

Investigating Social Dynamics: Power, Conformity, and Obedience

I believe that in all men's lives at certain periods, and in many men's lives at all periods between infancy and extreme old age, one of the most dominant elements is the desire to be inside the local Ring and the terror of being left outside.... Of all the passions the passion for the Inner Ring is most skilful in making a man who is not yet a very bad man do very bad things.

—C. S. Lewis, "The Inner Ring" (1944)¹

Motives and needs that ordinarily serve us well can lead us astray when they are aroused, amplified, or manipulated by situational forces that we fail to recognize as potent. This is why evil is so pervasive. Its temptation is just a small turn away, a slight detour on the path of life, a blur in our sideview mirror, leading to disaster.

In trying to understand the character transformations of the good young men in the Stanford Prison Experiment, I previously outlined a number of psychological processes that were pivotal in perverting their thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and actions. We saw how the basic need to belong, to associate with and be accepted by others, so central to community building and family bonding, was diverted in the SPE into conformity with newly emergent norms that enabled the guards to abuse the prisoners.² We saw further that the basic motive for consistency between our private attitudes and public behavior allowed for dissonant commitments to be resolved and rationalized in violence against one's fellows.³

I will argue that the most dramatic instances of directed behavior change and "mind control" are not the consequence of exotic forms of influence, such as hypnosis, psychotropic drugs, or "brainwashing," but rather the systematic manipulation of the most mundane aspects of human nature over time in confining settings.⁴

It is in this sense, I believe what the English scholar C. S. Lewis proposed—that a powerful force in transforming human behavior, pushing people across the boundary between good and evil, comes from the basic desire to be "in" and not "out." If we think of social power as arrayed in a set of concentric circles from the most powerful central or inner ring moving outward to the least socially significant outer ring, we can appreciate his focus on the centripetal pull of that central

circle. Lewis's "Inner Ring" is the elusive Camelot of acceptance into some special group, some privileged association, that confers instant status and enhanced identity. Its lure for most of us is obvious—who does not want to be a member of the "in-group"? Who does not want to know that she or he has been tried and found worthy of inclusion in, of ascendance into, a new, rarified realm of social acceptability?

Peer pressure has been identified as one social force that makes people, especially adolescents, do strange things—anything—to be accepted. However, the quest for the Inner Ring is nurtured from within. There is no peer-pressure power without that push from self-pressure for Them to want You. It makes people willing to suffer through painful, humiliating initiation rites in fraternities, cults, social clubs, or the military. It justifies for many suffering a lifelong existence climbing the corporate ladder.

This motivational force is doubly energized by what Lewis called the "terror of being left outside." This fear of rejection when one wants acceptance can cripple initiative and negate personal autonomy. It can turn social animals into shy introverts. The imagined threat of being cast into the out-group can lead some people to do virtually anything to avoid their terrifying rejection. Authorities can command total obedience not through punishments or rewards but by means of the double-edged weapon: the lure of acceptance coupled with the threat of rejection. So strong is this human motive that even strangers are empowered when they promise us a special place at their table of shared secrets—"just between you and me."⁵

A sordid example of these social dynamics came to light recently when a forty-year-old woman pleaded guilty to having sex with five high school boys and providing them and others with drugs and alcohol at weekly sex parties in her home for a full year. She told police that she had done it because she wanted to be a "cool mom." In her affidavit, this newly cool mom told investigators that she had never been popular with her classmates in high school, but orchestrating these parties enabled her to begin "feeling like one of the group."⁶ Sadly, she caught the wrong Inner Ring.

Lewis goes on to describe the subtle process of initiation, the indoctrination of good people into a private Inner Ring that can have malevolent consequences, turning them into "scoundrels." I cite this passage at length because it is such an eloquent expression of how this basic human motive can be imperceptibly perverted by those with the power to admit or deny access to their Inner Ring. It will set the stage for our excursion into the experimental laboratories and field settings of social scientists who have investigated such phenomena in considerable depth.

To nine out of ten of you the choice which could lead to scoundrelism will come, when it does come, in no very dramatic colors. Obviously bad men, obviously threatening or bribing, will almost certainly not appear. Over a drink or a cup of coffee, disguised as a triviality and sandwiched between

two jokes, from the lips of a man, or woman, whom you have recently been getting to know rather better and whom you hope to know better still—just at the moment when you are most anxious not to appear crude, or naive or a prig—the hint will come. It will be the hint of something, which is not quite in accordance with the technical rules of fair play, something that the public, the ignorant, romantic public, would never understand. Something which even the outsiders in your own profession are apt to make a fuss about, but something, says your new friend, which "we"—and at the word "we" you try not to blush for mere pleasure—something "we always do." And you will be drawn in, if you are drawn in, not by desire for gain or ease, but simply because at that moment, when the cup was so near your lips, you cannot bear to be thrust back again into the cold outer world. It would be so terrible to see the other man's face—that genial, confidential, delightfully sophisticated face—turn suddenly cold and contemptuous, to know that you had been tried for the Inner Ring and rejected. And then, if you are drawn in, next week it will be something a little further from the rules, and next year something further still, but all in the jolliest, friendliest spirit. It may end in a crash, a scandal, and penal servitude; it may end in millions, a peerage and giving the prizes at your old school. But you will be a scoundrel.

RESEARCH REVELATIONS OF SITUATIONAL POWER

The Stanford Prison Experiment is a facet of the broad mosaic of research that reveals the power of social situations and the social construction of reality. We have seen how it focused on power relationships among individuals within an institutional setting. A variety of studies that preceded and followed it have illuminated many other aspects of human behavior that are shaped in unexpected ways by situational forces.

Groups can get us to do things we ordinarily might not do on our own, but their influence is often indirect, simply modeling the normative behavior that the group wants us to imitate and practice. In contrast, authority influence is more often direct and without subtlety: "You do what I tell you to do." But because the demand is so open and bold-faced, one can decide to disobey and not follow the leader. To see what I mean, consider this question: To what extent would a good, ordinary person resist against or comply with the demand of an authority figure that he harm, or even kill, an innocent stranger? This provocative question was put to experimental test in a controversial study on blind obedience to authority. It is a classic experiment about which you have probably heard because of its "shocking" effects, but there is much more of value embedded in its procedures that we will extract to aid in our quest to understand why good people can be induced to behave badly. We will review replications and extensions of this clas-

sic study and again ask the question posed of all such research: What is its external validity, what are real-world parallels to the laboratory demonstration of authority power?

Beware: Self-Serving Biases May Be at Work

Before we get into the details of this research, I must warn you of a bias you likely possess that might shield you from drawing the right conclusions from all you are about to read. Most of us construct self-enhancing, self-serving, egocentric biases that make us feel special—never ordinary, and certainly "above average." Such cognitive biases serve a valuable function in boosting our self-esteem and protecting against life's hard knocks. They enable us to explain away failures, take credit for our successes, and disown responsibility for bad decisions, perceiving our subjective world through rainbow prisms. For example, research shows that 86 percent of Australians rate their job performance as "above average," and 90 percent of American business managers rate their performance as superior to that of their average peer. (Pity that poor average dude.)

Yet these biases can be maladaptive as well by blinding us to our similarity to others and distancing us from the reality that people just like us behave badly in certain toxic situations. Such biases also mean that we don't take basic precautions to avoid the undesired consequences of our behavior, assuming it won't happen to us. So we take sexual risks, driving risks, gambling risks, health risks, and more. In the extreme version of these biases, most people believe that they are less vulnerable to these self-serving biases than other people, even after being taught about them.⁸

That means when you read about the SPE or the many studies in this next section, you might well conclude that *you* would not do what the majority has done, that you would, of course, be the exception to the rule. That statistically unreasonable belief (since most of us share it) makes you even more vulnerable to situational forces precisely because you underestimate their power as you overestimate yours. You are convinced that you would be the good guard, the defiant prisoner, the resistor, the dissident, the nonconformist, and, most of all, the Hero. Would that it were so, but heroes are a rare breed—some of whom we will meet in our final chapter.

So I invite you to suspend that bias for now and imagine that what the majority has done in these experiments is a fair base rate for you as well. At the very least, please consider that you can't be certain of whether or not you could be as readily seduced into doing what the average research participant has done in these studies—if you were in their shoes, under the same circumstances. I ask you to recall what Prisoner Clay-416, the sausage resister, said in his postexperimental interview with his tormenter, the "John Wayne" guard. When taunted with "What kind of guard would you have been if you were in my place?" he replied modestly, "I really don't know."

It is only through recognizing that we are all subject to the same dynamic forces in the human condition, that humility takes precedence over unfounded pride, that we can begin to acknowledge our vulnerability to situational forces. In this vein, recall John Donne's eloquent framing of our common interrelatedness and interdependence:

All mankind is of one author, and is one volume; when one man dies, one chapter is not torn out of the book, but translated into a better language; and every chapter must be so translated. . . . As therefore the bell that rings to a sermon, calls not upon the preacher only, but upon the congregation to come: so this bell calls us all. . . . No man is an island, entire of itself... any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind; and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.

(Meditations 27)

Classic Research on Conforming to Group Norms

One of the earliest studies on conformity, in 1935, was designed by a social psychologist from Turkey, Muzafer Sherif.⁹ Sherif, a recent immigrant to the United States, believed that Americans in general tended to conform because their democracy emphasized mutually shared agreements. He devised an unusual means of demonstrating conformity of individuals to group standards in a novel setting.

Male college students were individually ushered into a totally dark room in which there was a stationary spot of light. Sherif knew that without any frame of reference, such a light appears to move about erratically, an illusion called the "autokinetic effect." At first, each of these subjects was asked individually to judge the movement of the light. Their judgments varied widely; some saw movement of a few inches, while others reported that the spot moved many feet. Each person soon established a range within which most of his reports would fall. Next, he was put into a group with several others. They gave estimates that varied widely, but in each group a norm "crystallized" wherein a range of judgments and an average-norm judgment emerged. After many trials, the other participants left, and the individual, now alone, was asked again to make estimates of the movement of the light—the test of his conformity to the new norm established in that group. His judgments now fell in this new group-sanctioned range, "departing significantly from his earlier personal range."

Sherif also used a confederate who was trained to give estimates that varied in their latitude from a small to a very large range. Sure enough, the naive subject's autokinetic experience mirrored that of the judgments of this devious confederate rather than sticking to his previously established personal perceptual standard.

Asch's Conformity Research: Getting into Line

Sherif's conformity effect was challenged in 1955 by another social psychologist, Solomon Asch,¹⁰ who believed that Americans were actually more independent than Sherif's work had suggested. Asch believed that Americans could act autonomously, even when faced with a majority who saw the world differently from them. The problem with Sherif's test situation, he argued, was that it was so ambiguous, without any meaningful frame of reference or personal standard. When challenged by the alternative perception of the group, the individual had no real commitment to his original estimates so just went along. Real conformity required the group to challenge the basic perception and beliefs of the individual—to say that X was Y, when clearly that was not true. Under those circumstances, Asch predicted, relatively few would conform: most would be staunchly resistant to this extreme group pressure that was so transparently wrong.

What actually happened to people confronted with a social reality that conflicted with their basic perceptions of the world? To find out, let me put you into the seat of a typical research participant.

You are recruited for a study of visual perception that begins with judging the relative size of lines. You are shown cards with three lines of differing lengths and asked to state out loud which of the three is the same length as a comparison line on another card. One is shorter, one is longer, and one is exactly the same length as the comparison line. The task is a piece of cake for you. You make few mistakes, just like most others (less than 1 percent of the time). But you are not alone in this study; you are flanked by a bunch of peers, seven of them, and you are number eight. At first, your answers are like theirs—all right on. But then unusual things start to happen. On some trials, each of them in turn reports seeing the long line as the same length as the medium line or the short line the same as the medium one. (Unknown to you, the other seven are members of Asch's research team who have been instructed to give incorrect answers unanimously on specific "critical" trials.) When it is your turn, they all look at you as you look at the card with the three lines. You are clearly seeing something different than they are, but do you say so? Do you stick to your guns and say what you know is right, or do you go along with what everyone else says is right? You face that same group pressure on twelve of the total eighteen trials where the group gives answers that are wrong, but they are accurate on the other six trials interspersed into the mix.

If you are like most of the 123 actual research participants in Asch's study, you would yield to the group about 70 percent of the time on some of those critical, wrong-judgment trials. Thirty percent of the original subjects conformed on the majority of trials, and only a quarter of them were able to maintain their independence throughout the testing. Some reported being aware of the differences between what they saw and the group consensus, but they felt it was easier to go along with the others. For others the discrepancy created a conflict that was re-

solved by coming to believe that the group was right and their perception was wrong! All those who yielded underestimated how much they had conformed, recalling yielding much less to the group pressure than had actually been the case. They remained independent—in their minds but not in their actions.

Follow-up studies showed that, when pitted against just one person giving an incorrect judgment, a participant exhibits some uneasiness but maintains independence. However, with a majority of three people opposed to him, errors rose to 32 percent. On a more optimistic note, however, Asch found one powerful way to promote independence. By giving the subject a partner whose views were in line with his, the power of the majority was greatly diminished. Peer support decreased errors to one fourth of what they had been when there was no partner—and this resistance effect endured even after the partner left.

One of the valuable additions to our understanding of why people conform comes from research that highlights two of the basic mechanisms that contribute to group conformity.¹¹ We conform first out of *informational needs*: other people often have ideas, views, perspectives, and knowledge that helps us to better navigate our world, especially through foreign shores and new ports. The second mechanism involves *normative needs*: other people are more likely to accept us when we agree with them than when we disagree, so we yield to their view of the world, driven by a powerful need to belong, to replace differences with similarities.

Conformity and Independence Light Up the Brain Differently

New technology, not available in Asch's day, offers intriguing insights into the role of the brain in social conformity. When people conform, are they rationally deciding to go along with the group out of normative needs, or are they actually changing their perceptions and accepting the validity of the new though erroneous information provided by the group? A recent study utilized advanced brain-scanning technology to answer this question.¹² Researchers can now peer into the active brain as a person engages in various tasks by using a scanning device that detects which specific brain regions are energized as they carry out various mental tasks. The process is known as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Understanding what mental functions various brain regions control tells us what it means when they are activated by any given experimental task.

Here's how the study worked. Imagine that you are one of thirty-two volunteers recruited for a study of perception. You have to mentally rotate images of three-dimensional objects to determine if the objects are the same as or different from a standard object. In the waiting room, you meet four other volunteers, with whom you begin to bond by practicing games on laptop computers, taking photos of one another, and chatting. (They are really actors—"confederates," as they are called in psychology—who will soon be faking their answers on the test trials so that they are in agreement with one another but not with the correct responses

that you generate.) You are selected as the one to go into the scanner while the others outside look at the objects first as a group and then decide if they are the same or different. As in Asch's original experiment, the actors unanimously give wrong answers on some trials, correct answers on others, with occasional mixed group answers thrown in to make the test more believable. On each round, when it is your turn at bat, you are shown the answers given by the others. You have to decide if the objects are the same or different—as the group assessed them or as you saw them?

As in Asch's experiments, you (as the typical subject) would cave in to group pressure, on average giving the group's wrong answers 41 percent of the time. When you yield to the group's erroneous judgment, your conformity would be seen in the brain scan as changes in selected regions of the brain's cortex dedicated to vision and spatial awareness (specifically, activity increases in the right intraparietal sulcus). Surprisingly, there would be no changes in areas of the fore-brain that deal with monitoring conflicts, planning, and other higher-order mental activities. On the other hand, if you make independent judgments that go against the group, your brain would light up in the areas that are associated with emotional salience (the right amygdala and right caudate nucleus regions). This means that resistance creates an emotional burden for those who maintain their independence—autonomy comes at a psychic cost.

The lead author of this research, the neuroscientist Gregory Berns, concluded that "We like to think that seeing is believing, but the study's findings show that seeing is believing what the group tells you to believe." This means that other people's views, when crystallized into a group consensus, can actually affect how we perceive important aspects of the external world, thus calling into question the nature of truth itself. It is only by becoming aware of our vulnerability to social pressure that we can begin to build resistance to conformity when it is not in our best interest to yield to the mentality of the herd.

Minority Power to Impact the Majority

Juries can become "hung" when a dissenter gets support from at least one other person and together they challenge the dominant majority view. But can a small minority turn the majority around to create new norms using the same basic psychological principles that usually help to establish the majority view?

A research team of French psychologists put that question to an experimental test. In a color-naming task, if two confederates among groups of six female students consistently called a blue light "green," almost a third of the naive majority subjects eventually followed their lead. However, the members of the majority did not give in to the consistent minority when they were gathered together. It was only later, when they were tested individually, that they responded as the minority had done, shifting their judgments by moving the boundary between blue and green toward the green of the color spectrum.¹³

Researchers have also studied minority influence in the context of simulated jury deliberations, where a disagreeing minority prevents unanimous acceptance of the majority point of view. The minority group was never well liked, and its persuasiveness, when it occurred, worked only gradually, over time. The vocal minority was most influential when it had four qualities: it persisted in affirming a consistent position, appeared confident, avoided seeming rigid and dogmatic, and was skilled in social influence. Eventually, the power of the many may be undercut by the persuasion of the dedicated few.

How do these qualities of a dissident minority—especially its persistence—help to sway the majority? Majority decisions tend to be made without engaging the systematic thought and critical thinking skills of the individuals in the group. Given the force of the group's normative power to shape the opinions of the followers who conform without thinking things through, they are often taken at face value. The persistent minority forces the others to process the relevant information more mindfully.¹⁴ Research shows that the decisions of a group as a whole are more thoughtful and creative when there is minority dissent than when it is absent.¹⁵

If a minority can win adherents to their side even when they are wrong, there is hope for a minority with a valid cause. In society, the majority tends to be the defender of the status quo, while the force for innovation and change comes from the minority members or individuals either dissatisfied with the current system or able to visualize new and creative alternative ways of dealing with current problems. According to the French social theorist Serge Moscovici,¹⁶ the conflict between the entrenched majority view and the dissident minority perspective is an essential precondition of innovation and revolution that can lead to positive social change. An individual is constantly engaged in a two-way exchange with society—adapting to its norms, roles, and status prescriptions but also acting upon society to reshape those norms.

BLIND OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: MILGRAM'S SHOCKING RESEARCH

"I was trying to think of a way to make Asch's conformity experiment more humanly significant. I was dissatisfied that the test of conformity was judgments about lines. I wondered whether groups could pressure a person into performing an act whose human import was more readily apparent; perhaps behaving aggressively toward another person, say by administering increasingly severe shocks to him. But to study the group effect... you'd have to know how the subject performed without any group pressure. At that instant, my thought shifted, zeroing in on this experimental control. Just how far would a person go under the experimenter's orders?"

These musings, from a former teaching and research assistant of Solomon Asch, started a remarkable series of studies by a social psychologist, Stanley Mil-

gram, that have come to be known as investigations of "blind obedience to authority." His interest in the problem of obedience to authority came from deep personal concerns about how readily the Nazis had obediently killed Jews during the Holocaust.

"[My] laboratory paradigm . . . gave scientific expression to a more general concern about authority, a concern forced upon members of my generation, in particular upon Jews such as myself, by the atrocities of World War II. . . . The impact of the Holocaust on my own psyche energized my interest in obedience and shaped the particular form in which it was examined."¹⁷

I would like to re-create for you the situation faced by a typical volunteer in this research project, then go on to summarize the results, outline ten important lessons to be drawn from this research that can be generalized to other situations of behavioral transformations in everyday life, and then review extensions of this paradigm by providing a number of real-world parallels. (See the Notes for a description of my personal relationship with Stanley Milgram.¹⁸)

Milgram's Obedience Paradigm

Imagine that you see the following advertisement in the Sunday newspaper and decide to apply. The original study involved only men, but women were used in a later study, so I invite all readers to participate in this imagined scenario.

Public Announcement

**WE WILL PAY YOU \$4.00 FOR
ONE HOUR OF YOUR TIME**

Persons Needed for a Study of Memory

- We will pay five hundred New Haven men to help US complete a scientific study of memory and learning. The study is being done at Yale University.
- Each person who participates will be paid \$4.00 (plus 50c carfare) for approximately 1 hour's time. We need you for only one hour: there are no further obligations. You may choose the time you would like to come (evenings, weekdays, or weekends).
- No special training, education, or experience is needed. We want:


| | | |
|-----------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Factory workers | Businessmen | Construction workers |
| City employees | Clerks | Salespeople |
| Laborers | Professional people | White-collar workers |
| Barbers | Telephone workers | Others |

All persons must be between the ages of 20 and 50. High school and college students cannot be used.

- If you meet these qualifications, fill out the coupon below and mail it now to Professor Stanley Milgram, Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven. You will be notified later of the specific time and place of the study. We reserve the right to decline any application.
- You will be paid \$4.00 (plus 50c carfare) as soon as you arrive at the laboratory.

TO:
PROF. STANLEY MILGRAM, DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY,
YALE UNIVERSITY, NEW HAVEN, CONN. I want to take part in
this study of memory and learning. I am between the ages of 20 and
50. I will be paid \$4.00 (plus 50c carfare) if I participate.


A researcher whose serious demeanor and gray laboratory coat convey scientific importance greets you and another applicant at your arrival at a Yale University laboratory in Linsly-Chittenden Hall. You are here to help scientific psychology find ways to improve people's learning and memory through the use of punishment. He tells you why this new research may have important practical consequences. The task is straightforward: one of you will be the "teacher" who gives the "learner" a set of word pairings to memorize. During the test, the teacher gives each key word, and the learner must respond with the correct association. When right, the teacher gives a verbal reward, such as



"Good" or "That's right." When wrong, the teacher is to press a lever on an impressive-looking shock apparatus that delivers an immediate shock to punish the error.

The shock generator has thirty switches, starting from a low level of 15 volts and increasing by 15 volts at each higher level. The experimenter tells you that every time the learner makes a mistake, you have to press the next higher voltage switch. The control panel indicates both the voltage level of each of the switches and a corresponding description of the level. The tenth level (150 volts) is "Strong Shock"; the 13th level (195 volts) is "Very Strong Shock"; the 17th level (255 volts) is "Intense Shock"; the 21st level (315 volts) is "Extremely Intense Shock"; the 25th level (375 volts) is "Danger, Severe Shock"; and at the 29th and 30th levels (435 and 450 volts) the control panel is simply marked with an ominous XXX (the pornography of ultimate pain and power).

You and another volunteer draw straws to see who will play each role; you are to be the teacher, and the other volunteer will be the learner. (The drawing is rigged, and the other volunteer is a confederate of the experimenter who always plays the learner.) He is a mild-mannered, middle-aged man whom you help escort to the next chamber. "Okay, now we are going to set up the learner so he can get some punishment," the researcher tells you both. The learner's arms are



strapped down and an electrode is attached to his right wrist. The shock generator in the next room will deliver the shocks to the learner—if and when he makes any errors. The two of you communicate over the intercom, with the experimenter standing next to you. You get a sample shock of 45 volts, the third level, a slightly tingling pain, so you now have a sense of what the shock levels mean. The experimenter then signals the start of your trial of the "memory improvement" study.

Initially, your pupil does well, but soon he begins making errors, and you start pressing the shock switches. He complains that the shocks are starting to hurt. You look at the experimenter, who nods to continue. As the shock levels increase in intensity, so do the learner's screams, saying he does not think he wants to continue. You hesitate and question whether you should go on, but the experimenter insists that you have no choice but to do so.

Now the learner begins complaining about his heart condition and you dissent, but the experimenter still insists that you continue. Errors galore; you plead with your pupil to concentrate to get the right associations, you don't want to hurt him with these very-high-level, intense shocks. But your concerns and motivational messages are to no avail. He gets the answers wrong again and again. As the shocks intensify, he shouts out, "I can't stand the pain, let me out of here!" Then he says to the experimenter, "You have no right to keep me here! Let me out!" Another level up, he screams, "I absolutely refuse to answer any more! Get me out of here! You can't hold me here! My heart's bothering me!"

Obviously you want nothing more to do with this experiment. You tell the experimenter that you refuse to continue. You are not the kind of person who harms other people in this way. You want out. But the experimenter continues to insist that you go on. He reminds you of the contract, of your agreement to participate fully. Moreover, he claims responsibility for the consequences of your shocking actions. After you press the 300-volt switch, you read the next keyword, but the learner doesn't answer. "He's not responding," you tell the experimenter. You want him to go into the other room and check on the learner to see if he is all right. The experimenter is impassive; he is not going to check on the learner. Instead he tells you, "If the learner doesn't answer in a reasonable time, about five seconds, consider it wrong," since errors of omission must be punished in the same way as errors of commission—that is a rule.

As you continue up to even more dangerous shock levels, there is no sound coming from your pupil's shock chamber. He may be unconscious or worse! You are really distressed and want to quit, but nothing you say works to get your exit from this unexpectedly distressing situation. You are told to follow the rules and keep posing the test items and shocking the errors.

Now try to imagine fully what your participation as the teacher would be. I am sure you are saying, "No way would I ever go all the way!" Obviously, you

would have dissented, then disobeyed and just walked out. You would never sell out your morality for four bucks! But had you actually gone all the way to the last of the thirtieth shock levels, the experimenter would have insisted that you repeat that XXX switch two more times, for good measure! Now, that is really rubbing it in your face. Forget it, no sir, no way; you are out of there, right? So how far up the scale do you predict that *you* would you go before exiting? How far would the average person from this small city go in this situation?

The Outcome Predicted by Expert Judges

Milgram described his experiment to a group of forty psychiatrists and then asked them to estimate the percentage of American citizens who would go to each of the thirty levels in the experiment. On average, they predicted that less than 1 percent would go all the way to the end, that only sadists would engage in such sadistic behavior, and that most people would drop out at the tenth level of 150 volts. They could not have been more wrong! These experts on human behavior were totally wrong because, first, they ignored the situational determinants of behavior in the procedural description of the experiment. Second, their training in traditional psychiatry led them to rely too heavily on the dispositional perspective to understand unusual behavior and to disregard situational factors. They were guilty of making the fundamental attribution error (FAE)!

The Shocking Truth

In fact, in Milgram's experiment, two of every three (65 percent) of the volunteers went all the way up the maximum shock level of 450 volts. The vast majority of people, the "teachers," shocked their "learner-victim" over and over again despite his increasingly desperate pleas to stop.

And now I invite you to venture another guess: What was the dropout rate after the shock level reached 330 volts—with only silence coming from the shock chamber, where the learner could reasonably be presumed to be unconscious? Who would go on at that point? Wouldn't every sensible person quit, drop out, refuse the experimenter's demands to go on shocking him?

Here is what one "teacher" reported about his reaction: "I didn't know what the hell was going on. I think, you know, maybe I'm killing this guy. I told the experimenter that I was not taking responsibility for going further. That's it." But when the experimenter reassured him that he would take the responsibility, the worried teacher obeyed and continued to the very end.¹⁹

And almost everyone who got that far did the same as this man. How is that possible? If they got that far, why did they continue on to the bitter end? One reason for this startling level of obedience may be related to the teacher's not knowing how to exit from the situation, rather than just blind obedience. Most participants dissented from time to time, saying they did not want to go on, but the experimenter did not let them out, continually coming up with reasons why

they had to stay and prodding them to continue testing their suffering learner. Usually protests work and you can get out of unpleasant situations, but nothing you say affects this impervious experimenter, who insists that you must stay and continue to shock errors. You look at the shock panel and realize that the easiest exit lies at the end of the last shock lever. A few more lever presses is the fast way out, with no hassles from the experimenter and no further moans from the now-silent learner. Voilà! 450 volts is the easy way out—achieving your freedom without directly confronting the authority figure or having to reconcile the suffering you have already caused with this additional pain to the victim. It is a simple matter of up and then out.

Variations on an Obedience Theme

Over the course of a year, Milgram carried out nineteen different experiments, each one a different variation of the basic paradigm of: experimenter/teacher/learner/memory testing/errors shocked. In each of these studies he varied one social psychological variable and observed its impact on the extent of obedience to the unjust authority's pressure to continue to shock the "learner-victim." In one study, he added women: in others he varied the physical proximity or remoteness of either the experimenter-teacher link or the teacher-learner link; had peers rebel or obey before the teacher had the chance to begin; and more.

In one set of experiments, Milgram wanted to show that his results were not due to the authority power of Yale University—which is what New Haven is all about. So he transplanted his laboratory to a run-down office building in downtown Bridgeport, Connecticut, and repeated the experiment as a project, ostensibly of a private research firm with no apparent connection to Yale. It made no difference; the participants fell under the same spell of this situational power.

The data clearly revealed the extreme pliability of human nature: almost everyone could be totally obedient or almost everyone could resist authority pressures. It all depended on the situational variables they experienced. Milgram was able to demonstrate that compliance rates could soar to over 90 percent of people continuing the 450-volt maximum or be reduced to less than 10 percent—by introducing just one crucial variable into the compliance recipe.

Want maximum obedience? Make the subject a member of a "teaching team," in which the job of pulling the shock lever to punish the victim is given to another person (a confederate), while the subject assists with other parts of the procedure. Want people to resist authority pressures? Provide social models of peers who rebelled. Participants also refused to deliver the shocks if the learner said he wanted to be shocked; that's masochistic, and they are not sadists. They were also reluctant to give high levels of shock when the experimenter filled in as the learner. They were more likely to shock when the learner was remote than in proximity. In each of the other variations on this diverse range of ordinary Ameri-

can citizens, of widely varying ages and occupations and of both genders, it was possible to elicit low, medium, or high levels of compliant obedience with a flick of the situational switch—as if one were simply turning a "human nature dial" within their psyches. This large sample of a thousand ordinary citizens from such varied backgrounds makes the results of the Milgram obedience studies among the most generalizable in all the social sciences.

When you think of the long and gloomy history of man, you will find far more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of obedience than have been committed in the name of rebellion.

—C. P. Snow, "Either-Or" (1961)

Ten Lessons from the Milgram Studies: Creating Evil Traps for Good People

Let's outline some of the procedures in this research paradigm that seduced many ordinary citizens to engage in this apparently harmful behavior. In doing so, I want to draw parallels to compliance strategies used by "influence professionals" in real-world settings, such as salespeople, cult and military recruiters, media advertisers, and others.²⁰ There are ten methods we can extract from Milgram's paradigm for this purpose:

1. Prearranging some form of contractual obligation, verbal or written, to control the individual's behavior in pseudolegal fashion. (In Milgram's experiment, this was done by publicly agreeing to accept the tasks and the procedures.)
2. Giving participants meaningful roles to play ("teacher," "learner") that carry with them previously learned positive values and automatically activate response scripts.
3. Presenting basic rules to be followed that seem to make sense before their actual use but can then be used arbitrarily and impersonally to justify mindless compliance. Also, systems control people by making their rules vague and changing them as necessary but insisting that "rules are rules" and thus must be followed (as the researcher in the lab coat did in Milgram's experiment or the SPE guards did to force prisoner Clay-416 to eat the sausages).
4. Altering the semantics of the act, the actor, and the action (from "hurting victims" to "helping the experimenter," punishing the former for the lofty goal of scientific discovery)—replacing unpleasant reality with desirable rhetoric, gilding the frame so that the real picture is disguised. (We can see the same semantic framing at work in advertising, where, for example, bad-tasting mouthwash is framed as good for you because it kills germs and tastes like medicine is expected to taste.)

5. Creating opportunities for the diffusion of responsibility or abdication of responsibility for negative outcomes; others will be responsible, or the actor won't be held liable. (In Milgram's experiment, the authority figure said, when questioned by any "teacher," that he would take responsibility for anything that happened to the "learner.")
6. Starting the path toward the ultimate evil act with a small, seemingly insignificant first step, the easy "foot in the door" that swings open subsequent greater compliance pressures, and leads down a slippery slope.²¹ (In the obedience study, the initial shock was only a mild 15 volts.) This is also the operative principle in turning good kids into drug addicts, with that first little hit or sniff.
7. Having successively increasing steps on the pathway that are gradual, so that they are hardly noticeably different from one's most recent prior action. "Just a little bit more." (By increasing each level of aggression in gradual steps of only 15-volt increments, over the thirty switches, no new level of harm seemed like a noticeable difference from the prior level to Milgram's participants.)
8. Gradually changing the nature of the authority figure (the researcher, in Milgram's study) from initially "just" and reasonable to "unjust" and demanding, even irrational. This tactic elicits initial compliance and later confusion, since we expect consistency from authorities and friends. Not acknowledging that this transformation has occurred leads to mindless obedience (and it is part of many "date rape" scenarios and a reason why abused women stay with their abusing spouses).
9. Making the "exit costs" high and making the process of exiting difficult by allowing verbal dissent (which makes people feel better about themselves) while insisting on behavioral compliance.
10. Offering an ideology, or a big lie, to justify the use of any means to achieve the seemingly desirable, essential goal. (In Milgram's research this came in the form of providing an acceptable justification, or rationale, for engaging in the undesirable action, such as that science wants to help people improve their memory by judicious use of reward and punishment.) In social psychology experiments, this tactic is known as the "cover story" because it is a cover-up for the procedures that follow, which might be challenged because they do not make sense on their own. The real-world equivalent is known as an "ideology." Most nations rely on an ideology, typically, "threats to national security," before going to war or to suppress dissident political opposition. When citizens fear that their national security is being threatened, they become willing to surrender their basic freedoms to a government that offers them that exchange. Erich Fromm's classic analysis in *Escape from Freedom* made us aware of this trade-off, which Hitler and other dictators have long used to gain and maintain power: namely, the claim that they will be able to provide security in

exchange for citizens giving up their freedoms, which will give them the ability to control things better.²²

Such procedures are utilized in varied influence situations where those in authority want others to do their bidding but know that few would engage in the "end game" without first being properly prepared psychologically to do the "un-thinkable." In the future, when you are in a compromising position where your compliance is at stake, thinking back to these stepping-stones to mindless obedience may enable you to step back and not go all the way down the path—their path. A good way to avoid crimes of obedience is to assert one's personal authority and always take full responsibility for one's actions.²³

Replications and Extensions of the Milgram Obedience Model

Because of its structural design and its detailed protocol, the basic Milgram obedience experiment encouraged replication by independent investigators in many countries. A recent comparative analysis was made of the rates of obedience in eight studies conducted in the United States and nine replications in European, African, and Asian countries. There were comparably high levels of compliance by research volunteers in these different studies and nations. The majority obedience effect of a mean 61 percent found in the U.S. replications was matched by the 66 percent obedience rate found across all the other national samples. The range of obedience went from a low of 31 percent to a high of 91 percent in the U.S. studies, and from a low of 28 percent (Australia) to a high of 88 percent (South Africa) in the cross-national replications. There was also stability of obedience over decades of time as well as over place. There was no association between when a study was done (between 1963 and 1985) and degree of obedience.²⁴

Obedience to a Powerful Legitimate Authority

In the original obedience studies, the subjects conferred authority status on the person conducting the experiment because he was in an institutional setting and was dressed and acted like a serious scientist, even though he was only a high school biology teacher paid to play that role. His power came from being perceived as a representative of an authority system. (In Milgram's Bridgeport replication described earlier, the absence of the prestigious institutional setting of Yale reduced the obedience rate to 47.5 percent compared to 65 percent at Yale, although this drop was not a statistically significant one.) Several later studies showed how powerful the obedience effect can be when legitimate authorities exercise their power within their power domains.

When a college professor was the authority figure telling college student volunteers that their task was to train a puppy by conditioning its behavior using electric shocks, he elicited 75 percent obedience from them. In this experiment, both the "experimenter-teacher" and the "learner" were "authentic." That is, college students acted as the teacher, attempting to condition a cuddly little puppy,

the learner, in an electrified apparatus. The puppy was supposed to learn a task, and shocks were given when it failed to respond correctly in a given time interval. As in Milgram's experiments, they had to deliver a series of thirty graded shocks, up to 450 volts in the training process. Each of the thirteen male and thirteen female subjects individually saw and heard the puppy squealing and jumping around the electrified grid as they pressed lever after lever. There was no doubt that they were hurting the puppy with each shock they administered. (Although the shock intensities were much lower than indicated by the voltage labels appearing on the shock box, they were still powerful enough to evoke clearly distressed reactions from the puppy with each successive press of the shock switches.)

As you might imagine, the students were clearly upset during the experiment. Some of the females cried, and the male students also expressed a lot of distress. Did they refuse to continue once they could see the suffering they were causing right before their eyes? For all too many, their personal distress did not lead to behavioral disobedience. About half of the males (54 percent) went all the way to 450 volts. The big surprise came from the women's high level of obedience. Despite their dissent and weeping, 100 percent of the female college students obeyed to the full extent possible in shocking the puppy as it tried to solve an insoluble task! A similar result was found in an unpublished study with adolescent high school girls. (The typical finding with human "victims," including Milgram's own findings, is that there are no male-female gender differences in obedience.²⁵)

Some critics of the obedience experiments tried to invalidate Milgram's findings by arguing that subjects quickly discover that the shocks are fake, and that is why they continue to give them to the very end.²⁶ This study, conducted back in 1972 (by psychologists Charles Sheridan and Richard King), removes any doubt that Milgram's high obedience rates could have resulted from subjects' disbelief that they were actually hurting the learner-victim. Sheridan and King showed that there was an obvious visual connection between a subject's obedience reactions and a puppy's pain. Of further interest is the finding that half of the males who disobeyed lied to their teacher in reporting that the puppy had learned the insoluble task, a deceptive form of disobedience. When students in a comparable college class were asked to predict how far an average woman would go on this task, they estimated 0 percent—a far cry from 100 percent. (However, this faulty low estimate is reminiscent of the 1 percent figure given by the psychiatrists who assessed the Milgram paradigm.) Again this underscores one of my central arguments, that it is difficult for people to appreciate fully the power of situational forces acting on individual behavior when they are viewed outside the behavioral context.

Physicians' Power over Nurses to Mistreat Patients

If the relationship between teachers and students is one of power-based authority, how much more so is that between physicians and nurses? How difficult is it, then, for a nurse to disobey an order from the powerful authority of the doctor—when she knows it is wrong? To find out, a team of doctors and nurses tested obedience in their authority system by determining whether nurses would follow or disobey an illegitimate request by an unknown physician in a real hospital setting.²⁷

Each of twenty-two nurses individually received a call from a staff doctor whom she had never met. He told her to administer a medication to a patient immediately, so that it would take effect by the time he arrived at the hospital. He would sign the drug order then. He ordered her to give his patient 20 milligrams of the drug "Astrogen." The label on the container of Astrogen indicated that 5 milliliters was usual and warned that 10 milliliters was the maximum dose. His order doubled that high dose.

The conflict created in the minds of each of these caregivers was whether to follow this order from an unfamiliar phone caller to administer an excessive dose of medicine or follow standard medical practice, which rejects such unauthorized orders. When this dilemma was presented as a hypothetical scenario to a dozen nurses in that hospital, ten said they would refuse to obey. However, when other nurses were put on the hot seat where they were faced with the physician's imminent arrival (and possible anger at being disobeyed), the nurses almost unanimously caved in and complied. All but one of twenty-two nurses put to the real test started to pour the medication (actually a placebo) to administer to the patient—before the researcher stopped them from doing so. That solitary disobedient nurse should have been given a raise and a hero's medal.

This dramatic effect is far from isolated. Equally high levels of blind obedience to doctors' almighty authority showed up in a recent survey of a large sample of registered nurses. Nearly half (46 percent) of the nurses reported that they could recall a time when they had in fact "carried out a physician's order that you felt could have had harmful consequences to the patient." These compliant nurses attributed less responsibility to themselves than they did to the physician when they followed an inappropriate command. In addition, they indicated that the primary basis of social power of physicians is their "legitimate power," the right to provide overall care to the patient.²⁸ They were just following what they construed as legitimate orders—but then the patient died. Thousands of hospitalized patients die needlessly each year due to a variety of staff mistakes, some of which, I assume, include such unquestioning obedience of nurses and tech aides to physicians' wrong orders.

Deadly Obedience to Authority

This potential for authority figures to exercise power over subordinates can have disastrous consequences in many domains of life. One such example is found in the dynamics of obedience in commercial airline cockpits, which have been shown to lead to many airline accidents. In a typical commercial airline cockpit, the captain is the central authority over a first officer and sometimes a flight engineer, and the might of that authority is enforced by organizational norms, the military background of most pilots, and flight rules that make the pilot directly responsible for operating the aircraft. Such authority can lead to flight errors when the crew feels forced to accept the "authority's definition of the situation," even when the authority is wrong.

An investigation of thirty-seven serious plane accidents where there were sufficient data from voice recorders revealed that in 81 percent of these cases, the first officer did not properly monitor or challenge the captain when he had made errors. Using a larger sample of seventy-five plane accidents as the context for evaluating destructive obedience, the author of this study concludes, "If we assume that both monitoring and challenging errors are due to excessive obedience, we may conclude that excessive obedience may cause as many as 25% of all airplane accidents."²⁹

Administrative Obedience to Authority

In modern society people in positions of authority rarely punish others with physical violence as in the Milgram paradigm. What is more typical is, *mediated violence*, where authorities pass along orders to underlings who carry them out or the violence involves verbal abuse that undercuts the self-esteem and dignity of the powerless. Authorities often take actions that are punitive and whose consequences are not directly observable. For example, giving hostile feedback to someone that knowingly will disrupt their performance and adversely affect their chances of getting a job qualifies as a form of such socially mediated violence.

A team of Dutch researchers assessed the extension of authority-based obedience to such a situation in a series of ingenious experiments involving twenty-five separate studies of nearly 500 participants from 1982 to 1985 at Utrecht University in the Netherlands.³⁰ In their "administrative obedience paradigm" the experimenter told the research participant, acting as administrator, to make a series of fifteen "stress remarks" to a job applicant (a trained accomplice) in the next room. Specifically, the subjects were instructed to administer a job selection test to the applicant—if he passed the test, he would get the job; if he failed, he would remain unemployed.

They were also instructed to disturb and stress the applicant while giving him the test. These fifteen graded remarks were critical of his test performance and also denigrated his personality, such as "That was really stupid of you." As the participant-administrators delivered these ever-more-hostile remarks, they

"placed the applicant under such intense psychological strain that he did not perform satisfactorily and consequently failed to get the job." In addition, they were told by the researchers to continue despite any protests from the applicant. Any dissent by the participant-administrators was countered with up to four prods by the experimenter to continue the hostile remarks before they were finally permitted to stop if they were adamant. Finally, and most significantly, the subjects were informed that the ability to work under stress was *not* an essential job requirement, but the procedure had to be followed because it assisted the experimenter's research project, which was studying how stress affects test performance. Causing distress and hurting another person's job chances had no further use than the researcher's collection of some data. In the control condition, subjects could stop making the stress remarks at any point they chose.

When asked to predict whether they would make all the stress remarks under these circumstances, more than 90 percent of a separate set of comparable Dutch respondents said they would not comply. Again, the "outsider's view" was way off base: fully 91 percent of the subjects obeyed the authoritative experiment to the very end of the line. This same degree of extreme obedience held up even when personnel officers were used as the subjects despite their professional code of ethics for dealing with clients. Similarly high obedience was found when subjects were sent advance information several weeks before their appearance at the laboratory so that they had time to reflect on the nature of their potentially hostile role.

How might we generate *disobedience* in this setting? You can choose among several options: Have several peers rebel before the subject's turn, as in Milgram's study. Or notify the subject of his or her legal liability if the applicant-victim were harmed and sued the university. Or eliminate the authority pressure to go all the way, as in the control condition of this research—where no one fully obeyed.

Sexual Obedience to Authority: The Strip-Search Scam

"Strip-search scams" have been perpetrated in a number of fast-food restaurant chains throughout the United States. This phenomenon demonstrates the pervasiveness of obedience to an anonymous but seemingly important authority. The modus operandi is for an assistant store manager to be called to the phone by a male caller who identifies himself as a police officer named, say, "Scott." He needs their urgent help with a case of employee theft at that restaurant. He insists on being called "Sir" in their conversation. Earlier he has gotten relevant inside information about store procedures and local details. He also knows how to solicit the information he wants through skillfully guided questions, as stage magicians and "mind readers" do. He is a good con man.

Ultimately Officer "Scott" solicits from the assistant manager the name of the attractive young new employee who, he says, has been stealing from the shop and is believed to have contraband on her now. He wants her to be isolated in the rear room and held until he or his men can pick her up. The employee is detained there

and is given the option by the "Sir, Officer," who talks to her on the phone, of either being strip-searched then and there by a fellow employee or brought down to headquarters to be strip-searched there by the police. Invariably, she elects to be searched now since she knows she is innocent and has nothing to hide. The caller then instructs the assistant manager to strip search her; her anus and vagina are searched for stolen money or drugs. All the while the caller insists on being told in graphic detail what is happening, and all the while the video surveillance cameras are recording these remarkable events as they unfold. But this is only the beginning of a nightmare for the innocent young employee and a sexual and power turn-on for the caller-voyeur.

In a case in which I was an expert witness, this basic scenario then included having the frightened eighteen-year-old high school senior engage in a series of increasingly embarrassing and sexually degrading activities. The naked woman is told to jump up and down and to dance around. The assistant manager is told by the caller to get some older male employee to help confine the victim so she can go back to her duties in the restaurant. The scene degenerates into the caller insisting that the woman masturbate herself and have oral sex with the older male, who is supposedly containing her in the back room while the police are slowly wending their way to the restaurant. These sexual activities continue for several hours while they wait for the police to arrive, which of course never happens.

This bizarre authority influence in absentia seduces many people in that situation to violate store policy, and presumably their own ethical and moral principles, to sexually molest and humiliate an honest, churchgoing young employee. In the end, the store personnel are fired, some are charged with crimes, the store is sued, the victims are seriously distressed, and the perpetrator in this and similar hoaxes—a former corrections officer—is finally caught and convicted.

One reasonable reaction to learning about this hoax is to focus on the dispositions of the victim and her assailants, as naive, ignorant, gullible, weird individuals. However, when we learn that this scam has been carried out successfully in sixty-eight similar fast-food settings in thirty-two different states, in a half-dozen different restaurant chains, and with assistant managers of many restaurants around the country being conned, with both male and female victims, our analysis must shift away from simply blaming the victims to recognizing the power of situational forces involved in this scenario. So let us not underestimate the power of "authority" to generate obedience to an extent and of a kind that is hard to fathom.

Donna Summers, assistant manager at McDonald's in Mount Washington, Kentucky, fired for being deceived into participating in this authority phone hoax, expresses one of the main themes in our *Lucifer Effect* narrative about situational power. "You look back on it, and you say, I wouldn't a done it. But unless you're put in that situation, at that time, how do you know what you would do. You don't."³¹

In her book *Making Fast Food: From the Frying Pan into the Fryer*, the Canadian

sociologist Ester Reiter concludes that obedience to authority is the most valued trait in fast-food workers. "The assembly-line process very deliberately tries to take away any thought or discretion from workers. They are appendages to the machine," she said in a recent interview. Retired FBI special agent Dan Jablonski, a private detective who investigated some of these hoaxes, said, "You and I can sit here and judge these people and say they were blooming idiots. But they aren't trained to use common sense. They are trained to say and think, 'Can I help you?' "³²

THE NAZI CONNECTION: COULD IT HAPPEN IN YOUR TOWN?

Recall that one of Milgram's motivations for initiating his research project was to understand how so many "good" German citizens could become involved in the brutal murder of millions of Jews. Rather than search for dispositional tendencies in the German national character to account for the evil of this genocide, he believed that features of the situation played a critical role; that obedience to authority was a "toxic trigger" for wanton murder. After completing his research, Milgram extended his scientific conclusions to a very dramatic prediction about the insidious and pervasive power of obedience to transform ordinary American citizens into Nazi death camp personnel: "If a system of death camps were set up in the United States of the sort we had seen in Nazi Germany, one would be able to find sufficient personnel for those camps in any medium-sized American town."³³

Let us briefly consider this frightening prediction in light of five very different but fascinating inquiries into this Nazi connection with ordinary people willingly recruited to act against a declared "enemy of the state." The first two are classroom demonstrations by creative teachers with high school and grade school children. The third is by a former graduate student of mine who determined that American college students would indeed endorse the "final solution" if an authority figure provided sufficient justification for doing so. The last two directly studied Nazi SS and German policemen.

Creating Nazis in an American Classroom

Students in a Palo Alto, California, high school world history class were, like many of us, not able to comprehend the inhumanity of the Holocaust. How could such a racist and deadly social-political movement have thrived, and how could the average citizen have been ignorant of or indifferent to the suffering it imposed on fellow Jewish citizens? Their inventive teacher, Ron Jones, decided to modify his medium in order to make the message meaningful to these disbelievers. To do so, he switched from the usual didactic teaching method to an experiential learning mode.

He began by telling the class that they would simulate some aspects of the German experience in the coming week. Despite this forewarning, the role-playing "experiment" that took place over the next five days was a serious matter

for the students and a shock for the teacher, not to mention the principal and the students' parents. Simulation and reality merged as these students created a totalitarian system of beliefs and coercive control that was all too much like that fashioned by Hitler's Nazi regime.¹⁴

First, Jones established new rigid classroom rules that had to be obeyed without question. All answers must be limited to three words or less and preceded by "Sir," as the student stood erect beside his or her desk. When no one challenged this and other arbitrary rules, the classroom atmosphere began to change. The more verbally fluent, intelligent students lost their positions of prominence as the less verbal, more physically assertive ones took over. The classroom movement was named "The Third Wave." A cupped-hand salute was introduced along with slogans that had to be shouted in unison on command. Each day there was a new powerful slogan: "Strength through discipline"; "Strength through community"; "Strength through action"; and "Strength through pride." There would be one more reserved for later on. Secret handshakes identified insiders, and critics had to be reported for "treason." Actions followed the slogans—making banners that were hung about the school, enlisting new members, teaching other students mandatory sitting postures, and so forth.

The original core of twenty history students soon swelled to more than a hundred eager new Third Wavers. The students then took over the assignment, making it their own. They issued special membership cards. Some of the brightest students were ordered out of class. The new authoritarian in-group was delighted and abused their former classmates as they were taken away.

Jones then confided to his followers that they were part of a nationwide movement to discover students who were willing to fight for political change. They were "a select group of young people chosen to help in this cause," he told them. A rally was scheduled for the next day at which a national presidential candidate was supposed to announce on TV the formation of a new Third Wave Youth program. More than two hundred students filled the auditorium at Cubberly High School in eager anticipation of this announcement. Exhilarated Wave members wearing white-shirted uniforms with homemade armbands posted banners around the hall. While muscular students stood guard at the door, friends of the teacher posing as reporters and photographers circulated among the mass of "true believers." The TV was turned on, and everyone waited—and waited—for the big announcement of their next collective goose steps forward. They shouted. "Strength through discipline!"

Instead, the teacher projected a film of the Nuremberg rally; the history of the Third Reich appeared in ghostly images. "Everyone must accept the blame—no one can claim that they didn't in some way take part." That was the final frame of the film and the end of the simulation. Jones explained the reason to all the assembled students for this simulation, which had gone way beyond his initial intention. He told them that the new slogan for them should be "Strength through

understanding." Jones went on to conclude, "You have been manipulated. Shoved by your own desires into the place you now find yourselves."

Ron Jones got into trouble with the administration because the parents of the rejected classmates complained about their children being harassed and threatened by the new regime. Nevertheless, he concluded that many of these youngsters had learned a vital lesson by personally experiencing the ease with which their behavior could be so radically transformed by obeying a powerful authority within the context of a fascistlike setting. In his later essay about the "experiment," Jones noted that "In the four years I taught at Cubberly High School, no one ever admitted to attending the Third Wave rally. It was something we all wanted to forget." (After leaving the school a few years later, Jones began working with special education students in San Francisco. A powerful docudrama of this simulated Nazi experience, titled "The Wave," captured some of this transformation of good kids into pseudo Hitler Youth.³⁵)

Creating Little Elementary School Beasties: Brown Eyes Versus Blue Eyes

The power of authorities is demonstrated not only in the extent to which they can command obedience from followers, but also in the extent to which they can define reality and alter habitual ways of thinking and acting. Case in point: Jane Elliott, a popular third-grade schoolteacher in the small rural town of Riceville, Iowa. Her challenge: how to teach white children from a small farm town with few minorities about the meaning of "brotherhood" and "tolerance." She decided to have them experience personally what it feels like to be an underdog and also the top dog, either the victim or the perpetrator of prejudice.³⁶

This teacher arbitrarily designated one part of her class as superior to the other part, which was inferior—based only on their eye color. She began by informing her students that people with blue eyes were superior to those with brown eyes and gave a variety of supporting "evidence" to illustrate this truth, such as George Washington's having blue eyes and, closer to home, a student's father (who, the student had complained, had hit him) having brown eyes.

Starting immediately, said Ms. Elliott, the children with blue eyes would be the special "superior" ones and the brown-eyed ones would be the "inferior" group. The allegedly more intelligent blue-eyes were given special privileges, while the inferior brown-eyes had to obey rules that enforced their second-class status, including wearing a collar that enabled others to recognize their lowly status from a distance.

The previously friendly blue-eyed kids refused to play with the bad "brown-eyes," and they suggested that school officials should be notified that the brown-eyes might steal things. Soon fistfights erupted during recess, and one boy admitted hitting another "in the gut" because, "He called me brown-eyes, like being a black person, like a Negro." Within one day, the brown-eyed children began to do more poorly in their schoolwork and became depressed, sullen, and angry. They described themselves as "sad," "bad," "stupid," and "mean."

The next day was turnabout time. Mrs. Elliott told the class that she had been wrong—it was really the brown-eyed children who were superior and the blue-eyed ones who were inferior, and she provided specious new evidence to support this chromatic theory of good and evil. The blue-eyes now switched from their previously "happy," "good," "sweet," and "nice" self-labels to derogatory labels similar to those adopted the day before by the brown-eyes. Old friendship patterns between children temporarily dissolved and were replaced by hostility until this experiential project was ended and the children were carefully and fully debriefed and returned to their joy-filled classroom.

The teacher was amazed at the swift and total transformation of so many of her students whom she thought she knew so well. Mrs. Elliott concluded. "What had been marvelously cooperative, thoughtful children became nasty, vicious, discriminating little third-graders. . . . It was ghastly!"

Endorsing the Final Solution in Hawaii: Ridding the World of Misfits

Imagine that you are a college student at the University of Hawaii (Manoa campus) among 570 other students in any of several large evening school psychology classes. Tonight your teacher, with his Danish accent, alters his usual lecture to reveal a threat to national security being created by the population explosion (a hot topic in the early 1970s).¹⁷ This authority describes the emerging threat to society posed by the rapidly increasing number of people who are physically and mentally unfit. The problem is convincingly presented as a high-minded scientific project, endorsed by scientists and planned for the benefit of humanity. You are then invited to help in "the application of scientific procedures to eliminate the mentally and emotionally unfit." The teacher further justifies the need to take action with an analogy to capital punishment as a deterrent against violent crime. He tells you that your opinions are being solicited because you and the others assembled here are intelligent and well educated and have high ethical values. It is flattering to think that you are in this select company. (Recall the lure of C. S. Lewis's "Inner Ring.") In case there might be any lingering misgivings, he provides assurances that much careful research would be carried out before action of any kind would be taken with these misfit human creatures.

At this point, he wants only your opinions, recommendations, and personal views on a simple survey to be completed now by you and the rest of the students in the auditorium. You begin answering the questions because you have been persuaded that this is a new vital issue about which your voice matters. You diligently answer each of the seven questions and discover that there is a lot of uniformity between your answers and those of the rest of the group.

Ninety percent of you agree that there will always be some people more fit for survival than others.

Regarding killing of the unfit: 79 percent wanted one person to be responsible for the killing and another to carry out the act; 64 percent preferred anonymity for those who pressed the button with only one button causing death

though many were pressed; 89 percent judged that painless drugs would be the most efficient and humane method of inducing death.

If required by law to assist, 89 percent wanted to be the one who assisted in the decisions, while 9 percent preferred to assist with the killings or both. Only 6 percent of the students *refused* to answer.

Most incredibly, fully 91 percent of all student respondents agreed with the conclusion that "under extreme circumstances it is entirely just to eliminate those judged most dangerous to the general welfare"!

Finally, a surprising 29 percent supported this "final solution" even if it had to be applied to their own families!"³⁸

So these American college students (night school students and thus older than usual) were willing to endorse a deadly plan to kill off all others who were judged by some authorities to be less fit to live than they were—after only a brief presentation by their teacher-authority. Now we can see how ordinary, even intelligent Germans could readily endorse Hitler's "Final Solution" against the Jews, which was reinforced in many ways by their educational system and strengthened by systematic government propaganda.

Ordinary Men Indoctrinated into Extraordinary Killing

One of the clearest illustrations of my exploration of how ordinary people can be made to engage in evil deeds that are alien to their past history and moral values comes from a remarkable discovery by the historian Christopher Browning. He recounts that in March 1942 about 80 percent of all victims of the Holocaust were still alive, but a mere eleven months later about 80 percent were dead. In this short period of time, the *Endlösung* (Hitler's "Final Solution") was energized by means of an intense wave of mobile mass murder squads in Poland. This genocide required mobilization of a large-scale killing machine at the same time that able-bodied German soldiers were needed on the collapsing Russian front. Because most Polish Jews lived in small towns and not large cities, the question that Browning raised about the German high command was "where had they found the manpower during this pivotal year of the war for such an astounding logistical achievement in mass murder?"³⁹

His answer came from archives of Nazi war crimes, which recorded the activities of Reserve Battalion 101, a unit of about five hundred men from Hamburg, Germany. They were elderly family men, too old to be drafted into the Army; they came from working-class and lower-middle-class backgrounds, and they had no military police experience. They were raw recruits sent to Poland without warning of, or any training in, their secret mission—the total extermination of all Jews living in the remote villages of Poland. In just four months they shot to death at point-blank range at least 38,000 Jews and had another 45,000 deported to the concentration camp at Treblinka.

Initially, their commander told them that this was a difficult mission that must be obeyed by the battalion. However, he added that any individual could

refuse to execute these men, women, and children. The records indicate that at first about half the men refused and let the other police reservists engage in the mass murder. But over time, social modeling processes took over, as did guilt-induced persuasion by those reservists who had been doing the shooting, along with the usual group conformity pressures of "how would they be seen in the eyes of their comrades." By the end of their deadly journey, up to 90 percent of the men in Battalion 101 were blindly obedient to their battalion leader and were personally involved in the shootings. Many of them posed proudly for photographs of their up-close and personal killing of Jews. Like those who took photos of the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib Prison, these policemen posed in their "trophy photos" as proud destroyers of the Jewish menace.

Browning makes it clear that there was no special selection of these men, nor self-selection, nor self-interest or careerism that could account for these mass murders. Instead, they were as "ordinary" as can be imagined—until they were put into a novel situation in which they had "official" permission and encouragement to act sadistically against people who were arbitrarily labeled as the "enemy." What is most evident in Browning's penetrating analysis of these daily acts of human evil is that these ordinary men were part of a powerful authority system, a political police state with ideological justifications for destroying Jews and intense indoctrination of the moral imperatives of discipline and loyalty and duty to the state.

Interestingly, for the argument that I have been making that experimental research can have real-world relevance, Browning compared the underlying mechanisms operating in that far-off land at that distant time to the psychological processes at work in both the Milgram obedience studies and our Stanford Prison Experiment. The author goes on to note, "Zimbardo's spectrum of guard behavior bears an uncanny resemblance to the groupings that emerged within Reserve Police Battalion 101" (p. 168). He shows how some became sadistically "cruel and tough," enjoying the killing, whereas others were "tough, but fair" in "playing the rules," and a minority qualified as "good guards" who refused to kill and did small favors for the Jews.

The psychologist Ervin Staub (who as a child survived the Nazi occupation of Hungary in a "protected house") concurs that most people under particular circumstances have a capacity for extreme violence and destruction of human life. From his attempt to understand the roots of evil in genocide and mass violence around the world, Staub has come to believe that "Evil that arises out of ordinary thinking and is committed by ordinary people is the norm, not the exception.... Great evil arises out of ordinary psychological processes that evolve, usually with a progression along the continuum of destruction." He highlights the significance of ordinary people being caught up in situations where they can learn to practice evil acts that are demanded by higher-level authority systems: "Being part of a system shapes views, rewards adherence to dominant views, and makes deviation psychologically demanding and difficult."⁴⁰

Having lived through the horrors of Auschwitz, John Steiner (my dear friend and sociologist colleague) returned for decades to Germany to interview hundreds of former Nazi SS men, from privates to generals. He needed to know what had made these men embrace such unspeakable evil day in and day out. Steiner found that many of these men were high on the F-Scale measure of authoritarianism, which attracted them to the subculture of violence in the SS. He refers to them as "sleepers," people with certain traits that are latent and may never be expressed except when particular situations activate these violent tendencies. He concludes that "the situation tended to be the most immediate determinant of SS behavior," rousing "sleepers" into active killers. However, from his massive interview data Steiner also found that these men had led normal—violence-free—lives both before and after their violent years in the concentration camp setting.⁴¹

Steiner's extensive experience with many of the SS men at a personal and scholarly level led him to advance two important conclusions about institutional power and the role enactment of brutality: "Institutional support for roles of violence has apparently far more extensive effects than generally realized. When implicit, and especially explicit, social sanctions support such roles, people tend to be attracted to them who may not only derive satisfaction from the nature of their work but are quasiexecutioners in feeling as well as action."

Steiner goes on to describe how roles can trump character traits: "[It] has become evident that not everyone playing a brutal role has to have sadistic traits of character. Those who continued in roles originally not conducive to their personality often changed their values (i.e., had a tendency to adjust to what was expected of them in these roles). There were SS members who clearly identified with and enjoyed their positions. Finally there were those who were repulsed and sickened by what they were ordered to do. They tried to compensate by helping inmates whenever possible. (This writer's life was saved by SS personnel on several occasions.)"

It is important to acknowledge that the many hundreds of thousands of Germans who became perpetrators of evil during the Holocaust were not doing so simply because they were following the orders given by authorities. Obedience to an authority system that gave permission and reward for murdering Jews was built on a scaffold of intense anti-Semitism that existed in Germany and other European nations at that time. This prejudice was given direction and resolve by the German chain of command to ordinary Germans, who became "Hitler's willing executioners," in the analysis by the historian Daniel Goldhagen.⁴²

Although it is important to note the motivating role of Germans' hatred of Jews, Goldhagen's analysis suffers from two flaws. First, historical evidence shows that from the early nineteenth century on there was less anti-Semitism in Germany than in neighboring countries such as France and Poland. He also errs in minimizing the influence of Hitler's authority system—a network that glorified racial fanaticism and the particular situations created by the authorities, like the concentration camps, which mechanized genocide. It was the interaction of per-

sonal variables of German citizens with situational opportunities provided by a System of fanatical prejudice that combined to empower so many to become willing or unwilling executioners for their state.

THE BANALITY OF EVIL

In 1963, the social philosopher Hannah Arendt published what was to become a classic of our times, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*. She provides a detailed analysis of the war crimes trial of Adolf Eichmann, the Nazi figure who personally arranged for the murder of millions of Jews. Eichmann's defense of his actions was similar to the testimony of other Nazi leaders: "I was only following orders." As Arendt put it, "[Eichmann] remembered perfectly well that he would have had a bad conscience only if he had not done what he had been ordered to do—to ship millions of men, women, and children to their death with great zeal and the most meticulous care" (p. 25).⁴³

However, what is most striking in Arendt's account of Eichmann is all the ways in which he seemed absolutely ordinary:

Half a dozen psychiatrists had certified him as "normal"—"More normal, at any rate, than I am after having examined him," one of them was said to have exclaimed, while another had found that his whole psychological outlook, his attitude toward his wife and children, mother and father, brothers, sisters, and friends, was "not only normal but most desirable" (pp. 25-26).

Through her analysis of Eichmann, Arendt reached her famous conclusion:

The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal. From the viewpoint of our legal institutions and our moral standards of judgment, this normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together, for it implied . . . that this new type of criminal . . . commits his crimes under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or feel that he is doing wrong (p. 276).

It was as though in those last minutes [of Eichmann's life] he was summing up the lesson that this long course in human wickedness had taught us—the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil (p. 252).

Arendt's phrase "the banality of evil" continues to resonate because genocide has been unleashed around the world and torture and terrorism continue to be common features of our global landscape. We prefer to distance ourselves from such a fundamental truth, seeing the madness of evildoers and senseless violence of tyrants as dispositional characters within their personal makeup. Arendt's

analysis was the first to deny this orientation by observing the fluidity with which social forces can prompt normal people to perform horrific acts.

Torturers and Executioners: Pathological Types or Situational Imperatives?

There is little doubt that the systematic torture by men of their fellow men and women represents one of the darkest sides of human nature. Surely, my colleagues and I reasoned, here was a place where dispositional evil would be manifest among torturers who did their daily dirty deeds for years in Brazil as policemen sanctioned by the government to get confessions by torturing "subversive" enemies of the state.

We began by focusing on the torturers, trying to understand both their psyches and the ways they were shaped by their circumstances, but we had to expand our analytical net to capture their comrades in arms who chose or were assigned to another branch of violence work: death squad executioners. They shared a "common enemy": men, women, and children who, though citizens of their state, even neighbors, were declared by "the System" to be threats to the country's national security—as socialists and Communists. Some had to be eliminated efficiently, while others, who might hold secret information, had to be made to yield it up by torture, confess to their treason, and then be killed.

In carrying out this mission, these torturers could rely in part on the "creative evil" embodied in torture devices and techniques that had been refined over centuries since the Inquisition by officials of the Catholic Church and later of many nation-states. However, they had to add a measure of improvisation when dealing with particular enemies to overcome their resistance and resiliency. Some of them claimed innocence, refused to acknowledge their culpability, or were tough enough not to be intimidated by most coercive interrogation tactics, it took time and emerging insights into human weaknesses for these torturers to become adept at their craft. By contrast, the task of the death squads was easy. With hoods for anonymity, guns, and group support, they could dispatch their duty to country swiftly and impersonally: "just business." For a torturer, the work could never be just business. Torture always involves a personal relationship: it is essential for the torturer to understand what kind of torture to employ, what intensity of torture to use on a certain person at a certain time. Wrong kind or too little—no confession. Too much—the victim dies before confessing. In either case, the torturer fails to deliver the goods and incurs the wrath of the senior officers. Learning to determine the right kind and degree of torture that yields up the desired information elicits abounding rewards and flowing praise from one's superiors.

What kind of men could do such deeds? Did they need to rely on sadistic impulses and a history of sociopathic life experiences to rip and tear the flesh of fellow beings day in and day out for years on end? Were these violence workers a breed apart from the rest of humanity, bad seeds, bad tree trunks, and bad flowers? Or is it conceivable that they could be ordinary people, programmed to carry out their deplorable acts by means of some identifiable and replicable training

programs? Could we identify a set of external conditions, situational variables, that had contributed to the making of these torturers and killers? If their evil actions were not traceable to inner defects but rather attributable to outer forces acting on them—the political, economic, social, historical, and experiential components of their police training—we might be able to generalize across cultures and settings and discover some of the operative principles responsible for this remarkable human transformation.

The sociologist and Brazil expert Martha Huggins, the Greek psychologist and torture expert Mika Haritos-Fatouros, and I interviewed several dozen of these violence workers in depth at various venues in Brazil. (For a summary of our methods and detailed findings about these violence workers, see Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo⁴⁴). Mika had done a similar, earlier study of torturers trained by the Greek military junta, and our results were largely congruent with hers.⁴⁵ We found that sadists are selected out of the training process by trainers because they are not controllable, get off on the pleasure of inflicting pain, and thus do not sustain the focus on the goal of extraction of confessions. Thus, from all the evidence we could muster, torturers and death squad executioners were not unusual or deviant in any way prior to practicing their new roles, nor were there any persisting deviant tendencies or pathologies among any of them in the years following their work as torturers and executioners. Their transformation was entirely explainable as being the consequence of a number of situational and systemic factors, such as the training they were given to play this new role; their group camaraderie; acceptance of the national security ideology; and their learned belief in socialists and Communists as enemies of their state. Other situational influences contributing to the new behavioral style included being made to feel special, above and better than their peers in public service by being awarded this special assignment; the secrecy of their duties being shared only with comrades in arms; and the constant pressure to produce results regardless of fatigue or personal problems.

We reported many detailed case studies that document the ordinariness of the men engaged in these most heinous of acts, sanctioned by their government, and secretly supported by the CIA at that point in the Cold War (1964-1985) against Soviet communism. The account *Torture in Brazil*, by members of the Catholic Archdiocese of São Paulo, provides detailed information of the extensive involvement of CIA agents in the torture training of Brazilian police.⁴⁶ Such information is consistent with all that is known of the systematic instruction in interrogation and torture offered at the "School of the Americas" to operatives from countries sharing a common enemy in communism.⁴⁷

However, my colleagues and I believe that such deeds are reproducible at any time in any nation when there is an obsession with threats to national security. Before the fears and excesses engendered by the recent "war against terrorism," there was the nearly perpetual "war against crime" in many urban centers. In

New York City's police department, that "war" spawned "the commandos of the NYPD." This insular police team was given free rein to hunt down alleged rapists, robbers, and muggers as local conditions dictated. They wore T-shirts with their motto, "There is no hunting like the hunting of men." Their battle cry was "We own the night." Such a professionalized police culture was comparable to that of the Brazilian police-torturers we had studied. One of their notable atrocities was the murder of an African immigrant (Amadou Diallo, from Guinea), gunning him down with more than forty bullets while he tried to pull out his wallet to give them his ID.⁴⁸ Sometimes "bad shit happens," but usually there are identifiable situational and systemic forces operating to make it happen.

Suicide Bombers: Mindless Fanatics or Mindful Martyrs?

Amazingly, what holds true for these violence workers is comparable to the transformation of young Palestinians from students into suicide bombers intent on killing innocent Israeli civilians. Recent media accounts converge on the findings from more systematic analyses of the process of becoming a suicidal killer.⁴⁹

Who adopts this fatalistic role? Is it poor, desperate, socially isolated, illiterate young people with no career and no future? Not at all. According to the results of a recent study of four hundred al-Qaeda members, three quarters of that sample came from the upper or middle class. This study by the forensic psychiatrist Marc Sageman also found other evidence of the normality and even superiority of these youths turned suicide bombers. The majority, 90 percent, came from caring, intact families. Two thirds had gone to college; two thirds were married; and most had children and jobs in science and engineering. "These are the best and brightest of their society in many ways," Sageman concludes.⁵⁰

Anger, revenge, and outrage at perceived injustice are the motivational triggers for deciding to die for the cause. "People desire death when two fundamental needs are frustrated to the point of extinction," according to the psychologist Thomas Joiner in his treatise *Why People Die by Suicide*. The first need is one we have pointed to as central to conformity and social power, the need to belong with or connect to others. The second need is the need to feel effective with or to influence others.⁵¹

Ariel Merari, an Israeli psychologist who has studied this phenomenon extensively for many years, outlines the common steps on the path to these explosive deaths.⁵² First, senior members of an extremist group identify young people who appear to have an intense patriotic fervor based on their declarations at a public rally against Israel or their support of some Islamic cause or Palestinian action. Next, they are invited to discuss how seriously they love their country and hate Israel. They are asked to commit to being trained. Those who do commit become part of a small secret cell of three to five youths. They learn the tricks of the trade from their elders: bomb making, disguise, and selecting and timing targets.

Finally, they make public their private commitment by making a videotape,

declaring themselves to be "the living martyr" for Islam (*"al-shahid-al-hai"*). In one hand they hold the Koran, in the other a rifle; the insignia on their headband declares their new status. This video binds them to the final deed, because it is sent to their families. The recruits are also told the Big Lie that not only will they earn a place beside Allah, but their relatives will also be entitled to a high place in Heaven because of their martyrdom. The suicidal pie is sweetened with a sizable financial incentive, or a monthly pension, that goes to their family.

Their photo is emblazoned on posters that will be put on walls everywhere in the community the moment they succeed in their mission—to become inspirational models for the next round of suicide bombers. To stifle their concerns about the pain from wounds inflicted by exploding nails and other bomb parts, the recruits are assured that before the first drop of their blood touches the ground they will already be seated at the side of Allah, feeling no pain, only pleasure. The die is cast; their minds have been carefully prepared to do what is ordinarily unthinkable. Of course, the rhetoric of dehumanization serves to deny the humanity and innocence of their victims.

In these systematic ways a host of normal, angry young men and women become transformed into heroes and heroines. Their lethal actions model self-sacrifice and total commitment as true believers to the cause of the oppressed. That message is sent loud and clear to the next cadre of young suicide bombers in waiting.

We can see that this program utilizes a variety of social psychological and motivational principles to assist in turning collective hatred and general frenzy into a dedicated, seriously calculated program of indoctrination and training for individuals to become youthful living martyrs. It is neither mindless nor senseless, only a very different mind-set and with different sensibilities than we have been used to witnessing among young adults in most countries.

For his new film, *Suicide Killers*, the French filmmaker Pierre Rehov interviewed many Palestinians in Israeli jails who were caught before detonating their bombs or had abetted would-be attacks. His conclusion about them resonates with the analyses presented here: "Every single one of them tried to convince me it was the right thing to do for moralistic reasons. These aren't kids who want to do evil. These are kids who want to do good.... The result of this brainwashing was kids who were very good people inside (were) believing so much that they were doing something great."⁵³

The suicide, the murder, of any young person is a gash in the fabric of the human family that we elders from every nation must unite to prevent. To encourage the sacrifice of youth for the sake of advancing the ideologies of the old must be considered a form of evil that transcends local politics and expedient strategies.

"Perfect 9/11 Soldiers" and "Ordinary British Lads" Are Bombing Us

Two final examples of the "ordinariness" of mass murderers are worth mentioning. The first comes from an in-depth study of the 9/11 hijackers, whose suicidal

terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., resulted in the deaths of nearly three thousand innocent civilians. The second comes from the London police reports of suspected suicide bombers of London's Underground and a double-decker bus in June 2005 that resulted in scores of deaths and serious injuries.

The carefully researched portraits of several of the 9/11 terrorists by the reporter Terry McDermott in *Perfect Soldiers* underscores just how ordinary these men were in their everyday lives.⁵⁴ His research led McDermott to an ominous conclusion: "It is likely that there are a great many more men just like them" out there throughout the world. One review of this book takes us back to Arendt's banality-of-evil thesis, updated for our new era of global terrorism. *The New York Times'* reviewer Michiko Kakutani offers us a scary postscript: "Perfect Soldiers replaces the caricatures of outsize 'evil geniuses' and 'wild-eyed fanatics' with portraits of the 9/11 plotters as surprisingly mundane people, people who might easily be our neighbors or airplane seatmates."⁵⁵

That frightening scenario was played out in the subsequent coordinated attacks on London's transit system by a team of suicide bombers, "mundane murderers," who anonymously rode a subway train or a bus. To their friends, relatives, and neighbors in the northern England city of Leeds, these young Muslim men were "ordinary British lads."⁵⁶ Nothing in their past history would mark them as dangerous; indeed, everything about them enabled these "ordinary lads" to fit in seamlessly in their town, at their jobs. One was a skilled cricket player who gave up drinking and women to lead a more devout life. Another was the son of a local businessman who ran a fish-and-chips shop. Another was a counselor who worked effectively with disabled children and had recently become a father and moved his family into a new home. Unlike the 9/11 hijackers, who had raised some suspicions as foreigners seeking flight training in the United States, these young men were homegrown, flying well below any police radar. "It's completely out of character for him. Someone must have brainwashed him and made him do it," reflected a friend of one of them.

"The most terrifying thing about suicide bombers is their sheer normality," concludes Andrew Silke, an expert on the subject.⁵⁷ He notes that in all the forensic examinations of the bodies of dead suicide bombers there have never been traces of alcohol or drugs. Their mission is undertaken with a clear mind and dedication.

And as we have seen, whenever there has been a student shooting in a school, as in Columbine High School in the United States, those who thought they knew the perpetrators typically report, "He was such a good kid, from a respectable family... you just can't believe he would do it." This harkens back to the point I raised in our first chapter—how well do we really know other people?—and its corollary—how well do we know ourselves to be certain of how we would behave in novel situations under intense situational pressures?

THE ULTIMATE TEST OF BLIND OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: KILLING YOUR CHILDREN ON COMMAND

Our final extension of the social psychology of evil from artificial laboratory experiments to real-world contexts comes to us from the jungles of Guyana, where an American religious leader persuaded more than nine hundred of his followers to commit mass suicide or be killed by their relatives and friends on November 28, 1978. Jim Jones, the pastor of Peoples Temple congregations in San Francisco and Los Angeles, set out to create a socialist utopia in this South American nation, where brotherhood and tolerance would be dominant over the materialism and racism he loathed in the United States. But over time and place Jones was transformed from the caring, spiritual "father" of this large Protestant congregation into an Angel of Death—a truly cosmic transformation of Luciferian proportions. For now I want only to establish the obedience to authority link between Milgram's basement laboratory in New Haven and this jungle-killing field.⁸

The dreams of the many poor members of the Peoples Temple for a new and better life in this alleged utopia were demolished when Jones instituted extended forced labor, armed guards, total restriction of all civil liberties, semistarvation diets, and daily punishments amounting to torture for the slightest breach of any of his many rules. When concerned relatives convinced a congressman to inspect the compound, along with a media crew, Jones arranged for them to be murdered as they were leaving. He then gathered almost all of the members who were at the compound and gave a long speech in which he exhorted them all to take their lives by drinking poison, cyanide-laced Kool-Aid. Those who refused were forced to drink by the guards or shot trying to escape, but it appears as though most obeyed their leader.

Jones was surely an egomaniac; he had all of his speeches and proclamations, and even his torture sessions tape-recorded—including this last-hour suicide drill. In it Jones distorts reality, lies, pleads, makes false analogies, appeals to ideology and to transcendent future lives, and outright insists that they follow his orders, as his staff is efficiently distributing the deadly poison to the more than nine hundred members gathered around him. Some excerpts from that last hour convey a sense of the death-dealing tactics he used to induce total obedience to an authority gone mad:

Please get us some medication. It's simple. It's simple. There's no convulsions with it [of course there are, especially for the children].... Don't be afraid to die. You'll see, there'll be a few people land out here. They'll torture some of our children here. They'll torture our people. They'll torture our seniors. We cannot have this.... Please, can we hasten? Can we hasten with that medication? You don't know what you've done. I tried. . . . Please. For God's sake, let's get on with it. We've lived—we've lived as no

other people lived and loved. We've had as much of this world as you're gonna get. Let's just be done with it. Let's be done with the agony of it. [Applause.]. . . . Who wants to go with their child has a right to go with their child. I think it's humane. I want to go—I want to see you go, though.... It's not to be feared. It is not to be feared. It is a friend. It's a friend... sitting there, show your love for one another. Let's get gone. Let's get gone. Let's get gone. [Children crying.]. . . . Lay down your life with dignity. Don't lay down with tears and agony. There's nothing to death. . . .

it's just stepping over to another plane. Don't be this way. Stop this hysterics. . . . No way for us to die. We must die with some dignity. We must die with some dignity. We will have no choice. Now we have some choice.... Look children, it's just something to put you to rest. Oh, God. [Children crying.]. . . . Mother, Mother, Mother, Mother, Mother, please. Mother, please, please, please. Don't—don't do this. Don't do this. Lay down your life with your child. [The full transcript is available online; see the Notes.³⁹]

And they did, and they died for "Dad." The power of charismatic tyrannical leaders, like Jim Jones and Adolf Hitler, endures even after they do terrible things to their followers, and even after their demise. Whatever little good they may have done earlier somehow comes to dominate the legacy of their evil deeds in the minds of the faithful. Consider the example of a young man, Gary Scott, who followed his father into the Peoples Temple but was expelled for being disobedient. In his statement as he called the National Call-in following the broadcast of the NPR show "Father Cares: The Last of Jonestown," by James Reston, Jr., Gary describes how he was punished for an infraction of the rules. He was beaten, whipped, sexually abused, and forced to endure his worst fear of having a boa constrictor crawling all over him. But, more important, listen to the articulation of his enduring reaction to this torment. Does he hate Jim Jones? Not one bit. He has become a "true believer," a "faithful follower." Even though his father died in Jonestown at that poison fount, and he himself was brutally tortured and humiliated, Gary publically states that he still admires and even loves his "dad"—Jim Jones. Not even George Orwell's omnipotent *1984* Party could honestly claim such a victory.

Now we need to go beyond conformity and authority obedience. Powerful as these are, they are only starters. In the confrontation of potential perpetrators and victims, like guard and prisoner, torturer and sufferer, suicide bomber and civilian victims, there are processes that operate to change the psychological makeup of one or the other. Deindividuation makes the perpetrator anonymous, thereby reducing personal accountability, responsibility, and self-monitoring. This allows perpetrators to act without conscience-inhibiting limits. Dehumanization takes away the humanity of potential victims, rendering them as animallike, or as nothing. We will also inquire about conditions that make bystanders to evil become passive observers and not active intruders, helpers, or whistle-blowing he-

roes. That slice of the evil of inaction is really a cornerstone of evil because it allows perpetrators to believe that others who knew what was going on accepted and approved it even if only by their silence.

A fitting conclusion to our investigation of the social dynamics of conformity and obedience comes from the Harvard psychologist Mahrzarin Banaji:

What social psychology has given to an understanding of human nature is the discovery that forces larger than ourselves determine our mental life and our actions—chief among these forces [is] the power of the social situation.⁶⁰

Investigating Social Dynamics: Deindividuation, Dehumanization, and the Evil of Inaction

The historical account of humans is a heap of conspiracies, rebellions, murders, massacres, revolutions, banishments, the very worst effects that avarice, faction, hypocrisy, perfidiousness, cruelty, rage, madness, hatred, envy, lust, malice, and ambition could produce.... I cannot but conclude the bulk of your natives to be the most pernicious race of little odious vermin that nature ever suffered to crawl upon the surface of the earth.

—Jonathan Swift, *Gulliver's Travels* (1727)¹

Perhaps Jonathan Swift's total condemnation of our human race—of us Yahoos—is a bit extreme, but consider that he wrote this critique several hundred years before the advent of genocides throughout the modern world, before the Holocaust. His views reflect a basic theme in Western literature that "Mankind" has suffered a great fall from its original state of perfection, starting with Adam's act of disobedience against God when he succumbed to Satan's temptation.

The social philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau elaborated this theme of the corrupting influence of social forces by envisioning human beings as "noble, primitive savages" whose virtues were diminished by contact with corrupting society. In stark opposition to this conception of human beings as the innocent victims of an all-powerful, malignant society is the view that people are born evil—genetic bad seeds. Our species is driven by wanton desires, unlimited appetites, and hostile impulses unless people are transformed into rational, reasonable, compassionate human beings by education, religion, and family, or controlled by the discipline imposed upon them by the authority of the State.

Where do you stand in this ages-old debate? Are we born good and then corrupted by an evil society or born evil and redeemed by a good society? Before casting your ballot, consider an alternative perspective. Maybe each of us has the capacity to be a saint or a sinner, altruistic or selfish, gentle or cruel, dominant or submissive, perpetrator or victim, prisoner or guard. Maybe it is our social circumstances that determine which of our many mental templates, our potentials, we develop. Scientists are discovering that embryonic stem cells are capable of becoming virtually any kind of cell or tissue and ordinary skin cells can be turned into embryonic stem cells. It is tempting to expand these biological concepts and

what is now known about the developmental plasticity of the human brain to the "plasticity" of human nature.⁷

What we are is shaped both by the broad systems that govern our lives—wealth and poverty, geography and climate, historical epoch, cultural, political and religious dominance—and by the specific situations we deal with daily. Those forces in turn interact with our basic biology and personality. I have argued earlier that the potential for perversion is inherent in the complexity of the human mind. The impulse toward evil and the impulse toward good together comprise the most fundamental duality in human nature. This conception offers a complex, richer portrait of the pride and puzzles in human actions.

We have examined the power of group conformity and obedience to authority that can dominate and subvert individual initiative. Next, we add insights from research into the domains of deindividuation, dehumanization, and bystander apathy, or the "evil of inaction." This information will complete the foundation for us to fully appreciate how ordinary, good individuals—perhaps even you, gentle reader—can be led at times to do bad things to others, even bad deeds that violate any sense of common decency or morality.

DEINDIVIDUATION: ANONYMITY AND DESTRUCTIVENESS

William Golding's novel *Lord of the Flies* asks how a simple change in one's external appearance can trigger dramatic changes in overt behavior. Good British choirboys are transformed into murderous little beasts by simply painting their faces. When food runs out on their desert island, a group of boys, led by Jack Meridew, try to kill a pig—but they can't complete the act because killing has been inhibited by their Christian morality. Then Jack decides to paint his face into a mask, and as he does, a frightening metamorphosis occurs as he sees his reflection in the water:

He looked in astonishment, no longer at himself but at an awesome stranger. He spilt the water and leapt to his feet, laughing excitedly. Beside the pool his sinewy body held up a mask that drew their eyes and appalled them [the other boys]. He began to dance and his laughter became a blood-thirsty snarling. He capered toward Bill, and the mask was a thing on its own, behind which Jack hid, liberated from shame and self-consciousness.

After the other boys in Jack's gang also disguise themselves with painted masks, they are readily able to "Kill the pig. Cut her throat. Spill her blood."⁸ Once that alien deed of killing another creature is accomplished, they then relish the fun of killing both animals and their human enemies, notably the intellectual boy nicknamed "Piggy." Might makes right, and all hell breaks loose as Ralph, the good-boy leader, is hunted down by the herd.

Is there any psychological validity to the notion that disguising one's exter-

nal appearance can drastically infect behavioral processes? I attempted to answer that question with a set of studies that helped stimulate a new field of inquiry on the psychology of deindividuation and antisocial behavior.⁴

The Shocking Behavior of Anonymous Women

The basic procedure in this first experiment involved having female college students believe they were delivering a series of painful electric shocks to other women, under the guise of a believable "cover story." They would have multiple opportunities to shock each of two other young women whom they saw and heard from behind a one-way mirror. Half of the student volunteers were randomly assigned to a condition of anonymity, or *deindividuation*, half to a condition where their identity was made salient, or *individuation*. The four college student subjects, in each of the ten separately tested deindividuation groups, had their appearance concealed by hoods and loose, oversized lab coats, their names replaced by numbers, one to four. The experimenter treated them as an anonymous group, not as individuals. These procedures were performed allegedly to mask their non-verbal behavior so that others could not detect their reactions. The comparison group, by contrast, was given name tags that helped to make them feel unique, but everything else was the same for them as for those in the deindividuated groups. Both the deindividuated and the comparison subjects were in four-woman groups, and both were asked to repeatedly shock each of two women "victims" over the course of twenty trials.

The cover story was that the target women were subjects in a study of creativity under stress. The job of our participants was to stress them by administering painful electric shocks while I, as the experimenter in the next room, also behind the mirror, administered the creativity test.

Unlike in the Milgram paradigm, there was no authority directly pressuring them to act aggressively by delivering these painful shocks because I did not interact with them at all during the shock episodes. The students could see me through the observation window along with each of the two women in the alleged creativity study. In addition, there was no group conformity pressure exerted on them because they did not interact with one another, being in separate cubicles adjacent to one another. Finally, there was not even pressure on them to perform the task in order not to violate the rationale for the study. If any one of the four group members delivered a shock, the target woman would act hurt, so there would be sufficient stress induced to impact her creativity. Thus, not shocking would be neither disobedient nor confrontational—one could be merely a passive observer of teammates' shocking instead of an active perpetrator.

The behavior of interest was the *duration* of shock administered—how long each student continued to hold down the shock button after the shock-ready signal appeared. Their decision was not whether to press the shock switch but how quickly to pull their finger off the switch or to keep pressing it down and deliver

longer shocks to the victims. Of course, they could choose not to follow the instructions and refuse to even press the shock switch at all (no one ever did that).

One of the complicit women had been portrayed as very nice, the other as "bitchy," in their tape-recorded interviews. This was done to create divergent attitudes toward them in the minds of their "stress inducers." Actually, they were both research confederates, trained to act as though they were in pain when a shock light lit up and to give a convincing performance that the students in the other room could witness.

Before the experiment began, each of the students in the study was given a sample of the painful shock (of 75 volts) so they knew that it would hurt—but of course, no shock was actually given in the experiment. For each of twenty trials, the women had to decide whether and for how long they would administer this standard level of painful shock to a woman who was seemingly suffering in pain from their actions. Then, after the first target woman left, she was replaced by the second target woman for yet another round of twenty shock trials. Because each member of the four-person experimental and comparison groups was tested in adjacent individual cubicles, their "teammates" could not directly influence their behavior. Nevertheless, they had a sense of being in a group from having been together initially while they listened together to the tape recordings. It is important to note that except for the manipulation of anonymity versus identifiability, everything in the study was identical for both groups.

The results were clear: The women in the deindividuation condition delivered twice as much shock to both victims as did the comparison women who had been randomly assigned to the individuated condition. Moreover, the women who were anonymous shocked both victims equally, the one they had previously rated as pleasant and the other they had rated as unpleasant. It did not matter what they had previously felt about them once they had their finger on the trigger. They also increased shock time for both over the course of the twenty trials, holding their finger down ever longer on the shock switch as their victims twisted and moaned right before them. In contrast, the individuated women discriminated between the likeable and unpleasant targets, shocking the pleasant woman less over time than they did the unpleasant one.

That the anonymous women ignored their previous liking or disliking of the two target women when they had the chance to harm them speaks to a dramatic change in their mentality when in this psychological state of deindividuation. The escalation of shock, with repeated opportunities to administer its painful consequences, appears to be an upward-spiraling effect of the emotional arousal that is being experienced. The agitated behavior becomes self-reinforcing, each action stimulating a stronger, less controlled next reaction. Experientially, it comes not from sadistic motives of wanting to harm others but rather from the energizing sense of one's domination and control over others at that moment in time.

This basic paradigm has been repeated with comparable results in a host of laboratory and field studies, using deindividuating masks, administering white noise, or throwing Styrofoam balls at the target victims, and with military personnel from the Belgian Army as well as with schoolchildren and a variety of college students. Similar escalations of shock over time were also found in a study where teacher-shockers were supposed to be educating their pupil-victims—they too delivered increasing levels of shock across training sessions.⁵

The Stanford Prison Experiment, as you recall, relied on the deindividuating silver reflecting sunglasses for the guards and staff along with standard military-style uniforms. One important conclusion flows from this body of research: anything, or any situation, that makes people feel anonymous, as though no one knows who they are or cares to know, reduces their sense of personal accountability, thereby creating the potential for evil action. This becomes especially true when a second factor is added: if the situation or some agency gives them *permission* to engage in antisocial or violent action against others, as in these research settings, people are ready to go to war. If, instead, the situation conveys merely a reduction of self-centeredness with anonymity and encourages prosocial behavior, people are ready to make love. (Anonymity in party settings often makes for more socially engaging parties.) So William Golding's insight about anonymity and aggression was psychologically valid—but in more complex and interesting ways than he depicted.

Sure, this robe of mine doth change my disposition.

—William Shakespeare, *The Winter's Tale*

Anonymity can be conferred on others not only with masks but also by the way that people are treated in given situations. When others treat you as if you are not a unique individual but just an undifferentiated "other" being processed by the System, or your existence is ignored, you feel anonymous. The sense of a lack of personal identifiability can also induce antisocial behavior. When a researcher treated college student research volunteers either humanely or as "guinea pigs" in an experiment, guess who ripped him off when he wasn't looking? Later on, these students found themselves alone in the professor-researcher's office with the opportunity to steal coins and pens from a bowl full of them. Those who were in the anonymity condition stole much more often than did the humanely treated students.⁶ Kindness can be more than its own reward.

Halloween Aggression by Schoolchildren

What happens when children go to an unusual Halloween party where they put on costumes and are given permission by their teacher to play aggressive games for prizes? Will anonymity plus opportunity to aggress lead children to engage in more aggression over time?

Elementary school children attended a special, experimental Halloween party given by their teacher and supervised by a social psychologist, Scott Fraser.⁷ There were many games to play, and the children could win tokens for each game they won. These tokens could be exchanged for gifts at the end of the party. The more tokens you won, the better the toys you could get, so the motivation to win as many tokens as possible was high.

Half the games were nonaggressive in nature, and half involved confrontations between two children to reach the goal. For example, a nonaggressive game might have individual students trying to speedily retrieve a beanbag in a tube, while a potentially aggressive game would entail two students competing to be the first one to get that one beanbag out of the tube. The aggression observed typically involved the competitors' pushing and shoving each other. It was not very extreme but was characteristic of first-stage physical encounters between children.

The experimental design used only one group, in which each child served as his or her own control. This procedure is known as the A-B-A format—pre-baseline/change introduced/post-baseline. The children first played the games without costumes (A), then with costumes (B), then again without costumes (A). Initially, while the games were played, the teacher said the costumes were on the way so they would start the fun while they waited for them to arrive. Then, when the costumes arrived, they were put on in different rooms so the children's identities were not known to each other, and they played the same games but now in costume. In the third phase, the costumes were removed (allegedly to be given to other children in other parties) and the games continued as in the first phase. Each phase of the games lasted about an hour.

The data are striking testimony to the power of anonymity. Aggression among these young schoolchildren increased significantly as soon as they put the costumes on. The percentage of the total time that these children played the aggressive games more than doubled from their initial base level average, up from 42 percent (in A) to 86 percent (in B). Equally interesting was the second major result: aggression had a high negative payoff. The more time a child spent engaged in the aggressive games, the fewer tokens she or he won during that phase of the party. Being aggressive thus cost the children a loss of tokens. Acting in the aggressive games took more time than the nonaggressive games and only one of two contestants could win, so overall, being aggressive lost valued prizes. However, that did not matter when the children were costumed and anonymous. The smallest number of tokens won was during the second, anonymity B, phase, where aggression was highest: only an average of 31 tokens were won, compared to 58 tokens in the A phase.

A third important finding was that there was no carryover of aggressive behavior from the high level in the B phase to the last A-phase level, which was comparable to the initial A phase. The percentage of aggressive acts dropped to 36 percent, and the number of tokens won soared to 79. Thus, we can conclude that

the behavior change brought on by anonymity did not create a dispositional, internal change, but only an outward response change. Change the situation, and behavior changes in lockstep fashion. The use of this A-B-A design also makes apparent that perceived anonymity was sufficient to dramatically alter behavior in each time frame. Anonymity facilitated aggression even though the consequences of that physical aggression were not in the child's best immediate interest of winning tokens exchangeable for fine prizes. Aggression became its own reward. Goals that were distant took a backseat to "the fun and games" of the present moment. (We will see a similar phenomenon operating in some of the Abu Ghraib abuses.)

In a related field study, Halloween trick-or-treaters visiting local homes in their own costumes were more likely to steal goodies when they were anonymous than when identifiable. Friends of the researchers put out bowls filled with candies and others with coins, each of which was labeled "Take one." Going beyond that limit constituted a transgression, stealing. Some children arrived alone, others in groups of friends. In the anonymous condition, the homeowner made it evident that he or she could not tell who they were. With their identities concealed by their costumes, the majority of those in groups stole the candy and money (just as did those college students in the study where they were treated as "guinea pigs"). This was in contrast to the nonanonymous condition, wherein the adult host had first asked them to reveal their identity behind their masks.*

Among the more than seven hundred children studied in this natural situation, more transgressions were found when they were in anonymous groups (57 percent) than when anonymous and alone (21 percent). Fewer transgressions occurred when nonanonymous children were alone (8 percent) than when they were in groups of other nonanonymous trick-or-treaters (21 percent). Even when alone and identifiable, the temptation of easy money and delicious treats was too great for some children to pass up. However, adding the full-anonymity dimension turned that singular temptation into an overwhelming passion for most children to take all the goodies they could.

Cultural Wisdom: How to Make Warriors Kill in War but Not at Home

Let's leave the laboratory and the games at children's parties to go back to the real world, where these issues of anonymity and violence may take on life-and-death significance. Specifically, let's look at the differences between societies that go to war without having young male warriors change their appearance and those that always include ritual transformations of appearance by painting faces and bodies or masking the warriors (as in *Lord of the Flies*). Does a change in external appearance make a significant difference in how warring enemies are then treated?

A cultural anthropologist, R. J. Watson,⁹ posed that question after reading my earlier work on deindividuation. His data source was the Human Relations Area Files, where information on cultures around the world is archived in the form of

reports of anthropologists, missionaries, psychologists, and others. Watson found two pieces of data on societies in which warriors did or did not change their appearance prior to going to war and the extent to which they killed, tortured, or mutilated their victims, a decidedly deadly dependent variable—the ultimate in outcome measures.

The results are striking confirmation of the prediction that anonymity promotes destructive behavior—when permission is also given to behave in aggressive ways that are ordinarily prohibited. War provides the institutionally approved permission to kill or wound one's adversaries. This investigator found that, of the twenty-three societies for which these two data sets were present, in fifteen warriors changed their appearance. They were the societies that were the most destructive; fully 80 percent of them (twelve of fifteen) brutalized their enemies. By contrast, in seven of eight of the societies in which the warriors did *not* change their appearance before going into battle, they did not engage in such destructive behavior. Another way to look at this data is that 90 percent of the time when victims of battle were killed, tortured, or mutilated, it was by warriors who had first changed their appearance and deindividuated themselves.

Cultural wisdom dictates that a key ingredient in transforming ordinarily nonaggressive young men into warriors who can kill on command is first to change their external appearance. Most wars are about old men persuading young men to harm and kill other young men like themselves. For the young men, it becomes easier to do so if they first change their appearance, altering their usual external façade by putting on military uniforms or masks or painting their faces. With the anonymity thus provided in place, out go their usual internal compassion and concern for others. When the war is won, the culture then dictates that the warriors return to their peacetime status. This reverse transformation is readily accomplished by making the warriors remove their uniforms, take off their masks, wash away the paint, and return to their former personae and peaceful demeanor. In a sense, it is as though they were in a macabre social ritual, unknowingly using the A-B-A paradigm of Fraser's Halloween experiment. Peaceful when identifiable, murderous when anonymous, peaceful again when returned to the identifiable condition.

Certain environments convey a sense of transient anonymity in those who live or behave in their midst, without changing their physical appearance. To demonstrate the impact of the anonymity of place in facilitating urban vandalism, my research team did a simple field study. Recall from chapter 1 that we abandoned cars on the streets near the uptown campus of New York University in the Bronx, New York, and near Stanford University's campus in Palo Alto, California. We photographed and videotaped acts of vandalism against these cars, which were clearly abandoned (license plates removed, hoods raised). In the anonymity of the Bronx setting, several dozen passersby, on the street or in cars, stopped to vandalize the car within forty-eight hours. Most were reasonably well-

dressed adults, who stripped the car of any valuable items or simply destroyed it—all in the daytime. By contrast, over a week's time, not a single passerby engaged in any act of vandalism against the car abandoned in Palo Alto. This demonstration was the only empirical evidence cited in support of the "Broken Windows Theory" of urban crime. Environmental conditions contribute to making some members of society feel that they are anonymous, that no one in the dominant community knows who they are, that no one recognizes their individuality and thus their humanity. When that happens, we contribute to their transformation into potential vandals and assassins. (For full details of this research and Broken Windows Theory, see our Lucifer Effect website.)

Deindividuation Transforms Our Apollonian Nature into a Dionysian Nature

Let's assume that the "good" side of people is the rationality, order, coherence, and wisdom of Apollo, while the "bad" side is the chaos, disorganization, irrationality, and libidinous core of Dionysus. The Apollonian central trait is constraint and the inhibition of desire; it is pitted against the Dionysian trait of uninhibited release and lust. People can become evil when they are enmeshed in situations where the cognitive controls that usually guide their behavior in socially desirable and personally acceptable ways are blocked, suspended, or distorted. The suspension of cognitive control has multiple consequences, among them the suspension of: conscience, self-awareness, sense of personal responsibility, obligation, commitment, liability, morality, guilt, shame, fear, and analysis of one's actions in cost-benefit calculations.

The two general strategies for accomplishing this transformation are: (a) reducing the cues of social accountability of the actor (no one knows who I am or cares to) and (b) reducing concern for self-evaluation by the actor. The first cuts out concern for social evaluation, for social approval, doing so by making the actor feel anonymous—the process of deindividuation. It is effective when one is functioning in an environment that conveys anonymity and diffuses personal responsibility. The second strategy stops self-monitoring and consistency monitoring by relying on tactics that alter one's state of consciousness. This is accomplished by means of taking alcohol or drugs, arousing strong emotions, engaging in hyperintense actions, getting into an expanded present-time orientation where there is no concern for past or future, and projecting responsibility outward onto others rather than inward toward oneself.

Deindividuation creates a unique psychological state in which behavior comes under the control of immediate situational demands and biological, hormonal urges. Action replaces thought, seeking immediate pleasure dominates delaying gratification, and mindfully restrained decisions give way to mindless emotional responses. A state of arousal is often both a precursor to and a consequence of deindividuation. Its effects are amplified in novel or unstructured situations where typical response habits and character traits are nullified. One's

vulnerability to social models and situational cues is heightened; therefore, it becomes as easy to make love as to make war—it all depends on what the situation demands or elicits. In the extreme, there is no sense of right and wrong, no thoughts of culpability for illegal acts or Hell for immoral ones.¹⁰ With inner restraints suspended, behavior is totally under external situational control; outer dominates inner. What is possible and available dominates what is right and just. The moral compass of individuals and groups has then lost its polarity.

The transition from Apollonian to Dionysian mentalities can be swift and unexpected, making good people do bad things, as they live temporarily in the expanded present moment without concerns for the future consequences of their actions. Usual constraints on cruelty and libidinal impulses melt away in the excesses of deindividuation. It is as if there were a short circuit in the brain, cutting off the frontal cortex's planning and decision-making functions, while the more primitive portions of the brain's limbic system, especially its emotion and aggression center in the amygdala, take over.

The Mardi Gras Effect: Communal Deindividuation as Ecstasy

In ancient Greece, Dionysus was unique among the gods. He was seen as creating a new level of reality that challenged traditional assumptions and ways of living. He represented both a force for the liberation of the human spirit from its staid confinement in rational discourse and orderly planning, and a force of destruction: lust without limits and personal pleasure without societal controls. Dionysus was the god of drunkenness, the god of insanity, the god of sexual frenzy and battle lust. Dionysus' dominion includes all states of being that entail the loss of self-awareness and rationality, the suspension of linear time, and the abandonment of the self to those urges in human nature that overthrow codes of behavior and public responsibility.

Mardi Gras has its origins as a pagan, pre-Christian ceremony now recognized by the Roman Catholic Church as occurring on the Tuesday (Fat Tuesday, or Shrove Tuesday) just before Ash Wednesday. That holy day marks the start of the Christian liturgical Season of Lent with its personal sacrifices and abstinence leading to Easter Sunday, forty-six days later. Mardi Gras celebrations begin on the Twelfth Night Feast of the Epiphany, when the three kings visited the newborn Jesus Christ.

In practice, Mardi Gras celebrates the excess of libidinous pleasure seeking, of living for the moment, of "wine, women, and song." Cares and obligations are forgotten while celebrants indulge their sensual nature in communal revelries. It is a Bacchanalian festivity that loosens behavior from its usual constraints and reason-based actions. However, there is always the preconscious awareness that this celebration is transitory, soon to be replaced by even greater than usual limits on personal pleasures and vices with the advent of Lent. "The Mardi Gras effect" involves temporarily giving up the traditional cognitive and moral con-

straints on personal behavior when part of a group of like-minded revelers bent on having fun now without concern for subsequent consequences and liabilities. It is deindividualization in group action.

DEHUMANIZATION AND MORAL DISENGAGEMENT

Dehumanization is the central construct in our understanding of "man's inhumanity to man." Dehumanization occurs whenever some human beings consider other human beings to be excluded from the moral order of being a human person. The objects of this psychological process lose their human status in the eyes of their dehumanizers. By identifying certain individuals or groups as being outside the sphere of humanity, dehumanizing agents suspend the morality that might typically govern reasoned actions toward their fellows.

Dehumanization is a central process in prejudice, racism, and discrimination. Dehumanization stigmatizes others, attributing to them a "spoiled identity." For example, the sociologist Erving Goffman¹¹ described the process by which those who are disabled are socially discredited. They become not fully human and thus tainted.

Under such conditions, it becomes possible for normal, morally upright, and even usually idealistic people to perform acts of destructive cruelty. Not responding to the human qualities of other persons automatically facilitates inhumane actions. The golden rule then becomes truncated: "Do unto others as you would." It is easier to be callous or rude toward dehumanized "objects," to ignore their demands and pleas, to use them for your own purposes, even to destroy them if they are irritating.¹²

A Japanese general reported that it had been easy for his soldiers to brutally massacre Chinese civilians during Japan's pre-World War II invasion of China, "because we thought of them as *things*, not people like us." This was obviously so during the "Rape of Nanking" in 1937. Recall the description (in chapter 1) of the Tutsis by the woman who orchestrated many of the rapes of them—they were nothing more than "insects," "cockroaches." Similarly, the Nazi genocide of the Jews began by first creating through propaganda films and posters a national perception of these fellow human beings as inferior forms of animal life, as vermin, as voracious rats. The many lynchings of black people by mobs of whites in cities throughout the United States were likewise not considered crimes against humanity because of the stigmatization of them as only "niggers."¹³

Behind the My Lai massacre of hundreds of innocent Vietnamese civilians by American soldiers was the dehumanizing "gooks" label that GIs had for all of those different-looking Asian people.¹⁴ Yesterday's "gooks" have become today's "hajjis" and "towel heads" in the Iraq War as a new corps of soldiers derogates these different-looking citizens and soldiers. "You just sort of try to block out the fact that they're human beings and see them as enemies," said Sergeant Mejia,

who refused to return to action in what he considered an abominable war. "You call them 'hajis', you know? You do all the things that make it easier to deal with killing them and mistreating them."¹⁵

That such labels and their associated images can have powerful motivating effects was demonstrated in a fascinating controlled laboratory experiment (mentioned in chapter 1, elaborated here).

Experimental Dehumanization: Animalizing College Students

My Stanford University colleague Albert Bandura and his students designed a powerful experiment that elegantly demonstrates the power of dehumanizing labels to foster harm against others.¹⁶

Seventy-two male volunteers from nearby junior colleges were divided into three-member "supervisory teams" whose task was to punish the inadequate decision making of other college students who were allegedly serving as a group of decision makers. The real subjects of the study were, of course, the students playing the role of supervisors.

On each of twenty-five bargaining trials, the supervisors heard the decision-making team (reported to be in an adjacent room) supposedly formulating collective decisions. The supervisors were given information they used to evaluate the adequacy of the decision on each trial. Whenever a bad decision was made, it was the job of this supervisory team to punish the error by administering a shock. They could choose the shock intensity from a mild level of 1 to a maximum level of 10 on any trial, which all the members of the decision-making team would receive.

The supervisors were told that participants from different social backgrounds were included in this project to increase its generality, but each group of decision makers was composed of people with similar attributes. This was done so that the positive or negative labels soon to be applied to them would hold for the entire group.

The researchers varied two features of this basic situation: how the "victims" were labeled and how personally responsible the supervisors were for the shocks they administered. The volunteers were randomly assigned to three conditions of labeling—dehumanized, humanized, or neutral—and two conditions of responsibility—individualized or diffused.

Let's first consider how the labeling was imposed and its effects. Then we will see how the responsibility variations operated. After settling into the study, each group of participants believed they were overhearing an interchange over the intercom between the research assistant and the experimenter about the questionnaires the decision makers had allegedly completed. The assistant remarked in a brief aside that the personal qualities exhibited by this group confirmed the opinion of the person by whom they had been recruited. In the *dehumanized* condition, the decision makers were characterized as "an animalistic, rotten bunch." By

contrast, in the *humanized* condition, they were characterized as a "perceptive, understanding, and otherwise humanized group." No evaluative references were made about those in the third, *neutral* condition.

It should be made clear that the participants never interacted with their shock victims and therefore could not make such evaluations personally or evaluate their adequacy. The labels were secondhand attributions made about other young college men, supposedly also volunteers functioning in an assigned role in this situation. So did the labels have any effect on how these college students punished those they were allegedly supervising? (There were, in fact, no actual "others," only standardized tape feedback.)

Indeed, the labels stuck and had a big impact on the extent to which the students punished their supervisees. Those labeled in the dehumanizing way, as "animals," were shocked most intensively, and their shock level increased linearly over ten trials. It also climbed higher and higher over trials, up to an average of 7 out of the maximum of 10 for each group of participants. Those labeled "nice" were given the smallest amount of shock, while the unlabeled, neutral group fell in the middle of these two extremes.

Further, during the first trial, there was no difference at all between the three experimental treatments in the level of shock administered—they all administered the same low level of shock. Had the study ended then, the conclusion would have been that the labels made no difference. However, with each successive trial, as the errors of the decision makers allegedly multiplied, the shock levels of the three groups diverged. Those shocking the so-called animals shocked them more intensively over time, a result comparable to the escalating shock level of the deindividuated female college students in my earlier study. That rise in aggressive responding over time, with practice, or with experience illustrates a self-reinforcing effect. Perhaps the pleasure is not so much in inflicting pain as in the sense of power and control one feels in such a situation of dominance—giving others what they deserve to get. The researchers point to the disinhibiting power of labeling to divest other people of their human qualities.

On the plus side in this study, that same arbitrary labeling also resulted in others being treated with greater respect if someone in authority had labeled them positively. Those perceived as "nice" were harmed the least. Thus, the power of humanization to counteract punitiveness is of equal theoretical and social significance as the phenomenon of dehumanization. There is an important message here about the power of words, labels, rhetoric, and stereotyped labeling, to be used for good or evil. We need to refashion the childhood rhyme "Sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never harm me," to alter the last phrase to "but bad names can kill me, and good ones can comfort me."

Finally, what about the variations in *responsibility* for the level of shock that was being administered? Significantly higher levels of shock were given when participants believed that the shock level was an average response of their team

rather than when it was the direct level of each individual's personal decision. As we have seen before, diffusion of responsibility, in any form it takes, lowers the inhibition against harming others. As one might predict, the very highest levels of shock—and anticipated harm—were administered both when participants felt less personally responsible and when their victims were dehumanized.

When Bandura's research team evaluated how the participants had justified their performance, they found that dehumanization promoted the use of self-absolving justifications, which in turn were associated with increasing punishment. These findings about how people disengage their usual self-sanctions against behaving in ways that are detrimental to others led Bandura to develop a conceptual model of "moral disengagement."

Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement

This model begins by assuming that most people adopt moral standards because of undergoing normal socialization processes during their upbringing. Those standards act as guides for prosocial behavior and deterrents of antisocial behavior as defined by their family and social community. Over time, these external moral standards imposed by parents, teachers, and other authorities become internalized as codes of personal conduct. People develop personal controls over their thoughts and actions that become satisfying and provide a sense of self-worth. They learn to sanction themselves to prevent acting inhumanely and to foster humane actions. The self-regulatory mechanisms are not fixed and static in their relation to a person's moral standards. Rather, they are governed by a dynamic process in which moral self-censure can be selectively activated to engage in acceptable conduct; or, at other times, moral self-censure can be disengaged from reprehensible conduct. Individuals and groups can maintain their sense of moral standards by simply disengaging their usual moral functioning at certain times, in certain situations, for certain purposes, it is as if they shift their morality into neutral gear and coast along without concern for hitting pedestrians until they later shift back to a higher gear, returning to higher moral ground.

Bandura's model goes further in elucidating the specific psychological mechanisms individuals generate to convert their harmful actions into morally acceptable ones as they selectively disengage the self-sanctions that regulate their behavior. Because this is such a fundamental human process, Bandura argues that it helps to explain not only political, military, and terrorist violence but also "everyday situations in which decent people routinely perform activities that further their interests but have injurious human effects."¹⁷

It becomes possible for any of us to disengage morally from any sort of destructive or evil conduct when we activate one or more of the following four types of cognitive mechanisms.

First, we can redefine our harmful behavior as honorable. Creating moral justification for the action, by adopting moral imperatives that sanctify violence, does this. Creating advantageous comparisons that contrast our righteous behav-

ior to the evil behavior of our enemies also does this. (We only torture them; they behead us.) Using euphemistic language that sanitizes the reality of our cruel actions does this as well. ("Collateral damage" means that civilians have been bombed into dust; "friendly fire" means that a soldier has been murdered by the stupidity or intentional efforts of his buddies.)

Second, we can minimize our sense of a direct link between our actions and its harmful outcomes by diffusing or displacing personal responsibility. We spare ourselves self-condemnation if we do not perceive ourselves as the agents of crimes against humanity.

Third, we can change the way we think about the actual harm done by our actions. We can ignore, distort, minimize, or disbelieve any negative consequences of our conduct.

Finally, we can reconstruct our perception of victims as deserving their punishment, by blaming them for the consequences, and of course, by dehumanizing them, perceiving them to be beneath the righteous concerns we reserve for fellow human beings.

Understanding Dehumanization Is Not Excusing It

It is important once again to add here that such psychological analyses are never intended to excuse or make light of the immoral and illegal behaviors of perpetrators. By making explicit the mental mechanisms people use to disengage their moral standards from their conduct, we are in a better position to reverse the process, reaffirming the need for moral engagement as crucial for promoting empathic humaneness among people.

However, before moving on it is important to make concrete the notion that people in positions of power and authority often reject attempts at causal situational analyses in matters of great national concern. Instead, at least in one recent instance, they have endorsed simplistic dispositional views that would have made Inquisition judges smile.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is a Stanford University professor of political science with a specialization in the Soviet military. Her training should have made her sensitive to systems-level analyses of complex political problems. However, not only was that perspective missing during an interview with Jim Lehrer on his *NewsHour* (July 28, 2005), but instead she championed a dogmatic, simplistic dispositional view. In response to her interviewer's question about whether U.S. foreign policy is promoting rather than eliminating terrorism, Rice attacked any such thinking as "excuse mongering," as she makes it clear that terrorism is simply about "evil people": "When are we going to stop making excuses for the terrorists and saying that somebody is making them do it? No. these are simply evil people who want to kill. And they want to kill in the name of a perverted ideology that really is not Islam, but they somehow want to claim that mantle to say that this is about some kind of grievance. This isn't about some kind of grievance. This is an effort to destroy, rather than to build. And until everybody

in the world calls it by name—the evil that it is—stops making excuses for them, then I think we're going to have a problem."

I Am More Human than You: The Infrahumanization Bias

Beyond perceiving and derogating others in the "out-group" with animallike qualities, people also deny them any "human essence." *Out-group infrahumanization* is a newly investigated phenomenon in which people tend to attribute uniquely human emotions and traits to their in-group and deny their existence in out-groups. It is a form of emotional prejudice.¹⁸

However, we go further in declaring that the essence of humanness resides primarily in ourselves, more so than in any others, even our in-group members. While we attribute infrahumanity to out-groups, as less than human, we are motivated to see ourselves as more human than others. We deny uniquely human traits and even human nature to others, relative to our own egocentric standard. This *self-humanization bias* is the complement of the other-infrahumanization bias. These tendencies appear to be rather general and multifaceted. A team of Australian researchers concluded their investigation into the perception of humanness with a variant of the famous quote by the ancient Roman writer Terence. He proudly proclaimed, "Nothing human is alien to me." Its ironic twist notes, "Nothing human may be alien to me, but something human is alien to you."¹⁹ (It is unlikely that such an imperial "I" exists among members of collectivist cultures, but we await new research to inform us of the limits of such egocentrism.)

Creating Dehumanized Enemies of the State

Among the operational principles we must add to our arsenal of weapons that trigger evil acts by ordinarily good men and women are those developed by nation-states to incite their own citizens. We learn about some of these principles by considering how nations prepare their young men to engage in deadly wars while also preparing citizens to endorse engaging in wars of aggression. A special form of cognitive conditioning through propaganda helps accomplish this difficult transformation. "Images of the enemy" are created by national media propaganda (in complicity with governments) to prepare the minds of soldiers and citizens to hate those who fit the new category "your enemy." Such mental conditioning is a soldier's most potent weapon. Without it, he might never put another young man in the crosshairs of his gun sight and fire to kill him. It induces a fear of vulnerability among citizens who can imagine what it would be like to be dominated by that enemy.²⁰ That fear becomes morphed into hatred and a willingness to take hostile action to reduce its threat. It extends its reaches into a willingness to send our children to die or be maimed in battle against that threatening enemy.

In *Faces of the Enemy*, Sam Keen²¹ shows how archetypes of the enemy are created by visual propaganda that most nations use against those judged to be the dangerous "them," "outsiders," "enemies." These visual images create a consen-

sual societal paranoia that is focused on the enemy who would do harm to the women, children, homes, and God of that nation's way of life, destroying its fundamental beliefs and values. Such propaganda has been widely practiced on a worldwide scale. Despite national differences in many dimensions, it is still possible to categorize all such propaganda into a select set utilized by "*homo hostilis*." In creating a new evil enemy in the minds of good members of righteous tribes, "the enemy" is: aggressor, faceless, rapist, godless, barbarian, greedy, criminal, torturer, murderer, an abstraction, or a dehumanized animal. Scary images reveal one's nation being consumed by the animals that are most universally feared: snakes, rats, spiders, insects, lizards, gigantic gorillas, octopi, or even "English pigs."

A final point on the consequences of adopting a dehumanized conception of selected others is the unthinkable things that we are willing to do to them once they are officially declared different and undesirable. More than 65,000 American citizens were sterilized against their will during an era (1920s-1940s) when eugenics advocates used scientific justifications to purify the human race by ridding it of all those with undesirable traits. We expect that view from Adolf Hitler but not from one of America's most revered jurists, Oliver Wendell Holmes. He ruled in a majority opinion (1927) that compulsory sterilization laws, far from being unconstitutional, were a social good:

It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.²²

Please recall the research cited in chapter 12 on students at the University of Hawaii who were willing to endorse the "final solution" to eliminate the unfit, even their own family members if necessary.

Both the United States and England have had a long history of involvement in the "war against the weak." They have had their fair share of vocal, influential proponents of eugenics advocating and scientifically justifying plans to rid their nation of the misfits while enhancing the privileged status of the most fit.²³

THE EVIL OF INACTION: PASSIVE BYSTANDERS

The only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing.

—British statesman Edmund Burke

[W]e must learn that passively to accept an unjust system is to cooperate with that system, and thereby to become a participant in its evil.

—Martin Luther King, Jr.²⁴

Our usual take on evil focuses on the violent, destructive actions of perpetrators, but the failure to act can also be a form of evil, when helping, dissent, disobedience, or whistle-blowing are required. One of the most critical, least acknowledged contributors to evil goes beyond the protagonists of harm to the silent chorus who look but do not see, who hear but do not listen. Their silent presence at the scene of evil doings makes the hazy line between good and evil even fuzzier. We ask next: Why don't people help? Why don't people act when their aid is needed? Is their passivity a personal defect of callousness, of indifference? Alternatively, are there identifiable social dynamics once again at play?

The Kitty Genovese Case: Social Psychologists to the Rescue, Belatedly

In a major urban center, such as New York City, London, Tokyo, or Mexico City, one is surrounded by literally tens of thousands of people. We walk beside them on the streets, sit near them in restaurants, movies, buses, and trains, wait in line with them—but remain unconnected, as if they do not really exist. For a young woman in Queens, they did not exist when she most needed them.

For more than half an hour, 38 respectable, law-abiding citizens in Queens [New York] watched a killer stalk and stab a woman in three separate attacks in Kew Gardens. Twice the sound of their voices and the sudden glow of their bedroom lights interrupted him and frightened him off. Each time he returned, sought her out and stabbed her again. Not one person telephoned the police during the assault; one witness called the police after the woman was dead. [*The New York Times*, March 13, 1964]

A recent reanalysis of the details of this case casts doubt upon how many people actually saw the events unfolding and whether they really comprehended what was happening, given that many were elderly and had awoken suddenly in the middle of the night. Nevertheless, there seems to be no question that many residents of this well-kept, usually quiet, almost suburban neighborhood heard the chilling screams and did not help in any way. Kitty died alone on a staircase, where she could no longer elude her crazed murderer.

Yet only a few months later, there was an even more vivid and chilling depiction of how alienated and passive bystanders can be. An eighteen-year-old secretary had been beaten, choked, stripped, and raped in her office. When she finally broke away from her assailant, naked and bleeding, she ran down the stairs of the building to the doorway screaming "Help me! Help me! He raped me!" A crowd of about forty persons gathered on the busy street and watched as the rapist dragged her back upstairs to continue his abuse. No one came to her aid! Only the chance arrival of passing police prevented her further abuse and possible murder (*The New York Times*, May 6, 1964).

Researching Bystander Intervention

Social psychologists heeded the alarm by initiating a series of pioneering studies on bystander intervention. They countered the usual slew of dispositional analyses about what is wrong with the callous New York bystanders by trying to understand what in the *situation* freezes the prosocial actions of ordinary people. At the time, both Bibb Latané and John Darley²⁵ were professors at New York City universities—Columbia and NYU, respectively—so they were close to the heart of the action. Their field studies were done in a variety of New York City venues, such as on subways and street corners, and in laboratories.

Their research generated a counterintuitive conclusion: the more people who witness an emergency, the *less* likely any of them will intervene to help. Being part of a passively observing group means that each individual assumes that others are available who could or will help, so there is less pressure to initiate action than there is when people are alone or with only one other observer. The mere presence of others diffuses the sense of personal responsibility of any individual to get involved. Personality tests of participants showed no significant relationship between any particular personality characteristics and the speed or likelihood of intervening in staged emergencies.²⁶

New Yorkers, like Londoners or others from big cities around the world, are likely to help and will intervene if they are directly asked or when they are alone or with a few others. The more people present who might help in an emergency situation, the more we assume that someone else will step forward, so we do not have to become energized to take any personal risk. Rather than callousness, failure to intervene is not only because one fears for one's life in a violent scenario, but also because one denies the seriousness of the situation, fears doing the wrong thing and looking stupid or worries about the costs of getting involved in "someone else's business." There is also an emergent group norm of passive non-action.

Want Help? Just Ask for It

A former student of mine, Tom Moriarity, conducted a convincing demonstration that a simple situational feature can facilitate active bystander intervention among New Yorkers.²⁷ In two scenarios, Tom arranged for a confederate to leave her purse on a table in a public, busy restaurant or her radio on a blanket at a crowded beach. Then another member of his research team would pretend to steal the purse or the radio as Tom recorded the actions of those near the scene of the simulated crime. Half the time virtually no one intervened and let the criminal escape with the goods. However, the other half of the time virtually everyone stopped the criminal in his tracks and prevented the crime. What made the difference?

In the first case, the woman merely asked the person nearby for the time,

making minimal social contact, before leaving the scene temporarily. However, in the second case, she made a simple request to a nearby person to keep an eye on her purse or her radio until she returned. That direct request created a social obligation to protect this stranger's property—an obligation that was honored fully. Want help? Ask for it. Chances are good that you will get it, even from allegedly callous New Yorkers or other large-city folks.

The implications of this research also highlight another theme we have been developing, that social situations are created by and can be modified by people. We are not robots acting on situational demand programs but can change any programming by our creative and constructive actions. The problem is that too often we accept others' definition of the situation and their norms, rather than being willing to take the risk of challenging the norm and opening new channels of behavioral options. One interesting consequence of the line of research on passive and responsive bystanders has been the emergence of a relatively new area of social psychological research on helping and altruism (well summarized in a monograph by David Schroeder and his colleagues).²⁸

How Good Are Good Samaritans in a Hurry?

A team of social psychologists staged a truly powerful demonstration that the failure to help strangers in distress is more likely due to situational variables than to dispositional inadequacies.²⁹ It is one of my favorite studies, so let's role-play with you once again as a participant.

Imagine you are a student studying for the ministry at Princeton University's Theological Seminary. You are on your way to deliver a sermon on the Good Samaritan so that it can be videotaped for a psychology experiment on effective communication. You know the passage from the Gospel of Luke, chapter 10, quite well. It is about the only person who stopped to help a victim in distress on the side of the road from Jerusalem to Jericho. The Gospel tells us that he will reap his just rewards in Heaven for having been the Good Samaritan on Earth—a biblical lesson for all of us to heed about the virtues of altruism.

Imagine further that as you are heading from the Psychology Department to the videotaping center, you pass a stranger huddled up in an alley in dire distress, on the ground moaning, clearly in need of some aid. Now, can you imagine any conditions that would make you *not* stop to be that Good Samaritan, especially when you are mentally rehearsing the Good Samaritan parable at that very moment?

Rewind to the psychology laboratory. You have been told that you are late for the appointed taping session and so should hurry along. Other theology students were randomly assigned to conditions in which they were told that they had a little time or a lot more time to get to the taping center. But why should time pressure on you (or the others) make a difference if you are a good person, a holy person, a person thinking about the virtue of intervening to help strangers in dis-

tress, as did that old-time Good Samaritan? I am willing to wager that you would like to believe it would *not* make a difference, that in that situation you would stop and help, no matter what the circumstances. And so would the other seminary students come to the aid of the victim in distress.

Guess again: if you took the bet, you lost. The conclusion from the point of view of the victim is this: Don't be a victim in distress when people are late and in a hurry. Almost every one of those seminary students—fully 90 percent of them—passed up the immediately compelling chance to be a Good Samaritan because they were in a hurry to give a sermon about it. They experienced the clash in task demands: to help science or to help a victim. Science won, and the victim was left to suffer. (As you would now expect, the victim was an acting confederate.)

The more time the seminarians believed they had, the more likely they were to stop and help. Thus, the situational variable of *time pressure* accounted for the major variations in who helped and who were passive bystanders. There was no need to resort to dispositional explanations about theology students being callous, cynical, or indifferent, as the nonhelping New Yorkers were assumed to be in the case of poor Kitty Genovese. When the research was replicated, the same result occurred, but when the seminarians were on their way to fulfill a less important task, the vast majority did stop to help. The lesson from this research is to not ask *who* does or does not help but rather *what* the social and psychological features of that situation were when trying to understand situations in which people fail to help those in distress.³⁰

The Institutionalized Evil of Inaction

In situations where evil is being practiced, there are perpetrators, victims, and survivors. However, there are often observers of the ongoing activities or people who know what is going on and do not intervene to help or to challenge the evil and thereby enable evil to persist by their inaction.

It is the good cops who never oppose the brutality of their buddies beating up minorities on the streets or in the back room of the station house. It was the good bishops and cardinals who covered over the sins of their predatory parish priests because of their overriding concern for the image of the Catholic Church. They knew what was wrong and did nothing to really confront that evil, thereby enabling these pederasts to continue sinning for years on end (at the ultimate cost to the Church of billions in reparations and many disillusioned followers).³¹

Similarly, it was the good workers at Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Andersen, and hosts of similarly corrupt corporations who looked the other way when the books were being cooked. Moreover, as I noted earlier, in the Stanford Prison Experiment it was the good guards who never intervened on behalf of the suffering prisoners to get the bad guards to lighten up, thereby implicitly condoning their continually escalating abuse. It was I, who saw these evils and limited only physi-

cal violence by the guards as my intervention while allowing psychological violence to fill our dungeon prison. By trapping myself in the conflicting roles of researcher and prison superintendent, I was overwhelmed with their dual demands, which dimmed my focus on the suffering taking place before my eyes, I too was thus guilty of the evil of inaction.

At the level of nation-states, this inaction, when action is required, allows mass murder and genocide to flourish, as it did in Bosnia and Rwanda and has been doing more recently in Darfur. Nations, like individuals, often don't want to get involved and also deny the seriousness of the threat and the need for immediate action. They also are ready to believe the propaganda of the rulers over the pleas of the victims. In addition, there often are internal pressures on decision makers from those who "do business there" to wait it out.

One of the saddest cases I know of the institutional evil of inaction occurred in 1939, when the U.S. government and its humanitarian president, Franklin D. Roosevelt, refused to allow a ship loaded with Jewish refugees to embark in any port. The SS *St. Louis* had come from Hamburg, Germany, to Cuba with 937 Jewish refugees escaping the Holocaust. The Cuban government reversed its earlier agreement to accept them. For twelve days these refugees and the ship's captain tried desperately to get permission from the U.S. government to enter a port in Miami, which was in clear view. Denied permission to enter this or any other port, the ship turned back across the Atlantic. Some refugees were accepted in Britain and other countries, but many finally died in Nazi concentration camps. Imagine being so close to freedom and then dying as a slave laborer.

When incompetence is wedded to indifference and indecision, the outcome is the failure to act when action is essential for survival. The Katrina hurricane disaster in New Orleans (August 2005) is a classic case study in the total failure of multiple, interlocking systems to mobilize the enormous resources at their disposal to prevent the suffering and deaths of many citizens. Despite advance warnings of the impending disaster of the worst kind imaginable, city, state, and national authorities did not engage in the basic preparations needed for evacuation and for the safety of those who could not leave on their own. In addition to the municipal and state authority systems failing to communicate adequately (because of political differences at the top), the response from the Bush administration was nil, too late, and too little when it did come. Incompetent, inexperienced heads of the Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA) and of the Department of Homeland Security failed to engage the National Guard, Army reserve units, Red Cross, state police, or Air Force personnel to provide food, water, blankets, medicine, and more for the hundreds of thousands of survivors living in squalor for days and nights on end. A year later, much of the city is still in shambles, with entire neighborhoods decimated and deserted, thousands of homes marked for destruction, but little help has been forthcoming. Touring these desolate areas was heartbreaking for me. Critics contend that the systems'

failed response can be traced to class and racial issues, because most of the survivors who could not evacuate were lower-class African Americans. This evil of inaction has been responsible for the deaths, despair, and disillusion of many citizens of New Orleans. Perhaps as many as half of those who did finally leave may never come home again.³²

Et tu, Brute?

Each of us has to wonder if, and hope that when the time comes, we will have the courage of our convictions to be a responsive bystander who sounds the alarm when our countrymen and -women are violating their oath of allegiance to country and to humanity. However, we have seen in these chapters that pressures to conform are enormous, to be a team player, not to rock the boat, and not to risk the sanctions against confronting any system. Those forces are often coupled with the top-down power of authority systems to convey expectations indirectly to employees and underlings that unethical and illegal behavior is appropriate under special circumstances—which they define. Many of the recently uncovered scandals at the highest levels of government, in the military, and in business involve the toxic mix of un verbalized authority expectations conveyed to subordinates who want to be accepted in the "Inner Ring," with the tacit approval of a horde of knowingly silent partners.

"Toxic leaders cast their spell broadly. Most of us claim we abhor them. Yet we frequently follow—or at least tolerate—them, be they our employers, our CEOs, our senators, our clergy, or our teachers. When toxic leaders don't appear on their own, we often seek them out. On occasion, we even create them by pushing good leaders over the toxic line." In Jean Lipman-Blumen's penetrating analysis of the dynamic relationship between leaders and followers in *The Allure of Toxic Leaders*, we are reminded that recognizing the early signs of toxicity in our leaders can enable us to take preventive medicine, not passively imbibe their seductive poison.³³

Throughout history, it has been the inaction of those who could have acted; the indifference of those who should have known better; the silence of the voice of justice when it mattered most; that has made it possible for evil to triumph.

—Haile Selassie, former emperor of Ethiopia

WHY SITUATIONS AND SYSTEMS MATTER

It is a truism in psychology that personality and situations interact to generate behavior; people are always acting within various behavioral contexts. People are both products of their different environments and producers of the environments they encounter.³⁴ Human beings are not passive objects simply buffeted about by

environmental contingencies. People usually select the settings they will enter or avoid and can change the setting by their presence and their actions, influence others in that social sphere, and transform environments in myriad ways. More often than not, we are active agents capable of influencing the course of events that our lives take and also of shaping our destinies.³⁵ Moreover, human behavior and human societies are greatly affected by fundamental biological mechanisms as well as by cultural values and practices.³⁶

The individual is the coin of the operating realm in virtually all of the major Western institutions of medicine, education, law, religion, and psychiatry. These institutions collectively help create the myth that individuals are always in control of their behavior, act from free will and rational choice, and are thus personally responsible for any and all of their actions. Unless insane or of diminished capacity, individuals who do wrong should know that they are doing wrong and be punished accordingly. Situational factors are assumed to be little more than a set of minimally relevant extrinsic circumstances. In evaluating various contributors to any behavior of interest, the dispositionalists put the big chips on the Person and the chintzy chips on the Situation. That view seemingly honors the dignity of individuals, who should have the inner strength and will power to resist all temptations and situational inducements. Those of us from the other side of the conceptual tracks believe that such a perspective denies the reality of our human vulnerability. Recognizing such common frailties in the face of the kinds of situational forces we have reviewed in our journey thus far is the first step in shoring up resistance to such detrimental influences and in developing effective strategies that reinforce the resilience of both people and communities.

The situationist approach should encourage us all to share a profound sense of humility when we are trying to understand "unthinkable," "unimaginable," "senseless" acts of evil—violence, vandalism, suicidal terrorism, torture, or rape. Instead of immediately embracing the high moral ground that distances us good folks from those bad ones and gives short shrift to analyses of causal factors in that situation, the situational approach gives those "others" the benefit of "attributional charity." It preaches the lesson that any deed, for good or evil, that any human being has ever done, you and I could also do—given the same situational forces.

Our system of criminal legal justice over-relies on commonsense views held by the general public about what things cause people to commit crimes—usually only motivational and personality determinants. It is time for the legal justice system to take into account the substantial body of evidence from the behavioral sciences about the power of the social context in influencing behavior, criminal actions as well as moral ones. My colleagues Lee Ross and Donna Shestowsky have offered a penetrating analysis of the challenges that contemporary psychology poses to legal theory and practice. Their conclusion is that the legal system might adopt the model of medical science and practice by taking advantage of current research on what goes wrong, as well as right, in how the mind and body work:

The workings of the criminal justice system should not continue to be guided by illusions about cross-situational consistency in behavior, by erroneous notions about the impact of dispositions versus situations in guiding behavior, or by failures to think through the logic of "person by situation" interactions, or even comforting but largely fanciful notions of free will, any more than it should be guided by once common notions about witchcraft or demonic possession.³⁷

Situated Identities

Our personal identities are socially situated. We are *where* we live, eat, work, and make love. It is possible to predict a wide range of your attitudes and behavior from knowing any combination of "status" factors—your ethnicity, social class, education, and religion and where you live—more accurately than by knowing your personality traits.

Our sense of identity is in large measure conferred on us by others in the ways they treat or mistreat us, recognize or ignore us, praise us or punish us. Some people make us timid and shy; others elicit our sex appeal and dominance. In some groups we are made leaders, while in others we are reduced to being followers. We come to live up to or down to the expectations others have of us. The expectations of others often become self-fulfilling prophecies. Without realizing it, we often behave in ways that confirm the beliefs others have about us. Those subjective beliefs can create new realities for us. We often become who other people think we are, in their eyes and in our behavior.³⁸

Can You Be Judged Sane in an Insane Place?

Situations confer their social identities on us even when it should be obvious that it is not our true personal identity. Recall in the "mock ward" study at Elgin State Mental Hospital (chapter 12) that hospital staff mistreated the "mental patients" on their ward in a variety of ways; however, they were not actually patients but fellow staff members dressed as and playing the role of patients. Similarly, in the Stanford Prison Experiment, everyone knew that the guards were college kids pretending to be guards and that the prisoners were college kids pretending to be prisoners in that mock prison. Did it matter what their real identity was? Not really, as you saw; not after a day or so. They became their situated identities. In addition, I too became The Prison Superintendent in walk, talk, and distorted thought—when I was in that place.

Some situations "essentialize" the roles people are assigned; each person must be what the role demands when he is on that stage set. Image, if you will, that you are a totally normal person who finds yourself hospitalized in a psychiatric ward in a mental hospital. You are there because a hospital admissions officer mistakenly labeled you as "schizophrenic." That diagnosis was based on the fact that you complained to him about "hearing voices," nothing more. You believe that you do not deserve to be there and realize that the way to be released is

to act as normal and as pleasant as you can. Obviously the staff will soon realize there has been some mistake, you are not a mentally ill patient, and send you back home. Right?

Don't count on this happening if you were in that setting. You might never be released, according to a fascinating study conducted by another of my Stanford colleagues, David Rosenhan, with the wonderful title "On Being Sane in Insane Places."³⁹

David and seven associates each went through the same scenario of making an appointment with a different mental hospital admissions officer and complaining of hearing voices or noises, "thuds," but giving no other unusual symptoms. Each of them was admitted to their local mental hospital, and as soon as they were dressed in the patient's pajamas and scuffles, they behaved in a pleasant, apparently normal fashion at all times. The big question was how soon the staff would catch on, realize they were really sane, and bid them adieu.

The simple answer in every one of the eight cases, in each of the eight mental wards, was *Never!* If you are in an Insane Place, you must be an Insane Person because Sane People are not Patients in Insane Asylums—so the situated-identity reasoning went. To be released took a lot of doing, after several weeks, and only with help from colleagues and lawyers. Finally, after the suitably sane Eight were checked out, written across each of their hospital charts was the same final evaluation: "Patient exhibits schizophrenia in remission." Meaning that, no matter what, the staff still believed that their madness could erupt again some day—so don't throw away those hospital scuffles!

Assessing Situational Power

At a subjective level, we can say that you have to be embedded within a situation to appreciate its transformative impact on you and others who are similarly situated. Looking in from the outside won't do. Abstract knowledge of the situation, even when detailed, does not capture the affective tone of the place, its nonverbal features, its emergent norms, or the ego involvement and arousal of being a participant. It is the difference between being an audience member at a game show and being the contestant onstage. It is one reason that experiential learning can have such potent effects, as in the classroom demonstrations by Ms. Elliott and Ron Jones we visited earlier. Do you recall that when forty psychiatrists were asked to predict the outcome of Milgram's experimental procedure, they vastly underestimated its powerful authority impact? They said that only 1 percent would go all the way up to the maximum shock level of 450 volts. You have seen just how far off they were. They failed to appreciate fully the impact of the social psychological setting in making ordinary people do what they would not do ordinarily.

How important is situational power? A recent review of 100 years of social psychological research compiled the results of more than 25,000 studies including 8 million people.⁴⁰ This ambitious compilation used the statistical technique

of *meta-analysis*, which is a quantitative summary of findings across a variety of studies that reveals the size and consistency of such empirical results. Across 322 separate meta-analyses, the overall result was that this large body of social psychological research generated substantial effect sizes—that the power of social situations is a reliable and robust effect.

This data set was reanalyzed to focus only on research relevant for understanding the social context variables and principles that are involved when ordinary people engage in torture. The Princeton University researcher Susan Fiske found 1,500 separate effect sizes that revealed the consistent and reliable impact of situational variables on behavior. She concluded, "Social psychological evidence emphasizes the power of the social context, in other words, the power of the interpersonal situation. Social psychology has accumulated a century of knowledge across a variety of studies about how people influence each other for good or ill."¹¹

LOOKING AHEAD TO APPLES, BARRELS, WHEELERS, AND DEALERS

Now the time has come to collect our analytical gear and move our journey to the far-off foreign land of Iraq to try to understand an extraordinary phenomenon of our times: the digitally documented abuses of Iraqis detained in the prison at Abu Ghraib. Revelations of these violations against humanity moved out from that secret dungeon in Tier 1A, that little shop of horrors, to reverberate around a shocked world. How could this happen? Who was responsible? Why had photographs been taken that implicated the torturers in the act of committing their crimes? These and more questions filled the media for months on end. The president of the United States vowed "to get to the bottom of this." A host of politicians and pundits knowingly proclaimed that it was all the work of a few "bad apples." The abusers were nothing more than a band of sadistic "rogue soldiers."

Our plan is to reexamine what happened and how it happened. We are now adequately prepared to contrast this standard dispositional analysis of identifying the evil perpetrators, the "bad apples," in the otherwise presumably good barrel, with our search for situational determinants—the nature of that bad barrel. We will also review some of the conclusions from various independent investigations into these abuses that will take us beyond situational factors to implicate the System—military and political—in our explanatory mix.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Resisting Situational Influences and Celebrating Heroism

Every exit is an entry somewhere else.

—Tom Stoppard, *Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern Are Dead*

We have come to the end of our journey through the dark places that imprison the minds of our fellow travelers. We have witnessed the conditions that reveal the brutal side of human nature and have been surprised by the ease and the extent to which good people can become so cruel to others. Our conceptual focus has been on trying to understand better how such transformations take place. Although evil can exist in any setting, we have looked most closely into its breeding ground in prisons and wars. They typically become crucibles, in which authority, power, and dominance are blended and, when covered over by secrecy, suspend our humanity, and rob us of the qualities we humans value most: caring, kindness, cooperation, and love.

Much of our time was spent in the simulated prison that my colleagues and I created in the basement of Stanford University's Psychology Department. In just a few days and nights the virtual paradise that is Palo Alto, California, and Stanford University became a hellhole. Healthy young men developed pathological symptoms that reflected the extreme stress, frustration, and hopelessness they were experiencing as prisoners. Their counterparts, randomly assigned to the role of guards, repeatedly crossed the line from frivolously playing that role to seriously abusing "their prisoners." In less than a week, our little "experiment," our mock prison, receded into the background of our collective consciousness, to be replaced by a reality of prisoners, guards, and prison staff that seemed remarkably real to all. It was a prison run by psychologists rather than by the State.

The detailed scrutiny that I brought to the nature of these transformations, which have never before been fully elaborated, is aimed at bringing each reader as close as possible to that special place where we can pit person power against institutional power. I tried to convey a sense of the unfolding processes by which a host of seemingly minor situational variables, such as social roles, rules, norms,

and uniforms, came to have so powerful an impact on all those caught up in its system.

At a conceptual level, I have proposed that we give greater consideration and more weight to situational and systemic processes than we typically do when we are trying to account for aberrant behaviors and seeming personality changes. Human behavior is always subject to situational forces. This context is embedded within a larger, macrocosmic one, often a particular power system that is designed to maintain and sustain itself. Traditional analyses by most people, including those in legal, religious, and medical institutions, focus on the actor as the sole causal agent. Consequently, they minimize or disregard the impact of situational variables and systemic determinants that shape behavioral outcomes and transform actors.

Hopefully, the examples and supporting information in this book will challenge the rigid Fundamental Attribution Error that locates the inner qualities of people as the main source of their actions. We have added the need to recognize both the power of situations and the behavioral scaffolding provided by the System that crafts and upholds the social context.

We have journeyed from a make-believe prison to the nightmare reality that was Iraq's Abu Ghraib Prison. Surprising parallels emerged between the social psychological processes at work in both of those prisons, the mock one and the all-too-real one. In Abu Ghraib, our analytical spotlight focused on one young man, Staff Sergeant Ivan Chip Frederick, who made a dual transformation: from good soldier to bad prison guard and then to suffering prisoner. Our analysis revealed, just as in the Stanford Prison Experiment, the dispositional, situational, and systemic factors that played a crucial role in fostering the abuse and torture that Frederick and other military and civilian personnel heaped on the prisoners in their custody.

I moved then from my position as an impartial social science researcher to assume the role of a prosecutor. In doing so, I exposed to you, readers-as-jurors, the crimes of the top brass in the military command and in the Bush administration that make them complicit in creating the conditions that in turn made possible such wide-ranging wanton abuse and torture throughout most U.S. military prisons. As noted repeatedly, the view I have provided does not negate the responsibility of these MPs, nor their guilt; explanation and understanding do not excuse such misdeeds. Rather, understanding how the events happened and appreciating what were the situational forces operating on the soldiers can lead to proactive ways to modify the circumstances that elicit such unacceptable behavior. Punishing is not enough. "Bad systems" create "bad situations" create "bad apples" create "bad behaviors," even in good people.

For the last time, let's define Person, Situation, and System. The Person is an actor on the stage of life whose behavioral freedom is informed by his or her makeup—genetic, biological, physical, and psychological. The Situation is the be-

havioral context that has the power, through its reward and normative functions, to give meaning and identity to the actor's roles and status. The System consists of the agents and agencies whose ideology, values, and power create situations and dictate the roles and expectations for approved behaviors of actors within its spheres of influence.

In this, the final phase of our journey, we will consider advice about how to prevent or combat negative situational forces that act upon all of us from time to time. We will explore how to resist influences that we neither want nor need but that rain upon us daily. We are not slaves to the power of situational forces. But we must learn methods of resisting and opposing them. In all the situations we have explored together, there were always a few, a minority, who stood firm. The time has come to try to expand their numbers by thinking about how they were able to resist.

If I have in some measure brought you to appreciate that under some circumstances *You* might behave in the ways that participants did in the research conditions outlined here and in the real prison of Abu Ghraib, I ask you to consider now, could you also accept a conception of *You* as a Hero? We will celebrate also the good in human nature, the heroes among us, and the heroic imagination in all of us.

LEARNING HOW TO RESIST UNWANTED INFLUENCES

People with paranoid disorders have great difficulty in conforming to, complying with, or responding to a persuasive message, even when it is offered by their well-meaning therapists or loved ones. Their cynicism and distrust create an isolating barrier that shields them from involvement in most social encounters. Because they are adamantly resistant to social pressures, they provide an extreme model for immunity to influence, though obviously at great psychic cost. At the other end of the scale are the overly gullible, unconditionally trusting people who are easy marks for any and every scam artist.

Among them are the many people who fall prey to frauds, scams, and confidence games at some time in their lives. A full 12 percent of Americans are defrauded by con-artist criminals each year, sometimes losing their life savings. It is likely that this figure is shared by people in most nations. Although the majority of those defrauded are over fifty years old, at a time of life when wisdom should prevail, many people of all ages are regularly duped by tricksters in telemarketing, health care, and lottery scams.¹

Remember the phony authority hoax perpetrated on an innocent teenager at a McDonald's restaurant that was described in chapter 12? Surely you asked yourself, "How could she and those adults duped by this caller be so stupid?" Well, this same hoax was effective in getting many other fast-food restaurant personnel to follow that false authority blindly. How many? Recall in a dozen different restaurant chains in nearly seventy different establishments, in thirty-two states!² We

noted that one assistant manager in a McDonald's restaurant, who was totally duped by the phony caller-con man, asks us all, "Unless you are in that situation, at that time, how do you know what you would do? You don't know what you would do."³

The point is that instead of distancing ourselves from the individuals who were deceived by assuming negative dispositional attributes in them—stupidity, naivete—we need to understand why and how people like us were so completely seduced. Then we will be in a position to resist and to spread awareness of methods of resisting such hoaxes.

The Duality of Detachment Versus Saturation

A basic duality exists in the human condition of detachment versus saturation, of cynical suspicion versus engagement. Detaching ourselves from others in the fear of being "taken in" is an extreme defensive posture, but it is true that the more open we are to other people's persuasion, the more likely we are to be swayed by them. Nevertheless, open, passionate involvement with others is essential to human happiness. We want to feel strongly, to trust completely, to act spontaneously, and to feel connected to others. We want to be fully "saturated" in living. At least some of the time, we want to suspend our evaluative faculties and abandon our primitive fearful reserve. We want to dance with passion along with Zorba the Greek.⁴

Yet, we must regularly assess the worth of our social involvements. The challenge for each of us is how best to oscillate between two poles, immersing fully and distancing appropriately. Knowing when to stay involved with others, when to support and be loyal to a cause or a relationship rather than dismissing it, is a delicate question that we all face regularly. We live in a world in which some people aim to use us. In that same world are others who genuinely want us to share what they believe are mutually positive goals. How to tell which is which? That is the question, dear Hamlet and dear Ophelia.

Before we begin to deal with specific means for combating mind-controlling influences, we must consider another possibility: the old illusion of *personal invulnerability*.⁵ Them? Yes. Me? *No!* Our psychological journey should have convinced you to appreciate how the array of situational forces that we've highlighted can suck in the majority of people. But not You, right? It is hard to extend the lessons we have learned from an intellectual assessment to affect our own codes of conduct. What is easily applied in the abstract to "those others" is not easily applied in the concrete to oneself. We are different. Just as no two fingerprints have identical patterns, no two people have identical genetic, developmental, and personality patterns.

Individual differences should be celebrated, but in the face of strong, common situational forces, individual differences shrink and are compressed. In such instances, behavioral scientists can predict what the majority of people will do knowing nothing about the particular people who comprise a group, only the

nature of their behavioral context. It should be clear that not even the best psychology can predict how each and every individual will behave in a given situation; some degree of individual variance always exists that cannot be accounted for. Therefore, you may reject the lessons that we are about to learn as inapplicable to yourself; you are the special case, the special end of the tail of the normal distribution. However, know that you do so at the cost of being caught with your defenses down and your tail twisted.

My advice about what to do in case you encounter a "dirty, rotten scoundrel," disguised as a nice guy or a sweet old lady, has been accumulated over many decades from many personal experiences. As a scrawny, sickly kid trying to survive on the mean streets of my South Bronx ghetto, I had to learn basic street smarts; these consisted of figuring out quickly how certain people would be likely to act in certain situations. I got good enough at the skill to become a leader of the gang, the team, or the class. Then I was trained by an unscrupulous boss, a Fagin-like character in drag, on how to deceive Broadway theatergoers into checking their hats and coats when they did not want to and to manipulate them into paying tips to get them back, when tipping was not required. As her apprentice, I became experienced in selling expensive show programs when free versions were available and in overdosing kids with loads of candy and drinks if their parents were not chaperoning them to our candy counter. I was also trained to sell magazines door to door, eliciting pity from, and thereby sales to, sympathetic tenement dwellers. Later on, I studied formally the tactics police use to get confessions from suspects, that state-sanctioned torturers use to get anything they want from their victims, and that cult recruiters use in seducing the innocent into their dens. My scholarship extended to studying the mind control tactics used by the Soviets and the methods used by the Chinese Communists in the Korean War and in their massive national thought reform programs. I also studied our own homegrown mind manipulators in the CIA, the state-sponsored MKULTRA program,⁶ and Jim Jones's lethal charismatic power over his religious followers (described in earlier chapters).

I have both counseled and learned from those who survived various cult experiences. In addition, I have engaged in a lifetime of investigative research on persuasion, compliance, dissonance, and group processes. My writing on some of these topics includes a training manual for peace activists during the Vietnam War, as well as several basic texts on attitude change and social influence.⁷ These credentials are offered only to bolster the communicator credibility of the information provided next.

Promoting Altruism via the Virtuous Authority Experiment

Let us first imagine a "Reverse-Milgram" authority experiment. Our goal is to create a setting in which people will comply with demands that intensify over time *to do good*. The participants would be guided gradually to behave in ever-more-altruistic ways, slowly but surely moving further than they could have imagined

toward ever-more-positive, prosocial actions. Instead of the paradigm arranged to facilitate a slow descent into evil, we could substitute a paradigm for a slow ascent into goodness. How could we formulate an experimental setting in which that was possible? Let us design such a thought experiment. To begin, imagine that we arrange for each participant a hierarchy of experiences or actions that range from slightly more positive acts than he or she is used to doing to ever-more-extreme "good" actions. The extremes of virtue push him or her upward all the way to engaging in actions that at first seemed unimaginable.

There might be a time-based dimension in the design for those busy citizens who do not practice virtue because they have convinced themselves that they just don't have time to spare for good deeds. The first "button" on the "Goodness Generator" might be to spend ten minutes writing a thank-you note to a friend or a get-well card to a colleague. The next level might demand twenty minutes of giving advice to a troubled child. Increasing the pressure in this paradigm might then entail the participant's agreeing to give thirty minutes of his time to read a story to an illiterate housekeeper. Then the altruism scale moves upward to spending an hour tutoring a needy student, then to babysitting for a few hours to allow a single parent to visit her sick mother, working for an evening in a soup kitchen, helping unemployed veterans, devoting part of a day to taking a group of orphaned children to the zoo, being available to talk with returning wounded veterans, and on and on upward, a step-by-step commitment to giving precious time every week to ever-more-worthy causes. Providing social models along the way who are already engaged in the requested task, or who take the initiative to ante up to the next level, should work to encourage obedience to virtuous authority, should it not? It's worth a try, especially since, as far as I know, nothing like this experiment has ever been done.

Ideally, our experiment in social goodness would end when the person was doing something that he or she could never have imagined doing before. Our goodness track could also include contributions to creating a healthy and sustainable environment that might go from minimal acts of conservation or recycling to ever more substantial activities, such as giving money, time, and personal involvement to "green" causes. I invite you to expand on this notion in a host of domains in which society would benefit as more citizens "went all the way"—doing good without any supporting ideology, for, as we know from dissonance theory, beliefs follow behavior. Get people to perform good actions, and they will generate the necessary underlying principles to justify them. Talmudic scholars are supposed to have preached not to require that people believe before they pray, only to do what is needed to get them to begin to pray; then they will come to believe in what and to whom they are praying.

Research Supports a Reverse-Milgram Altruism Effect

As noted, this reverse-Milgram experiment has never been done. Suppose we actually attempted to perform such an experiment in the laboratory or, better yet, in

our homes and communities. Would it work? Could we use the power of authority and of the situation to produce virtue? Based on what I know about human beings and the principles of social influence, I am confident that we could do a better job of bringing about righteousness in our world, employing basic principles of social influence (see Notes for some references).⁸

The reverse-Milgram experiment described here combines three simple influence tactics that have been extensively studied and documented by social psychologists: the foot-in-the-door tactic, social modeling, and self-labeling of helpfulness. I've merely brought them together in one situation for promoting altruism. Moreover, researchers have found that these tactics can be used to promote all sorts of prosocial behavior—from donating one's hard-earned money to charity to increasing recycling and even to giving blood at the next Red Cross blood drive.

Our "slow ascent into goodness step by step" makes use of what social psychologists call the "*foot-in-the-door*" (FITD) tactic. This tactic begins by first asking someone to do a small request (which most people readily perform) and then later on to ask them to comply with a related but much bigger request (which was the actual goal all along).⁹ The classic demonstration of this tactic was done more than forty years ago by Jonathan Freedman and Scott Fraser.¹⁰ They asked suburbanites to put a big, ugly sign urging "Drive Carefully" in their nice suburban yard. Fewer than twenty percent of the homeowners did so. However, three fourths of the homeowners agreed to place that sign in their yards if two weeks earlier they had taken a small step and posted in their windows an unobtrusive three-inch sign urging safe driving. The same approach works with other prosocial behavior. For example, researchers have found that merely signing a petition leads to increased monetary support of the handicapped, filling out a brief questionnaire increases the willingness of people to donate their organs to others after death, conserving a small amount of energy induces homeowners to subsequently conserve more energy, and making a small public commitment increases the recycling of paper products.¹¹ What is more, this FITD effect can be enhanced by chaining together a series of increasingly larger requests, putting two feet in the door—just as in our reverse-Milgram experiment on promoting altruism.¹²

Our reverse-Milgram experiment would also employ *social models* to encourage prosocial behavior. In the SPE and Abu Ghraib Prison, there was an abundance of negative models that supported abusive behavior. Turning the power of social models around to enhance positive acts can be as effective in achieving the opposite, desirable outcomes. Researchers have found that altruistic role models increase the likelihood that those around them will engage in positive, prosocial behavior. Here is just a sampling of findings: social role models have been shown to increase donations to the Salvation Army; to promote helping a stranger with a flat tire; to lower rates of aggression and promote nonviolent responses; to reduce littering; and to increase donating money to poor children and a willingness to share one's resources with others.¹³ But one word of advice: Remember to

practice what you preach. Models persuade far more effectively than words. For example, in one set of experiments, children were exposed to an adult model that preached either greed or charity to them in a persuasive sermon. However, that adult then went on to practice either greedy or charitable actions. The results showed that the children were more likely to do what the model did than what the model had said.¹⁴

The wisdom of the Talmudic scholars previously mentioned is consistent with another social influence principle underlying our reverse-Milgram experiment: Give someone an *identity label* of the kind that you would like them to have as someone who will then do the action you want to elicit from them. When you tell a person that he or she is helpful, altruistic, and kind, that person is more likely to do helpful, altruistic, and kind behaviors for others. In the Stanford Prison Experiment, we randomly assigned young men to the roles of prisoner and guard, and they soon took on the manners and the behaviors of those roles. So, too, if we tell someone that he or she is a helpful person, he or she will take on the manners and actions consistent with that identity label. For example, researchers have found that telling someone that he or she is "a generous person" increases compliance with a request to make a large contribution to prevent multiple sclerosis: giving people feedback that they are kind makes them more likely to help someone who has dropped a large number of cards; and those given a salient identity as "blood donors" are more likely to continue to donate their own blood to a stranger whom they don't expect ever to know or meet.¹⁵

One of the great advantages of our species is the ability to explore and understand our social world and then to use what we know to make our lives better. Throughout this book, we have seen the power of the situation to produce evil. I now argue that we can take those same basic principles and use the power of the situation to produce virtue. I fear for the future of humanity if my argument on this point is a failure or if I fail in making my argument acceptable to you. Might I suggest that you take a small step today in carrying out the reverse-Milgram experiment in your own life? I think you are just the person to do it and to serve as a role model for others in transforming our world to one with a more positive future. If not you, then who?

A Ten-step Program to Resist Unwanted Influences

If we consider some of the social psychological principles that fostered the evils we saw during the course of our journey, then once again—as we have just done in constructing the Goodness Generator example—let us use variants of those principles to get people to accentuate the positive and eliminate the negative in their lives. Given the range of different types of influence, it would be necessary to tailor resistance to each type. Combating wrong dissonant commitments requires different tactics from opposing compliance-gaining strategies used on us. Confronting persuasive speeches and powerful communicators forces us to use different principles than we need for dealing with those who would dehumanize us or

deindividuate us. Ways of undercutting groupthink are also different from ways of modifying the impact of intense recruiters.

I have developed such a compendium for you; however, it offers more depth and specifics than is possible to deal with in this chapter. The solution is to make it all available to you free, online in the special website developed as a companion to this book: www.LuciferEffect.com. That way, you can read it at your leisure, take notes, check out the reference sources on which it is based, and contemplate scenarios in which you will put these resistance strategies into practice in your life. Also, after you have encountered a particular social influence tactic used on you or on others you know, you can turn to this handy guide for solutions about what to do next time around to be in a better position to master that challenge.

Here is my ten-step program for resisting the impact of undesirable social influences and at the same time promoting personal resilience and civic virtue. It uses ideas that cut across various influence strategies and provides simple, effective modes of dealing with them. The key to resistance lies in development of the three Ss: self-awareness, situational sensitivity, and street smarts. You will see how they are central to many of these general strategies of resistance.

"I made a mistake!" Let's start out by encouraging admission of our mistakes, first to ourselves, then to others. Accept the dictum that to err is human. You have made an error in judgment; your decision was wrong. You had every reason to believe it was right when you made it, but now you know you were wrong. Say the six magic words: "I'm sorry"; "I apologize"; "Forgive me." Say to yourself that you will learn from your mistakes, grow better from them. Don't continue to put your money, time, and resources into bad investments. Move on. Doing so openly reduces the need to justify or rationalize our mistakes and thereby to continue to give support to bad or immoral actions. Confession of error undercuts the motivation to reduce cognitive dissonance; dissonance evaporates when a reality check occurs. "Cutting bait" instead of resolutely "staying the course" when it is wrong has an immediate cost, but it always results in long-term gain. Consider how many years the Vietnam War continued long after top military and administration officials, such as Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, knew that the war was wrong and could not be won.¹⁶ How many thousands of lives were lost to such wrongheaded resistance, when acknowledging failure and error could have saved them? How much good could come to all of us were our political leaders able to admit their similar errors in Iraq? It is more than a political decision to "save face" by denying errors instead of saving soldiers' and civilian lives—it is a moral imperative.

"I am mindful." In many settings smart people do dumb things because they fail to attend to key features in the words or actions of influence agents and fail to notice obvious situational clues. Too often we function on automatic pilot, using outworn scripts that have worked for us in the past, never stopping to evaluate

whether they are appropriate in the here and now.¹⁷ Following the advice of the Harvard researcher Ellen Langer, we must transform our usual state of mindless inattention into "mindfulness," especially in new situations.¹⁸ Don't hesitate to fire a wake-up shot to your cortex; when we are in familiar situations old habits continue to rule even though they have become obsolete or wrong. We need to be reminded not to live our lives on automatic pilot but always to take a Zen moment to reflect on the meaning of the immediate situation, to think before acting. Never go mindlessly into situations where angels and sensible people fear to tread. For the best results, add "critical thinking" to mindfulness in your resistance.¹⁹ Ask for evidence to support assertions; demand that ideologies be sufficiently elaborated to allow you to separate rhetoric from substance. Try to determine whether the recommended means ever justify potentially harmful ends. Imagine end-game scenarios of the future consequences of any current practice. Reject simple solutions as quick fixes for complex personal or social problems. Support critical thinking from the earliest times in children's lives, alerting them to the deceptive TV ads, biased claims, and distorted perspectives being presented to them. Help them become wiser and warier knowledge consumers.²⁰

"I am responsible." Taking responsibility for one's decisions and actions puts the actor in the driver's seat, for better or for worse. Allowing others to compromise their own responsibility, to diffuse it, makes them powerful backseat drivers and makes the car move recklessly ahead without a responsible driver. We become more resistant to undesirable social influence by always maintaining a sense of personal responsibility and by being willing to be held accountable for our actions. Obedience to authority is less blind to the extent that we are aware that diffusion of responsibility merely disguises our individual complicity in the conduct of questionable actions. Your conformity to antisocial group norms is undercut to the extent that you do not allow displacement of responsibility, when you refuse to spread responsibility around the gang, the frat, the shop, the battalion, or the corporation. Always imagine a future time when today's deed will be on trial and no one will accept your pleas of "only following orders," or "everyone else was doing it."

"I am Me, the best I can be." Do not allow others to deindividuate you, to put you into a category, a box, a slot, to turn you into an object. Assert your individuality; politely state your name and your credentials, loud and clear. Insist on the same behavior in others. Make eye contact (remove all eye-concealing sunglasses), and offer information about yourself that reinforces your unique identity. Find common ground with dominant others in influence situations and use it to enhance similarities. Anonymity and secrecy conceal wrongdoing and undermine the human connection. They can become the breeding grounds that generate dehumanization, and, as we now know, dehumanization provides the killing ground for bullies, rapists, torturers, terrorists, and tyrants. Go a step beyond self-individuation.

Work to change whatever social conditions make people feel anonymous. Instead, support practices that make others feel special, so that they too have a sense of personal value and self-worth. Never allow or practice negative stereotyping; words, labels, and jokes can be destructive, if they mock others.

"I respect just authority but rebel against unjust authority." In every situation, work to distinguish between those in authority who, because of their expertise, wisdom, seniority, or special status, deserve respect, and the unjust authority figures who demand our obedience without having any substance. Many who assume the mantle of authority are pseudo-leaders, false prophets, confidence men and women, self-promoters who should not be respected but rather disobeyed and openly exposed to critical evaluation. Parents, teachers, and religious leaders should play more active roles in teaching children this critical differentiation. They should be polite and courteous when such a stance is justified, yet be good, wise children by resisting those authorities who do not deserve their respect. Doing so will reduce our mindless obedience to self-proclaimed authorities whose priorities are not in our best interests.

"I want group acceptance, but value my independence." The lure of acceptance into a desired social group is more powerful than that of the mythical golden ring in *Lord of the Rings*. The power of that desire for acceptance will make some people do almost anything to be accepted and go to even further extremes to avoid rejection by the Group. We are indeed social animals, and usually our social connections benefit us and help us to achieve important goals that we could not achieve alone. However, there are times when conformity to a group norm is counterproductive to the social good. It is imperative to determine when to follow the norm and when to reject it. Ultimately, we live within our own minds, in solitary splendor, and therefore we must be willing and ready to declare our independence regardless of the social rejection it may elicit. It is not easy, especially for young people with a shaky self-image or adults whose self-image is isomorphic with that of their job. Pressures on them to be a "team player," to sacrifice personal morality for the good of the team, are nearly irresistible. What is required is that we step back, get outside opinions, and find new groups that will support our independence and promote our values. There will always be another, different, better group for us.

"I will be more frame-vigilant." Who makes the frame becomes the artist, or the con artist. The way issues are framed is often more influential than the persuasive arguments within their boundaries. Moreover, effective frames can seem not to be frames at all, just sound bites, visual images, slogans, and logos. They influence us without our being conscious of them, and they shape our orientation toward the ideas or issues they promote. For example, voters who favored reducing estate tax benefits for the rich were urged to vote against a "death tax"; the tax was exactly

the same, but its denning term was different. We desire things that are framed as being "scarce," even when they are plentiful. We are averse to things that are framed as potential losses and prefer what is presented to us as a gain, even when the ratio of positive to negative prognoses is the same.²¹ We don't want a 40 percent chance of losing X over Y, but we do want the 60 percent chance of gaining Y over X. The linguist George Lakoff clearly shows in his writings that it is crucial to be aware of frame power and to be vigilant in order to offset its insidious influence on our emotions, thoughts, and votes.²²

"J will balance my time perspective." We can be led to do things that are not really what we believe in when we allow ourselves to become trapped in an expanded present moment. When we stop relying on our sense of past commitments and our sense of future liabilities, we open ourselves to situational temptations to engage in *Lord of the Flies* excesses. By not "going with the flow" when others around you are being abusive or out of control, you are relying on a temporal perspective that stretches beyond present-oriented hedonism or present-oriented fatalism. You are likely to engage in a cost-benefit analysis of your actions in terms of their future consequences. Or you may resist by being sufficiently conscious of a past time frame that contains your personal values and standards. By developing a balanced time perspective in which past, present, and future can be called into action depending on the situation and task at hand, you will be in a better position to act responsibly and wisely than when your time perspective is biased toward reliance on only one or two time frames. Situational power is weakened when past and future combine to contain the excesses of the present.²³ For example, research indicates that righteous Gentiles who helped to hide Dutch Jews from the Nazis did not engage in the kind of rationalizing their neighbors did in generating reasons for *not* helping. These heroes depended upon moral structures derived from their past and never lost sight of a future time when they would look back on this terrible situation and be forced to ask themselves whether they had done the right thing when they chose not to succumb to fear and social pressure.²⁴

"7 will not sacrifice personal or civic freedoms for the illusion of security." The need for security is a powerful determinant of human behavior. We can be manipulated into engaging in actions that are alien to us when faced with alleged threats to our security or the promise of security from danger. More often than not, influence peddlers gain power over us by offering a Faustian contract: You will be safe from harm if you will just surrender some of your freedom, either personal or civic, to that authority. The Mephistophelian tempter will argue that his power to save you depends upon all the people making small sacrifices of this little right or that small freedom. Reject that deal. Never sacrifice basic personal freedoms for the promise of security because the sacrifices are real and immediate and the security is a distant illusion. This is as true in traditional marital arrange-

ments as it is in the commitment of good citizens to the interests of their nation when its leader promises personal safety and national security at the cost of a collective sacrifice of suspending laws, privacy, and freedoms. Erich Fromm's classic *Escape from Freedom* reminds us that this is the first step a fascist leader takes even in a nominally democratic society.

"I can oppose unjust systems." Individuals falter in the face of the intensity of the systems we have described: the military and prison systems as well as those of gangs, cults, fraternities, corporations, and even dysfunctional families. But individual resistance in concert with that of others of the same mind and resolve can combine to make a difference. The next section in this chapter will portray individuals who changed systems by being willing to take the risk of blowing the whistle on corruption within them or by constructively working to change them. Resistance may involve physically removing one's self from a total situation in which all information, rewards, and punishments are controlled. It may involve challenging the groupthink mentality and being able to document all allegations of wrongdoing. It may involve getting help from other authorities, counselors, investigative reporters, or revolutionary compatriots. Systems have enormous power to resist change and withstand even righteous assault. Here is one place where individual acts of heroism to challenge unjust systems and their bad barrel makers are best performed by soliciting others to join one's cause. The system can redefine individual opposition as delusional, a pair of opponents as sharing a *folie à deux*, but with three on your side, you become a force of ideas to be reckoned with.

This ten-step program is really only a starter kit toward building individual resistance and communal resilience against undesirable influences and illegitimate attempts at persuasion. As mentioned, a fuller set of recommendations and relevant research-based references can be found on the Lucifer Effect website under *"Resisting Influence Guide."*

Before moving to the final stop in our journey, celebrating heroes and heroism, I would like to add two final general recommendations. First, be discouraged from venal sins and small transgressions, such as cheating, lying, gossiping, spreading rumors, laughing at racist or sexist jokes, teasing, and bullying. They can become stepping-stones to more serious falls from grace. They serve as mini-facilitators for thinking and acting destructively against your fellow creatures. Second, moderate your in-group biases. That means accepting that your group is special but at the same time respecting the diversity that other groups offer. Fully appreciate the wonder of human variety and its variability. Assuming such a perspective will help you to reduce group biases that lead to derogating others, to prejudice and stereotyping, and to the evils of dehumanization.

THE PARADOXES OF HEROISM

A young woman challenges an authority older than she, forcing him to recognize his complicity in reprehensible deeds that are being perpetrated on his watch. Her confrontation goes further and helps to terminate the abuse of innocent prisoners by their guards. Does her action qualify as "heroic," given that scores of others who had witnessed the prisoners' distress all failed to act against the system when they realized its excesses?

We would like to celebrate heroism and heroes as special acts by special people. However, most people who are held up to this higher plane insist that what they did was not special, was really what everyone should have done in the situation. They refuse to consider themselves "heroes." Maybe such a reaction comes from the ingrained notion we all have—that heroes are supermen and -women, a cut or more above the common breed. Perhaps more than their modesty is at work. Perhaps, rather, it is our general misconception of what it takes to be heroic.

Let's now look at the best in human nature and the transformation of the ordinary into the heroic. We will examine alternative conceptions and definitions of heroism and propose a way to classify different kinds of heroic action; then elaborate on some examples that fall into these categories; and finally design a table of contrasts between the banalities of evil and of heroism. But first, let's go back to the person and the act that started this section and ended the Stanford Prison Experiment.

Recall (from chapter 8) that Christina Maslach was a recently graduated Ph.D. from the Stanford Psychology Department with whom I had become romantically involved. When she saw a chain gang of prisoners being carted to the toilet with bags over their heads as guards shouted orders at them and she witnessed my apparent indifference to their suffering, she exploded.

Her later account of what she felt at the time, and how she interpreted her actions, tells us a good deal about the complex phenomenon of heroism.²⁵

What he [Zimbardo] got was an incredibly emotional out-burst from me (I am usually a rather contained person). I was angry and frightened and in tears. I said something like, *"What you are doing to those boys is a terrible thing!"*

So what is the important story to emerge from my role as "the Terminator" of the Stanford Prison Experiment? I think there are several themes I would like to highlight. First, however, let me say what the story is not. Contrary to the standard (and trite) American myth, the Stanford Prison Experiment is not a story about the lone individual who defies the majority. Rather, it is a story about the majority—about how everyone who had some contact with the prison study (participants, researchers, observers, consultants, family, and friends) got so completely sucked into it. The

power of the situation to overwhelm personality and the best of intentions is the key story line here.

So why was my reaction so different? The answer, I think, lies in two facts: I was a late entrant into the situation, and I was an "outsider." Unlike everyone else, I had not been a consenting participant in the study. Unlike everyone else, I had no socially defined role within that prison context. Unlike everyone else, I was not there every day, being carried along as the situation changed and escalated bit by bit. Thus the situation I entered at the end of the week was not truly the "same" as it was for everyone else—I lacked their prior consensual history, place, and perspective. For them, the situation was construed as being still within the range of normalcy; for me, it was not—it was a madhouse.

As an outsider, I did not have the option of specific social rules that I could disobey, so my dissent took a different form—of challenging the situation itself. This challenge has been seen by some as a heroic action, but at the time it did not feel especially heroic. To the contrary, it was a very scary and lonely experience being the deviant, doubting my judgment of both situations and people, and maybe even my worth as a research social psychologist.

Christina then raises a profound qualification. For an act of personal defiance to be worthy of being considered "heroic," it must attempt to change the system, to correct an injustice, to right a wrong:

I had to consider also in the back of my mind what I might do if Phil continued with the SPE despite my determined challenge to him. Would I have gone to the higher authorities, the department chair, dean, or Human Subjects Committee, to blow the whistle on it? I can't say for sure, and I am glad it never came to that. But in retrospect, that action would have been essential in translating my values into meaningful action. When one complains about some injustice and the complaint only results in cosmetic modifications while the situation flows on unchanged, then that dissent and disobedience are not worth much.

She expands on a point that was raised in our discussion of the Milgram research, where it was argued that verbal dissent was only ego balm for the "teacher," to make him feel better about the terrible things he was doing to his "learner." *Behavioral disobedience* was necessary to challenge authority. However, in the Milgram experiment case there was never disobedience more significant than a silent retreat as each teacher-perpetrator exited from the distressing situation without changing it in any meaningful way. Christina's take on what the heroic minority should have done after they opposed the authority figure has never been framed so eloquently:

What did it matter to the classic original Milgram study that one third of the participants disobeyed and refused to go all the way? Suppose it was not an experiment; suppose Milgram's "cover story" were true, that researchers were studying the role of punishment in learning and memory and would be testing about one thousand participants in a host of experiments to answer their practical questions about the educational value of judiciously administered punishment. If you disobeyed, refused to continue, got paid, and left silently, your heroic action would not prevent the next 999 participants from experiencing the same distress. It would be an isolated event without social impact unless it included going to the next step of challenging the entire structure and assumptions of the research. Disobedience by the individual must get translated into systemic disobedience that forces change in the situation or agency itself and not just in some operating conditions. It is too easy for evil situations to co-opt the intentions of good dissidents or even heroic rebels by giving them medals for their deeds and a gift certificate for keeping their opinions to themselves.

What Is the Stuff of Heroism and Heroes?

When does a person who engages in an action that qualifies as a heroic act, on the basis of criteria we will lay out next, not become a "hero"? Further, under what circumstances might her or his act be considered not heroic but cowardly?

Christina's action had the positive consequence of terminating a situation that had spiraled out of control and began to do more harm than had been intended at its inception. She does not consider herself a hero because she was simply expressing her personal feelings and beliefs that were translated (by me as principal investigator) into the outcome she desired. She did not have to "blow the whistle" to higher authorities to intervene in order to stop the runaway experiment.

Compare her condition to that of two potential heroes in that study, Prisoner Clay-416 and Prisoner "Sarge." Both of them openly defied the authority of the guards and suffered considerably for doing so. Clay's hunger strike and refusal to eat the sausages challenged the guards' complete control and should have rallied his peers to stand up for their rights. It did not. Sarge's refusal to utter public obscenities despite the harassment by Guard "John Wayne" also should have been viewed as heroic defiance by his peers and rallied them not to yield to such abuse. It did not. Why not? In both cases, they acted alone, without sharing their values or intentions with the other prisoners, without asking for their support and recognition. Therefore, it was easy for the guards to label them "troublemakers" and to brand them as the culprits responsible for the guards' deprivations of the rest of the prisoners. Their acts could be considered heroic, but they cannot be considered heroes because they never acted to change the whole abusive system by bringing other dissidents on board.

Another aspect of heroism is raised by their example. Heroism and heroic status are always social attributions. Someone other than the actor confers that honor on the person and the deed. There must be social consensus about the significance and meaningful consequence of an act for it to be deemed heroic, and for its agent to be called a hero. Wait! Not so fast! A Palestinian suicide bomber who is killed in the act of murdering innocent Jewish civilians is given heroic status in Palestine and demonic status in Israel. Similarly, aggressors may be construed as heroic freedom fighters or as cowardly agents of terrorism, depending on who is conferring the attribution.²⁶

This means that definitions of heroism are always culture-bound and time-bound. To this day, puppeteers enact the legend of Alexander the Great before children in remote villages of Turkey. In the towns where his command posts were set up and his soldiers intermarried with villagers, Alexander is a great hero, but in towns that were simply conquered on his relentless quest to rule the known world, Alexander is portrayed as a great villain, more than a thousand years after his death.²⁷

What is more, to become part of any culture's history a hero's acts must be recorded and preserved by those who are literate and who have the power to write history or to pass it on in an oral tradition. Poor, indigenous, colonized, illiterate people have few widely acknowledged heroes because there is no record of their acts.

Defining Heroes and Heroism

Heroism has never been systematically investigated in the behavioral sciences.²⁸ Heroes and heroism seem to be best explored by literature, art, myth, and cinema. Multiple data sources document the ills of human existence: homicides and suicides, crime rates, prison populations, poverty levels, and the base rate of schizophrenia in a given population. Similar quantitative data for positive human activities are not easy to come by. We don't keep records of how many acts of charity, kindness, or compassion occur in a community in the course of a year. Only occasionally do we learn of a heroic act. Such apparently low base rates lead us to believe that heroism is rare and that heroes are the truly exceptional. Nevertheless, renewed interest in the importance of addressing the good in human nature has arisen from the new research and empirical rigor of the Positive Psychology movement. Spearheaded by Martin Seligman and his colleagues, this movement has created a paradigm shift toward accentuating the positive in human nature and minimizing psychology's long-held focus on the negative.²⁹

Currently accepted conceptions of heroism emphasize primarily its physical risk without adequately addressing other components of heroic acts, such as nobility of purpose and nonviolent acts of personal sacrifice. Emanating from the analyses of human virtues by positive psychologists is a set of six major categories of virtuous behavior that enjoy almost universal recognition across cultures. The classification includes: wisdom and knowledge, courage, humanity, justice, tern-

perance, and transcendence. Of these, courage, justice, and transcendence are the central characteristics of heroism. Transcendence includes beliefs and actions that go beyond the limits of self.

Heroism focuses us on what is right with human nature. We care about heroic stories because they serve as powerful reminders that people are capable of resisting evil, of not giving in to temptations, of rising above mediocrity, and of heeding the call to action and to service when others fail to act.

Many modern dictionaries describe heroism as "gallantry" or "bravery," and these in turn are described as courage, and courage returns us, once again, to heroics. However, older dictionaries were at pains to break down the concept, offering subtle distinctions among words used to describe heroic acts. For example, the *1913 Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary* associates heroism with courage, bravery, fortitude, intrepidity, gallantry, and valor.³⁰ As part of the entry for each of these words, the dictionary's editor tried to ensure that the reader understood how they differed.

Courage is that firmness of spirit and swell of soul, that meets danger without fear. Bravery is daring and impetuous courage, like that of one who has the reward continually in view and displays his courage in daring acts. Fortitude has often been styled "passive courage" and consists in the habit of encountering danger and enduring pain with a steadfast and unbroken spirit. Valor is courage exhibited in war (against living opponents) and cannot be applied to single combat; it is never used figuratively. Intrepidity is firm, unshaken courage. Gallantry is adventurous courage, which courts danger with a high and cheerful spirit.

The dictionary goes on to elaborate, in footnote examples, that a man may show courage, fortitude, or intrepidity in the common pursuits of life, as well as in war. Valor, bravery, and gallantry are displayed in the contest of arms. Valor belongs only to battle; bravery may be shown in single combat; gallantry may be manifested either in attack or defense; but in the latter case, the defense is usually turned into an attack. Heroism may call into exercise all these modifications of courage. It is a contempt of danger, not from ignorance or inconsiderate levity but from a noble devotion to some great cause and a just confidence of being able to meet danger in the spirit of such a cause.³¹

Military Heroes

Historically, most examples of heroism have emphasized acts of courage that involved bravery, gallantry, and risk of serious physical injury or death. According to the psychologists Alice Eagly and Selwyn Becker, the combination of courage and nobility of purpose is more likely to result in someone being considered a hero than just courage alone.³² The idea of nobility in heroism is often tacit and elusive. Generally the risk of life and limb or of personal sacrifice is much more conspicuous. The heroic ideal of the war hero has served as a theme from ancient epics to modern journalism.

Achilles, commander of Greek forces in the Trojan War, is often held up as an

archetypal war hero.³³ Achilles' engagement in combat was based on his commitment to a military code that defined his actions as gallant. Yet, while his acts were heroic, his overriding motivation was the pursuit of glory and renown that would make him immortal in the minds of men after his death.

The historian Lucy Hughes-Hallett argued that "A hero may sacrifice himself so that others might live, or so that he himself may live forever in other's memories.... Achilles will give anything, including life itself, to assert his own uniqueness, to endow his particular life with significance, and to escape oblivion."³⁴ The desire to risk one's physical being in exchange for lasting recognition across generations may seem a relic from another era, yet it still warrants serious consideration in our evaluation of modern heroic behavior.

This historical view of the hero also suggests that there is something innately special about heroes. Hughes-Hallett wrote, "There are men, wrote Aristotle, so godlike, so exceptional, that they naturally, by right of their extraordinary gifts, transcend all moral judgment or constitutional control: 'There is no law which embraces men of that caliber: they are themselves law.' " One definition of heroism arises from this Aristotelian conception: "It is the expression of a superb spirit. It is associated with courage and integrity and a disdain for the cramping compromises by means of which the unheroic majority manage their lives—attributes that are widely considered noble.... [Heroes are] capable of something momentous—the defeat of an enemy, the salvation of a race, the preservation of a political system, the completion of a voyage—which *no one else* [italics added] could have accomplished."³⁵

This concept of conspicuous service that distinguishes a warrior from his peers persists to this day in our military services. The U.S. Department of Defense recognizes heroism by awarding a number of medals for acts considered to be above and beyond the call of duty. The highest of these is the Medal of Honor, which has been awarded to about 3,400 soldiers.³⁶ Rules governing the Medal of Honor emphasize the role of gallantry and intrepidity, the willingness to enter into the heart of a battle without flinching that clearly distinguishes the individual's performance from that of his fellow soldiers.³⁷ Similarly, the British military awards the Victoria Cross as its highest medal for heroism, defined as valorous conduct in the face of an enemy.³⁸

The ideal of the military hero is clearly echoed in other contexts, and it includes those who routinely risk their health and lives in the line of duty, such as police officers, firefighters, and paramedics. The insignia worn by firefighters is a version of the Maltese Cross, a symbolic acknowledgment of the creed of heroic service that Knights of Malta were sworn to live by in the Middle Ages. The Maltese Cross in its original form remains a symbol of gallantry for the military in the British Victoria Cross, and from 1919 to 1942 in the U.S. Navy's version of the Medal of Honor, the Tiffany Cross.

Civilian Heroes

If Achilles is the archetypal war hero, Socrates holds the same rank as a civic hero. His teaching was so threatening to the authorities of Athens that he became the target of government censure and was eventually tried and sentenced to death for refusing to renounce his views. When we equate the military heroism of Achilles with the civil heroism of Socrates, it becomes clear that while heroic acts are usually made in service to others or the fundamental moral principles of a society, the hero often works at the nexus of constructive and destructive forces. Hughes-Hallett suggests that "the wings of opportunity are fledged with the feathers of death." She proposes that heroes expose themselves to mortal danger in pursuit of immortality. Both Achilles and Socrates, powerful exemplars of heroism, go to their deaths in service of the divergent codes of conduct by which they chose to live.

Socrates' choice to die for his ideals serves as an eternal normative reminder of the power of civil heroism. We are told that at the hour of Socrates' sentencing, he invoked the image of Achilles in defending his decision to die rather than to submit to an arbitrary law that would silence his opposition to the system he opposed. His example brings to mind the similar heroism of the U.S. Revolutionary War patriot Nathan Hale, whose defiant dying stand will later be used to illustrate one type of heroic action.

Consider the daring deed of the "unknown rebel" who confronted a line of seventeen oncoming tanks that were aimed at smashing the freedom rally of the Chinese Democracy Movement at Tiananmen Square, Peking, on June 5, 1989.



This young man stopped the deadly advance of a column of tanks for thirty minutes and then climbed atop the lead tank, reportedly demanding of its driver, "Why are you here? My city is in chaos because of you. Go back, turn around and stop killing my people." The anonymous "Tank Man" became an instant international symbol of resistance; he faced the ultimate test of personal courage with honor and delineated forever the proud image of an individual standing in defiance against a military juggernaut. The image of that confrontation was broadcast around the world and made him a universal hero. There are conflicting stories about what happened to him as a consequence of his act, some reporting his imprisonment, others his execution, others his anonymous escape. Regardless of what became of him, his status as a civil hero was acknowledged when the Tank Man was included in the list of *Time* magazine's 100 most influential people of the twentieth century (April 1998).

The physical risk demanded of civilians who act heroically differs from a soldier's or first responder's heroic acts, because professionals are bound by duty and a code of conduct and because they are trained. Thus, the standard for duty-bound and non-duty-bound physical-risk heroism may differ, but the style of engagement and potential sacrifice the action demands is very similar.

Civilian heroes who perform acts that involve immediate physical risk are recognized in awards, such as the Carnegie Hero Award in the United States and the George Cross in Britain.³⁹ British and Australian authorities also recognize heroic actions that involve groups.⁴⁰ For example, Australia recognized "a group of students who tackled and restrained an armed offender after a crossbow attack on a fellow student at Tomaree High School, Salamander, New South Wales" in 2005 by awarding a group bravery citation. The citation is, "For a collective act of bravery, by a group of persons in extraordinary circumstances, that is considered worthy of recognition." Once again, a seemingly simple concept is broadened from the behavior of a solitary hero to that of a collective hero, which we will consider shortly.

Physical-Risk Heroes Versus Social-Risk Heroes

One definition offered by psychologists cites physical risk as the defining feature of heroes. For Becker and Eagly, heroes are "individuals who choose to take risks on behalf of one or more other people, despite the possibility of dying or suffering serious physical consequences from these actions."⁴¹ Other motives for heroism, such as principle-driven heroism, are acknowledged but not elaborated on. It seems curious that psychologists would promote so narrow a prototype of heroism and exclude other forms of personal risk that might qualify as heroic acts, such as risks to one's career, the possibility of imprisonment, or the loss of status. A challenge to their definition came from the psychologist Peter Martens, who noted that it singled out only heroes who stood for an idea or principle—the nobility component of heroism that betokens the Aristotelian hero among the proletariat.⁴²

Senator John McCain, himself a hero who resisted giving any military information in spite of being subjected to extreme torture, believes that the concept of heroism might be broadened beyond physical risk and suffering. McCain contends that "the standard of courage remains, as I think it should, acts that risk life or limb or other very serious personal injuries for the sake of others or to uphold a virtue—a standard often upheld by battlefield heroics but one that is certainly not limited to martial valor."⁴³ Each of these descriptions of heroic behavior equates the characteristics found in physical and civil heroism while pointing out critical differences between them.

The various conceptions of heroism also roughly map onto ideas of courage, justice, and transcendence that Seligman and his colleagues developed as part of their classification system for virtues and strengths. For example, the virtue of courage is erected on four character strengths that include authenticity, bravery (roughly similar to intrepidity), persistence (similar to fortitude), and zest. Justice is noted as another virtue. Fairness, leadership, and teamwork are subsumed within this virtue. In practice, the concept of service to a noble cause or ideal is often ultimately a matter of justice, for example, the abolition of slavery. Finally, transcendence is another of the virtues that touches on heroism insofar as it is the strength that forces connection to the larger universe and gives meaning to our actions and existence. While not articulated in the literature on heroism, transcendence may be related to Webster's 1913 conception of fortitude in heroic behavior. Transcendence may allow an individual involved in a heroic act to remain detached from the negative consequences, anticipated or revealed, that are associated with his or her behavior. In order to be heroic, one must rise above the immediate risks and perils that heroism necessarily entails, either by reframing the nature of the risks or by altering their significance relevant to "higher-order" values.

A New Taxonomy of Heroism

Stimulated by thinking about the heroic behaviors associated with the Stanford Prison Experiment, I began a fuller exploration of this intriguing topic in dialogues with my psychology colleague Zeno Franco. We first broadened the conception of heroic risk, then proposed an enhanced definition of heroism, and finally generated a new taxonomy of heroism. It seemed apparent that risk or sacrifice should not be limited to an immediate threat to physical integrity or death. The risk component in heroism can be any serious threat to the quality of life. For example, heroism might include persistent behavior in the face of known long-term threats to health or serious financial consequences; to the loss of social or economic status; or to ostracism. Because this broadens the definition of heroism considerably, it also seemed necessary to rule out some forms of apparent heroism that might, in fact, not be heroic but "pseudoheroic."

In his book *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America*, Daniel Boorstin deflates the modern confluence of heroism with celebrity. "Two centuries ago

when a great man appeared, people looked for God's purpose in him; today we look for his press agent____Among the ironic frustrations of our age, none is more tantalizing than these efforts of ours to satisfy our extravagant expectations of human greatness. Vainly do we make scores of artificial celebrities grow where nature planted only a single hero."⁴⁴

Another example of what heroism is *not* can be seen in a children's book on American heroes that offers fifty examples.⁴⁵ Its stories of heroism actually point to a group of activities or roles that are necessary but insufficient to warrant true heroic status. All of the examples are role models upheld as worthy of emulation, but only a fraction meet the definitional requirements of hero status. Not all mavericks, warriors, or saints are heroes. The hero must embody a combination of deliberate nobility and potential sacrifice. Sometimes individuals are accorded hero status when not deserved by their actions, but they become so for some purpose of an agency or government. These "pseudoheroes" are media creations promoted by powerful systemic forces.⁴⁶

Heroes are rewarded in various ways for their heroic deeds, but if they anticipate secondary gain at the time of their act they must necessarily be disqualified from heroic status. However, if secondary gains are accrued subsequent to their act without prior anticipation of or motivation to attain them, the act still qualifies as heroic. The point is that a heroic act is *sociocentric* and not *egocentric*.

Heroism can be defined as having four key features: (a) it must be engaged in voluntarily; (b) it must involve a risk or potential sacrifice, such as the threat of death, an immediate threat to physical integrity, a long-term threat to health, or the potential for serious degradation of one's quality of life; (c) it must be conducted in service to one or more other people or the community as a whole; and (d) it must be without secondary, extrinsic gain anticipated at the time of the act.

Heroism in service of a noble idea is usually not as dramatic as physical-risk heroism. However, physical-risk heroism is often the result of a snap decision, a moment of action. Further, physical-risk heroism usually involves a probability, not the certainty, of serious injury or death. The individual performing the act is generally removed from the situation after a short period of time. On the other hand, it might be argued that some forms of civil heroism are more heroic than physical risk forms of heroism. People such as Nelson Mandela, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Dr. Albert Schweitzer willingly and knowingly submitted to the trials of heroic civil activity day after day for much of their adult lives. In this sense, the risk associated with physical-risk heroism is better termed *peril*, while the risk involved in civil heroism is considered *sacrifice*.

Sacrifice entails costs that are not time-limited. Typically, civil heroes have the opportunity to carefully review their actions and to weigh the consequences of their decisions. Each might have chosen to retreat from the cause he championed because the cost of his or her actions had become too burdensome, yet they did not. Each of these individuals risked their quality of life on many levels. Their

activities had serious consequences: arrest, imprisonment, torture, and risk to family members, and even assassination.

Returning to Webster's 1913 definition of heroism, we may say that upholding the highest civil ideas in the face of danger is the core concept of heroism. Taking physical risk is only one means of meeting the dangers that can be encountered in performing heroic acts. We are reminded that heroism "is a contempt of danger, not from ignorance or inconsiderate levity, but from a *noble devotion to some great cause* [italics added], and a just confidence of being able to meet danger in the spirit of such a cause." The danger may be immediately life threatening, or it may be insidious. Consider one of Nelson Mandela's statements at the beginning of his twenty-seven-year-long imprisonment for opposing the tyranny of apartheid:

During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to the struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But, if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.⁴⁷

Based on this more flexible definition of heroism, Zeno Franco and I created a working taxonomy that includes twelve subcategories of heroism, distinguishing two subcategories within the military, physical-risk heroic type and ten subcategories with the civilian, social-risk type. In addition, the taxonomy identifies discriminating characteristics of each of the dozen hero types, as well as the form of risk they encounter, and gives a few examples drawn from historical and contemporary sources.

The taxonomy was developed *a priori*, based on reasoning and literature reviews. It is neither empirically grounded nor fixed but is rather a working model that is open to modification by new research findings and readers' qualifications and additions. It will be obvious that the subcategories, definitions, risks, and exemplars offered are all deeply culturally and temporally bound. They reflect a largely European-American, middle-class, adult, postmodern perspective. Incorporating other perspectives will surely expand and enrich it.

Courage, Intrepidity
Military Heroism—
Civil Heroism
Social Heroism—Fortitude,

| Subtype | Definition | Risk/ Sacrifice | Exemplars |
|---|---|--|--|
| 1. Military and Other Duty-bound Physical-Risk Heroes | Individuals involved in military or emergency response careers that involve repeated exposure to high-risk situations; heroic acts must exceed the call of duty | Serious Injury Death | Achilles Medal of Honor recipients Hugh Thompson Adm. James Stockdale |
| 2. Civil Heroes—Non-duty-bound Physical-Risk Heroes | Civilians who attempt to save others from physical harm or death while knowingly putting their own life at risk | Serious Injury Death | Carnegie heroes |
| 3. Religious figures | Dedicated, life-long religious service embodying highest principles or breaks new religious/spiritual ground. Often serves as a teacher or public exemplar of service | Sacrifice of self in ascetic path Upsetting religious orthodoxy | Buddha Mohammed St. Francis of Assisi Mother Teresa |

Social Heroism—Fortitude, Courage, Intrepidity

| Subtype | Definition | Risk/ Sacrifice | Exemplars |
|----------------------------------|--|---|---|
| 4. Politico-Religious figures | Religious leaders who have turned to politics to affect wider change, or politicians who have a deep spiritual belief system that informs political practice | Assassination Imprisonment | Mohandas Gandhi Martin Luther King, Jr. Nelson Mandela Rev. Desmond Tutu |
| 5. Martyrs | Religious or political figures who knowingly (sometimes deliberately) put their lives in jeopardy in the service of a cause | Certain or near certain death in the service of a cause or ideal | Jesus Socrates Joan of Arc José Martí Steve Biko |
| 6. Political or Military leaders | Typically lead a nation or group during a time of difficulty; serve to unify nation, provide shared vision, and may embody qualities that are seen as necessary for the group's survival | Assassination Opposition Being voted out of office Smear campaigns Imprisonment | Abraham Lincoln Robert E. Lee Franklin Roosevelt Winston Churchill Vaclav Havel |

Social Heroism—Fortitude, Courage, Intrepidity

| Subtype | Definition | Risk/ Sacrifice | Exemplars |
|---|---|---|--|
| 7. Adventurer/ Explorer/ Discoverer | Individual who explores unknown geographical area or uses novel and unproven transportation methods | Physical health Serious injury Death Opportunity costs (length of journey) | Odysseus Alexander the Great Amelia Earhart Yuri Gagarin |
| 8. Scientific (Discovery) heroes | Individual who explores unknown area of science, uses novel and unproven research methods, or discovers new scientific information seen as valuable to humanity | Inability to convince others of the importance of findings Professional ostracism Financial losses | Galileo Edison Madam Curie Einstein |
| 9. Good Samaritan | Individuals who step in to help others in need: situation involves considerable disincentives for altruism; may not involve immediate physical risk | Punitive sanctions from authorities Arrest Torture Death Opportunity costs Ostracism | Holocaust rescuers Harriet Tubman Albert Schweitzer Richard Clark Richard Rescorla |

Social Heroism—Fortitude, Courage, Intrepidity

| Subtype | Definition | Risk/ Sacrifice | Exemplars |
|------------------------------|--|--|---|
| 10. Odds beater/ Underdog | Individuals who overcome handicap or adverse conditions and succeed in spite of circumstances and provide model for others | Failure Rejection Scorn Envy | Horatio Alger Helen Keller Eleanor Roosevelt Rosa Parks |
| 11. Bureau- cracy heroes | Employees in large organizations in controversial arguments within or between agencies; typically involves standing Arm on principle despite intense pressures | Jeopardize carefully groomed career Professional ostracism Loss of social status Financial losses Loss of credibility Risk to health | Louis Pasteur Edward Tolman Barry Marshall |
| 12. Whistle- blowers | Individuals who are aware of illegal or unethical activities in an organization who report the activity without expectation of reward | Jeopardize carefully groomed career Professional ostracism Loss of social status Financial losses Loss of credibility Physical reprisal | Ron Ridenhour Cynthia Cooper Coleen Rowley Deborah Layton Christina Maslach Joe Darby Sherron Watkins |

A Sampling of Hero Profiles

Putting some flesh on the bare bones of heroism both humanizes the conception and illustrates its many forms. I will profile a dozen individuals that are particularly interesting or that I know personally. Having argued that situations make heroes, we can use some major situational markers to cluster some of them, such as apartheid, McCarthyism, Vietnam and Iraq wars, and the Jonestown mass suicides/murders.

Apartheid Heroes

At the vanguard of efforts to promote freedom and human dignity are special kinds of heroes who are willing to engage in lifelong battles against systemic oppression. In recent times, Mohandas Gandhi and Nelson Mandela took heroic paths that led to their engaging and dismantling two systems of apartheid. In 1919, Gandhi began passive resistance to Britain's authority over India. He was imprisoned for two years. Over the next twenty years, he struggled for the liberation of India, for equal treatment of members of the Hindu class system, and for religious tolerance. World War II delayed the advent of India's self-determination, but in 1948 the country finally celebrated its independence from Great Britain. Gandhi was assassinated shortly thereafter, but he became the exemplar of enduring nonviolent resistance to oppression.⁴⁸

South Africa developed a formalized, legalized apartheid structure in 1948 that prevailed until 1994 and that virtually enslaved the native black population. Nelson Mandela was tried for inciting strikes and protest meetings and on other charges in 1962. He spent the next twenty-seven years incarcerated in the notorious Robben Island prison. During the time he was imprisoned, Mandela and his fellow political prisoners used the prison system itself to create both a real and symbolic resistance situation that served to galvanize the people of South Africa and the world to end the system of apartheid. He was able to transform the self-generated identities of several generations of prisoners by leading them to understand that they were political prisoners acting with dignity to support a just cause. But in the process of doing so, he helped to transform the attitudes and beliefs of many of the guards, and to challenge the entire prison system as well.⁴⁹

Anti-McCarthyism Heroes

The menace of global communism was from the 1950s until the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall what the fear of global terrorism is now: it dictated national policy, it fomented wars, and it entailed an enormous waste of resources and lives. It is important to remember McCarthyism because it was a form of repressive, authoritarian quasi-government control that occurred in a mature democracy. Those who defused the anti-Communist hysteria propelled by Senator Joe McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee in the United States never received the enduring, universal recognition that Gandhi or Mandela

enjoyed. Nevertheless, their opposition to injustice meets our definitional criteria.

At the height of the McCarthy era, the University of California initiated a "loyalty oath" that all faculty members were required to sign. A psychology professor, Edward Tolman, refused to sign the oath and led a small group of professors who opposed the policy. On July 18, 1950, Tolman submitted a letter of protest to the president of the University of California, Robert Sproul. In August of that year, the Regents of the University of California fired thirty-one professors, including Tolman, for their refusal to sign the loyalty oath. Later that month, the professors filed suit for reinstatement under *Tolman vs. Underhill*. In 1952, the State Supreme Court found in favor of these nonsigners. During the loyalty oath dispute, Tolman encouraged other young faculty members to sign the oath and leave the fight against it to him and others who could (financially) afford to continue the struggle. Tolman, a soft-spoken academician with no prior history of political involvement, became deeply respected for his courageous stance by many professors and staff in the University of California system.⁵⁰

Other heroes of the McCarthy era included investigative journalists such as George Seldes and I. F. Stone and the cartoonists Herb Block and Daniel Fitzpatrick. During this period, I. F. Stone's name was listed on a Senate Internal Security Subcommittee list of eighty-two "most active and typical sponsors of Communist-front organizations." As a consequence of being blacklisted, Stone was forced to sue in order to get his press card.⁵¹

Moving from the imaginary Communist menace that faced the United States to the palpable daily menace and cruelty of national domination by a Communist regime, we meet Vaclav Havel. Havel is extraordinary in the sense that the Dalai Lama is, and is ordinary in the sense that a former stagehand and writer is. However, he was the architect of the "Velvet Revolution" that toppled the Czech Communist regime in 1989. Before finally convincing the government that its totalitarian brand of communism was destructive of all that Czechoslovakia stood for, Havel was imprisoned repeatedly for nearly five years. He was a leading figure in drafting the Charter 77 manifesto and organizing the Czechoslovak human rights movement of intellectuals, students, and workers. As a passionate supporter of nonviolent resistance, Havel is famous for having articulated the concept of "post-totalitarianism," which challenged his countrymen to believe they had the power to change a repressive regime that they inadvertently upheld by passively submitting to its authority. In letters he wrote from prison to his wife and in speeches, Havel made it evident that the first step in overthrowing an unacceptable social and political order is for citizens to realize that they are comfortably living within a lie. This unpretentious, shy man was made president by the Federal Assembly, and when the Communist government finally yielded to the power of the people, Vaclav Havel was democratically elected the first president of the new Czech Republic. He continues now, as a famous private citizen, to oppose political injustice and to support efforts for global peace.⁵²

Vietnam War Heroes

Two very different kinds of military heroism under conditions of extreme duress appear in the actions of James Stockdale and Hugh Thompson. Stockdale, a former Stanford colleague at the Hoover Institute (and guest lecturer in my course on mind control), rose to the rank of vice admiral before his death at eighty-one in July 2005. He is considered by many to be one of the clearest examples of military heroism in the twentieth century for having endured extreme torture sessions repeatedly over seven years of imprisonment and never giving in to his Viet Cong captors. His key to survival was relying on his earlier training in philosophy, which enabled him to call to mind the teaching of the Stoic philosophers, notably Epictetus and Seneca. Stockdale's focus enabled him to distance himself psychologically from the torture and pain that he could not control and galvanize his thinking around those things he could control in his prison surroundings. He created a self-willed code of conduct for himself and others imprisoned with him. Survival under conditions of extreme trauma requires that one's will never be broken by the enemy, as when Epictetus was tortured by Roman rulers thousands of years earlier.⁵³

Hugh Thompson is distinguished for his extreme courage in a nearly lethal battle—against his own soldiers! One of the most terrible events in the history of the U.S. military was the My Lai massacre, which took place on March 16, 1968, during the Vietnam War. An estimated 504 Vietnamese civilians were rounded up and killed in Son My village (My Lai 4 and My Khe 4) by American soldiers and their Charlie Company officers, Captain Ernest Medina and Lieutenant William Calley, Jr.⁵⁴ In response to military losses from ambushes and booby traps, the military command issued an order for the destruction of "Pinkville," a code name for a Communist Viet Cong village. Finding no enemy warriors there, the soldiers gathered up all the inhabitants of the village—elderly men, woman, children, and babies—and machine-gunned them to death (some they burned alive, raped, and scalped).

While this massacre was unfolding, a helicopter, piloted by Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, Jr., which was flying overhead to provide air cover, set down to help a group of Vietnamese civilians who appeared to still be alive. As Thompson and his two-man crew returned to their helicopter after having set smoke signal markers, they saw Captain Medina and other soldiers running over to shoot the wounded. Thompson flew his helicopter back over My Lai village, where soldiers were about to blow up a hut full of wounded Vietnamese. He ordered the massacre to stop and threatened to open fire with the helicopter's heavy machine guns on any American soldier or officer who refused his order.

Although the commissioned lieutenants outranked Thompson, he did not let rank get in the way of morality. When he ordered that civilians be taken out of the bunker, a lieutenant countered that they would be taken out with grenades. Refusing to back down, Thompson replied, "I can do better than that. Keep your peo-

ple in place. My guns are on you." He then ordered two other helicopters to fly in for medical evacuation of the eleven wounded Vietnamese. His plane returned to rescue a baby he had spotted still clinging to her dead mother. Only after Thompson reported the massacre to his superiors were cease-fire orders given.⁵⁵

For his dramatic intervention and the media coverage it received, Thompson became persona non grata in the military and for punishment was required to fly the most dangerous helicopter missions again and again. He was shot down five times, breaking his backbone and suffering lasting psychological scars from his nightmare experience. It took thirty years before the military recognized his heroic deeds and those of his companions, Glenn Andreotta and Lawrence Colburn, with the Soldier's Medal for Heroism, the Army's highest award for bravery not involving direct contact with the enemy. Hugh Thompson died in January 2006. (Paradoxically, Lieutenant Calley was treated as a hero in some quarters, even with a song in his honor that cracked *Billboard's* Top 40 in 1971.⁵⁶)

Whistle-Blowers in the Vietnam and Iraq Wars and Women on the Home Front

Less dramatic forms of heroism occur when an individual verbally confronts a system with news it does not want to hear, in this case of the complicity of officers and enlisted men in the abuse and murder of civilians. Two such soldiers are Ron Ridenhour, who exposed the My Lai massacre, and Joe Darby, the Army Reservist whose heroic action exposed the Abu Ghraib abuses and tortures.

Although the officers involved in the My Lai episode sought to cover up the atrocity, Ron Ridenhour, a twenty-two-year-old private newly sent to Vietnam, did all he could to uncover it. He had heard about the event from five eyewitness accounts of soldiers who had been at the bloody scene, had independently investigated it in Vietnam, and had continued to do so after returning home. Ridenhour sent a letter to President Nixon, members of Congress, and officials within the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army arguing that a public investigation of the My Lai massacre was needed. In his letter, Ridenhour made it clear that "as a conscientious citizen I have no desire to besmirch the image of American servicemen in the eyes of the world." However, he insisted that an investigation was essential (a year after the incident). He was largely ignored, but persisted until his righteous cause was recognized. Ridenhour demonstrates the principled heroic stance in his letters to these officials: "I remain irrevocably persuaded that if you and I do truly believe in the principles of justice and equality for every man, however humble, before the law, that form the very backbone that this country is founded on, then we must press forward a widespread and public investigation of this matter with all our combined efforts."⁵⁷

Following the exposé by a young investigative reporter, Seymour Hersh, who got valuable material from Ridenhour, a major investigation was ordered and its findings fill four volumes of the Peers Report, released on March 14, 1970. Although up to twenty officers and enlisted men were identified as in various ways being involved in this massacre, only Lieutenant William Calley, Jr., was convicted

and sentenced for the crimes. Although given a life sentence, his punishment was limited to a light term of three and a half years under house arrest, and he was later pardoned by the Secretary of the Army.⁵⁸ Incidentally, Ridenhour went on to a career as a journalist, but he told me in conversation that he always felt distrusted by many people in Washington, D.C. for having exposed the My Lai massacre.

By now we know too well the events surrounding the abuses heaped upon prisoners at Abu Ghraib's hard site, Tier 1 A, by MPs and others involved in intelligence gathering. This scandalous behavior was brought to a sudden halt when dramatic images of the torture, humiliation, and violence were forced upon the attention of military commanders. It was a most ordinary young man who did an extraordinary thing that caused the halt to the horror. What he did took great personal fortitude, in the opinion of my military contacts, because he was a lowly Army Reserve specialist who put a superior officer on notice that something horrendous was happening on his watch.

When Darby first looked at the pictures on a CD that buddy Charles Graner had given him, he thought they were pretty funny. "To me, that pyramid of naked Iraqis, when you first see it, is hilarious ____ When it came up out of nowhere like that, I just laughed," Darby recalled in a recent interview{sic}." However, as he viewed more of them—the sexually explicit ones, the ones showing the beatings, and the others—his affect shifted. "It just didn't sit right with me. I couldn't stop thinking about it. After about three days, I made a decision to turn the pictures in." It was a tough decision for Darby, because he realized fully the moral conflict facing him. "You have to understand: I'm not the kind of guy to rat somebody out ____ But this crossed the line to me. I had the choice between what I knew was morally right and my loyalty to other soldiers. I couldn't have it both ways."⁶⁰

Darby was afraid of retaliation against him by soldiers in his company unless he remained anonymous in this action.⁶¹ He burned another CD copy of the pictures, typed an anonymous letter about them, put them in a plain manila envelope, and handed it to an agent at the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), remarking simply that they were left in his office. Shortly after, Special Agent Tyler Pieron grilled him and got Darby to admit: "I'm the one who put them in there," and then he gave a sworn statement. He was able to maintain his anonymity until Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld unexpectedly "outed" Darby during the 2004 congressional hearings on these abuses—while Darby was having dinner with hundreds of soldiers in the mess hall. He was whisked away, and eventually concealed in military protective custody for the next several years. "But I don't regret any of it," Darby said recently. "I made my peace with the decision before I turned the pictures in. I knew that if people found out that it was me, I wouldn't be liked."

The revelations led to a host of formal investigations into abuses in that prison and at all other military facilities where detainees were being held. Darby's

actions stopped much of the torture and abuse and led to significant changes in the way the Abu Ghraib Prison was run.⁶²

But not everyone thinks that what Darby did was the right thing to do. For many, even in his hometown in the Allegheny Mountains, Darby's calling attention to the abuses was unpatriotic, un-American, and even faintly treasonous. "Hero a Two-Timing Rat," ran a headline in the *New York Post*. Even those who are not angry at his whistle-blowing are surprised that he could be a hero because he was such an ordinary kid from a poor family, an average student and even bullied in school. Darby's high school history teacher and football coach, Robert Ewing, a Vietnam veteran, eloquently summed up the mixed reactions:

Some people are upset with what he did—ratting them out—and also because of what happened to those contractors, the beheading. They might say what the guards did pales in comparison. But... if we as a country, as a culture, believe certain values then you can't excuse that behavior. If I ever do see him again, I'll tell him I'm very proud. And as time goes on, most Americans are going to realize that, too.⁶³

I helped arrange for Darby to receive a Presidential Citation from the American Psychological Association in 2004. He was unable to accept this honor personally because he, his wife, and his mother had to remain in military protective custody for several years in the wake of the many retaliation threats they received. Darby was finally recognized as a hero nationally when he received the 2005 John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award. In bestowing the award, Caroline Kennedy, president of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation, said, "Individuals who are willing to take personal risk to further the national interest and uphold the values of American democracy should be recognized and encouraged in all parts of government. Our nation is indebted to U.S. Army Specialist Joseph Darby for standing up for the rule of law that we embrace as a nation."

Challenges to authority systems are not gender-bound; women are as likely to blow the whistle against crimes and injustice as men are. *Time* magazine honored three such women in choosing its "Persons of the Year" (2002) for their bold confrontation of major corporate fraud and FBI incompetence. Cynthia Cooper, an internal auditor at WorldCom, was responsible for revealing fraudulent accounting practices that kept \$3.8 billion of losses off the company's books. After months of intensive investigation, often conducted during the night to avoid detection, Cooper and her team of auditors exposed the deceptive practices, which resulted in the firing and indictment of senior company officers.⁶⁴

Sherron Watkins, a vice president at the high-flying Enron Corporation, also blew the whistle on the extensive corporate corruption taking place there, which involved "cooking the books" to give the appearance of great success to cover up failure. The formerly reputable Arthur Andersen accounting firm was also implicated in the huge scandal.⁶⁵ An FBI staff attorney, Colleen Rowley, blew the whis-

tle on the FBI for its failure to follow up on pleas from her office that they check out a person whom it identified as a potential terrorist and who turned out to be one of the co-conspirators in the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. These "three woman of ordinary demeanor but extraordinary guts and sense" risked a great deal in challenging their established power base."

Jonestown Heroes

Debbie Layton and Richard Clark were two survivors among the 913 American citizens who died in the mass suicides and murders that took place in Jonestown, Guyana, on November 18, 1978. Debbie came from a relatively affluent, educated white family in Oakland, California, while Richard came to San Francisco from humble African-American origins in Mississippi. They both became my personal friends when they arrived in the Bay area after having escaped the horrors of the Jonestown nightmare. Both qualify as heroes in different ways, Debbie as a whistle-blower and Richard as a Good Samaritan.

Debbie joined Reverend Jim Jones's Peoples Temple congregation as an eighteen-year-old. She was a loyal follower for many years and eventually became the Temple's finance secretary. As such, she was entrusted with moving millions of dollars out of Jonestown to deposits in secret Swiss bank accounts. Her mother and brother, Larry, were also Temple members. But over time she realized that Jonestown was more like a concentration camp than the promised **Utopia** where racial harmony and a sustainable lifestyle would prevail. Nearly a thousand faithful members were subjected to hard labor, semistarvation, and physical and sexual abuse. Armed guards surrounded them, and spies infiltrated their lives. Jones even forced them to practice regular suicide drills, called "White Nights," that frightened Debbie into understanding that he was actually preparing them for a mass suicide.

At great personal peril, she decided to flee Jonestown and take the message of its potential destructive power to concerned relatives and to the government. She could not even alert her sick mother to her escape plan for fear that her emotional reaction that might tip off Jones. After executing a complex set of maneuvers, Debbie did escape and immediately did all she could to alert authorities to the abusive conditions at Jonestown and to warn them of what she believed was an imminent tragedy.

In June 1978, she issued an affidavit to the U.S. government warning of a potential mass suicide. Its thirty-seven detailed points began: "RE. The Threat And Possibility Of Mass Suicide By Members Of The People's Temple. I, Deborah Layton Blakey, declare the following under penalty of perjury: The purpose of this affidavit is to call to the attention of the United States government the existence of a situation which threatens the lives of United States citizens living in Jonestown, Guyana."

Six months later, her Cassandra-like prediction was eerily validated. Sadly, her pleas for aid were met by the skepticism of government officials who refused to

accept that such a bizarre tale could be true. However, some concerned relatives did believe her and encouraged California Congressman Leo Ryan to investigate. Reporters, a cameraman, and some relatives accompanied Ryan on his visit. As he was about to return home with a positive evaluation of what he had been duped into believing were ideal living conditions, several families who decided to defect under his protection joined Ryan. But it was too late. Jones, by now very paranoid, believed the defectors would reveal the truth about Jonestown to the outside world. He had the congressman and some of his entourage murdered and then arranged for cyanide-laced Kool-Aid to be given to his weary followers. His infamous last-hour speech was outlined in Chapter 12; a full version is available online at the Jonestown website.⁶⁷

Debbie Layton has written an eloquent account of how she and so many others were trapped by the persuasive lures of this diabolical preacher man. Jim Jones's Lucifer-like transformation from benevolent religious minister to angel of death unfolds chillingly in her book, *Seductive Poison*.⁶⁸ I have argued elsewhere that there are remarkable parallels between the mind control tactics used by Jones and those depicted in George Orwell's classic novel *1984* that might make the Jonestown phenomenon a field experiment of the most extreme mind control imaginable—and perhaps even sponsored by the CIA.⁶⁹

I helped counsel Richard Clark and his girlfriend, Diane Louie, after they returned to San Francisco, having escaped the mass suicide. Richard was a simple, pragmatic man, a slow-speaking but sensitive observer of people and places. He said that the moment he got to Jonestown he could detect that something was seriously wrong. No one in the Promised Land was smiling. Everyone in the supposed land of plenty was hungry. People whispered and never laughed. Work not only came before play but also never left time for play. Jones's voice boomed out over the compound day and night, in person or on tape. The sexes were segregated into different barracks, and sex, even among married couples, was forbidden without Jones's approval. No one could leave because no one could figure out where they were in the midst of a jungle in a foreign land thousands of miles from home.

Richard Clark hatched a plan. He volunteered for a job that no one wanted in the "piggery," which was in an isolated smelly part of the sprawling compound. The place was ideal for Richard to escape Jones's mind-numbing rhetoric and to seek out a path through the jungle to freedom. Once he had slowly and carefully laid out his escape, he told Diane about it and said that when the time was ripe, they would flee together. In defiance of Jones's extensive spy system, Richard made the decidedly risky decision to tell the members of a few families about the planned escape. On the morning of Sunday, November 18, Jones ordered everyone to have a holiday in celebration of Congressman Ryan's return to America with the message about the good works being accomplished in this agricultural socialist **Utopia**. That was Richard's exit cue. He assembled his party of eight and, pretending they were off on a picnic, led them through the jungle to safety. By the


time they reached the capital at Georgetown, every one of their friends and other family members was dead.

Richard Clark died recently of natural causes, knowing that he made the right decision to trust his intuition, his street smarts, and his "discrepancy detectors." But most of all, he was pleased that he had saved the lives of those who followed him, an ordinary hero, out of the heart of darkness.⁷⁰

A Four-Dimensional Model of Heroism

Based on the concepts of courage and examples of heroic behavior presented here, an elementary model of heroism can be generated. Within the overall motivational framework of a particular person, heroism can be described on three continua: Risk Type/Sacrifice: Engagement Style or Approach; and Quest. The axis of Risk Type/Sacrifice is anchored at one end by physical risk and at the other by social risk. Similarly, Engagement Style or Approach is anchored at one end by active (gallant) and, at the other end, passive (with fortitude) approaches. On the third dimension, the Quest is described as being in service of the preservation of life or in the preservation of an ideal. Although they are synonymous in some ways—the preservation of life is also a noble idea—the distinction is important within this context. The first three dimensions of this model are depicted in this illustration. We will add a fourth later.

Let's position three different types of heroes in this model space, Nathan Hale, Mother Teresa, and Richard Rescorla. The American Revolutionary War hero Nathan Hale had been operating as a spy in the British ranks for some time,



before he was caught. While his activities were patriotic, they were not in themselves heroic. Had his clandestine activities gone unnoticed, he would never have become an American hero. It was in the moment of his execution at the hands of the British, a death he accepted with dignity, that he became a heroic figure. "I regret that I have but one life to give for my country" was his classic farewell. In that moment, Hale showed great fortitude, sacrificing his life in the service of a principle.

A very different kind of heroism is found in the life and work of Mother Teresa. Her activities cannot be not summed up in a single act, as was Nathan Hale's defiance at his execution. Rather, her heroic acts span the course of decades. Her dedication to enable the dying poor to die in a state of grace, Catholic grace, was based on service to a principle (compassion), in which she was actively and perpetually involved, and the sacrifices she made took the ascetic path to glory: her poverty, her chastity, and her denial of herself for the sake of others.


Our third hero to be placed in our multidimensional hero grid is Richard Rescorla. He was the director of security in Morgan Stanley's World Trade Center (WTC) offices in New York City at the time of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. A decorated Vietnam veteran (Silver Star, Purple Heart, and Bronze Stars for Valor and Meritorious Service), Rescorla is credited with saving the lives of thousands of Morgan Stanley employees by his decisive actions. Rescorla defied WTC authorities in ordering the employees in his offices to evacuate rather than to follow the order to remain at their desks. During the evacuation of the forty-fourth to seventy-fourth floors of WTC Tower 2, reports indicate, Rescorla verbally calmed the employees over a bullhorn and told them to stop talking on cell phones and to keep moving down the stairs. Rescorla, two security guards whom he had trained, and three other Morgan Stanley employees died when the building imploded. Rescorla and his team are credited with saving the lives of an estimated 2,800 employees who exited WTC-2 before it collapsed.⁷¹ In contrast to the heroism of a figure like Nathan Hale, Rescorla's act was active and was performed directly in the service of preserving life, yet his glory too demanded the ultimate physical sacrifice.

Nathan Hale, Richard Rescorla, and Mother Teresa represent different aspects of the heroic ideal. The distinctions among their actions illuminate the diversity of acts that meet the enigmatic standard of heroic. Their actions are mapped on to our model of heroism.

A fourth dimension to be added to this model is that of Chronicity. Heroes can be made in instantaneous actions, or their heroism can accrue over time. Acute heroism, the heroism shown in a single act, is described in the martial context as bravery—an act of courage in a single combat. In contrast, chronic military heroism, courage that is displayed time and again in battle, is called valor. There are not yet comparable terms to denote duration in civil heroism, perhaps because the dramatic quality of heroism that is demonstrated in perilous situations is not as easily evident in the civic sphere. Among civic heroes we might con-

Richard Rescorla

(active, preservation of life, physical sacrifice)



Nathan Hale (at the moment of execution)

(passive, principle based, physical sacrifice)

trast a time-limited, situationally specific heroism of the moment, like that of whistle-blowers, with the chronic heroism demonstrated by an enduring engagement in service to society, like that of Martin Luther King, Jr.

Collective Heroism as a Matter of Degree

The solitary heroic figure, like the brave marshal in a western movie who faces down a band of renegades, is supported, more often than not, by groups of people working in unison in emergencies, disasters, and situations that demand concerted action. The Underground Railroad, which took southern slaves to freedom in northern towns, could function only with the coordinated efforts of many people who worked in peril of their lives. Similarly, first responders to disasters are typically citizen volunteers working in loosely organized teams. As the "Tank Man" was, many individuals working in collective harmony are anonymous. They brave danger without expectation of personal notoriety but for the sake of answering a call to community service.

A special instance of this kind of collective heroism occurred on United Airlines flight 93, which was hijacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001. At first, passengers, believing the plane was returning to the airport, followed the norm by staying in their seats. But when some passengers were alerted by cell phone calls about the crash of other planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a new norm emerged. A small group of them gathered in the back of the plane and planned to get control of the cockpit. One of them was on the phone with a GTE operator, who heard him say, "Let's roll!" before he was disconnected. Their concerted action prevented the plane from reaching its intended target, either the White House or the Capitol. That field now stands as a memorial to collective heroism of the highest order.⁷²

HEROIC CONTRASTS: THE EXTRAORDINARY VERSUS THE BANAL

Fame is no plant that grows on mortal soil.

—John Milton

To the traditionally accepted notion that heroes are exceptional people, we can now add an opposing perspective—that some heroes are ordinary people who have done something extraordinary. The first image is the more romantic and is favored in ancient myth and modern media. It suggests that the hero has done something that ordinary people in the same position would not or could not have done. These superstars must have been born with a hero gene. They are the exception to the rule.

A second perspective, which we might call "the rule is the exception," directs us to examine the interaction between situation and person, the dynamic that impelled an individual to act heroically at a particular time and place. A situation may act either as a catalyst, encouraging action, or it may reduce barriers to action, such as the formation of a collective social support network. It is remarkable that in most instances people who have engaged in heroic action repeatedly reject the name of hero, as we saw was the case with Christina Maslach.

Such doers of heroic deeds typically argue that they were simply taking an action that seemed necessary at the time. They are convinced that anybody would have acted similarly, or else they find it difficult to understand why others did not. Nelson Mandela has said, "I was not a messiah, but an ordinary man who had become a leader because of extraordinary circumstances."⁷³ Phrases like this are used by people at all levels of society who have acted heroically: "It was nothing special"; "I did what had to be done." These are the refrains of the "ordinary" or everyday warrior, our "banal hero." Let's contrast such positive banality with what Hannah Arendt has taught us to call "the banality of evil."

On the Banality of Evil

This concept emerged from Arendt's observations at the trial of Adolf Eichmann, indicted for crimes against humanity because he helped to orchestrate the genocide of European Jews. In *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, Arendt formulates the idea that such individuals should not be viewed as exceptions, as monsters, or as perverted sadists. She argues that such dispositional attributes, typically applied to perpetrators of evil deeds, serves to set them apart from the rest of the human community. Instead, Eichmann and others like him, Arendt says, should be exposed in their very ordinariness. When we realize this, we become more aware that such people are a pervasive, hidden danger in all societies. Eichmann's defense was that he was simply following orders. Of this mass murderer's motives and conscience, Arendt notes:

As for his base motives, he was perfectly sure that he was not what he called an *innerer Schweinehund*, a dirty bastard in the depths of his heart; and as for his conscience, he remembered perfectly well that he would have had a bad conscience only if he had not done what he had been ordered to do—to ship millions of men, women, and children to their death with great zeal and the most meticulous care.

What is most striking in Arendt's account of Eichmann is all the ways in which he seemed absolutely normal and totally ordinary:

Half a dozen psychiatrists had certified him as "normal"—"More normal, at any rate, than I am after having examined him," one of them was said to have exclaimed, while another had found that his whole psychological outlook, his attitude toward his wife and children, mother and father, brothers, sisters, and friends was "not only normal but most desirable."⁷⁴

Arendt's now-classic conclusion:

The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal. From the viewpoint of our legal institutions and our moral standards of judgment, this normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together, for it implied . . . that this new type of criminal, who is in actual fact *hostis generis humani*, commits his crimes under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or feel that he is doing wrong.⁷⁵

Then came her punch line, describing Eichmann's dignified march to the gallows:

It was as though in those last minutes he was summing up the lesson that this long course in human wickedness had taught us—the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evil.⁷⁶

The notion that "ordinary men" can commit atrocities has been more fully developed by the historian Christopher Browning, as we noted earlier. He uncovered the systematic and personal annihilation of Jews in remote Polish villages that were committed by hundreds of men in Reserve Police Battalion 101, sent to Poland from Hamburg, Germany. These middle-aged, family men of working-class and lower-middle-class backgrounds shot thousands of unarmed Jews—men, women, the elderly, and children—and arranged for the deportation to death camps of thousands more. Yet Browning contends in his book that they were all "ordinary men." He believes that the mass-murder policies of the Nazi regime "were not aberrational or exceptional events that scarcely ruffle the surface of everyday life. As the story of Reserve Battalion 10 demonstrates, mass murder and routine had become one. Normality itself had become exceedingly abnormal."⁷⁷

The psychologist Ervin Staub holds a similar view. His extensive research led him to the conclusion that "Evil that arises out of ordinary thinking and is committed by ordinary people is the norm, not the exception."⁷⁸ Cruelty should be attributed to its social origins more than to its "characterological" determinants or "faulty personalities," according to Zygmunt Bauman's analysis of the horrors of the Holocaust. Bauman believes further that the exception to this norm is the rare individual who has the capacity to assert moral autonomy in resisting the demands of destructive authorities. Such a person is rarely aware that he or she possesses this hidden strength until put to the test.⁷⁹

Another quality of the banality of evil ushers us into the torturers' den to consider whether such people, whose mission is to use all means necessary to break the will, resistance, and dignity of their victims, are anything other than pathological villains. The consensus among those who have studied torturers is that in general they were not distinguishable from the general population in their backgrounds or dispositions prior to taking on their sordid job. John Conroy, who studied men involved in torture in three different venues in Ireland, Israel, and Chicago, concluded that in all cases "unspeakable acts" were committed by "ordinary people." He maintains that torturers act out the will of the community they represent in suppressing its foes.⁸⁰

From her in-depth analysis of soldiers trained by the Greek military junta to be state-sanctioned torturers (1967-1974), my colleague the Greek psychologist Mika Haritos-Fatouros concluded that torturers are not born but made by their training. "Anybody's son will do" is her answer to the question "Who will make an effective torturer?" In a matter of a few months, ordinary young men from rural villages became "weaponized" by their training in cruelty to act like brute beasts capable of inflicting the most horrendous acts of humiliation, pain, and suffering on anyone labeled "the enemy," who, of course, were all citizens of their own country.⁸¹ Such conclusions are not limited to one nation, but are common in many totalitarian regimes. We studied "violence workers" in Brazil, policemen who tortured and murdered other Brazilian citizens for the ruling military junta. They too were "ordinary men," based on all the evidence we could amass.⁸²

On the Banality of Heroism⁸³

We may now entertain the notion that most people who become perpetrators of evil deeds are directly comparable to those who become perpetrators of heroic deeds, alike in being just ordinary, average people. The banality of evil shares much with the banality of heroism. Neither attribute is the direct consequence of unique dispositional tendencies; there are no special inner attributes of either pathology or goodness residing within the human psyche or the human genome. Both conditions emerge in particular situations at particular times when situational forces play a compelling role in moving particular individuals across a decisional line from inaction to action. There is a decisive decisional moment when a person is caught up in a vector of forces that emanate from a behavioral con-

text. Those forces combine to increase the probability of one's acting to harm others or acting to help others. Their decision may or may not be consciously planned or mindfully taken. Rather, strong situational forces most often impulsively drive the person to action. Among the situational action vectors are: group pressures and group identity, the diffusion of responsibility for the action, a temporal focus on the immediate moment without concern for consequences stemming from the act in the future, presence of social models, and commitment to an ideology.

A common theme in the accounts of European Christians who helped the Jews during the Holocaust could be summed up as the "banality of goodness." What is striking over and over again is the number of these rescuers who did the right thing without considering themselves heroic, who acted merely out of a sense of common decency. The ordinariness of their goodness is especially striking in the context of the incredible evil of the systematic genocide by Nazis on a scale the world had never before experienced.⁸⁴

I have tried to show throughout our journey that the military police guards who abused prisoners at Abu Ghraib and the prison guards in my Stanford Prison Experiment who abused their prisoners illustrate a *Lord of the Flies*-type temporary transition of ordinary individuals into perpetrators of evil. We must set them alongside those whose evil behavior is enduring and extensive, tyrants such as Idi Amin, Stalin, Hitler, and Saddam Hussein. Heroes of the moment also stand in contrast to lifetime heroes.

The heroic action of Rosa Parks's refusal to sit in the "colored" section in the back of an Alabama bus, of Joe Darby's exposing the Abu Ghraib tortures, or of the first responders' rush to the World Trade Center disaster are acts of bravery that occur at particular times and places. In contrast, the heroism of Mohandas Gandhi or Mother Teresa consists of valorous acts repeated over a lifetime. Chronic heroism is to acute heroism as valor is to bravery.

This perception implies that any of us could as easily become heroes as perpetrators of evil depending on how we are influenced by situational forces. The imperative becomes discovering how to limit, constrain, and prevent the situational and systemic forces that propel some of us toward social pathology. But equally important is the injunction for every society to foster a "heroic imagination" in its citizenry. It is achieved by conveying the message that every person is a hero in waiting who will be counted upon to do the right thing when the moment of decision comes. The decisive question for each of us is whether to act in help of others, to prevent harm to others, or not to act at all. We should be preparing many laurel wreaths for all those who will discover their reservoir of hidden strengths and virtues enabling them to come forth to act against injustice and cruelty and to stand up for their principled values.

The large body of research on situational determinants of antisocial behavior that we reviewed here, bookended by Milgram's investigations of authority power and the SPE's institutional power, reveals the extent to which normal, ordinary people can be led to engage in cruel acts against innocent others.⁸⁵ However,

in those studies and many others, while the majority obeyed, conformed, complied, were persuaded, and were seduced, there was always a minority who resisted, dissented, and disobeyed. In one sense, heroism lies in the ability to resist powerful situational forces that so readily entrap most people.

Are the personalities of the resisters different from those of the blindly obedient?⁶⁶ Are they like Clark Kent, whose normal appearance conceals Superman's extraordinary powers? Not at all. Rather, our banality of heroism conception maintains that doers of heroic deeds of the moment are not essentially different from those who comprise the base rate of the easily seduced. There is not much empirical research on which to base such assertions. Because heroism is not a simple phenomenon that can be studied systematically, it defies clean definitions and on-the-spot data collection. Heroic acts are ephemeral and unpredictable, and appreciation of them is decidedly retrospective. Because heroes are usually interviewed months or years after their heroic behavior has occurred, there are no prospective studies of what the photographer Henri Cartier-Bresson might call the "decisive moment" of heroic action.⁶⁷ Generally we do not know what the decision matrix for heroes is at the time they elect to engage in risk-laden activities.

What seems evident is that heroic behavior is rare enough not to be readily predictable by any psychological assessments of personality. They measure individual differences between people in their usual, standard behavioral settings, not in the atypical settings that often elicit heroic deeds.

Lieutenant Alexander (Sandy) Nininger is a case example of a heroic soldier who engaged in extraordinarily fearless and ferocious fighting during World War II's infamous Battle of Bataan. This twenty-three-year-old West Point graduate volunteered to go hunting for Japanese snipers where the fighting was most intense. With grenades, a rifle, submachine gun, and bayonet, Nininger killed many Japanese soldiers single-handedly in intense close combat, and kept fighting although repeatedly wounded. Only after he had destroyed an enemy bunker did he collapse and die. His heroism earned him the Medal of Honor, posthumously, the first given in that war.

What makes this hero an object of our concern is that nothing from his past would have predicted that he would engage in such killing. This quiet, sensitive, intellectual young man had gone on record as saying that he could never kill anyone out of hatred. Yet, he had done so repeatedly without regard for his own safety. Had he been given all available personality tests, would they have helped predict this unexpectedly violent behavior? In his review of personality testing, the author Malcolm Gladwell surmises that Nininger's file might be as thick as a phone book, but "his file will tell us little about the one thing we're most interested in. For that, we have to join him in the jungles of Bataan." In short, we have to understand the Person in the Situation.⁶⁸

HEROISM VALIDATES THE HUMAN CONNECTION

For reasons we do not yet fully understand, thousands of ordinary people in every country around the world, when they are placed in special circumstances, make the decision to act heroically. On the face of it, the perspective we take here seems to deflate the myth of the hero and to make something special into something banal. This is not so, however, because our position still recognizes that the act of heroism is indeed special and rare. Heroism supports the ideals of a community and serves as an extraordinary guide, and it provides an exemplary role model for prosocial behavior. The banality of heroism means that we are all heroes in waiting. It is a choice that we may all be called upon to make at some point in time. I believe that by making heroism an egalitarian attribute of human nature rather than a rare feature of the elect few, we can better foster heroic acts in every community. According to journalist Carol Depino "Everyone has the capability of becoming a hero in one degree or another. Sometimes you might not realize it. To someone it could be as small as holding a door open and saying 'hello' to them. We are all heroes to someone."⁸⁹


This new theme of the universality of ordinary heroes encourages us to re-think about the common heroes among us, those whose daily sacrifices enrich our lives. Daniel Boorstin's earlier noted cynical view of media-crafted celebrities as heroes gives way before his deep appreciation of the everyday unsung heroes living and working among us:

In this life of illusion and quasi-illusion, the person with solid virtues who can be admired for something more substantial than his well-knownness often proves to be the unsung hero: the teacher, the nurse, the mother, the honest cop, the hard worker at lonely, under-paid, unglamorous, unpublicized jobs. Topsy-turvy, these can remain heroes precisely because they remain unsung.⁹⁰

And so, the parting message that we might derive from our long journey into the heart of darkness and back again is that heroic acts and the people who engage in them should be celebrated. They form essential links among us; they forge our Human Connection. The evil that persists in our midst must be countered, and eventually overcome, by the greater good in the collective hearts and personal heroic resolve of Everyman and Everywoman. It is not an abstract concept, but, as we are reminded by the Russian poet and former prisoner in Stalin's Gulag Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: "The line between good and evil is in the center of every human heart."⁹¹

Thanks for sharing this journey with me.

Ciao, Phil Zimbardo



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CHAPTER TWELVE: Investigating Social Dynamics: Power, Conformity, and Obedience

1. C. S. Lewis (1898-1963), professor of medieval and Renaissance English at Cambridge University, was also a novelist, a writer of children's books, and a popular speaker on moral and religious issues. In his best-known book, *The Screwtape Letters* (1944), he impersonated a veteran devil in Hell that writes letters encouraging the efforts of a novice devil hard at work on Earth. "The Inner Ring" was the Memorial Lecture at King's College, University of London, delivered to the students in 1944.
2. R. F. Baumeister and M. R. Leary, "The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation," *Psychological Bulletin* 117 (1995): 427-529.
3. R. B. Cialdini, M. R. Trost, and J. T. Newsome, "Preference for Consistency: The Development of a Valid Measure and the Discovery of Surprising Behavioral Implications," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 69 (1995): 318-28; Also see L. Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957).
4. P. G. Zimbardo and S. A. Andersen, "Understanding Mind Control: Exotic and Mundane Mental Manipulations," in *Recovery from Cults*, ed. M. Langone, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993); see also A. W. Schefflin and E. M. Opton, Jr., *The Mind Manipulators: A Non-Fiction Account* (New York: Paddington Press, 1978).
5. In addition to normative, social pressures to go along with others' views, there are rational forces at work because people can serve to provide valuable information and wisdom. M. Deutsch and H. B. Gerard, "A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influence upon Individual Judgement," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 51 (1955): 629-36.
6. Associated Press (July 26, 2005), " 'Cool Mom' Guilty of Sex with Schoolboys: She Said She Felt Like 'One of the Group.' " The report is of her sex and drug parties from October 2003 to October 2004 in the rural town of Golden, Colorado.
7. Self-serving, egocentric, and above-average biases have been investigated extensively. For a summary of the main effects across many different domains of application, see D. Myers, *Social Psychology*, 8th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), pp. 66-77.
8. E. Pronin, J. Kruger, K. Savitsky, and L. Ross, "You Don't Know Me, but I Know You: The Illusion of Asymmetric Insight," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81 (2001): 639-56.
9. M. Sherif, "A Study of Some Social Factors in Perception," *Archives of Psychology* 27 (1935): pp. 210-11.
10. S. E. Asch, "Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority," *Psychological Monographs* 70 (1951): whole no. 416; S. E. Asch, "Opinions and Social Pressure," *Scientific American*, November 1955, pp. 31-35.
11. M. Deutsch and H. B. Gerard (1955).
12. G. S. Berns, J. Chappelow, C. F. Zin, G. Pagnoni, M. E. Martin-Skurski, and J. Richards, "Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and Independence During Mental Rotation," *Biological Psychiatry* 58 (August 1, 2005): 245-53; Sandra Blakeslee, "What Other People Say May Change What You See," *New York Times*, online: www.nytimes.com/2005/06/28/science/28brai.html, June 28, 2005.
13. S. Moscovici and C. Faucheux, "Social Influence, Conformity Bias, and the Study of Active Minorities," in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 6, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1978), pp. 149-202.
14. E. Langer, *Mindfulness*. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1989).
15. C.J. Nemeth, "Differential Contributions to Majority and Minority Influence," *Psychological Review* 93 (1986): 23-32.

16. S. Moscovici, "Social Influence and Conformity." in *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 3rd. ed.. eds. G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (New York: Random House, 1985). pp. 347-412.
17. T. Blass, *Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Miligram Paradigm* (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1999). p. 62.
18. In 1949, seated next to me in senior class at James Monroe High School in the Bronx, New York, was my classmate Stanley Milgram. We were both skinny kids full of ambition and a desire to make something of ourselves so that we might escape from life in the confines of our ghetto. Stanley was the little smart one whom we went to for authoritative answers. I was the tall popular one, the smiling guy other kids would go to for social advice. Even then we were budding situationists. I had just returned to Monroe High from a horrible year at North Hollywood High School, where I had been shunned and friendless (because, as I later learned, there was a rumor circulating that I was from a New York Sicilian Mafia family), to be chosen "Jimmy Monroe," the most popular boy in Monroe High School's senior class. Stanley and I discussed once how that transformation could have happened. We agreed that I had not changed but the situation was what had mattered. When we met years later, at Yale University in 1960, as beginning assistant professors, him starting out at Yale and me at NYU, it turned out that Stanley really wanted to be popular and I really wanted to be smart. So much for unfulfilled desires.

I should also mention a recent discovery I made about another commonality that I shared with Stanley. I was the one who initially constructed a basement laboratory that was later modified to be the site in which Milgram's Yale obedience experiments were conducted (after he could no longer use the elegant interaction laboratory of sociologist O. K. Moore). I had done so a few years earlier for a study I did with Irving Sarnoff to test Freudian predictions about the differences between fear and anxiety in their effects on social affiliation. I fabricated a little lab in the basement of the building where we taught Introductory Psychology courses. It had the delightfully British name Linsly-Chittenden Hall. It is also interesting that both his experiments and the SPE were conducted in basements.

19. T. Blass, *The Man Who Shocked the World* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 116.
20. See R. Cialdini, *Influence*. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001).
21. J. L. Freedman and S. C. Fraser, "Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot-in-the-Door Technique," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 4 (1966): 195-202; also see S.J. Gilbert, "Another Look at the Milgram Obedience Studies: The Role of the Graduated Series of Shocks," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 4 (1981): 690-95.
22. E. Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1941). In the United States, the fear of threats to national security posed by terrorists, amplified by government officials, has led many citizens, the Pentagon, and national leaders to accept the torture of prisoners as a necessary method of eliciting information that could prevent further attacks. That reasoning, I will argue in chapter 15, contributed to the abuses by American guards at Abu Ghraib prison.
23. H. C. Kelman and V. L. Hamilton, *Crimes of Obedience: Toward a Social Psychology of Authority and Responsibility* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).
24. Blass, *The Man Who Shocked the World*, Appendix C, "The Stability of Obedience Across Time and Place."
25. C. L. Sheridan and R. G. King, "Obedience to Authority with an Authentic Victim," *Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association*, vol. 7 (Part 1), 1972, pp. 165-66.
26. M. T. Orne and C. H. Holland. "On the Ecological Validity of Laboratory Deceptions," *International Journal of Psychiatry* 6 (1968) 282-93.
27. C. K. Hofling, E. Brotzman, S. Dalrymple, N. Graves, and C. M. Pierce, "An Experimental Study in Nurse-Physician Relationships," *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease* 143 (1966): 171-80.

28. A. Krackow and T. Blass, "When Nurses Obey or Defy Inappropriate Physician Orders: Attributional Differences," *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality* 10 (1995): 585-94.
29. E. Tarnow, "Self-Destructive Obedience in the Airplane Cockpit and the Concept of Obedience Optimization," in *Obedience to Authority*, ed. T. Blass, pp. 111-23.
30. W. Meeus and Q. A. W. Raaijmakers, "Obedience in Modern Society: The Utrecht Studies," *Journal of Social Issues* 51 (1995): 155-76.
31. From *The Human Behavior Experiments*, transcript: Sundance Lock, May 9, 2006, Jig Saw Productions, p. 20. Transcript available on www.prisonexp.org/pdf/HBE-transcript.pdf.
32. These quotes and information about the strip-search hoaxes come from an informative article by Andrew Wolfson, "A Hoax Most Cruel," in *The Courier-Journal*, October 9, 2004, available online at: www.courier-journal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051009/NEWS01/510090392/1008Hoax.
33. Quoted from a 1979 television interview in Robert V. Levine, "Milgram's Progress," *American Scientist Online*, July-August 2004. Originally in Blass, *Obedience to Authority*, pp. 35-36.
34. R. Jones, "The Third Wave," in *Experiencing Social Psychology*, ed. A. Pines and C. Maslach (New York: Knopf, 1978), pp. 144-52; also see the article that Ron Jones wrote about his Third Wave class exercise, available at: www.vaniercollege.qc.ca/Auxiliary/Psychology/Frank/Thirdwave.html.
35. "The Wave," television docudrama, directed by Alexander Grasshoff, 1981.
36. W. Peters, *A Class Divided Then and Now* (expanded ed.) (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985 [1971]). Peters was involved in the filming of both prizewinning documentaries, the ABC News documentary "The Eye of the Storm" (available from Guidance Associates, New York) and the follow-up PBS Frontline documentary "A Class Divided" (available online at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/divided/etc/view.html).
37. H. H. Mansson, "Justifying the Final Solution," *Omega: The Journal of Death and Dying* 3 (1972): 79-87.
38. J. Carlson, "Extending the Final Solution to One's Family," unpublished report. University of Hawaii, Manoa, 1974.
39. C. R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), p. xvi.
40. E. Staub, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 126, 127.
41. J. M. Steiner, "The SS Yesterday and Today: A Sociopsychological View," in *Survivors, Victims, and Perpetrators: Essays on the Nazi Holocaust*, ed. J. E. Dinsdale (Washington, DC: Hemisphere Publishing Corporation, 1980), pp. 405-56; quotes on p. 433. Also see A. G. Miller, *The Obedience Experiments: A Case Study of Controversy in Social Science* (New York: Praeger, 1986).
42. D. J. Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners* (New York: Knopf, 1999). Also see the review by Christopher Reed, "Ordinary German Killers," in *Harvard Magazine*, March-April 1999, p. 23.
43. H. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, revised and enlarged edition (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), pp. 25, 26, 252, 276. Following quotes are from this source.
44. M. Huggins, M. Haritos-Fatouros, and P. G. Zimbardo, *Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murders Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
45. M. Haritos-Fatouros, *The Psychological Origins of Institutionalized Torture* (London: Routledge, 2003).
46. Archdiocese of São Paulo, *Torture in Brazil* (New York: Vintage, 1998).
47. Official site for School of the Americas is www.ciponline.org/facts/soa.html; also see a critical site: www.soaw.org/new/.

48. F. Morales, "The Militarization of the Police," *Covert Action Quarterly* 67 (Spring-Summer 1999): 67.
49. See the body of literature on suicide bombers; among the sources recommended are: Ariel Merari, "Suicide Terrorism in the Context of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Institute of Justice Conference, Washington, DC, October 2004; Ariel Merari, "Israel Facing Terrorism," *Israel Affairs* 11 (2005): 223-37; Ariel Merari, "Suicidal Terrorism," in *Assessment, Treatment and Prevention of Suicidal Behavior*, eds. R. I. Yufit and D. Lester (New York: Wiley, 2005).
50. M. Sageman, "Understanding Terrorist Networks," November 1, 2004, available at www.fpri.org/enotes/2004/101.middleeast.sageman.understandingterrornetworks.html. Also see M. Shermer, "Murdercide: Science Unravels the Myth of Suicide Bombers," *Scientific American*, January 2006, p. 33; A. B. Krueger, "Poverty Doesn't Create Terrorists," *The New York Times*, May 29, 2003.
51. T. Joiner, *Why People Die by Suicide*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006; Scott Atran, "Genesis of Suicide Terrorism," *Science* 299 (2003): 1534-39; Mia M. Bloom, "Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding," *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 1 (2004): 61-88; Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Dipak K. Gupta and Kusum Mundra, "Suicide Bombing as a Strategic Weapon: An Empirical Investigation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17 (2005): 573-98; Shaul Kimi and Shemuel Even, "Who Are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16 (2005): 814-40; Ami Pedhazur, "Toward an Analytical Model of Suicide Terrorism—A Comment," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16 (2004): 841-44. Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97 (2003): 343-61; Christopher Reuter, *My Life as a Weapon: A Modern History of Suicide Bombing* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004); Andrew Silke, "The Role of Suicide in Politics, Conflict, and Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18 (2006): 35-46; Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no. 1 (2005): 3-42.
52. A. Merari, "Psychological Aspects of Suicide Terrorism," in *Psychology of Terrorism*, eds. B. Bongar, L. M. Brown, L. Beutler, and P. G. Zimbardo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
53. Jonathan Curiel, "The Mind of a Suicide Bomber," *San Francisco Chronicle* (October 22, 2006): p. E1, 6; quote on p. E6.
54. T. McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005).
55. M. Kakutani, "Ordinary but for the Evil They Wrought," *The New York Times*, May 20, 2005, p. B32.
56. Z. Coile, " 'Ordinary British Lads,' " *San Francisco Chronicle*, July 14, 2005, pp. A1, A10.
57. A. Silke, "Analysis: Ultimate Outrage," *The Times* (London), May 5, 2003.
58. I became connected to this experience through my acquaintance with the brother of one of the few people who had escaped the massacre, his sister, Diane Louie, and her boyfriend, Richard Clark. I offered them counseling when they returned to San Francisco and learned much from their firsthand horror accounts. Later, I became an expert witness for Larry Layton, accused of conspiracy to murder Congressman Ryan, and through him I became friends with his sister, Debbie Layton, another heroic resistor of Jim Jones's domination. We will learn more about them in our final chapter, where their heroism is discussed.
59. The transcript of Jones's last-hour speech on November 18, 1978, is known as the "Death Tape" (FBI no. Q042), and is available online free, courtesy of the Jonestown Institute in Oakland, California, as transcribed by Mary McCormick Maaga: <http://jonestown.sdsu.edu/Aboutjonestown/Tapes/Tapes/Deathtape/Q042.maaga.html>.
60. M. Banaji, "Ordinary Prejudice," *Psychological Science Agenda* 8 (2001): 8-16; quote on p. 15.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: Investigating Social Dynamics: Deindividuation, Dehumanization, and the Evil of Inaction

1. Jonathan Swift, *Gulliver's Travels and Other Works* (London: Routledge, 1906 [1727]). Swift's condemnation of his fellow human beings comes indirectly by verbal attacks to his alter ego, Lemuel Gulliver, from various notables whom Gulliver encounters on his travels to Brobdingnag and elsewhere. We human Yahoos are described as "deformed creatures at their most base." We also learn that our inadequacies are beyond remedial redemption, since "there is not enough time to correct the vices and follies to which Yahoos are subject, even if their natures had been capable of the least disposition toward virtue and wisdom."
2. R. Weiss, "Skin Cells Converted to Stem Cells," *The Washington Post*, August 22, 2005, p. A01.
3. W. Golding, *Lord of the Flies* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1954), pp. 58, 63.
4. P. G. Zimbardo, "The Human Choice: Individuation, Reason, and Order Versus Deindividuation, Impulse, and Chaos," in 1969 *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, eds. W. J. Arnold and D. Levine (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970).
5. M. H. Bond and D. G. Dutton, "The Effect of Interaction Anticipation and Experience as a Victim on Aggressive Behavior," *Journal of Personality* 43 (1975): 515-27.
6. R. J. Kiernan and R. M. Kaplan, "Deindividuation, Anonymity, and Pilfering," paper presented at the Western Psychological Association Convention, San Francisco, April 1971.
7. S. C. Fraser, "Deindividuation: Effects of Anonymity on Aggression in Children," unpublished report, University of Southern California, 1974, reported in P. G. Zimbardo, *Psychology and Life*, 10th ed. (Glenview IL: Scott, Foresman, 1974). Unfortunately, this fine study was never published because the data set and procedural materials were destroyed in the fire that swept through many homes in California's Malibu Hills (October 1996), where these materials were being temporarily stored.
8. E. Diener, S. C. Fraser, A. L. Beaman, and R. T. Kelem, "Effects of Deindividuation Variables on Stealing Among Halloween Trick-or-Treaters," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 33 (1976): 178-83.
9. R. J. Watson, Jr., "Investigation into Deindividuation Using a Cross-Cultural Survey Technique," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 25 (1973): 342-15.
10. Some relevant references on deindividuation include: E. Diener, "Deindividuation: Causes and Consequences," *Social Behavior and Personality* 5 (1977): 143-56; E. Diener, "Deindividuation: The Absence of Self-Awareness and Self-Regulation in Group Members, in *Psychology of Group Influence*, ed. P. B. Paulus (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1980), pp. 209-42; L. Festinger, A. Pepitone, and T. Newcomb, "Some Consequences of De-individuation in a Group," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 47 (1952): 382-89; G. Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (London: Transaction, 1995 [1895]); T. Postmes and R. Spears, "Deindividuation and Antinormative Behavior: A Meta-analysis," *Psychological Bulletin* 123 (1998): 238-59; S. Prentice-Dunn and R. W. Rogers, "Deindividuation in Aggression," in *Aggression: Theoretical and Empirical Reviews*, eds. R. G. Geen and E. I. Donnerstein (New York: Academic Press, 1983), pp. 155-72; S. Reicher and M. Levine, "On the Consequences of Deindividuation Manipulations for the Strategic Communication of Self: Identifiability and the Presentation of Social Identity," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 24 (1994): 511-24; J. E. Singer, C. E. Brush and S. C. Lublin, "Some Aspects of Deindividuation: Identification and Conformity," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 1 (1965): 356-78; C. B. Spivey and S. Prentice-Dunn, "Assessing the Directionality of Deindividuated Behavior: Effects of Deindividuation, Modeling, and Private Self-Consciousness on Aggressive and Prosocial Responses," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 4 (1990): 387-403.
11. E. Goffman, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

12. See C. Maslach and P. G. Zimbardo. "Dehumanization in Institutional Settings: 'Detached Concern' in Health and Social Service Professions; The Dehumanization of Imprisonment," paper presented at the American Psychological Association Convention, Montreal, Canada, August 30, 1973.
13. R. Ginzburg, *200 Years of Lynching* (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1988). Also see the photographs of lynchings that were distributed on postcards in J. Allen, H. Ali, J. Lewis, and L. R. Litwack, *Without Sanctuary: Lynching Photography in America* (Santa Fe, NM: Twin Palms Publishers, 2004).
14. See H. C. Kelman, "Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflections on the Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers," *Journal of Social Issues* 29 (1973): 25-61.
15. B. Herbert, "'Gooks' to 'Hajis.'" *The New York Times*, May 21, 2004.
16. A. Bandura, B. Underwood, and M. E. Fromson, "Disinhibition of Aggression Through Diffusion of Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims," *Journal of Research in Personality* 9 (1975): 253-69.
17. See the extensive writings of Albert Bandura on moral disengagement, among them: A. Bandura, *Social Foundations of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986); A. Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," in *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind*, ed. W. Reich (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 161-91; A. Bandura, "Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* (Special Issue on Evil and Violence) 3 (1999): 193-209; A. Bandura, "The Role of Selective Moral Disengagement in Terrorism," in *Psychosocial Aspects of Terrorism: Issues, Concepts and Directions*, ed. F. M. Moghaddam and A. J. Marsella (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press, 2004), pp. 121-50; A. Bandura, C. Barbaranelli, G. V. Caprara, and C. Pastorelli, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71 (1996): 364-74; M. Osofsky, A. Bandura, and P. G. Zimbardo, "The Role of Moral Disengagement in the Execution Process," *Law and Human Behavior* 29 (2005): 371-93.
18. J. P. Leyens et al., "The Emotional Side of Prejudice: The Attribution of Secondary Emotions to In-groups and Out-groups," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 4 (2000): 186-97.
19. N. Haslam, P. Bain, L. Douge, M. Lee, and B. Bastian, "More Human Than You: Attributing Humanness to Self and Others," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 89 (2005): 937-50; quote, p. 950.
20. In one account from Reuters news service, a thirty-five-year-old Hutu mother named Mukankwaya said that she and other Hutu women had rounded up the children of their Tutsi neighbors whom they had come to perceive as their "enemies." With gruesome resolve, they bludgeoned the stunned youngsters to death with their large sticks. "They didn't cry because they knew us," she reported. "They just made big eyes. We killed too many to count." Her moral disengagement involved believing that she and the other women murderers were "doing the children a favor": it was better that they die now because they would be orphans, given that their fathers had been butchered with the machetes the government had given to Hutu men, and their mothers had been raped and killed by them. The children would have had a difficult life ahead, she and other Hutu mothers reasoned, so they beat them to death so they would avoid that bleak future.
21. See S. Keen, *Faces of the Enemy: Reflections on the Hostile Imagination* (San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco, 2004 [1991]). Also well worth watching is his companion DVD (2004).
22. From Harry Bruinius, *Better for All the World: The Secret History of Forced Sterilization and America's Quest for Racial Purity* (New York: Knopf, 2006).
23. See: F. Galton, *Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1892; Watts and Co. 1950); R. A. Soloway, *Democracy and Denigration: Eugenics and the Declining Birthrate in England, 1877-1930* (Chapel Hill: University of North

- Carolina Press, 1990); Race Betterment Foundation, *Proceedings of the Third Race Betterment Conference* (Battle Creek, MI: Race Betterment Foundation, 1928); E. Black, *War Against the Weak: Eugenics and America's Campaign to Create a Master Race* (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 2003); E. Black, *IBM and the Holocaust: The Strategic Alliance Between Nazi Germany and America's Most Powerful Corporation* (New York: Crown, 2001).
24. M. L. King, Jr., *Strength to Love* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), p. 18.
 25. B. Latané and J. M. Darley, *The Unresponsive Bystander: Why Doesn't He Help?* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970).
 26. J. M. Darley and B. Latané, "Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibilities," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 8 (1968): 377-83.
 27. T. Moriarty, "Crime, Commitment, and the Responsive Bystander: Two Field Experiments," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 31 (1975): 370-76.
 28. D. A. Schroeder, L. A. Penner, J. F. Dovidio, and J. A. Pillaiyan, *The Psychology of Helping and Altruism: Problems and Puzzles* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995). Also see C. D. Batson, "Prosocial Motivation: Why Do We Help Others?" in *Advanced Social Psychology*, ed. A. Tesser (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), pp. 333-81; E. Straub, "Helping a Distressed Person: Social, Personality, and Stimulus Determinants," *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 7, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1974), pp. 293-341.
 29. J. M. Darley and C. D. Batson, "From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of Situational Variables in Helping Behavior," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 27 (1973): 100-8.
 30. C. D. Batson et al. "Failure to Help in a Hurry: Callousness or Conflict?," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 4 (1978): 97-101.
 31. "Abuse Scandal to Cost Catholic Church at Least \$2 Billion, Predicts Lay Leader," Associated Press, July 10, 2005. See also the documentary film *Deliver Us from Evil*, which is about father Oliver O'Grady, convicted of serial child molestation of young boys and girls over a period of two decades in Northern California. Cardinal Roger Mahoney, who knew of the many complaints against him, did not remove O'Grady, but instead periodically relocated this sex addict to other parishes, where he would continue to pry on fresh crops of child victims. (The film was directed by Amy Berg; distributed by Lionsgate Films, October 2006).
 32. D. Baum, "Letter from New Orleans: The Lost Year," *The New Yorker*, August 21, 2006: 44-59; D. Wiegand, "When the Levees Broke: Review of Spike Lee's Documentary" (*When the Levees Broke: A Requiem in Four Acts*, HBO-TV, August 21, 22, 2006), *San Francisco Chronicle*, August 21, 2006, pp. F1-F4.
 33. J. Lipman-Blumen, *The Allure of Toxic Leaders: Why We Follow Destructive Bosses and Corrupt Politicians—and How We Can Survive Them* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). Quote p. ix.
 34. L. Ross and R. E. Nisbett, *The Person and the Situation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991).
 35. A. Bandura, *Self-Efficacy: The Exercise of Control* (New York: Freeman, 1997).
 36. R. Kueter, *The State of Human Nature* (New York: iUniverse, 2005). For a review of culture's psychological effects, see R. Brislin, *Understanding Culture's Influence on Behavior* (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993). Also see H. Markus and S. Kitayama, "Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion and Motivation," *Psychological Review* 98 (1991): 224-53.
 37. L. Ross and D. Shestowsky, "Contemporary Psychology's Challenges to Legal Theory and Practice," *Northwestern University Law Review* 97 (2003): 1081-1114; quote p. 1114. It is also valuable to read the extensive review and analysis of the place of the situation in law and economics by two legal scholars, Jon Hanson and David Yosifon, "The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 129 (2003): 152-346. In addition, my research collaborator Craig Haney has written extensively on the need for greater inclusion

- of contextual factors in legal justice; see, e. g., C. Haney, "Making Law Modern: Toward a Contextual Model of Justice," *Psychology, Public Policy and Law* 8 (2002): 3-63.
38. M. Snyder, "When Belief Creates Reality," in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, vol. 18, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1984), pp. 247-305.
 39. D. L. Rosenhan, "On Being Sane in Insane Places," *Science* 179 (1973): 250-58.
 40. F. D. Richard, D. F. Bond, Jr., and J. J. Stokes-Zoota, "One Hundred Years of Social Psychology Quantitatively Described," *Review of General Psychology* 7 (2003): 331-63.
 41. S. T. Fiske, L. T. Harris, and A.J.C. Cudy, "Why Ordinary People Torture Enemy Prisoners," *Science (Policy Forum)* 306 (2004): 1482-83; quote, p. 1482. Also see Susan Fiske's analyses in *Social Beings* (New York: Wiley, 2003).

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: Abu Ghraib's Abuses and Tortures: Understanding and Personalizing Its Horrors

1. Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations. The full report is available on the Stanford Prison Experiment website at www.prisonexp.org/pdf/SchlesingerReport.pdf. It was issued on November 8, 2004.
2. Report on CBS's *60 Minutes II* website at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/27/60II/main614063.shtml.
3. Evidence exists that General Myers personally called Dan Rather eight days before the Abu Ghraib abuse report was scheduled to air on *60 Minutes II* to request that CBS delay broadcasting the segment. His justification for this delay was to avoid danger to "our troops" and to the "war effort." CBS complied with Myers's request and put off showing the piece for two weeks. It finally decided to air it only when the network discovered that *The New Yorker* magazine was preparing to publish a detailed report by the investigative journalist Seymour Hersh. The request showed that the military brass was well aware of the "image problems" that would be created by the upcoming media revelations.
4. Congressional Testimony: Donald Rumsfeld, Federal Document Clearing House, 2004, available at www.highbeam.com/library/wordDoc.doc?docid=IP1:94441824; Testimony of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, May 7, 2004; available at www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040507-secdef1042.html.
5. Quoted in Adam Hochschild, "What's in a Word? Torture," *The New York Times*, May 23, 2004. Susan Sontag offered an elegant challenge to the notion that these deeds were merely "abuse" and not "torture" in her essay "Regarding the Torture of Others," *The New York Times Magazine*, May 23, 2004, pp. 25 ff.
6. The foreign minister of the Vatican, Archbishop Giovanni Lajolo, had a different perspective; "The torture? A more serious blow to the United States than September 11. Except that the blow was not inflicted by terrorists but by Americans against themselves." The editor of the London-based Arabic-language newspaper *Al Quds Al Arabi*, proclaimed, "The liberators are worse than the dictators. This is the straw that broke the camel's back for America."
7. "It's Not About Us; This Is War!" *The Rush Limbaugh Show*, May 4, 2004. See www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Rush_Limbaugh.
8. Senator James Inhofe's remarks come from the transcript of a Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing, May 11, 2004, in which Major General Taguba addressed the committee on the issue of Iraqi prisoner abuse, his first publicly delivered testimony to the committee, based on his six-thousand-page investigation (which took one month to conduct in nine volumes). The entire transcript (five Internet pages) is online at *The Washington Post* website at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/AI7812-2004May11.html.
9. Joseph Darby gave his first interview about his role in exposing the abuses to Wil S. Hylton,

in *GQ* magazine, September 2006, entitled "Prisoner of Conscience." (Darby quotes are from this source.) Available online at http://men.style.com/gq/features/landing?id=content_4785/.

10. There is an interesting parallel here with another soldier, Ronald Ridenhour, who blew the whistle on the 1968 My Lai massacre in Vietnam. He too was a bit of an outsider who came on the scene the day after some of his buddies had brutally slaughtered hundreds of Vietnamese civilians. Distressed both by their cavalier account of the atrocity and its violation of what he considered the fundamental principles of morality that America stood for, Ridenhour decided to go public. His repeated requests to superior officers, to President Nixon, and congressmen that this massacre be investigated were ignored or suppressed for more than a year. Finally, Ridenhour's persistence paid off. A young investigative reporter, Seymour Hersh, became involved and broke the story in his 1970 book, *My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and its Aftermath*. It was perhaps no accident that the same, now older, Seymour Hersh broke the story of the Abu Ghraib abuses in his *New Yorker* article (April 2004) and his book *Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib* (2004).

The sad aftermath of Darby's daring deed was that he had to be placed in protective custody for several years because many people wanted to kill him for humiliating the military. His wife and mother also had to go into hiding with him because of threats to their lives as well.

11. I wanted to start a Joe Darby Hero Fund, to collect donations nationwide that would be given to Darby once he was out of protective custody. A reporter for *USA Today*, Marilyn Elias, said her paper would run a story about this "hero in hiding" and mention the Hero Fund if I could provide a source where people could send donations. For months. I tried in vain to convince various organizations to be the public conduit for such funds, including Amnesty International, Darby's hometown bank, my Union Bank in Palo Alto, and a torture victims' association. Each gave various reasons that seemed spurious. I was able to encourage the then-president of the American Psychological Association, Diane Halperin, to give Darby a Presidential Citation at APA's annual convention, but against much opposition by members of its Board of Directors. It was all too political for too many people.
12. Quoted from "A Question of Torture," *PBS News Frontline*, October 18, 2005.
13. CBS, *60 Minutes II*, April 28, 2004.
14. An Army criminal investigative officer, Marci Drewry, was my informant about the conditions that existed at Abu Ghraib from the time the military took it over through the time of the investigations of abuse in Tier 1A. In a series of e-mails (September 16, 18, and 20, 2005) and a phone interview (September 8, 2005) she offered firsthand accounts of the "deplorable, miserable conditions facing the MPs as well as the prisoners. She served as assistant operations officer for the CID (Criminal Investigation Division) investigating crimes by U.S. soldiers in theater of war. Chief Warrant Officer Drewry was one of the first to see the images on the CD that Darby turned in. Her unit started the first internal investigation and completed it by February 2004. She told me that she wants the truth to come out about the conditions in the prison that might have influenced the MPs to behave as they did.
15. "80 Acres of Hell," History Channel program about Camp Douglas, June 3, 2006.
16. Reported in "Iraq Prison Abuse Stains Entire Brigade," *The Washington Times* (www.washingtontimes.com), May 10, 2004.
17. Janis Karpinski with Steven Strasser, *One Woman's Army: The Commanding General at Abu Ghraib Tells Her Story* (New York: Miramax Press, 2005).
18. BBC Radio 4 interview with Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, June 15, 2004. She also repeated these accusations in a conference held at Stanford University, which I introduced, on May 4, 2006.

19. The psychological assessment consisted of an interview with the military psychologist, Dr. Alvin Jones, on August 31 and September 2, 2004, followed by a battery of psychological tests. They included the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory, Second Edition (MMPI-2); the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-111; and the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scale (WASI). The official psychology consultation report and the test data were sent to me on September 21 and forwarded to Dr. Larry Beutler, head of the Ph.D. training program at the Pacific Graduate School of Psychology in Palo Alto. He provided an independent test interpretation blind to the status and name of the test client. I administered the Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI) at my home during my interview with Chip, and it was sent for interpretation to an expert on job stress, Dr. Michael Leiter, Center for Organizational Development in Wolfville, Canada. His formal evaluation was received on October 3, 2004. He was also blind to the background of the test client.
20. Psychology consultation report, August 31, 2004.
21. See my trade book for a general summary of this and related shyness research: P. G. Zimbardo, *Shyness: What It Is. What to Do About It* (Reading, MA: Perseus Books, 1977).
22. Personal letter, June 12, 2005.
23. Mimi Frederick, e-mail correspondence September 21, 2005. (Permission given to quote.)
24. The 372nd Military Police Company was a unit of reservists based in Cresaptown, Maryland. Most members of this company were from small, low-income towns in Appalachia, where military recruitment advertisements appear frequently in the local media. People there often join the military as teenagers in order to earn money or see the world, or just because it's a way to leave the town where they grew up. The members of the 372nd reported being a tight-knit group. See *Time* magazine. *Special Report*, May 17, 2004.
25. My interview with Chip, September 30, 2004, and personal letter, June 12, 2005.
26. Summary of Dr. Alvin Jones's report of his interview and battery of psychological tests with Frederick (August 31-September 2, 2004).
27. Dr. Jones's summary of all test results.
28. These and other quotations are from the "Test Interpretation of Client" on September 22, 2004, by Dr. Larry Beutler in a written report to me.
29. Dr. Leiter's evaluation was provided to me on October 3, 2004, based on the raw data submitted to him of Chip's responses on the MBI-General Survey. See C. Maslach and M. P. Leiter, *The Truth About Burnout* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997). Also see M. P. Leiter and C. Maslach, *Preventing Burnout and Building Engagement: A Complete Package for Organizational Renewal* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000).
30. There is a large psychological literature on cognitive overload and cognitive resource load. A few references are: D. Kirsh, "A Few Thoughts on Cognitive Overload," *Intellectica* 30 (2000): 19-51; R. Hester and H. Caravan, "Working Memory and Executive Function: The Influence of Content and Load on the Control of Attention," *Memory & Cognition* 33 (2005): 221-33; F. Pass, A. Renkl, and J. Swelle, "Cognitive Load Theory: Instructional Implications of the Interaction Between Information Structures and Cognitive Architecture," *Instructional Science* 32 (2004): 1-8.
31. Notes about the saga of Private Jessica Lynch are from a BBC 2 TV documentary indicating that the U.S. military faked and distorted virtually everything about her "heroic" narrative. The same military creation of a pseudohero occurred with the former NFL Arizona Cardinals football star Pat Tillman, who was killed by his own men's "friendly fire"—which was covered up until his family forced the truth to come out. The BBC exposé of Jessica Lynch was "War Spin: The Truth About Jessica," May 18, 2003 (reporter, John Kampfner). The transcript of the program can be accessed at: <http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/3028585.stm>. The case of Pat Tillman was covered in a two-part series in *The Washington Post*: S. Coll, "Barrage of Bullets Drowned Out Cries of Comrades: Communication Breakdown, Split Platoon Among Factors of 'Friendly Fire,'" *The Washington Post*, December 4, 2004, p A01; S. Coll, "Army Spun Tale Around Ill-Fated Mission," *The Wash-*

ington Post, December 6, 2004, p A01; The two articles are available online at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35717-2004Dec4.html and www.Washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37679-2004Dec5.html. Pat Tillman's father, Patrick, a lawyer, continues to investigate his son's death. A recent *New York Times* article offers new details of the case: M. Davey and S. Eric "Two Years After Soldier's Death, Family's Battle is with Army," *The New York Times*, March 21, 2006), p A01. See also the eloquent and powerful statement by Pat's brother, Kevin, who joined the Army with Pat in 2002, and served with him in Iraq and Afghanistan; titled "After Pat's Birthday." Online: www.truthdig.com/report/item/200601019_after-pats-birthday/.

32. All interview questions and answers are from the September 30, 2004, interview at my home, tape-recorded and then transcribed by my assistant Matt Estrada.
33. R.J. Smith and J. White, "General Granted Latitude at Prison: Abu Ghraib Used Aggressive Tactics," *The Washington Post*, June 12, 2004, p. A01, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35612-2004Jun11.html.
34. A veteran military interrogator shared his view with me on the issue of interrogators manipulating Military Police personnel to assist them in getting the information they were after: "THIS is where the rub lies. Unscrupulous interrogators (of the kind, in descending order, of: junior military interrogators, contracted personnel, CIA personnel) willing to play into preconceived notions on the part of folks willing to believe in them. I have had the experience of personnel charged with the detention of others (in this case it was a company of infantry soldiers that were given the mission of running the prison) applying every stereotype of an "interrogator" in the range of American culture; however, when I took the time to explain not only that I did not engage in the behavior they suspected me of, but also why I didn't do so, they not only understood my perspective on it, they agreed and *willingly modified their operations to support it*. The control of one human being over another is an awesome responsibility that must be taught, trained and understood, not *ordered*." Received August 3, 2006; source prefers to remain anonymous.
35. Chip Frederick, interview with me, September 30, 2004.
36. Ken Davis's statement was included in a documentary, "The Human Behavior Experiments," that aired on the Sundance Channel, June 1, 2006.
37. I. Janis, "Groupthink," *Psychology Today*, November 1971, pp. 43-46. The Senate Intelligence Committee conclusions are available at <http://intelligence.senate.gov/conclusions.pdf>.
38. S. T. Fiske, L. T. Harris, and A. J. Cuddy, "Why Ordinary People Torture Enemy Prisoners," *Science* 306 (2004): 1482-83; quote, p. 1483.
39. Personal communication by e-mail, August 30, 2006, with permission to reprint. Writer is now working in the Security Office of the Department of Commerce.
40. General Taguba's report was presented to Congress on May 11, 2004.
41. We will have more to say in the next chapter about Major General Fay's report, which he co-authored with Lieutenant General Jones. Part of the Fay/Jones Report is presented in Steven Strasser, ed., *The Abu Ghraib Investigations: The Official Reports of the Independent Panel and the Pentagon on the Shocking Prisoner Abuse in Iraq*. (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

The full report is available at <http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf>.

42. *Fifth Estate*, "A Few Bad Apples: The Night of October 25, 2003," Canadian Broadcast Company Television News, November 16, 2005, available at <http://cbc.ca/fifth/badapples/resource.html>.
43. M. A. Fuoco, E. Blazina, and C. Lash, "Suspect in Prisoner Abuse Has a History of Troubles," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, May 8, 2004.
44. Testimony by a military intelligence analyst at Graner's pretrial hearing.
45. Stipulation of Fact, Case of *United States v. Frederick*, August 5, 2004.

46. Personal written communication from Chip Frederick to me from Fort Leavenworth, June 12, 2005.
47. Guard "Hellmann" on "The Human Behavior Experiments," June 1, 2006.
- 48.

| DEVELOPMENTAL COUNSELING FORM | | | |
|--|--|---------------------|--------------------|
| For use of this form, see FM 22-100; the proponent agency is TRADOC. | | | |
| DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 | | | |
| AUTHORITY: | 5 USC 301, Departmental Regulations; 10 USC 3013, Secretary of the Army and E.O. 9397 (SSN) | | |
| PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: | To assist leaders in conducting and recording counseling data pertaining to subordinates. | | |
| ROUTINE USES: | For subordinate leader development IAW FM 22-100. Leaders should use this form as necessary. | | |
| DISCLOSURE: | Disclosure is voluntary. | | |
| PART I - ADMINISTRATIVE DATA | | | |
| Name (Last, First, MI) | Rank/Grade | Social Security No. | Date of Counseling |
| Granger, Charles | CPL/E-4 | | 16 NOV 03 |
| Organization | Name and Title of Counselor | | |
| 372nd Military Police Company | CPT [REDACTED] / Platoon Leader | | |
| PART II - BACKGROUND INFORMATION | | | |
| Purpose of Counseling: (Leader states the reason for the counseling, e.g., performance/professional growth or event-oriented counseling, and includes the leader's facts and observations prior to the counseling.) | | | |
| Performance o Performance in Tier 1 at BCF | | | |
| PART III - SUMMARY OF COUNSELING | | | |
| Complete this section during or immediately subsequent to counseling. | | | |
| Key Points of Discussion: CPL Granger, you are doing a fine job in Tier 1 of the BCF. As the NCOIC of the "MI Hold" area, you have received many accolades from the MI units here and specifically from LTC [REDACTED]. Continue to perform at this level and it will help us succeed at our overall mission. I am concerned about two matters related to your performance. First, SFC [REDACTED] has spoken to you about your appearance while on duty. I require all soldiers to maintain the Army's uniform and appearance standards at all times and encourage them to exceed them when possible. I want to reinforce this issue with you now. Second, due to the higher level of stress associated with working in tier 1, I am concerned that it does not affect your performance. Many times you have to deal with security detainees that are of the highest intelligence value. These detainees often try to incite our soldiers to aggressive acts by taunting them or not responding to commands. In addition, tier 1 houses the isolations cells for the hard site prison. These cells are filled with detainees whose noncompliant and/or aggressive behavior has placed them in isolation. Also, tier 1 holds detainees with mental health issues. These detainees add to the stress of working in tier 1. There was an incident on 14 NOV 03 involving a security detainee whose actions in your words required you to use force to regain control of the situation. The detainee received abrasions and cuts on his face from the incident. Let me state first and foremost, you have an inherent right to self-defense that cannot be taken away from you. I 100 percent support your decision when you believe you must defend yourself. You stated that you escalated your actions through the approved levels of force. You stated you used the appropriate level of force up through the continuum of the use of force to contain the situation. Then you stated that you ceased all use of force and sought medical attention for the detainee. Statements from other MP working that evening do not shed any light on the incident. Unless other evidence presents itself, I accept your version of events. | | | |
| OTHER INSTRUCTIONS | | | |
| This form will be destroyed upon: reassignment (other than rehabilitative transfers), separation at ETS, or upon retirement. For separation requirements and notification of loss of benefits/consequences see local directives and AR 635-200. | | | |

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49. Ibid. MP Ken Davis's report on "The Human Behavior Experiments."
50. See www.supportmpscagegoats.com.
51. Sontag, "Regarding the Torture of Others," May 23, 2004.
52. "Now That's Fucked Up": www.nowthatsfuckedup.com/bbs/index.php (see especially www.nowthatsfuckedup.com/bbs/ftopic41640.html.)
53. Allen et al., *Without Sanctuary: Lynching Photography in America*.
54. Browning, *Ordinary Men* (1993).
55. Janina Struk, *Photographing the Holocaust: Interpretations of the Evidence* (New York: Palgrave, 2004).
56. www.armenocide.am.
57. For more on Teddy Roosevelt's trophy photos with his son Kermit, see "On Safari with Theodore Roosevelt, 1909," available at www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/tr/htm. Interest-

ingly, although the expedition was billed as "collecting" a variety of animal species, it was actually a hunt-and-kill safari in which 512 animals were slain, among them 17 lions, 11 elephants, and 20 rhinoceros. Ironically, Theodore Roosevelt's grandson Kermit Jr. was head of the CIA's Operation Ajax in Iran, the agency's first successful coup d'état, which removed from power the (democratically elected) Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. The CIA's rationale for this first coup was the Communist threat posed by allowing Mossadegh to remain in power. According to Stephen Kinzer, a veteran *New York Times* journalist, this operation set a pattern for the next half century, during which the United States and CIA successfully removed (or supported the removal of) heads of state in Guatemala (1954), then in Cuba, Chile, the Congo, Vietnam, and, most relevant to our story here, all the way to Saddam Hussein in Iraq (2003). Kinzer also notes that the environments in these countries after the coups d'état were often marked by instability, civil strife, and countless amounts of violence. These operations have had profound effects that reverberate to this day. The immense misery and suffering they created has turned whole regions of the world bitterly against the United States. To come full circle all the way from Operation Ajax and recently from the war zone of Iraq, the United States has embarked on another mission of counterintelligence and perhaps even made plans for war against Iran. Seymour Hersh, our familiar friend and journalist from *The New Yorker* who investigated My Lai and Abu Ghraib, exposed this revelation; www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?050124fa_fact; S. Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003); S. Kinzer, *Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq* (New York: Times Books, 2006).

58. The quote is from my notes recorded during the panel (which I introduced), in which Janis Karpinski spoke as part of a session on "Crimes Against Humanity Committed by the Bush Administration," May 4, 2006. A veteran military interrogator casts doubt on this version of the top-down permission to MPs from interrogators to take the photos: "I do not believe that 'permission' to have come from the interrogators, if it came from anyone at all.... In my over two decades of being an interrogator and a supervisor of interrogation operations, I have heard just about every 'approach' there is, and it does not seem credible to me that an interrogator would not only willingly engage in an unlawful act that is of dubious value to the process of interrogation, but that he would conspire with others and depend on their trust." Received August 3, 2006; source prefers anonymity.
59. Judith Butler, "Torture, Sexual Politics, and the Ethics of Photography." Lecture presented at Stanford University symposium *Thinking Humanity After Abu Ghraib* (October 20, 2006).
60. This CBS report of abuses at Camp Bucca is available online at www.cbsnews/stories/2004/05/11/60II/main616849.shtml.
61. These accounts and much more are available in the Human Rights Watch report "Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi Detainees by U.S. Army's 82nd Airborne Division." September 24, 2005, available at <http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0905>.
62. Chip Frederick's eight-year sentence was reduced by six months by order of the Commanding General, and by another eighteen months by the Army Clemency and Parole Board (August 2006), based on a variety of appeals and justifications for leniency in my statements and those of many others.
63. The kind of stress that Chip experienced nightly on Tier 1A, and later during his imprisonment, can have a major enduring impact on brain functioning, and in turn on mood, thinking, and behavior; see Robert M. Sapolsky, "Why Stress Is Bad for Your Brain." *Science* 273(1996): 749-50.
64. Personal communication, June 12, 2005.
65. E. Aronson and J. Mills, "The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 59 (1959): 177-81.

66. Personal communication, February 25, 2005.
67. Personal communication, June 15, 2005.
68. Darius M. Rejali, *Torture and Modernity: Self, Society, and State in Modern Iran* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994). Also see his online essays available at http://archive.salon.com/opinion/feature/2004/06/18/torture_methods/index.html and http://archive.salon.com/opinion/feature/2004/06/18/torture_1/index.html.
69. A military officer reported to me, "I have myself used the term 'going Stanford' when describing uncharacteristic sadistic behavior on the part of persons in charge of others."
70. Hensley is a Board Certified Expert in Traumatic Stress (BC ETS) and diplomate with the American Academy of Experts in Traumatic Stress, who is now a psychological operations (PSYOP) and antiterrorism adviser to the federal government. Hensley, a doctoral learner at Capella University with a specialization in PTSD, has studied the abuses at Abu Ghraib extensively. Hensley also notes, "The reliability of the assertions expressed in this paper may be established by similar analysis of a representative selection of the defendants' unit. A positive correlation of similar data might indicate the validity of the Zimbardo Effect at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility, thus explaining the deviant behavior" (p. 51). A. L. Hensley, "Why Good People Go Bad: A Psychoanalytic and Behavioral Assessment of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility Staff." A strategic courts-martial defense strategy presented to the Area Defense Council in Washington, D.C., on December 10, 2004.
71. R. Norland, "Good Intentions Gone Bad," *Newsweek*, June 13, 2005, p. 40.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: Putting the System on Trial: Command Complicity

1. Closing statement, October 21, 2004, by Major Michael Holley, Court-martial trial of Sergeant Ivan Frederick, Baghdad, October 20 and 21, 2005, pp. 353-54.
2. My closing spontaneous statement, October 21, 2004, p. 329.
3. "Administrative evil" functions by having agency operatives focus on developing the correct procedures, the right steps in a process that is the most efficient means to an end. These administrators do so without recognizing that the means to that end are immoral, illegal, and unethical. They are conveniently blinded from the realities of the substance of the abuses—and the horrendous consequences—that are generated by their policies and practices. Those guilty of administrative evil may be corporations, police and corrections departments, or military and government centers, as well as radical revolutionary groups.

As we saw some forty years ago in the calculated approach of Robert McNamara to the war in Vietnam, reliance on a scientific-analytic mind-set along with a technical-rational-legalistic approach to social and political problems enables an organization and its members to engage in evil that is masked and ethically hidden. In one of its manifestations, the State sanctions its agents' engagement in actions ordinarily considered immoral, illegal, and evil by recasting them as necessary for the defense of national security. Just as the Holocaust and the internment of Japanese-American citizens during World War II were examples of administrative evil, so too, I argue, is the torture program of the Bush administration as part of its "war on terror."

This profound concept of "administrative evil" has been developed by Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour in their provocative book *Unmasking Administrative Evil*, re. ed. (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004).

4. A good single source on the Abu Ghraib chronology and the investigative reports can be found at www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iraq/abu-ghurayb-chronology.htm.
5. The investigative journalist Seymour M. Hersh broke the story of abuses and torture at Abu Ghraib in "Torture at Abu Ghraib. American Soldiers Brutalize Iraqis: How Far Up Does the Responsibility Go?," *The New Yorker*, May 5, 2004, p. 42, available at www.notinourname.net/war/torture-5may04.htm.
6. Available at <http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html#ThRI.14>.
7. Part of the Fay/Jones Report is presented in Steven Strasser and Craig R. Whitney eds., *The*

- Abu Ghraib Investigations: The Official Reports of the Independent Panel and the Pentagon on the Shocking Prisoner Abuse in Iraq* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004). The full report is available at <http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf>. Also see Strasser and Whitney *The 9/11 Investigations: Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission: Excerpts from the House-Senate Joint Inquiry Report on 9/11: Testimony from Fourteen Key Witnesses* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).
8. It is reported that CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid requested that an officer of higher rank than Major General Fay lead the investigation so that he would be able to interview senior officers, which Army regulations prevented Major General Fay from doing but allowed Lieutenant General Jones to do so.
 9. Steven H. Miles, *Oath Betrayed: Torture, Medical Complicity, and the War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2006).
 10. Captain Wood's case was described in detail in "A Few Bad Apples," CBC News, *The Fifth Estate*, November 16, 2005.
 11. Eric Schmitt, "Abuses at Prison Tied to Officers in Military Intelligence," *The New York Times*, August 26, 2004.
 12. The members of the Independent Panel to Review DoD [Department of Defense] Detention Operations briefed Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld as they delivered their final report on August 24, 2004. The four members of the panel included former secretary of defense Harold Brown; former representative Tillie Fowler (R-Fla.); General Charles A. Horner, USAF (Retired); and former secretary of defense James R. Schlesinger, Panel Chair. The full report, including Appendix G, can be found at www.prisonexp.org/pdf/SchlesingerReport.pdf.
 13. See www.hrw.org. Another valuable resource to review is that provided in the report by the Canadian Broadcast Company's *Fifth Estate* program "A Few Bad Apples," which aired on November 16, 2005. It focused on the events in Tier 1A on the night of October 25, 2003, when several soldiers tortured Iraqi prisoners while others looked on. It is the incident reported in chapter 14, that was started by the rumor these prisoners had raped a boy, which turned out to be false. The CBC site is a source for a chronology of events leading up to this abuse, Seymour Hersh's articles on Abu Ghraib, and memos by Bush, Rumsfeld, and Sanchez; available at www.cbc.ca/fifth/badapples/resource.html.
 14. See www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040506-9.html.
 15. "Abu Ghraib Only the 'Tip of the Iceberg,'" *Human Rights Watch Report*, April 27, 2005.
 16. E. Schmitt, "Few Punished in Abuse Cases," *The New York Times*, April 27, 2006, p. A24. This summary is based upon a full report prepared by New York University's Center for Human Rights and Global Justice in association with Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First. Their researchers compiled the statistics from about 100,000 documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. They note that about two thirds of all the abuses occurred in Iraq.
 17. "Abu Ghraib Dog Handler Gets 6 Months," *CBS News Video Report*, May 22, 2006. Available at www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/22/iraq/main1430842.shtml.
 18. The full report is available at <http://humanrightsfirst.info/PDF/06425-etn-by-the-numbers.PDF>.
 19. The full HRW report, including the quotations that I have extracted from it, is available at www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405/1.htm (for Executive Summary); see also /2.htm up to /6.htm for additional sections of this lengthy report.
 20. Congressional Testimony of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners, Federal News Service, May 7, 2004.
 21. See www.genevaconventions.org/.
 22. "Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conven-

- tions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation," February 2004. See http://download.repubblica.it/pdf/rapporto_crocerossa.pdf.
23. Amnesty International, "Beyond Abu Ghraib: Detention and Torture in Iraq," 2006, available at <http://web.amnestv.org/library/print/ENGMD140012006/>.
 24. Quote from "A Question of Torture," PBS *Frontline*, October 18, 2005.
 25. J. White, "Some Abu Ghraib Prisoners 'Ghosed.'" *The Washington Post*, March 11, 2005.
 26. A. W. McCoy, *A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (New York: Henry Holt, 2006), pp. 5, 6.
 27. Testimony of Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on Iraq Prisoner Abuse, May 19, 2004.
 28. Mark Danner, *Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib and the War on Terrorism* (New York: The New York Review of Books, 2004), p. 33.
 29. Janis Karpinski, interview on "A Question of Torture," PBS *Frontline*, October 18, 2005.
 30. From Lt. Ricardo Sanchez to Commander Central Command, memorandum, Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, September 14, 2003, available at www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=17851&c=206.
 31. Joseph Darby interview, *GQ* magazine, September 2006.
 32. *The New Yorker's* Jane Mayer, quoted on "A Question of Torture," PBS *Frontline*, October 18, 2005.
 33. More recently (June 2006), nearly ninety detainees at Gitmo went on extended hunger strikes to protest their false imprisonment. A Navy commander dismissed this action as nothing more than an "attention-getting" tactic. To prevent them from dying, officials had to begin daily forced feeding through nose tubes of at least six of them administered by medics. That itself resembles a new kind of torture, though officials claim it is "safe and humane." See Ben Fox, "Hunger Strike Widens at Guantánamo," Associated Press, May 30, 2006, and Andrew Selsky, "More Detainees Join Hunger Strike at Guantánamo," Associated Press, June 2, 2006.
- In an earlier chapter, I noted the role of hunger strikes by political prisoners in Ireland and elsewhere to draw a parallel with the tactic used by our Prisoner Clay-416. One of the most celebrated of the Irish hunger strikers, who died for the cause, was Bobby Sands. It is remarkable that the organizer of the hunger strikes at Gitmo, Binyam Mohammed al-Habashi, has proclaimed that he and the other hunger strikers will either have their requests respected or die like Bobby Sands, who "had the courage of his convictions and starved himself to death. Nobody should believe for one moment that my brothers here have less courage." See Kate McCabe, "Political Prisoners' Resistance from Ireland to GITMO: 'No Less Courage,'" www.CounterPunch.com, May 5, 2006.
34. "GITMO Suicides Comment Condemned. U.S. Officials' "Publicity Stunt" Remark Draws International Backlash," Associated Press, June 12, 2006. The government official was Colleen Graffy, deputy assistant, U.S. Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. The naval officer was Henry Harris.
 35. Janis Karpinski, interview on "A Question of Torture," PBS *Frontline*, October 18, 2005. Also reported in "Iraq Abuse 'Ordered from the Top,'" BBC, June 15, 2004, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3806713.stm>. When Miller arrived at Abu Ghraib, he said, "It's my opinion that you're treating the prisoners too well. At Guantánamo, the prisoners know that we are in charge, and they know that from the very beginning." He said, "You have to treat the prisoners like dogs, and if you think or feel differently, you've lost control." Available at www.truthout.org/docs_2006/012406Z.shtml.
 36. Scott Wilson and Sewell Chan, "As Insurgency Grew, So Did Prison Abuse," *The Washington Post*, May 9, 2004. Also see Janis Karpinski, *One Woman's Army* (New York: Hyperion, 2005), pp. 196-205.
 37. Jeffrey R. Smith, "General Is Said to Have Urged Use of Dogs," *The Washington Post*, May 26, 2004.

38. General Kern in "A Question of Torture," *PBS Frontline*, October 18, 2005.
39. Major General Geoffrey Miller retired from the military on July 31, 2006. He elected to retire without seeking a promotion or his third star because his legacy has been tarnished by allegations of his direct role in torture and abuse in Abu Ghraib and Gitmo prisons, according to military and congressional sources.
40. General Myers's statement about his continuing to blame only the MP "bad apples" for all the Abu Ghraib abuses, while ignoring or dismissing all the evidence from the many independent investigations that reveal extensive complicity by senior officers and many systemic failures indicates either his rigid perseverance or ignorance. Available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/etc/script.html.
41. More than 100,000 pages of government documents have been released detailing the abuses and torture of detainees, which can be searched via the ACLU's search engine for public access to these documents at: www.aclu.org/torturefoiasearch. The story about the April 2004 Army Information Paper is available at www.rawstory.com/news/2006/New_Army_documents_reveal_US_knew_0502.html.
42. Eric Schmitt, "Outmoded Interrogation Tactics Cited," *The New York Times*, June, 17, 2006, p. A11.
43. The *Toledo Blade* newspaper in Ohio and its reporters won a Pulitzer Prize for the investigation of atrocities committed by the "Tiger Force" in Vietnam, which, over a seven-month period, left a trail of civilian murders and mayhem that have been concealed by the military for three decades. This commando unit of the 101st Airborne Division was one of the most highly decorated units in Vietnam. The Army investigated allegations of their war crimes, mutilations, torture, murder, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and found probable cause to indict eighteen soldiers but did not file any charges against them. See "Buried Secrets, Brutal Truths," www.toledoblade.com. Experts agree that an earlier probe of the Tiger Force rampage could have averted the My Lai carnage six months later.
44. An American reporter, Nir Rosen, who has been living in Iraq for three years and speaks Arabic, even its Iraqi dialect, reports that "The occupation has become one vast extended crime against the Iraqi people, and most of it has occurred unnoticed by the American people and the media"; see Nir Rosen, "The Occupation of Iraqi Hearts and Minds," June 27, 2006, available at http://truthdig.com/dig/item/20060627_occupation_iraq_hearts_minds/. See also the related commentary by the reporter Haifer Zangana, "All Iraq is Abu Ghraib. Our Streets Are Prison Corridors and Our Homes Cells as the Occupiers Go About Their Strategic Humiliation and Intimidation," *The Guardian*, July 5, 2006.
45. Anna Badkhen, "Atrocities Are a Fact of All Wars, Even Ours: It's Not Just Evil Empires Whose Soldiers Go Amok," *San Francisco Chronicle*, August 13, 2006, pp. E1, E6. Quote by John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, on p. E1.
46. Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995). Grossman's website is www.killology.com.
47. Vicki Haddock, "The Science of Creating Killers: Human Reluctance to Take a Life Can Be Reversed Through Training in the Method Known as Killology," *San Francisco Chronicle*, August 13, 2006, pp. E1, E6. Quote by former Army private Steven Green, p. E1.
48. David S. Cloud. "Marines May Have Excised Evidence on 24 Iraqi Deaths," *The New York Times*, August 18, 2006; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., "Iraqi Leader Lambasts U.S. Military: He Says There Are Daily Attacks on Civilians by Troops," *The New York Times*, June 2, 2006.
49. D. S. Cloud and E. Schmitt, "Role of Commanders Probed in Death of Civilians," *The New York Times*, June 3, 2006; L. Kaplow, "Iraqi's Video Launched Massacre Investigation," Cox News Service, June 4, 2006.
50. MSNBC.COM. "Peers Vowed to Kill Him if He Talked, Soldier Says," Associated Press report, August 2, 2006. available at www.msnbc.com/id/14150285.

51. T. Whitmore, "Ex-Soldier Charged with Rape of Iraqi Woman, Killing of Family," June 3, 2006, available at <http://news.findlaw.com/ap/0/51/07-04-2006/d493003212d3/a9c.html>; Julie Rawe and Aparisim Ghosh, "A Soldier's Shame," *Time*, July 17, 2006, pp. 38-39.
52. "Blair Promises Iraq Abuse' Probe," BBC News, February 12, 2006; the story and the video images of this abuse are available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/UK/4705482.STM>.
53. Roger Brokaw and Anthony Lagouranis, on "A Question of Torture," PBS *Frontline*, October 18, 2005, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/interviews.html.
54. "To take the gloves off" is generally taken to mean to fight an opponent with one's bare knuckles, removing the protection of the softer prizefighting gloves that are usually worn in such fights. Colloquially, it means to fight hard and tough, without constraints of the usual rules governing such combat between adversaries.
55. T. R. Reid, "Military Court Hears Abu Ghraib Testimony: Witness in Graner Case Says Higher-ups Condoned Abuse," *The Washington Post*, January 11, 2005, page AO3. "Frederick, a staff sergeant who was demoted to private after pleading guilty to abuse at Abu Ghraib, said he had consulted with six senior officers, ranging from captains to lieutenant colonels, about the guards' actions but was never told to stop. Frederick also said that a CIA official, whom he identified as Agent Romero, told him to 'soften up' one suspected insurgent for questioning. The agent told him he did not care what the soldiers did, 'just don't kill him,' Frederick testified." Available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62597-2005Jan10.html.
56. A. Zagorin, and M. Duffy, "Time Exclusive: Inside the Wire at Gitmo," *Time*, available at www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,10712,84.00.html.
57. Quoted in Jane Mayer, "The Memo," *The New Yorker*, February 27, 2006, p. 35.
58. Details of the interviews with Captain Fishback and the two sergeants are posted on Human Rights Watch's report "Leadership Failure: Firsthand Accounts of Torture of Iraqi Detainees by the Army's 82nd Airborne Division," September 2005, vol. 17, no. 3(G), available at hrw.org/reports/2005/us0905/1.htm. Fishback's full letter to Senator McCain was published in *The Washington Post* on September 18, 2005; available at www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/27/AR2005092701527.html.
59. Erik Saar and Viveca Novak, *Inside the Wire: A Military Intelligence Soldier's Eyewitness Account of Life at Guantánamo* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).
60. Eric Saar, radio interview with Amy Goodman, "Democracy Now," Pacifica Radio, May 4, 2005, available at www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=05/05/04/1342253/.
61. Maureen Dowd, "Torture Chicks Gone Wild," *The New York Times*, January 30, 2005.
62. These quotes by Saar and Interrogator "Brooke" are in *Inside the Wire*, pp. 220-228.
63. See a fascinating story, A. C. Thompson and Trevor Paglen, "The CIA's Torture Taxi," *San Francisco Bay Guardian*, December 14, 2005, pp. 15 and 18. This investigation revealed a Boeing jet, no. N313P, owned by a private company, that had unprecedented clearance to land at any Army base in the world; its use was traced to the kidnapping of a German citizen of Lebanese descent, Khaled El-Masri. It is alleged to be one of twenty-six planes in the CIA fleet used for such renditions, according to one ACLU human rights expert, Steven Watt.
64. See Human Rights Watch, "The Road to Abu Ghraib," June 2004, available at www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/. See also John Barry, Michael Hirsh, and Michael Isikoff, "The Roots of Torture," *Newsweek*, May 24, 2004, available at <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4989422/site/newsweek/>: "According to knowledgeable sources, the president's directive authorized the CIA to set up a series of secret detention facilities outside the United States, and to question those held in them with unprecedented harshness."
65. *Frontline*, "The Torture Question," transcript, p. 5.
66. *Ibid.*

67. Jan Silva, "Europe Prison Inquiry Seeks Data on 31 Flights: Romania, Poland Focus of Investigation into Alleged CIA Jails," Associated Press. Nov. 23, 2005.
68. "21 Inmates Held Are Killed, ACLU Says," Associated Press. October 24, 2005; full report by ACLU, "Operative Killed Detainees During Interrogations in Afghanistan and Iraq," October 24, 2005, available at www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=19298&c=36.
69. See M. Huggins, M. Haritos-Fatouros, and P. G. Zimbardo, *Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
70. White House, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat: Remarks by the President on Iraq (October 7, 2002). Available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007=8.html.
71. "Iraq on the Record: The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq," prepared by the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform—Minority Staff's Special Investigations Division, March 16, 2004, available at www.reform.house.gov/min/.
72. Ron Suskind, *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p. 10.
73. Adam Gopnik, "Read It and Weep," *The New Yorker*, August 28, 2006, pp. 21–22.
74. Philip Zimbardo with Bruce Kluger. "Phantom Menace: Is Washington Terrorizing Us More than Al Qaeda?" *Psychology Today*, 2003, 34–36; Rose McDermott and Philip Zimbardo elaborate on this theme in the chapter "The Politics of Fear: The Psychology of Terror Alerts," in *Psychology and Terrorism*, eds. B. Bongor, L. M. Brown, L. Beutler, J. Breckenridge, and Philip Zimbardo (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 357–70.
75. *The Washington Post*, October 26, 2005, p. A18.
76. Letter to Senator John McCain by thirteen retired military commanders and ambassador Douglas Peterson, July 23, 2005. (Ultimately signed by twenty-eight retired military commanders.) Available at www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/pdf/mccain-100305.pdf. McCain's comments about it on the Senate floor available at http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Content_id=1611 & Content_id=1611.
77. John McCain, "The Truth About Torture," *Newsweek*, November 21, 2005, p. 35.
78. Cheney's remarks about the "dark side," made on *Meet the Press with Tim Russert*, September 16, 2001, at Camp David, Maryland, can be found in full at www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916.html.
79. Quoted in Maureen Dowd, "System on Trial," *The New York Times*, November 7, 2005.
80. James Risen, *State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration* (New York: Free Press, 2006).
81. Anthony Lewis, "Making Torture Legal," *The Washington Post*, June 17, 2004, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf. The DOD memo of March 6, 2003, advising Rumsfeld on interrogation tactics is also online at www.news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/toture/30603wgrpt/.
82. K. J. Greenberg, and J. L. Dratel, eds., *The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Some of this material is available at www.ThinkingPiece.com/pages/books.html.
83. Quote by Anthony Lewis, in Introduction to *The Torture Papers*, p. xiii. It should also be mentioned that a small coterie of Justice Department lawyers, all appointed by the Bush administration, rebelled against the legal rationales being proposed to give the president virtually unlimited powers for spying on citizens and torturing suspected enemies. *Newsweek* reporters revealed this "Palace Revolt" (February 2006) as "a quietly dramatic profile in courage." Some of them have paid a high price for defending the principle of a nation of laws and not men—being ostracized, denied promotions, and encouraged to leave the service.

84. Joshua Dratel, "The Legal Narrative," in *The Torture Papers*, p. xxi.
85. B. Minutaglio, *The President's Counselor: The Rise to Power of Alberto Gonzales* (New York: HarperCollins, 2006).
86. R. J. Gonzalez, Review of Minutaglio's *The President's Counselor*, *San Francisco Chronicle*, July 2, 2006, pp. M1 and M2.
87. Online: "Gitmo Interrogations Spark Battle Over Tactics: The Inside Story of Criminal Investigators Who Tried to Stop the Abuse," MSNBC.COM, October 23, 2006. www.msnbc.com/msn.com/id/15361458.
88. "FBI Fed Thousands of Spy Tips. Report: Eavesdropping by NSA Flooded FBI, Led to Dead Ends," *The New York Times*, January 17, 2006.
89. Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, "Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report." *The New York Times*, December 23, 2005. Also Adam Liptak and Eric Lichtblau, "Judge Finds Wiretap Actions Violate the Law," *The New York Times*, August 18, 2006.
90. Bob Herbert, "The Nixon Syndrome," *The New York Times*, January 9, 2006.
91. C. Savage, "Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws." *The Boston Globe*, April 30, 2006.
92. L. Greenhouse, "Justices, 5-3, Broadly Reject Bush Plan to Try Detainees," *The New York Times*, June 30, 2006. A Navy lawyer who represented an assigned client detainee at Gitmo, was denied promotion by the Bush administration for taking his duty seriously and honestly. Lt. Cmdr. Charles Swift did not get his Yemeni citizen client to plead guilty before a military tribunal, as he had been urged to do. Rather, he concluded that such commissions were unconstitutional, and provided support for the Supreme Court's decision to reject them in *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*. Denial of his promotion spelled the end of his twenty-year distinguished military career. According to a *New York Times* editorial, "With his defense of Mr. Hamdan and his testimony before Congress starting in July 2003, Commander Swift did as much as any single individual to expose the awful wrongs of Guantánamo Bay and Mr. Bush's lawless military commissions." "The Cost of Doing Your Duty," *New York Times*, October 11, 2006, p. A26.
93. Guy B. Adams and Danny L. Balfour, *Unmasking Administrative Evil* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004). Similarly important background reading to understand the extent of the disaster visited on Iraq by the Bush administration's flawed policies and the Pentagon's denial of battlefield realities is found in Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).
94. The original story of this stealth attempt to gut the War Crimes Act was written by R. Jeffrey Smith, "War Crimes Act Changes Would Reduce Threat of Prosecution," *The Washington Post*, August 9, 2006, p. A1. It is more fully reported and developed by Jeremy Brecher and Brendan Smith in "Bush Aims to Kill War Crimes Act," *The Nation* online, September 5, 2006. Available at www.thenation.com/doc/2006/09/18brecher.
95. Lieutenant Colonel Jordan, who supervised the interrogation task force at Abu Ghraib, was charged with seven offenses and found guilty of criminal abuse by Army investigators—several years after those abuses came to light. He is reported to have dealt with the abuses by building a plywood wall so that he could not see them in action (according to a report on Salon.com, April 29, 2006). Jordan was charged with seven offenses from the articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice on April 26, 2006, but no decision has been reached as of September 6, 2006. Available at cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/26/iraq/main1547777.shtml. Colonel Pappas was granted immunity from prosecution in a plea bargain to testify into Jordan's alleged offenses. Major General Geoffrey Miller invoked his constitutional right against self-incrimination when called to testify in related cases involving the use of dogs to threaten detainees. Story in Richard A. Serrano and Mark Mazzetti, "Abu Ghraib Officer Could Face Charges: Criminal Action Would Be First in Army's Higher Ranks," *Los Angeles Times*, January 13, 2006.
96. In January 2006, a tribunal was held in New York City by The International Commission of Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity Committed by the Bush Administration of the

United States. Among other charges this tribunal leveled at the Bush administration were the following six counts that are in accordance with the command complicity charges I have brought against Rumsfeld, Tenet, Cheney, and Bush.

Torture. Count 1: The Bush administration authorized the use of torture and abuse in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law and domestic constitutional and statutory law.

Rendition. Count 2: The Bush administration authorized the transfer ("rendition") of persons held in U.S. custody to foreign countries where torture is known to be practiced.

Illegal Detention. Count 3: The Bush administration authorized the indefinite detention of persons seized in foreign combat zones and in other countries far from any combat zone and denied them the protections of the Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war and the protections of the U.S. Constitution; Count 4: The Bush administration authorized the roundup and detention in the United States of tens of thousands of immigrants on pretextual grounds and held them without charge or trial in violation of international human rights law and domestic constitutional and civil rights law; Count 5: The Bush administration used military forces to seize and detain indefinitely without charges U.S. citizens, denying them the right to challenge their detention in U.S. courts.

Murder. Count 6: The Bush administration committed murder by authorizing the CIA to kill those that the president designates, either U.S. citizens or noncitizens, anywhere in the world.

For more information about this tribunal and its conclusions, see www.bushcommissionindictments_files/bushcommissionindictments.htm. Three videos of the testimonies from the Bush Crimes Commission are available for viewing, see details at: www.BushCommission.org.

97. Personal communication in interview with Colonel Larry James, Honolulu, April 25, 2005. James has reviewed and approved the accuracy of this section.
98. The horrors of Abu Ghraib are not over for Iraqis still detained there since the Americans have abandoned it—they are worse. A recent report indicates that their new captors, Iraqi guards and Iraqi authorities, are torturing them, nearly starving them on diets of rice and water, forcing them to live in filth, oppressive heat, and crammed into small cells almost twenty-four hours a day. On September 6, 2006, the first mass executions since the days of Saddam Hussein were carried out against twenty-seven men imprisoned in that hellhole. Some prisoners report wishing that the Americans were back in charge. Story available online at www.theage.com.au/articles/2006/09/10/1157826813724.html.
99. Reported in Vanora McWalters, "Britain's Top Legal Adviser: Close Guantanamo, Symbol of Injustice," *Los Angeles Times*, May 11, 2006.
100. E. Sciolino, "Spanish Magistrate Calls on U.S. to Close Prison at Guantanamo," *The New York Times*, June 4, 2006.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN: Resisting Situational Influences and Celebrating Heroism

1. These and related data are found in an important resource book published by the American Association of Retired People (AARP), based on extensive research by the social psychologist Anthony Pratkanis of hundreds of audiotapes recorded of con men and swindlers pitching their wares to potential victims. See his important book filled with specific advice about how to detect hoaxes and not be taken in by them: Anthony Pratkanis and Doug Shadel, *Weapons of Fraud: A Source Book for Fraud Fighters* (Seattle: AARP Press, 2005).
2. Andrew Wolfson, "A Hoax Most Cruel," *The Courier-Journal*, October 9, 2005.
3. Quote by former assistant manager Donna Summers in "The Human Behavior Experiments," Jigsaw productions, Sundance TV, June 1, 2006.
4. *Zorba the Greek* is Niko Kazantzakis's classic novel, written in 1952. Alexis Zorba was

portrayed by Anthony Quinn in the 1964 movie of the same name, directed by Michael Cacoyannis, and co-starring Alan Bates as the shy, intellectual boss who is the foil to Zorba's boundless extroversion and devotion to living life with unbridled passion.

5. B. J. Sagarin, R. B. Cialdini, W. E. Rice, and S. B. Serna, "Dispelling the Illusion of Invulnerability: The Motivations and Mechanisms of Resistance to Persuasion," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 83 (2002): 526-41.
6. The MKULTRA program, secretly sponsored by the CIA in the 1950s and '60s, is well presented in John D. Marks, *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate: The CIA and Mind Control* (New York: Times Books, 1979). A more detailed scholarly presentation is found in Alan W. Schefflin and Edward Opton, Jr., *The Mind Manipulators* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978). See Alex Constantine's *Virtual Government: CIA Mind Control Operations in America* (Los Angeles: Feral House, 1997) for a fuller exposition of many other CIA-sponsored programs, such as Operation Mockingbird, designed to influence the American press and program public opinion.
7. A sample of my work in these diverse domains of social influence can be found in these publications: R. P. Abelson and P. G. Zimbardo, *Canvassing for Peace: A Manual for Volunteers* (Ann Arbor, MI: Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, 1970); P. G. Zimbardo, "Coercion and Compliance: The Psychology of Police Confessions," in *The Triple Revolution Emerging*, eds. R. Perruci and M. Pilisuk, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 492-508; P. G. Zimbardo, E. B. Ebbesen, and C. Maslach, *Influencing Attitudes and Changing Behavior*, 2nd ed. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1977); P. G. Zimbardo and C. E. Hartley, "Cults Go to High School: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Initial Stage in the Recruitment Process," *Cultic Studies Journal* 2 (Spring-Summer 1985): 91-147; P. G. Zimbardo and S. A. Andersen, "Understanding Mind Control: Exotic and Mundane Mental Manipulations," *Recovery from Cults*, ed. M. Langone (New York: Norton Press, 1993), pp. 104-25; P. G. Zimbardo and M. Leippe, *The Psychology of Attitude Change and Social Influence* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991).
8. To learn more about basic social influence principles, see R. B. Cialdini, *Influence*, 4th ed. (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2001); A. R. Pratkanis, "Social Influence Analysis: An Index of Tactics," in *The Science of Social Influence: Advances and Future Progress*, ed. A. R. Pratkanis (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, 2007, in press); A. R. Pratkanis and E. Aronson, *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion* (New York: W. H. Freeman, 2001); Robert Levine, *The Power to Persuade: How We're Bought and Sold* (New York: Wiley, 2003); Daryl Bern, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs* (Belmont, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1970); Richard Petty and John Cacioppo, *Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986); Steven Hassan, *Combating Cult Mind Control* (Rochester, VT: Park Street Press, 1988); Brad Sagarin and Sarah Wood, "Resistance to Influence" in *The Science of Social Influence: Advances and Future Progress*, ed. A. R. Pratkanis (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, in press, 2007).
9. J. M. Burger, "The Foot-in-the-Door Compliance Procedure: A Multiple-Process Analysis and Review," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 3 (1999): 303-25.
10. J. Freedman and S. Fraser, "Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot-in-the-Door Technique," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 4 (1966): 195-202.
11. For some references to prosocial applications of the foot-in-the-door tactic, see J. Schwarzwald, A. Bizman, and M. Raz, "The Foot-in-the-Door Paradigm: Effects of Second Request Size on Donation Probability and Donor Generosity," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 9 (1983): 443-50; B. J. Carducci and P. S. Deuser, "The Foot-in-the-Door Technique: Initial Request and Organ Donation," *Basic and Applied Social Psychology* 5 (1984): 75-81; B. J. Carducci, P. S. Deuser, A. Bauer, M. Large, and M. Ramaekers, "An Application of the Foot in the Door Technique to Organ Donation," *Journal of Business and Psychology* 4 (1989): 245-49; R. D. Katzev and T. R. Johnson, "Comparing the Effects of Monetary Incentives and Foot-in-the-Door Strategies in Promoting Residential Electricity

- Conservation," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 14 (1984): 12-27; T. H. Wang and R. D. Katzev, "Group Commitment and Resource Conservation: Two Field Experiments on Promoting Recycling," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 20 (1990): 265-75; R. Katzev and T. Wang, "Can Commitment Change Behavior? A Case Study of Environmental Actions," *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality* 9 (1994): 13-26.
12. M. Goldman, C. R. Creason, and C. G. McCall, "Compliance Employing a Two-Feet-in-the-Door Procedure," *Journal of Social Psychology* 114 (1981): 259-65.
 13. For references on the prosocial effects of positive models, see J. H. Bryan and M. A. Test, "Models and Helping: Naturalistic Studies in Aiding Behavior," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 6 (1967): 400-7; C. A. Kallgren, R. R. Reno, and R. B. Cialdini, "A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: When Norms Do and Do Not Affect Behavior," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 26 (2000): 1002-12; R. A. Baron and C. R. Kepner, "Model's Behavior and Attraction Toward the Model as Determinants of Adult Aggressive Behavior," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 14 (1970): 335-44; M. E. Rice and J. E. Grusec, "Saying and Doing: Effects on Observer Performance," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 32 (1975): 584-93.
 14. J. H. Bryan, J. Redfield, and S. Mader, "Words and Deeds About Altruism and the Subsequent Reinforcement Power of the Model," *Child Development* 42 (1971): 1501-8; J. H. Bryan and N. H. Walbek, "Preaching and Practicing Generosity: Children's Actions and Reactions," *Child Development* 41 (1970): 329-53.
 15. For references on social identity labeling, also known as "altercasting," see R. E. Kraut, "Effects of Social Labeling on Giving to Charity," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 9 (1973): 551-62; A. Strenta and W. Dejong, "The Effect of a Prosocial Label on Helping Behavior," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 44 (1981): 142-47; J. A. Piliavin and P. L. Callero, *Giving Blood* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
 16. Robert S. McNamara et al., *Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy* (New York: Perseus Books, 1999); R. S. McNamara and B. Van deMark, *In Retrospect: The Tragic Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Vantage, 1996). Also see the DVD of Errol Morris's film *The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara*, 2004.
 17. When a blaze broke out in 1979 in a Woolworth store in the British city of Manchester, most people escaped, but ten died in the fire when they could have readily fled to safety. The fire chief reported that they had died because they were following a "restaurant script" rather than a survival script. They had finished dinner and were waiting to pay their bill; one does not leave a restaurant until one's bill is paid. No one wanted to stand out from the others; no one wanted to be different. So they waited, and they all died.
- This event is described in one of the vignettes in a British television production in which I was involved, called "The Human Zoo." It is available from Insight Media, New York.
18. E. J. Langer, *Mindfulness* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1989).
 19. D. F. Halpern, *Thought and Knowledge: An Introduction to Critical Thinking*, 4th ed. (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2003).
 20. C. Poche, P. Yoder, and R. Miltenberger, "Teaching Self-Protection to Children Using Television Techniques," *Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis*, vol. 21 (1988): pp. 253-61.
 21. D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," *Econometrica* 47 (1979): 262-91. A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106 (1991): 1039-61.
 22. G. Lakoff, *Don't Think of an Elephant: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate* (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green, 2004). G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
 23. P. G. Zimbardo and J. N. Boyd, "Putting Time in Perspective: A Valid, Reliable Individual Differences Metric," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 77 (1999): 1271-88.

24. Andre Stein, *Quiet Heroes: True Stories of the Rescue of Jews by Christians in Nazi-Occupied Holland* (New York: New York University Press, 1991).
25. This passage is from pp. 216-20 of Christina Maslach's reflections on the meaning of the Stanford Prison Experiment in the chapter written jointly with Craig Haney and me: P. G. Zimbardo, C. Maslach, and C. Haney, "Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis, Transformations, Consequences," in *Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm*, ed. T. Blass (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2000).
26. The alternative meanings of suicide terrorism can be found in a new book by the psychologist Fathali Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View: What They Experience and Why They Come to Destroy Us* (New York: Praeger, 2006).
27. For full details, see Michael Wood's fascinating account of his attempt to follow the journey that Alexander took in his conquests: *In the Footsteps of Alexander The Great: A Journey from Greece to Asia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). There is also a remarkable BBC documentary of Wood's journey, produced by Maya Vision (1997).
28. Many of the ideas presented in this section were developed in collaboration with Zeno Franco and offered in greater detail in our co-authored article "Celebrating Heroism: a Conceptual Exploration," 2006 (submitted for publication). I am also engaged in new research that tries to understand the decision matrix at the time an individual resists social pressures to obey authority. My first study, in collaboration with Piero Bocchiaro, was recently completed at the University of Palermo, Sicily. "Inquiry into Heroic Acts: The Decision to Resist Obeying Authority." In preparation.
29. M. Seligman, T. Steen, N. Park, and C. Peterson, "Positive Psychology Progress," *American Psychologist* 60 (2005): 410-21. Also see D. Strumpfer, "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Notes on Early Positive Psychology (Psychofortology)," *South African Journal of Psychology* 35 (2005): 21-45.
30. *ARTEL Project: 1913 Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary*, http://humanities.uchicago.edu/orgs/ARTFL/forms_unrest/webster.form.html.
31. Adapted from definition footnotes pp. 334 and 689.
32. A. Eagly and S. Becker, "Comparing the Heroism of Women and Men," *American Psychologist* 60 (2005): 343-44.
33. Lucy Hughes-Hallett, *Heroes* (London: HarperCollins, 2004).
34. *Ibid.*, p. 17. We should also remember that after Achilles has died and is a shade, he tells Odysseus that he would rather be the live servant of a peasant than a dead hero. Homer does not define heroism as battle skill and daring, but more socially as the establishment and maintenance of bonds of fidelity and mutual service among men. A swineherd can be as heroic as Achilles (and is so in Homer's *Odyssey*, where one protects Odysseus) if he upholds the rules of courtesy and mutual respect. "If ever my father, Odysseus, has served you by work done or promise kept, help me," Telemachus says as he visits the surviving heroes of the Trojan War in search of his father. Homer's take on heroism is thus far different from that of Hughes-Hallett.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6. This is Aristotle's definition of a "tragic" hero. Macbeth is a hero in this sense, evil though he is and is known to be. The tragic hero must fall because he thinks he "is the law," as is seen in the character of Creon in *Antigone*.
36. "Medal of Honor Citations," available at www.army.mil/cmhp-g/mohl.htm.
37. U.S. Code, Subtitle B—Army, Part II—Personnel, Chapter 357—Decorations and Awards.
38. "Victoria Cross," available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victoria_cross.
39. M. Hebblethwaite and T. Hissey. "George Cross Database." available at www.gc-database.co.uk/index.htm.
40. Governor-General, "Australian Bravery Decorations," available at www.itsanhonour.gov.au/honours_announcements.html.
41. S. Becker and A. Eagly, "The Heroism of Women and Men," *American Psychologist* 59 (2004): 163-78; quote, p. 164.

42. Peter Martens, "Definitions and Omissions of Heroism," *American Psychologist* 60 (2005)-342-43.
 43. J. McCain and M. Salter, *Why Courage Matters* (New York: Random House, 2004), 14.
 44. D. J. Boorstin, *The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America*. New York: Vantage Books, 1992 [1961], pp. 45, 76.
 45. D. Denenberg and L. Roscoe, *50 American Heroes Every Kid Should Meet* (Brookfield, CT: Millbrook Press, 2001).
 46. Pseudoheroism at its worst comes from the example of the shameless exploitation by the U.S. military of the American soldier Private Jessica Lynch. By exaggeration and falsehoods, Lynch was converted from an ordinary wounded, unconscious, captured young soldier into a Medal of Honor hero who had allegedly fought off her brutal captors singlehandedly. A totally fabricated scenario was constructed because the Army needed a hero at a time when there was little good news to send home from the war in Iraq. A BBC documentary exposed the many lies and deceptions that were involved in creating this fraudulent heroine. Nevertheless, Private Lynch's story was just too good not to be told by an NBC docudrama, headlined in major magazines, and retold in her book, which earned a million-dollar advance. See "Saving Pvt. Jessica Lynch," BBC America documentary, July 18, 2003; Rick Bragg, *I Am a Soldier, Too: The Jessica Lynch Story* (New York: Vintage, 2003).
 47. A. Brink, "Leaders and Revolutionaries: Nelson Mandela," available at www.time.com/time/timeOO/leaders/profile/mandela.html.
 48. D. Soccio, *Archetypes of Wisdom*, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995).
 49. W. F. Cascio and R. Kellerman, *Leadership Lessons from Robben Island: A Manifesto for the Moral High Ground* (manuscript submitted for publication).
 50. G. A. Kimble, M. Wertheimer, and C. L. White, *Portraits of Pioneers in Psychology* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1991).
 51. V. Navasky, "I. F. Stone," available at www.thenation.com/doc/20030721/navasky.
 52. I had the good fortune to spend several days with Vaclav Havel on the occasion of my being awarded the Havel Foundation Vision 97 Award for my research and writings in October 2005. I recommend his collection of letters sent to his wife, Olga, from prison, and the political background provided in their introduction by Paul Wilson: Vaclav Havel, *Letters to Olga: June 1979-September 1982* (New York: Knopf, 1988).
 53. D. Soccio, *Archetypes of Wisdom* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995).
 54. S. Hersh, *My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath* (New York: Random House, 1970). One of the most thorough accounts of the My Lai massacre, including personnel involved, photographs, and the events that led up to the trial of Lieutenant William Calley, Jr., is provided by Doug Linder in his "Introduction to the My Lai Courts-Martial," available online at www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftirals/mylai/MY1_intro.htm/.
- The photographs of the My Lai massacre of dead women, children, babies, and elderly Vietnamese were taken by the Army photographer assigned to Charlie Company, Ronald Haerberle, using his private camera, on March 16, 1968. He recorded no such atrocities on his second official Army camera. His photos exposed the military cover-up alleging that those killed were insurgents rather than innocent, unarmed civilians murdered in cold blood. However, unlike Abu Ghraib, none of his photos included U.S. soldiers posing during acts of atrocity.
55. T. Angers, *The Forgotten Hero of My Lai: The Hugh Thompson Story* (Lafayette, LA: Acadian House Publishing, 1999).
 56. The lyrics of the ode to Lieutenant Calley ran "Sir, I followed all my orders and did the best I could. / It's hard to judge the enemy and hard to tell the good. / Yet there's not a man among us who would not have understood."
 57. Ron Ridenhour, letter of March 29, 1969, reproduced in David L. Anderson, ed., *Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press; quote, pp. 201-6).
 58. M. Bilton and K. Sim, *Four Hours in My Lai* (New York: Penguin, 1993).

59. Joe Darby spoke out publicly for the first time since exposing the Abu Ghraib atrocities in an interview with Wil S. Hylton in *GQ* magazine, September 2006, entitled "Prisoner of Conscience." (Darby quotes are from this source.) Available online at http://men.style.com/gq/features/landing?id=content_4785/.
60. K. Zernike, "Only a Few Spoke Up on Abuse as Many Soldiers Stayed Silent," *The New York Times*, May 22, 2004, p. 1.
61. E. Williamson, "One Soldier's Unlikely Act: Family Fears for Man Who Reported Iraqi Prisoner Abuse," *The Washington Post*, May 6, 2004, p. A 16.
62. Colonel Larry James, personal communication, April 24, 2005.
63. H. Rosin, "When Joseph Comes Marching Home: In a Western Mountain Town Ambivalence About the Son Who Blew the Whistle at Abu Ghraib," *The Washington Post*, May 17, 2004, p. C01.
64. S. Pulliam and D. Solomon, "How Three Unlikely Sleuths Exposed Fraud at WorldCom," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 30, 2002, p. 1.
65. M. Swartz and S. Watkins, *Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron* (New York: Random House, 2003).
66. R. Lacayo and A. Ripley, "Persons of the Year 2002: Cynthia Cooper, Colleen Rowley and Sherron Watkins," *Time*.
67. Jim Jones's final speech, November 1978, available at <http://jonestown.sdsu.edu/AboutJonestown/Tapes/Tapes/DeathTape/death.html>.
68. D. Layton, *Seductive Poison: A Jonestown Survivor's Story of Life and Death in the People's Temple* (New York: Doubleday, 2003). Also see her website, www.deborahlayton.com.
69. My ideas relating the mind control tactics of Jim Jones and those in Orwell's 1984, along with a dose of the CIA's mind control program, MKULTRA, can be found in my chapter P. G. Zimbardo, "Mind Control in Orwell's 1984: Fictional Concepts Become Operational Realities in Jim Jones' Jungle Experiment," in *1984: Orwell and Our Future*, eds. M. Nussbaum, J. Goldsmith, and A. Gleason (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). A detailed account of Jonestown as a CIA supported experiment is given in the thesis of Michael Meires, *Was Jonestown a CIA Medical Experiment? A Review of the Evidence* (Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press, 1968). (Studies in American Religion Series, vol. 35).
70. See the story I co-wrote with the reporter Dan Sullivan about Richard Clark and Diane Louie: D. Sullivan and P. G. Zimbardo, "Jonestown Survivors Tell Their Story," *Los Angeles Times*, March 9, 1979, part 4, pp. 1, 10-12.
71. M. Grunwald, "A Tower of Courage," *The Washington Post*, October 28, 2001, p. 1.
72. United Airlines flight 93 was headed to San Francisco from New Jersey on the morning of September 11, 2001, when Saudi terrorists hijacked it. Evidence from the 9/11 Commission indicates that the pilot, flight attendants, and at least seven passengers fought back against the four hijackers. Their actions diverted the plane from its likely target of the Capitol building or the White House. All forty-four people aboard died when the plane nose-dived into an empty field outside Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Its high-speed crash (nearly 600 mph) caused a crater 115 feet (35 meters) deep. A dramatic movie, *United Flight 93*, was made by Universal Studios in 2006.
73. Brink, "Leaders and Revolutionaries."
74. H. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (rev. and enlarged edition) (New York: Penguin, 1994 [1963]) pp. 25-26.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
77. C. R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992), p. xix.
78. E. Staub, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 126.
79. Z. Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).

80. J. Conroy, *Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: The Dynamics of Torture* (New York: Knopf, 2000).
81. M. Haritos-Fatouros, *The Psychological Origins of Institutionalized Torture* (London: Routledge, 2003).
82. M. Huggins, M. Haritos-Fatouros, and P. G. Zimbardo, *Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
83. This conception of the banality of heroism was first presented in an essay by Zimbardo on *Edge* Annual Question 2006, an annual event sponsored by John Brockman inviting a range of scholars to reply to a provocative question, which that year was "What is your dangerous idea?" See www.edge.org.
84. See Francois Rochat and Andre Modigliani, "Captain Paul Grueninger: The Chief of Police Who Saved Jewish Refugees by Refusing to Do His Duty," in *Obedience to Authority: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm*, ed. T. Blass (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2000).
85. Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). Also see Philip Zimbardo, Craig Haney, William Curtis Banks, and David Jaffe, "The Mind Is a Formidable Jailer: A Pirandellian Prison," *The New York Times Magazine*, April 8, 1973, pp. 36 ff.
86. Research on the personality correlates that differentiate "obedients" from "defiants" points to only a few significant predictors. Those who are high scorers on a measure of authoritarian personality (F-Scale) were more likely to obey authority, while defiants had lower F-scores. See A. C. Elms and S. Milgram, "Personality Characteristics Associated with Obedience and Defiance Toward Authoritative Command," *Journal of Experimental Research in Personality* 1 (1966): 282-89.

A second variable that may influence the tendency to obey or disobey is one's belief in external controlling influences on one's life versus internal control, with greater obedience among those who accept the notion of their behavior as being controlled by external forces. In a similar vein, among Christian research participants, obedience was greatest among those who believed in divine control of their lives while those who were low on measures of belief in external divine control tended to reject scientific as well as religious authority. See Tom Blass, "Understanding Behavior in the Milgram Obedience Experiment: The Role of Personality, Situations, and Their Interactions," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 60 (1991): 398-413.

87. E. Midlarsky, S. F. Jones, and R. Corley, "Personality Correlates of Heroic Rescue During the Holocaust," *Journal of Personality* 73 (2005): 907-34.
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