**Figure 5.3** Hochschild's Basic Concepts and Theoretical Orientation

the emotive expressions of others. Feeling rules account for the social patterning of emotive experiences, and in doing so establish the "standards used in emotional conversation to determine what is rightly owed and owing in the currency of feeling" (Hochschild 1983:18). It is on the basis of feeling rules, and the sense of emotional entitlement or "rights" and obligations or duties they establish, that we guide our private emotion work (ibid.:56). For just as there are social expectations that set the boundaries of acceptable behavior, so, too, there are rules that set limits to our feelings. And like behavioral standards, the emotive standards enforced through feeling rules are not the same for everyone. At home and at work there are class and gender-based differences that determine what and how we "should" feel. Conforming to such socially created standards often "loops back" to reinforce the belief that there are inherent differences between individuals, particularly men and women, that justify relations of domination. For instance, to be emotional and to express one's self emotionally is often considered a sign of weakness. To the degree that men uphold the masculine standard of emotionlessness they are considered strong. Conversely, when a woman "acts like a woman" and conforms to the expectation that she should be emotionally expressive, she reinforces the conviction that she is weak. Of course, "acting like a man" carries its own penalties for women. In extreme cases, feeling rules and the expectations they foster may even have the power of life and death over the individual. Consider a court trial in which the defendant is found guilty of murder in part because he expressed the "wrong amount" of grief over the victim's death, thus suggesting his guilt.

Readings

In the selections that follow, you first will find Hochschild explicating her general approach to emotions. Next, she goes on to discuss the everyday implications of her perspective, in particular how emotive experiences are connected to gender identity and the unequal distribution of resources, power, and authority along gendered lines.

Introduction to "Working on Feeling"

In her essay "Working on Feeling," Hochschild (2003) outlines her emotion-management model. Here you will encounter many of the key concepts discussed in the previous section. After laying out the theoretical lineage of her perspective, Hochschild moves to a discussion of two of her central ideas: emotion work and feeling rules. In doing so, Hochschild evinces her multidimensional model of emotive experiences by exploring the links between our awareness of our feelings and the social rules that shape our personal efforts to manage them. Moreover, feeling rules are themselves embedded in a broader structural context. Most significant in this regard are existing class relations that subject middle-class service workers more than others to the demands of emotional labor and the commodification of feelings. For it is the middle-class job that is more likely to entail personal interaction with the public, the requirement to produce specific feeling states in others, and the surveillance of their emotional labor by superiors.

"Working on Feeling" (2003)

Arlie Russell Hochschild

Why is the emotive experience of normal adults in daily life as orderly as it is? Why, generally speaking, do people feel gay at parties, sad at funerals, happy at weddings? This question leads us to examine not conventions of appearance or outward comportment, but conventions of *feeling*. Conventions of feeling become surprising only when we imagine, by contrast, what totally unpatterned, unpredictable emotive life might actually be like at parties, funerals, weddings, and in all of normal adult life. Indeed, when novelists set out to create poignant scenes they evoke the full weight of a feeling rule. In *Lie Down in Darkness*, for example, William Styron describes a confused and desperately unhappy bride on the "happy" day of her wedding:

> When she spoke the vows her lips parted not like all the brides he'd ever seen—exposing their clean, scrubbed teeth in a little eager puff of rapture—but rather with a kind of wry and somber resignation. It had been a brief shadow of a mood, just a flicker, but enough for him to tell her "I will" had seemed less an avowal than a confession, like the tired words of some sad, errant nun. Not any of her put-on gaiety could disguise this.[i]

Against the chaotic flow of feeling that emerges from real relationships are more abiding (though also changeable) rules of feeling. In a culture of freely chosen love matches, the bride should feel like saying "I will" with an "eager puff of rapture."

But what, then, is a feeling or emotion? I define "emotion" as bodily cooperation with an image, a thought, a memory—a cooperation of which the individual is usually aware. I will use the terms "emotion" and "feeling" interchangeably, although the term "emotion" denotes a state of being overcome that "feeling" does not. The term "emotion management" I use synonymously with "emotion work" and "deep acting."

What happens to these emotions? Erving Goffman suggests both the surprise to be explained and part of the explanation: "We find that participants will hold in check certain psychological states and attitudes, for after all, the very general rule that one enter into the prevailing mood in the encounter carries the understanding that contradictory feelings will be in abeyance. . . . So generally, in fact, does one suppress unsuitable affect, that we need to look at offenses to this rule to be reminded of its usual operation."[ii]

The key—and curiously bureaucratic—word here is "unsuitable." In light of the passage from William Styron above, we could also add "disturbing" or even, in the emotional sense, "dangerous." "So why is she at the altar at all? And why in this way?" we ask. And, from the viewpoint of

[i]Styron 1951, p. 291.

[ii]Goffman 1961, p. 23.

the guests and surely the groom, what is wrong with how—beneath the put-on gaiety—she is really feeling? This very line of questioning suggests that we have in mind a right way for her to feel. How are we to understand such a thing?

We can take two possible approaches. One is to study the situation that would seem to cause her to feel as she does. The other is to study secondary acts performed *upon* the ongoing nonreflective stream of primary emotive experience, that is, how she is or isn't trying to alter her state of feeling. The first approach focuses on how social factors affect what people feel, the second on how social factors affect what people think and do about what they feel or sense they are going to feel (i.e., acts of assessment and management). Those who take the first approach might regard those who take the second as being "overly cognitive," while those who take the second approach see the "stimulate primary emotions" people as simplistic. But we need both approaches, and indeed the second, taken here, relies on some understanding of the first.

If we take as our object of focus what it is people think or do about feelings, several questions emerge. What is an emotion? How responsive is emotion to deliberate attempts to suppress or evoke it? What are the links among social structure, ideology, feeling rules, and emotion management? To begin with, *are* there feeling rules? How do we *know* about them? How are these rules used as baselines in social exchanges? What in the nature of work and childrearing might account for different ways adults of varying social classes and ethnic or religious cultures manage their feelings?

TWO ACCOUNTS OF EMOTION AND FEELING

So what do we assume is true about emotion? There is the *organismic* account and there is the *interactive* account. They differ in what they imply about our capacity to manage emotion, and thus in what they imply about the importance of rules about managing it. According to the organismic view, the paramount questions concern the relation of emotion to biologically given *instinct* or *impulse*. In large part, biological factors

account for the questions the organismic theorist poses. The early writings of Sigmund Freud, Charles Darwin, and, in some though not all respects, William James fit this model. The concept "emotion" refers mainly to strips of experience in which there is no conflict between one and another aspect of self: the individual "floods out," is "overcome." The image that comes to mind is that of a sudden, automatic reflex syndrome—Darwin's instant snarl expression, Freud's tension discharge at a given breaking point of tension overload, James and Lange's notion of an instantaneous unmediated visceral reaction to a perceived stimulus, the perception of which is also unmediated by social influences.

In this first model, social factors enter in only in regard to how emotions are stimulated and expressed (and even here Darwin took the universalist position). Social factors are not seen as an influence on how emotions are actively suppressed or evoked. Indeed, emotion is seen as fixed and universal, much like a knee-jerk reaction or a sneeze. In this view, one could as easily manage an emotion as one could manage a knee jerk or a sneeze. If the organismic theorist were to be presented with the concept of feeling rules, he or she would be hard put to elucidate what these rules impinge *on*, or what capacity of the self could *be called on* to try to obey a feeling rule. Recent attempts to link an organismic notion of emotion to social structure, such as Randall Collins's wonderfully bold attempt, suffer from the problems that were implicit in the organismic account to begin with. Collins, like Darwin, on whom he draws, sees emotions as capacities (or susceptibilities) within a person, to be automatically triggered, as Collins develops it, by one or another group in control of the ritual apparatus that does the triggering.[iii] A wholly different avenue of social control, that of feeling rules, is bypassed because the individual's capacity to try to—or try not to—feel that to which the rule applies is not suggested by the organismic model with which Collins begins.

In the interactive account, social influences permeate emotion more insistently, more effectively, and at more junctures. In large part, sociopsychological factors account for the questions the interactive theorist poses. The writings of Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Erving Goffman,

[iii]Collins 1975, p. 59.

Richard Lazarus, James Averill, Stanley Schachter, Jerome Singer, Thomas Kemper, Judith Katz, and aspects of late Freudian and neo-Freudian thought fit this model. To invoke the Freudian vocabulary, the image here is not that of a runaway id, but of an ego and superego, acting in union, shaping and nagging the id, however ineffectively, temporarily, or consciously. Emotion is sometimes posited as a psychobiological means of adaptation—an analogue to other adaptive mechanisms, such as shivering when cold or perspiring when hot. But emotion differs from these other adaptive mechanisms, in that thinking, perceiving, and imagining—themselves subject to social influence—enter in.

As in the first model, social factors affect how emotions are elicited and expressed. But here we also notice how social factors guide the ways we *label*, interpret, and manage emotion. These actions *reflect back*, in turn, on that which is labeled, interpreted, and managed. They are, finally, intrinsic to what we call emotion. Emotion, in this second school of thought, is seen as more deeply social. Lazarus's work in particular lends empirical weight to the interactive model. It shows how normal adults, like the university students on whom he conducted experiments, can control their emotions. Their capacity is far greater than what we expect from a small child, an insane adult, or an animal, from all of which Freud and Darwin drew inspiration. But since we're trying to understand the emotional experience of normal adults, we would do well to explore the model that fits them best—the interactive account.

If emotions and feelings can to some degree be managed, how might we get a conceptual grasp of the managing act from a social perspective? The interactive account of emotion leads us into a conceptual arena "between" the Goffmanian focus on consciously designed appearances, on the one hand, and the Freudian focus on unconscious intrapsychic events, on the other. The focus of G. H. Mead and Herbert Blumer on conscious, active, and responsive gestures might have been most fruitful had not their focus on deeds and thought almost entirely obscured the importance of feeling. The self as emotion manager is an idea that borrows from both sides—Goffman and

Freud—but squares completely with neither. Here I sketch only the basic borrowings and departures—and these begin with Goffman.

Erving Goffman

Goffman catches an important irony: moment to moment, the individual is actively, consciously negotiating a personal and apparently unique course of action, but in the long run all the action often seems like passive acquiescence to some unconscious social convention. But the conserving of convention is not a passive business. We can extend and deepen Goffman's approach by showing how people not only try to conform outwardly, but do so inwardly as well. "When they issue uniforms, they issue skins," Goffman says. And, we can add, "two inches of flesh."[iv] But how can we understand these two inches of flesh? . . .

Goffman proposed an intermediate level of conceptual elaboration, *between* social structure and personality. He focused one by one on situations, episodes, encounters. The emergent encounters he evoked were not only nearly divorced from social structure and from personality; he even seems to intend his situationism as an analytic substitute for these concepts. Structure, he seems to say, can be not only transposed but reduced "in and down," while personality can be reduced "up and out" to the here-now, gone-then interactional moment. The resulting perspective removes the determinisms of institution and personality. It illuminates the room there is between them to slide around.

But each episode—a card game, a party, a greeting on the street—takes on the character of a government. It exacts from us certain "taxes" in the form of appearances we "pay" for the sake of sustaining the encounter. We are repaid in the currency of safety from disrepute.

This model of the situation qua minigovernment illuminates something. But, to study how and why "participants . . . hold in check certain psychological states,"[v] we are forced out of the here-now, gone-then situationism and back, in part at least, to the social structure and personality model. We are led to appreciate the importance of Goffman's work, as it seems he didn't, *as the critical set of conceptual connecting tissues by*

[iv]Goffman 1974.

[v]Goffman 1961, p. 23.

which structure and personality, real in their own right, are more precisely joined. For if we are to understand the origin and causes of change in feeling rules—this underside of ideology—we are forced back out of a study of the immediate situations in which they show up, to a study of such things as the changing relations between classes, sexes, races, and nations, in order to see why they're changing. . . .

The characters in Goffman's books actively manage outer impressions, but they do not actively manage inner feelings. The very topic, sociology of emotion, presupposes a human capacity for, if not the actual habit of, reflecting on and shaping inner feelings, a habit itself distributed variously across time, age, class, and locale. This variation would quickly drop from sight were we to adopt an exclusive focus on the actor's attentiveness to behavioral facade and assume a uniform passivity vis-à-vis feelings. . . .

Sigmund Freud

The need to replace Goffman's "black-box psychology" with some theory of self, in the full sense of the term, might seem to lead to Freudian or neo-Freudian theory. Yet, here, as with Goffman, only some aspects of the Freudian model seem useful to my understanding of conscious, deliberate efforts to suppress or evoke feeling.

Freud dealt with emotions, of course, but for him they were always secondary to *drive.* He proposed a general theory of sexual and aggressive drives. Anxiety, as a derivative of aggressive and sexual drives, was of paramount importance, while a wide range of other emotions, including joy, jealousy, and depression, were given relatively little attention. He developed, and many others have since elaborated, the concept of ego defense as a generally unconscious, involuntarily means of avoiding painful or unpleasant affect. The notion of "inappropriate affect" is then used to point to aspects of the individual's ego functioning, not the social rules according to which a feeling is or is not deemed appropriate to a situation.

The emotion-management perspective is indebted to Freud for the general notion of what resources individuals of different sorts possess for accomplishing the task of emotion work and for the notion of unconscious involuntary emotion management. The emotion-management perspective differs from the Freudian model in its focus on the full range of emotions and feelings and its focus on conscious and deliberate efforts to shape feeling.

How do we understand inappropriate emotion? . . . To the psychiatrist, which circumstances warrant which degree and type of feeling seems relatively unproblematic. A doctor intuitively knows what inappropriate affect is; one should be happy at occupational success. The main problem is not so much to discern the rich variety of kinds of misfit of feeling to situation as to cure the patient of whatever interferes with feeling that "right" feeling. From the emotion-management perspective, on the other hand, the warranting function of circumstances is a real problem. How does the psychiatrist decide what the patient should feel? The way he decides may well be the same for a psychiatrist as for a salesclerk or school disciplinarian. For in a sense, we all act as lay psychiatrists using unexamined means of arriving at a determination about just *which* circumstances warrant *that much* feeling of *that sort.*

What the psychiatrist, the salesclerk, and the school disciplinarian share is a habit of comparing situation (e.g., high opportunity, associated with an accomplishment at work) with role (e.g., hopes, aspirations, expectations typical of, and expected from, those enacting the role). Social factors alter how we expect a person to play—or shall we say encounter—a role. If, for example, the patient were a "sober, technically minded and active" *woman,* and if the observer (rightly or wrongly) assumed or expected her to value family and personal ties over worldly success, ambivalence at the prospect of advance might seem perfectly appropriate. Lack of enthusiasm would have a warrant of that social sort. Again, if the patient were an antinuclear activist and his discovery had implications for nuclear energy, that would alter his hopes and aspirations and might warrant dismay. Or if an immigrant is, by virtue of enormous family sacrifice, sent off to succeed in America, his or her enthusiasm might be infused with a sense of indebtedness to those left back home.

We assess the "appropriateness" of a feeling by making a comparison between feeling and situation, not by examining the feeling in the abstract. This comparison lends the assessor a "normal" yardstick—a *socially* normal one—with which to factor out the personal meaning systems that may lead a worker to distort his view of "the" situation and feel inappropriately with regard to it. The psychiatrist holds constant the socially normal yardstick and focuses on what we have just factored out. The student of emotion management holds constant what is factored out and studies variations in socially normal yardsticks. . . .

In sum, the emotion-management perspective fosters attention on how people try to feel, not, as for Goffman, on how people try to appear to feel. It leads us to attend to how people consciously feel and not, as for Freud, to how people feel unconsciously. The interactive account of emotion points to alternate theoretical junctures—between consciousness of feeling and consciousness of feeling rules, between feeling rules and emotion work, between feeling rules and social structure.

By "emotion work" I refer to the act of trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling. To "work on" an emotion or feeling is, for our purposes, the same as "to manage" an emotion or to do "deep acting." Note that "emotion work" refers to the effort—the act of trying—and not to the outcome, which may or may not be successful. Failed acts of management still indicate what ideal formulations guide the effort, and on that account are no less interesting than emotion management that works.

The very notion of an attempt suggests an active stance vis-à-vis feeling. In my exploratory study respondents characterized their emotion work by a variety of active verb forms: "I *psyched myself up* . . . I *squashed* my anger *down* . . . I *tried hard* not to feel disappointed . . . I *made* myself have a good time . . . I *tried* to feel grateful . . . I *killed* the hope I had burning." There was also the actively passive form, as in "I *let myself* finally feel sad."

Emotion work differs from emotion "control" or "suppression." The latter two terms suggest an effort merely to stifle or prevent feeling. "Emotion work" refers more broadly to the act of evoking or shaping, as well as suppressing feeling. I avoid the term "manipulate" because it suggests a shallowness I do not want to imply.

We can speak, then, of two broad types of emotion work: *evocation,* in which the cognitive focus is on a desired feeling that is initially absent, and *suppression,* in which the cognitive focus is on an undesired feeling that is initially present. One respondent, going out with a priest twenty years her senior, exemplifies the problems of evocative emotion work:

> Anyway, I started to try and make myself like him. I made myself focus on the way he talked, certain things he'd done in the past. . . . When I was with him I did like him, but I would go home and write in my journal how much I couldn't stand him. I kept changing my feeling and actually thought I really liked him while I was with him, but a couple of hours after he was gone, I reverted back to different feelings.[vi]

Another respondent exemplifies the work not of working feeling up, but of working feeling down:

> Last summer I was going with a guy often, and I began to feel very strongly about him. I knew, though, that he had just broken up with a girl a year ago because she had gotten too serious about him, so I was afraid to show any emotion. I also was afraid of being hurt, so I attempted to change my feelings. I talked myself into not caring about Mike . . . but I must admit it didn't work for long. To sustain this feeling I had to almost invent bad things about him and concentrate on them or continue to tell myself he didn't care. It was a hardening of emotions, I'd say. It took a lot of work and was unpleasant, because I had to concentrate on anything I could find that was irritating about him.

Often emotion work is aided by setting up an emotion-work system—for example, telling friends all the worst faults of the person one wanted to fall out of love with and then going to those friends for reinforcement of this view of the ex-beloved. This suggests another point: emotion work can be done by the self upon the self, by the self upon others, and by others upon oneself.

[vi]The illustrations of emotion work come from a content analysis of 261 protocols given to students in two classes at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1974.

In each case the individual is conscious of a moment of "pinch," or discrepancy, between what one does feel and what one wants to feel (which is, in turn, affected by what one thinks one ought to feel in such a situation). In response, the individual may try to eliminate the pinch by working on feeling. Both the sense of discrepancy and the response to it can vary in time. The managing act, for example, can be a five-minute stopgap measure, or it can be a decade-long effort suggested by the term "working through."

There are various techniques of emotion work. One is *cognitive:* the attempt to change images, ideas, or thoughts in the service of changing the feelings associated with them. A second is *bodily:* the attempt to change somatic or other physical symptoms of emotion (e.g., trying to breathe slower, trying not to shake). Third, there is *expressive* emotion work: trying to change expressive gestures in the service of changing inner feeling (e.g., trying to smile or cry). This differs from simple display in that it is directed toward change in feeling. It differs from bodily emotion work in that the individual tries to alter or shape one or another of the classic public channels for the expression of feeling.

These three techniques are distinct theoretically, but often go together in practice. For example:

> I was a star halfback in high school. Before games I didn't feel the upsurge of adrenalin—in a word I wasn't "psyched up." (This was due to emotional difficulties I was experiencing and still experience—I was also an A student whose grades were dropping.) Having been in the past a fanatical, emotional, intense player, a "hitter" recognized by coaches as a very hard worker and a player with "desire," this was very upsetting. I did everything I could to get myself "up." I would try to be outwardly "rah rah" or get myself scared of my opponent—anything to get the adrenalin flowing. I tried to look nervous and intense before games, so at least the coaches wouldn't catch on. . . . When actually I was mostly bored, or in any event, not "up." I recall before one game wishing I was in the stands watching my cousin play for his school, rather than "out here."

Emotion work becomes an object of awareness most often, perhaps, when the individual's feelings do not fit the situation, that is, when the latter does not account for or legitimate feelings in the situation. A situation (such as a funeral) often carries with it a proper definition of itself ("this is a time of facing loss"). This official frame carries with it a sense of what it is fitting to feel (sadness). It is when this tripartite consistency among situation, conventional frame, and feeling is somehow ruptured, as when the bereaved feels an irrepressible desire to laugh delightedly at the thought of an inheritance, that rule and management come into focus. It is then that the more normal flow of deep convention—the more normal fusion of situation, frame, and feeling—seems like an enormous accomplishment.

The smoothly warm airline hostess, the ever-cheerful secretary, the unirritated complaint clerk, the undisgusted proctologist, the teacher who likes every student equally, and Goffman's unflappable poker player may all have to engage in deep acting, an acting that goes well beyond the mere ordering of display. Work to make feeling and frame consistent with situation is work in which individuals continually and privately engage. But they do so in obeisance to rules not completely of their own making.

FEELING RULES

We feel. We try to feel. We want to try to feel. The social guidelines that direct how we want to try to feel may be describable as a set of socially shared, albeit often latent (not thought about unless probed at), rules. In what way, we may ask, are these rules themselves known and how are they developed?

To begin with, let us consider several common forms of evidence for feeling rules. In common parlance, we often talk about our feelings or those of others as if rights and duties applied directly to them. For example, we speak of "having the right" to feel angry at someone. Or we say we "should feel more grateful" to a benefactor. We chide ourselves that a friend's misfortune, a relative's death, "should have hit us harder," or that another's good luck, or our own, should have inspired more joy. We know feeling rules, too, from how others react to what they infer from our emotive display. Someone may say to us, "You *shouldn't* feel so guilty: it wasn't your fault," or "You *don't have a right* to feel jealous, given our agreement." Another may simply declare an opinion as to the fit of feeling to situation and attach authority to his opinion. Others may question or call for an account of a particular feeling in a situation, whereas they do not ask for an accounting of some other situated feeling. Claims and callings for an account can be seen as *rule reminders*. At other times, a person may, in addition, chide, tease, cajole, scold, shun—in a word, sanction—us for "mis-feeling." Such sanctions are a clue to the rules they are meant to enforce.

Rights and duties set out the proprieties as to the *extent* (one can feel "too" angry or "not angry enough"), the *direction* (one can feel sad when one should feel happy), and the *duration* of a feeling, given the situation against which it is set. These rights and duties of feeling are a clue to the depth of social convention, to one final reach of social control.

There is a distinction, in theory at least, between a feeling rule as it is known by our sense of what we can *expect* to feel in a given situation and a rule as it is known by our sense of what we *should* feel in that situation. For example, one may realistically expect (knowing oneself and one's neighbor's parties) to feel bored at a large New Year's Eve party and at the same time acknowledge that it would be more fitting to feel exuberant.

In any given situation, we often invest what we expect to feel with idealization. To a remarkable extent these realizations vary socially, as is shown by a woman recalling her experiences as a "flower child":

> When I was living down south, I was involved with a group of people, friends. We used to spend most evenings after work or school together. We used to do a lot of drugs, acid, coke or just smoke dope, and we had this philosophy that we were very communal and did our best to share everything—clothes, money, food, and so on. I was involved with this one man—and thought I was "in love" with him. He in turn had told me that I was very important to him. Anyway, this one woman who was a very good friend of mine at one time and this man started having a sexual relationship, supposedly without my knowledge. I knew though and had a lot of mixed feelings about it. I thought intellectually that I had no claim to the man, and believed in fact that no one should ever try to own another person. I believed also that it was none of my business and I had no reason to worry about their relationship together, for it had nothing really to do with my friendship with either of them. I also believed in sharing. But I was horribly hurt, alone and lonely, depressed, and I couldn't shake the depression and on top of those feelings I felt guilty for having those possessively jealous feelings. And so I would continue going out with these people every night and try to suppress my feelings. My ego was shattered. I got to the point where I couldn't even laugh around them. So finally I confronted my friends and left for the summer and traveled with a new friend. I realized later what a heavy situation it was, and it took me a long time to get myself together and feel whole again.

Whether the convention calls for trying joyfully to possess, or trying casually not to, the individual compares and measures experience against an expectation that is often idealized. It is left for motivation ("what I want to feel") to mediate between feeling rule ("what I should feel") and emotion work ("what I try to feel"). Much of the time we live with a certain dissonance between "ought" and "want," and between "want" and "try to." But the attempts to reduce emotive dissonance are our periodic clues to rules of feeling.

A feeling rule shares some formal properties with other sorts of rules, such as rules of etiquette, rules of bodily comportment, and those of social interaction in general. A feeling rule is like these other kinds of rules in the following ways: It delineates a zone within which one has permission to be free of worry, guilt, or shame with regard to the situated feeling. A feeling rule sets down a metaphoric floor, walls, and ceiling, there being room for motion and play within boundaries. Like other rules, feeling rules can be obeyed halfheartedly or boldly broken, the latter at varying costs. A feeling rule can be in varying proportions external or internal. Feeling rules differ curiously from other types of rules in that they do not apply to action but to what is *often taken as a precursor to action.* Therefore they tend to be latent and resistant to formal codification.

Feeling rules reflect patterns of social membership. Some rules may be nearly universal, such as the rule that one should not enjoy killing or witnessing the killing of a human being. Other rules are unique to particular social groups and can be used to distinguish among them as alternate governments or colonizers of individual internal events.

FRAMING RULES AND
FEELING RULES: ISSUES IN IDEOLOGY

Rules for managing feeling are implicit in any ideological stance: they are the "bottom side" of ideology. Ideology has often been construed as a flatly cognitive framework, lacking implications for how we feel. Yet, drawing on Emile Durkheim, Clifford Geertz, and Erving Goffman, we can think of ideology as an interpretive framework that can be described in terms of framing rules and feeling rules. By "framing rules" I refer to the rules according to which we ascribe definitions or meanings to situations. For example, a man who just got fired can see it as a result of personal failure or heartless capitalism. According to another, one can't. Framing and feeling rules mutually imply each other. They stand back to back.

It follows that when an individual changes an ideological stance, he or she drops old rules and assumes new ones for reacting to situations, cognitively and emotively. A sense of rights and duties applied to feelings in situations is also changed. One uses emotional sanctions differently and accepts different sanctioning from others. For example, feeling rules in American society have differed for men and women because of the assumption that their natures differ basically. The feminist movement brings with it a new set of rules for framing the work and family life of men and women: the same balance of priorities in work and family now ideally applies to men as to women. This carries with it implications for feeling. A woman can now as legitimately as a man become angry (as opposed to disappointed) over abuses at work, since her heart is supposed to be

in that work and she has the right to hope for advancement as much as a man would. Or a man has the right to feel angry at the loss of custody if he has shown himself the fitter parent. Old-fashioned feelings are now as subject to new chidings and cajolings as are old-fashioned perspectives on the same array of situations.

One can defy an ideological stance not simply by maintaining an alternative frame on a situation but by maintaining an alternative set of feeling rights and obligations. One can defy an ideological stance by inappropriate affect and by refusing to perform the emotion management necessary to feel what, according to the official frame, it would seem fitting to feel. Deep acting is a *form of obeisance* to a given ideological stance and lax emotion management a clue to a lapsed ideology.

As some ideologies gain acceptance and others dwindle, contending sets of feeling rules rise and fall. Sets of feeling rules contend for a place in people's minds as a governing standard with which to compare the actual lived experience of, say, the first kiss, the abortion, the wedding, the birth, the first job, the first layoff, the divorce. What we call the changing climate of opinion partly involves a changed framing of the same sorts of events. For example, each of two mothers may feel guilty about leaving her small child at daycare while working all day. One mother, a feminist, may feel that she should not feel as guilty as she does. The second, a traditionalist, may feel that she should feel more guilty than she does.

Part of what we refer to as the psychological effects of "rapid social change," or unrest, is a change in the relation of feeling rule to feeling and a lack of clarity about what the rule actually is, owing to conflicts and contradictions between contending rules and between rules and feelings. Feelings are taken out of their conventional frames but not set into new ones. We may, like the marginal man, say, "I don't know how I should feel."

It remains to note that ideologies can function, as Randall Collins rightly notes, as weapons in the conflict between contending elites and social strata.[vii] Collins suggests that elites try to

gain access to the emotive life of adherents by gaining legitimate access to ritual, which for him is a form of emotive technology. Developing his view, we can add that elites, and indeed social groups in general, struggle to assert the legitimacy of their framing rules and their feeling rules. Not simply the evocation of emotion but the rules governing it become the objects of political struggle.

FEELING RULES AND SOCIAL EXCHANGE

Any gesture—a cool greeting, an appreciative laugh, the apology for an outburst—is measured against a prior sense of what is reasonably owed another, given the sort of bond involved. Against this background measure, some gestures will seem more than ample, others less. The exchange of gestures has in turn two aspects. It is an exchange of display acts—of surface acting— and an exchange of emotion work—of deep acting. In either case, rules (display rules or feeling rules), once agreed upon, *establish the worth of a gesture and are thus used in social exchange to measure the worth of emotional gestures*. Feeling rules thus establish the basis of worth to be ascribed to a range of gestures, including emotion work. Emotion work is a gesture in a social exchange; it has a function there and is not to be understood merely as a facet of personality.

There seem to be two ways in which feeling rules come into play in social exchange. In the first, the individual takes the "owed" feeling to heart, takes it seriously. For example, a young woman on the eve of her college graduation felt anxious and depressed but thought that she "ought to feel happy," and that she "owed this happiness" to her parents for making her graduation possible.

> To my parents and friends, graduation was a really big deal, especially for my parents, since I'm the oldest in the family. For some reason, however, I couldn't get excited about it. I had had a good time at college and all, but I was ready to get out and I knew it. Also, we had practiced the ceremony so many times that it had lost its meaning to me. I put on an act,

though, and tried to act real emotional and hug my friends and cry, but I knew inside I didn't really feel it.[viii]

The young graduate "paid" her parents, we might say, in surface acting dissociated from her "real" definition of the situation. Going one step further, she could pay them with a gesture of deep acting—of trying to feel. A most generous gesture of all is the act of successful self-persuasion, of genuine feeling and frame change, a deep acting that jells, that works, that becomes what the emotion is, though it is nonetheless not a "natural" gift. The best gift, the gift the parents wish for, is, of course, their daughter's real joy.

The second way feeling rules come into play in exchange is shown when the individual does not take the affective convention seriously but instead plays with it. For example, an airport observation: There are two airline ticket agents, one experienced, one new on the job. The new agent is faced with the task of rewriting a complex ticket (involving change of date, lower fare, and credit of the difference between the previous and present fare to be made toward an air travel card, etc.). The new ticket agent looks for the "old hand," who is gone, while the customers in line shift postures and stare intently at the new agent. The old hand finally reappears after ten minutes, and the following conversation takes place: "I was looking for you. You're supposed to be my instructor." Old hand: "Gee," with an ironic smile, "I am *really* sorry, I feel *so* bad I wasn't here to help out" (they both laugh). The inappropriate feeling (lack of guilt, or sympathy) can be played upon in a way that says, "Don't take my nonpayment in emotion work or display work personally. I don't want to work here. You can understand that." The laughter at an ironic distance from the affective convention suggests also an intimacy: we do not need these conventions to hold us together. We share our defiance of them.

COMMODIFICATION OF FEELING

In the beginning I asked how feeling rules might vary in salience across social classes. One possible approach to this question is via the connections

---

[vii]Collins suggests that elite groups contend not only for access to the means of economic production or the means of violence but also for access to the means of "emotion production" (1975, p. 59). Rituals are seen as useful tools for forging emotional solidarity (that can be used against others) and for setting up status hierarchies (that can dominate those who find that the new ideals have denigrating effects on themselves).

[viii]Hochschild 1983, p. 82.

among social exchange, commodification of feeling, and the premium, in many middle-class jobs, on the capacity to manage meanings.

Conventionalized feeling may come to assume the properties of a commodity. When deep gestures of exchange enter the market sector and are bought and sold as an aspect of labor power, feelings are commodified. When the manager gives the company his enthusiastic faith, when the airline stewardess gives her passengers her psyched-up but quasi-genuine reassuring warmth, what is sold as an aspect of labor power is deep acting.

But commodification of feeling may not have equal salience for people in every social class or occupational sector. When I speak of social class, it is not strictly income, education, or occupational status that I refer to, but to something roughly correlated to these—the on-the-job task of creating and sustaining appropriate meanings. The bank manager or the IBM executive may be required to sustain a definition of self, office, and organization as "up-and-coming" or "on the go," "caring," or "reliable," meanings most effectively sustained through acts upon feeling. Feeling rules are of utmost salience in jobs such as these; rule reminders and sanctions are more in play. It is not, as Erich Fromm and C. Wright Mills suggest, that the modern middle-class man "sells" his personality but that many jobs call for an appreciation of display rules, feeling rules, and a capacity for deep acting.

Working-class jobs more often call for the individual's external behavior and the products of it—a car part assembled, a truck delivered 500 miles away, a road repaired. The creation and the sustaining of meanings go on of course, but it is not what the boss pays for. Some working- or lower-class jobs do require emotion work—the

jobs of prostitute, servant, nanny, and eldercare worker, for example. Such workers are especially important as a source of insight about emotion management. Being less rewarded for their work than their superiors, they are, perhaps, more detached from, and perceptive about it. Just as we can learn more about "appropriate situation-feeling fits" by studying misfits, we can probably understand commodification of feeling better from those who more often have to ask themselves: Is this what I *do* feel or what I *have* to feel?

Why, I asked, do we feel in ways appropriate to the situation as much of the time as we do? One answer is because we *try* to manage what we feel in accordance with latent rules. In order to elaborate this suggestion I considered first the responsiveness of emotion to acts of management as it is treated in the organismic and interactive account of emotion.

Still, occasionally emotions come over us like an uncontrollable flood. We feel overcome with grief, anger, or joy. Insofar as emotion is, as Darwin suggests, a substitute for action, or *action-manqué*, we may become enraged instead of killing, envious instead of stealing, depressed instead of dying. Or, yet again, emotion can be a prelude to action—and we become so enraged that we kill, so envious that we steal, so depressed that we die. Newspapers make a business of recording emotions of this sort. But the other half of the human story concerns how people calm down before they kill someone, how people want something but don't steal it, how people put the bottle of sleeping pills away and call a friend. Just how it is we hold, shape, and—to the extent we can—direct feeling is not what we read about in the newspaper. But it may be the really important news.

Introduction to *The Managed Heart*

While in the previous reading Hochschild singled out class position as a central determinate of the commodification of feelings, in this chapter from *The Managed Heart* (1983), she turns her attention to the effects of gender relations on emotion management. If members of the lower and working classes tend more to things than to people, and thus are less practiced in the skills of emotional labor, the hierarchical patterning of managing emotions is reversed when it comes to gender. In other words, while the occupations associated with

the more advantaged classes (flight attendants, sales workers, teachers, lawyers, health care providers, etc.) are more likely to require the manipulation of personal feelings, it is women, the less-advantaged gender, who more often find it necessary to be skilled emotion managers and thus who are more susceptible to the commodification of their feelings. As you will read, Hochschild attributes these differences in the emotional lives of men and women to the unequal distribution of money, power, authority, and status. As a result, in their private lives, "women make a resource out of feeling and offer it to men as a gift in return for the more material resources they lack" (ibid.:163). Emotion work is central to how to be, and what it means to be, a wife, a mother, and a woman. Meanwhile, men and women are typically called on to perform different types of emotional labor because of the gendered nature of occupations. This, too, carries with it a number of consequences that make the managing of feelings a different business for women and for men.

The Managed Heart (1983)

Arlie Russell Hochschild

GENDER, STATUS, AND FEELING

More emotion management goes on in the families and jobs of the upper classes than in those of the lower classes. That is, in the class system, social conditions conspire to make it more prevalent at the top. In the gender system, on the other hand, the reverse is true: social conditions make it more prevalent, and prevalent in different ways, for those at the bottom—women. In what sense is this so? And why?

Both men and women do emotion work, in private life and at work. In all kinds of ways, men as well as women get into the spirit of the party, try to escape the grip of hopeless love, try to pull themselves out of depression, try to allow grief. But in the whole realm of emotional experience, is emotion work as important for men as it is for women? And is it important in the same ways? I believe that the answer to both questions is No. The reason, at bottom, is the fact that women in general have far less independent access to money, power, authority, or status in society. They are a subordinate social stratum, and this has four consequences.

First, lacking other resources, women make a resource out of feeling and offer it to men as a gift in return for the more material resources they

lack. . . . Thus their capacity to manage feeling and to do "relational" work is for them a more important resource. Second, emotion work is important in different ways for men and for women. This is because each gender tends to be called on to do different kinds of this work. . . . This specialization of emotional labor in the marketplace rests on the different childhood training of the heart that is given to girls and to boys. ("What are little girls made of? Sugar and spice and everything nice. What are little boys made of? Snips and snails and puppy dog tails.") Moreover, each specialization presents men and women with different emotional tasks. Women are more likely to be presented with the task of mastering anger and aggression in the service of "being nice." To men, the socially assigned task of aggressing against those that break rules of various sorts creates the private task of mastering fear and vulnerability.

Third, and less noticed, the general subordination of women leaves every individual woman with a weaker "status shield" against the displaced feelings of others. . . . The fourth consequence of the power difference between the sexes is that for each gender a different portion of the managed heart is enlisted for commercial use. Women more often react to subordination by use. Women more often react to subordination by