Werner Röder, eds., *International Biographical Dictionary of Central European Emigrés, 1933–1945* (Munich, 1980–83), 1:790–91; Axel Springer, "Zum 65. Geburtstag von Hans Wallenberg: 'In Berlin wird der Kampf um die Freiheit gewonnen'" [Hans Wallenberg turns 65: "The fight for freedom will be won in Berlin"], *Die Welt*, 27 November 1972; questionnaire filled out by Hans Wallenberg, MA 1500/62, IfZ; "Jim" (OMGUS/ICD) to Henry P. Leverich (chief Area V, OIC, Department of State), "Trip to U.S. Zone," 15/17 April 1947, courtesy of Harold Hurwitz; Hurwitz, *Stunde Null*, 264; Hans-Joachim Netzer, "Die *Neue Zeitung*," *Gazette Internationale Zeitschrift für Zeitungswissenschaft* (Leiden, 1956), 17; W. P. Davison, "Building a Democratic Press," address delivered before the Nassau Club, Princeton, 8 January 1947, manuscript, RG 260, OMGUS/ISD 5/238-3/11, IfZ; interviews with Peter Bönisch, Munich, 22 September 1992, Max Kraus, 6 July 1991, Hans Lehmann, Stockdorf b. Munich, 17 October 1992, and Jack M. Stuart, New York, 12 July 1993.



The Habe Circus at the Psychological Warfare Division in Luxembourg, 1944–45. Center: Hans Habe (sitting). From left to right: Richard Hauser, Ernst Wynder, Julius Bond, Otto Brandt, Stefan Heym, Louis Atlas, Peter Wyden (b. Weidenreich), Morris Bishop, Joseph Eaton. Note the difference between Habe's dapper jacket, shirt, and tie, carefully ironed by Louis Atlas every day, and the attire of his staffers. Courtesy of Peter Wyden.

news, or rather this unwieldy name, Habe later claimed, had discouraged Austrian leaders from giving immediate consent to the *Anschluss*.¹⁴

In 1940, Habe emigrated to the United States. The upper circles in Washington and New York welcomed the young noble man with open arms. His classy tenure, cosmopolitan manner, and elegant dress opened him doors that otherwise remained shut for most visitors from the Old World. The jaunty Hungarian befriended First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt as well as Joseph Davies, the former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union. Not long after his arrival, Habe, who proclaimed himself to be a lady's man, exchanged marriage vows with Davies's stepdaughter Eleanor, the heiress of the Postum fortune.¹⁵

Habe's social contacts boosted his professional career in the United States. After the publication of his first novel, *A Thousand Shall Fall*, an autobiographical account of the French army's hopeless situation at the Western front, Habe became a national sensation. He received a position as lecturer at West Point and toured the country expounding Germany's reeducational potential. In 1942, Habe joined the army and eventually received an assignment as organizer of a

14. Hans Habe, *Ich stelle mich* [I take up the challenge] (Vienna, 1954), 100–23, 143–59, 212–30.

15. Habe, *Ich stelle mich*, 381–413; Choly Knickerbocker, "The Smart Set" (newspaper column, n.d., n.p.), Hans Habe Collection, box 12, Department of Special Collections, Mugar Memorial Library, Boston University (hereafter MBU); *Who's Who in America* (Chicago, 1968), 1:985.

top secret camp at Camp Sharpe in Maryland. Here, foreign émigrés were trained in psychological warfare in preparation for the invasion of Normandy.¹⁶

Yet army life did not suit Habe's taste. Observers often perceived him as a vain extrovert and exotic outsider who paid more attention to his chic outfit than army rules and regulations. Some soldiers worshipped the ground he walked on in admiration of his charm and individualism. Others despised Habe's nonconformity as unqualified egocentrism and disobedience. In this respect, the young Hungarian represented a typical if somewhat exaggerated example of the socially and culturally isolated position of many émigrés in the U.S. Army.¹⁷

Equally important to the Jewish émigrés' understanding of German and American culture was the fact that their experiences during the Third Reich did not discourage but rather boosted their willingness and efficacy as cultural brokers in postwar Germany. This was particularly true of the older ones who often regarded themselves both as Jews and as Germans, despite their acquisition of U.S. citizenship. Continuously, Hans Habe stated that he was "burning with desire to help fight for democracy." Yet he always emphasized his European identity within the American camp. "In order to serve a country," he later explained in his autobiography, "it is sufficient to believe in her institutions, her principles, and in her righteousness. My emotional affection, however, belongs to Europe." Habe and his fellow émigrés had fought in the war in order to preserve Germany as it had existed before the Nazis came to power. To them, World War II was not merely an international conflict, it was their personal chance to get even with Adolf Hitler.¹⁸

Most surprisingly, despite the editors' Jewishness, their rough experiences in exile, and their internment in German concentration camps, they often felt compassion rather than abomination toward the vanquished. "When I came to [Germany] . . . I had, of course, a strange feeling," Karl Löwenstein remembers today. "But when I saw the first children, little children on the street, begging for whatever, my whole attitude changed. How could I possibly hate children?"¹⁹ This surprisingly "mild" reaction to the Holocaust may have originated at least partly in their fairly assimilated and frail sense of Jewish identity.

As a result, the émigrés' concern was often coupled with a sense of culpability. Since learning that his family had been killed by the Nazis, Ernst Cramer had been blaming himself for not leaving Germany in time to help them flee the country. "Like many others, among them my parents, I did not recognize early enough that the Nazis were serious when they talked about the 'extinction of the Jewish race,'" he recently recounted in a public speech in Berlin. "When

16. Hans Habe, *A Thousand Shall Fall* (New York, 1941); idem, *Ich stelle mich*, 389f.

17. Interview with Peter Wyden; W. Phillips Davison, Princeton, New Jersey, to the author, 17 January 1992; William E. Daugherty, *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore, 1968), 165.

18. Habe, *Ich stelle mich*, 430, 440; Heym, *Nachruf*, 362; Peter Wyden, *Wall: The Untold Story of Divided Berlin* (New York 1986), 522.

19. Interview with Karl Löwenstein.

we began to realize the horrible truth, it was too late.” Hans Wallenberg reportedly confessed one night that had he stayed in Nazi Germany, he well might have enrolled in the NSDAP.²⁰ The émigrés had fought against Hitler, not against Germany. Now they were ready to appeal to that part of their former home country that they had appreciated even before the Nazis came to power.

Moving on to the third factor influencing the editors’ perception of the relation between American and German culture – and their appreciation of the latter – the older Jewish émigrés in particular were familiar with German culture because it was part of their own intellectual and educational experience. Since the nineteenth century, *Bildung* (education, knowledge) and *Kultur* had been important factors contributing to the Jewish identity in Germany. As Abraham Peck explains, *Bildung* included “character formation, moral education, the primacy of culture and a belief in the potential of humanity.” German Jews admired German literature, music, and scholarship and saw them as part of their own heritage. When emigrating to Palestine or the United States, many German Jews made sure to take Schiller, Goethe, and other German classics with them.²¹

To many prewar Jewish intellectuals, *Bildung* and *Kultur* represented a last bridge to form a dialogue with the German intelligentsia. As George Mosse writes, “Indeed, what is generally regarded as Weimar culture has little bearing upon what the average middle-class German read or thought, but was . . . an inner-Jewish dialogue to which few gentiles listened.” German Jews emigrating to the United States often retained this concept as a last hope to democratize postwar Germany. Most likely, individual editors of the *Neue Zeitung* hoped to reconnect the ties that had once united Jewish and non-Jewish inhabitants in Germany. After all, postwar Munich quickly became a center of Jewish cultural and editorial activity, though only a transient one.²²

The editors’ perception of their mission in postwar Germany, then, was markedly characterized by their European identity, their experiences during the Nazi period, and their admiration of German culture. German *Kultur*, above all, represented their most viable instrument for the democratization of the defeated country because in the eyes of the editors, the two were inextricably connected.

Not surprisingly, the *Neue Zeitung*’s coverage of culture clearly resembled a German “Feuilleton” in the Weimar tradition more than an American style

20. Typewritten manuscript, “Dankrede von Ernst Cramer aus Anlaß der Verleihung der Ehrendoktorwürde der Bar-Ilan Universität,” speech given on 30 October 1994, in the Centrum Judaicum Berlin, courtesy of Ernst Cramer; interview with Egon Bahr, Bonn, 16 November 1992.

21. Abraham J. Peck, ed., *The German-Jewish Legacy in America, 1938–1988: From Bildung to the Bill of Rights* (Detroit, 1989), 5.

22. George L. Mosse, “The End Is Not Yet: A Personal Memoir of the German-Jewish Legacy in America,” in Peck, *The German-Jewish Legacy*, 1–15; David Sorkin, *The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780–1840* (New York, 1987); George L. Mosse, *German Jews beyond Judaism* (Bloomington, 1985); Juliane Wetzel, *Jüdisches Leben in München 1945–1951* (Munich, 1987), 276–300, 315–36; Abraham J. Peck, “Vom Monolog zum Dialog?” [From monologue to dialogue?], *Aufbau*, 20 January 1995.

section because the émigrés themselves had very strong ties to European culture. Furthermore, to run the cultural section they had hired the popular German author Erich Kästner whom both adults and children in Weimar Germany had celebrated for his humorous yet instructive novels. Kästner saw Germany's future in a "non-political democracy."²³ Only a thorough investigation of German *Kultur* – and not German politics or political culture – could win Germany for the democratic cause.

In this context it is important to understand that the American notion of "culture" and the German term "*Kultur*" never denoted the same thing. Over the past two centuries, the notion of "culture" has acquired diverse and often contradictory connotations. In the late nineteenth century, culture meant primarily "high culture," comprising masterpieces of art, music, and literature. According to German and American elites, self-cultivation was the duty of an individual and related to *Bildung*.²⁴

In the twentieth century, American culture – similar to U.S. citizenship – came to be regarded as a shared system of beliefs and customs that is open to anybody. To be American did and does not mean to be ethnically bounded. "Culture" embraces both popular and high culture, including county fairs, circuses, and Fourth of July celebrations.²⁵ "American culture was not – as was the case in Europe – a part of normal daily life, it was not as respected as abroad," Manfred George, chief editor of the New York Jewish *Aufbau*, observed in 1948. "The measure was success, power, industrial position, all this being based on the ability to make one's mark."²⁶

German bourgeois *Kultur*, in contrast, has clearly identifiable historical and Germanic roots. *Kultur* represented a distinct part of the country's national heritage that was shaped primarily by the bourgeoisie and an educated elite. Until the 1970s the German term used to refer almost exclusively to highbrow culture (theater, literature, classical music, and the like), and attributed a decisively educational, political, and even mythical note to this definition.²⁷

The *Neue Zeitung* devoted a considerable amount of time and space to the analysis of the Germans' relationship to their culture. As the editors saw it, the


23. Wilhelm Dultz, "Unpolitische Demokratie" [Nonpolitical democracy], *Einheit: Theoretische Zeitschrift des wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus* 2 (August 1947): 798–800.

24. Matthew Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy: An Essay in Political Social Criticism* (London, 1869); John Storey, *Introductory Guide to Cultural Theory and Popular Culture* (New York, 1993) 21–27; Lawrence W. Levine, *Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America* (Cambridge, MA, 1988).

25. Thomas Molnar, *The Emerging American Culture* (New Brunswick, 1994); Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society, 1780–1950* (New York, 1958); Herbert J. Gans, *Popular Culture and High Culture: An Analysis and Evaluation of Taste* (New York, 1974); Stanley Coben and Lorman Ratner, eds., *The Development of an American Culture* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970).

26. Manfred George, "Probleme des amerikanischen Theaters," *Neue Zeitung*, 6 May 1948.

27. For further exploration of the term *Kultur* see Georg Bollenbeck, *Bildung und Kultur: Glanz und Elend eines deutschen Deutungsmusters* [Education and culture: Fame and distress of a German tool of interpretation] (Frankfurt a.M., 1994); Franz Rauhut, "Die Herkunft der Worte und Begriffe 'Kultur', 'Civilisation' und 'Bildung'" [The origins of the words and notions "culture," "civilization," and "education"], *Germanisch-Romanische Monatschrift* 3 (April 1953): 81–91.



Advertising pillar from 1952 in Frankfurt/Main featuring a *Neue Zeitung* ad: "Daily Once Around the World." Note the surrounding ads for the local theater, the symphony, and two movie theaters emphasizing European *Kultur*. Below is an ad for the film *Plaisier*. Courtesy of Hans-Joachim Netzer, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Sammlung Netzer, ED 352.

country's current political problem lay in the attitude of the individual citizen toward *Kultur*: Germans had always suffered from a certain insolence that had forced the country to develop a concept of culture apart from the rest of the world. The Nazis had only carried this characteristic to the extreme. This megalomania, in turn, created intolerance, misunderstanding, and a staunch

resistance to modern trends. Citing Dennis Brogan, professor of modern history at the University of Cambridge, the editors assured their readers that in the community of nations, “[t]here is no conspiracy against the Germans’ claim to be a great people with a great culture. But there is an increase in the refusal of the claim that German culture was or should be the model for all of Europe.”²⁸

According to the editors, German cultural arrogance and fear was most obvious in the field of art. Goebbels’s strict prescription of what was “beautiful art” and what was “degenerate” had destroyed any individual opinion and creativity. In fact, it had been the death of the individual.²⁹

The aftereffects of this megalomania were still visible in postwar Germany. During an Augsburg exhibition of abstract art in early 1946 students yelled “What filth!” and “[t]hese artists should be done away with. Concentration camp!” Some visitors even menaced to “shoot the painter who did this.” Their attitude, as the *Neue Zeitung* interpreted it, reflected a fundamental fear of modernity. Since the beginning of the world, it was always the young who had defended passionately progress and invention. But these youths were down-right reactionary. As children in the 1930s, “they grew up in ignorance of foreign accomplishments and without any respect for the courage of highly individual natures,” Erich Kästner observed. “Now these children have become students. Art is free again. And the students spit, as they have learned it, on everything that they do not understand.”³⁰

Therefore, at the top of the editors’ agenda stood the refinement of their readers’ perception of all kinds of international art. Tolerance of all artistic movements, such as abstract art and expressionism, their argument went, was required for a well-functioning democracy. It inspired discussion, criticism, and courage. “Art” did not simply consist of beautiful pictures or heroic sculptures. Rather, it depicted the right to display individual feelings, tastes, and opinions, and, at the same time, respect each other’s feelings, tastes, and opinions. In other words, art was democracy and democracy was art: “The creed of an artist,” the American dramatic adviser Maxwell Anderson was quoted as saying, “is nothing short of the belief in the human race and its gradual ascendance to wisdom.” Without the artist and his

28. Dennis William Brogan, “Deutschland und der Westen” [Germany and the West], *Neue Zeitung*, 26 November 1945; Franz Roh, “Kunst im Dritten Reich” [Art in the Third Reich], *ibid.*, 15 November 1945.

29. Hans Habe, “Beleidigte Künstler” [Offended artists], *Neue Zeitung*, 18 November 1945; *idem*, “Freiheit des Geschmacks” [Freedom of taste], *ibid.*, 21 December 1945; “Säuberung im deutschen Kunstleben” [Cleansing of German art culture], *ibid.*, 12 July 1946; Franz Roh, “Über den Bildungsdünkel besonders vor Kunstwerken” [On educational snobbery, particularly in front of works of art], *ibid.*, 18 November 1946; Hellmuth Lehmann-Haupt, “Wiederbegegnung mit dem deutschen Kunstleben” [Reencounter with the German art culture], *ibid.*, 16 May 1947; Conrad Westphal, “Gedanken über die ‘entartete’ Kunst” [Thoughts about degenerated art], *ibid.*, 12 September 1947.

30. Erich Kästner, “Die Augsburger Diagnose” [The Augsburg Diagnosis], *Neue Zeitung*, 7 January 1946; Hans Habe, “Tagebuch der Kultur” [Diary of culture], *ibid.*, 18 January 1945.

constant quest for godliness, a society would lose its driving force and would decline.³¹

In this respect, the effort to introduce readers to all kinds of cultural movements was by no means simply a lecture on international civilization but an attempt to illuminate a number of essential democratic notions through the medium of art, literature, and drama: individualism, tolerance, equality, public discussion, and an international consciousness. Germans who looked at an expressionist painting and refrained from murdering the artist were presumably less inclined to go to war than those who intended to kill him or her.³²

Clearly, the editors of the *Neue Zeitung* could not have taken this approach had they not exhibited such an intricate bicultural background. This is particularly obvious in their comparison of both culture and politics in Germany and the United States. In order to explain the importance of a political conscience, the editors implicitly likened it to the cultural conscience of their readers. Germans worshipped their traditional ideal of high culture just as much as Americans glorified their democratic tradition: it was a higher purpose that required a common consensus, a strong faith, and a set of traditional icons.³³ Highlights of *Kultur* such as Friedrich Schiller and his famous poem “*Die Glocke*” (The Bell) symbolized for Germans exactly what icons of democracy such as Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence symbolized for Americans – they were untouchable and almost sacred shrines.

On the other hand, democracy meant just as much to Germans as culture meant to the citizens of the New World: it represented a tool, a commodity to buy, to try, to use, and to destroy if it turned out to be useless or unfashionable.³⁴ There was no political consensus in Germany that democracy was “the one best

31. Maxwell Anderson, “Wir haben eine Hoffnung” [We have one hope], *Neue Zeitung*, 4 January 1946; Franz Roh, “Die Erziehung zur neuen Kunst” [Education for the new art], *ibid.*, 28 January 1946; Edwin Redslob, “Die erwachende Kunst” [The awakening art], *ibid.*, 4 March 1946; Roh, “Die andere Wirklichkeit” [The other reality], *ibid.*, 11 March 1946; Kenneth Clark, “Kunst und Demokratie” [Art and democracy], *ibid.*, 27 May 1946; Hans Lilje, “Die Krisis des modernen Menschen” [The crisis of modern man], *ibid.*, 13 June 1947; Franz Werfel, “Von der Glückseligkeit durch die Kunst” [On bliss through art], *ibid.*, 8 September 1947.

32. Bernhard Kellermann, “Unbeliebtheit – warum?” [Unpopularity – Why?], *Neue Zeitung*, 28 October 1945; Bruno E. Werner, “Ein Vorhang geht auf” [A curtain parts], *ibid.*, 14 March 1947; André Malraux, “Der Mensch und die künstlerische Kultur” [Man and the artistic culture], *ibid.*, 14 July 1947; Julian Huxley, “Weltgemeinschaft der Kunst” [World community of art], *ibid.*, 18 August 1947.

33. “Selbstkritik” [Self-criticism], *Neue Zeitung*, 3 November 1947; Werner Richter, “Der Präsident” [The president], *ibid.*, 22 February 1948; Max W. Kraus, “Die Präsidentenwahl (I)” [The presidential election], *ibid.*, 6 June 1948; “USA feiern Independence Day” [The United States celebrate independence day], *ibid.*, 4 July 1948; Johannes Urzidill, “Tradition und Wechsel in USA” [Continuity and change in the United States], *ibid.*, 18 August 1948.

34. Erich Kästner, “Püffe im Kino” [Whistles at the movie theater], *Neue Zeitung*, 8 November 1945; Walter Kain, “Mangelnder Idealismus” [A lack of idealism], letter to the editor, *ibid.*, 11 February 1946; Arthur M. Schlesinger, “Die Wiederentdeckung Amerikas” [The rediscovery of America], *ibid.*, 3 May 1946; “Amerikanische Bibliotheken” [American libraries], *ibid.*, 9 August 1946; Hans Habe, “Was liest man in Amerika?” [What do people in America read?], *ibid.*, 6 August 1946; Karl Misch, “Hat der Amerikaner Kunstverstand?” [Do Americans have a sense of art?], *ibid.*, 19 May 1947.

system” just as there was no consensus in the United States over one particular kind of culture. But if Germans would be democratized, they had to appreciate democracy just as much as *Kultur*. Not only were the two alike, but they were also intertwined. In order to think independently and be eligible for a place in the community of nations, the Jewish journalist Leopold Goldschmidt expounded in an article on denazification in November 1946, Germans should “regain their conscience, that once again they will stand before the world as the nation whose intellectual history, industriousness, thoroughness, talents, idealism, science, poetry, and music will remain just as important as the achievements of the Americans, the Russians, the British or the French.”³⁵

Not surprisingly, right from the start, the War Department and OMGUS had strong doubts about the employment of some of these individuals as well as their methods of information and reeducation. The investigators of the Office of Strategic Services found that Hans Habe, for example, was the son of “one of the worst ‘revolver journalists’” of the twentieth century, and a reactionary, undemocratic anti-Semite – despite the fact that he was Jewish himself. Stefan Heym was labeled a Communist of doubtful origins and “inappropriate” for a leading position in the military intelligence service. Nonetheless, officials softened these reports: by employing the émigrés’ special language skills and cultural knowledge, the ICD hoped to transform Goebbels’s propaganda image of the “evil American” and obtain a more direct grip on the German psyche.³⁶

Yet as a result of their bicultural background, the editors and their superiors in the ICD differed on at least six different points regarding the profile of a U.S. newspaper for the German audience. First, the ICD had intended to create a reeducational tool and a “journalistic model” when founding the *Neue Zeitung*. The ICD was determined to create a licensed German press as soon as possible under close U.S. supervision. Officials, therefore, regarded the paper as a temporary venture that would fill the gap until a genuine German press came into existence. But as long as German readers preferred the *Neue Zeitung* to the German licensed press, the ICD’s foremost goal – the establishment of a sound, pro-democratic, and popular local press – could not be fulfilled. At ICD headquarters, therefore, officials continued to believe that Habe and his crew “were a lot of irresponsible whippersnappers who wanted to set up a lot of

35. Leopold Goldschmidt, “Innerpolitische Rundschau der ‘NZ.’” [Domestic review of the NZ], *Neue Zeitung*, 11 November 1946.

36. “The Bekessy’s [sic], Washington D.C.,” n.d. (marked as “Received” on 16 September 1942), RG 226, Office of Strategic Services, Foreign Nationalities Branch Files 1942–1945, Int-15Hu-522, National Archives, Washington, DC (hereafter NARA); “Report on Hans Habe,” March 1942, RG 226, Int-15Hu-552; “Report from a Czechoslovak program held at Town Hall in New York City on February 15, 1943,” n.d., RG 226, OSS, Foreign Nationalities Branch, Entry 100, INT-9CZ-265, MF C0002, NARA; Heym, *Nachruf*, 243–44; Robert A. McClure and Gordon E. Textor, “Rebuilding Germany’s Information Media,” *Army Information Digest* (Washington, 1948): 8f; Daugherty, *Psychological Warfare Casebook*, 126, 131, 157ff; Daniel Lerner, *Psychological Warfare against Nazi Germany: The Sykewar Campaign, D-Day to V-E-Day* (Cambridge, MA, 1971), 350–64; interview with Konrad Kellen, Los Angeles, 27 July 1993.

personal empires and live like Oriental potentates, without any regard for the aims of the United States.”³⁷ The paper absorbed paper stocks, gas, valuable German-speaking personnel, and most of all, power and prestige.

Second, the émigrés and their American-born officials held quite different opinions regarding the appearance of a U.S. Army paper for the German population. While their American fellow soldiers had fought in the war for the preservation of the “American Way of Life,” the émigrés had fought primarily against Hitler and for the reestablishment of German democracy and culture. Consequently, their “American Newspaper for the German Population” looked and sounded much more like a high-brow paper from the Weimar period with flashy cultural articles and subjective columns on the front page, than a U.S. newspaper, which ideally separates news and opinion.

None of the editors believed that American journalism would appeal to a German audience. Hardly any of them had been professional journalists on a U.S. newspaper staff. Instead, a number of the émigrés had been authors in Germany, Austria, and Hungary before they fled the Third Reich. For example, the journalistic trade represented an old tradition in both Hans Habe’s and Hans Wallenberg’s families. Many of the émigrés and their German subordinates believed that the high-brow newspapers of the pre-Nazi period had been the best ones in the world. As Enno Hobbing, who had emigrated to America in 1927 and led the Berlin edition of the *Neue Zeitung*, wrote to his superior, “Unless the Germans become Americans, the American paper will not really touch them. It will impress them from then to then [*sic*] and it will perhaps interest them but it will not be a decisive factor in their lives.”³⁸

U.S. observers, however, regarded the editors’ single-handed emphasis on German culture not simply as a breach of loyalty but as a betrayal of the American Dream and the values for which U.S. soldiers had stormed the beaches of Normandy. As the civilian Bernard Lewis wrote in a furious memorandum to ICD chief McClure in April 1946,

[The *Neue Zeitung*] through its emphasis on interpreting and projecting German life and culture, with America receiving dribbles of attention, has involuntarily played the Goebbels propaganda tune [that] “Americans are money-hungry barbarians with no cultural life of their own.” Germans have felt and feel that only German life is important, only German art, music, culture and literature significant. By inference, and by conspicuous absence of Americana, *Neue Zeitung* has confirmed this national feeling.

Lewis went on to charge that the paper had used a traditional German layout despite the fact that “American [newspaper] make-up has been scientifically

37. W.P. Davison, Santa Monica, to Harold Hurwitz, Berlin, 15 August 1955, courtesy of Harold Hurwitz, Berlin.

38. Undated manuscript by Enno Hobbing, re.: Memorandum by Wayne Jordan, visiting expert, OMG Hessc, “Program for Training German Newspapermen,” 16 August 1948, courtesy of Harold Hurwitz, Berlin; McClure and Textor, “Rebuilding Germany’s Information Media,” 12.

demonstrated to be the best in the world. . . . A quarter of a million American lives were not lost, and untold billions of dollars spent, for us now to fear German public opinion. We did not fear German reaction to American ideas and life while our troops were hammering at Germany's front lines. Why now, with victory in our hands, should we be afraid to tread on Germany's ideological toes?"³⁹

Third, much to the chagrin of U.S. press officers, the staff of the *Neue Zeitung* did not pay as much attention to news from the United States as American-born observers in the ICD would have liked to see. Although the editors championed democracy, individualism, and the pursuit of happiness, they also emphasized Europe's social democratic traditions and German *Kultur*. As a result, apart from daily political news, exclusive features from the United States appeared infrequently. Those that did appear clearly emphasized the scientific and cultural development much more than America's political role and institutions.⁴⁰

The editors' glorification of German *Kultur* stood in sharp contrast to the ICD's argument that any suggestions to the effect that German culture was unique would make the acceptance of democratic values more difficult. OMGUS officials such as W. Phillips Davison, the ICD's chief of the branch for plans and directives, complained that the paper's "feature" material was devoted almost entirely to German culture, whereas "material on American life and culture is conspicuous by its absence." In that respect, Davison went on, "the *Neue Zeitung* is unwittingly supporting the old Nazi slogan that America is a land of barbarians, looking only to Europe – and principally to Germany – for culture and art."⁴¹

Fourth, the *Neue Zeitung* openly called for mutual understanding between American GIs and German civilians at a time when the "collective guilt thesis" and the non-fraternization order forbade any such international contact. They believed a stock of democratic "good Germans" existed. During the Nuremberg Trial in 1945–46, they applauded any signs indicating a reconciliation between German civilians and American officers. They used the relevance of the trial for the future of Germany and the development of international law to promote the idea of an "other," "good" Germany.⁴²

39. Bernard Lewis (U.S. civilian) to Robert A. McClure, "Suggested Changes in *Die Neue Zeitung*," 26 April 1946, RG 260, OMGUS/ISD 5/241-1/7, IfZ.

40. Arnold Sommerfeld, "Atomphysik in Amerika" [Nuclear physics in the United States], *Neue Zeitung*, 18 November 1945; "USA – Städte nach dem Krieg" [United States – Cities after the war], *ibid.*, 14 December 1945; Ernest L. Wynder, "Penizillin, Streptomycin, Paludrin," *ibid.*, 1 February 1946; Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, "Kontakt mit Amerika" [Contact with America], *ibid.*, 11 March 1946; Jessica C. E. Gienow, "Cultural Transmission and the U.S. Occupation in Germany: The *Neue Zeitung*, 1945–55," (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1995), 21–23, 108–20, 129–36.

41. W. Phillips Davison to Arthur Eggleston, "Die *Neue Zeitung*," 19 November 1945, RG 260, OMGBY 10/116-3/5, BHStA; W. P. Davison to Mr. Arthur Eggleston, "Die *Neue Zeitung*," 19 November 1945, RG 260, OMGBY 10/116-3/5, BHStA.

42. According to the defenders of a "hard" peace, all Germans were collectively guilty for the war crimes and the crimes against humanity. The "policy of austerity" ordered a strict and non-reconciling treatment of the civilian population and remained officially valid for many

Fifth, the journalists of the *Neue Zeitung* took a very critical view of the United States in general as well as U.S. occupation policies in particular. The editors portrayed fascism, greed, and poverty in America, thus clearly dismissing the glorification of individualism and freedom in “God’s own country.” A letter from a dead soldier published on the front page on 1 February 1946 drew a despicable picture of racism in U.S. society: “[H]as anyone ever reflected over how many dyed-in-the-wool fascists we even have in our great American army?” Sergeant Vincent Kelly had written to his wife before he fell in Kelheim, Germany, “Can an army that, as we dearly hope, is designed to bring the rest of the world a higher respect for the American ideals of tolerance and racial equality, permit members of such an association [fascism] to participate in a mission that is concerned with the highest ideals of equality?” Simultaneously, the paper harshly criticized various measures of the military government, such as the timing of regional elections, and the political empowerment of local German authorities.⁴³

Sixth and most importantly, while the editors emphasized their hope of creating a forum for discussion, many U.S. officials dismissed the idea of a dialogue with the vanquished. They viewed the paper primarily as their loudspeaker to the German civilian population. Brigadier General Robert McClure, head of the ICD, believed that “[t]he Germans do not have to form their own opinion – the Germans have to be told.” Similarly, General Eisenhower, the first military governor of the U.S. zone, announced that “The *Neue Zeitung*, although published in the German language, in no way attempts to be a ‘German’ newspaper.” In contrast, it would represent a U.S. product, created to destroy militarism in Germany. The general was convinced that “[f]or all

months after the end of the war. Jessica C. E. Gienow, “Trial by Fire: Newspaper Coverage of the Nuremberg Trial, 1945–46,” *Studies in Periodical and Newspaper History* 10, ed. Michael Harris and Tom O’Malley (Westport, CT, 1997), 167–83; James Tent, *Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany* (Chicago, 1982), 13–14; Hermann-Josef Rupieper, “Bringing Democracy to the Frauleins: Frauen als Zielgruppe der amerikanischen Demokratisierungspolitik in Deutschland 1945–1952” [Women as target group of the American democratization policy, 1945–1952], *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 17 (1991): 61–91; Bradley F. Smith, *Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg* (New York, 1963), xiii; “Beweise in Nuremberg” [Evidence at Nuremberg], *Neue Zeitung*, 26 November 1945; Hans Habe, “Nürnberger Tagebuch” [Nuremberg diary], *ibid.*, 26 November 1945; Hans Habe, “Gegenseitige Enttäuschung” [Mutual disappointment], *ibid.*, 25 January 1946.

43. Hans Habe, “Das Vertrauen” [Trusting], *Neue Zeitung*, 21 October 1945; Stefan Heym, “Weltpolitische Rundschau der ‘N.Z.’” [International political review of the NZ], *ibid.*, 25 October 1945; Habe, “Politische Reife” [Political maturity], *ibid.*, 8 November 1945; “Die Streikklage” [The situation of the strike], *ibid.*, 11 January 1946; “Die Streikwelle ist nicht eingedämmt” [The wave of strikes continues], *ibid.*, 21 January 1946; Richard Wright, “Ich war ein Negerjunge” [I was a negro boy], *ibid.*, 14 January 1946; “Ein Toter schreibt” [Dead man writing], *ibid.*, 1 February 1946; Adolf Keller, “Kalifornisches Klima” [California climate], *ibid.*, 15 March 1946; “Die Szene in den Vereinigten Staaten” [The scene in the United States], *ibid.*, 19 August, 30 September, and 18 November 1946. For a comprehensive account of the editors’ portrayal of U.S. society see Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “When Spengler Saw Jefferson: The US Army Newspaper *Neue Zeitung* and the Image of America in Postwar Germany, 1945–47,” in *American and European National Identities: Faces in the Mirror*, ed. Stephen Fender (Keele, 1996), 89–109.

civilized nations on this earth, aggression [*sic*] is immoral; the Germans, however, have to be educated to this self-evident truth." And always remember, Eisenhower reminded Habe in the fall of 1945, "you have to tell the Germans. That's the language they understand."⁴⁴

Yet U.S. officials never specified what, exactly, the *Neue Zeitung* was to tell the Germans. Throughout the early years of the occupation, ICD officers eloquently reproached the *Neue Zeitung* for its high-brow approach and lack of American features without ever offering an alternative vision. One may speculate whether ICD officers' negligence was grounded in their belief that the editors obtained sufficient information from official publications printed by OMGUS and the State Department, such as the *Weekly Information Bulletin*, or whether the division simply did not want to give precise editorial advice. The fact remains that when questioned about the paper's objectives, officials often displayed a stunning ignorance. In October 1948, the Civil Affairs Division of the Department of Defense confessed somewhat bashfully that it was unable to track down an official statement of the paper's policy. "There exists no stack of directives," Colonel Bernard B. McMahon, deputy chief of the department's reorientation branch, marveled. "The policy, quite Topsy like, just grew."⁴⁵

In this respect, the *Neue Zeitung* mirrored the indeterminate course of the entire U.S. reeducation program in Germany between 1945 and 1947. Caught in a vacuum of power, ideas, and responsibilities, it lacked a cohesive and pragmatic policy and thus became the task of the men on the spot rather than policymakers in Washington. One could go even further and claim that the ICD's hesitant tenure mirrored U.S. officials' general behavior in postwar Europe. Looking at French-American relations after V-E Day, Irwin Wall concludes that "[i]n general the Americans were reluctant about exercising their newly discovered power, and in many cases they found it did not go as far as they might have wished."⁴⁶

In this respect, the reproaches and demands on the part of American officials tell us much more about themselves than about what they deemed appropriate for the German audience. Often, their reports reveal a deep suspicion of anything intellectual and a determination to promote vigorously "the American

44. ISC Branch U.S. Zone Liaison Officer, c/o ICD/USFET, to Information Services Control Commission for Germany (BE), "Liaison Report No. 10," 1 November 1945, FO 1056/57, PRO; W. P. Davison to Arthur Eggleston, "Die *Neue Zeitung*," 19 November 1945, RG 260, OMGBY 10/116-3/5, BHSTA; Alfred Toombs (chief of Intelligence Branch) to Col. C. R. Powell (deputy director of division), "Scrutiny of *Neue Zeitung*," 18 February 1946, RG 260, OMGUS 5/241-1/7, IfZ; Habe, *Im Jahre Null*, 27-28, 56, 85ff, 106, 128; Hans Habe, *Our Love Affair with Germany* (New York, 1953), 105-10; Hurwitz, *Stunde Null*, 64-65, 108f; Habe, *Ich stelle mich*, 490ff; "General Eisenhower an die 'Neue Zeitung': Opening Words - Zum Geleit," *Neue Zeitung*, 18 October 1945.

45. William W. Wertz, Jr., Berkeley, to commanding officer, Military Government Training School, Carlisle Barracks, 19 October 1948, RG 165, War Department, CAD, Entry 463, box 400,000.76, Sec. 2, NARA; B. B. McMahon (colonel, Infantry, deputy chief, Reorientation Branch) to Captain William W. Wertz, Jr., RG 165, War Department, CAD, Entry 463, box 400,000.76, Sec. 2, NARA.

46. Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France*, 3.

view” and “American features” long before the tensions among the four allies escalated. Confusing “American” with “democratic,” individual U.S. observers such as Bernard Lewis regarded the customs, the products, and the journalistic practices of the New World as a pillar of democracy, and furthermore the one best system. Because they had fought the war for the American way of life and not for the reestablishment of German culture and democracy, they failed to see that by catering to German *Kultur*, the editors nonetheless conveyed some American ideals crucial to the political reorientation of their readers. Selling politics as *Kultur* and *Kultur* as politics, they stressed values such as individualism, tolerance, equality, mutual adjustment, conflict solution by discussion, and cooperation among equals.

For over two years, ICD officials criticized but also put up with the actions of the individuals in the *Neue Zeitung*. Their reluctance to interfere with the paper’s coverage during this period can be attributed to at least five reasons. Most importantly, the ICD was bound politically to the ideology of freedom of speech. In the Allied Control Council the First Amendment quickly turned into a heatedly debated topic when the delegates discussed the issue of free interzonal newspaper exchange. French and Soviet officials resisted the import of publications from other zones while Anglo-American delegates advocated such circulation policies.⁴⁷ U.S. officers correctly feared that they could not insist on press freedom in order to distribute their papers in all four zones and incessantly encourage the Germans to develop their own point of view only to rebuke their own principles by censoring the *Neue Zeitung*.

Second, there was no consensus within the ICD about what a model newspaper for Germany should look like. A democratic newspaper, as one press officer said, was “one that has the front page arranged in such a way that you can see all the significant news without opening the paper.” Another felt that democracy in the press could be achieved only by having more active verbs in the headlines.

Third, press licensing officers spent four-fifths of their time “trying to make physical arrangements for either the licensed press or the overt press.” As W. Phillips Davison later recalled, “I was supposed to have something to do with policy. But by the time I had secured a paper allocation for Hans Wallenberg [*Neue Zeitung*], protected a licensed paper from an MP Detachment that was trying to throw it out of its office, and written a staff paper to get a gas ration for DANA [*Deutsche Allgemeine Nachrichten Agentur*] reporters, there was no time left for policy.”⁴⁸

47. T. B. Wenner, memorandum, “Free Speech and Press in Germany, under Potsdam. Interzonal Transmission of Newspaper in Germany,” 22 July 1946, RG 84, POLAD (Political Adviser) Berlin, classified general correspondence, 1946, dec. file 891, box 122, Washington National Research Center (hereafter WNRC); Gienow, “Cultural Transmission,” 186–213, 230–32, 237–72.

48. W. Phillips Davison, Santa Monica, to Harold Hurwitz, Berlin, 15 August 1955, courtesy of Harold Hurwitz; Davison, Princeton, to the author, 17 January 1992; Hurwitz, *Stunde Null*, 130–51.

Fourth, press guidelines from the State and the War Departments to the ICD (and the *Neue Zeitung*) often got lost, came late, and struck even U.S. proconsuls in Germany as utterly useless. “We felt they had little real daily importance for us,” remembers one ICD officer who was in charge of setting up and licensing a German news agency in Hesse. “They were written by people in D.C. who were pretty ignorant of daily issues and had no knowledge of the local situation.” Officers got particularly angry over a guideline sent out after the dropping of the Hiroshima bomb, stating: “Stress but do not overemphasize its importance until we have further assessment of this terrible new weapon.” Such written directives, Morris Janowitz, former PWD intelligence staffer and later professor of sociology at the University of Michigan, stated, served as an a posteriori cover for information activities rather than an outline for future actions.⁴⁹

But the most significant reason for officials’ hesitation to block the émigrés’ area of maneuver was the paper’s enormous success, both in popularity and in long-term influence. With up to ten million readers, the power of publicity turned it into an important channel to the civilian population in the U.S. occupation zone. Many readers failed to realize that the *Neue Zeitung* was directed by the U.S. Army. Part of this enthusiasm was certainly due to the fact that paper was scarce and newsprint allocations for the *Neue Zeitung* were much higher than for the licensed press. But the polls also showed that many people deeply appreciated this publication, particularly intellectuals, professionals, and women, who felt attracted by its high-brow appeal and its emphasis on cultural features.⁵⁰

A small-town newspaper distributor claimed that he had a waiting list for the *Neue Zeitung* of more than a hundred people, “many of whom called every day to see if a new consignment had arrived.” “We bought it [*Neue Zeitung*] from our spare money,” one reader later remembered, “and we gave it as a gift when we were invited somewhere.” Twenty-six-year-old student Gottfried Strohschneider, a resident in the Soviet zone, even bribed the restaurant caterer of the express train Berlin-Stralsund with a bag of potatoes to have him bring the newest edition of the *Neue Zeitung* every week. Officially priced at twenty pfennig, on the black market the price of the “American Newspaper for the German Population” rose to eight marks – or one egg.⁵¹

49. Interviews with Jack M. Stuart, Robert L. Lochner, Berlin, 10 April 1992, and Jack M. Fleischer, Little Rock, 27 April 1993; Morris Janowitz, “Written Directives,” in Daugherty, ed., *Psychological Warfare Casebook*, 314–16.

50. “Germany. Letters and Reports, 1945–46, on current affairs and conditions in Bavaria and in Germany generally addressed to the editors of the *Neue Zeitung*, of Munich,” gift of Saul K. Padover, 1 box, The New York Public Library, Rare Books and Manuscripts Division; W. Knoller, Eicherloh, to the author, 7 August 1992.

51. Monthly Report, Military Governor, U.S. zone, No. 5, 20 December 1945, DK 101.006, IfZ; “Die Insel in der Schellingstraße: Vor 30 Jahren wurde die *Neue Zeitung* eingestellt,” broadcasting by Bayerischer Rundfunk, 25 September 1983, manuscript by Susanne Bittorf, Hans-Joachim Netzer collection, ED 352, IfZ; interview with Gottfried Strohschneider, Gauting, 13 February 1994.

The influence of the *Neue Zeitung* outlasted the end of the occupation period. Until the paper ceased publication, in January 1955, it managed to maintain almost two hundred thousand readers including numerous intellectual and political leaders. When Congress finally voted against its continuation due to financial reasons, the State Department's Office of German affairs was reportedly flooded with complaints from subscribers. It was even rumored that the German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, called up the paper's last chief editor in Berlin, exclaiming: "But Mr. Fodor! Why didn't somebody tell me [that the *Neue Zeitung* was going out of business]? I would have bought it!" Half a century later, individuals in the news business, politics, and academia still vividly remember this publication as "exemplary," "inspiring," and even "brilliant."⁵²

Moreover, the careers of the young Germans who were trained at the *Neue Zeitung* hint at a very complex and lasting political influence. Young reporter Egon Bahr from Berlin, for example, grew into a key leader of the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and the co-author of the *Ostverträge*. Hildegard Brücher (later Hamm-Brücher), editor for natural sciences, rose to prominence in the FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei) and was a candidate for the federal presidency in 1994. Reporter Peter Bönisch continued his career as a journalist and served until recently as ex-Chancellor Helmut Kohl's public relations adviser.

Due to U.S. officials' ignorance or reluctance to hesitate to dismiss the venture, the editors operated autonomously in a vacuum of power and responsibility for almost two years. State Department officials and Congress first postponed and then pondered the question of whether it was feasible to drop or expand the U.S. information program in Europe.⁵³ Meanwhile, the *Neue Zeitung* performed precisely that duty but on its own terms. Its strategy "worked" as long as it could operate relatively autonomously during a transient vacuum of power in U.S. psychological warfare between the end of World War II and the Cold War when experts like the ICD and OSS officers were uncertain of their mission, their authority, and the future of their endeavor.

Only in 1947–48 did the strains of the Cold War begin to influence the fate of the newspaper. Professional propagandists such as Edward W. Barrett, who

52. In December 1954, the paper had a circulation of thirty-eight thousand. O. F., "Einstellung der 'Neuen Zeitung' in Westberlin" [Publication stop of the *Neue Zeitung* in West Berlin], *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 12/13 December 1954; "Senatoren gegen 'Neue Zeitung'" [Senators against *Neue Zeitung*], *Tagesspiegel*, 8 May 1954; Norbert Muhlen, "Zwischen New York und Berlin" [Between New York and Berlin], *Neue Zeitung*, 30 January 1955; collection of published letters to the editor, "Neue Zeitung," Ullstein Aktiengesellschaft, Archiv, Axel Springer Haus, Berlin; L. S. Briggs (chief, Press Service, United States Information Agency) memorandum to James C. Hagerty, The White House, (approximately December 1954), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, box 37, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas; Henry Kellermann to Mr. Lyon, 28 January 1955, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1955–59 Central Decimal File, box 5318, NARA; letters and questionnaires sent to the author by Wilfried Wiegand, Niedenau, 9 August 1992, Hans-Wolfgang Pfeiffer, Frankfurt, 20 August 1992, Alfred Koch, Munich, 13 August 1992, Klaus Asche, Hamburg, 6 January 1993, and Dietrich Hoffmann, Göttingen, 19 September 1992.

53. Wallace Carroll, *Persuade or Perish* (Boston, 1948), 380–82.

had already served in the Office of Strategic Services in World War II, stressed the importance of truthful propaganda as a weapon to “win the minds of men” in the struggle against communism.⁵⁴ To achieve this goal, his colleague Wallace Carroll from the State Department quoted Abraham Lincoln: the United States had “to convince the peoples of the world that we are their sincere friend.”⁵⁵

These developments limited the émigrés’ independence. While bringing together both American institutions and German culture, and creating the necessary popular consensus, they were increasingly handicapped by the suspicion of their superiors and the American public. In the eyes of many U.S. officials and journalists, the refugees’ loyalty was questionable because their pre-exile, intellectual, and often socialist pasts had failed to render them sufficiently American. As the Cold War intensified and with it the efforts to spread a “western way of life,” their bicultural and independent identity seemed to be more of a burden on the American consciousness than an aid.⁵⁶ They did not seem to be reliable friends.

In October 1947, General Lucius D. Clay, military governor of the U.S. zone, publicly proclaimed the beginning of “Operation Talk Back.” After two years of secret struggle with the Soviets over Allied control, information policies, and interzonal newspaper circulation, Clay’s announcement came as no surprise for insiders. But in sharp contrast to the original goal of reeducation, this “vigorous information program” would serve to condemn communism and totalitarianism in Germany. Now even those U.S. officials who had hitherto been indifferent to the U.S. information program in postwar Germany perceived the *Neue Zeitung’s* value as a powerful propaganda weapon. Though banned from the Soviet zone, the paper clandestinely penetrated East Germany in the form of a so-called pony edition (a pocket-size copy of the *Neue Zeitung*) that the Counter Intelligence Center distributed among avid readers. But that is a different story.⁵⁷

The year 1947 also marked the temporary fall from grace for the émigrés. In April of that year, Clay issued a secret order urging the removal of

54. Edward W. Barrett, *Truth is Our Weapon* (New York, 1953), ix–x, 55–62. Barrett continuously blamed State Department officials for postponing the issue of a sound international information program in 1945–46, the period during which the Jewish editors worked almost independently.

55. Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, 392.

56. L. M. MacDonald, T. W. Smith, Jr., Henry E. Luhrs, “Report of Representatives from the Toy Manufacturers of the U.S.A. Inc. on their trip to Germany sent to the war and the State Dept.,” June 1947, RG 107, Office of the Secretary of War, Assistant Secretary of War, correspondence Howard Peterson, dec. file 091 (Germany), box 7, NARA.

57. OMGUS Staff Meetings, 14 August 1948, RG 260, Fg 12/14, IfZ; Secret Report, “Sovzone Edition of ‘Echo der Woche,’” 11 July 1950, RG 466, US HICOG BE, Public Affairs Division, Classified Subject Files, 1949–53, box 7, WNRC; John H. Backer, *Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay* (New York, 1983), 202. For a detailed account of the *Neue Zeitung’s* fate during the Cold War see Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “Friends, Foes, or Reeducators? *Feindbilder* and Anti-communism in the U.S. Military Government in Germany, 1946–1953,” in *Enemy Images in American History*, ed. Ragnhild Fiebig-v. Hase and Ursula Lehmkuhl (Providence, 1997), 281–300.

non-American-born soldiers from military government. And in 1948, the State Department itself launched an initiative to eliminate all foreign-born Americans from the army.⁵⁸ Ironically, all this happened just about when top U.S. officials, too, came to realize the significance of *Kultur* in German social life. In 1947, General Eisenhower testified before Congress that “you can starve them [the Germans] all week if you will give them a ballet or a chance to go into the art gallery on Sunday afternoon. Their appreciation for that sort of thing and their love for it is remarkable.”⁵⁹

In the long run, efforts to curtail non-American influences in OMGUS were rather unsuccessful; émigrés worked in military government and, after its dismissal, within the High Commission well into the 1950s. For example, Henry Kissinger, born Heinz Kissinger, a student from Fürth who had emigrated in 1938, worked for the U.S. news service in Europe before he became resident officer for the district of Krefeld, in 1946.⁶⁰

Methodologically, my analysis tries to shift the research focus away from intentions, plans, and recipients; it draws attention to the selection of agents who transmit political and cultural values to the outside world. The cultural identity of these transmitters is crucial to the success of the enterprise because particular agents develop a particular type of package. The efficacy of a cultural message depends on the people who “transport” it abroad. In the case of the *Neue Zeitung*, the émigrés proved to be uniquely equipped to convey American values for a German audience. It is questionable whether an American-born press officer could have performed this job or could have understood, let alone dealt with, the crucial distinction between culture and *Kultur*, regardless of his knowledge of German history and civilization.

With roots in both camps, the émigrés thought that German readers would appreciate the philosophical implications of American values much more than blunt presentation of features, news, and culture from America. The success of the paper among readers proved that the émigrés had, in fact, to disregard their American supervisors’ occasional criticism and make up their own policy in order to accomplish their mission; only the carrot-and-stick method – U.S. values wrapped up in a German cloth – could bait the natives’ interest for democratic ideals and American society.

58. Frank A. Keating (deputy military governor) to director, OMG Hesse, “Employment and Renewal of Contracts of Naturalized American Civilian Employees,” 7 April 1947, RG 260, OMGUS, U.S. Occupation HQ, box 581, file AG 49, B43, WNRC; “Geburtsland: Deutschland. Amerikaner deutscher Herkunft in der Militärregierung,” *Neue Zeitung*, 26 May 1947; Ulrich Bausch, *Die Kulturpolitik der US-amerikanischen Information Control Division in Württemberg-Baden von 1945 bis 1949* (Stuttgart, 1992), 179f; interviews with Henry Kellermann and Max W. Kraus, Chevy Chase, MD, 16 May 1994, and Jack M. Stuart, 20 March 1994; Ernst Cramer and W. Phillips Davison to the author, 9 and 15 March 1994 respectively.

59. *Eightieth Congress, First Session on H. R. 3342* (Washington, 1948), 219.

60. For this and other examples see *Biographical Dictionary* 1:365f, 542, 2:376f; Thomas Köbner und Erwin Rotermund, *Rückkehr aus dem Exil. Emigranten aus dem Dritten Reich in Deutschland nach 1945. Essays zu Ehren von Ernst Loewy* [Return from exile: Emigrés of the Third Reich in Germany after 1945. Essays in honor of Ernst Loewy] (Marburg, 1990).

The story of the *Neue Zeitung* between 1945 and 1947 shows that the transmission of Western values into Germany would have been much more likely to fail in its beginnings had it not been for the agents, that is, Jewish and political émigrés, and the tool, that is, an overt newspaper, which “translated” and modified the message of America for the German receivers. Émigrés like the editors of the *Neue Zeitung* can be found throughout military government, often at the crossroad between U.S. proconsuls and German citizens. Yet nowhere did these émigrés work in such an independent and influential position as in the *Neue Zeitung*.

Therefore, in addition to describing U.S. intentions and plans,⁶¹ which are rarely carried out exactly as planned, and studying effects,⁶² which are notoriously difficult to measure, one should focus on exactly what was done and who did it. Historians need to investigate further the agencies of acculturation that operated between the United States and the foreign world. As long as we are not clear on who and what the tools and agents were, the discussion surrounding U.S. cultural influences abroad will remain rather theoretical. We need to ask less whether or not the United States was a political and cultural model for Germany and more about whether and how transmission was implemented. The case study of the *Neue Zeitung* provides a unique insight into precisely these items.

61. See, for example, Laura A. Belmonte, “Defending a Way of Life: American Propaganda and the Cold War, 1945–1959” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1996), and Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York, 1997).

62. See the introductory paragraphs of this essay.