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The effect of multiple-office holding on the parliamentary activity of MPs in the Czech Republic

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ABSTRACT

This article deals with multiple-office holdings by legislators in the Czech Republic during the VI. Chamber of Deputies, 2010–2013. First, both positive and negative theoretical consequences of simultaneously holding multiple political offices are depicted. Then, a uniquely detailed database of member of parliament-periods is constructed for quantitative research. Multiple-office holding is demonstrated to be a frequent behaviour among Czech deputies. The analysis results suggest that some of the deputies' parliamentary performances were influenced both positively and negatively. Multiple-office holders probably save time on certain activities, and focus more strongly on others. Different mandates held simultaneously by deputies affect their activity differently; local and non-executive mandates' effects tend to be positive compared with regional and executive mandates' effects.


KEYWORDS Multiple-office holding; member of parliament; activity; parliament; Chamber of Deputies; Czech Republic

Introduction

Being a member of parliament (MP) is a complex and highly demanding activity. Nevertheless, for a significant number of MPs, mostly across the European continental parliamentary systems, multiple-office holding (MOH) seems to be an attractive business (Dewoghélaëre, Berton, & Navarro, 2006; Navarro & François, 2013; Pilet, 2013; Sandberg, 2013; Zagorc, 2009). As a result, many MPs not only occupy the office of a legislator, but also work as municipal (regional) councillors or local (regional) executives. Naturally, there is a number of questions on both incentives and consequences of such behaviour.

In this study, I focus on analysing the effect of MOH on the parliamentary activity of MPs. I scrutinise the parliamentary activity of the members of the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic during the complete sixth term from 2010 until 2013. The analysis accomplishes two goals. First, the paper

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opens the topic of MOH to the Czech Republic and other central and eastern European parliamentary systems where the issue has been largely ignored, save for a few exceptions (e.g. Bernard & Šafr, 2016; Hájek, 2016; Klimovský, 2009; Ryšavý, 2016; Zagorc, 2009). Second, the study contributes to a general debate on MOH thanks to its detailed statistical analysis.

Typical quantitative research on MOH works on a general level of individual MPs and electoral terms (Bach, 2011; Foucault, 2006; François, 2006). The problem is the status of MPs' MOH changes, which can distort results (François & Weill, 2016, p. 40). To improve on these shortcomings, the delivered analysis works on a level of MP-periods constructed specifically according to an accumulation of mandates. The construct of MP-periods enables a more accurate and unique evaluation of MOH on the parliamentary activity of MPs given the type of MOH. The case of the Czech Republic has several interesting implications since it is an example of a post-communist parliamentary system that is similar to those in western Europe due to its fast and successful democratic consolidation.

The results suggest that MOH was a frequent behaviour among the Czech deputies during the respective term. Some of the deputies' parliamentary performances were influenced negatively by MOH (e.g. committee meetings attendance and annual number of addressed speeches) while others were positively affected (e.g. plenary sessions attendance and annual number of proposed bills). Different mandates held simultaneously by deputies affected their activity differently; local and non-executive mandates' effects tended to be more positive compared with regional and executive mandates' effects.

The article is divided into several parts. The following section addresses the theoretical background of MOH. Then, a methodical process of the analysis is described and all germane findings are presented. Finally, the conclusion discusses the results with their limitations, and further research is proposed.

Aspects of a multiple-office holding

According to Navarro (2009), MOH 'implies that the very same person is politically involved at two different tiers of government' (p. 11). Nevertheless, I propose to replace the word 'two' with 'at least two' since there is evidence of multiple-office holders occupying more than just two mandates at the same time (Dewoghélaëre et al., 2006; Mény, 2008). There is a debate about what duration of simultaneously occupying several political positions is required to be considered MOH. Bach (2012) claims that MOH includes only the cases when an occupation of a mandate is repeated. However, I work with a more conventional definition, which recognises MOH when it occurs with no qualifications (Sandberg, 2013).

Generally, MOH is closely related to a theory of parliamentary role orientation. The concept of roles is central in sociology, and its adoption by

political scientists emerged in the 1950s and the 1960s. It is perceived as the behaviourist turning point in legislative studies (Blomgren & Rozenberg, 2012). According to *The Legislative System*, written in 1962, 'identification and description of the roles which a legislator takes in the course of his participation in the legislative process seems to be a promising research strategy' (Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, & Ferguson, 1962, p. 240).

In the 1990s, the theory of parliamentary roles was accepted even by neo-institutionalists, and two leading analytical approaches were established. In his motivational approach, Searing (1994) defined political roles as 'patterns of interrelated goals, attitudes, and behaviors that are characteristic of people in particular positions' (p. 18). Strøm (1997) reacted with his strategic approach and claimed that 'legislative roles can be viewed as behavioural strategies conditioned by the institutional framework in which parliamentarians operate' (p. 157). To summarise, the theory of how MPs perceive their roles (especially within the motivational approach) can help us understand legislators' motivations hidden behind their potential MOH and even anticipate their behaviour.

To continue, it is essential to understand who MPs represent and how they do it. Three conceptions of representational-role orientations exist (Wahlke et al., 1962). A *delegate* predominantly follows the preferences of MPs' voters and is based on James Madison's thoughts about representation. A *trustee* is primarily an autonomous role where an MP makes Burkean decisions according to his or her best conviction. A *politico* bridges the dichotomy since it describes a 'schizophrenic' position of multiple-office holders trapped between local and national mandates and interests, acting sometimes as trustees and at other times as delegates (Wahlke et al., 1962).

Representation as a delegate means that MPs are bound by local and direct interests, which is characteristic of local and regional political offices. Serving as a trustee is typical for politicians working at a national level who are forced to follow welfare shared by a higher number of voters in many constituencies. MPs who hold a subnational mandate should simultaneously be more oriented than others to represent subnational constituencies directly as delegates while still being trustees in the role of national deputy (Katz, 1997).

Unfortunately, surveys among the Czech MPs do not provide a full picture of the presented issues in the Czech political environment and are even outdated today. The last published figures from 2007 show that almost 40 per cent of the Czech deputies claim to represent all citizens. Besides this, approximately one-quarter of the Czech legislators assert that they represent only the citizens of their constituency (Rakušanová Guasti, 2009). There seems to be a trend that a growing majority of MPs generally perceive themselves as delegates. However, further analysis is missing.

Consequences of a multiple-office holding

The phenomenon of MOH is generally considered negative (Sandberg, 2013). Nevertheless, there are also positive traits of MOH, and it is therefore necessary to compare both aspects (Olivier, 1998). Since the goal here is to summarise a theoretical background that will help construct research hypotheses, it is reasonable to look at the consequences mainly from the MPs' point of view. Moreover, it is important to differentiate between effects based on holding different types of office (councillor vs. executive) on different levels (local vs. regional).

The main argument supporting MOH asserts that the behaviour interconnects different tiers of government. Thus, it prevents the possibility that a politician working at a national level is isolated from everyday reality at the local or regional tier (Olivier, 1998). MPs who are locally active and understand the problems of their voters can handle appropriately the most pertinent issues. The same logic does not necessarily apply to the MPs who hold only regional mandates where politics is more distant from the citizens. Approximately 60 per cent of Czechs trust local political institutions, while regional institutions are endorsed by only 40 per cent (CVVM, 2017).

Frequent contact with citizens' problems should lead to a higher number of questions delivered in parliamentary sessions by the multiple-office holders (Rouban, 2013). Moreover, Lazardoux (2005, pp. 271–272) argues that multiple-office holders occupying regional executive positions are expected to ask more questions because of greater staffing capacity compared with local and even regional councillors.

MOH also helps to professionalise politics (Navarro, 2009). The practice of MOH is typical for politicians who are extraordinarily active, and an expansion of the MOH phenomenon increases the ranks of these hyperactive representatives (Bach, 2011). Multiple-office holders can reliably live on politics because a potential loss of one office (and salary) can be compensated for by another. This reduces uncertainty and enables MOH politicians to focus on their performance more responsibly.

Last but not least, MOH supports an efficiency of work with finances, information, and other resources (Foucault, 2006). MOH expands the nets of politicians, which results in a more transparent and effective political system. Here, it is important to differentiate between different mandates since working at a regional level (rather than local) and being an executive (rather than a councillor) mean that these MPs simultaneously possess more information, finances and other benefits. One reason for this is that they are frequently in touch with national institutions.

On the contrary, there are also numerous negative consequences of MOH. Multiple-office holders are not able to be fully engaged in both offices (Bach, 2012; Mény, 1993). It is impossible due to the vast amount of work and

limited time multiple-office holders have, even though they often have more assistants and resources (Bach, 2011; Navarro, 2009). Undoubtedly, the quantity of work is demanding, especially in the case of MPs simultaneously occupying local or regional executives.

MOH is also closely linked to a concentration of power, which weakens political competition (François, 2006; McCaffrey, 2010). Multiple-office holders, compared with other politicians, occupy more positions, which decreases the plurality of public opinions (François, 2006). Paradoxically, the legislative process, which can possibly reverse the preserved state, is controlled by multiple-office holders (Mény, 1993).

Another argument against multiple-office holders is that they are more liable to be corrupted than other politicians. The more offices a person holds, the higher the probability he or she comes across corruption. Further, an MP can be lured into corruption on one level and use immunity at the parliamentary level.

Besides this, MOH is linked to conflicts of interest, which is characteristic for politicians representing several different groups of voters (Zagorc, 2009). Finally, MOH is inconsistent with the theory of separation of powers, which is the fundamental pillar of modern liberal democracies (Bradley & Morrison, 2012). Although the concept is based on historic notions of Locke (1999) and Montesquieu (1989), its implications persist (Shapiro, Stokes, Wood, & Kirshner, 2009).

Multiple-office holding across countries

MOH is primarily observable in European parliamentary (semi-presidential) systems, for which France is exemplary (Dewoghélaëre et al., 2006; Foucault, 2006). In 2009, only 13 per cent of French MPs did not hold a local mandate simultaneously, and MOH is characteristic for about 90 per cent of the MPs in the long term (Bach, 2011; Mény, 1993; Navarro, 2009). MOH in France is considered a connection with the public (François, 2013). However, since the 1980s there has been a wide political push to restrict it (Dewoghélaëre et al., 2006). Since the effects of the enacted legislative acts explicitly prohibiting MOH are ambiguous, more new legislative actions have therefore been proposed (François & Magni-Berton, 2014).

Three-quarters of Belgian MPs held a local mandate in 2013 (Pilet, 2013). Belgium attempts to limit the phenomenon by requiring every MP to publish several declarations on his or her public and private occupations.

In Germany, MOH is more sporadic than systematic; a third of MPs accumulate mandates (Navarro, 2009). The phenomenon is restricted again in a different way with a resistant German political culture and political parties. To summarise, the three aforementioned countries demonstrate three ways to approach and potentially limit MOH by direct, indirect, and self-regulatory tools, respectively (Hájek, 2016).

Undoubtedly, MOH is an observable practice in other countries as well. In the United Kingdom, there is a long-standing debate on the accumulation of a mandate in the House of Commons and an office in the local assemblies of Northern Ireland, Wales, or in the Scottish Parliament (McCaffrey, 2010). Voters in Slovenia primarily criticise MOH because of conflicts of interest (Zagorc, 2009). On the other hand, in countries such as Spain or Sweden MOH exists but the phenomenon is not considered to be a major problem (Bach, 2012).

In the Czech Republic, there are signals indicating that MOH is frequent among Czech MPs (Bernard & Šafr, 2016; Česká televize, 2014; Kruntorádová, 2013; Ryšavý, 2016). This finding is not surprising in the light of three characteristics of the political environment. First, the Czech law is highly benevolent in the matter of limiting potential MOH. Basically, the only explicitly restrictive legal document is the Constitution of the Czech Republic. According to Article 21 '[N]o person may be at the same time a member of both chambers of Parliament'. Further, according to Article 22: 'Holding the office of Deputy or Senator is incompatible with holding the office of the President of the Republic, the office of a judge, and is with other offices, as designated by statute'.

Second, the Czech Republic has a monarchic past prior to 1918, which fostered MOH through a heritage of a concentration of (patriarchal) powers (Navarro, 2009). Third, there are also personal incentives for MPs to hold multiple offices: higher financial income, concentration of power or information, and limitation on political competitors. The Czech law is weak even in regards to conflicts of interest (Pilet, 2013). Ultimately, even though a proper summarising study of Czech multiple-office holders is missing, MOH is clearly a sound part of many successful political careers and a representation of interests (Kruntorádová, 2013).

Method of the analysis

Overall, a majority of analyses of MOH are limited to the simple count of MPs that accumulated offices during the term (e.g. Bach, 2011; Dewoghélaère et al., 2006; Navarro, 2009). However, MOH is well known for dynamic changes of these accumulations (François & Weill, 2016, p. 40). Thus, it is crucial to focus on a detailed level of research and to take specific periods of MPs' mandates into account.

To explain this, I include every one of the MPs in the data set from their initiation into parliament, only (!) until the time they changed their MOH combination (either gained another new mandate or renounced some of the old ones held before). To put it differently, the data set consists of only the first MP-periods, bounded by any change in MOH, which naturally lasted different lengths of time.¹ Even though it is tempting also to use the

subsequent MP-periods and expand the number of cases in the data set, I do not do that as there is a hazardous issue of a potential autocorrelation within a later quantitative analysis.

To conclude, I track the parliamentary activity of each MP in the concrete period of time when he or she holds a specific number and type of accumulated offices. This is the reason why the research includes just one voting term since the collection of the data alone is so laborious.

The objects of the analysis are the MPs of the VI. Chamber of Deputies who were elected on 29 May 2010 and served until 28 August 2013 when the term was prematurely terminated. Thanks to an asymmetrical bicameralism of the Czech parliamentary regime, the chamber is the country's institutional and political core (Vodička & Cabada, 2011). Although the legislative body consists of 200 deputies, 218 MPs occupied the office altogether due to several personal changes.

Nonetheless, the main analysis is conducted only for 132 MPs since a number of the deputies have been excluded from the data set for analytical purposes. I do not take into account 66 MPs whose parliamentary mandate (the first period) lasted less than six months because it is not possible to perform the mandate properly in such a short time.² Second, I dismiss all 17 MPs who served as members of a national cabinet. This particular office is so specific and demanding that their presence in the data set would distort the results of the deputies' performance. Third, I exclude three deputies whose parliamentary activities were highly influenced by extraordinary consequences, such as an illness or custody of an MP.³

Altogether, there were five parties in the respective VI. Chamber of Deputies – three cabinet parties forming the coalition (the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), TOP 09, and the Public Affairs⁴ (VV)), and two opposition parties (the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)).

Construction of the data set

The data set consists of three groups of variables – the independent, the dependent, and the control variables. First, the independent variables represent mandates that an MP holds simultaneously with his or her deputy office. I recognise four types of mandate (Borecký & Prudký, 2003) and a fifth independent variable that sums the mandates:

- (1) municipal councillor (MC),
- (2) member of a municipal cabinet (including mayor) (MMC),
- (3) regional councillor (RC),
- (4) member of a regional cabinet (including regional cabinet president) (MRC),
- (5) the overall number of accumulated mandates.

The dependent variables represent several different parliamentary activities performed by MPs. The basic idea is that they should portray all functions of the parliament – scrutiny, legislation, and debating (Vodička & Cabada, 2011). Six final variables are selected as follows (Archiv Poslanecké sněmovny; Parlament České republiky, 2017):

- (1) plenary sessions attendance – the percentage of possible voting when a deputy was at plenary sessions and voted yes, no, or abstained,
- (2) plenary sessions active voting – the percentage of active voting (either yes or no) when a deputy attended voting,
- (3) committee meetings attendance – the deputy's average attendance at meetings of the committees he or she was a member of,
- (4) number of addressed speeches – the average annual number of speeches an MP addressed during a plenary session,
- (5) number of proposed bills – the average annual number of bills proposed by a deputy or by a group of deputies which a deputy was a member of,
- (6) number of delivered interpellations – the average annual number of both oral and written interpellations delivered by a deputy.

Finally, I utilise six control variables that were confirmed as factors affecting parliamentary performance of MPs: gender (Bäck, Debus, & Müller, 2014), age (Mocan & Altindag, 2013), education (Gagliarducci, Nannicini, & Naticchioni, 2010), the number of experienced parliamentary terms (Gagliarducci et al., 2010; Mocan & Altindag, 2013), dummy variables of a party affiliation (Proksch & Slapin, 2012), and geographical distance between MPs' region and the location of plenary sessions (Prague) (Weinberg, Cooper, & Weinberg, 1999). Concerning the last one, the ordinal variable dividing the Czech regions into four categories according to their proximity to Prague is utilised.

Hypotheses

There are only partial clues helping to construct hypotheses. Generally, multiple-office holders cannot perform their mandates properly due to a lack of time and high quantity of work (Bach, 2012; Mény, 1993; Navarro, 2009). Thus, I form negative hypotheses on attendances at both plenary sessions and committee meetings because of their high time consumption:

H1: A multiple-office holding negatively influences MPs' plenary sessions attendance.

H2: A multiple-office holding negatively influences MPs' committee meetings attendance.

However, analyses of the French political environment (François & Weill, 2014, 2016; Lazardoux, 2005; Rouban, 2013) imply that multiple-office

holders deliver more questions and they are also legislatively more active (Olivier, 1998). Therefore, I formulate positive hypotheses on active voting, addressing speeches, proposing bills, and delivering interpellations. I assume that through these activities multiple-office holders can actually influence political outputs in a way that favours the MPs' voters and constituencies at a local or a regional level. Consequently, the hypotheses are constructed as follows:

H3: A multiple-office holding positively influences MPs' plenary sessions active voting.

H4: A multiple-office holding positively influences MPs' number of addressed speeches.

H5: A multiple-office holding positively influences MPs' number of proposed bills.

H6: A multiple-office holding positively influences MPs' number of delivered interpellations.

These relationships should be either supported or refuted by the effect of the total number of accumulated offices held in a particular period of time. Additionally, there is much more information on the effects of individual types of accumulated mandate. To begin, in the Czech Republic local politicians can boast about substantially more public trust than regional ones (CVVM, 2017). Since multiple-office holders are therefore more responsible to the local citizens for this confidence, it is possible to form a hypothesis as follows:

H7: MPs simultaneously holding mandates at a local level are more parliamentarily active than MPs occupying mandates at a regional level.

Last but not least, Lazardeux (2005) claims that MPs serving especially in executives are more active in parliament because of their staffing capacity. On the contrary, the quantity of work is greater in the case of executives compared with councillors (Ryšavý, 2016). As a result, I finally construct two contradictory hypotheses:

H8a: MPs simultaneously holding mandates of local or regional executives are more active than MPs simultaneously occupying offices of local or regional councillors due to a higher staffing capacity.

H8b: MPs simultaneously holding mandates of local or regional executives are less active than MPs simultaneously occupying offices of local or regional councillors due to a higher workload.

Results

The occurrence of MOH among all 218 deputies is depicted in Table 1. Only a third of the MPs did not experience any MOH during the respective

Table 1. Multiple-office holding by MPs in the Czech Republic (2010–2013).

Number of accumulated mandates	Maximum of simultaneously accumulated mandates		MC		MMC		RC		MRC	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
0	72	33.03	91	41.74	170	77.98	162	74.31	210	96.33
1 mandate	78	35.78	123	56.42	48	22.02	56	25.69	8	3.67
2 mandates	44	20.18	4 ^a	1.83						
3 mandates	22	10.09								
4 mandates	2	0.92								
Total:	218	100	218	100	218	100	218	100	218	100

^aFour MPs simultaneously held two different mandates of municipal councillors.

parliamentary term at all. On the other hand, 35.78 per cent of the deputies accumulated their legislative position with at most one other mandate, 20.18 per cent with two other mandates, 10.09 per cent with three other mandates, and two deputies with even four other mandates. An accumulation with an office of municipal councillors was by far the most frequent one.

The durations of MOH are analysed in more detail. First, it is necessary to sum all of the days that the MPs occupied their parliamentary offices. Then, it is possible to say that 50.61 per cent of the overall time was not spent by any MOH. However, 30.43 per cent of the time was spent by MOH with one other mandate, 14.02 per cent with two, 4.81 per cent with three, and 0.13 per cent with four other mandates.

Table 2 presents detailed characteristics of the durations. Some MOHs lasted only several days or weeks, others persisted across the whole parliamentary term of 1188 days. Both the mode and the mean of the parliamentary attendance suggest that MOH among the Czech deputies was not an ephemeral behaviour. Overall, it is possible to say that MOH is a common phenomenon among Czech deputies.

Next, I scrutinise relationships between MPs' characteristics and their MOH. Table 3 shows the basic descriptive regression analyses concerning all 218 deputies during their whole parliamentary mandates. It implies that levels of MOH are not significantly affected by age, education, or geographic background of the MPs. However, there is some evidence that MOH is practised more by men than by women.

Importantly, the more parliamentary terms MPs spend in the Chamber of Deputies, the fewer other mandates they occupy simultaneously. This is an

Table 2. Number of days spent holding multiple offices.

Duration of MOH	MC	MMC	RC	MRC
Mean	781.25	561.33	746.63	639.63
Standard deviation	472.78	467.96	362.26	496.76
Min	2	2	74	31
Max	1188	1188	1188	1188
Mode	1188	1188	869	1188

Table 3. Relationship between MPs' characteristics and multiple-office holding.

	Dependent variable:				
	Cumulative MOH Model 1	MC Model 2	MMC Model 3	RC Model 4	MRC Model 5
Female	−0.235 (0.169)	−0.167** (0.085)	−0.078 (0.068)	−0.006 (0.073)	0.009 (0.032)
Age	0.004 (0.007)	0.002 (0.003)	−0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.001)
Education	−0.100 (0.182)	−0.023 (0.091)	−0.060 (0.074)	−0.060 (0.078)	0.022 (0.035)
Parliamentary Experience	−0.267*** (0.060)	−0.068** (0.030)	−0.081*** (0.024)	−0.100*** (0.026)	−0.013 (0.011)
Geographic Area	0.084 (0.067)	0.029 (0.033)	0.016 (0.027)	0.064** (0.029)	−0.009 (0.013)
VV	−0.748*** (0.245)	−0.183 (0.122)	−0.128 (0.099)	−0.353*** (0.105)	−0.109** (0.046)
KSČM	0.111 (0.236)	0.149 (0.118)	−0.035 (0.095)	0.110 (0.101)	−0.108** (0.045)
ODS	0.082 (0.179)	−0.009 (0.089)	0.198*** (0.072)	−0.062 (0.077)	−0.087** (0.034)
TOP 09	−0.315 (0.204)	−0.213** (0.102)	0.101 (0.082)	−0.065 (0.088)	−0.125*** (0.039)
Constant	1.495*** (0.397)	0.658*** (0.198)	0.440*** (0.160)	0.291* (0.170)	0.048 (0.075)
N	218	218	218	218	218
R ²	0.126				
Adjusted R ²	0.088				
F Statistic	3.332*** (df = 9; 208)				
Log likelihood		−148.172	−101.653	−115.358	62.593

Note: Model 1 is constructed by an OLS regression analysis. Models 2–5 are logistic regressions. *p*-Values:

****p* < .01, ***p* < .05, **p* < .1.

interesting discovery with several potential explanations. For instance, MPs over the course of time find that their deputy mandates are too demanding to perform MOH. Alternatively, Czech politicians primarily seek the mandate of MP and they perceive lower levels of politics as a ladder. Once they enter the Chamber of Deputies, they leave other political offices one by one.

There are also patterns of MOH based on the MP's party affiliation. ČSSD was noticeably more represented in regional cabinets compared with other parties since the social democrats decisively won the latest regional elections preceding the sixth parliamentary term in 2008. ODS traditionally occupied a vast number of municipal mandates compared with other parties, such as VV and TOP 09, that did not manage to spread at either a local or a regional level (Vodička & Cabada, 2011).

Effects of multiple-office holding on the parliamentary activity of deputies

In order to evaluate properly the hypotheses, several analytical models are constructed. The dependent variables of plenary sessions attendance,

plenary sessions voting activity, and committee meetings attendance are close to normal distribution and the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis is therefore applied. Although the distributions of the dependent variables are skewed slightly, their transformation within the analyses does not substantially change the results and the data are utilised in their basic form.

The activities of addressed speeches, proposed bills, and delivered interpellations are over-dispersed count outcome variables since their mean is much lower than the variance. Thus, I employ negative binomial models to assess their relationships with the independent variables.

The models of the first three dependent variables are depicted in [Table 4](#). The very first interesting finding is that none of the three dependent variables is significantly affected by the aggregate number of mandates accumulated by MPs. This result holds for Models 1, 3, and 5 even in the case when all the control variables are excluded. Models 2, 4, and 6 do not provide many statistically significant results either, however it is still possible to observe the trends of the aforementioned relationships and describe the effects.

Plenary sessions attendance tends to be positively influenced by MOH while the effects on committee meetings attendance seem to be negative. To put it differently, multiple-office holders preferred plenary sessions to committee meetings. Probably, a lack of time causes multiple-office holders to choose carefully the meetings they attend, and naturally they find plenary sessions superior. The results suggest a rejection of H1 and a failure to refute H2. There is no shared trend in models of plenary sessions voting activity and it is therefore impossible to assess properly H3.

To continue, analysis of the horizontal dimension of the table is more interesting. Effects of holding a mandate of a municipal councillor are significantly positive across all three models. On the contrary, impacts of a regional executive mandate are predominantly significantly negative. Holding an MRC mandate decreased MP's plenary sessions and committee meetings attendance by 15.76 and even 32.65 per cent units, respectively. These effects are graphically depicted in [Figure 1](#).

These results imply that MPs involved at the local level of politics, especially in municipal councils, attend more plenary sessions, vote there more actively, and join a higher number of committee meetings compared with their colleagues without such mandates. This potentially suggests that multiple-office holders have more political stimulation from other levels of politics and as a result are more active in parliament as they represent these voters (Lazardeux, 2005; Olivier, 1998; Rouban, 2013).

Interestingly, this finding does not apply to the MPs simultaneously working in regional executives. Contrarily, the regional executive's attendance is substantially reduced, which is probably caused by the fact that these offices are too demanding compared with the mandates of municipal councillors. These discoveries tend to confirm H7: MPs simultaneously holding mandates

Table 4. Ordinary least squares regression analyses of plenary sessions attendance, plenary sessions voting activity, and committee meetings attendance.

	Dependent variable:					
	Plenary sessions attendance		Plenary sessions voting activity		Committee meetings attendance	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Cumulative MOH	1.304 (1.065)		0.853 (0.573)		-1.161 (1.550)	
MC		3.786* (2.213)		3.271*** (1.210)		7.032** (3.065)
MMC		0.566 (3.229)		-1.050 (1.766)		-7.337 (4.472)
RC		0.853 (2.485)		-0.639 (1.359)		-2.921 (3.441)
MRC		-15.763** (6.277)		-1.659 (3.433)		-32.653*** (8.694)
Female	1.068 (2.274)	1.122 (2.228)	0.779 (1.224)	0.877 (1.218)	-3.697 (3.311)	-3.674 (3.086)
Age	0.033 (0.096)	0.012 (0.095)	0.082 (0.051)	0.067 (0.052)	0.115 (0.139)	0.046 (0.131)
Education	-3.063 (2.430)	-2.271 (2.374)	0.030 (1.308)	0.163 (1.298)	2.027 (3.537)	3.442 (3.288)
Parliamentary Experience	-2.168*** (0.821)	-2.272*** (0.804)	-1.216*** (0.442)	-1.323*** (0.440)	-1.183 (1.195)	-1.461 (1.114)
Geographic Area	-0.181 (0.923)	-0.286 (0.897)	0.714 (0.497)	0.691 (0.490)	-0.494 (1.344)	-0.693 (1.242)
VV	2.094 (3.549)	1.645 (3.468)	9.565*** (1.910)	9.418*** (1.896)	-0.028 (5.167)	-0.670 (4.803)
KSCM	11.858*** (3.027)	10.904*** (2.956)	-5.539*** (1.630)	-5.712*** (1.617)	11.529** (4.407)	9.750** (4.094)
ODS	3.226 (2.525)	3.405 (2.548)	7.462*** (1.359)	7.913*** (1.393)	6.903* (3.676)	8.346** (3.529)
TOP 09	7.159*** (2.674)	6.909** (2.786)	10.087*** (1.439)	10.711*** (1.524)	4.571 (3.893)	5.756 (3.859)
Constant	81.337*** (5.567)	81.888*** (5.410)	77.212*** (2.997)	77.479*** (2.959)	68.658*** (8.106)	70.046*** (7.493)

<i>N</i>	132	132	132	132	132	132
<i>R</i> ²	0.221	0.285	0.574	0.596	0.092	0.245
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.157	0.206	0.539	0.552	0.017	0.162
<i>F</i> Statistic	3.441*** (df = 10;121)	3.610*** (df = 13;118)	16.325*** (df = 10;121)	13.406*** (df = 13;118)	1.228 (df = 10;121)	2.946*** (df = 13;118)

Note: *p*-values: ****p* < .01, ***p* < .05, **p* < .1.




Figure 1. The effect of multiple-office holding on plenary sessions attendance and committee meetings attendance.

Note: The expected values and associated 95 per cent confidence intervals are simulated using the Zelig package in R (R Core Team, 2007). The simulations are conducted for male deputies with a university education, average age, parliamentary experience, geographic proximity, and affiliated to ČSSD as the largest (opposition) party. All other mandates are held at zeros and the only change is between zero and one in the case of the analysed mandates.

at a local level are more active in parliament than MPs occupying mandates at a regional level. H8b is more valid than the contradictory H8a, as being a councillor positively affects MPs' parliamentary activity while holding an executive mandate is related negatively since these offices are too exacting.

Next, Table 5 presents the analyses of addressed speeches, proposed bills, and delivered interpellations. Unlike Table 4, the effects of the independent variables of a cumulative MOH are significant in the case of addressed speeches (negative) and proposed bills (positive). Even though the impact on legislative activity has been anticipated by H5, the finding on addresses rejects H4, which projected a positive effect.

The relationships between the number of accumulated mandates and both addressed speeches and proposed bills are displayed in Figure 2. One possible explanation is that as an MP accumulates other mandates, he or she lacks the time and thus abandons some relatively ineffective parliamentary rights (addressing speeches). Nevertheless, the MP simultaneously attempts to increase his/her representation of the voters from his/her other levels of politics, for instance, by proposing more bills, as we can see here. This relationship is highly influenced by a particular institutional setting of parliament that 'forces' an MP to an activity that he or she finds the most efficient. This could be a reason why the presented effects differ from the findings observed in the French parliament (François & Weill, 2016; Lazardex, 2005; Rouban, 2013).

The impacts of the specific mandates in Models 2, 4, and 6 suggest that they negatively influence the number of addressed speeches and positively influence the number of proposed bills. The analyses of the interpellations deliver ambiguous information and H6 cannot therefore be evaluated. The reason for this may be that the instrument of interpellations is not utilised frequently by the deputies in the Czech Republic, and the model misses that.

Table 5. Negative binomial models of speeches, bills, and interpellations.

	Dependent variable:					
	Addressed speeches		Proposed bills		Delivered interpellations	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Cumulative MOH	−0.240*** (0.092)		0.080* (0.048)		−0.193 (0.208)	
MC		−0.161 (0.190)		0.136 (0.091)		0.305 (0.338)
MMC		−0.727*** (0.282)		0.122 (0.148)		−3.062*** (1.077)
RC		0.136 (0.212)		0.055 (0.106)		0.147 (0.443)
MRC		−0.917* (0.535)		−0.256 (0.258)		−0.617 (0.976)
Female	−0.307 (0.198)	−0.397** (0.197)	−0.049 (0.111)	−0.042 (0.111)	0.430 (0.411)	0.200 (0.399)
Age	−0.017** (0.008)	−0.019** (0.008)	−0.0002 (0.004)	−0.001 (0.004)	0.023 (0.017)	0.017 (0.017)
Education	0.090 (0.205)	0.140 (0.204)	−0.069 (0.107)	−0.044 (0.107)	0.156 (0.449)	0.350 (0.459)
Parliamentary Experience	0.219*** (0.071)	0.220*** (0.071)	−0.032 (0.039)	−0.033 (0.039)	−0.168 (0.147)	−0.153 (0.145)
Geographic Area	0.058 (0.079)	0.056 (0.078)	0.027 (0.040)	0.025 (0.040)	0.190 (0.162)	0.180 (0.155)

(Continued)

Table 5. Continued.

	Dependent variable:					
	Addressed speeches		Proposed bills		Delivered interpellations	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
VV	−0.596** (0.300)	−0.497* (0.298)	−0.931*** (0.161)	−0.937*** (0.160)	−2.042*** (0.593)	−1.832*** (0.579)
KSČM	−0.279 (0.248)	−0.248 (0.246)	−1.158*** (0.150)	−1.179*** (0.149)	−1.013** (0.450)	−0.868** (0.437)
ODS	−0.544** (0.211)	−0.413* (0.215)	−1.972*** (0.163)	−1.981*** (0.165)	−2.523*** (0.455)	−2.118*** (0.459)
TOP 09	−0.750*** (0.229)	−0.633*** (0.240)	−1.609*** (0.146)	−1.626*** (0.152)	−38.921 (> 1000)	−38.047 (> 1000)
Constant	3.707*** (0.459)	3.660*** (0.453)	2.346*** (0.250)	2.349*** (0.250)	0.432 (0.978)	0.260 (0.969)
<i>N</i>	125	125	132	132	132	132
Log Likelihood	−486.005	−483.774	−254.580	−253.008	−189.001	−184.285
Theta	1.556*** (0.211)	1.613*** (0.220)	231.326 (856.602)	2645.624 (105,695.600)	0.550*** (0.111)	0.623*** (0.130)

Note: Models 1–2 exclude the deputies who worked in the presidency of the chamber and therefore had an extraordinarily high number of (procedural) speeches as they were presiding over the plenary sessions. *p*-Values: ****p* < .01, ***p* < .05, **p* < .1.




Figure 2. The effect of cumulative multiple-office holding on addressed speeches and proposed bills.

Note: The expected values and associated 95 per cent confidence intervals are simulated using the Zelig package in R (Venables & Ripley, 2008). The simulations are conducted for male deputies with a university education, average age, parliamentary experience, and geographic proximity, affiliated to ĆSSD as the largest (opposition) party. All other mandates are held at zeros and the only change is from zero to four in the case of the cumulative MOH.

Regarding the differences of the impacts of mandates from either local or regional levels, there are no such visible patterns similar to Table 4. Thus, H7 is not confirmed. However, an assessment of differences between effects of the councillor mandates and the executive offices is more promising. The models imply that serving as local and regional councillors positively affects all addressed speeches, proposed bills, and delivered interpellations. On the other hand, holding local and regional executive mandates influences these activities of deputies negatively. Therefore, similarly to the previous analyses, H8b is preferred to H8a.

To be more specific, deputies who accumulate the local and regional mandate of councillor, which is close to the voters but not excessively demanding, increase their parliamentary activity. However, when MPs serve as either local or regional executives, they face a significantly higher workload, which negatively affects their activity in parliament.

Finally, I conducted several robustness tests of the presented findings. First, robustness regressions of the OLS models, insensitive to outliers, only change the significance of plenary session attendance by MOHs who also serve as MCs, rendering the effect insignificant. Second, for the negative binomial models, all significant results are robust against several exclusions of outliers in the dependent variables, except for the effect of cumulative MOH on a number of proposed bills.

The analyses were also done using different data sets, and the results show that the presented frameworks are the most reasonable ones. For example, the examination that included MPs regardless of their first-period duration erased the significance of many effects. Thus, it is rational to scrutinise only the activities of MPs who served for a substantial period of time. Overall, the

depicted regressions are the most justifiable with predominantly robust results, albeit the delivered analytical models struggle mainly with a low number of cases, and outliers.

Conclusion

The statistical analysis shows that MOH is a frequent behaviour among MPs in the Czech Republic. Therefore, MOH is a characteristic phenomenon not only for western European political systems but also for the post-communist country. The analysis also suggests that MPs' parliamentary activity is influenced by MOH, though a number of insignificant results make inferences difficult. However, it is still possible to derive two general findings.

First, MOH affects some of the MPs' parliamentary activities positively (plenary sessions attendance or an annual number of proposed bills), while others are influenced negatively (committee meetings attendance or annual number of addressed speeches). On the one hand, multiple-office holders deal with an increased workload and lack of time that disrupt their parliamentary performance. On the other hand, the same multiple-office holders face a higher number of political stimuli from their voters, which forces them to be more active in parliament.

Multiple-office holders' parliamentary roles are truly complicated as they deal with demanding duties at a national level and have to fulfil promises given to voters as local or regional delegates at the same time. As a result, they need to select carefully 'how' they are active in parliament. The decision depends on a particular institutional and political setting that determines which parliamentary activities are time-consuming and which are effective. To put it differently, impressing voters efficiently is essential.

In the Czech Republic, politicians generally focus on their voting at plenary sessions and proposing bills rather than addressing speeches or delivering interpellations. These preferences correlate with the presented results. It shows that in a matter of MOH every political system is unique and a positive effect of MOH on the asked questions in one country can be negative in another (François & Weill, 2016; Lazardeux, 2005; Rouban, 2013).

Therefore, although it is possible to draw inspiration from effects of MOH in other political systems, this does not necessarily correspond to impacts in other and even similar countries. Too many factors, such as historical experience, political culture, or public support of particular offices, intervene. Thus, initial case studies of individual political systems and subsequent comparative studies seem to be the most appropriate way of doing research on MOH.

Second, different offices held simultaneously with a parliamentary mandate seem to have different effects on MPs' parliamentary activity. The findings imply that deputies serving at a local level are more active in parliament compared with their colleagues working at a regional level. One

explanation is that serving at a local level means closer engagement with voters, without the greater responsibilities of regional level politics.

Another coinciding effect suggests that both local and regional councillors are more active in parliament compared with multiple-office holders holding local or regional executive mandates. Although the latter politicians are equipped with a larger staffing capacity, they have to deal with such a great workload that their activity in a parliament is significantly decreased. To sum up these findings, local (rather than regional) multiple-office holders and councillors (rather than executives) are more active in their parliamentary performance.

These trends should again always be scrutinised with respect to a particular institutional setting. In the Czech Republic, there is a high number of small municipalities, and serving in these villages is not so demanding for deputies. The regional level of politics is not largely supported by the Czechs compared with municipalities; therefore, regional politicians face less stimulation and pressure from voters to be more active in parliament compared with local ones.

Even though this research is based on a justifiable theoretical framework and employs sophisticated tools for analysis, there are a few drawbacks. First, the data set encompasses just one electoral term of the Chamber of Deputies, which leads to a relatively low number of the cases. Second, the analysis is based on a unique research design that is thus unfortunately not comparable to other studies and the paper itself does not analytically deal with other parliaments.

All this being said, research on MOH is important as the phenomenon obviously affects the behaviour of legislators. Today, there is a vast amount of literature describing causes and general (theoretical) impacts of MOH. However, detailed analyses of the effects of MOH are scarce. This paper has delivered a novel technique using specific MP-periods. Even though the research design faces several more or less serious shortcomings, it still has the potential to be an inspiration for further research.

Notes

1. Altogether, the data consist of 132 MP-periods with the descriptive statistics of their durations as follows – minimum 187 days, maximum 1188, mean 1058.50, standard deviation 255.80.
2. The point of 186 days was chosen by two different approaches that confirm the very same result. The first method finds out the exact length of time spent in the office after which a deputy becomes active (addressing speeches, proposing bills, or delivering interpellations). The second method is a brief survey conducted among deputies asking ‘after how much time spent in the office is a deputy able to perform his or her mandate responsibly?’

3. A severe disease limited Petr Jalowiczor MP over a long period of time. Next, Roman Pekárek MP was in prison for most of his parliamentary term. Finally, David Rath MP was a prisoner on remand for a significant period of his deputy term.
4. VV split up in 2012 and a fraction called LIDEM continued to support the cabinet until the end of the term.

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