Political Geography 41 (2014) 74–89

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Political Geography

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo

A comparative analysis of diaspora policies

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ARTICLE INFO

Article history:
Available online 14 February 2014

Keywords:
Diaspora
Neo-liberalism
Governmentality
Transnational nationalism
Multiple correspondence analysis

ABSTRACT

Why are states increasingly developing policies aimed at embracing their populations abroad? This interest in diaspora policies has become relevant beyond the academic context, reflecting a growing practice of states and international organizations. To address this, the article first provides a description of the growing number of state practices aimed at their population abroad. Based on an original dataset of thirty-five states, it then uses multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to establish an inductive typology of sending states policies: expatriate, closed, indifferent, global-nation and managed labor. Finally, it assesses three explanatory frameworks of diaspora policies, finding that, while explanations based on material factors and ethnic conceptions of citizenship provide insights into the determinants of diaspora policies, analyses in terms of governmentality provide a more fruitful framework for research.

Introduction

An increasing number of governments and international organizations have developed policies intended to incorporate populations abroad in a variety of domains, such as citizenship, economic development or diplomatic service. How can this proliferation of policies aimed at seducing, embracing, using or controlling populations abroad be explained? Such policies have been the subject of a growing body of literature in anthropology, sociology, political science and geography (Dufoix, 2012). Within the broader literature on diaspora and transnationalism that emerged in the 1990s (Vertovec & Cohen, 1999), these diaspora policies have been linked to a "diaspora turn" in policy discourse and practice (Agunias, 2009). With a few exceptions (Gamlen, 2008), however, the academic literature so far has focused on qualitative studies of single cases or small-scale comparisons, with few large comparative analyses of diaspora policies. This article aims to fill that gap.

In order to accomplish my objective, I proceed in four steps. First, I describe the diaspora turn in state policy over the past years. Drawing on secondary literature, I detail the development of the incorporation of populations abroad in symbolic, bureaucratic, legal, diplomatic, and economic terms. I argue that the relative absence of a broad comparative framework has led to the development of inaccurate typologies of diaspora policies. Next, I present an original dataset of thirty-five states characterized in terms of their symbolic policies, social and economic policies, religious and cultural policies, citizenship policies and government and bureaucratic control, coded in nineteen categorical variables. Based on a multiple correspondence analysis of the dataset, I map the relation between the thirty-five state policies and the categorical variables. This leads to an original typology of diaspora policies based on the statistical clustering of policy characteristics, including five broad types of state policies: the expatriate, the closed, the indifferent, the global-nation and the managed labor state. After this, I consider the established typology in relation to three existing explanatory frameworks of diaspora policies: what I term the structural–instrumental framework, based loosely on Marxian and utilitarian assumptions of state behavior; the ethnic framework, based on opposing theories of cosmopolitanism and transnational nationalism; and, finally, the political-economy hypothesis, related to the governmentality framework. I show that the structural–instrumental and ethnic framework provides only partial explanation for the development of diaspora policies, and the political-economy framework provides a better understanding of the process of transnationalization of state practices, suggesting that the governmentality framework is the most useful avenue of analysis. What best explains the development of diaspora policies is indeed not transnational material or nationalist interests, but the broader political-economic context and rationality within which these interests can be considered legitimate objects of government. I conclude by highlighting a few methodological, theoretical and political insights resulting from the analysis.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2013.12.004

A new relationship between governments and their diasporas?

Geographies of diaspora

Diaspora emerged in the 1990s as the signifier around which debates on cosmopolitanism and post-national belonging coalesced (Brah, 1996; Cohen, 1996; Clifford, 1994; Gilroy, 1994; Soysal, 1994). In geography, the concept was proposed as a new tool to "provide bridges between population geography and new human geographies" (Ní Laoire, 2003: 275; Ogden, 2000), introducing creolization and hybridity as analytical lenses (Boyle, 2001: 429). It allowed thinking about new geographies of social and political space, defined as transnational communities (Vertovec & Cohen, 1999), transnational spaces (Jackson, Crang, & Dwyer, 2004), informal political spaces (Mavroudi, 2008) or diasporic public spheres (Mohan, 2008). Diaspora also provided a framework for alternative geographies of gender (Gray, 1997; Preston, Kobayashi, & Man, 2006), as well as of citizenship and belonging (Dickinson & Bailey, 2007; Leitner & Ehrkamp, 2006; Mohan, 2008; Nagel & Staeheli, 2004).

In spite of all this, however, the virulent ethnic politics of some diasporic actors revealed that trans-territorial processes of identification and mobilization do not necessarily go toward more hybridity or emancipation from the national imagination. Many warned of the dangers of projecting progressive tropes onto the concept (Mitchell, 1997; Mohan, 2008; Yeh, 2007), calling for the analysis of diaspora as a performative category (Dickinson, 2011; Dickinson & Bailey, 2007; Mavroudi, 2008), or a category of everyday, political and economic practice, rather than as a normatively charged and potentially essentialist category of analysis (Adamson & Demetriou, 2007; Carter, 2005; Ní Laoire, 2003; Samers, 2003). The focus of the analysis then shifted from the processes of diasporas transnational identifications (Long, 2009; Mohammad, 2007) and mobilizations (Blunt, 2003; Werbner, 2002) to the transnational practices of power deployed by states (Ancien, Boyle, & Kitchin, 2009; Gamlen, 2008, 2012), i.e. the long-distance practices of state symbolic categorization (Dickinson & Bailey, 2007), bureaucratic classification (Ho, 2011: 759) and political and economic management (Ball & Piper, 2002; Gray, 2006; Larner, 2007). These studies echoed a broader interest in sociology and political science for state-diaspora relations (Itzighson, 2000; Levitt & de la Dehesa, 2003; Smith, 2003).

Paradoxically, while academia progressively distanced itself from a naïve belief in the promises of diaspora, the term gained renewed traction in policy, marked by an increasing attention from states and international institutions (Agunias, 2009; Agunias & Newland, 2012; Boyle & Kitchin, 2011), and it acquired the status of a new policy buzzword (Basch, Glick Schiller, & Szanton Blanc, 1995; Kunz, 2010; Laguerre, 1999; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Ragazzi, 2009). Through political speeches, bureaucratic practices of surveillance and control, strategies of development, and citizenship regulations, governments from all corners of the world now embrace what they increasingly define as their "diasporas". While states have reached out to their populations abroad in an additional number of ways, through institutional change, philanthropy, tourism, knowledge networks, capital funds, the broad comparative framework of this article does not allow full exploration of all aspects of these policies (for more on these aspects, see Agunias & Newland, 2012).

The diaspora turn in policy

First, after being ignored or rejected from the national discourses for many years, populations abroad are now being symbolically represented as constitutive elements of the national population, passing from "traitors to heroes" as Jorge (2004) put it. The term "diaspora" itself has proliferated as a positive signifier to designate populations abroad and their symbolic link to the homeland (Dufoix, 2008, 2012; Green & Weil, 2007). Previously derogatory terms are now being inverted and used to praise those abroad, as in the Ecuadorian president's claim to head a "migrant's government", the changing value of *pochos* (Mexicans living in the US) and the declining social condemnation of the *yordim* (those who emigrate from Israel, as opposed to the *olim*, those who do *Aliyah*, i.e. immigrate to Israel) (Fitzgerald, 2006; Margheritis, 2011). Governments are also increasingly dedicating memorials and organizing conferences and commemorations to their diaspora, for example, the *Pravasi Bharatiya Divas* in India (Jaffrelot & Therwath, 2007) and the national Day of the Moroccan Community Abroad (Marocains du Monde, 2011). State-run television channels, websites, and information centers are also being deployed to inform the population abroad of the governments' activities, from Hungary's Duna TV to Turkey's TRT International (Turkish Ratio and Television Corporation) and Italy's RAI International (Italian Radio and Television Corporation).

Second, populations abroad are increasingly being included from a bureaucratic point of view. This attention paid by sending states implies a growing reshaping of institutional organizational charts within departments and ministries (Brand, 2006). I use here the term "sending states" to designate states of origin of populations abroad. Although these populations might not have been "sent" by their state of origin, this term is now generally accepted in the literature. In addition to the conventional consular services within ministries of foreign affairs, domestic ministries like health, welfare, labor, culture, and religion are developing sections to deal with populations abroad, for example Ghana's National Migration Unit (Ministry of Interior), the Philippines' Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (Ministry of Labor), and Ethiopia's Diaspora Coordinating Office (Ministry of Capacity Building) (Agunias & Newland, 2012: 78). More and more governments speak of an "*n*th" region, or a republic abroad, like Haiti's "tenth department" (Glick Schiller & Fouron, 1999). Several governments reinforce their service of imams to cater to – while also possibly controlling – their population abroad, for example, Turkey's Ministry for Religious Affairs (Çitak, 2010; De Haas, 2007). Governments also export educational systems along with culture and language professors (Kenway & Fahey, 2011), and cultural centers dedicated to populations are no longer the prerogative of West European governments (UK's *British Council*, France's *Alliance Française*, Italy's *Istituto Dante Allighieri*, Germany's *Goethe Institut*), as the new Turkish initiative of *Yunus Emre* cultural centers illustrates (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). Some governments have decided to coordinate these initiatives in inter-ministerial agencies linked to ministries of foreign affairs, welfare, education or economy, like the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, Guatemala's National Council for Migrants or Sierra Leone's Office of the Diaspora (Agunias & Newland, 2012: 80). An increasing number of governments even have fully-fledged ministries entirely dedicated to the issue, like Armenia's Ministry of Diaspora, Haiti's Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad, and India's Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (Agunias & Newland, 2012: 73).

The legal and social link between the government and populations abroad is being reinforced in several ways. While some governments still restrict movement and police their population overseas, the global trend is in the opposite direction, with increasing numbers of governments facilitating the preservation of, or access to, citizenship for their nationals abroad (Barry, 2006; Faist, 2001; Ho, 2011; Smith, 2003; Tintori, 2011). When they do not, governments with large populations abroad often develop new

forms of para-citizenship, such as ethnic origin cards (among the many examples are India's Overseas Citizen of India and Person if Indian Origin cards, Turkey's Pink Card, and Croatia's Cro-card). Undocumented migrants from Mexico, Guatemala or Brazil can use consular identification cards – the "matricula consular" in the case of Mexicans – as an alternative to the papers of their countries of arrival when opening bank accounts or obtaining driver's licenses in some states in the United States of America (USA) (Bruno & Storrs, 2005; Lomeli-Azoubel, 2002; Pérez Juárez, 2003).

In addition, in many states with effective electoral systems, the structures of representation are also being re-designed, with governments extending political rights to their population abroad through the right to vote, the right to have dedicated representatives and the right to be elected (Bauböck, 1994, 2005; Fitzgerald, 2009). Dual citizenship is also becoming accepted and recognized (Blatter, Erdmann, & Schwanke, 2009; Faist, Gerdes, & Rieple, 2004; Kejžar, 2009; Sejersen, 2008; Spiro, 1997), and, when citizens abroad are not allowed to vote, representative bodies of émigré associations are developed as alternative forms of representation, like the *Assemblée des Français de l'Etranger* in France or the *Comitati degli Italiani Residenti all'Estero* (COMITES) in Italy. Some governments also include social rights for their populations abroad, from the possibility of receiving benefits abroad through the multiplication of bilateral agreements to comprehensive programs of welfare protection and care such as in the Philippines (Solomon, 2009).

Another shift is that populations abroad are being increasingly included as informal diplomatic actors (King & Melvin, 1999; Shain, 1994). Through informal engagement in relationships with diaspora institutions and the creation of more formal umbrella organizations, sending states are increasingly using their diaspora as a multiplier for foreign policy (Jaffrelot & Therwath, 2007). The question of ethnic lobbying and the role of immigrant organizations in shaping foreign policy has been particularly noticeable in the 1990s (Huntington, 1997; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Schlesinger, 1991), and other areas, such as the place of diasporas more broadly in democratization (Koinova, 2009), conflict resolution (Lyons, 2004; Mohamoud, 2005; Shain & Bristman, 2002) and international relations (Popescu, 2005; Shain & Barth, 2003), have since been explored.

The most recent trend is that many governments now consider the permanent stay of their populations abroad as an asset for the development of the economy (Agunias & Newland, 2012; Kunz, 2011). This is a major change as, in the past, the economic development of sending states was associated with the elimination of excess labor through emigration, the return of productive forces to the homeland, the development of circulatory migration (e.g., guest worker programs and bracero programs) or the return of educated migration through brain gain programs (Gamlen, 2012; Larner, 2007). Today, however, populations permanently resident abroad are considered economically valuable. This takes different forms, including skilled workers networks, as in Australia's "Advance" network, and Morocco's "*Migrations et Développement Economique dans la région de l'Oriental*" (Agunias & Newland, 2012: 135). It can also take the shape of co-development strategies or diaspora strategies, where receiving states and international organizations pursue development aid deployment, such as Mexico's "*Tres por Uno*" and "*Programa Paisano*" programs (Guarnizo, 2007: 96). International organizations like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Organisation for International Migration (OIM) are at the forefront of this trend, "prescribing" this solution to many developing states with large populations abroad (Boyle & Kitchin, 2011).

While scholarship to date has provided a wealth of detailed analysis concerning specific cases and small-N comparisons of "diaspora policies", the scarcity of systematic comparative analysis has left two broad questions open: first, an analysis of patterns, similarities and distinctions between policies, and second, an analysis of the determinants or explanations for the development and diversity of these patterns. Existing scholarship has proposed preliminary taxonomies of sending states policies. Levitt and Glick Schiller, for example, distinguish three types of states along the yardstick of their extractive attitude: transnational nation-states, strategically selective states and disinterested and denouncing states (Levitt & Glick Schiller, 2004: 1023–1024). Similarly, Gamlen (2006: 21) classifies states into three categories depending on the rights they provide: exploitative (obligations without rights), generous (rights without obligations) and engaged (both rights and obligations).[1] Due to the arbitrariness of the single criterion around which they are built, these typologies are, however, unsatisfactory. Why should the criterion of citizenship rights and obligations, for example, rather than cultural or diplomatic ties, provide the grounds for the categorizations? By focusing on developing states, Levitt and Glick Schiller's typology excludes the policies of developed countries such as France or the UK toward their expatriate citizens. Similarly, Gamlen's analysis conflates states' policies that present similar attitudes toward citizenship but significant differences in terms of sectors exported (culture and education, as opposed to labor, welfare, diplomacy), thus preventing an analysis of these differences and the factors that might explain them.

Identifying the characteristic features of diaspora policies is key to assessing the ability of explanatory frameworks to account for these characteristics and their regularities. Explanatory frameworks should be able to explain not just one type of policy, but the entire range of state practices. What is required, therefore, is a framework that can simultaneously explain why certain states engage or do not to engage with their population abroad, why some extend or do not to extend citizenship rights, and why certain states develop only cultural and educational policies while others engage their populations abroad in large-scale development schemes after ignoring them for many years. The typology of sending states, against which I assess various explanatory frameworks identifies which correlations need to be explained across a wide range of criteria: why is it that the majority of states who have a planned economy are generally not open to populations abroad? Why is it that, generally, states with a high GDP develop cultural policies but do not enroll their populations abroad in diplomatic efforts? By mapping the multiplicity of possible correspondences between diaspora policy characteristics and their explanatory factors, the typology based on MCA therefore allows a relational and structural assessment of existing explanatory frameworks that is not permitted by previous studies.

The next section details the data and method of multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) for the comparison of features of diaspora policies. Building on the results of the analysis, An inductive typology of diaspora policies section then offers an inductive typology based on statistical features of diaspora policies, and Explaining diaspora policies section provides an analysis of possible explanatory frameworks of the development and diversity of these policies.

Data and methods

Methodology

MCA is a sub-type of factorial analysis used to visualize the features of a dataset composed of categorical variables (Bourdieu & de Saint Martin, 1978; Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010). MCA allows visualizing the distance between cases (in the present analysis, states at a given date in time) on the basis of their specific

Table 1
Active and supplementary variables.

Variable	Modalities	Notes
Active variables		
Symbolic policies		
Inclusion of the diaspora in the national calendar of celebrations	Yes, no	
Diaspora conferences	Yes, no	
Highest administrative unit	Directorate, agency, ministry	Directorate is the default administrative unit within the ministries of foreign affairs. Agencies generally coordinate the work of various ministries and function as a reference point. Ministries are the highest symbolic investment in the diaspora.
Religious and cultural policies		
Religious institutions or personnel abroad	Yes, no	
Cultural centers abroad	No, co-financed, fully-financed	A distinction is made here between centers that are primarily the outcome of community involvement and which might receive some funding from the sending state (co-financed) from centers which are entirely financed by the sending state (fully-financed).
Schools abroad	No, language and cultural programs abroad, affiliated schools, controlled schools	The distinction here is made between states which do not have schools abroad, but might fund language and cultural programs in host-state schools; states which run schools funded by communities abroad with some form of recognition from the sending state; and schools which correspond entirely to the national curriculum.
Social and economic policies		
Scientific networks	No, not orientated toward return, orientated toward return	A distinction is made here between scientific policies oriented at sending students abroad with the obligation of return and policies which do not have this requirement. Scientific policies without a return requirement are indeed inscribed in the idea of a global-nation which does not necessarily need to return to contribute to the growth of the country.
Investment schemes for populations abroad	No, only for returnees, for returnees and for the diaspora	
Welfare provisions for the diaspora	Yes, no	
Welfare provisions for returnees	Yes, no	
Citizenship policies		
Access to citizenship through ethnic or religious belonging	No, with residency provisions, without residency provisions	
Loss of citizenship through residence abroad	Yes, no	
Loss of citizenship if other citizenship is adopted (acceptance of dual citizenship)	Yes, no	
External vote	No, vote from abroad, vote from abroad and representation	A distinction is made between voting abroad and having representatives which are directly designated by voters abroad.
State and bureaucratic control		
Origin identification document for non-citizens	Yes, no	
Lobbying officially encouraged by the state	Yes, no	
Policing of populations abroad is suspected	Yes, no	
Mobility restrictions for citizens who want to go abroad	Yes, no	
Supplementary variables		
Structural–instrumental hypotheses		
GDP × capita	Values are in USD$: <2500: very low GDP/capita, 2500–10,000: low GDP/capita; 10,000–35,000: high GDP/capita, >35,000: very high GDP/capita	
Absolute value of remittances	<1.3 M$ remit, <4.5 M$ remit, <8 M$ remit, <10 M$ remit, <50 M$ remit	
Relative value of remittances	Irrelevant <0.20%, <0.60%, small <2%, important <5%, very important +5%	
Absolute number of nationals abroad	The unit is thousands of persons. <800: very small population abroad, 800–2500: small population abroad, 2500–5000: large population abroad, >5000: very large population abroad	
Percentage of nationals abroad in relation to total population	<1%: Very small percentage abroad, 1–4%: small percentage abroad, 4–6%: important percentage abroad, 6–10% large percentage abroad, >10% very large percentage abroad	

(*continued on next page*)

Table 1 (*continued*)

Variable	Modalities	Notes
Ethnic affiliation hypothesis		
Jus Soli after birth	Yes, no	
Jus Soli at birth	Yes, no	
Governmentality hypothesis		
Fiscal pressure	No, low, average, mild and high fiscal pressure	The categories for the four variables of the governmentality hypothesis are based on the indexes of the "2010 Index of Economic Freedom" database generated jointly by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. See the referenced sources document for more information: http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/22569
Financial deregulation	State controlled, highly regulated, regulated, deregulated, highly deregulated	
Labor deregulation	Very controlled labor market, controlled labor market, regulated labor market, liberal labor market, very liberal labor market	
Openness to international trade	Closed trading, semi-closed trading, open trading, very open trading, highly open trading	

properties described through categorical variables. These variables are termed *active variables* because they contribute to the calculation of the distances – in our case, a series of indicators of government's diaspora strategies.[2]

The dataset

The dataset is composed of 35 cases: Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Greece, Haiti, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, North Korea, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US. The cases have been chosen to represent a broad typology of governments as described in the literature: from governments engaged in low-skilled labor diaspora policies (Philippines, Morocco, Mexico) to high-skilled labor (France, Belgium, Germany); from governments with a high dependence on remittances (Tajikistan, Lesotho, Lebanon, Jordan) to governments for which remittances are not important (US, Turkey, Brazil, Italy); from states with a large number of citizens abroad in absolute terms (Mexico, India, Bangladesh, Ukraine) or relative terms (Ireland, Serbia, Croatia) to states with very small population abroad in absolute terms (Lesotho, Hungary, Australia) or relative terms (Ethiopia, China, Nigeria). In addition, the sample includes a fair distribution of low-income (min US$ 185 per capita) and high-income countries (max US$ 55,671 per capita), with a median of US$ 9521 per capita (all USD values are for 2010), and pays attention to a fair distribution of countries in terms of citizenship policies (*Jus Soli*, *jus sanguinis*), political regimes (democratic, authoritarian), and degrees of openness to international trade, as well as financial, labor and tax regulation. Since the aim of the analysis is primarily to observe the proximity between types of state policies and state characteristics, unlike other statistical methods, the sample does not need to be representative of the broader population of states (Le Roux & Rouanet, 2010: 81).

Active variables

The active variables include features of diaspora policies (see Table 1 for a detailed description). The dataset is composed of 19 active variables, regrouped in five headings: symbolic policies, social and economic policies, religious and cultural policies, citizenship policies and government and bureaucratic control. Each of these headings' modalities (a modality is the name given to possible choices for each variable – for example a "yes"/"no" variable has two modalities) contribute 15–22% of the total distribution, so none of these headings places excessive emphasis on any of these five particular aspects of diaspora policies. Data for these variables has been collected from a variety of secondary sources, as well as primary sources from states, international organizations and diaspora organizations.[3]

Limits of the dataset

A few clear limits of this dataset and the conclusions that can be derived from the analysis need to be specified. First, the dataset does not include any data on the international position of the state: there is no indicator of states belonging to regional or international organizations that might influence or inform their diaspora policies, for example, the freedom of movement in the EU, as well as the provisions for the portability of pensions and some benefits, which influence the policies of certain states. The strong influence of the donor-funded IOM programs in diaspora policy-making is another element not represented in the graph – see instead Gamlen's (2011) on the role of IOM. Second, the current analysis is based exclusively on official data, so nothing is recorded about the actual practices related to these policies. While an extensive and comparative survey of policy makers, qualitative interviews and observations would provide a much more fine grained picture of diaspora policies, in particular about the actual bureaucratic practices, their effectiveness, misuses and failure, that is beyond the remit of this article. A third limitation of this study is the assumption, for the purpose of the visualization, that the state can be considered a unitary actor rather than a series of institutions with multiple, heterogenous and sometimes contradictory positions (Poggi, 1990; Weber, 1998). An alternative would have been to visualize individual ministries and bureaucratic institutions belonging to the different countries, allowing illustration of the similarities between the intra-state institutions of different states. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, I have, however, set this aside.

An inductive typology of diaspora policies

Interpretation of the results

The MCA yields a series of factorial axes (a combination of active modalities) that distribute governments according to their



Fig. 1. Plane 1–2. Interpretation of Axis 1.

characteristics (active variables). The axes formed by the MCA are first interpreted to establish along which lines the MCA has divided the various cases. For the current analysis, I chose the two first axes.[4] To interpret Axis 1, I highlight the modalities that contribute most to the constitution of the axis[5] and represent them on the plot (Fig. 1).

The left hand side displays strong symbolic, bureaucratic, social and economic and citizenship inclusion (conferences, origin identification, lobbying, investment), where educational policies are reduced to language and cultural programs. The right hand side shows an under-represented interest for these features of the state abroad, with an emphasis on cultural policies: policies intended to provide a fully-fledged educational system abroad within its expatriate population, and to promote the homeland culture in foreign states.

To interpret Axis 2, I highlight the modalities that contribute most to the constitution of the axis[6] and represent them on the plot (Fig. 2). The upper sector represents tight control of the population through restrictions and policing, a tight grip on citizenship through exclusive conceptions of belonging (no dual citizenship), and limited access to democratic rights (no external vote) and social rights (no welfare provisions) for the populations abroad. In the lower sector, populations enjoy civic, political, social and cultural rights. The modality "ministry" is located in the upper section of the graph, indicating the co-existence of tight control policies and symbolic representation within state institutions.

In summary, the analysis of Axis 1 reveals what most distinguishes state policy is the type of "sector" the state exports. This axis separates states engaging their populations abroad at multiple levels from states that do not have specific provisions for them, except for a strong commitment toward education and culture. Axis 2 reveals that the second most important statistical factor of distinction between state policies is the presence or absence of citizenship rights. This axis separates states that exclude their population abroad from rights – whether they are reserved to domestic populations or because they are generally denied – to states that have developed transnational modalities of civic, political, social and cultural citizenship.

Analysis of active variables and clustering

The analysis provides the basis for regrouping of states in types through clustering on the basis of statistical proximity of policy characteristics. Fig. 3 presents the variables contributing most to



Fig. 2. Plane 1–2. Interpretation of Axis 2.



Fig. 3. Statistical formation of clusters.

the formation of the clusters, and Fig. 4 presents the most representative cases (Fig. 5).

Based on the analysis of the dataset, the following inductive typology is established along two statistical criteria: (1) the type of state sector "exported" to the population abroad (Axis 1 on the plot); and (2) the level of transnational inclusion in a system of rights (Axis 2 on the plot). Five state ideal-types are derived from the analysis: (1) the expatriate state, (2) the closed state, (3) and (3′) the global-nation state, (4) the managed labor state and (5) the indifferent state.

The expatriate state

A first group of states is formed around the focus on cultural and educational policies as the most distinguishing factor. It regroups countries that deploy these bureaucracies, typical of states providing state services to a high-income category of "expats" (UK, France, Germany, Spain or Italy), employed, for example, in the transnational corporations of the sending states. These states might provide voting from abroad, but not necessarily.

The closed state

This cluster regroups the most closed states, those that strongly regulate or seek to restrict the mobility of their population and police it abroad and do not allow for external voting. States in this upper right corner of the graph are also close to other active variables, such as loss of residence for residents abroad, absence of schools or welfare for the population abroad. Unsurprisingly, we find in this cluster states such as Cuba and North Korea, but also Iran and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The global-nation state

Clusters 3 and 3′, located in the lower left corner of the graph, regroup states that represent the widest range of diaspora policy features and provide populations abroad with the broader number of rights. Including Mexico, Ireland, Greece, Russia, India, Morocco and Ethiopia, they encourage lobbying, generally provide a document certifying the national origin (such as India's OCI and PIO cards), and provide welfare for returnees and organizing diaspora conferences. These states are associated with language and cultural programs, rather than fully controlled schools, and are interested in extracting economic and political resources from the population abroad, in exchange (as a result of diaspora – sending state struggles) providing a variable range of civil, political and social rights.

The managed labor state

Cluster 4 regroups states united by the provision of investment schemes for returnees. The cluster is close to other active variables, such as the provision to welfare for returnees and the provision to welfare for populations abroad. In Cluster 4, we find states that have a large émigré population, but have not really developed



Fig. 4. Visualization of clusters.



Fig. 5. Dendrogram of clusters.

policies toward them (in the upper right part of the cluster, such as Colombia, Jordan, Bangladesh) and states that have mostly focused on labor and circulation migration (in the lower part of the cluster, Philippines, Brazil).

The indifferent state

Finally, Cluster 5 is primarily defined by states that do not organize symbolic events, such as a yearly conference dedicated to its population abroad. This cluster is also characterized by a generalized lack of interest to its population abroad (no investment nor lobbying). We therefore see a category of sending state often overlooked in the literature, which might still be an interesting counter-factual object of analysis. I define this as the "Indifferent State".

The first contribution of the analysis is therefore the elaboration of a five-fold typology of sending state policies – expatriate, closed, global-nation, managed labor and indifferent – on the basis of the characteristics of the thirty-five states of the dataset. It is important to stress here that the criteria for the constitution of the clusters, and therefore the typology, are not single nor random criteria, but the result of the statistical similarities determined by a combination of all the descriptive features of each state. Having established this

inductive typology, I now proceed to analysis of the possible explanatory factors behind the diversity of diaspora engagement policies.

Explaining diaspora policies

Three accounts of diaspora policies

Existing research provides three main analytical frameworks to explain the development of diaspora policies. The first framework, currently dominant in the literature, can be defined as "structural–instrumental" in that it explains state behavior as resulting from the position of the states at the core, or the periphery, of the world economy and as the outcome cost/benefit calculations. Drawing partly on the world systems theories of Wallerstein, authors such as Smith (2003), Itzighson (2000) and Levitt and de la Dehesa (2003) argue that it is primarily the poorer states that reach out to their diasporas, mainly to pursue their economic interests. These four authors also consider structural elements in the domestic sphere, such as the nature of domestic politics (democracy or dictatorship) and the role of structural inequalities, such as racism and xenophobia in the receiving states. In this context, the migrants' agency and the sending states calculations are made in the context of political costs and benefit that can be obtained through bargaining. The relative and absolute value of remittances, in particular, are believed to be the principal tool of leverage, particularly if the population abroad is numerically important or represents a large share of the national population.

The second interpretation framework focuses on the changes in the conceptions of nationalism brought about by globalization, in particular by the transformation of the means of transportation and communication. Three primary hypotheses can be derived from this literature. The first hypothesis is that diaspora policies are the outcome of the development of the cosmopolitan norms of belonging. Extending rights to diasporas is, therefore, progress toward a more inclusive citizenship (Appiah, 2006; Benhabib, 2007), or, in a more subtle rendering, in a process of the denationalization of citizenship (Bosniak, 2000; Sassen, 2006). This cosmopolitan hypothesis has been widely criticized by several authors, who have instead focused on the exclusionary underpinnings of the policies. For authors such as Glick Schiller and Fouron (2001), Anderson (1998), Joppke (2003) and Skrbiš (1999), we are indeed facing a process of "re-ethnicization" and "long-distance nationalism" – reducing the criteria for inclusion in the polity along ethnic lines – that embraces transnational communities as a new component of the nationalist program. A final take, developed by Bauböck, argues that the politics of the inclusion of emigrants and those related to immigration are not necessarily connected. States attitudes can therefore be mapped on a two-by-two table along the two criteria, in which four positions appear: civic republicanism (no rights for non-residents, no rights for non-citizens), ethnic nationalism (rights for non-residents, no rights for non-citizens), territorial inclusion (no rights for non-residents, rights for non-citizens) and affected interests (rights for both non-residents and non-citizens) (Bauböck, 2005).

Finally, a growing number of studies are offering a third framework of interpretation, based on Foucault's notion of governmentality (Dickinson & Bailey, 2007; Gamlen, 2012; Ho, 2011; Irazuzta, 2011; Larner, 2007; McConnell, 2012; Mullings, 2011a, 2011b; Ragazzi, 2009). From this perspective, diaspora policies are shaped by modifications in programs of government and practices of power in the past decades, and in particular the shift from welfare liberalism to neo-liberalism. While previous rationalities of government advocated modalities of development and wealth redistribution based on territorialized societies, the current neo-liberal modality of government instead privileges opening boundaries to deregulated labor, trade and financial sectors, state disengagement from social sectors as well as managerial approaches to traditional functions of the state. In this approach, states' "interests" are not fixed over time, but are instead highly contingent upon political–economical rationality that underpins a government's program (Kunz, 2011; Varadarajan, 2010). Since the very nature of Foucault's method is qualitative and interpretive, evaluating the governmentality hypothesis through a broad comparative framework might appear a difficult exercise. However, as a framework of interpretation, governmentality assumes a strong link between the types of political-economic rationalities and regimes (planned economy, welfare state, neo-liberal state) and diaspora policies. Even if the current analysis cannot provide a subtle qualitative interpretation, it can analyze the relation between diaspora policies and objectified indicators of political-economic models such as financial regulation, fiscal regulation, trade openness and labor market regulation, which represent both the conditions under which specific forms of governmentality develop and the outcome of these rationalizations of power.

Supplementary variables in the dataset

In order to assess the relation between these explanatory models and the existing typology, I project supplementary variables from the dataset onto the plot obtained in Fig. 6. While supplementary variables do not intervene in the calculation of the distance active variable on the plot, when projected on the same graph as the active variables, they allow the derivation of inferences about their correlation with active variables, on the basis of their proximity. In the dataset, supplementary variables are regrouped under three headings corresponding to each of the hypotheses. For the "structural–instrumental" hypotheses, I list GDP × capita; the relative and absolute values of remittances (in relation to total GDP); absolute numbers of population abroad, and the proportion of the total state population they represent.[7] Ethnic policies are indicated by *Jus Soli* at birth and *Jus Soli* after birth. *Jus Soli* designates a citizenship regime through which birth on the territory is a sufficient condition for the acquisition of citizenship. Access to citizenship abroad through ethnic affiliation and existence of ethnic origins identification documents are listed in the active variables. Finally, the political-economy hypothesis is measured through four indexes corresponding to the states' deregulation of financial, trade, labor and fiscal sectors. The financial deregulation index comprises measures of the extent of government regulation of financial services, the degree of state intervention in banks and other financial firms through direct and indirect ownership, the extent of financial and capital market development, government influence on the allocation of credit, and openness to foreign competition. The trade openness index is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and services based on two inputs, the trade-weighted average tariff rate and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The labor deregulation index consists of measures of ratio of minimum wage to the average value added per worker, hindrance to hiring additional workers, rigidity of hours, difficulty of firing employees, legally mandated notice period, and mandatory severance pay. The fiscal regulation openness index consists of measures of the top tax rate on individual income, the top tax rate on corporate income, and the total tax burden as a percentage of GDP.

The structural–instrumental hypothesis

In contrast to what is assumed in a large part of the literature, this analysis finds that variables based on the "structural–



Fig. 6. States, clusters and active variables.



Fig. 7. GDP per capita.



Fig. 9. Population abroad (relative numbers).

instrumental" framework, i.e. the explanation based on states' interests and their position in the international capitalist system, fail to provide a consistent framework of analysis. I find that GDP per capita partly explains the distribution of the states within the various clusters (Fig. 7), and to a lesser degree, the absolute and relative numbers of the population abroad (Figs. 8 and 9). GPD per capita seems, for example, to explain well the contrast between expatriate states such as Spain, Italy, France and the UK, characterized by controlled schools and cultural centers on the one hand, and Managed Labor States such as Brazil, the Philippines or Poland, characterized by welfare provisions for expatriates and returnees. However, instrumental variables are unable to explain variation along the vertical axis of the graph, namely why the DRC, Ethiopia and Bangladesh, which share a similar Very Low GDP per capita, are located respectively in the Closed, Global-Nation or Managed Labor cluster. The framework provides no explanation as to why, on the one hand, Croatia, Mexico and India adopt a Global-Nation stance and, on the other, Belgium and Nigeria display an Indifferent attitude, while remittances represent a similar portion of the GDP for all these countries. In addition, the percentage of remittances and absolute number of remittances (Figs. 10 and 11) is not related to the distribution of the states. With a collapsed U shape, the trajectory of the number of remittances distributes states from smaller to larger numbers along a diagonal, yet the final return to the center of the graph prevents a consistent explanation through this variable. Similarly, with points for "irrelevant" and "highly important" remittances so close to one another, the percentage of remittances in the GDP does not explain the distribution of states on either axes.

Consequently, the analysis suggests is that while explanations based on material factors – whether grounded in Marxian or utilitarian assumptions – do provide a partial understanding the typology of sending states attitudes, they are unable to provide a comprehensive explanatory framework. In particular, the material variables are unable to account for the emergence of transnational conceptions of belonging and inclusion, i.e. states providing citizenship, voting and welfare rights (see Fig. 2, variables located in



Fig. 8. Population abroad (absolute numbers).



Fig. 10. Remittances (absolute numbers).



Fig. 11. Remittances (in % of GDP).



Fig. 13. Trade deregulation.

the lower section of Axis 2), and those which remain fixed on a territorialized understanding of sovereignty, restricting mobility, policing their population abroad, and denying their citizens abroad the benefits of citizenship. The framework is therefore useful in that it points toward the importance of materiality in our comprehension of the development of diaspora policies, yet it fails to provide an account of the conditions under which these material and economic factors become constituted as interests, i.e. how they become part of broader projects of administrative and bureaucratic re-organization of the state.

The ethnic conceptions hypothesis

In relation to frameworks based on ethnicity and citizenship, the analysis reveals that the cosmopolitanism and transnational nationalism hypotheses only provide partial explanations, limited to specific cases. Both these hypotheses presuppose a relationship between inclusion of immigrants and inclusion of emigrants. For authors such as Appiah (2006) or Benhabib (2007), the expansion of external citizenship is located within the same trend as the expansion of domestic citizenship, driven by cosmopolitan norms of inclusion. According to their analysis, the external citizenship policies should therefore be associated with inclusionary citizenship practices toward non-citizen residents, such as the development of *Jus Soli* at Birth and *Jus Soli* after Birth. For authors of the transnational nationalism thesis (Glick Schiller & Fouron, 2001; Joppke, 2003; Skrbiš, 1999), on the other hand, diaspora policies are underpinned by a transnational, exclusionary conception of the nation. Joppke (2003), for example, contends that the provision of citizenship to non-residents corresponds to as a re-ethnicization of national citizenship, a process that occurs in parallel with a closure of citizenship to non-citizen residents. In this view, diaspora policies should therefore be located in the proximity of restrictive policies of *Jus Soli* at Birth and after Birth (Fig. 12).

The data shows that neither of these underpinning assumptions are wrong per se, but neither holds as a comprehensive framework of analysis. Instead, the analysis supports a third hypothesis, proposed by Bauböck (2005: 685), that the inclusion of non-residents and the inclusion of non-citizens are not linked. At least four configurations are possible: 1) states that display inclusive attitudes



Fig. 12. *Jus Soli* at birth and after birth.



Fig. 14. Fiscal pressure.



Fig. 15. Labor market deregulation.

toward non-residents and non-citizens ("expatriate state" cluster: Germany, France, etc.), 2) states that display inclusive attitudes toward non-residents but restrictive attitudes toward non-citizens (managed labor and global-nation clusters: Mexico, Ireland, Turkey, Croatia, etc.), 3) states that display restrictive attitudes toward non-residents and non-citizens (Cluster 5 as a sub-category of the global-nation cluster: India, Morocco, Ethiopia, Israel), and 4) states that display restrictive attitudes toward non-residents but inclusive attitudes toward non-citizens (China, Cuba, North Korea or Iran). The analysis therefore suggests that while the development of policies toward populations abroad is indeed linked to the development of transnational conceptions of citizenship and belonging as codified in citizenship laws, the development of external citizenship should be distinguished from the inclusionary and exclusionary features that it is likely to assume. In other words, diaspora policies are not located on one side or the other of the traditional divide between ethnic and civic conceptions of citizenship, they are, instead, the framework within which a new geography of citizenship is legitimized and invested by conflicting conceptions of ethnicity and belonging.



Fig. 16. Financial deregulation.

The political-economy hypothesis

The political-economy hypothesis is, to a large extent, consistent with the analysis of the proximities between clusters and the four indexes as supplementary variables. The closed state cluster's characteristics – restricted mobility, police surveillance abroad, mostly return policies – correlate with states with highly controlled financial systems (Fig. 16) and closed trading (Fig. 13). In the center of the graph, we find states that present features of traditional liberal welfare states, with open borders, an important level of fiscal pressure (Fig. 14), and partly regulated labor markets (Fig. 15). These characteristics correspond to the indifferent and managed state clusters (Philippines, Colombia, Jordan, Bangladesh and Egypt, on the one side, Belgium, Nigeria, Lebanon and Australia, on the other). The global-nation cluster is present in most of the features of a highly neo-liberalized state (Mexico, Turkey, Ireland). The most deregulated economies primarily correspond to the expatriate states (Spain, Germany, UK, France). Closed states are located at the top of the graph, liberal and welfare states in the middle, while the neo-liberal states, which have developed the most inclusive transnational policies, are located at the bottom. The variables of the political-economy hypothesis best correlate with the degree of de-territorialized practices of inclusion (Axis 2). What these findings indicate, therefore, is the close relationship between diaspora policies and objectified indicators that reflect a governmentality framework of analysis (Kunz, 2011; Ragazzi, 2009).

The governmentality hypothesis assumes a relation between disciplinary, liberal and neo-liberal governmentalities and shifting conceptions of territorial sovereignty. Disciplinary governmentality, based to a large extent on the mercantilist or post-mercantilist credos of population growth, protectionism and the accumulation of wealth through currency, are closely linked to policies of promotion of return of their population abroad, restriction of emigration and cultural policies abroad intended to awaken national consciences abroad to facilitate returns (Foucault, 2004: 7). The liberal governmentality is based instead on the assumption that the state should not intervene and disturb the natural equilibrium of the flow of goods, capital and labor markets. Unlike disciplinary governmentality, which fears depopulation, liberal governmentality fears overpopulation and a reserve army of laborers (Foucault, 2004: 72, 74). Emigration is, therefore, seen as an acceptable safety valve policy for the economic and political problems of the industrial revolution (Gray, 1997). For most European states after the Second World War, under the pressure of social and philanthropist movements on the one hand, and the evidence of circulation migration's benefits in terms of incoming foreign currency on the other, the government has become involved in the promotion and regulation of this departure of excess labor. The current situation of development of diaspora policies is, however, explained by a third, neo-liberal program of government and its associated practices. Neo-liberalism, which has brought about profound transformations, not only in the organization of the economy, but also in the objectives and the organization of state structures, is best understood as a departure from the bureaucratic control of the welfare state, and a re-organization of public authorities' role as facilitators or enablers of pre-existing social and economic processes that must stem from self-initiative, encouraging and accompanying transnational flows of people and capital (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 1993). It is a political–economical model that emphasizes self-regulating social and economic sectors and the opening up of commerce and finance to transnational networks, not bound to a territorialized conception of economic development.

On the one hand, the strong correlation between financial deregulation and openness to international trade and diaspora policies and, on the other, the strong correlation between high tariff, financially controlled and highly regulated financial market and closed states, irrespective of the actual size of population abroad, or quantity of the remittances' flow, suggest that the political–economical model of a state (planned economy, welfare state, neo-liberal) ultimately best explains the development of diaspora policies. In other words, the statistical analysis points toward is a relatively intuitive, yet overlooked, feature of diaspora policies: they are not determined by material factors or conceptions of ethnicity alone, but by the broader political-economic rationality within which these material factors and conceptions are framed, problematized and constituted as elements of broader strategies of political, economic and cultural development.

Conclusion

The study of diaspora policies is at a crossroads. While a growing number of studies have documented the emergence of the phenomenon and detailed the characteristics of each case, explanatory frameworks developed on the basis of one or a few cases have, so far, rarely been subjected to a broader comparative examination. Relying on multiple correspondence analysis, this article makes three contributions. First, it provides a description of the diaspora turn in state policy in the recent years. Second, it proposes an original, empirically-grounded typology of state policies based on the comparative analysis of their characteristics. Finally, it reviews three alternative explanatory frameworks for the development of these policies, showing that while structural–instrumental and ethnicity-based frameworks provide some insight into the determinants of diaspora policies, the governmentality framework provides a more comprehensive point of entry to understand their transnationalization and the development of post-territorial forms of government.

The conclusions I have drawn here have methodological, theoretical and political implications. From a methodological point of view, the article underscores the usefulness of broad comparisons as a tool for determining the scope conditions of small-N studies for the analysis of diaspora policies. While instrumentalist explanations might explain policies of states that have taken the neo-liberal turn, they fail to explain closed policies of planned economy states. Equally, the cosmopolitan argument might have some value in Western European contexts, but cannot explain the exclusionary practices of the Global-Nation states. The analysis of the broad range of state attitudes and their determinants therefore provides a context for the validity of explanatory frameworks. Such a broad analysis cannot, however, be achieved without in-depth studies of the cases themselves – both in terms of the characteristics of the policies and in terms of the explanatory factors that might be idiosyncratic to each case. Here, qualitative surveys, interviews and ethnographic observation might significantly qualify the data gathered through secondary sources, and might suggest different outcomes and analyses. In this sense, the results of the present study should not be interpreted as conclusive and definitive, but as exploratory, calling for qualitative and quantitative research and collaboration between scholars of diaspora policies to confirm, refine or dismiss the typologies and explanations presented (see Agunias & Newland, 2012 for a comparative study drawing on primary sources in a policy context).

At a theoretical level, this article suggests that the political geography of a growing number of governments' is being reshaped, with implications for national narratives, cultural strategies, bureaucratic organizations, principles of belonging and representation, foreign policy instruments and development tools. As such, the increased diffusion of diaspora policies represents a break with the long process of territorialization of sovereignty that began with the peace of Westphalia (Agnew, 2009), as well as the nationalizing objectives of homogenization of citizenship, initiated in the 19th century with the Bancroft treaties and pursued by the nationality conventions of the early 20th century (Koslowski, 2001). Although, the previous trend toward territorialization and homogenization aimed to clearly distinguish between the international and the domestic, undoing previous forms of incongruence between territories, populations and political authority, whether these were the result of migration, such as dual citizenship, or the result of colonial arrangements, such as the extraterritorial legal provisions,[8] these are precisely the type of incongruences that diaspora policies seem to revive.

This new discrepancy between identities, borders and orders therefore raises the question of the type of politics brought about by these changes (Albert, Jacobson, & Lapid, 2001). If diaspora policies are becoming a new way to organize citizenship, what consequences does it have on the organization of democratic life? Benedict Anderson, for example, argues that long-distance nationalism emerges among communities who do not have to live with the consequences of their lobbying or absentee voting (Anderson, 1998). Others have reformulated the old argument that there should be "no representation without taxation": why would citizens who, most of the time, do not pay their taxes at home benefit from services of the state (Kasapović, 2012)? With the proliferation of dual citizenship, one of the inevitable consequences of the acquisition or transmission of citizenship to non-resident populations, others have claimed that diasporic citizenship violates equality among citizens, since the dual national enjoys rights and benefits in more than one country, electing representatives in more than one country (Hansen & Weil, 2002) At a more fundamental level, diasporic citizenship undermines one of the main functions of citizenship since the end of the 19th century, namely dividing populations into discrete, territorial nation-states (Hindess, 2001). Although it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the alternative models to the territorial state that post-territorial citizenship forces us imagine, it is clear that that political and legal theory of the state has yet to integrate the full consequences of an enlargement of civic, political and/or social rights to individuals located outside of the territory of the state that confers them those rights.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the following individuals for their invaluable help in the constitution of the database for this study: Elena Barabantseva, Francisco Casal Bertoa, Andreas Gostinas, Saskia Koppenberg, Rahel Kunz, Beatriz Padilla, Scott Solomon, Amal Tawfik, Guido Tintori, Latha Varadarajan, Biao Xiang. Many thanks also to Natasha Iskander, Jonathan Bach, Arpi Miller, Yossi Shain and Aristide Zolberg for their comments during the workshop "To Protect and Promote? Sending States and Diasporas in Comparative Perspective", The New School, New York, May 6–7 2011. Thanks to Alexandra Delano and Alan Gamlen for organizing the workshop and providing comments during several stages of the paper. Thanks for the anonymous referees for substantially improving the quality of the article. Thanks finally to Lee Seymour for his close reading of the final manuscript.

Endnotes

[1] I would like to thank Alexandra Delano for highlighting this point. See also Delano (2011: 8).

[2] For a summary of the mechanisms of MCA, see the annex of Hjellbrekke et al. (2012). For a more detailed explanation of the technique, see Le Roux and Rouanet (2010).

[3] The replication data, the variables table summary, as well as the exhaustive list of sources used for the constitution of the database is stored at the Harvard Dataverse Network under the reference UNF:5:q/XX8BD7gT117Mw+A2taiw == http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/22569.
[4] The MCA yields: (i) the variances of the axes; (ii) the principal coordinates of 46 active modalities and 48 supplementary modalities; (iii) the contributions of categories to axes; and (iv) the geometric representation of the three clouds (active modalities, individuals and supplementary modalities).
[5] I retain modalities that contribute to more than 100/46 = 2.17%. There are 13 modalities that have contributions meeting the criterion, together accounting for 72.73% of the variance of Axis 1 ($\lambda = 0.207$).
[6] There are 15 modalities that have contributions meeting the criterion, together accounting for 82.66% of the variance of Axis 2 ($\lambda = 0.162$).
[7] For the sources, please consult: http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/22569.
[8] Extraterritoriality, "the retention of certain states, according to treaty or custom the jurisdiction over their nationals in a given sovereign territory for the purpose of garanteeing to them their own standards of justice and their own legal concepts" was, in 1933, already considered to be "vanishing" by legal scholars. See Surridge and Matthews (1933–1934: 1). On extraterritoriality in China, see Ruskola (2008), on capitulations in the Ottoman Empire, see Augusti (2011).

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