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MOBILIZING THE PAST: NATIONALIST IMAGES OF HISTORY

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There is an obvious sense in which nationalist mobilization has an important basis in images of the past—images which are typically embellished to produce a tendentious image of the community's own history. This article first examines the mechanisms by which myths of history are created and disseminated, making an important distinction between circumstances where those engaged in this process control a state structure and those where they do not. It then seeks to generalize about the kinds of historiographical stereotypes that have emerged, identifying in particular myths of origin, myths of development (including the golden age, the dark age and the age of struggle) and myths of destiny. These are illustrated by evidence mainly from Europe, and their instrumental character is stressed.

The capacity of elites to shape political outcomes by influencing the way in which the past is perceived and interpreted is a well-known characteristic of public life. It is not, then, surprising that the education, information, and foreign ministries of the modern state devote particular attention to matters of history, especially in contexts where a political regime feels threatened. Examples may be cited from a range of different but related contexts.

First, "history" may be used to help consolidate particular types of regime. Thus, the former communist-governed states of central and eastern Europe were highly conscious of the importance of perceptions of the past in legitimating contemporary ideologies, as surviving communist regimes elsewhere continue to be to the present. To this end, the resources of the educational system were mobilized systematically in inculcating the ideology of "historical materialism."[1] Similarly, "historical" arguments can offer powerful legitimation to imperialism and colonialism, helping, for instance, to justify the conquest of indigenous peoples. Thus powerful settler

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societies such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand managed to marginalize the indigenous population not only in real life but also in mainstream history books.[2]

Second, contemporary ideological and political battles can be fought out by highlighting certain features of the past and suppressing others. Thus, in the Baltic republics in the 1990s those who had supported bolshevism in the 1920s could be portrayed as traitors, while those who had assisted the Germans during the 1940s could be presented as heroes seeking to liberate their countries—or these descriptions could be reversed, depending on one's political standpoint.[3] Similarly, the Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa was able to build on certain aspects of the Zulu past—such as elevating the leadership role of King Shaka—in cultivating Zulu nationalism.[4]

Third, and more specifically, recourse may be had to history and even to archaeology in justifying contemporary claims to disputed territory, as is clear from the very extensive historical section in the Israeli Foreign Ministry website that outlines 4,000 years of Jewish history,[5] or from the use in Palestinian schools of textbooks that state a prior Palestinian claim to the same land.[6]

Fourth, perceptions of the past can serve the cause of the vanquished. Thus, after the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, French professional historians sought to "use the lessons of history to revive the flagging spirits of a vanquished people," taking the view that the French people required a spiritual reawakening comparable to that which had animated the Germans.[7]

Some of these examples overlap with the primary focus of this article, a matter that has been of crucial importance in the modern state: the centrality of historical interpretation to the process of the creation and maintenance of ethnic or national solidarity. States and political elites have been quick to appreciate this, a point that is illustrated vividly in the many statements produced by national education ministries regarding the objectives of history teaching.[8] Recognition of this fact by scholars is as old as the study of nationalism itself; ethnic communities and nations are famously defined as groups of people with a characteristic self-image, in which a vital ingredient is a sense of shared history—as Ernest Renan described it, "the common possession of a rich heritage of memories."[9] As one early overview put it,

> It is probable that the most potent of all nation-moulding factors, the one indispensable factor which must be present whatever else be lacking, is the possession of a common tradition, a memory of sufferings endured or victories won in common, expressed in song and legend, in the dear names of great personalities that seem to embody in themselves the character and ideals of the nation, in the names also of sacred places wherein the national memory is enshrined. . . . Heroic achievements, agonies heroically endured, these are the sublime food by which the spirit of nationhood is nourished: from these are born the sacred and imperishable traditions that make the soul of nations.[10]

But this sense of a shared past is obviously not simply an ideological package that emanates from an "objective" historical experience; it is necessarily based on selection and over-simplification, if not on misinterpretation and fabrication.[11] The form that this package takes will be determined by the current needs of the state, or of the elites that have placed themselves at the head of a national movement. It follows that the content of the package will change as political realities move on; the historical myth of a separatist nationalist movement in the early stage of mobilization is likely to evolve if that movement is successful and captures control of its own state. Professional historians are typically involved in this process, and are prepared to lend their pens to the nationalist agenda. It has been observed that South Slav (Serb, Croat and Slovene) historical textbook authors "in their specialised monographs . . . produced works that met the criteria of impartiality expected of scholars, but in their school textbooks, their writings followed the national flag."[12] In this, South Slav historians were not alone; the tension between political and more academic motivations for researching the past is a profound one. Indeed, to quote once again one of the more celebrated authors on the subject, Renan, "forgetfulness, and I shall even say historical error, form an essential feature in the creation of a nation; and thus it is that the progress of historical studies may often be dangerous to the nationality."[13]

The importance of myths of the past for power relations is, then, clear. Such myths have particularly strong implications for ethnonational identity, interethnic relations and the relationship between ethnonational communities and the state. Brokers of power—whether in charge of the levers of the state, or placed at the head of a major political movement—both possess the capacity to shape the ideological perspective of those whom they seek to

lead, and have a strong interest in doing so, given the assumed susceptibility of their potential supporters to ideological cues that are politically loaded. This raises two issues about the character of myths of this kind, and these are addressed in the two sections that follow. The first is the question of "guardianship" over the past: what agencies determine the way in which the past is perceived, and what media are used to propagate this image through society? The second has to do with the shape of this image: are there characteristic contours that commonly run through ethnic or national "histories", features that are instrumental in mobilizing popular support and in legitimating contemporary leadership? Although the points made about national imagery are illustrated below mainly by reference to the European experience, it is likely that equally appropriate examples could be drawn from other parts of the world. A third obvious question lies beyond the scope of this article: how effective are ideological packages of these kinds, in terms of their impact on the actual behavior of the potential nationalist cause?

Controlling the Past

In examining the mechanisms by which a particular image of its past is propagated, the two most obvious issues are those of creation and dissemination. The first relates to the set of individuals or bodies that undertake production of a new, persuasive version of a community's past. The second refers to the capacity of ethnonational leaders to ensure acceptance of this account by the wider community, and the channels through which they do so.

Of course, it needs to be emphasized that stereotyped versions of "national history" are but one aspect—albeit a central one—of nationalist ideology. They are embedded in a wider, more general myth of the national culture, one that extends to other areas such as literature, theatre, music, folklore, and sport. Furthermore, even this complex set of myths, with its well-defined, tendentious content, does not tell us the full story about the manner in which people react to their perceived past. Two other features are important.[14] The first is ritual: processions, parades, marches, funerals (including frequently re-burials, often many years after death), commemorations, inauguration ceremonies, swearings-in and other public ceremonials that serve to remind people vividly of

their membership in a community existing over time. The second is symbol: most obviously, such emotive objects as flags, anthems, and emblems, but also public monuments and buildings, coins, postage stamps, passports, and such everyday phenomena as place names, military uniforms, and commonly even national airlines.

Creating Ethnonational History

Any attempt to identify who, precisely, is responsible for the creation of the "history" of an ethnonational community must begin with an obvious consideration: the question whether that community holds political power, most characteristically through possession of its "own" state. When elites hold state power, the task of creating communal history may be almost routine; when they do not, they are faced with the formidable challenge of providing an alternative to "official" history.

This dichotomy between elites who control a state apparatus and those who do not recalls another long established set of dichotomies in the study of nationalism, that between "Western" and "Eastern" conceptions of the nation, resting respectively on essentially political foundations (a sense of shared territoriality and a tradition of life under a common government), on the one hand, and on a sense of shared membership of a cultural group typically identified in linguistic terms, on the other.[15] This dichotomy has been used to account for differences between nationalism in the old states of western Europe and the newer states of central and eastern Europe, but sometimes also to make a broader distinction between nationalism in the developed West and in the rest of the world—or even, more narrowly, to explain the distinction between French and German nationalism. It corresponds also to a distinction between "demotic" and "ethnic" nationalism,[16] and has, of course, been much debated in recent decades in terms of a distinction between "civic" and "ethnic" nationalism.[17]

The significance of this dichotomy for the formation of nationalist ideologies in Europe has been exaggerated. While there are differences of nuance between the two parts of the continent, we will find elements of both forms in both parts of Europe, western and eastern. Nevertheless, it is an empirical fact that the territorial identity of the typical west European state is a long-established one. Most of the 15 states that were EU members at the end of the

20th century had come into existence long before 1900. The major exceptions were Ireland (1922) and, with some qualifications, Austria and Finland in their current shape (1918), while in 1900 Germany and Italy were only 30 years old as unified states. In the case of new (2004) EU members and candidate countries, however, many dated only from the 1990s, and few had existed before 1918; Romania and Bulgaria are the most striking exceptions.[18] By and large, then, the dominant versions of national history were created and propagated over a long time frame by the ruling political elites of the states of western Europe, whereas in central and eastern Europe these were commonly created by counter-elites who were not able to exercise unfettered control of state resources (though they might have had a major say in ideological formation at sub-state level).

Although the contrast between the eastern and western parts of the continent should not be exaggerated, in the typical west European case the creation of "national history" was a routine and uncontested matter—something so taken for granted that it makes up part of a kind of "banal nationalism," a set of values that forms an unquestioned backdrop to everyday life.[19] Especially in the past, the history of the ruling dynasty played a central role in this image, but republican regimes were easily able to replace this by the broader canvas of "the people." This core version of national history exists in a symbiotic relationship with other national symbols—anthems, flags, and commemorations. Thus, in Britain royal coronation ceremonies, state funerals, the trooping of the colour on the Queen's birthday and Remembrance Day all serve to bolster the image of the nation rooted in a deep history, while in the United States Independence Day, Memorial Day and the anniversaries of Washington's and Lincoln's birthdays serve a similar function.[20]

This point is reinforced rather than being undermined by the observation that the United Kingdom has not been western Europe's most successful case of nation building. After all, Ireland broke away in 1922, and separatist nationalism flickers in Wales and especially in Scotland; but these developments may in an important sense be traced back to the failure to develop a true "United Kingdom" history, one that would show the inevitably growing bonds linking the peoples of the two islands.[21] The case of Spain, contending with peripheral nationalism in Catalonia and the Basque

Country, is another example: one study has concluded that separatist tendencies in these regions may be traced back to a failure to invent "a national history that is more than the sum of the separate histories of its component nationalities."[22]

Yet, in all cases state agencies offer a powerful infrastructure for the promotion of "national" history. The history of the ruling dynasty will necessarily be celebrated by royal officials, and the people will be continually reminded of the long-standing role of the royal family in personifying the nation. State almanacs and private serial publications will report on and highlight the antiquity of the genealogy of the dynasty. Even if, as in republics, there is no royal family, accounts of the history of the state will appear in the writings of professional historians linked to universities, national science academies, and public or private learned bodies. Early examples of scientific bodies whose sponsorship of learning over the whole spectrum of disciplines also stimulated historical research include the Académie française (1635), the Leopoldine-Caroline Academy in Germany (1652), the Royal Society (1660) in Great Britain, and the Academies of Science in Berlin (1711), Saint Petersburg (1725), and Stockholm (1739). Quite apart from the volume of literature deriving from these sources, various private individuals wrote about aspects of their country's history, whether for specialist readerships or for the general public; and, especially as literacy levels increased, popular accounts of vivid episodes in the past and other forms of literature such as historical novels were produced on a large scale.

When, however, the "nation" did not have a state of its own the challenge facing nation builders was more profound. This was particularly the case where (as for the Estonians, Latvians, Slovenes, and especially the Slovaks) the ethnonational territory did not enjoy any reasonable degree of administrative autonomy. Where some kind of autonomous institutions existed (as in Finland, Ireland, or Bohemia), these provided a potential focal point for the production of "national" history. Remarkably, this potentially subversive process typically took place under royal patronage and with the active encouragement of members of the loyal local nobility, who were thus—usually unwittingly—sowing the seeds of future separatist nationalism.[23] Some of the bodies that played a leading role in this process, such as the Finnish Society of Science (1838), the Royal Bohemian Society of the Sciences (dating in its

original form from 1775) and the Royal Irish Academy (1785), resembled the broad national science academies referred to above. But others had a more specifically cultural or historical focus, and were active in promoting research of a kind that would prove valuable to nationalist myth makers—for example, the Finnish Literary Society (1831), the Society of the Museum of the Homeland in Prague (1822), and the Irish Archaeological Society (1840) and its successors. But institutionally sponsored historical writing was not confined to countries with a well-developed structure of learned bodies; elsewhere, too, members of the local intelligentsia were able to establish organizations where the people's past could be explored—for example, in the Latvian Literary Society (1824) or the Estonian Learned Society (1838).

Not surprisingly, then, a particular role in the process of nation formation has frequently been attributed to prominent historians. For the Czechs, František Palacký's *History of Bohemia* (1836–76) played such a role.[24] Among the Bulgarians, the *Slavonic-Bulgarian History of the Peoples, Tsars and Saints* produced in the 18th century by an Orthodox monk, Father Paisii, had a comparable influence in the longer term.[25] A work of Simonas Daukantas, *The Character of the Ancient Lithuanians and Samogitians* (1845), laid the groundwork for Lithuanian nationalist ideology.[26] But the list of influential nationalist historians could be extended greatly—to include also the "Transylvanian triad" of Maior, Micu-Klein, and Sincai for the Romanians, Hrushevsky and others for the Ukrainians, and Bofarull for the Catalans. Another form of nationalist writing was more accessible to the public: the popular literary output of Zacharias Topelius in Finland, for instance, or the historical novels of Sir Walter Scott in Scotland. Indeed, literary-historical works (including novels, stories, and poetry that presented idealized images of the past) played a considerable role in the growth of nationalism among the Ukrainians, Czechs, Poles, and Danes.[27]

Disseminating Ethnonational History

Compiling an ideological package is, of course, only one step in the creation of an effective nationalist myth; ensuring its widespread acceptance throughout the community is another.

Here, again, the outcome will depend overwhelmingly on one central issue: whether ethnonational elites control power in their own state, or whether they are at the head of a movement whose objective is, by one means or another, to seize state power. In the latter case, the elites may enjoy a good deal of formal power at the level of the region, but ultimately they are subject to the control of the authorities of the central state.

There can be no doubt about the range of resources that the modern state possesses when it comes to shaping the values of its citizens. Mass communications media are in varying degrees subject to governmental influence and control, and public education has normally been rigidly supervised. Since the 19th century, states have typically engaged in a process of civic education designed to turn all citizens into loyal subjects, either explicitly by the direct cultivation of loyalty to the symbols of the state, or implicitly through control of the curriculum in such sensitive subjects as history, or by both mechanisms. In addition to helping to disseminate an "official" version of history, the state can also influence values through its capacity to control symbols and rituals. It is, after all, the state that determines regulations about display of the national flag, performance of the national anthem, design of coinage and postage stamps, construction of monuments, the holding of processions and parades, and all other aspects of public ritual.

Sub-state elites face a much greater challenge. Under liberal regimes they may have free access to the state media, and they may also operate an independent communications media system of their own; and at least under federal regimes they are likely to be able to exert a considerable degree of control over the educational system. Public monuments and statues may be independently funded, and parades and processions may be largely a matter of private initiative, and thus may be available as an instrument to nationalist counter-elites; but the state does, at least in theory, typically exercise the ultimate right of control over these symbols and rituals. States may, indeed, be extraordinarily tolerant of expressions of peripheral national autonomy. The United Kingdom, for instance, not only issues separate sets of postage stamps for England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland; it also permits the last two of these to print separate currency notes.[28] In such cases, the position of the state can sometimes appear incompatible with predictable criteria of rationality. In 19th century Ireland,

for example, British educational policy used the educational system to promote values of tolerance (which required the exclusion of history from the curriculum, since Protestant and Catholic versions were in sharp conflict) rather than seeking to use the teaching of history to inculcate a sense of emotional affiliation with the state; indeed, it eventually permitted the teaching in Ireland of a nationalist version of history that was implicitly—but strongly—dysfunctional for the state itself.[29]

If, however, all else fails, and nationalist elites are unable to colonize or otherwise influence the curriculum in the state educational system in their own region, other options are open. Private schools may be established and, although these may be required to conform to certain conditions imposed by the state, they may be able to exercise a degree of curricular autonomy. Newspapers and public reading rooms, similarly, may be used to propagate nationalist forms of history (subject, of course, to whatever regime of control the state may wish to apply). But there are other agencies over which the state has no control: discourse in the family, informal storytelling among local groups, and the intellectual endeavors of secret societies or openly organized independent clubs, for instance.[30] A powerful role may thus be played by forces far removed from state control—by "the interaction of generations, the collective, unreflective memory of individuals and groups."[31] By these and other means, particular images of the past may be preserved and disseminated autonomously.

Packaging the Past

Having looked at the mechanisms by which "national" histories were created and propagated, it is appropriate to turn to the actual content of these accounts. Of course, the pattern of creation of popular national history is highly instrumental:

> The early nationalist, like the religious reformer . . . professes to be rediscovering when indeed he is innovating. History serves him as a grab-bag from which he instinctively selects past themes that suit his present purpose . . . the historical themes he invokes are significant not as hypotheses of historic causation but as part of a psychological search for symbols of confidence in the present.[32]

In looking for patterns in nationalist historiographical mythology, then, it is appropriate to begin by considering the kinds of functions to which they may be expected to respond. One thoughtful summary, based on analysis of a large number of cases, identifies nationalist ideology as responding to three functions: *coordination* of heterogeneous groups behind a common set of demands; *mobilization* through appropriate political channels; and justification of the *legitimacy* of the national struggle in the wider world.[33] There is some overlap between this formulation and another recent categorization of components of the "politics of remembrance" that is more comprehensive and more specific, and therefore particularly valuable in suggesting a theoretical framework. This suggests that nationalist historiography will fill one or more of five types of function: *definition* of the conceptual boundaries of the nation; *reinforcement* of a sense of pride in national achievements; capacity to promote *commiseration* over unjust suffering that justifies compensation; *legitimization* of the current national struggle by reference to its roots in the past; and *inspiration* regarding the bright future of the nation.[34]

This five-element classification forms a useful basis for grouping the various components that are to be found in nationalist historiography. The literature that describes these components is as scattered as it is large; innumerable case studies of nationalism in particular countries address this question, and there are some well-informed comparative overviews.[35] Taking account of the elements described in studies of this kind, it is possible to see these five functions as implying a set of five distinctive themes. The first of these, *definition*, is associated with myths of origin (which have two rather distinct expressions, myths of descent and myths of ethnogenesis). The next three, *reinforcement*, *commiseration* and *legitimization*, may be seen as corresponding to three mainstream myths of development: those of the golden age, the dark age, and the age of struggle. Finally, the function of *inspiration* finds expression in two distinctive myths of destiny—the ideas of the national mission and of the national territory.

Two points, one obvious and bland, the other less obvious but extremely striking, need to be made about this approach. The first is that the significance of the different components in this list will obviously vary from one society to another. In some smaller "nations" without even the elements of the history of a state structure

in the past, the national myth may stress popular culture and folklore rather than political history, and some of the key elements may be skipped over. At the other extreme, in many countries with a long-established territorial identity and history of statehood, national identity may be so secure that there is little need to dwell on developments in earlier centuries. In some cases, indeed, regimes make a deliberate attempt to break with the past. The French revolutionaries sought to do so, declaring 1792 to be Year 1 and sweeping aside, with uneven success, much of the baggage of the past; and their American counterparts were similarly future-oriented, Thomas Jefferson declaring that "the dead have no rights . . . Our Creator made the world for the use of the living and not of the dead."[36]

The second point is bolder. It could be argued that traces, at least, of each of these types of myth will be found in all nationalist movements. In some cases, admittedly, the signs may be almost invisible, and particular challenges may be encountered (for example, for the Slovenes in identifying their "golden age," or for the English in identifying their "age of oppression"). In the case of many peoples, identifying the "national mission" may present a significant challenge. But in none of these cases is this a quite impossible task, and somewhere or other will be found a historian—not necessarily a mainstream or a distinguished one—who will make a case even in the most improbable circumstances. But, it must be conceded, such strained fragments of evidence are not always incorporated in the most generally accepted version of the national historical myth.

Myths of Origin

Although it might be possible to produce obscure examples that would cast doubt on the generalization, there is a strong case for arguing that a myth of origin is an essential ingredient in any nation's self-conception. Few scholars of nationalism would argue that the nation is anything other than a recent phenomenon, associated with processes of large-scale social and economic change over the past two centuries.[37] It is also clear that the composition of the nation is mixed in the fullest sense of the word—that its members are drawn from groups originally dispersed over a wide geographical area, varying in linguistic, cultural, and racial background.[38]

In recent years, advances in genetic research have allowed the regional clustering of particular gene types to be mapped, and these advances have also offered more conclusive evidence as to the absence of genetic "purity," and on genetic mixing as the norm within spatially defined groups.[39] But the nationalist image of national origin is simpler: a single group or people is identified as the prime ancestor.[40]

THE GENEALOGY OF THE NATION

The capacity to trace a people's roots to an ancient and noble heritage has obvious implications for national solidarity. Indeed, the more miserable a people's standing in the present, the greater the attraction that is offered by any apparently convincing argument that that people is descended from noble forebears—from a high-born hero, or from a stock that provides a link with leading contemporary cultures.[41] Among many of the peoples of Europe, precisely such a lineage suggested itself. For Christians, the Old Testament possesses a particularly elevated standing, and voices within some of the smaller peoples of western Europe have claimed descent from one of the tribes of Israel (including "British Israelites" in Northern Ireland, claiming descent from Abraham and Jacob, and some Welsh voices in the past, claiming descent from one of the grandsons of Noah).[42] The fabled warrior peoples of the east provided further impressive potential as ancestors: early Polish historians could claim a Sarmatian origin for their people, just as their Hungarian counterparts could stress their Scythian ancestry.[43] The Roman empire was another impressive achievement, and we find claims among Lithuanian nationalists that their people were of Roman descent.[44] Romanians, similarly, argued that they were descended from Roman colonists in Dacia.[45] Albanians claimed to represent the ancient Illyrians, renowned already in the age of Homer—and thus predating Slav presence in this part of the Balkans.

Of course, there are circumstances where historical links are easier to validate, if only because the contemporary nation still resides in the land of its claimed ancestors. Thus the Greeks of today identify with the glories of ancient Greece; Scandinavians trace their origins to the bellicose but adventurous seafaring Vikings; and Germans can look back to the sturdy Teutonic tribes.

In other cases, emphasis on biological ancestry is replaced by the notion of cultural affinity with a presumed ancestral group: the national historical myth acknowledges multiple origins in terms of descent but asserts the primacy of one.[46] Thus, Irish history tells of the settlement of the island by four groups of people before the Celts, and by others, such as the Vikings and Normans, at a later stage; but, in this view, the Celts emerged victorious against both their predecessors and later invaders and constitute the true stem of the Irish people. Indeed, 18th century historians traced these early settlers back to the Phoenicians and thus to the cradle of civilization in the Middle East.[47] English history allows a romantic place to the ancient (Celtic) Britons around whom the Arthurian tales are woven, but stresses their defeat by the invading Germanic tribes (Jutes, Angles and Saxons); and it was the culture of the Saxon and the name of the Angle that was eventually to triumph—not only over the Vikings, but also over their Norman relatives whose dynasty eventually asserted its political dominance. For the French, the story was more complex: the heritage of the continental Celts, the heroic Gauls, was romanticized, as was their leader, Vercingetorix, but the political role of the Franks as romanized Teutons who created the French state was also acknowledged.

THE BIRTH OF THE NATION

In many cases, the national story incorporates a particular episode in which the "nation" was crystallized into its "modern" form. Here, there were broadly two types of claim. First, the nation had existed in the same territory "from time immemorial." The Greeks, for example, could make this claim, one that placed the community on the same soil since before the beginning of recorded history, and that therefore gave them a particular entitlement to their land. The Basques, similarly, were claimed to be a pure-blooded race, descended from Noah, and located in their homeland since the Deluge.[48]

Second, the ancestors of the nation moved from elsewhere, but at a particular point in time settled permanently in their current location, establishing a decisive presence. Thus, the Irish and the Welsh acknowledged that their Celtic ancestors had moved across Europe, to settle eventually in Ireland and Wales. The Huns and Finns came from the east, to make their home in Hungary and Finland respectively. The Turkic Bulgars had also migrated

from the East, but adopted a Slavic language and culture. In these cases, later nationalists identified with these particular population groups, relegating to a subordinate position the claims both of those who had been there earlier and those who were to arrive later. In many cases, they were happy to popularize medieval legends that associated the "nation" with a particular incident, such as the decisions by the brothers Lekh and Czech, claimed ancestors respectively of the Poles and Czechs, to settle in their countries on first encountering them (a third brother, Rus, made his appearance later, and filled a similar role for the Ukrainians).[49] A similar tale about the settlement of the Hungarians on the basis of a decision by their ancestor, Arpad, was also popularized.

Notwithstanding the complexity of patterns of population movement and settlement—or, indeed, perhaps precisely because of this—nationalist histories often point to crucial dates in the establishment of the nation. For the English, the Battle of Hastings in 1066 (which marked the decisive establishment of Norman rule) was of particular significance; it led to the creation of the "modern" English state in which the numerically dominant (Germanic) inhabitants were eventually to triumph.[50] For the Irish, the Battle of Clontarf in 1014 (when Viking intrusions were brought under control) was of comparable, if admittedly less durable, importance. The Hungarians celebrated the coronation of King Stephen on Christmas Day 1000 as marking not just the foundation of the state; it was also a landmark in the life of the nation. For the Ukrainians, the adoption of Christianity and the baptism of Prince Volodymyr in 988 were later interpreted as a formative moment in the emergence of the nation.[51]

Myths of Development

Sandwiched between myths of prehistory (dealing with the origins of the nation) and those that are present- and future-oriented (dealing with the national destiny) we find the mainstream historical myths. In nationalist historiography, a relentless theme of national progress runs through this (even if it is acknowledged that this path has also experienced its setbacks). Although the weight given to the different components varies, these typically extend over three types of theme: the primitive golden age, when national development flowered dramatically; the dark age, when this

path of development was cut short, typically by the intervention of foreigners (who either swept in an era of oppression or encouraged national disunity); and the national struggle to restore the golden age, by establishing the unity and independence of the nation.

THE GOLDEN AGE

One of the most characteristic—but not always obvious—episodes in nationalist historiography is the notion of the "golden age," a distant period when the nation enjoyed its greatest achievements. The value of this myth to nationalist activists is obvious. First, it provides a people that may be suffering from socio-economic and cultural deprivation with a self-validating image of former greatness, one that allows members of the nation to hold their heads high in a context where other nations enjoy much greater power and prestige in the present. Second, it implies a political project for the future that is entirely compatible with the nationalist agenda: the re-establishment of national freedom and unity are seen as prerequisites to the re-establishment of the golden age. Broadly speaking, three themes run through the notion of the golden age, and nationalist elites vary in the emphasis that they place on one or another of these. They refer to the politico-military world, the socio-cultural dimension, and the domain of literary achievement.

The vision of a glorious political and military past is exceptionally attractive to the politically marginal. Thus, Lithuanian peasants could be told that they were heirs to the vast Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which at its greatest extent in the 16th century stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea. For the Czechs, the golden age was the reign of Charles IV, King of Bohemia in 1357–78, under whose rule Prague became one of the most important cities of Europe and also a capital of the Holy Roman Empire. For the Serbs, the golden age arrived in the reign of Stefan Dušan (1331–55), whose kingdom covered much of contemporary Yugoslavia and Greece. For the Bulgarians, the corresponding period was that of the second Bulgarian Empire in the early 13th century. As Fr Paisii put it to his fellow-Bulgarians, "In the entire Slavic race the Bulgarians have had the greatest glory, they first called themselves tsars, they first had a patriarch, they first became Christians, and they ruled over the largest territory."[52] This was, of course, a singular piece

of over-simplification, since the Bulgarians were of substantially non-Slavic origin, notwithstanding their later embrace of Slavic language and culture.

But military prowess was not the only source of ancient greatness. For the Irish, more distinguished in losing battles than in winning them, the path of military distinction was unpromising. In an era when religion was important, though, greatness could lie in the area of spiritual achievement. The Irish golden age lay in the second half of the first millennium, when Ireland, the "island of saints and scholars," shone like a bright torch in spiritually benighted Europe and sent missionaries forth to convert the European heathen. Holiness and fidelity to the truth in a world that was full of corruption was central to the self-image of many other peoples, including most notably the Jews. The golden age could be characterized also by significant social accomplishments. Marginal communities commonly claimed native adhesion to forms of primitive but impressive democracy, set against the authoritarianism of their oppressors—thus Ukrainian nationalists looked back to the era of the free community of Cossacks, while Poles, not always consistently, stressed their link to Slav democracy.

Literary attainments were yet another pointer to a great past. Many nationalist entrepreneurs have tried to find a national epic that would emulate the importance of Homer's *Iliad* for the Greeks, and some have succeeded. First were the Scots, with James Macpherson's publication of the Gaelic-based epic, *Fingal*, in the late 18th century. This had a major impact on 19th-century romantic nationalism in Europe, as others tried to follow this lead. For the Germans, the early medieval *Nibelungenlied* displayed the impressive extent of national cultural history. In Finland, the *Kalevala*, based on old folk songs, was published in 1835 by Elias Lönnrot, and had a major impact on Finnish nationalism.[53] There followed its Estonian equivalent, *Kalevipoeg*, published by FR Kreutzwald in 1857, with a similar popular impact.[54] Yet not all of these "discoveries" stood the test of time. Macpherson's work was exposed in the 19th century as substantially a forgery, as were the Dvur Králové and Zelená Hora manuscripts "discovered" by Václav Hanka in 1816–17 and apparently providing a Czech rival to the *Nibelungenlied*.[55] Yet the former discovery did not prevent the Irish from later popularizing their own epic story, the *Táin*, based on early Gaelic materials.

THE DARK AGE

For many nationalist movements, the "dark age" was brief, or almost non-existent. For others, it was a dominant theme. It tended to take two forms—again, ones that were not mutually exclusive. The two had in common the notion of intervention by alien forces—either directly, by the assertion of explicit political and military control, or indirectly, through the fomentation of dissent and encouragement of political disunity. These resulted respectively in an era of national oppression and an era of national fragmentation. In this context, nationalist historiography served the useful function of identifying and, where appropriate, demonizing the external enemy, in some cases generating a catalogue of brutality and treachery on the part of this group and its agents.

The era of oppression is a very distinctive theme in nationalist historiography. It was, the argument runs, external intervention that brought the golden age to an end and ushered in a new period where the people were ruled, often with great brutality, by foreign masters. In this perspective, the Norman invasions of Ireland that began in 1169 initiated the process by which the country became subordinated to the neighboring island, and marked the beginning of 750 years of "English" oppression. The independence of the Czech lands was gradually undermined, but the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620 marked the decisive subordination of the Czechs to the Habsburg monarchy and the beginning of the "dark age" (*temno*). Bulgarian defeat in 1396 ushered in almost five centuries of oppression under the "Turkish yoke."

These examples could be multiplied, but in yet other cases it was unity rather than independence that was seen to be lacking. This was allegedly the case among the Germans, divided between many small states; but France, Denmark, and to some extent Austria could be blamed, at least in part, for this state of affairs. In Italy, too, absence of unity was seen as deriving not just from internal divisions; the malign influence of foreign powers such as Austria was given some of the blame.

THE AGE OF STRUGGLE

Myths of national oppression tend to be closely related to myths of struggle. If the ills of the nation were attributable to external oppression, then the struggle for freedom became an important theme. If the problem lay in disunity, then the solution

was to be found in a rather different direction—in a struggle for unity.

The freedom struggle is one of the more powerful components in the nationalist historiographical myth. Over the centuries, the argument runs, the fight against oppression was unceasing—suspended, perhaps, for years or even for decades, but never abandoned. Four distinctive phenomena recur in nationalist tales of the freedom struggle.

First, there are many *brave heroes* whose military attainments helped to make the nation great or, at least, helped to sustain national pride. Some of these were presented as great military leaders, such as William Wallace for the Scots, Frederick the Great for the Germans and Michael the Brave for the Romanians. Others were noble martyrs, like Robert Emmet for the Irish, who died to preserve the spirit of freedom (national martyrdom is, indeed, a common theme in this connection). Yet others were messiah-type figures, who rose up to inspire their people and to lead them to a new life (such as Joan of Arc for the French). This category forms an abundant store for the creation of national statues and monuments, and can form the basis for a powerful nationalist hagiography.

Second, there are *despicable traitors* who, by siding with the enemy, undermined the national struggle. Many of these are reported as having died gruesome deaths, and suffered dishonor both before and after leaving this life. This was the alleged fate of Dermot McMurrough, responsible for the Norman invasion of Ireland. In England, Guy Fawkes, noted for his unsuccessful attempt to blow up the Houses of Parliament in 1605, played a similar role in the catalogue of national traitors.

Third there are *great victories*, when the armed forces of the nation managed to defeat a powerful enemy (though typically winning only the battle, not the war). Again, these are sometimes the subject of physical monuments or later rituals (for example, the lifting of the siege of Derry in 1689 and the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 are still vividly remembered by Ulster Protestants, and commemorated by marches each August and July respectively).

Finally, there are *glorious defeats*, where the national forces fight bravely but are overcome by superior numbers and, perhaps, by treachery. There is less cause to remember these, but they nevertheless occupy a distinctive place in nationalist memory, as setting

apart a "good" era from an "evil" one (examples are the Battle of Kinsale in 1601 for the Irish and the Battle of the White Mountain in 1620 for the Czechs).[56]

In the case of movements for unity, the national struggle is between the nation-building elite and retrogressive, parochial forces that stand as obstacles to unity. But an external dimension may also be present, as is illustrated by the story of William Tell, the legendary Swiss hero of the 14th century who fought against the Austrians.

Myths of Destiny

What does the future hold for the nation? Nationalist historiography offers two types of answer, one general and vague, the other specific and politically loaded. The first is the identification of some kind of "national mission." The second is the identification of the ancestral "national territory," the target territory of the nationalist movement.

THE NATIONAL MISSION

The idea that a particular people may have a distinctive mission to humanity is a recurring one in nationalist ideology. Not only may there be individual Messiah-type figures who participate in the national movement; the nation itself may have a messianic function to perform. First, it may be endowed with an important political function—to demonstrate to others how they should govern themselves, if not to do it for them, and to uphold the rule of law. Second, it may have important functions to perform in the socio-economic domain—to promote notions of material innovation and progress. Third, and quite differently, it may have a spiritual or intellectual mission to uphold.

The notion of a national political mission will necessarily be confined to those countries which themselves possess a distinguished record of contemporary achievement (for smaller nations, any political mission must be sought in other directions—in the promotion of ideals of internationalism, for instance). Thus, as Europe's powers began to flex their muscles in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the judgment that their way of life was superior to that of the developing world (with the British shouldering the "white man's burden" and the French undertaking a *mission*

civilatrice) gained increasing currency. Imperial intervention in Africa and Asia could thus be justified in part on the grounds that it was bringing the benefits of civilization to the native populations. This was carried a step further by the Nazi state; and those states that found themselves under communist rule were similarly assured by their elites that their "more advanced" system of political and economic organization should be exported to other parts of the world. Nor have these images perished with the end of the cold war: American nationalism continues to rest heavily on a profound belief in the superiority of the "American way of life," and in the appropriateness of its adoption in other parts of the world (a belief that is not incompatible with periods of isolationism and withdrawal from international involvement).

But if the American national historical myth rests substantially on an image of political harmony and military power, it also has a second, more technocratic strand: the "American way of life" implies not merely a particular form of democracy but also a free market economy and a compelling commitment to socio-economic "progress."[57] For other nations, too, the national self-image may be strongly linked to notions of economic and technological advance (this was the case with the English after the industrial revolution, for example, and for the Japanese in the latter part of the 20th century). On a smaller scale, adjacent populations could seek to project contrasting images of each other. Thus, Catalans were claimed to be "practical, economical, realistic people possessing a work ethic," a distinctive form of civilization setting them apart from the more backward Castilians,[58] and the Ulster Protestant self-image as a progressive, entrepreneurial people set that community apart from the image of economically regressive Irish Catholics.

For smaller, poorer countries, or for more marginal ones, neither political nor economic models are likely to be sufficiently impressive to constitute an example to the world. Small peoples may nevertheless be able to find solace in their own exceptional virtues. Poland, like many other countries such as Spain, Croatia, Hungary, and the Romanian principalities, could present itself as a bastion of Christianity.[59] For the Czechs, the values of rationalism and humanism could be advanced against the romanticism and militarism of the Germans (at least in the ideals of such leaders as Masaryk). For the Irish the value of spirituality could be exalted

to contrast with the materialism of the English (indeed, we find references to "Ireland's spiritual empire," created by a worldwide network of Catholic missionaries capable of exerting a subtle religious influence, to rival the political empire of the English). The Indian mission was to save humanity from western materialism, through "religious spiritualism and metaphysical profundity."[60] In some instance, indeed (as in the case of Ulster Protestants, Armenians and Afrikaners), the "national mission" was divinely endorsed, forming part of a covenant or compact between God and a chosen people.[61]

THE NATIONAL TERRITORY

If the notion of a national mission is lacking in precision, another component that is commonly to be found in nationalist historiography is more specific. This is the notion of the national territory. This derives, in many cases, from the image of the golden age: the nation is entitled to re-establish its greatness by reconquering the territory that once belonged to it—even if much of this is now occupied by other peoples.[62] The concept of national territory thus acquires particular political significance because the territory in question is contested, part of it being occupied by members of other groups.

One of the most striking examples of this is the case of the Israelis, with their powerful image of the biblical lands, which until recently were overwhelmingly Palestinian Arab in composition; but this ethnogeographical fact has done little to weaken the appeal of the image of the national territory of Israel. A second current example is that of the Serbs, preoccupied with the ancient Serbian national territory, whose "cradle," Kosovo, is now overwhelmingly Albanian; much of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia arose not simply from Serbian attempts to control areas in which they were ethnically dominant but rather from vigorous efforts to translate this historical-geographical blueprint into reality.

There are many other examples whose political significance is now less immediate. These include the Hungarians, whose "Lands of the Crown of St Stephen" extended, inter alia, over Slovakia and Transylvania, and the Czechs, whose "Lands of Czech Crown" included the almost exclusively German Sudetenland (it is interesting that in the latter case the image of the "national territory" did not extend to Slovakia, a factor that no doubt facilitated the

break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1993). For the Lithuanians, the "historic national territory" could be seen as extending over vast areas of Belarusia and the Ukraine; even the "historic capital," Vilnius, was traditionally non-Lithuanian in terms of its ethnic composition. The fact that Lithuanians would have been a minority in the most extensive definition of this territory, together with geopolitical realities after 1918, left the Lithuanians with only their ethnic territory; but following annexation to the USSR in 1940 Vilnius was "restored" to Lithuania. Finally, the Irish constitution until 1998 defined the "national territory" as "the whole island of Ireland, its islands, and the territorial seas."

Conclusion

From a nation-building perspective, the implicit functionality of the types of historical myth discussed in the last section is clear, and they may be related to the five political functions outlined above.[63] The function of *definition* is filled by myths of origin, which can be used to persuade people as to their distinguished ancestry, a consideration whose importance increases as contemporary life conditions deteriorate in terms of social status and material well-being. The myth of the golden age fills an obvious *reinforcement* function, demonstrating the capacity of the nation, when free, to express itself in ways of which all can feel proud, and offering promise of potential regeneration.[64] The dark age, similarly, provides a reassuring explanation as to why the performance of the nation in more recent centuries has been less than impressive; to the extent that a single explanation may be forthcoming, this will be found in the phenomenon of alien intervention and oppression—a myth clearly calculated to evoke *commiseration*. This, in turn, provides an important *legitimization* of the national struggle to re-create a free, united, independent state through which the nation can express its individuality. The people, again, can be made aware of the reason that this form of national self-expression is so important: the nation has a distinctive mission to humanity, one that should further enhance the sense of pride of its members. This tendentious version of "national history," with its important *inspiration* function, can point also to more specific objectives; it can target a particular "national territory" that ought to constitute the national home, and over which the nation should be able to exert full control.

Some elements in the nationalist mythology may be multifunctional. Thus the myth of origin not only serves to enhance the definition of the nation; it may also legitimize the national struggle, demonstrating that the nation's claim to a particular territory is strongest because it "got there first." Disputes of this kind as to who settled an area originally will be found in Finland (Swedish versus Finnish), Sri Lanka (Tamils versus Sinhalese), the Czech lands (Germans versus Czechs) and even Northern Ireland (where some Protestants claim that the 17th-century "plantations" that brought them from Scotland represented in reality a *return* to Northern Ireland, whence they had migrated centuries earlier).

The great value of nationalist historiography to ethnonational political elites is, then, clear: it can be used to justify not only past actions but also current or planned political programs.[65] In many respects, its importance increases in proportion to the shaky nature of its empirical foundations; the nations who most need a myth of their "great past" are those which do not have one. Historical memory may, then, play a major role in compensating for other "shortcomings" in the process of ethnonational formation. It has been argued that it has served to overcome differences of time and place among the Jewish people,[66] and we may, no doubt, expect a similar exercise in the creation of a common history to accompany the European integration project.

From the perspective of the elites who shape ideological messages, then, the creation, development, and dissemination of historical myth is of central importance (though it is by no means the only instrument available in the battle for the minds of the masses). It helps politically excluded groups in their pursuit of power; and it helps those who already have power to continue to hold it. This is illustrated in particular by the manner in which historical messages are shaped to serve new political and social realities. Interpretations of the past have a necessarily fluid character, and we will find major projects in historical revision accompanying changes of direction in the nationalist project, as in contemporary Ireland, Quebec, and central Europe.[67] These processes pose particular problems to elites: as past events are reinterpreted, the clash between old and new becomes obvious, with potentially disruptive consequences. The outcome of the battle for the past may be decisive in determining the course a people will follow, recalling George Orwell's pithy but chilling formulation in 1984: "Who

controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past."

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Notes

1. As a statement on the teaching of history in schools produced by the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic put it in 1959: "In a history course, special attention should be given to explaining the role of the Communist Party as the directing and guiding force in Soviet society and to a study of the modern stage of communist construction in the USSR. It is also necessary to show in detail the formation and development of the socialist system, the growth of national liberation movements, and the major events in the modern and recent history of other countries. History instruction in school is intended to bring up the young people in the spirit of communist ideals, socialist patriotism, proletarian internationalism, and a deep respect for labour, and to facilitate the training of students for an active public life"; cited in Marin Pundeff (ed.), *History in the USSR: Selected Readings* (San Francisco, CA: Chandler, for the Hoover Institution, 1967), p. 251.
2. Christopher Saunders, *The Making of the South African Past* (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1988), p. 192. Where, as in South Africa, the indigenous population remained large and vibrant, "history" nevertheless played a critical role; Afrikaner historians, for instance, focused on the history of settlement and on topics such as the Great Trek or resistance to the British (pp. 192–3).
3. For other examples, see Vladimíra Dvořáková, "The Legacy of the Past and Its Role in the Process of Democratic Consolidation," Paper Presented at the 19th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Durban, South Africa, 29 June–4 July 2003.
4. Daphna Golan, *Inventing Shaka: Using History in the Contruction of Zulu Nationalism* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994).
5. See *Facts About Israel: History*, at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/history/history%20of%20israel/ [accessed 8 Aug. 2004].
6. Johanan Manor, *Les Manuels Scolaires Palestiniens: Une Génération Sacrifiée* (Paris: Berg International, 2003), pp. 26–31.

7. William R. Keyler, *Academy and Community: The Foundation of the French Historical Profession* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 54.
8. One may give just two examples. The statement of educational policy for elementary schools in the new Irish state that was born in 1922 defined the aim of history teaching as being "to develop the best traits of the national character and to inculcate national pride and self-respect . . . by showing that the Irish race has fulfilled a great mission in the advancement of civilisation and that, on the whole, the Irish nation has amply justified its existence"; cited in John Coakley, "The Northern Conflict in Southern Irish School Textbooks," pp. 119–41 in Adrian Guelke (ed.), *New Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Conflict* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1994), p. 124. Similarly, a Syrian government decree in 1947 defined the role of history as being "to strengthen the nationalist and patriotic sentiments in the hearts of the people . . . because the knowledge of the nation's past is one of the most important incentives to patriotic behaviour"; cited in Bernard Lewis, *History—Remembered, Recovered, Invented* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 65.
9. Ernest Renan, "What Is a Nation," pp. 61–83 in *Poetry of the Celtic Races and Other Essays* (London: W Scott, 1896), p. 80.
10. Ramsay Muir, *Nationalism and Internationalism: The Culmination of Modern History* (London: Constable, 1917), pp. 48–9.
11. For a vivid exposition of a range of misrepresentations commonly to be found in US high school textbooks, see James W Loewen, *Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Textbook Got Wrong* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
12. Charles Jelavich, *South Slav Nationalisms—Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1990), p. 176.
13. Renan, "What Is a Nation," p. 66.
14. See Eric Hobsbawm, "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870–1914," pp. 263–307 in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
15. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background* (New York: Macmillan, 1944), pp. 329–34.
16. E.K. Francis, *Interethnic Relations: An Essay in Sociological Theory* (New York: Elsevier, 1976).
17. Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 97–102.
18. Defining the period when a state came into existence is, of course problematic: in the case of Hungary, was it 1867 or 1918? What about the predecessors of united Romania and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later, Yugoslavia) as they came into existence in 1918? What about short-lived republics during the interwar period (Estonian, Latvia, Lithuania) or during the World War II (Croatia, Slovakia)?
19. See Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).
20. Christel Lane, *The Rites of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society—the Soviet Case* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 252–84.
21. John Coakley and Kevin Howard, "Transforming the United Kingdom: The View from Dublin," *Soundings* Vol. 18 (2001), pp. 184–97. For a general

discussion of this aspect of historiography, in which England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland have been conventionally seen as possessing separate "histories," see Hugh Kearney, *The British Isles: A History of Four Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 1–9.

22. Carolyn P. Boyd, *Historia Patria: Politics, History and National Identity in Spain, 1875–1975* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 307.
23. See John Coakley, "Independence Movements and National Minorities: Some Parallels in the European Experience," *European Journal of Political Research,* Vol. 8, No. 2 (1980), pp. 215–47. For a discussion of some contemporary examples of this process of members of privileged minorities "changing sides" in contexts of ethnonational revolution (in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, South Africa and Rhodesia), see Thomas G Mitchell, *Indispensable Traitors: Liberal Parties in Settler Conflicts* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002).
24. Joseph F. Zacek, "Palacky and His History of the Czech Nation," *Journal of Central European affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1964), pp. 412–23.
25. RJ Crampton, *A Concise History of Bulgaria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 46–52.
26. Vincent Trumpa, "Simonas Daukantas, Historian and Pioneer of Lithuanian National Rebirth," *Lituanus,* Vol. 11, No. 1 (1965), pp. 5–17.
27. Gerhard Brunn, "Historical Consciousness and Historical Myths," pp. 327–38 in Andreas Kappeler, with Fikret Adanir and Alan O'Day (eds), *Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850–1940. Volume VI: The Formation of National Elites* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, for European Science Foundation, 1992), p. 331.
28. Ironically, at a time when the European Union insists on identical currency note design from Dublin to Athens and from Helsinki to Lisbon, the United Kingdom (without even including Man and the Channel Islands) recognizes no fewer than eight entirely different sets of bank notes: the standard set issued by the Bank of England for use throughout the United Kingdom, three additional sets in Scotland (issued by the Bank of Scotland, Clydesdale Bank, and the Royal Bank of Scotland) and four in Northern Ireland (issued by the Bank of Ireland, First Trust, the Northern Bank and the Ulster Bank).
29. See John Coakley, "El Estado, el Sistema Educativo y los Problemas de Identidad Nacional: El Caso de Irlanda, 1831– 1971," *Universidad y Sociedad*, Vol. 4 (1982), pp. 29–54; Coakley, "The Northern Conflict."
30. Lorenz Rerup, "Channels of Communication," pp. 309–26 in Kappeler et al., *Comparative Studies.*
31. Brunn, "Historical Consciousness," p. 330.
32. Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernisation* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 40–42.
33. John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State.* 2nd Ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 381–90.
34. Garth Stevenson. "The Politics of Remembrance in Irish and Quebec Nationalism," Paper Presented at the 19th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Durban, South Africa, 28 June–4 July 2003.

35. For examples, see Florian Znaniecki, *Modern Nationalities: A Sociological Study* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1952), pp. 35–45, 83–100; Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and Myths of Ethnic Descent," pp. 95–130 in *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* Vol. 7 (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1984), reprinted in Anthony D Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 57–95; Brunn, "Historical Consciousness"; George Schöpflin, "The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myth," pp. 19–35 in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (eds), *Myths and Nationhood* (London: Hurst, 1997); Andrew Wilson, "Myths of National History in Belarus and Ukraine," pp. 182–97 in Hosking and Schöpflin, *Myths and Nationhood*; Anne-Marie Thiesse, *La Création des Identités Nationales: Europe XVIIe–XXe Siècle* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1999).
36. Cited in John R. Gillis, "Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship," pp. 3–24 in John R Gillis (ed.), *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 7.
37. Notwithstanding the extent of debate among scholars of nationalism on the question whether nations are essentially modern phenomena or have deep roots extending over the centuries, it is not clear that any major analyst actually endorses the "primordialist" position; on the other hand, "primordialism" is commonly taken for granted by nationalists themselves.
38. See Anthony D. Smith, *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates About Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000).
39. Emmeline W Hill, Mark A Jobling and Daniel G Bradley, "Y-Chromosome Variation and Irish Origins," *Nature* Vol. 404, No. 6776 (23 Mar. 2000), pp. 351–2.
40. On the centrality of this belief in shared origins, see Walker Connor, "The Nation and Its Myth," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 33, No. 1–2 (1992), pp. 48–57.
41. Ferenc Glatz, "Backwardness, Nationalism, Historiography," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1983), pp. 31–40.
42. See Colin H. Williams, "Minority Nationalist Historiography," pp. 203–21 in RJ Johnston, David B Knight and Eleonore Kofman (eds), *National Self-Determination and Political Geography* (London: Croom Helm, 1988); Anthony Buckley, "'We're Trying to Find Our Identity': Uses of History among Ulster Protestants," pp. 183–97 in Elisabeth Tonkin, Maryon McDonald and Malcolm Chapman (eds), *History and Ethnicity* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 183; Prys Morgan, "From a Death to a View: The Hunt for the Welsh Past in the Romantic Period," pp. 43–100 in Hobsbawm and Ranger, *Invention of Tradition*, p. 67.
43. Leszek Hensel, "Le Mythe Sarmate et le Mythe Scythe: une Tentative de Comparaison," pp. 41–51 in Chantal Delsol, Michel Maslowski and Joanna Nowicki (eds), *Mythes et Symboles Politiques en Europe Centrale* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002).
44. J. Puzinas, *Vorgeschichtsforschung Und Nationalbewusstsein in Litauen* [Dissertation, Heidelberg] Kaunas: n.p., 1935), pp. 3–10.
45. See Ionel Buse, "Mythes Roumains des Origines," pp. 81–94 in Delsol et al., *Mythes et Symboles*.

46. See Smith, "National Identity and Myths of Ethnic Descent."
47. John Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 55.
48. Davydd J Greenwood, "Castilians, Basques, and Andalusians: An Historical Comparison of Nationalism, 'True' Ethnicity, and 'False' Ethnicity," pp. 202–27 in Paul R Brass (ed.), *Ethnic Groups and the State* (London, Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985).
49. See Alina Nowicka-Jezova, "Le Mythe des Trois Frères ou la Communauté Slave Programmée dans l'Historiographie du Moyen Âge et de la Renaissance," pp. 51–65 in Delsol et al., *Mythes et Symboles.*
50. Billie Melman, "Claiming the Nation's Past: The Invention of an Anglo-Saxon Tradition," pp. 221–41 in Jehuda Reinharz and George L Mosse (eds), *The Impact of Western Nationalisms: Essays Dedicated to Walter Z Laqueur on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday* (London: Sage, 1992).
51. Giovanna Brogi Berkoff, "Le Mythe du Baptême: Pologne, Ukraine et le Respect de la Diversité," pp. 65–81 in Delsol et al., *Mythes et Symboles.*
52. Cited in Maria Todorova, "The Course and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism," pp. 70–102 in Peter F Sugar (ed.), *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Washington, DC: American University Press, 1995), p. 75.
53. Juoko Hautala, *Finnish Folklore Research 1828–1918* (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1969); William A Wilson, "The Kalevala and Finnish Politics," pp. 51–75 in Felix J Oinas (ed.), *Folklore, Nationalism, and Politics* (Columus, OH: Slavia Publishers, 1978).
54. Toivo U Raun, "Die Rolle Finnlands für das Nationale Erwachen der Esten," *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung,* Vol. 34, No. 4 (1985), pp. 568–78.
55. S.E. Mann, "Vaclav Hanka's Forgeries," *Slavonic and East European Review,* Vol. 36, No. 87 (1958), pp. 491–6.
56. See Josef and Lydia Petránová Petrán, "The White Mountain as a Symbol in Modern Czech History," pp. 143–63 in Mikulaš Teich (ed.), *Bohemia in History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
57. Loewen, *Lies,* pp. 254–70.
58. Gerhard Brunn, "The Catalans within the Spanish Monarchy from the Middle of the Nineteenth to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century," pp. 133–59 in Kappeler et al., *Comparative Studies,* p. 149.
59. Janusz Tzabir, "La Pologne: Rempart de la Chrétienté," pp. 97–107 in Delsol et al., *Mythes et Symboles.*
60. Hans Kohn, *Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1946), p. 6.
61. Anthony D Smith, "The Resurgence of Nationalism? Myth and Memory in the Renewal of Nations," *British Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 47, No. 4 (1996), pp. 575–98, reprinted in Smith, *Myths and Memories,* pp. 253–81; see also Anthony D Smith, "Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive," *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* Vol. 15, No. 3 (1992), pp. 436–56, reprinted in Smith, *Myths and Memories,* pp. 125–47.
62. See John Coakley, "National Territories and Cultural Frontiers: Conflicts of Principle in the Formation of States in Europe," pp. 34–49 in Malcolm Anderson (ed.), *Frontier Regions in Western Europe* (London: Frank Cass, 1983);

John Coakley, "Introduction: The Challenge," pp. 1–22 in John Coakley (ed.), *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict*. 2nd edn. (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

63. Stevenson. "Politics of Remembrance."
64. See Smith, "Resurgence of Nationalism?"
65. David McCrone quotes the long historical component in the preamble to the constitution of Croatia (1990), which summarizes Croatian history since the 7th century in 450 words; see *The Sociology of Nationalism: Tomorrow's Ancestors* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 49–51. To this could be added the preamble to the Irish constitution (1937), which includes the words: "We, the people of Éire, humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial, gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain the rightful independence of our nation, and seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of prudence, justice and charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations, do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this constitution."
66. Robert Paine, "Israel: Jewish Identity and Competition over 'Tradition'," pp. 121–36 in Tonkin et al., *History and Ethnicity*.
67. See Ciarán Brady (ed.), *Interpreting Irish History: The Debate on Historical Revisionism, 1938–1994* (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1994); Linda Cardinal, Claude Couture, and Claude Denis, "La Révolution Tranquille à l'Épreuve de la 'Nouvelle' Historiographie et de l'Approche Post- Coloniale: une Démarche Exploratoire," *Globe: Revue Internationale d'Études Québecoises*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1999), pp. 75–95; Stefan Auer, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 16–18.

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