

Religion and the Global History of Europe

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European history has been defined as a field by a notion of Europe—its borders, values, civilization, and nationalities—that is structured by Christianity and its secular legacies.¹ Christianity has been intertwined with European imperialism since the early modern era, while the concept of “Europe” remains unavoidably shaped by its long association with Latin Christendom.² When the historian Robert Bartlett wrote of the “Europeanisation of Europe,” he described a process whereby “a culture or society ... that had its centres in the old Frankish lands, ... Latin and Christian but

This article was originally published in French as “L’histoire globale de l’Europe à l’aune de la religion,” *Annales HSS* 76, no. 4 (2021): 763–74.

* I would like to thank Martin Conway, David Feldman, Emily Greble, and Ruth Harris for their feedback and support during the writing of this article.

1. On the Christianity of secularism, see Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); and the contributions in Ari Joskowicz and Ethan Katz, eds., *Secularism in Question: Jews and Judaism in Modern Times* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

2. On Europe and Latin Christendom, see for instance Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950–1350* (London: Penguin, 1993), especially chapter 11; William Chester Jordan, “‘Europe’ in the Middle Ages,” in *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 72–90. On the shift from Christendom to a more geographical conception of Europe, see John Hale, *The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 3–50. On the emergence of a more secular conception of Europe linked to particular political forms, see the discussion in Anthony Pagden’s introduction to Pagden, *The Idea of Europe*, 1–32, especially pp. 1–4.

not synonymous with Latin Christendom,” expanded into the surrounding regions during the High Middle Ages, changing as it did so.³ Today, Christianity remains the religious heritage of the overwhelming majority of even “secular” Europeans. Arguably, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 1761 observation that “Europe, even now, is indebted more to Christianity than to any other influence for the union ... which survives among her members” still holds true.⁴ Certainly, in global historical terms, Europe continues to figure as “Christian.” The global turn has therefore prompted historians to think anew about the outward-facing dynamic of European religious energies in the modern era—not just the relationship between missions and empire, but also the relationship between Christianity and the politics of anti-slavery and humanitarianism.⁵ But thinking about how European Christianity impacted other parts of the world—and was impacted by them—has so far done nothing to unsettle the dominant narrative.

We might do better to ask how the historiography of Europe can be integrated with the historiographies of Europe’s historic non-Christian populations, more specifically Jews and Muslims. This is a different undertaking from diversifying our understanding of individual European states through a focus on religious and ethnic minorities—a project that remains rooted within a national framework.⁶ Jews and Muslims have lived in Europe (and been Europeans) for centuries, but they also belong to religious worlds that have historically transcended both the

3. Bartlett, *The Making of Europe*, 160–61.

4. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de monsieur l’abbé de Saint-Pierre” [1761], *Œuvres complètes*, vol. 4, *Mélanges*, part 1 (Paris: Lefèvre, 1839), 259, cited in Anthony Pagden, “Europe: Conceptualising a Continent,” in Pagden, *The Idea of Europe*, 33–54, here p. 43.

5. Indicative of new work on missions and empire are Andrew Porter, *Religion Versus Empire? British Protestant Missionaries and Overseas Expansion, 1700–1914* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); and J. P. Daughton, *An Empire Divided: Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism, 1880–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). On the mobilization of faith communities around secular causes, see Abigail Green and Vincent Viaene, eds., *Religious Internationalists in the Modern World: Globalization and Faith Communities since 1750* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 49–94, reflects the direction of travel on humanitarianism, but see the critique offered in Abigail Green, “Humanitarianism in Nineteenth-Century Context: Religious, Gendered, National,” *Historical Journal* 57, no. 4 (2014): 1157–75.

6. On Jews in national contexts, see Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson, eds., *Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States, and Citizenship* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Recent work has been more locally focused, see Till van Rahden, *Jews and Other Germans: Civil Society, Religious Diversity and Urban Politics in Breslau, 1860–1925* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008). A not wholly dissimilar literature on Muslims has begun to emerge, for instance Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain, eds., *Islam in Interwar Europe* (New York: Hurst and Company, 2008), part 4. Humayun Ansari, “*The Infidel Within*”: *Muslims in Britain since 1800* (London: Hurst, 2004), is a model of how to write such a study. For a more imperial take, see Naomi Davidson, “Muslim Bodies in the Metropole: Social Assistance and ‘Religious’ Practice in Interwar Paris,” in *Muslims in Interwar Europe: A Transcultural Historical Perspective*, ed. Bekim Agai, Umar Ryad, and Mehdi Sajid (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 105–23.

continent and its nation-states. If we take this as our starting point, we can engage their European histories on more challenging terms, as one component in a differently configured global geography. For while “Europe” has long been part of the Jewish and Muslim worlds, it is not necessarily center stage: these are historiographies with their own particular rhythms, conceptual frameworks, and geographies; they are historiographies in which Europe—as a continent, a civilization, and an idea—carries quite different connotations. Transcending the interface between the “European” and the “global,” they allow us to rethink what that interface might mean.

To begin with, thinking about Jews and Muslims imposes a different geography because they have, until relatively recently, been located primarily on the European “periphery”: in medieval Spain and, later, in the Mediterranean and in eastern Europe.⁷ In this sense, the histories of both groups challenge the notion of Christian Europe that underpins modern European history. They shift our focus from west to east, and highlight the persistence of an older geography structured not by land but rather around the “Middle Sea” of Fernand Braudel in which “the Turkish Mediterranean lived and breathed with the same rhythms as the Christian, [and] the whole sea shared a common destiny.”⁸ The importance of Jews as a Mediterranean diaspora highlights the problematic nature of these overly prescriptive terms of reference and the need to consider the dynamic relationship between all three religious cultures.

Yet the historical evolutions of these groups as European minorities has been so divergent that we need to consider them separately. On the one hand, we have the project of making Jews European which, seventy years after the Holocaust, has largely succeeded and no longer entails any kind of *quid pro quo* signifying the rejection or denigration of “traditional” Jewish culture (previously regarded as “Oriental,” “medieval,” and “uncivilized”). On the other, we have the project of making the Balkans Christian within the emerging nation-states of south-east Europe and despite the continued presence of large numbers of Muslims.⁹ Antisemitism is far from dead, but except on the Far Right the Europeaness of Jews is now accepted almost without question. The Europeaness of Islam has, in

7. On the relative novelty of this periphery, see Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

8. Fernand Braudel, preface to the English edition of *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* [1949], trans Siân Reynolds, 2 vols. (1972–1973; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995–1996), 1:13–14, here p. 14. On the Mediterranean as a modern unity, see Julia A. Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 1800–1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Maurizio Isabella and Konstantina Zanou, eds., *Mediterranean Diasporas: Politics and Identity in the Long 19th Century* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015); and James McDougall, “Modernity in ‘Antique Lands’: Perspectives from the Western Mediterranean,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 60, no. 1/2 (2017): 1–17.

9. Ben Gidley and James Renton, eds., *Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Europe: A Shared Story?* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

contrast, vanished from view—or even been completely denied.¹⁰ Consequently, Jewish and Muslim geographies raise different questions about the interface between “Europe” and “the world.”

Jews and Europe

Jewish history was until recently a profoundly Eurocentric field, driven by the apparently divergent dilemmas modernity posed for Jews living in western and eastern Europe, by the devastation of the Holocaust, and by the Zionist promise of redemption—a promise that was quintessentially European in both its nationalist and its settler-colonial dimensions. Yet the global turn currently taken by Jewish history speaks to a rather different historical trajectory, in which the distinction between Europe and the rest of the world that animates both European and global history only really acquired relevance for Jews with the Enlightenment. Rather, the Sephardi-Ashkenazi divide—arguably the most important divide in the Jewish world even today—cut right across Europe splitting north from south, although cities like Venice, Amsterdam, and London provided crucial points of contact. Even in the late eighteenth century the Italian Jew Samuele Romanelli operated within a Sephardic world order comprising the Mediterranean, pockets of Northern Europe, and America. He and his Moroccan patrons belonged to the same Jewish, halachic world and “shared the same transnational identity in which being Jewish transcended any type of national affiliation—in Europe as well as the Maghreb.”¹¹ Jewish history in this reading was neither European nor global but something else entirely. Jews led diasporic lives, and the shape of the Western Sephardi diaspora reflected the rise of world maritime empires: Venetian, Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, English, and French. Indeed, it was precisely the ability to transcend divides that mattered to others that rendered Jews such important agents of early modern globalization. As Jonathan Israel has argued, Jewish “diasporas within a diaspora” linked all the continents and bridged all four religious spheres—Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim—in Europe and the Near East, with the divide between Christendom and Islam forming a central axis of activity.¹² This Jewish world was itself fragmented and divided. Yet recent research emphasizes too the importance of this period in generating structures of solidarity, religious authority, and subversion that bridged internal divides within the Jewish world in ways that point to a certain trans-Judaic cohesion.¹³

10. Tharik Hussain, *Minarets in the Mountains: A Journey into Muslim Europe* (Chesham: Bradt Travel Guides, 2021).

11. Daniel J. Schroeter, “Orientalism and the Jews of the Mediterranean,” *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 4, no. 2 (1994): 183–96, here p. 185.

12. Jonathan I. Israel, *Diasporas within a Diaspora: Jews, Crypto-Jews and the World Maritime Empires (1540–1740)* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

13. Notably Elisheva Carlebach, *The Pursuit of Heresy: Rabbi Moses Hagiz and the Sabbatian Controversies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Matthias B. Lehmann, *Emissaries from the Holy Land: The Sephardic Diaspora and the Practice of Pan-Judaism*

These structures remained relevant even as the Great Divergence erected a distinction, more familiar to both European and global historians, between the West and the rest of the world. In a sense, this was the moment when Jewish history became properly European: first, because modern Jewish history was invented by *maskilic* Jews who were products of the Jewish Enlightenment, conceived of themselves as Europeans, and thereby helped shape what that meant; second because the decline of the ancien régime made it possible for Jews in western Europe to enter the social and political mainstream. Jews had lived on the fringes of “European” politics and culture; now through emancipation—and new patterns of Jewish migration—the histories of these interrelated societies gradually began to merge. In reality, however, European Jewry was only one element in a broader picture, and Jews in large swaths of North Africa, the Middle East, and even South Asia continued to lead non-European lives.

Modern Jewish history is only just beginning to incorporate these Jews into a narrative that was created to fit a European mold. In this context, global history has proved a very useful framework for rethinking the Jewish encounter with modernity, both through its imperial preoccupations and through the study of what I and others have termed “Jewish internationalism.”¹⁴ The divide between “Europeans” and “Orientals” which animates this new historiography operated differently in the Jewish world.¹⁵ Here too it reflected the disparities and priorities of western European imperialism. Yet “Oriental” Jews were as likely to live in eastern Europe as the Middle East and North Africa, while the birth of global civil society and a set of interlocking global publics provided a space in which Jews of “East” and “West” could connect in transformative ways.¹⁶ The migrations and traumatic upheavals of the twentieth century have further complicated this picture. Western European ideologues like Romano Prodi may celebrate Jews as “the first Europeans,”¹⁷ but the identification of Jews with contemporary

in the Eighteenth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014); Adam Teller, *Rescue the Surviving Souls: The Great Jewish Refugee Crisis of the Seventeenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020).

14. Lisa Moses Leff, *Sacred Bonds of Solidarity: The Rise of Jewish Internationalism in Nineteenth-Century France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006); Abigail Green, “Nationalism and the ‘Jewish International’: Religious Internationalism in Europe and the Middle East c. 1840–c. 1880,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, no. 2 (2008): 535–58.

15. Ivan Davidson Kalmar and Derek J. Penslar, eds., *Orientalism and the Jews* (Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2005).

16. Eli Bar-Chen, *Weder Asiaten Noch Orientalen. Internationale Jüdische Organisationen und die Europäisierung “Rückständiger” Juden* (Würzburg: Ergon, 2005); Abigail Green, “The ‘West’ and the Rest: Jewish Philanthropy and Globalization to c. 1880,” in *Purchasing Power: The Economics of Modern Jewish History*, ed. Rebecca Kobrin and Adam Teller (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 155–70.

17. Romano Prodi, “A Union of Minorities” [2004], in *The Jewish Contribution to European Integration*, ed. Sharon Pardo and Hila Zahavi (London: Lexington Books, 2020), 85–92, here p. 85; cited in Matti Bunzl, “Between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Some Thoughts on the New Europe,” *American Ethnologist* 32, no. 4 (2005): 499–508, here p. 502.

Europe—expressed in the 1968 slogan *nous sommes tous des juifs allemands*—is an appropriation that denies Jewish difference. Prodi's assertion reflects an essentially Christian reading of the European past, structured by European boundedness and the problems posed by “multiple allegiances” for the modern nation-state. In fact, after 1945 Judaism ceased to be a predominately European faith or culture. Most Jews now live elsewhere, in the United States and in Israel—a country in the eastern Mediterranean understood in the Arab world as a European colonial outpost and occasionally treated as such within frameworks like the Eurovision Song Contest or sporting events, and yet also seen by many Europeans as an essentially exotic Middle Eastern state.

These realities have shaped the new international Jewish history, which has both transatlantic and Mediterranean dimensions even as it incorporates European Jews as actors and beneficiaries of transnational Jewish activism.¹⁸ Unlike their predecessors, these historians are relatively unconcerned by the problem of the European nation-state. Nor are they overly preoccupied with what Malachi Hacoen has termed “a European cosmopolitan project that left only limited room for traditional Jews.”¹⁹ The challenge, for European history, is to recognize the extent to which the new Jewish history changes the terms of debate. By showing that the “burdens of brotherhood” shared by North African Jews and Muslims living in France were quite as significant as those which bound Jews to the nation-states of Christian Europe (and arguably deeper-rooted), it reminds us that Jews living in Europe cannot simply be categorized as European.²⁰ By imposing a different geography it obliges us to recognize that the Jewish world never fitted neatly into a European framework even though Europe was, for centuries, its center of gravity. Finally, by emphasizing the need for traditional Jewish culture to become part of European history on equal terms—alongside the better-known integrationist trajectory of assimilation and radical secularization—it challenges complacent assumptions about the evolution of Europe as a continent, a civilization, and an idea, forcing us to confront the diversity that has always existed within it.²¹

18. For good case studies, see Jaclyn Granick, *International Jewish Humanitarianism in the Age of the Great War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021); and Nathan Kurz, *Jewish Internationalism and Human Rights after the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

19. Malachi Haim Hacoen, *Jacob and Esau: Jewish European History between Nation and Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), xi. Hacoen's attempt to produce a “Jewish European history” represents a less globally framed alternative to this approach.

20. Ethan B. Katz, *The Burdens of Brotherhood: Jews and Muslims from North Africa to France* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).

21. As a corrective to the Germanocentric narrative of Jewish modernity, see Eliyahu Stern, *The Genius: Elijah of Vilna and the Making of Modern Judaism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).

Muslims and Europe

Writing Islam and Europe's Muslims into European history poses similar challenges in a different key. Like Jewish history, thinking about Muslims undermines our conventional understanding of Europe as a conceptual and geographical category, drawing our attention to the importance of Mediterranean, Balkan, and Russian borderlands as unities in their own right, and to the continuous presence of Muslims in western Europe, albeit in very small numbers. More fundamentally, it enjoins us to embrace the Ottoman Empire as a properly European state, building on recent work pointing to its hybrid nature and the importance of Eastern Christianity and the Byzantine past in making and shaping the Ottoman world.²² Just as Renaissance thinkers like Thomas More were forced to accept that there was more to Europe than "those parts where the faith and religion of Christ prevails," so European historians need to think harder about what this means for our field.²³

Ottoman Europe is not a contradiction in terms. If we agree with Maria Todorova that "the conclusion that the Balkans are the Ottoman legacy is not an overstatement," we need to see the Ottoman Empire (and the Muslim world in which it loomed so large) as constitutive forces within Europe—not just outsiders against whom Europe has defined itself, but insiders too.²⁴ This means more than simply appreciating the role of Muslims and Islam in the making of early twentieth-century nation-states like Yugoslavia and Albania, the only European country with a Muslim majority.²⁵ Bosnia and Albania were not peripheral to the Ottoman Empire. They were core parts of the Ottoman state whose notables formed part of the religious and political establishment. That the early nineteenth-century founder of modern Egypt, Mehmed Ali, was in fact an Albanian speaks to the place of south-east Europe and European Muslims within this other world. Even as the Ottoman Empire retreated from the Balkans, informal ties of family, business, education, and trade continued to connect Bosnia-Herzegovina's 400,000 Muslims to the new Ottoman heartlands, while the religious freedoms accorded by the

22. See Daniel Goffman, *The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004); and the contributions to Pascal Firges, Tobias Graf, and Gülay Tulasoglu, eds., *Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

23. Thomas More, *Utopia* [1516], cited in Hale, *The Civilization of Europe*, 38.

24. Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (1997; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 12.

25. Edin Hajdarasic, *Whose Bosnia? Nationalism and Political Imagination in the Balkans, 1840–1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015); Emily Greble, "Hierarchies of Citizenship: Islam, the Yugoslav State, and Continuities of Empire," working paper, University of Washington-Seattle, February 9, 2017, <https://podtail.com/en/podcast/the-ellison-center-at-the-university-of-washington/emily-greble-hierarchies-of-citizenship-islam-and-/>; Nathalie Clayer, "Behind the Veil: The Reform of Islam in Inter-War Albania or the Search for a 'Modern' and 'European' Islam," in Clayer and Germain, *Islam in Inter-War Europe*, 128–55.

Habsburgs cemented their identity as Muslims and fostered a different kind of connection to the sultan-caliph, whose name they continued to mention in Friday prayers. Nor did the emerging Islamic reform movement overlook this new reality. Writing in 1909 in his Egyptian journal *al-Manar*, the influential Syrian-born pan-Islamist Muhammad Rashid Rida engaged with the problems of Muslim life under Christian rule raised by a Bosnian student, but concluded that *hijra* (religiously motivated migration) was not an obligation because Bosnian Muslims were free to practice their faith.²⁶ During the interwar period, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's secularist attack on Islamic institutions in Turkey only reinforced the networks that continued to link the Balkans and the Arab world. Al-Azhar University in Cairo now became the center of religious learning for European Muslims, who also forged new connections with their brethren in India, testifying to the increasingly global nature of twentieth-century Islam.²⁷

Europe was of course not the heart of this Muslim world, although it had always been part of it. (Indeed, the symbolic importance and political reach of the sultan-caliph suggest that we would be wrong to see Europe as peripheral in this context.) Yet thinking about its contours confronts us with a radically different geography which provincializes Europe in unsettling ways. The Ottoman Empire was a European state; it was also a Middle Eastern and a western Asian one. Thus Lâle Can has highlighted the way Russian imperial expansion in the later nineteenth century helped bring broader segments of central Asian society into sustained contact with Ottoman society: the creation of new railroads and steamship routes made travel to Ottoman cities more accessible, rerouting the *hajj* via Odessa and Istanbul and swelling the number of central Asian pilgrims. Even as the Tanzimat reforms of 1839 to 1876 created a concept of Ottoman citizenship that included Jews and Christians but excluded non-Ottoman Muslims previously subject to the sultan-caliph's authority, new *hajj* hubs emerged and Muslims from so-called peripheries became more connected to the central Islamic lands.²⁸ Abdülhamid II built on these expanding Ottoman networks as he sought to fashion an Islamist modernity in opposition to the West, emphasizing his role as caliph and protector of Muslims worldwide. European colonial expansion in south-eastern Europe, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, India, central Asia, Indonesia, and Malaysia meant that by the early 1900s the Ottoman Empire was the only major Muslim state apart from Iran to have preserved its independence. The historically

26. Leyla Amzi-Erdogdular, "Afterlife of Empire: Muslim-Ottoman Relations in Habsburg Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1878–1914" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2013), 94. See also Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen, "À la poursuite de la réforme: renouveau et débats historiographiques de l'histoire religieuse et intellectuelle de l'islam, xve–xxie siècle," *Annales HSS* 73, no. 2 (2018): 317–58.

27. See Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain, "Muslim Networks in Christian Lands," in Clayer and Germain, *Islam in Inter-War Europe*, 22–31.

28. Lâle Can, "Connecting People: A Central Asian Sufi Network in Turn-of-the-Century Istanbul," *Modern Asian Studies* 46, no. 2 (2012): 373–401; Can, "The Protection Question: Central Asians and Extraterritoriality in the Late Ottoman Empire," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 48, no. 4 (2016): 679–99.

fissiparous and heterogeneous Muslim world became more unipolar, as Muslims now living under European colonial rule increasingly looked to the sultan-caliph for guidance and support. This fostered a pan-Islamic sentiment combining the long-standing Islamic notion of *umma* with appeals to nascent anticolonial nationalism. One reading of this development might be that it cemented the divide between Christian Europe and an increasingly extra-European “Muslim world” more focused on Istanbul than ever before—a process enhanced by the massacre and expulsion of Muslims from most of the emerging nation-states in the Balkans. Another reading radically relativizes the importance of Balkan and Mediterranean contact zones in what was a global encounter between Muslims and European imperialism. In this reading, India—not the boundary between Christian Europe and the Ottoman world—was now “the frontline of ... Muslim interaction with Christian power.”²⁹ Such a reading turns the bread-and-butter assumptions of European history on their head.

Yet Europe as a place loomed surprisingly large in the international Muslim networks of the modern era. The bonds of empire and the magnetic attraction of European culture and power drew increasing numbers of Muslim travelers, intellectuals, students, and political exiles from Turkey, the Middle East, and India in particular, alongside the burgeoning communities of migrant laborers that arrived in France and elsewhere. Meanwhile, as Nile Green has argued, their encounters and experiences of travel and of life in Europe created new conceptions of geography and history that came to cluster around the notion of a “Muslim world”: “It was in the age of industrialized communications that the Muslim world was made. And it was made in Europe as much as Asia.”³⁰ By the interwar period, western Europe had emerged as a different kind of Muslim space: one that became a target for innovative forms of Muslim missionary activity originating in India, Algeria, and Singapore; but also one in which the old, primarily religious transnational networks linking south-east Europe to the rest of the Muslim world were revitalized in the context of European colonial expansion and secularization by new sociopolitical networks that began to promote reformist and pan-Islamic ideologies.³¹ The European Muslim Congress held in Geneva in 1935 reflected this new reality, symbolically establishing Islam as a European religion while defining the contours of European Islam in a way that denied its historic bonds with now secular Turkey. But this event too might be read differently, as a recognition of the new place a post-Ottoman “Europe” occupied within the

29. Nile Green, *Terrains of Exchange: Religious Economies of Modern Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 19.

30. Nile Green, “Spacetime and the Muslim Journey West: Industrial Communications in the Making of the ‘Muslim World’,” *American Historical Review* 118, no. 2 (2013): 401–29, here p. 429. See also David Motadel, “The Making of Muslim Communities in Western Europe, 1914–1939,” in *Transnational Islam in Interwar Europe: Muslim Activists and Thinkers*, ed. Götz Nordbruch and Umar Ryad (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 13–43.

31. For a transnational approach, see Agai, Ryad, and Sajid, *Muslims in Interwar Europe*.

Dar al-Islam. Indeed, Europe also became a place where dissident Muslim thinkers and conservative Islamists were able to develop political movements more freely than in their home countries.³²

Talal Asad has rightly observed that “although the West contains many faces at home it presents a single face abroad.”³³ Writing European history in a postcolonial world, we need to deconstruct that single face in a way that allows us to appreciate the implications of Europe’s religious diversity: we need to write the history of Europe itself against the grain. By challenging the conventional idea of Europe—as a continent, a civilization, and an idea—and denying its inevitable centrality, the modern histories of Europe’s Muslims and Jews expose the assumptions that underpin our field. After the global turn, European history must take account of such alternate readings and geographies. Writing connected history is not just about uncovering the connections between “Europe” and “the world”; it also entails connecting the overlapping histories we may find in Europe itself—both with each other and within divergent global frameworks. As I recently discovered, this poses fundamental conceptual and institutional challenges. At Oxford, European history and the history of Islam are both core areas for our library, but (like Hebrew and Jewish Studies) the latter remains the remit of what is, at the time of writing, still our Oriental Studies Faculty; the history of Muslims in western Europe has consequently fallen through the cracks. Wheels are now being set in motion, but this particular historian has grasped that when it comes to “religion,” reframing the history of Europe is both harder—and more urgent—than it looks.³⁴

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32. As described in Gerhard Höpp, “Zwischen Moschee und Demonstration. Muslime in Berlin, 1920–1930,” *Moslemische Revue* 3 (1990): 135–46; 4 (1990): 230–38; and 1 (1991): 13–19. On the social interaction and accommodations between Muslims and non-Muslim Europeans, see for instance David Motadel, “Islamische Bürgerlichkeit. Das soziokulturelle Milieu der muslimischen Minderheit in Berlin 1918–1939,” *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für Deutsche Geschichte* 37 (2009): 103–21.

33. Asad, *Formations of the Secular*, 13.

34. Talal Asad, “Muslims and European Identity: Can Europe Represent Islam?” in Pagden, *The Idea of Europe*, 209–27.