

“Kuhn and Psychology: The Rogers—Skinner, Day—Giorgi Debates.”

PATRICK K. DOOLEY

The combination of Thomas Kuhn and psychology makes for a potentially explosive, highly volatile mixture. This, in effect, compounds controversy. In 1971, a new journal, *Science Studies*, published David S. Palermo's, "Is a Scientific Revolution Taking Place in Psychology?"¹ His article was straightforward and non-polemic: Kuhn's account of scientific revolutions nicely fit the rise and fall of the Wundtian paradigm and the ascendancy of behaviorism. In a decidedly belligerent fashion, Neil Warren and L. B. Briskman rebutted. Palermo in turn responded and in the next two years *Science Studies* published four more exchanges. However, at the end, the topic was neither Kuhn, nor psychology, nor scientific revolutions. Instead the readers of *Science Studies* were treated to an analysis of high-handedness, nose-thumbing, *ad hominem* arguments and red-herrings as they related to "Standards of Scholarship and Debate."²

I shall not attempt a Kuhnian account of the history of psychology. My topic is modest and circumscribed. I will show how Thomas Kuhn's concept of "paradigm debate" illuminates the character of the conflict in two celebrated exchanges between phenomenology and behaviorism: The 1956 Carl Rogers—B. F. Skinner Symposium and, nearly twenty years later, the dialogue between Willard Day and Amedeo Giorgi. It is clear that in these exchanges fundamental disagreements separate behaviorists and phenomenologists. Both sides have very definite and very opposed ideas about the nature and practice of the science of psychology. Since behaviorists and phenomenologists hold radically different paradigms of psychology, the two sides are involved in paradigm debates. After a brief account of Kuhn's use of "paradigm" and "paradigm debate," I examine the Rogers—Skinner symposium and then the Day—Giorgi dialogue. I conclude with remarks about the dilemma which confronts psychology as the science of man.

a) *Thomas Kuhn and paradigm debate.* In his celebrated and influential work *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Thomas Kuhn describes a scientist's set of fundamental commitments and beliefs as his *paradigm*. On this view, behaviorists and phenomenologists adhere to fundamentally different psychological

paradigms. Kuhn argues that paradigms have a marked impact upon scientific inquiry and, as a consequence, differing paradigms are responsible for the incomplete logical contact between competing theories. In other words, different paradigms produce different experiences, promote apprehension of different facts, and prompt appreciation of different values. Because of the impact of paradigms, disagreements are understandable. Proponents of competing paradigms cannot reconcile these differences for each side has both different experiences and different vocabularies. Indeed, there is very little shared area for comparative assessment.

For our purposes, we will concentrate on Kuhn's sense of a paradigm as a research model: Here paradigm's include,

. . . accepted examples of actual scientific practice—examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together—provide *models* from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research. These are the traditions which the historian describes under such rubrics as "Ptolemaic Astronomy" (or "Copernican"), "Aristotelian dynamics" (or "Newtonian"), "corpuscular optics" (or "wave optics"), and so on.³

To this list we now add two psychological rubrics, behaviorism and phenomenology. As we shall see behaviorists and phenomenologists radically disagree on the proper conduct of psychological research. Kuhn gives the following account of paradigms and the actual practice of a science:

the study of paradigms . . . is what mainly prepares the student for membership in the particular scientific community with which he will later practice. Because he there joins men who learned the bases of their field from the *same concrete models*, his subsequent practice will seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals. Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and *standards for scientific practice*.⁴

Later Kuhn comments, "in learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory, methods, and standards together, usually in an inextricable mixture."⁵ That is, scientists who have learned different paradigms thereby also hold different criteria for legitimate problems and significant findings.

Although it is usually ignored, Kuhn's treatment of the learning and application of paradigms is an application of a more general epistemological position. In his introductory chapter, Kuhn urges his readers to see the forest, not just the trees. Though his study is historical and though his observations are "about the sociology or social psychology of scientists; yet [he urges his readers] at least a few of my conclusions belong traditionally to logic or epistemology."⁶ Learning a paradigm, like learning a language, has a decisive impact on how we experience the world. Kuhn's analysis of paradigms can be seen as a concrete application of William James' contention that man's experience of the world is of necessity, partial, provisional and selective. Each of us, says James, creates and actively constitutes a significant

portion of what we seek and what we find in reality.⁷ Kuhn's language is more specialized but his basic point is the same. Kuhn explains that paradigms function in both the "context of discovery and the context of justification."⁸ He points out that paradigms have both a heuristic and a legislative function. While a paradigm aids research by focusing attention, by highlighting details, and by suggesting tactics, it thereby necessarily leads one to ignore certain phenomena, to down-play some attributes, and to exclude certain methods. The point, very simply put, is when we ask someone to notice something, we are also asking him to ignore the other things. Accordingly a paradigm which poses certain problems, discounts others. A paradigm which suggests certain methods, forecloses others. A paradigm which legitimates certain results, disallows others.

When members of two different scientific schools compare results, their discussions quickly turn to the meta-level—the *standards* for significant findings and the *standards* for reliable methods. Kuhn characterizes a discussion of standards (rather than results) as a paradigm debate:

[when] . . . two scientific schools disagree about what is a problem and what a solution, they will inevitably talk through each other when debating the relative merits of their respective paradigms. In the partially circular arguments that regularly result, each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less the criteria that it dictates for itself and to fall short of a few of those dictated by its opponent . . . [it is this] incompleteness of logical contact that consistently characterizes paradigm debates.⁹

As we now turn to the Rogers-Skinner symposium and the Day-Giorgi dialogue we will see that each side: focuses on the standards for procedures and solutions (not on the results themselves), satisfies its own criteria (while it falls short of those dictated by its opponents), is confident of the scientific character of its results (and suspicious of the rival's results), and talks through the other. Finally, it will become clear that the disputants hold to fundamental extra-psychological, philosophical stances which commit them to incommensurate views of the science of psychology.

b) *The Rogers-Skinner Symposium*. This debate was held at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, September 4, 1956 in Chicago, Illinois. It was published as "Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior: A Symposium."¹⁰ It ostensibly concerned the use of scientific knowledge to control human beings. To no one's great surprise, Skinner advocated the wisdom and propriety of using psychological knowledge for control, while Rogers argued that such a practice was foolish and immoral. However, the Rogers-Skinner disagreement about the intelligence and morality of manipulation is not their fundamental conflict. Rogers and Skinner are actually debating paradigms with the issue under contest being the need to choose between two radically different views of the nature of psychology.

First of all, neither psychologist finds it necessary to defend the *possibility* of using psychological knowledge for purposes of control. The question at issue is not whether control techniques are available, but should those techniques be employed.

Skinner argues that controlling and being controlled are simply facts of life. Any concern about the morality of controlling and being controlled only serves to reemphasize "how nonscientific preconceptions are affecting our current thinking about human behavior."¹¹ That sort of thinking sees that individuals or social agencies employ coercion and compulsion, inducement and persuasion to influence human behavior. The first two techniques are considered immoral and the last two are deemed permissible. Skinner's critique advances two considerations. First, all four techniques are control techniques, they differ only in their degree of effectiveness or conspicuousness. Secondly, inconspicuous or ineffective techniques are considered acceptable because they preserve the *illusion* of choice and initiative. Thus "a heavy semantic cargo"¹² leads to a prejudiced and faulty assessment of the morality of various control techniques:

fear of control, generalized beyond any warrant, has lead to a misinterpretation of valid practices and the blind rejection of intelligent planning for a better way of life.¹³

Next a whole mind-set of non-scientific preconceptions (articulated in the philosophy and literature of democracy) conceals the actual dynamics of human behavior. This mind-set leads to the traditional view that human rights, personal responsibility, individual initiative, and freedom are inherently good. As a result, those tendencies which reduce or destroy rights, responsibility, initiative, and freedom are judged evil; those which preserve or enhance those qualities are good. Hence Skinner contends that a faulty, outmoded view of man leads us to misunderstand human behavior and to misjudge the morality of control.

Skinner proposes an overhaul which will establish a different order of priorities. He suggests that science be allowed to dictate the concept of man and science be used to evaluate the morality of control techniques. Up to now a view of man has established guide-lines for the scientific study of man and moral criteria for the application of the results of those findings. Skinner suggests the reverse:

... we must look at human nature as it is brought into focus through the methods of science rather than as it has been presented to us in a series of historical accidents . . . What is needed is a new conception of human behavior which is compatible with the implications of a scientific analysis.¹⁴

Although he cannot foresee all the details of this new portrait of man, a fundamental fact is clear, "all men control and are controlled."¹⁵ Though

Skinner is unsure of which patterns and forms of control will be permissible, he is confident that the central issue will *not* be "how freedom is to be preserved."¹⁶ He does predict that patterns of control which amount to master-slave relationships or despotic rule "... may well be the first to go when the experimental analysis of behavior comes into its own in the design of cultural practices."¹⁷ As we indicated above, Skinner's first and fundamental commitment is to science. As a result, he holds that it is science which ought to stipulate a concept of man; that an experimental analysis of behavior ought to resolve ethical questions.

Rogers' response to Skinner has two phases, conceptual and experimental. Rogers' objection, on the conceptual level, is that Skinner's suggestion that science dictate a concept of man and morality amounts to a faulty understanding of science. Rogers' second experiential contention is that psychotherapy provides evidence that control of human behavior is foolish and immoral.

Rogers challenges Skinner's rearranged priorities on the grounds that a scientific endeavor "has its meaning as the objective pursuit of a purpose which has been subjectively chosen by a person or persons."¹⁸ The work of a science is to discover and evaluate various means with regard to a goal, a purpose, or an end which is outside and *prior to* that science. Following an example which Skinner himself proposed, when it has been decided that a bridge should be built, the metallurgist and structural engineer use their sciences to determine the best *means* to accomplish that goal. Rogers states:

... the particular value which is being sought can never be tested or evaluated, confirmed or denied, by the scientific endeavor, to which it gives birth. The initial purpose or value always and necessarily lies outside the scope of the scientific effort which sets it in motion.¹⁹

Therefore the best that Skinner can hope to accomplish by his behavioral science is a systematic appraisal of various forms, styles, and patterns of control. Skinner's science cannot ever evaluate or even call into question the advisability of the *general policy of scientific control of human behavior*. The reason why Skinner's science can only appraise various kinds of control but never the advisability of the whole policy of control is that his science has already refused this choice. To speculate about the advisability of a general policy of control would be to reinstate the values of human freedom and personal responsibility. However Skinner has already determined that:

the concepts of human freedom, the capacity for choice, the responsibility for choice, the worth of the human individual ... [are] historical curiosities which once existed by cultural accident as values in a prescientific civilization.²⁰

Let us see, counters Rogers, if there is *scientific evidence* for the reality of human freedom and responsibility.

Rogers' evidence for human freedom and its value comes from psychotherapy. After a lengthy description of the details of psychotherapeutic practice, Rogers states his contention. First, Skinner's perspective does have some plausibility, "behavior, when it is examined scientifically, is surely best understood as determined by prior causation. This is one great fact of science."²¹ Nonetheless, there is still ample evidence of the realities of freedom and choice:

But the possible personal choice, which is the most essential element in being a person, which is the core experience in psychotherapy, which exists prior to any scientific endeavor, is an equally prominent fact in our lives. To deny the experience of responsible choice is, to me, as restricted a view as to deny the possibility of a behavioral science.²²

It comes to this, submits Rogers, "we cannot profitably deny our subjective life, any more than we can deny the objective description of that life."²³ Rogers charges that Skinner's denial of the validity of experiential evidence of freedom and responsibility is clearly arbitrary. Skinner refuses to admit these facts about man since they conflict with the view of man dictated by *his version* of the science of psychology!

Further, argues Rogers, there is experimental (that is, scientific) evidence of the realities of freedom and personal choices. Rogers explains that countless instances of psychotherapy attest to two critical facts: when the therapist controls and manipulates his client a submissive, conforming, defensive, rigid personality emerges; when the therapist refuses to control his client a free, creative, open, flexible personality structure results. Hence not only are freedom and personal responsibility real, psychotherapy has discovered techniques which enhance the personality type which is most likely to contribute to the progress and improvement of mankind.

Skinner is allowed the last word. His remarks confirm my contention that Rogers and Skinner are engaged in a paradigm debate. More importantly, Skinner clearly and unmistakably affirms a fundamental difference: his fundamental commitment is to "science" and Rogers' is to "man."

Skinner's response is very blunt: he cannot accept Rogers' "scientific" evidence because his view of science assures him Rogers must have made a mistake. Skinner explains that he has often been confronted with what others take to be clear indications of freedom, choice, and personal initiative, "when this happens, I look to other possible reinforcements for a plausible explanation."²⁴

So when Skinner is confronted with Rogers' psychotherapeutic evidence for freedom and personal initiative, he wonders if Rogers is:

correctly interpreting the result? What evidence is there that a client . . . [is] truly *self-directing*? What evidence is there that he ever makes a truly *inner* choice of ideal or goal?

Notice how Skinner rebutts. He argues that what Rogers finds *looks like* freedom and initiative but Skinner doubts that it is. Is Rogers' client *truly* self-directing or only apparently so? Is it *truly* an inner choice or only an apparent one? Skinner explains how *he* distinguishes reality from appearance:

The therapeutic situation is only a small part of the world of the client. From the therapist's point of view it may appear to be possible to relinquish control. But the control passes, not to a "self" but to forces in other parts of the client's world . . . to control by certain inexorable features of the environment.²⁶

Of course, the client and even the therapist seem to "experience" freedom and initiative. Further the participant's perspective does support the non-scientific preconceptions of the traditional view of man. However an objective, external, scientific description of the same actions would point to the relevant environmental factors:

science insists that action is initiated by forces impinging upon the individual, and that caprice is only another name for behavior for which we have not yet found a cause.²⁷

Though Rogers was not permitted a response he would surely have reiterated the dilemma quoted above, "we cannot profitably deny our subjective life, any more than we can deny the objective description of that life."²⁸

It is clear that Rogers and Skinner are debating paradigms. They talk through each other and they fail to make significant logical contact. Each psychologist defends and criticizes by referring to his own paradigm. As a consequence there is little communication. For instance, Rogers is not particularly impressed with the sort of evidence which Skinner produces; Skinner, not especially alarmed about Rogers' criticisms. Of course, Rogers is convinced that his criticisms of Skinner are debilitating, if not fatal. And naturally, Skinner views his evidence against Rogers to be unobjectionable and highly significant.

The key maneuver in the debate is the way each contests the *factual* nature of the other's findings. As we noted above, in a paradigm debate, it is not the results so much as it is the standards for results and the appropriateness of methods which becomes the issue. This is precisely the way Skinner and Rogers address each other's research. The disputed fact is human freedom. From psychotherapy, Rogers has evidence of free choice and personal initiative; Skinner brands that evidence subjective and counters that a scientific account of any human action will disclose the relevant environmental determinants.

Both Rogers and Skinner employ the strategy of arguing that his rival's facts are really only "facts." Notice that neither rejects, out-of-hand the conclusions of the other. Instead each explains the true significance of the other's findings.

Rogers acknowledges that human behavior "when it is examined scientifically, is surely best *understood as* determined by prior causation. This is one great *fact of science*."²⁹ But, Rogers explains, scientific facts are second-order descriptions of a more basic reality. Further, the more basic reality of human initiative and choice exist prior to and make possible any scientific endeavor. Therefore the one fact of science is only a "fact." The fundamental fact is, "our subjective life . . . the experience of responsible choice."³⁰ Hence, the second-order "fact" that human actions are determined, is merely an "objective *description* of that life."³¹ Rogers concedes that someone, like Skinner might describe or understand human behavior as determined, but the essential reality of the matter (directly experienced by each of us and further confirmed by psychotherapy) is the fact that humans are free.

Skinner handles Rogers' findings the same way: Rogers' facts are only "facts." What the agent subjectively reports as self-control and inner choice, needs a correct, objective, and scientific description: "[every] action is initiated [not by the individual but] by forces impinging upon the individual."³² Self-reports, along with information from the therapy, are often alleged to provide evidence for self-determination and human freedom but, asks Skinner, is Rogers

. . . correctly interpreting the result . . . From the therapist's point of view it may appear to be possible to relinquish control. But the control passes, not to a "self" but to forces in other parts of the client's world.³³

Rogers "facts" have been lent plausibility by ordinary language and common sense and his value judgments supported by "folk-wisdom, religion, and psychotherapy."³⁴ However, counters Skinner, it is *science* that psychology ought to be about and, "we must look at human nature as it is brought into focus through the methods of science . . . what is needed is a new conception of human behavior . . . all men control and are controlled."³⁵ Skinner concludes, the self-control so important to Rogers is not especially significant ("Even a pigeon can be taught some measure of self-control!"³⁶) and, more important, self-control is still control. Thus Rogers' "facts" amount to additional evidence for Skinner's basic fact, all men are controlled.

Each psychologist has attempted to show that the very facts critical and central to his own paradigm are mistakenly regarded by his opponent as trivial and peripheral "facts." The ultimate source for these profoundly conflicting evaluations can be found in the basic assumptions of each paradigm. Skinner's paradigm (in deference to a fundamental commitment to the exterior, observer, objective, descriptive perspective), readily accepts and highly values evidence consonant with this *external point of view*, all the while dismissing and deprecating contrary conclusions. Rogers' paradigm (due to its fundamental commitment to the interior, participant, subjective, experi-

ential perspective), is predisposed to discover and attach primary significance to evidence which buttresses the *internal point of view*, all the while explaining that conflicting findings are irrelevant.

c) *The Day-Giorgi Dialogue*. These psychologists call their exchange a dialogue. Both downplay the *contrast* between phenomenology and behaviorism (the subtitle of the popular and influential Rice University Symposium volume, *Behaviorism and Phenomenology*)³⁷ and both avoid the *tension* between these two psychologies (the topic of a series of articles in *Psychological Review*³⁸ in 1966-1967). It is clear that Willard Day³⁹ and Amedeo Giorgi⁴⁰ are very concerned to be fair to the other side and flexible with regard to his own; it is also clear that, in the end, their dialogue remains paradigm debate.

Willard Day's article, "Radical Behaviorism in Reconciliation with Phenomenology," proposes a very special sort of reconciliation, "the purpose of this paper is to show that Skinner's radical behaviorism is indeed capable of *encompassing* a productive phenomenology."⁴¹ The operative word is "encompassing;" what Day means is that phenomenology can be subsumed under the wider umbrella of behaviorism. He notes that phenomenological descriptions give psychology a wider, richer, more complex domain of problems. But will phenomenology or behaviorism *solve* these problems? Not phenomenology. Those psychologists rely on "practices of explanation in which powers or forces are attributed to . . . some inner mental entity presumed to influence behavior."⁴² Day had already stated his position on inner-entity explanations:

Issues of ontology are again involved here, since explanatory inner processes are generally regarded as having a kind of power metaphorically related to *primitive animism*. However, if the ontological pattern of language is insisted upon, it is only reasonable to ask what makes the inner process work as it does. Since an answer to this question is usually not provided, the *radical behaviorist regards such explanations as incomplete*.⁴³

Although, concedes Day, these explanations "pass as successful explanations to many people, and indeed common practices of explanation provide an interesting area for empirical investigation,"⁴⁴ these explanations are only "functional."⁴⁵ Ultimately these explanations must be supplemented by the sort offered by behaviorism, explanations which specify "the observable antecedents of behavior back as far as possible into the environment."⁴⁶ Hence phenomenological explanations are helpful, even insightful but they are only functional and incomplete explanations which fail to come to grips with the actual environmental causes of behavior. Thus Day reconciles phenomenology and behaviorism by subsuming phenomenology *under* phenomenology.

Notice how stark the options have become. Behaviorism espouses a para-

digm in which human behavior is caused and controlled by the external environment, phenomenology holds to a paradigm in which an inner self and its intentional states control and cause human behavior. Day speaks of behaviorism's "preference for environmental explanation."⁴⁷ in contrast to phenomenology's preference for "explanation in which powers or forces are attributed to . . . some inner mental entity."⁴⁸ It is a matter of preferences and it is an either/or situation. Human behavior is explained either by "the prior environment *or* [by] some inner mental entity."⁴⁹ Day's position then is that phenomenological explanations rely on a sort of "primitive animism,"⁵⁰ behavioristic explanations refer to "observable antecedents of behavior."⁵¹

Giorgi's belated response to Day pushes hard in the direction of conciliation and compromise. He begins with a long list of convergences in the two kinds of psychology. He compliments Day for avoiding the harsh polemic tone of other recent articles. He expresses high hopes for a constructive dialogue. He makes a few technical corrections in Day's description of phenomenology. And after he can stall no longer, he confronts the central issue. Though his statement is couched in cautious and tentative language, it is nonetheless clear that an obvious, fundamental and firmly-set difference remains:

Perhaps the key theoretical difference centers on the acceptance of intentionality by phenomenology, on the one hand, and the consistent explicit ignoring of it by radical behaviorism. It seems to me the essence of radical behaviorism is to account for man strictly in terms of external relations; to make absolutely no reference to man's own viewpoint on the world.⁵²

Giorgi emphasizes that behaviorism ignores intentionalistic factors and concentrates instead upon environmental ones:

I am not sure of the motivation for this insistence [on external environmental factors], but [it seems] to me it relates to radical behaviorism's understanding of science . . . Radical behaviorism has a clear understanding of science and it is not essentially different from how the natural sciences understand themselves.⁵³

Giorgi explains that behaviorism's emulation of the natural sciences leads to a strategy which confines behavior to "any measurable movement of a body."⁵⁴ This strategy also restricts causes of behavior to measurable changes in the external environment. Hence, a particular concept of science holds sway in behaviorism. On the other hand, a particular view of man holds sway in phenomenological psychology:

. . . phenomenology *begins* with the constitutive role of the describer, i.e., that he in part creates what he describes, and thus it is just as important for him to speak to the context or perspective from which he speaks as it is to describe what is thematically given . . . because of intentionality, behavior simply cannot be adequately described without reference to the situation from the viewpoint of the behavior.⁵⁵

Giorgi concludes that even though phenomenology begins with the internal perspective of the agent, a science of psychology might still be possible. However, this science of phenomenological psychology will require an expanded, "*broader understanding of science.*"⁵⁶

Like Rogers and Skinner, Day and Giorgi do not abruptly dismiss the contributions of the rival school. As a matter of fact, Day and Giorgi graciously compliment each other. As above, it is not the findings which are at issue as much as it is the significance and appropriateness of those findings. The nub of the Day-Giorgi paradigm debate is the way in which each side claims significance and ultimacy for its own method (and thereby its own results) and the way each side explains how it can readily subsume the methods (and results) of its rival.

Because each side eventually claims ultimate correctness, a full-fledged paradigm debate occurs. Before that, however, an interesting Kuhnian sort of preliminary occurs. Each side gives a brief sociological account for the plausibility of the other's approach. Day suggests that phenomenology's inner cause explanations reinforce the patterns of language and common sense so they seem satisfactory to many people. Giorgi observes that behaviorism's credibility can be traced to its emulation of natural science's search for public, environmental factors. However, since initial plausibility does not certify long-range adequacy, the question of the proper method for psychology emerges as the central question. Day nominates behaviorism and Giorgi counters with phenomenology. They then debate the merits of the competing paradigms.

In their debate, despite abundant goodwill and conciliation, Day and Giorgi fail to make much logical contact. Even where they carefully explore what seems like common ground, a deeper sort of conflict emerges. The status of consciousness (and private events) is a case in point. Day argues that an inner, private event can usually be "conspicuously related to the environment [and], then reference to the private event is likely to be considered *irrelevant or unnecessary* for purposes of manipulation and control."⁵⁷ But for Giorgi, the behavior's self-awareness is absolutely indispensable "behavior simply cannot be adequately described without reference to the situation from the viewpoint of the behavior?"⁵⁸ Because the issue of intentionality so deeply and so decisively splits Day and Giorgi, their debate poses for psychology an impasse of profound consequence: psychology must choose either the paradigm of phenomenological psychology or the paradigm of behavioristic psychology. In the former psychology investigates actions; in the latter, movements.

Actions as the subject matter of psychology require reference to awareness, intentions, desires, purposes, meanings, etc. of the agent. Thus a study of human actions would consist in an intentionalistic, phenomenological analysis of the agent's perspective. An investigation of behavior, that is bodily movements, dispenses with the agent's intention and point of view. As a

result, a public, quantifiable, objectively describable phenomenon is available as a scientific subject matter. At this juncture a critical issue must be settled: should psychology, as a science of man, yield to subject matter or to methods? A decisive either/or must be faced: *either* man *or* science. Either psychology retains the traditional view of man in which case psychology will investigate actions constituted by the agent's point of view, or psychology retains a traditional view of science in which case psychology will investigate physical movements thereby dispensing with the agent's perspective. Accordingly, behaviorism urges a change in the traditional view of man as the result of a view of science; phenomenology urges a change in the traditional concept of science as a result of an understanding of man. The dilemma and tension of psychology as a science of man involves a sort of bargaining. Phenomenology sacrifices scientific method in order to achieve adequacy of subject matter; behaviorism sacrifices subject matter in order to achieve adequacy of scientific method. In the first case, method is tailored to fit subject matter and in the second, the reverse. Whether it be man or science which will be compromised depends upon prior loyalties. Shall a view of man or a view of science be given the privilege of ultimacy? Any defense of this privilege reflects a decision that either the phenomenon of man or the enterprise of science is foundational.

Kuhn remarks that paradigm debates end with "the recourse to philosophy and to debate over *fundamentals*."⁵⁹ Day and Giorgi debated the most fundamental of the fundamental questions, the proper method and the appropriate subject matter for psychology. Carl Rogers and B. F. Skinner contested the very same points nearly twenty years earlier. In each case, the paradigm debate ended in a standoff. As we have seen, Rogers and Skinner, Day and Giorgi offered sharply conflicting answers to the questions of method and subject matter. However, these spokesmen for phenomenology and behaviorism did not merely *offer* different positions; they vigorously campaigned for their own answer and they aggressively attacked the opponent's solution. A special self-certifying kind of defense and criticism marked the debates. In these, and other paradigm debates, each side placed beyond criticism precisely those claims which the opponent sought to place in jeopardy.⁶⁰ As we have seen, Rogers and Skinner, Day and Giorgi placed beyond criticism a substantive and a non-negotiable stance on the nature of a science of psychology. The eventual result was, just as Kuhn had predicted, "when two scientific schools disagree . . . they will inevitably *talk through each other when debating the relative merits of their respective paradigms*."⁶¹

Patrick K. Dooley
 Philosophy Department
 St. Bonaventure University
 St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 14778
 U.S.A.

NOTES

¹ David S. Palermo, "Is a Scientific Revolution Taking Place in Psychology?" *Science Studies* 1 (1971), pp. 135-155.

² David S. Palermo and Walter B. Weimer, "Standards of Scholarship and Debate: A Rejoinder to Warren," *Science Studies* 4 (1974), pp. 198-200.

³ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (2nd ed.; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 10. Emphasis added.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11, emphasis added.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁷ For more on James' position on man as an "interested selector" see Patrick K. Dooley, *Pragmatism as Humanism: The Philosophy of William James* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1974) esp. Chapter 2, pp. 11-60.

⁸ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110.

¹⁰ Carl Rogers and B. F. Skinner, "Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior: A Symposium," *Science* 124 (1956), pp. 1057-1066.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1057.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 1058.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 1065.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1060.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1062.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1063.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1064.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1065.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1064.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Actually Carl Rogers has given a half a dozen replies, most notably two chapters, "The Growing Power of the Behavioral Sciences," and "The Place of the Individual in the New World of the Behavioral Sciences," in *On Becoming A Person* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), pp. 363-401. Also, in 1963, both Rogers and Skinner participated in the Rice University Symposium. (See below, section three.) In addition, since 1963 both psychologists have continued to discuss the issues first aired in the 1956 debate. I have confined my analysis to the text of the 1956 debate, because therein Rogers and Skinner directly addressed each other. I plan to analyze their additional comments in a subsequent article.

In 1973 (Vol. 13) *The Journal of Humanistic Psychology* published an informative pair of articles, "Twelve Years Later: A Reply to Carl Rogers", by Carl E. Pitts, pp. 75-81 and "Comment", by Carl Rogers, pp. 83-4. Pitts noted that, in 1961, Rogers had stated that behaviorism and humanism were so sharply split that any reconciliation was unlikely. Pitts then argued that in the twelve years between 1961 and 1973 humanists and behaviorists had come remarkably close and that each regularly used each other's methods and practical techniques.

In response, Rogers suggested a different reading of the facts. He began by telling a story about the preparations for the 1956 debate with Skinner:

"Skinner and I had agreed to exchange our manuscripts in advance, and since his was to be given first he sent me his draft first. In it, several times he used the word "choice" and also indicated that the person made choices. I naturally seized upon this because it went directly contrary to his theoretical statements that all behavior was the result of reinforcements, planned or unplanned, from the *environment*. Behavior had nothing to do with the inner phenomenological choice of the individual. So, when I sent Skinner my response to his, he carefully eliminated every reference to choice except to put it in quotes as an irrelevant concept. One of the major points in my response was to take exception to his point of view that we do not make significant subjective choices, whether in science or in any other endeavor. The person who is really interested might find it of value to re-read the 1956 debate in which I mention that Skinner had dropped all notions that the individual makes any value choices for himself."

Rogers concluded that if behaviorists had changed to the extent that when they refer to *choices* they actually mean "an inner phenomenological choice", (p. 83) then "behaviorists have come a long way in admitting the human being with his capacity for choice and decision and subjective appraisal back into the realm of psychology." (p. 84). Rogers wondered if behaviorists, especially Skinner, would acknowledge such a change. If they would, "this is . . . fruitful area for discussion." (p. 84). As is shown in the third section (below) Day (speaking for Skinner) does *not* admit that inner events are relevant for the science of behavior.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, emphasis added.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, emphasis added.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 1065.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1064.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1060.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1064.

³⁷ *Behaviorism and Phenomenology: Contrasting Bases for Modern Psychology*, edited by T. W. Wann (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964).

³⁸ *Psychological Review* 73 (1966), pp. 295-305; 74 (1967), pp. 318-324, 325-329, 330-334.

³⁹ Willard F. Day, "Radical Behaviorism in Reconciliation with Phenomenology," *Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior* 12 (1969), pp. 315-328.

⁴⁰ Amedeo Giorgi, "Convergences and Divergences Between Phenomenological Psychology and Behaviorism: A Beginning Dialogue", *Behaviorism* 3 (1975), pp. 200-212.

⁴¹ Willard F. Day, "Radical Behaviorism . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 317, emphasis added.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 326.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 323, emphasis added.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, emphasis added.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 323.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Amedeo Giorgi, "Convergences . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 208-209.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, emphasis added.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, emphasis added.

⁵⁷ Willard Day, "Radical Behaviorism . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 323.

⁵⁸ Amedeo Giorgi, "Convergences . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 209.

⁵⁹ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. *op. cit.*, p. 91, emphasis added.

⁶⁰ Rogers' story (footnote #28 above) about Skinner's changes in his debate text to eliminate any reference to "choices" is an especially neat instance of placing beyond criticism the claim which Rogers most needed to place in jeopardy.

⁶¹ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, *op. cit.*, p. 109, emphasis added.