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Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

A Basic Contradiction?

Walter A. Kemp



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First published in Great Britain 1999 by
MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London
Companies and representatives throughout the world

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 978-1-349-40997-6 ISBN 978-0-230-37525-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1057/9780230375253

First published in the United States of America 1999 by
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.,
Scholarly and Reference Division,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

ISBN 978-0-312-21799-4

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kemp, Walter A.
Nationalism and communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union : a basic contradiction? / Walter A. Kemp.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Nationalism and communism—Europe, Eastern. 2. Nationalism and communism—Soviet Union. 3. Europe, Eastern—Politics and government—20th century. 4. Soviet Union—Politics and government.
I. Title.
HX550.N3K396 1998
320.54—dc21 98-38456
CIP

© Walter A. Kemp 1999

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1999 978-0-333-74157-3

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08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99

To my parents

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Foreword

The relationship between communism and nationalism has always been a puzzling one. Could one be both a communist and a nationalist simultaneously? For many the answer was 'yes, why not?' One of the great strengths of Walter Kemp's book is that it starts out by recognizing this contradiction. It probes it deeply and offers a way out of the puzzle.

In simple terms, a communist cannot be a nationalist because the essential theoretical bases of these two answers to the problem of modernity contradict one another. Either one believes that culture determines consciousness (as nationalists do) or that economics does (the Marxist perspective). Practice is ever more complex, as Walter Kemp shows in subtle detail. Marxists had to make repeated concessions to the national identities of the peoples they ruled and, indeed, could be captured by national sentiments themselves. As Ignazio Silone, the Italian socialist, once remarked, 'The first thing that communists nationalize is socialism.'

Marxist–Leninists approached the problem in various ways. The simplest was suppression. National identity should be obliterated in the name of an imposed internationalism. In Stalin's time, so-called 'bourgeois nationalists' were executed or locked up in droves. But terror only works for so long; and it becomes counter-productive, particularly when a complex modern society has to be run. Modernity demands ever-higher levels of consent to being ruled, otherwise the complexity creates incoherence and the political, economic, cultural systems will either work badly or will not work at all.

Physical suppression was matched by an intellectual device, that of 'false consciousness', that contributed significantly to the long-term failure of Marxism to be able to do anything very meaningful about theoretical nationalism. The doctrine was deceptively simple. If workers, who according to the dictates of Marxism were supposed to be inherently internationalist ('the proletarian has no country'), manifested signs of nationalism, then this was explained by their false consciousness. They had been deceived by the wicked and crafty bourgeoisie into believing that they belonged to a national community rather than understanding their membership of a superior internationalism.

The trouble with 'false consciousness' is that it paralyses thought, providing a pre-digested answer and then – this is crucial – blocking any further thought. All the answers given by Marxists to the persistence of national consciousness remain at the level of words, as they must do if the

underlying sociological and cultural reality cannot be explored. And it could not be explored for directly political reasons – such analysis would have threatened the role and function of Marxism–Leninism as the legitimating ideology of the communist state. Stalemate.

In the real world, however, stalemate can only be sustained by force; and once the communist states began to move away from high terror, they were constrained to create various compromises with that real world, the real world which their ideological predictions told them could not be happening. And that necessarily meant coming to terms with national identity. In a sense, the entire history of post-Stalinist communism could be written from this perspective – as a quest for consent from people whose values and cognitions were fundamentally at variance with communism and who showed no signs of changing. Eventually, communism foundered on this basic contradiction; albeit there were others, like sheer economic incompetence.

What communism did do was to destroy all forms of identification other than communism and the nation. The institutions of civil society, or even of pre-modern peasant society, were shattered by the model of modernization imposed by communism. The state, a key creator of identity, was in the hands of the Party, and the use of state-national symbols was unsuccessful in communist terms – people identified with the symbols, but read them as enhancing a national consciousness rather than a communist one. A communist simply could not be an authentic member of the nation, because by definition communism denied the authenticity of nationhood ('false consciousness').

So, as time passed, two modes of identification were possible in the communist world. One could identify with class and claim that the true future lay in the classless proletarian society prescribed by the Marxists. Alternatively, there was nationhood, which the communists could never capture because they lacked the means and the cognitive capacity to do so without eliminating themselves as communists. Thus nationhood enjoyed a degree of autonomy, as being a space where the pseudo-world of communism – as it was perceived – was powerless.

How, then, were the agendas of the nation brought into a relationship with the aspirations of society? And how did nationhood establish a fit with the real sociological and cultural features of the changing societies of Central and Eastern Europe? Industrialization, massive rural–urban migration, the construction of a semi-modern bureaucracy, mass communication, mass literacy, urbanization were all brought to the region via communism (to some extent this even includes the Czech lands and the former GDR). And the particular type of modernity that communism

created, with its minimization of individual choice, high levels of homogenization and, vitally, the weakening or elimination of individual responsibility, the cutting of the nexus between cause and effect through a verbal and partially real collectivism, all added to a type of nationhood at the macro and micro levels that national ideologies did not address.

These patterns had major implications for post-communism. A very significant feature of Walter Kemp's book is that it offers signposts for why the democratic systems brought to the region after 1989 and 1991 have proved to be beset by extensive nationalist agitation, most tragically so in the case of Yugoslavia. As communism was running out of political resources, and as it half-understood that it needed ever-higher inputs of consent than that generated by Marxist–Leninist ideology, they had no alternative but to use national language and symbols in their bid for legitimation. Thus the societies of Central and Eastern Europe entered democracy with a contradictory legacy: that of a national identity that was strongly ethnic (in the absence of the civic institutions that communism had destroyed), together with a level of complexity to which ethnic nationalism offered quite inadequate answers. Which is where the region finds itself at the Millennium.

One of the central questions of twentieth-century politics is how the cultural communities that understand themselves to be nations can ensure their cultural reproduction. Anyone who exercises power in such a political space – the nation – must make accommodation with it or be doomed to failure. That is one of the central lessons to be drawn from this book. It seems safe to say on the basis of the evidence that once a cultural community has the degree of self-awareness that propels it into contests for power, it will oblige its rulers to do likewise. This is not some deterministic or ideological proposition, but is the consequence of the world of implicit meanings that hold cultural communities together. They are ignored at one's peril, as the communists discovered.

If a community has constructed its own symbolic world, with its myths, rituals, liturgies, emblems, the symbolic elements that sustain the creation of the deepest levels of coherence, then it will hold fast to these in order to ensure its own survival. A ruler who seeks to sidestep this implicit world will eventually fail. Hence the communist rulers were willy-nilly pulled into this symbolic world, and thus became the captives of the very nationalism that they sought to supplant.

It was failure on a grand scale, made ironic by the refusal of the communists, who claimed that they had the perfect cognitive tools to understand the world, to see that the greatest threat to their project came from a quarter that was necessarily invisible to them. Walter Kemp's book is an

excellent assessment of this process that has dominated so much of the century.

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Introduction

In 1989, when I was studying Eastern European and Soviet history at McGill University in Montreal, a friend of mine sent me a postcard from Germany. On the front was a picture of people clambering over the Berlin wall. On the back was written, 'You're studying it, I'm living it – Cheers'.

Cheers indeed. Needless to say, this stuck in my proverbial craw.

I finished my studies at McGill and then went on to the University of Toronto to study International Relations. But every night when I watched the news to see the latest developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, I could not help thinking that everything that I was studying was being eclipsed by events in the streets. What was more frustrating was that in most cases it was people my age who were precipitating or at least participating in these momentous events and I was merely watching them on television or reading about them in the newspaper. I was determined to see History at first hand.

Between 1991 and 1993 I lived and worked in Czechoslovakia and Latvia and travelled to Poland, Hungary, Russia, Lithuania and Estonia. In Latvia I worked briefly as an adviser in the foreign ministry. In Prague I worked with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). These experiences and travels gave me a front-row seat on the political, social and economic processes of transition in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Communism.

They also piqued my curiosity about the history of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. I wanted to understand better what life had been like under Communism, why Communism collapsed and why nationalism made such a strong revival in the early 1990s.

That curiosity led me away from Eastern Europe and into the department of International Relations at the London School of Economics. There, what was to have been Ph.D. on Baltic nationalism grew into a rather ambitious study on the clash of two of the most powerful forces of the past 150 years – nationalism and Communism. That thesis, with some modifications, is the basis of this book.

The main focus of the book is an analysis and explanation of how communist theorists and practitioners tried to cope with nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union from the writings of Marx and Engels in the 1840s to the collapse of the Communist bloc and the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991. It argues that although ideological reconciliation was possible by conceptualizing the contradiction between nationalism

and Communism in terms of a dialectic, in the political field the contradiction was antagonistic to the point of breaking down socialist internationalism.

Although the book takes a survey approach, two siginificant illustrative case studies are used to look at the development of 'national Communism' in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: Czechoslovakia from 1948 to 1953 and Lithuania under the regime of Antanas Sniečkus.

The book also identifies a cyclical pattern of behaviour that characterized Communism's attempts to come to terms with nationalism and which recurred until the 1980s, at which time the ideological and political discrepancies created by the incongruence of nationalism and Communism had become so antagonistic as to act as a major catalyst in the collapse of the Communist system.

The question raised by the book's subtitle, *A Basic Contradiction*?, is as relevant to our own time as it was in the period between 1848 and 1991. Chapter 7 suggests that the difficulties that the socialist theorists and Communist leaders encountered with nationalism are not unique to the geographical, political, cultural and historical conditions of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Their experiences provide several important lessons and warnings for those concerned with European security and integration, those looking at the role of nationalism in the study of International Relations and those concerned with the persistence of the politics of identity in an increasingly globalized world.

The physical preparation of this book would have been infinitely more difficult without the assistance of my sister Dora. She was of great help in preparing the manuscript as I shuttled between Vienna, Cambridge and London. I am also grateful to the publishing director of Macmillan, T. M. Farmiloe, for showing a great interest in my work. My thesis supervisor, Geoffrey Stern, also deserves great credit for his enthusiastic support of my thesis and his encouragement in having it published as a book.

There are many people who helped me in the preparation of this work who deserve acknowledgement. I would like to thank Richard Drury for his help with the Czech translations, and Dr Miroslav Jindra of Charles University and Karel Kaplan of the Institute of Contemporary History in Prague for their advice on the chapter dealing with nationalism and Communism in Czechoslovakia between 1948 and 1953. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr Algirdas Jakučionis of Vilnius University for his help in tracking down source material in the Lithuanian archives, and to the director and staff of the Archives of Public Organizations in Vilnius. A special thank you also goes to Vytautas Tininis, who so openly shared his notes and stories about Antanas Sniečkus, and to Justis Paleckis, who took the time to be interviewed. All the librarians of all the institutes,

archives and libraries that I have used deserve mention, particularly those at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, who were always very accommodating and co-operative. In particular I would like to thank Mary Bone for her help in digging up information from Russian sources. Advice from those who read sections of the thesis is also appreciated.

1 Defining the Terms

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has been the subject of numerous published works. The rise of nationalism since the mid-1980s has also been the focus of a great deal of scholarship in the fields of International Relations, Sociology and History. However, few of the works which examine the downfall of Communism take a long-term perspective on the role that nationalism played in eroding the foundations of the Communist bloc.[1] Similarly, those works which focus on nationalism and ethnicity in the post-Communist period seldom look for explanations of the contemporary situation by examining the relationship between nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe between 1948 and 1989 and in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1991.

This book endeavours to fill that gap by making a broad-based, long-term analysis of the relationship between nationalism and communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union between the 1840s and the 1990s. Taking such a wide-ranging geographical and chronological perspective allows one to identify salient themes and recurrent patterns of behaviour that, over time, played such a significant part in determining international relations among Communist states and in the ultimate collapse of Communism.

Chapter 1 concentrates on defining the terms. Three types of communism are identified and discussed, and a significant amount of explanation is given to the difficult-to-define term 'nationalism'. Chapter 2 looks at how some of the early socialist theorists in Europe tried to reconcile nationalism with communism ideologically. A great deal of attention is paid to the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin as well as the Austro-Marxists and their critics. Chapter 3 discusses how, on coming to power, Lenin and Stalin were forced to move from socialist theory to communist realpolitik. It looks at what compromises were made to the previous theoretical principles for the sake of keeping the multi-national Russian empire intact. A cyclical pattern of behaviour is identified, pointing out the contradictions inherent in the Bolshevik approach to dealing with nationalism. This pattern will be discussed in subsequent chapters, particularly Chapter 6, where it is demonstrated how the contradictions became so antagonistic as to contribute in large measure to the collapse of the Communist system. Chapter 4 concentrates on Eastern Europe in the post-Second-World-War

period, where Communist regimes sought to gain legitimacy by portraying themselves as heirs to the great traditions of the nation. Czechoslovakia between 1948 and 1953 is used as a case study. Chapter 5 takes a wide perspective on developments in the Communist bloc between the death of Stalin in 1953 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, looking at the strains that national Communism put on what was to have been a system of socialist internationalism. Events in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Romania are given particular attention, while Lithuania under the regime of Antanas Sniečkus (one of the Soviet Union's longest-serving First Secretaries) is featured as an example of the shifts which occured within even the most orthodox Socialist Republics and People's Democracies during the 1950s and 1960s. Chapter 6 covers the period from post-Prague-Spring 'normalization' to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and highlights the role which nationalism played in the collapse of Communism. The book concludes in Chapter 7 by looking at what lessons can be drawn from the Communist experience with nationalism. It suggests that for many of the same reasons that the Communists had difficulties in coming to terms with nationalism, European politicians and students of International Relations will not be able to overlook the force of nationalism when considering issues of European integration and security and the broader question of the politics of identity in an increasingly globalized world.

THE TERMS

Two terms are central to this thesis: nationalism and communism. Definition of the salient features of these terms will allow readers to start from the same foundation of ideas, with the argument focused clearly towards certain key areas and themes which will recur throughout. Through the definition process it will become apparent that there are several dimensions to nationalism; but first we must begin with the three strands of communism, namely classical Marxism, Marxism–Leninism and 'really-existing socialism', or Stalinism.

COMMUNISM

In defining communism one must differentiate between classical Marxism and 'really-existing socialism' or Stalinism. Geoffrey Stern distinguishes the two by referring to the first as communism, a socio-political ideal, and

to the second as 'Communism', a twentieth-century political movement.[2] This small- and large-'c' distinction will be maintained throughout. In the process of considering these two types of communism we will have to consider a crucial third element that links the two: Marxism–Leninism.

Communism, the political ideal, was the creation of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Through their writings they developed the notion of a society created by proletarian power in the wake of the overthrow of capitalism in one country after another. The heart of the communist programme was the abolition of the private ownership of capital (or 'bourgeois private property'). Marx's view was that the state, which is to say, the government, laws and social conventions of a community, is in each phase of social development simply an instrument of class domination; in particular, in capitalist society, it is the instrument by which the capitalist class (consisting of the owners of the means of production) attempts to perpetuate its domination of the proletariat: hence, to quote the first line of the *Communist Manifesto*, 'the history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles'.[3]

According to Marx, the goal of communists should be to initiate their own class struggle so as to break the cycle of capitalist domination. Their immediate aims should be the formation of the proletariat into a class, the overthrow of bourgeois supremacy, and the conquest of political power by the proletariat. Explicit in this argument is that the aim of the proletariat should be to overthrow the state, if necessary by force. Implicit is the fact that the proletariat had to rely on the communists for leadership.

As Stern cogently summarizes in *The Rise and Decline of International Communism*, in the communist society envisioned by Marx and Engels the state and its bureaucratic apparatus have 'withered away'; the 'class system', together with the 'exploitation' it engenders, has been abolished; the 'idiocy of rural life' has been eliminated; and the new order of things has become sufficiently agreeable to the masses to enable them to give up the 'opium' of religious belief. It is a state of affairs, moreover, in which the division of labour is no longer necessary, since people can realize their potential for versatility and turn their hands to whatever task the community requires of them. In consequence, they serve the community by giving 'according to their abilities' and are rewarded 'according to their needs'.[4] For Marx and Engels, communism was regarded as the ultimate stage of economic development: a process that had originated with feudalism would pass through capitalism and evolve into true socialism. Marxism is a positivist and scientifically based world-view which posits that people and the course of history are determined by economic forces, and that the solutions to mankind's problems are therefore economic rather than

political. The key to historical change is not in men's minds, but in the system of production.[5]

But why communist and not simply socialist? Engels remarked in the introduction to the 1888 English edition of the *Communist Manifesto* that by 1847 'socialism' was a word used by 'the most multifarious social quacks, who, by all manners of tinkering professed to redress, without any danger to capital and profit, all sorts of social grievances',[6] whereas the real working men who realized and proclaimed the necessity of a total social change were the communists. Socialists were middle-class philosophers who talked about revolution; communists were those true revolutionaries who mounted the barricades.[7] As Engels writes: 'Socialism was, on the Continent at least, "respectable"; Communism was the very opposite. And as our notion from the very beginning, was that the "emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself", there could be no doubt as to which of the two names we must take.'[8]

According to Marx and Engels (who were themselves 'bourgeois', yet professed to represent the views of the working man better than the working man himself), the first step of the socialist revolution was for workers of each country to 'settle matters with its own bourgeoisie'. Having done so, the workers would unite, because they have more in common with workers in other countries than the exploitative bourgeoisie of their own. Classical Marxism is thus fundamentally internationalist. However, it is not cosmopolitan. As will be shown in Chapter 2, Marx and Engels neither envisioned nor advocated that the place of the nation within the international system would be replaced by an anational world arrangement. Rather, it was the place of the workers within the nation and the relation of nations to each other that had to change.

Lenin had a firm grasp of Marxism, and sought to bring its theory into practice. As a Marxist, he viewed the October Revolution as a catalyst for a greater European proletarian revolution which would lead to the overthrow of the old capitalist order and precipitate the rise of worldwide socialism.

But whereas Marx had written about overthrowing capitalism in Western Europe, yet had few ideas as to how to effect such change, Lenin found himself in a position to effect change, though in circumstances geographically and economically different from those most suited to the classical Marxist formula. In order to implement Marxism under these conditions, Lenin stressed the revolutionary aspects of Marxism, the need for democratic centralism and the importance of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. In *State and Revolution* (1917) he wrote: 'To limit Marxism to the teaching of class struggle means to curtail Marxism – to

distort it to something which is acceptable to the bourgeoisie. A Marxist is one who extends the acceptance of class struggle to the acceptance of the dictatorship of the proletariat.'[9] Thus, in direct opposition to the Marxist belief that the revolution would take place as a result of the inescapable tide of productive forces, Lenin, in order to accelerate the advance of the proletarian revolution in Russia, stressed the importance of a properly organized party of the working class led by professional revolutionaries – the Communist party.

Marx had predicted that the revolution would take place in advanced capitalist societies; Lenin argued that bourgeois-democratic revolutions in less advanced societies could eventually be transformed into fully fledged socialist revolutions.[10] For this reason, 'the Communist Party – a Leninist invention – was deemed to hold the key to "communism", and in popular parlance "Communism" became a code word for the Communist movement organized world-wide'.[11] The Party could not operate in abstraction:

> the Party center needs just that State which was supposed to wither away upon the socialization of the means of production, for protection of its rule over the productive forces of the society, as well as a new, devoted bureaucracy which would perform this protective service and simultaneously carry out the rule of the communist managers over the economy.[12]

Thus although the goal was still socialism, the means of achieving that end would require a leading role for the Party and a strong centralized state. The realities of Russian society and the threats of the capitalist world necessitated such 'really-existing socialism'. This type of Communism refers to the whole system of social power that crystallized in the USSR in the 1930s, was exported to Eastern Europe in the second half of the 1940s, and survived until the 1980s, when it began to collapse. It was characterized by the hierarchically organized control of all aspects of social, political, economic and cultural life, regulated by a narrow oligarchy seated at the apex of the party and state apparatuses, the *nomenklatura*.[13] Although socialist and democratic in theory, it tended to be uncompromising and authoritarian in practice. Reaching its zenith under Stalin, Communism and the monolithism it sought to impose 'was the political reflection of the ideology of perfection and omniscience; it meant the denial of the possibility of error or political neutrality'.[14] As Seweryn Bialer remarks, 'the ideal of mature Stalinism was to politicize all spheres of social and often even private endeavours and to depoliticize political processes'.[15] It was a system held in place by terror and patronage. It was made worse by the addition of Stalin's theory that the class struggle becomes more intense as

the proletariat moves closer to victory and the bourgeoisie becomes more desperate to hold on to its privileged position. Ironically Stalinism, in professing to realize Marxism, proved Marx's assertion that the state is an oppressive instrument used by the minority to oppress the majority.

Since Russia was the first country to introduce Communism successfully, its model was exported to Eastern Europe and beyond. As later chapters will demonstrate, the Soviet model was copied so faithfully that even its shortcomings and internal contradictions (particularly those concerning nationalism) became institutionalized in other Communist countries.

NATION, STATE AND PATRIOTISM

Before nationalism is defined here, two important clarifications must be made. These are the difference between the nation and the state,[16] and the difference between nationalism and patriotism.

Although the terms 'nation' and 'state' are often used interchangeably, they are not the same thing. A 'state' in world politics generally refers to an administrative unit based on territoriality (a 'sovereign' unit if it has a legal status).[17] A nation, using Anthony D. Smith's definition, is a human group sharing (usually by birth) a historical territory, common myths and historical memories, often a common language, a mass public culture, a common perception of threat and common legal rights and duties for all members; whereas a state refers exclusively to public institutions, differentiated from and autonomous of other social institutions, and exercising a monopoly of coercion and extraction within a given territory.[18] As Johann Gottfried Herder wrote, the state is a mechanism, the product of manufacture, whereas the nation is an organism, the product of growth. Activity in the latter is self-generated: in the former it is not. A social and political organization moulded from the outside, while it may qualify for recognition as a 'body politic', is none the less an artificial whole as compared to a community bound together by the inner consciousness of sharing a common cultural heritage and set of historical circumstances.[19]

This distinction is particularly important when looking at the relationship between Communism and nationalism, for the goal of most nationalists is to gain control of the state as a means of structuring the national will in order to make the state mechanism and national organism one and the same or, in other words, to build a nation-state. The Communists worked in reverse. Once they controlled the state they tried to gain control of the nation by championing its history and distinctive cultural traditions. As they would discover, one can hold power by controlling the

state; but one needs to secure the support of the nation to have legitimacy and authority.

Similarly, a distinction must be made between the oft-confused terms 'nationalism' and 'patriotism'. Patriotism stems from allegiance to a fairly well-defined existing or historical territory, *patria*, the motherland, one's ancestral homeland. Yet the connotation of patriotism goes deeper than this love of country. Patriotism stems from the notion, espoused most vociferously by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, that the emotions and loyalties which people had hitherto directed to their familiar surroundings and customs should now be transferred to the political community.[20] Thus patriotism is the conviction of a person that his or her own welfare, and that of the significant groups to which he or she belongs, are dependent upon the preservation or expansion (or both) of the power and culture of his or her society.[21]

Patriotism, therefore, means devotion to the interests of a particular state (defined territorially, as a political community and as a sovereign legal authority), whereas nationalism means devotion to the interests of a particular national community (and all that this implies, based on the above-mentioned definition of the nation). Self-evidently, in a nation-state the two overlap and the two terms can be used interchangeably, but the number of countries which can be called 'nation-states' in the strictest terms of definition are minimal.[22] Another point to consider is that love of the nation does not necessarily equate with love of the state. As will be demonstrated, Communist regimes tried to promote the idea of socialist patriotism, but this did not always win the support of the national community at which it was directed, because it was synthetic and did not represent the underlying national political culture. In most cases it was perceived by the people as something imposed, something foreign, whereas national consciousness is something that is (or has become) innate. One could argue, as many have, that certain elements of nationalism are also synthetic, even invented. There is certainly truth in this argument. But in order to debate that point further one must have a sense of what nationalism is.

NATIONALISM

A general definition of nationalism is difficult, for, as Smith writes in *National Identity*:

> Chameleon-like, nationalism takes its colour from its context. Capable of endless manipulation, this eminently malleable nexus of beliefs,

> sentiments and symbols can be understood only in each specific instance; nationalism-in-general is merely a lazy historian's escape from the arduous task of explaining the influence of this or that particular nationalist idea, argument or sentiment in its highly specific context.[23]

None the less, as Smith himself would admit, there are common elements to all types of nationalism, and one can therefore make a general definition of nationalism as follows: Nationalism is a social and political movement and/or ideology (which stems from the individual and collective consciousness of belonging to a particular political community and homeland, and which usually shares a common culture, economy, traditions, value systems, myths, historical memories and, in most cases, a common language) that seeks to achieve and protect the autonomy, unity and identity of the said nation (or potential 'nation') and realize its national will.[24]

It is vital to understand that nationalism stems from the individual and collective consciousness; without this consciousness there would be no nationalism. It is this sense of identity and this feeling of belonging that create the strong bonds which tie the individual to the national community and, by extension, bind the community together as a whole.[25]

It is beyond the scope of this work to go into an exhaustive explanation of the origins of nationalism. Those interested in the subject may refer to a number of books.[26] However, a brief survey of the growth of nationalism will shed light on the origins of nationalism's key prerequisite – national consciousness. Nationalism's growth has been characterized by various different forms in different parts of the world. Therefore, although the comments in this first chapter are on nationalism in general, one should keep in mind that the focus of this book is on a particular geographical area and set of historical circumstances, namely Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with particular reference to Czechoslovakia and Lithuania.

There are, for example, fundamental differences between East and West European nationalism. The primary difference between the two lies in the fact that the state preceded the nation in the West whereas the nation preceded the state in the East. In Western Europe, particularly England and France (and later in Germany and Italy, who had originally developed states – Prussia and Piedmont – which were not yet nations), the growth of multi-class literacy in a common language, mass education and a common literature crystallized the notion of a common culture and identity. Concurrently these nations developed the state apparatus of systemic, professional bureaucracies and a national, professional army. Thereafter the economy became increasingly national and regulated by the state and,

along with culture and bureaucracy, it became one of the three main pillars of the nation-state.[27] In such nations with well-established states, the national principle was, for the most part, one of civil nationalism associated with liberalism and democracy. Michael Ignatieff defines civil nationalism as envisaging the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values. The bond in such nation-states is common citizenship rather than common ethnicity.[28]

In Eastern Europe it was usually the other way around.[29] As the title of Ignatieff's book highlights, the bonds were based on a sense of 'blood and belonging'. In this respect, nationhood (culturally, historically, territorially and linguistically defined) was a birthright rather than a conscious choice. The individual did not determine his nation; rather, the nation determined the individual.[30]

Because of the emphasis on a community of birth, native culture, common language, common territory and shared customs and traditions, the Eastern ethnic-based conception of the nation was, at its roots, a community of common descent.[31] The notion of common descent, accompanied by the primordial bond to a particular spatial and temporal territory,[32] gives these nations a close and mythical attachment to history. A sense of continuity with a glorious past gives the future – their future – a historic right.[33] This was clung to with desperate determination for, in most of these countries, that 'historic right' was frequently threatened by foreign powers to the point of extinction. Moreover, as most nations regarded their people's Golden Age as that historical epoch in which their territorial acquisitions were greatest, one nation's glory was almost invariably another's tragedy. The chance of territorial claims overlapping was almost inevitable.[34]

All of these elements made (and continue to make) nationalism a potentially explosive force in Eastern Europe and the territory of what was the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, in these countries as elsewhere, nationalism is latent unless it is aroused. The element that sparks nationalism is national consciousness.

NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

National consciousness is a modern phenomenon that initially developed as a result of the French and Industrial Revolutions and the reactions these revolutions provoked when exported. The French Revolution gave nationalism its political and cultural dimension; the Industrial Revolution

put in place mechanisms that promoted homogeneity and common identity within states and, like the French Revolution, acted as a catalyst in awakening nationalism through the reaction that it provoked when exported abroad.

The French Revolution developed the notion that the nation is based on consent. Thus the nation was no longer considered to be the monarch's property: it was constituted by a sovereign people.[35] These people individually possess freedom, yet, due to an affinity (based on ethnic, linguistic and/or territorial ties) that they feel with the larger polity, they see that their individual aims can be best forwarded as part of the greater whole; therefore they surrender themselves to the 'general will' which they believe will seek to protect the unity, autonomy and identity of the nation. This is the naissance of the schizophrenia of nationalism. On the one hand nationalism is a liberating factor, while on the other a member of the national group is bound to the destiny of the nation in order to have that liberation fulfiled. To consider it another way, liberty and equality depend on fraternity: 'the rights of Man' are forwarded through the 'general will' which is so vital to the interests of the nation that it may be defended through a 'reign of terror'. As Rudolf Rocker remarks in *Nationalism and Culture*:

> The Revolution did, indeed, free the people from the yoke of royal power, but in doing so it merely plunged them into deeper bondage to the national state. And this chain proved more effective than the strait-jacket of the absolute monarchy because it was anchored, not in the person of the ruler, but in the abstract idea of the 'common will', which sought to fit all efforts of the people to a definite norm ... As the galley-slave dragged the ball at his leg, so the new citizen dragged through life the abstract idea of the nation, which had been set up as the reservoir of the 'common will'.[36]

Just as defence of the 'general will' can be corrupted at the national level, it is potentially explosive when exported. In pursuing their national aims, and exporting the Revolution, the French aroused national consciousness in others. Following the French example, national groups rallied around the idea of greater liberty, equality and fraternity, the politics of consent and the rights of man within the nation. Part of this awakened consciousness was acquired through following the French example, but the growth of national identity was also due to a perception of threat. As countries felt threatened, by the French and by each other, they rallied around common principles. It was, after all, not just their king who was

being attacked; it was their land and their culture that was being threatened, not by a foreign monarch but by a foreign people, a foreign nation. This sentiment was most passionately articulated by the German Romantics like Herder, who stressed that the state gained its legitimacy from the nation (and not vice versa) and hence the driving force of the nation-state was its people – the *Volk*. The interests of the *Volk* had to be preserved and forwarded at all costs. It was this notion, when exported East, that had such explosive repercussions.

The second catalyst that aroused national consciousness and moulded national identity was the Industrial Revolution. It initiated social and technological advancements which fundamentally reorganized society. Chief among these was the modernization of the printing press, which precipitated mass distribution of newspapers and books that in turn helped to homogenize mass consciousness and develop mass education. As Ernest Gellner points out, this dramatically changed the nature of society, for 'when general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just élite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify'.[37] Industrialization had other effects. Urbanization precipitated the movement of peasants into the cities. The intelligentsia along with the bourgeoisie came to see these peasants, who were of the same nationality but of a different class, as valuable allies in the fight to control the means of production which were in the hands of foreign owners. This is an inversion of the Marxian premise that workers had more in common with the proletariat of other countries than with their own bourgeoisie.

As with the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution not only created conditions which actively fostered national consciousness, it also provoked reactive national consciousness in others. It did so by starting a process of economic development, one that took hold faster in some countries than in others. The fact that development was uneven led some nations to expand at the expense of others and forced the lesser developed nations to find an indigenous solution for catching up to, or at least fending off, their more rapidly industrializing neighbours. Again the perception of threat is a catalyst for awakening national consciousness. This time the threat is economic.

In the 'The Modern Janus'[38] Tom Nairn sketches out the notion of uneven development as follows. Uneven development generates an imperialism of the centre over the periphery. One after another these peripheric areas are forced into a profoundly ambivalent reaction against this

dominance, seeking at once to resist it and somehow to take over its vital forces for their own use. This can only be done by a kind of highly 'idealist' political and ideological mobilization, by a painful forced march based on their own resources: that is, employing their 'nationality' as a basis.[39] The mobilization is driven by a sense that the national territory must be self-sufficient, or at least not excessively dependent on outside forces for its economic survival. Autarchy is therefore as much a defense of sacred homelands as of economic interests.[40] This will become evident when we examine the rise of national Communism in Eastern Europe (particularly Romania) in the 1960s and the economic growth of the Baltic republics in the 1980s.

In trying to propel itself forward, a society turns inward. This is a natural reaction, for man is a social animal and seeks group identity. When threatened he follows a primitive and instinctive survival technique and bands together with his fellow men. In this respect 'modern nationalism signifies a more or less purposeful effort to revive primitive tribalism in an enlarged and more artificial way'.[41]

For this reason, although one may argue that nationalism does not have primordial origins, it nevertheless manifests itself in primordial ways. At the same time as turning inwards, the national community also looks backwards, using examples of past national glories for inspiration. This point was made by Herder in his 'Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind' when he wrote:

> The more a group is threatened, the more it will turn in upon itself and the closer will be the ties of its members. To avert dispersion they will do everything to strengthen their tribal roots. They will extol the deeds of their forefathers in songs, in patriotic appeals, in monuments, and thereby preserve their language and literary traditions for posterity.[42]

This is not a reversion to nostalgia. As John Hutchinson remarks in *Modern Nationalism*, drawing on one's history teaches not tradition but 'a modernization from within: to combine a sense of distinctiveness given by indigenous traditions with the progress provided by modern science through a regeneration of indigenous culture and institutions'.[43]

Generated by insecurity, this revival of tribalism or historically inspired modernization brings with it a tendency towards national self-centredness. The virtues that it celebrates are exclusively and solely those of the 'national self', and the crimes it condemns are those that threaten to disrupt that self.[44] As a result, to some degree the nation is defined not so much by what a people is, but by what it is not. It becomes a conceptualization of 'us' defined by the presence of 'them'.[45]

> Nationalism signifies the awakening of the nation and its members to its true collective 'self', so that it, and they, obey only the 'inner voice' of the purified community. Authentic experience and authentic community are therefore preconditions of full autonomy, just as only autonomy can allow the nation and its members to realize themselves in an authentic manner.[46]

Smith's point must be clearly understood to appreciate the later distinction that will be made between the Communists' superficial attempts to use national symbols in order to gain legitimacy by portraying themselves as the heirs to the great traditions of the nation, and the genuine national culture which reflected the authentic national community and its shared experience.

Although the experience must be authentic, just as important is the way that it is brought to the surface in a manner that can be identified with and understood by the people. Those who draw on these attributes and bring them to life are the élite, usually intellectuals. These 'intellectual-awakeners', as Gellner calls them, looked to the glories of the past to resurrect dormant or oppressed identity and create a high culture that could rival the existing foreign high culture. For example, the Czech nationalist Karel Havlíček wrote in 1850: 'As a nation, our life was almost gone ... This miserable generation had to be told the story of their great ancestors, who had feared neither the tyrannical worldly popes nor the land-hungry Emperor.'[47]

Whereas national identity in most Western European nations was fostered relatively easily because of an already existing linguistic and cultural homogeneity and religious uniformity (which were spread by the Reformation and the Enlightenment), the countries of Eastern Europe were stratified by class, religion, language and overlapping territorial ambitions. Of course, the development of a common national identity in many Western European states (like England, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) took some time and had to contend with competing identities. But in relation to Eastern Europe, it had the advantage of being grafted to a strong state identity. As Karl Deutsch observes in *Nationalism and its Alternatives*, Eastern European society was like a layer cake, with a topping of skilled foreigners and the privileged élite who spoke a different language and sometimes even professed a different faith from the masses. This layer cake was further complicated by the imposition of empires – Byzantine, Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungarian.[48] Eastern nationalist movements therefore started from a handicapped position, as they did not operate on behalf of an already existing, well-defined and codified high

culture, which had marked out and linguistically pre-converted its own territory by sustained literary activities ever since the early Renaissance or since the Reformation, as the case may be.[49] There were educated élites who were aware of a national culture and history and who wrote in the native language, but their task was difficult for, as Gellner remarks in *Nations and Nationalism*, these attempts at national awakening 'presided or strove to preside, in ferocious rivalry with similar competitors, over a chaotic ethnographic map of many dialects, with ambiguous historical or linguo-generic allegiances, and containing populations which had only just begun to identify with these emergent national high cultures'.[50]

These 'intellectual-awakeners' did not invent nationalism. As Smith writes, 'A hero cannot create a nation *ex nihilio*. He requires not just dedicated followers and an organization, but latent sympathies among the chosen population.'[51] These sympathies come from common ethnicity, common culture and a collective sense of shared historical experience. As Barnard remarks, an individual's consciousness of belonging to a distinct community is a derivative social and cultural process, the result of the continuous interaction – in both a temporal and spatial sense – between the self and the socio-cultural setting of its environment.[52] In many cases nationalism is certainly a self-defining phenomenon, and there can be mythologized or, indeed, invented traditions which can play a powerful role in insighting nationalist feelings; but that is not the same thing as suggesting that these 'intellectual-awakeners' are creating 'imagined communities'.[53] Robert Kann says it best when he compares the national awakeners to surgeons who restore to its natural function a limb which had been almost paralysed, but not severed from the national body, by a crushing blow of political destiny.[54]

In order to have wide appeal, nationalism needs to draw on historical sentiment. Tom Nairn explains that the increasingly nationalistic middle-class intelligentsia had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation-card had to be written in language that was understood by all. That is why a romantic culture quite remote from Enlightenment rationalism always went hand-in-hand with the spread of nationalism.[55] Nationalism was therefore usually painted in the Romantic colours of folk culture, with its symbolism and imagery drawn from the healthy, pristine, vigorous life of the peasants, of the *Volk*, the *narod*.[56]

Culture is therefore a key component of nationalism. For the reasons stated earlier, this is particularly the case in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It is the touchstone from which national identity and consciousness draw their strength. As Smith writes in *National Identity*, 'more than a style and doctrine of politics, nationalism is a form of culture – an

ideology, a language, a mythology, symbolism and consciousness – that has achieved global resonance, and the nation is a type of identity whose meaning and priority is presupposed by this form of culture'.[57] It should be noted with particular attention that nationalism is both a form of culture and cultural in form. This might seem redundant, but it will be a vital consideration when we come to look at the Communist notion that something could be national in form as long as it remained socialist in content. What the Communists failed to realize is that, in its cultural dimension, nationalist form begets nationalist content. By allowing nationalist form one implicitly allows nationalist content, for the form is a celebration of the content and a manifestation of one's allegiance to the nation and all that it represents. In their seminal work *The Political Uses of Symbols*, Charles D. Elder and Roger W. Cobb write about the relationship between national content and form:

> By definition, significant political symbols serve as common focal points for people's orientations toward politics. Those orientations constitute an important link between the individual and the larger polity, binding him to some, while distinguishing him from others. Thus, shared symbols become the currency through which personal, or micro-level, motives are given social, or macro-level, meaning.[58]

This symbolism, whether it be in the form of flags, anthems, parades, coinage, postage stamps, oaths, folk costumes, war memorials, passports, ceremonies of remembrance for the national dead, the fine arts (music, poetry, sculpture, painting, literature), folklore, folk songs, customs, traditions and, perhaps most importantly, language, are not window-dressing. They are the essence of nationalism. They embody a country's particular national traits, beliefs, traditions and history, making them visible and distinct for every member of the nation. They are outward manifestations of the patterns of values and symbols that the national community sees as fundamental to its identity. They communicate the tenets of an abstract ideology in palpable, concrete terms that evoke instant emotional responses from all strata of the community.[59] By allowing national forms one perpetuates the survival of the nation. By articulating and making tangible the ideology of nationalism and the concepts of the nation, ceremony and symbolism help to assure the continuity of an abstract community of history and destiny.[60]

A proviso must be made here: there must be an appreciable recognition by the individuals and community that the symbols in question do indeed represent a deeper political culture.

POLITICAL CULTURE

In its most general sense, political culture is 'the configuration of values, symbols and attitudinal and behavioural patterns underlying the patterns of society'.[61] It has objective and connotative properties, usually of a symbolic quality. But as Lowell Dittmar remarks, political culture does not consist of mere 'symbols', to be manipulated by élites for the pacification of the masses and the maximization of their own income, safety and deference, but must make claims to political reality and commitments to action. The political culture must be reflective of a collective consciousness; it must have a morally satisfying relationship to the political reality to which it refers.[62] As the Communists would discover when trying to foster a sense of 'Soviet' identity, the historical and cultural elements of political culture are most vital. In that sense political culture is like a nationally shared apperception – a cumulative integration of the nation's previous knowledge and experience into its collective understanding of present reality.[63] Granted, some aspects of this identity may be invented or based on mythology, but they must still strike a chord with the nation's sense of itself. I therefore profoundly disagree with David Kertzer's assertion that 'the nation itself has no palpable existence outside the symbolism through which it is envisioned',[64] for this would suggest that there is no deeper collective consciousness behind the symbols.

As will be pointed out in later chapters, it is the morally satisfying elements which can give national political culture a powerful influence and therefore, when absent, can make the regime's use of national symbols look cynical and hollow. As David Paul observes,

> if the political leadership of a society holds a set of values and operates according to political orientations that are in conflict with those of the political culture of the national community, the latter will tend to resist the programs and policies of the leaders. To the extent that the resistant groups are strong enough to obstruct the successful application of the government's policies, the leaders will be constrained to modify their political actions and expectations.[65]

The élite may endeavour to impose a political culture, but if this is at odds with the underlying national political culture there will be an ideological chasm between rulers and ruled which, if not bridged, will make the élites illegitimate in the eyes of their people. The affective relationship of citizens to their political system therefore imposes limits on the effectiveness

of the system in shaping the political culture of the people.[66] That is because

> popular support – i.e. identification with such an ideology comes only if it interprets and provides an appropriate attitude for an *experienced* reality. This experience may, of course, be politically manipulated – but a symbol or an ideology without a relevant experience is meaningless and impotent in terms of evoking identification.[67]

THE POLITICAL ELEMENT

Once national consciousness is aroused it must be channelled. Here one must recall the earlier definition of nationalism and the fact that nationalism is a social and political movement. Gellner makes the point most succinctly: 'Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.'[68] John Breuilly reinforces this sentiment when he writes in *Nationalism and the State*: 'nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics, and that politics is about power. Power, in the modern world, is primarily about control of the state. The central question, therefore, should be to relate nationalism to the objective of obtaining state power.'[69] This political dimension was first clearly expressed in the 'Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen' (1789) when it stated that: 'The principle of sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation; no body of men, no individual, can exercise authority that does not emanate expressly from it.'[70] This was an extraordinary declaration, for it professed the same rights for nations as it did for individuals. Collective rights and national sovereignty were being accorded the same status as natural law and human rights. This became an even more dangerous precedent when mixed with German Romantic *Volk* messianism.

One must not confuse the 'general will' with the *Volksville*.[71] Rousseau's idea of the 'Will' was based on a social contract, whereas *Volksville* stemmed from deep roots of ethnic, historical and cultural identity which were inherited at birth. What is common to both is the condition wherein defence of the nation is regarded as paramount and legitimate. Ignatieff has put it this way:

> The moral claims that nations are entitled to be defended by force or violence depends on the cultural claim that the needs they satisfy for security and belonging are uniquely important. The political idea that all peoples should struggle for nationhood depends on the cultural claim

> that only nations can satisfy these needs. The cultural idea in turn underwrites the political claim that these needs cannot be satisfied without self-determination.[72]

Self-determination is therefore the process wherein a cultural nation becomes a political state.[73] As will be noted in Chapter 3, Lenin got into considerable trouble when he failed to make this connection.

To this point it has been established that nationalism is a political ideology with a cultural doctrine at its centre.[74] But this explanation does not go far enough, as it does not account for what is at the heart of nationalism: spirituality. Nationalism is primarily a political principle, politics is a function of culture, and at the heart of culture is spirituality.

RIVAL SALVATION MOVEMENTS

In *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Smith describes nationalism and communism as two rival 'salvation movements' of modernization.[75] This is a very apt description, for both nationalism and communism have striking similarities to religion. Both are 'rooted in the secularization of the Biblical faith in world history as a single comprehensive conception, a connected whole, and in the recognition of man's own activities as a determining element in the historic process'.[76] Both are also messianist; in communism man's deliverance will come through the state, in nationalism through the nation.

It was noted above that nationalism signifies the awakening of the nation and its members to its true collective 'self', so that it, and they, obey only the 'inner voice' of the purified community. This use of religious terminology is not purple prose. It is a reflection of the fact that nationalism is an identity solution which, like religion, offers spiritual comfort. This is a theme which will be returned to in Chapter 7 in the context of nationalism and the politics of identity in the post-Cold-War context. But as the religious qualities of nationalism and communism are referred to throughout this work, it is also worth examining this phenomenon as part of the definition of terms.

The nation-state is the modern guide and stimulus to collective purpose.[77] As Gellner remarks, society no longer worships itself through religious symbols; a modern, streamlined, on-wheels high culture celebrates itself in song and dance, which it borrows (stylizing it in the process) from a folk culture that it fondly believes itself to be perpetuating, defending and reaffirming.[78] 'Like any other religion, nationalism is to a large extent a social function, and its chief rites are public rites performed in the name

of and for the salvation of the whole community.'[79] The nation is the community of believers, and by being part of it one gains a sense of fellowship. The nation is conceived as eternal. Yet although being eternal, nationalism has the added appeal of being immediate. It is therefore more accurate to refer to it as a millenarian movement rather than a religious one, for the salvation of nationalism is attained in this world as well as the next. Perhaps the surest proof of the religious character of modern nationalism is the zeal with which devotees have laid down their lives on battlefields of the past 200 years.[80] Those who sacrifice themselves to this end become heroes: their sacred names live on in national monuments, national cemeteries and in the immortality of the unknown soldier.

Nationalism has liturgical forms – lowering and hoisting the flag, saluting the flag. It also has catechisms – the oath of allegiance. It has a teleology in constitutions, and its national halls, parliaments and those buildings devoted to its founding fathers are its temples. There are festivals and saints' days for founding fathers and national heroes. The national anthem is the *Te Deum* of the new dispensation; worshippers stand when it is intoned, the military stand at attention and the male civilians take off their hats, all with external respect and veneration.[81]

Nationalism also possesses religion's negative attributes. It parallels to some extent what Julius Braunthal in *The Paradoxes of Nationalism* describes as 'the baffling manifestation of religious sentiment in the past: the persecution of heresy, morally justified by the all-pervading assumption that the Church was a law unto itself – and that therefore every action of the Church, however cruel and however repulsive, was sanctified.'[82] It is easy to see the short step from here to xenophobia, racism, Fascism and ethnic cleansing. This relates back to a point made earlier about the 'us'-versus-'them' characteristic of nationalism. 'We' are the chosen ones. As chosen ones we, or at least our nation, is infallible. As Hayes cogently points out: 'We are willing to assail the policies and even the characters of some of our politicians, but we are stopped by the faith that is in us from doubting the Providential guidance of our national state. This is the final mark of the religious nature of our modern nationalism.'[83]

Communism possessed many of these attributes too, in some cases to a greater degree. As George Weigel wrote in *The Final Revolution*, we miss the essence of Marxism–Leninism [and, one could add, Stalinism] – the essence that accounts for its mythic power and its ability to hold on to what it has seized over time – unless we understand it as a religion.[84]

Communism had all the elements of a traditional religion: its principles were laid down in formal texts, fixed assumptions, socio-economic and political rules. Venerated scriptures composed by authoritative 'prophets'

contained those norms and dogmas which were authoritatively interpreted by approved agencies (Communist parties), and in case of doubt, by the supreme authority in Moscow.[85] It had a doctrine and a theory of salvation (in this case through revolution). It had an ecclesiology (a theory of the Church: in this case, the Party). It had a Holy Trinity (Marx, Lenin, Stalin), saints, martyrs and a theory of apostolic (or diabolical) succession. Communist leaders were God-like: they were the chosen few who knew what was best for the people. They were to be reviled, praised and obeyed. Communism also had rituals, temples, icons, mausoleums and sacred texts (the *Communist Manifesto, Das Kapital, What Is to Be Done*?). Of these texts the *Manifesto* is the most sacred for, as A. J. P. Taylor remarked, it 'contains nearly all the elements which were to make Marxism the last and most contemporary of the great religions. It provided both a system of historical development and a programme for political action.'[86] Communism, like nationalism, also had a very strict way of dealing with heretics and unbelievers. Like nationalism, it provided its followers with an identity solution and a sense of faith, salvation and community.[87] Like nationalism, it is a millenarian movement. It gave hope to the wage slaves of capitalism the way Christianity gave hope to the slaves of the Roman Empire. Indeed, Marxism went one better, for the *Communist Manifesto* assured the wage slaves that they would win in this world rather than having to wait for the next.[88]

Therefore, as millenarian world views and identity solutions, the two have a great deal in common. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7, Marxists and nationalists can be seen to share a concern for Man's alienation and his reintegration and return to his authentic state of being.[89]

> Both ideologies present existing social and political structures as polarised around conflicting interests and values; on the one hand, the occupying or threatening alien and his collaborators locked in battle with freedom-fighters of an oppressed nationality; on the other hand, the class conflict of propertied capitalists and propertyless proletarians. In between the elect and their oppressors there is no room for intermediate strata, the passive spectator or the collaborator.[90]

THE UNIQUENESS OF ENIGMATIC NATIONALISM

However, despite these similarities, nationalism and communism diverge in several fundamental areas. Whereas Communism is dogmatic, deterministic and universalist, nationalism is undogmatic, subjectivist and parochial.[91]

Marxism is constrained by doctrine, exclusive to class, or a particular set of economic circumstances.

> Nationalists have never been committed to Lenin's idea of the dedicated, professional, vanguard élite; nor have they sought inspiration or guidance from specific centres of doctrine or organization, as communists look to Russia or China. On the contrary: nationalist movements look to native traditions and local virtues.[92]

Nationalism has a warmth and pietistic character which communism lacks. It is not so coldly and impersonally materialist. On the one hand, nationalism relates man to his nation's past and identifies him and his descendants with the future life of the nation. In many ways this link is very concrete, especially in terms of ties to a particular language, culture and territory. On the other hand, nationalism can be a very abstract phenomenon that is rather nebulous, emotive and intangible. In this respect it is a powerful identity solution, and can often act as a catch-all receptacle of dissent during times of crisis. It is these qualities which make nationalism so difficult to define. It also helps to explain why the study of nationalism is a growing field, yet one which often seems to bog down in polemics. As the Communists discovered, these characteristics also make nationalism a very difficult force to control.

2 Reconciling the Basic Contradiction

This chapter will examine the views of some of the major socialist theorists and look at how they tried to reconcile the basic contradiction between nationalism and communism, both ideologically and politically. It will become apparent that socialist theorists had difficulty defining and coming to grips with nationalism for the same reason sociologists do, namely that it is a diversified phenomenon that defies monocausal explanations.[1] They suffered from the additional handicap of being uncompromisingly shackled to economic determinism which, because of its historico-materialist perspective, regarded nationalism as nothing more than an epiphenomenon of capitalism. Their inability to tackle nationalism head-on created a cognitive dissonance between the strict parameters of ideology and the complexities of reality: a gap which, as it widened, led to a paradoxical situation wherein the socialists hardened their ideological intransigence at the same time as they made political decisions which were inconsistent with these same ideological statements.

MARX AND ENGELS

Marx and Engels had difficulties coming to terms with nationalism quite simply because they regarded it as something that was not really worth coming to terms with. For them the real unit of history, and therefore the unit of historical analysis, was the whole of human society, not any of its component geographic, political or linguistic parts. Unlike later Communists who professed to be following in his footsteps, Marx did not believe in the possibility of a 'revolution in one country', because he recognized no 'history in one country'. Instead he looked at the world in terms of a struggle between feudalism and communism which took place in a supra-national setting. Until the events of 1848, Marx and Engels did not think that national or state boundaries imposed a meaningful restraint on the operation of those larger causal units that gave rise to such events as revolution. They did not think that a state or nation constituted an objective entity capable of analysis.[2] As a result, their limited work on the subject of nationalism was vague, and fraught with wishful thinking, contradictions and sweeping generalizations. The main problem for Marx and

Engels was that in a world-view so based on metaphysics, economic determinism, positivism and the objective laws of social development there was little room for the unquantifiable. A theory attributing technological and socio-economic changes as the primary determinants of historic development is incompatible with the idea of the nation as an eternal datum, an unfathomable national spirit which is expressed in every facet of life, or the notion of a national fate and destiny which affect members of the national community, regardless of class, and which class influences only incidentally.[3] Regis Debray notes this shortcoming of Marxism:

> Marxists always complain of their inadequate understanding of the nation. But this 'inadequate theory' is not accidental: the nation resists conceptualization because Marxism has no concept of nature. It has only concepts of what we produce. How could it have a concept of what we do not determine – that is, not what we produce, but of that which produces us?[4]

For Marx and Engels the nation-state (their term) was primarily an economic unit, an objective condition that stemmed from a rational set of circumstances. It was the product of capitalism. Therefore as capitalism was a transitional phase on the evolutionary path to socialism, so too was its by-product – nationalism. As capitalism would evolve into socialism, nation-states would wither away (or at least be controlled by enlightened internationalists) and there would be no impetus for nationalist sentiment. As Marx used the terms nation, state and nation-state interchangeablely it is unclear whether he meant that the nation or just the state would wither away. One of the few clues comes when he discusses the situation of the Communes in France during the nineteenth century:

> The unity of the nation was not to be destroyed, but, on the contrary, to be organized by the communal constitution. The unity of the nation was to become a reality by means of the destruction of the state power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity but wanted to be independent of, and superior to, the nation. In fact this state power was only a parasitic excrescence on the body of the nation.[5]

Ironically, in the name of Marx, 'really-existing socialism' would later become a similar excrescence on the body of the nation.

It follows that Marx did not think that the nation would wither away. In the *Communist Manifesto* he prophesies that, as the exploitation of one class by another will be put to an end, the exploitation of one nation by another will follow: 'in proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come

to an end'.[6] In order for the exploitation within and between nations to come to an end the proletariat must rise to be the leading class ('national class' in the German edition of the *Manifesto*) of the nation, 'must constitute *itself* the nation'. It will then become national, 'though not in the bourgeois sense of the word'. This would suggest that in an international socialist system one could have nations without nationalism.[7]

Marx does not satisfactorily explain why nations will wither away if the proletariat becomes the national class and why, having become the national class, they will not be national 'in the bourgeois sense of the word'. He merely states:

> Communists are distinguished from the other working-class parties by this only: (1) In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. (2) In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.[8]

Without explaining why, he would have us believe that workers of the world are benevolent and internationalist in their world view. Engels actually said as much when he told the Festival of Nations in London in 1845 that 'the great mass of proletarians are, by their very nature, free from national prejudices and their whole disposition and movement is essentially humanitarian [and] anti-nationalist'.[9]

This view was predicated upon the conceit that 'the working men have no country'. Workers had no stake in the existing order. Deprived of the elementary rights and attributes of citizenship and control over the means of production, the oppressed workers of one country were indistinguishable from those of another by these vital facts of deprivation.[10] But that is not to say that workers did not aspire to have a homeland. Indeed, as was just pointed out, Marx stressed in the *Communist Manifesto* that workers should rise to be the national class. What would happen when the workers gained the elementary rights and attributes of citizenship? What if their interests were represented by the state or, indeed, if they became the 'national class'? In all fairness, these questions would have seemed somewhat optimistically irrelevant in the mid-nineteenth century. Marx and Engels were writing the *Manifesto* at a time when conditions for the workers were deplorable and their representation in political life was minimal. They could not have foreseen that the worker would gain a stake in his homeland so quickly and peaceably. But what is important to keep in mind is that although Marx and Engels could not have anticipated the extent to which

nations would become socialized, their successors who lived through these changes venerated the works of Marx and Engels so uncritically that the basic anti-national premisses on which they were based (although outdated even within Engels' lifetime) remained part of the communist creed.

Marx's theory, based on what one observer described as 'naive internationalism and undifferentiated monistic materialism'[11] was very tidy but too simplistic. The basic point that he failed to appreciate, or perhaps admit, was that during and because of the nation-state's evolution a 'superstructure' of patriotic feeling and national loyalty developed (or was created, depending on which sociologist you subscribe to)[12] which transcended class loyalty. As Walker Connor writes:

> His predilection for an economic interpretation of history caused him to slight the importance of psychological, cultural, and historical elements, and, therefore, to underestimate the magnetic pull exerted by the ethnic [or national] group. Since the nation was to Marx essentially an economic unit, the question of political legitimacy was reduced to economic ties. This led him to believe that ethnic minorities should and would be content to consider themselves as members of the larger nation to which they were economically wedded. Marx held that workers in a modern industrialized setting were deaf to ethno-national appeals that conflicted with their economic interests. Regardless, then, of dissimilarities in culture and ethnic traditions, identification with a given nation rested simply upon ties to an economic unit.[13]

As later chapters will show, these were characteristics which Lenin, Stalin and their successors would under-estimate as well. This is rather ironic, for in postulating universality and a withering-away of cultural and national peculiarities the Communists were espousing an idealist (or utopian) concept which had no connection with the theory of contradictions as a permanent motor of history.[14] In *The Break-Up of Britain* Tom Nairn identifies this shortcoming as being representative of a much deeper malaise in Marxism. 'Unable to foresee the real contradiction of Progress, its catastrophic side, this tradition of thought has also thereafter found it consistently impossible to apprehend and digest the fact properly. In turn, this blind spot has consistently become the fertile source of all modern irrationalism.'[15]

A monocausal theory based on rationality (often inconsistently applied) quickly comes unravelled when faced by the irrational. Man is not an economic animal, and the nation is not strictly governed by economic determinism. Thus, as Debray astutely points out:

> There are huge gaps in Marx, and ... those which are more than just gaps – the central contradictions lodged in the system – always have to

> do with the nation. In this small gap, everything not said in Marxism is concentrated and crystallized. And when the unsaid is said, it explodes all the rest. In this sense ... the nation is like the atomic nucleus in a general conflagration of Marxism as theory and socialism as practice.[16]

Many of these contradictions came to the surface during and after the revolutions of 1848. The revolutions, which could have been an ideal testing-ground for the proletariat revolutionaries, did not follow the predicted Marxist path. Nationalism showed itself to have much stronger appeal than socialism. The great heroes of 1848 were Guiseppe Mazzini, Italian prophet of nationalism, and Lajos Kossuth, Governor of (briefly) independent Hungary. This was a major drawback for Marx and Engels, for as Szporluk asserts:

> After Marx formulated what he thought was the question of the age – communism or capitalism? – the nationalists responded with several answers: 'Poland!' 'Ireland!' 'Serbia!' ... This did not mean that they refused to recognize the issues raised by socialism, only that their stand on capitalism versus socialism was dependent on which of the two was better for their nation in given circumstances.[17]

The events of 1848 caused Engels and Marx to move from the ideological to the political, from the abstract to the concrete. On the one hand the revolutions showed them the power of nationalism and they therefore sought to use it to their own ends as a device that could be combined with social revolution in an effort to overthrow the existing order. Nationalism as an overall concept was still not the issue. Instead the challenge was how to assess a multitude of individual national struggles on a case-by-case basis in order to determine their usefulness to the wider goal of the class-based international socialist revolution. In these struggles nationalism would be a tool which, like any other, could be used to further proletarian internationalism: 'since nationalism was not one of the principles that they recognized as valid for its own sake, they were prepared to sacrifice it at any point in the interest of the larger policy'.[18]

On the other hand, Marx and Engels felt that the revolutions vindicated their theory that nationalism was a by-product of capitalism. Those states that were the most nationalistic were the least developed. They would therefore have to be encouraged to modernize in order to pass through the phase of capitalism and then on to socialism. If they could not modernize quickly enough they would have to be dissolved or assimilated by larger economic units.

As a result of these criteria, Marx and Engels became very forthright in their support of certain national movements, which they interpreted as

being in the vanguard of the international revolution, and equally outspoken in their criticism of those who stood in the way of this revolution. For example, they supported self-determination for Ireland and Poland: an independent Poland would reduce the power of Tsarist Russia; an independent Ireland would be a blow to imperialist Britain. Poland and Ireland were therefore considered revolutionary and progressive even if their transition towards capitalism was very slow. But in supporting these two nations because of their strategic significance as bulwarks against the conservative and reactionary forces of 'Anglo–Russian slavery', Marx and Engels were forced to concede that the fulfilment of national demands was a prerequisite for social democracy, because in both Ireland and Poland the basic democratic task – agrarian revolution – was impossible without national independence. The social revolution could only advance once the national question was settled.[19]

This would become a recurring theme for Communism; failure to deal with nationalism meant that Communists could never move on to the social revolution. To combat this, nationalism had to be harnessed in order that revolutionary transformation could go hand in hand with national independence. This sometimes meant compromising socialist ideals as long as the ends would serve the revolutionary cause.

This was clearly demonstrated in Marx's support of revolutionary forces in Russia. For Marx, Russia was the embodiment of reaction and imperialism. The collapse of Russia was so vital to the international revolution that any means of overthrowing the Tsar and the whole conservative regime were justified. In a letter that he wrote, but never sent, to the editorial board of *Otechestvennye Zapiski* [*Notes of the Fatherland*] in 1877, Marx implied that means of developing socialism in Russia would be different from those employed in other countries:

> events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historical surroundings [lead] to totally different results. By studying each of these forms of evolution separately and then comparing them one can easily find the clue to this phenomenon but one will never arrive there by using as one's master key a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical.[20]

This is certainly a revealing statement from the father of one of the most rigid 'super-historical' and 'historico-philosophical' theories of all time. It shows Marx's willingness to sacrifice certain principles in order to adapt to and accommodate the phenomenon of nationalism. It also shows how he saw himself as a revolutionary, not a Marxist. Sacrifices to the letter of Marxism were permissible if one was fighting in the name of its spirit – a convenient argument used by later Communists.

However, although nationalism was to be supported where it forwarded the greater cause of the international proletarian revolution and certain alliances could be made in order to accelerate the pace of that revolution, the basic underlying theme in the writings of Marx and Engels was one of internationalism. But a qualification must be made here. Except for certain strategically important exceptions like Poland and Ireland, Marx and Engels favoured internationalism of advanced industrial nations.

According to Marxism, the advance of society presupposed a rich material foundation which only highly industrialized methods could create. Industrialization was most effective in large-scale production and in countries with viable, relatively homogeneous internal markets. This helps to explain why Marx and Engels supported the unification of Italy and Germany. The establishment of large, integrated societies was seen as a necessity for advancing from feudalism to capitalism and ultimately to socialism. Any nations which stood in the way of this development were counter-revolutionary. Such nations 'whose whole existence represents a protest against historical revolution' had 'the mission to perish in the revolutionary world tempest'.[21]

In forwarding these economic arguments Marx and Engels could not escape their own political and national prejudices. Engels was particularly outspoken in his criticism of the 'Southern Slavs', who in his opinion lacked the 'primary historical, geographical and industrial conditions for independence and viability' and therefore had no future. Not only did these 'bull-headed nations' have no future, they had no past. 'Such, in Austria, are the pan-Slavist Southern Slavs, who are nothing but the residual fragments of peoples, resulting from an extremely confused thousand years of development.'[22] Particular scorn was heaped upon the Czechs (regardless of the fact that one can hardly consider them 'Southern' Slavs).

> The Czechs, among whom we would include the Moravians and Slovaks, although they differ in respect of language and history, have never had a history of their own. Bohemia has been chained to Germany since the time of Charles the Great. The Czech nation freed itself momentarily and formed the Great-Moravian state, only immediately to come under subjection again and for five hundred years to be a ball thrown from one to another by Germany, Hungary and Poland. Following that, Bohemia and Moravia passed definitely to Germany and the Slovak regions remained with Hungary. And this historically absolutely non-existent 'nation' puts forward claims to independence?[23]

As harsh as Engels' criticism was, he could sympathize with the Czechs to a point. In an article written from Cologne during the Prague rising of June

1848 Engels, while attacking the Germans for being reactionary, steps to the defence of the Czechs by saying:

> Are the Czechs at fault for their willingness to attach themselves to a nation which oppresses and ill-treats other nations while freeing itself? Are they at fault for refusing to send representatives to an assembly like our miserable, half-hearted Frankfurt 'National Assembly', which trembles at the prospect of its own sovereignty? Are they at fault for disowning the impotent Austrian government, whose indecision and paralysis seems to serve neither to prevent nor to organize the dissolution of Austria, but only to confirm it?[24]

However, where the Czechs and the southern Slavs went wrong, in the eyes of Engels, was that they never banded together to join in the interests of the great European proletarian revolution. Putting nationalism and Pan-Slavism above internationalism was a cardinal sin. Ironically, Engels' writings betray the fact that this opinion had more to do with his own national biases than theoretical arguments based on economic considerations. For Engels, a larger economic association of Slavs did not constitute a viable economic unit. As he wrote in '*Der demokratische Panslawismus*' ['Democratic Pan-Slavism']:

> The Pan-Slavists want to join the revolution on condition that they gain – without taking into account the most basic material conditions – the independent Slav states for all Slavs without exception. The revolution does not allow men to put conditions to it. Either one is a revolutionary and accepts the results of revolution, whatever they are, or man is driven into the arms of the counter-revolution and will himself one morning – maybe entirely unwittingly and in spite of himself – wake up arm in arm with Nicholas and [Austrian Prince Alfred] Windischgratz.[25]

He reinforced his point in 'Germany and Pan-Slavism':

> Pan-Slavism is not merely a movement for national independence, it is a movement that strives to undo what the history of a thousand years has created, which cannot attain its ends without sweeping Turkey, Hungary and half of Germany off the map of Europe, a movement which – should it achieve this result – cannot ensure its future existence except by subjugating Europe. Pan-Slavism has now developed from a creed into a political programme with 800,000 bayonets at its service. It leaves Europe with only one alternative: subjugation by the Slavs, or the permanent destruction of the centre of their offensive force – Russia.[26]

This is a very confused view of history and a gross misreading of the contemporary situation since most Slavs, including the President of the Slavic Congress, the Czech historian František Palacký, worried about the expansion of Russian influence and the establishment of a 'universal Russian monarchy' even more than Engels himself.[27] Indeed, most of the 'Pan-Slavs' were Austrophiles who saw the maintenance of the Austrian empire's territorial integrity as a key security guarantee against German and Magyar domination. What they wanted, however, was a more equitable arrangement within that empire.

It took more than 50 years for the socialist theorists to work this out. As a result Communists held a suspicious view of Eastern European nationalism while the labour movement in Germany, in particular, remained to a great extent faithful to the notions of the Pan-Slavist terror directed by the Russian monster. This spectre, believed in by Marx and Engels and exploited by others, made German labour enthusiastically endorse the war of 1914[28] and caused communists to ostracize Central and East European national movements to the extent that their worst fears of Fascism and anti-communism became self-fulfilling.

What this demonstrates is that Marx and Engels had a very short-sighted and self-serving view of nationalism. One could go as far as A. J. P. Taylor and say that they had no true grasp of nationalism, only a desire to dictate what was right and wrong for the expediency of Marxism and a desire to discredit the champions of national freedom who were their revolutionary rivals.[29] The result was a gradual shift, precipitated by the events of 1848, towards grand theories about the relationship between nations rather than classes. As Connor remarks, Engels' interpretation of the events of 1848 read very much like a morality play where entire nations had come to denote the forces of enlightenment and progress, a role previously reserved for the proletariat, while other entire nations were given the negative and reactionary characteristics formerly attributed to the feudal aristocracy and the bourgeoisie.[30] Using terminology borrowed from Hegel, nations were classified as having a history or as being history-less, classifications not only incorrect (for in many cases the only thing that some of the Southern Slav nations had was a history) but also completely irrelevant to a theory based on economic determinism. As Connor points out, 'such an indictment of entire peoples requires a stereotypical approach to nations [as racial rather than class-based units] that is hardly consonant with a class analysis'.[31] The post-revolutionary view therefore implied that it was not so pertinent for states to wither away as it was for some nations – small ones, economically backward ones, ethnically heterogeneous ones, ones with no history or ones which were politically

inexpedient – to wither away (or assimilate to larger ones) so as to accelerate the international proletarian revolution.

Marx would argue that this was a reflection of their belief that the letter of Marxism could not be allowed to get in the way of its spirit. However, despite their linguistic acrobatics they could not escape the pull of their own German nationalism. Their writings display the attitude that, of all nations with a history, Germany's was one of the richest. As a large economic unit, its role was to assimilate smaller ones, especially the Slavs.

> These dying nationalities, the Bohemians, Carinthians, Dalmatians, etc., had tried to profit by the universal confusion of 1848, in order to restore the political status quo of AD 880. The history of a thousand years ought to have shown them that such a retrogression was impossible; that if all the territory east of the Elbe and Saale had at one time been occupied by kindred Slavonians, this fact merely proved the historical tendency, and at the same time physical and intellectual power of the German nation to subdue, absorb and assimilate its ancient eastern neighbours; that this tendency of absorption on the part of the Germans has always been, and still was, one of the mightiest means by which the civilization of Western Europe had been spread in the east of the continent; that it could only cease whenever the process of Germanisation had reached the frontier of large, compact, unbroken nations, capable of an independent national life, such as the Hungarians, and as in some degree the Poles, and that, therefore, the natural and inevitable fate of these dying nations was to allow this process of dissolution and absorption by their stronger neighbours to complete itself.[32]

The physical and intellectual power of the Germans? Germanization? This, like Engels' condemnation of the Slavs and other 'historyless peoples' as 'ethnic trash', smacks of chauvinism, social Darwinism and even racism. It is also profoundly un-Marxist. 'Classical Marxism, of course, would dictate against the existence of such class-transcending national traits. Even more fundamentally would it dictate against group characteristics of an immutable, transepochal type since such characteristics, as part of the super-structure, should necessarily reflect only a particular economic stage.'[33] It is also an inconsistent argument in so far as it equates nationalism with pre-modern barbarism, when previously Marx and Engels had argued that nationalism was a by-product of capitalism.

On the issue of nations and nationalism and communism's association with both, Marx and Engels left their successors with a great deal of confusion and many unanswered questions. For example, how and when was support for a nationalist movement justified? When did 'antiquated

national prejudice' turn into 'honourable national spirit'? Did internationalism mean the abolition of nations or just the overthrow of states? When was imperialism a positive force? Who spoke for the 'nation' in a workers' world?[34] Connor makes this caution:

> Care should... be taken not to mistake the significance of the inconsistencies and ambiguities found in Marx and Engels concerning the relation-ships between scientific socialism and nationalism. What is significant about these inconsistencies and ambiguities is that they illustrate the basic incompatibility between classical Marxist assumptions and national realities, and also illustrate the manner in which the founders of Marxism, despite their conviction that they could manipulate national sentiments to serve their movement, came themselves to be influenced more substantively by national concepts than they were probably aware.[35]

Thus, the fathers of communist theory were also the fathers of communism's inability to come to terms with nationalism. They were the first to use and misuse nationalism, and in that respect set certain precedents which their successors accepted as basic truths. These included the consideration that nationalism was an economically determined phenomenon (an epiphenomenon of capitalism), and that nationalism could be a useful tool in accelerating social revolution. They also unwittingly set the influential precedents of sacrificing ideology for the sake of political expediency and letting their own national biases cloud their theoretical and political judgements.

THE NATIONALIZATION OF SOCIALISM

Marx's and Engels' ideas were formulated at a particular stage in European economic development, when conditions suggested that the workers had little or no interest in the state. In 'Anti-Duhring: Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science', Engels wrote that 'the state was the official representative of society as a whole, its concentration in a visible corporation; but it was this only in so far as it was the state of that class which alone in its epoch represented society as a whole'. He therefore extrapolated that 'when the state finally becomes truly representative of society as a whole, it makes itself superfluous'.[36] But as the Industrial Revolution evolved, the conditions of the worker and his relation to the state changed. Increased prosperity for the owners of the means of production also brought with it increased prosperity for the proletariat. This

confounded Marx's prediction of the law of increasing misery and Engels' notion that the state would make itself superfluous. The growth of the social welfare state, the rapid expansion in numbers and importance of urban populations, the spread of mass culture, the dissemination of the ownership of capital, the growth of workers' organizations and the political consciousness of the workers, together with the introduction of universal compulsory education, protective social legislation and the extension of the franchise led workers to have both a stake and an interest in the state. Workers became more interested in using their organizations to constitutionally further their immediate interests – like improving their working conditions – and were less concerned with any long-range revolutionary aims. They wanted more capitalism, not its abolition. They wanted the state structures to be strengthened, not for the state to wither away. In addition, they ceased to regard the state solely as an instrument of capitalist domination.

This was a reciprocal arrangement. Not only did the proletariat rely more on the state, but governments had to consider how they could best protect the interests (and win the support of) the previously disenfranchised and politically marginalized working classes. E. H. Carr sums up this reciprocity in *Nationalism and After* with the phrase 'the socialization of the nation has as its corollary the nationalization of socialism'. He elaborates on this by saying:

> The socialization of the nation for the first time brings the economic claims of the masses into the forefront of the picture. The defence of the wages and employment becomes a concern of national policy and must be asserted, if necessary, against the national policies of other countries; this in turn gives the worker an intimate practical interest in the policy and power of his nation. ... National policy was henceforth founded on the support of the masses; and the counterpart was the loyalty of the masses to a nation which had become the instrument of their collective interests and ambitions.[37]

The worker thus now *had* a homeland, and, as Geoffrey Stern notes, whilst the Marxist slogan 'Working men of all lands unite!' could still prove an effective rallying-cry, the idea that they had 'nothing to lose but their chains' became increasingly outdated.[38] Once the nation was seen as the unit commanding working-class loyalty because it secured the interests of their class, socialists could not be indifferent to its fate.[39] If changes were to come, they would have to come through reform and not revolution. The predominant doctrine of the Second International thus resembled the 'reformism' which had been roundly condemned by Marx.

Chief among these 'reformists' or 'revisionists' was the German social democrat, Eduard Bernstein. He observed that modernity changes the character of nationalism and makes it acceptable to the aims of the worker.[40] Thus it was time that social democracy 'should find the courage to emancipate itself from a philosophy which has, in fact, long been outmoded, and be willing to show itself for what it really is – a democratic socialist party of reform'.[41] His argument was that instead of working against the state to produce the revolution, the proletariat might co-operate with the state while waiting for the revolution to unfold. The revolution was still treated as an inevitable event that no amount of effort could accelerate or postpone; but in the meantime concrete benefits could be gained by working in co-operation with the state.[42]

The reformers realized that it was not only the state which had to be considered. As Bernstein was forced to admit, 'national diversity and the historical element rooted in tradition are of far greater significance than we and our scientific teachers had originally assumed'.[43] The combination of these considerations led them to conclude that nationalism and internationalism, at least in the short term, were not necessarily incompatible. Thus the German socialist Georg von Vollmar could address the Stuttgart Congress of the Socialist International (1907), '*Es ist nicht wahr dass international gleich antinational ist. Es ist nicht wahr, dass wir kein Vaterland haben.*'[44] These views were shared by the Austro-Marxists.

BAUER AND RENNER

Austro-Marxism was a school of thought that did not associate itself very closely with the mainstream socialist parties of Western Europe, yet at the same time did not feel completely comfortable with the rigid theoretical approach of the orthodox left.

> The scheme of thought that they developed was a theory of society, open to criticism and correction, not a dogmatic creed such as Bolshevism became. On the other hand, unlike the reformist labour parties, they had a social theory which informed and guided their political action; they did not have to depend upon scraps of doctrine gathered from the most diverse sources and haphazardly utilized in each particular situation.[45]

Their position on the political spectrum between the Socialists and the Bolsheviks is reflected in their efforts to form the 'second and a half' International in February 1921 for those parties (including the Mensheviks)

who had withdrawn from the Second International but who were unhappy with the dogmatic rigidity of the Communist International.

The views of two of the most influential Austro-Marxists, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, were markedly different from those of Marx and Engels. Being Austrians, they had first-hand knowledge of the complexities of the nationalities problem in the Austro-Hungarian empire. Bauer wrote in 'What is Austro-Marxism?' (1927) that the Austrian Social Democrats knew from studying the political and demographic situation within the empire that nationalism 'defied analysis by any superficial or schematic application of the Marxist method'.[46] Marxism had been incapable of solving the nationalities problem. It was time to give the issue a thorough analysis for, as Bauer realized, 'we can only defeat bourgeois nationalism ... when we discover the national substance of the international class struggle ... we must defeat nationalism on its own ground'.[47] This was a radical departure from past socialist theorists, for it implied that nationalism was not only an entity with its own dynamic (as opposed to an epiphenomenon) but was also one that was capable of blocking the path to socialism. Nevertheless, the inspiration behind the Austro–Marxist attempt to come to terms with nationalism was in keeping with Marx's tactical use of nationalism; for the aim of the Austro-Marxists, as with Marx before them and subsequently with Lenin, was to use what was valuable in the national movement for the benefit of the socialist movement, and to neutralize what was harmful to it.[48]

In stark contrast to Marx and Engels, both Bauer and Renner used the nation as their starting-point. Their aim was not to destroy the nation, but rather to enhance it by giving the proletariat its rightful place within it. As Renner wrote in 1918, social democracy accepted the nation as the 'carrier of the new order'. It 'considers the nation both indestructible and undeserving of destruction. ... Far from being unnational or anti-national, it places the nations at the foundation of the world structure.'[49] Bauer had been even more explicit on this point when he wrote in *The Concept of the Nation* (1907):

> The transformation of men by the socialist mode of production leads necessarily to the organization of humanity in national communities. The international division of labour leads necessarily to the unification of the national communities in a social structure of a higher order. All nations will be united for the common domination of nature, but the totality will be organized in national communities which will be encouraged to develop autonomously and to enjoy freely their national culture – that is, the socialist principle of nationality.[50]

This, of course, is not the socialist principle of nationality, but the Austro–Marxist principle of nationality. Marx was an internationalist and not a cosmopolitanist, and therefore would agree that humanity should be organized in large national units; but accentuating the importance of national communities and encouraging the development of national culture is a significant departure from the spirit and letter of classical Marxism. What is most interesting in the Austro–Marxist interpretation is the fact that the nation is regarded as a cultural rather than an economic community. Standing Marxism on its head, their point was that the triumph of socialism would mark not the dissolution of the nation, but rather its affirmation, in the sense that it would be a cultural community which for the first time included the mass of the population, hitherto excluded from sharing in the cultural goods of the nation.[51]

To the Austro–Marxists not only was the nation undeserving of destruction, but the integrity of the Austrian empire had to be defended. This assertion stemmed in part from their belief in the merits of large economic units and also in part due to their desire to substitute what they considered to be the threat of Russian Pan-Slavism with (German-dominated) Austrian federalism.[52] As a result, in the eyes of the Austro–Marxists the fate of multinational social democracy was inextricably linked with the fate of the empire.

> The dismantling of the Danubian Empire under the impact of nationalist separatism was sure to be taken to demonstrate the greater vitality of nationalism, and to prove that after decades of international socialism, proletarians of the various races were unable to prevent their class enemies from disrupting the common home of the working classes of the different ethnic groups. As a result the Austrian Social-Democrats – ostensibly a party of revolution – emerged as the staunchest upholders of the indivisibility of the venerable monarchy, and as objectively the most reliable ally of the dynasty, and the state party of Austria par excellence.[53]

Renner considered himself a federalist and felt that large states, organized as federations, constituted the best foundation for alleviating nationalist demands. A federalist, said Renner, 'is one who separates what is separated by nature, and gives the separate part the necessary autonomy, yet at the same time takes care of the organic relations and harmonious incorporation of the single parts into the whole'.[54] Using Switzerland and the United States as his models, he advocated a federalist system for Austria that would allow regional administrative units to be autonomous on matters of direct concern, like culture, education and control of

municipalities, within a wider superstructure that would control trans-federalist issues like defence, foreign policy and economic issues. It was a vision that differentiated between national rights and state rights, or, in his words, *'Nationsrecht'* within *'Staatsrecht'*.[55] By separating nationality from statehood and national administration from state administration, and by giving the nationalities a limited amount of control over cultural matters, it was hoped that the national element could be contained within the cultural sphere and thereby depoliticized.[56] He felt that this model of *Nationsrecht* within *Staatsrecht* would not only solve the nationalities issue within the Austro-Hungarian empire but could also provide a model for the socialist organization of the world as a whole.

The concept of national cultural autonomy was the centre of debate at the All-Austrian Social Democratic Congress at Brünn (Brno) in 1899. At the Congress two resolutions were submitted. The first, introduced by the Austrian Social Democratic Party's Central Committee, supported the idea of the territorial autonomy of nations. A second resolution submitted by the Committee of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party went even further, saying that 'every nation living in Austria, irrespective of the territory on which its members reside, constitutes an autonomous group which manages all its national (linguistic and cultural) affairs quite independently'. This resolution, stressing extra-territorial rather than strictly territorial recognition of national groups, was withdrawn for lack of support and a compromise resolution was passed that recognized national autonomy within the boundaries of the Austrian state.[57] More specifically it called for the division of the Austrian Empire into provinces that coincided as closely as possible with the territorial distribution of the nationalities, and the granting of full autonomy over cultural and educational affairs to each national region. It deliberately did not specify the scope of political sovereignty that each unit would have in managing its own national affairs, nor did it attempt to address the thorny issue of the rights of minorities in ethnically heterogeneous areas.

Although Bauer did not have a hand in drafting the Brünn resolution, its central theme – national cultural autonomy – was very much the focus of his writings. Bauer was less concerned with the idea of the organization of multinational states than in the rise to power of the working class through the vehicle of the multinational state. He believed that, on the one hand, socialists had to support the aspirations of national groups in an effort to overthrow the bourgeoisie who misrepresented the national interest by merely wrapping their class interests in the flag. It was up to the proletariat to take back their rightful place within the nation. This was particularly the case for those states which Marx and Engels had considered historyless.

National liberation would accelerate the process towards development because only when nations would be free from all forms of oppression would they be in a position to develop. Yet, at the same time, one had to make sure that the proletariat's drive for national expression did not lead to national self-determination; and the way that this could be achieved was through recognizing and encouraging national cultural autonomy. One can see here the naissance of the later Stalinist idea of 'nationalist in form, socialist in content'. Bauer's position was that one would allow the nationalities to express their individuality, but this would be confined to the cultural rather than economic and political fields. However, as the Communists would later discover when trying to tackle the nationalities problem within the Soviet Union, this overlooks the fact that cultural autonomy is closely linked with political autonomy, and allowing the first acts as a catalyst to achieving the second. It is surprising that Bauer overlooked this point, for he showed a very shrewd and deep understanding of the elements which contribute to the rise of national consciousness.

Bauer believed that a nation is a stable and permanent 'community of fate', evolving through the reciprocal interaction of groups which are united through shared historical experiences unique to every community: 'the nation is the totality of men bound together through a common destiny into a common character'.[58] The nation, therefore, cuts across boundaries of class.

As already noted in the cases of the French and Industrial Revolutions, one catalyst for the rise of national consciousness is defensive unity in the face of an external threat. Bauer felt that national minority dissatisfaction was closely linked with social dissatisfaction. If one got rid of oppression, one would eliminate a major impetus for nationalism. As he wrote in 'Socialism and the Principle of Nationality' (1907): 'The nation is only manifested in the national character, in the nationality of the individual; and the nationality of the individual is only one aspect of his determination by the history of society, by the development of the conditions of the techniques of labour.'[59] His observation of Czech–German relations in Bohemia showed him that the Czech middle class's struggle for more equitable distribution of industrial ownership and greater access to capital and autonomy in matters of taxation became fused with calls for equal status of the Czech language with German and for more schooling in Czech. These grievances unified all social strata against German economic, political and cultural domination,[60] and led Bauer to submit that in the capitalist stage of development, national oppression was transformed class oppression and national hatred was transformed class hatred. Capitalism, therefore, created a nationalistic class-conscious proletariat rather than an internationally oriented one. He thought that socialism could hitch its

wagon to this discontent and promote democracy while overthrowing the existing order. When, as a result of slow revolution, society would divest social production of its capitalist integument, the unitary nation as a community of education, work and culture would emerge again.[61] In the socialist stage of development (according to this interpretation) nations would not wither away but would be strengthened. As Ephraim Nimni points out, the goal was that under socialism, as happened under clanic primitive communism, the whole population would belong to the national community; the crucial difference is that, this time, it would not be a static community of descent but a dynamic community resulting from the socialized enjoyment of the fruits of production.[62]

The nation, therefore, was a central element in the Austro-Marxist vision of social development. It was felt that only socialism would give the whole people a share in the national culture, just as only socialism would give all people a share in the means of production. Bauer was very explicit on this point: 'With the uprooting of the population through social production, and the development of the nation into a homogeneous community of education, labour, and culture, the more circumscribed local associations will lose their vigour, while the bond which unites all members of the nation will become increasingly strong.'[63]

This meant that the task of the International 'can and should be, not the levelling of national peculiarities, but the engendering of international unity in national multiplicity'.[64] A similar philosophy would be repeated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s with his call for the Soviet Union to have 'a strong centre and a strong periphery'. The assumption was that national groups, while enjoying their cultural uniqueness, would subordinate their political and economic interests to those of the international movement, just as nationalities would sacrifice autonomy for stability within the Austrian empire.

In this assessment Bauer, like some of his contemporaries, downplayed (or deliberately overlooked) the territorial component of nationalism. He advocated 'extra-territoriality' by proposing that members of each national community could participate in the cultural affairs of the national community that they identified with, regardless of their place of residence. Peter Zwick explained the motive behind Bauer's proposal:

> By treating nationality like religion, in allowing anyone who identified with a particular group to participate in formulating its doctrine and practices, Bauer hoped to avoid the problems of governing regions inhabited by many nationalities in the inevitable oppression of minorities living in an area dominated by a powerful nationality.[65]

But extra-territoriality and national cultural autonomy have their limits, even among so-called socialist internationalists. Since nationalism is cultural in form and content, allowing for the flourishing of national culture heightens national consciousness and this in turn often raises political aspirations. This would be a recurrent problem for Communists when coming to terms with nationalism, and was clearly evident in the way that the Czech socialists behaved within the Austrian Social Democratic Party.

THE CZECH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE *GESAMTPARTEI*

The motivations and actions of the Czech Social Democrats in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries demonstrate the role that nationalism played in ripping apart the Austrian Social Democratic Party (*Gesamtpartei*) and even to some extent the Austro-Hungarian empire. The split and collapse of the *Gesamtpartei* is also a portent of the causes and effects of the debates on polycentrism and 'many roads to socialism' which would preoccupy the Communist world between the Yugoslav defection of 1948 and the Prague Spring of 1968.

Ethnic differences were by definition inadmissible in trade unionism. But nationalism has a funny way of redefining relations on its own terms.[66]

Rapid industrial growth in Bohemia in the late nineteenth century changed the social and economic balance between the Czechs and Germans. Whereas previously the Germans had controlled the means of production, increasingly it was the Czechs who were owning and operating factories and industries. Increased economic prosperity led to a heightened sense of political and cultural identity. This national awareness manifested itself within the trade unions and the Social Democratic Party. For example, in 1868 the Czech social democrat Josef Barak voiced the concern that 'we recognise workers' brotherhood, but this should be based on something else than a platform draped with German flags'.[67]

A full Czech Social Democratic Party of Austria was created at the Gross–Brevnov Congress of 4 July 1878 calling for, among other things, self-determination of nations.[68] That being said, the Czech Social Democrats usually worked closely with their German counterparts, as they had many common concerns. Co-operation developed to the extent that a common party organizational structure was adopted. Due in large part to the mediating skills of Victor Adler, in 1889 a unified Austrian Social

Democratic Party (*Gesamtpartei*) was formed at the Hainfeld party congress. Through it Party members of all national groups fought together for political liberalism and social reform for all nationalities of the empire. Most significantly, they jointly fought for universal manhood suffrage which was achieved successfully in 1907.

Nevertheless, the Czechs regarded the *Gesamtpartei* as more of an alliance than a unified party. Although this had always practically been the case, it was made *de jure* when, at the 1897 Vienna Wimberg Congress, the *Gesamtpartei* was divided into six ethno-national parties. This decision – which made a virtue out of necessity – effectively made the Czech Social Democratic Party autonomous.

Increasingly, social and economic issues overlapped with cultural and political ones. The rising strength of the Czech lobby can be noted in Prime Minister Count Casimir Badeni's language ordinance of April 1897 giving the Czech language official parity with German in Bohemia and Moravia. The growing strength of the Czechs in many areas of society caused resentment among the Germans, one which manifested itself in the trade unions in particular. The first general congress of trade unions in 1893 became bogged down in accusations and counter-accusations which had more to do with national cultural issues than labour ones. The rift became so great that in 1897 the Czechs set up their own Czecho–Slav Union commission in Prague.

Because of growing industrialization and the simultaneous rise in Czech nationalism, mainstream political parties increasingly championed social issues. The socialists had to look over their shoulder at parties like the Young Czechs and the more chauvinistic National Socialists who were winning the support of disaffected workers by identifying social emancipation with populist nationalism. In order to retain support the socialists were forced to pay closer attention to national issues. This risked splitting the *Gesamtpartei*, but by the late nineteenth century they had few alternatives:

> while the social democratic leadership pretended indifference towards the Czech nationalist struggle, socialist local branches (*delnicke besedy*) were in fact the mass bases of violent nationalism; socialist youths founded secret societies at whose meetings proletarian songs mingled with ardently nationalist ones; the bulk of the demonstrating nationalist crowds, especially those arrested during riots, were Czech workers. The socialist leadership proved incapable of solving this conflict of dogma and reality, and consequently within the next years the social democratic party passed into the hands of nationalistically minded young men.[69]

This new generation argued that internationalism was synonymous with Great Germanism (an argument that would later be used against the Serbs and Russians by minorities in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union). It is interesting to note that the Czechs perpetrated the bogey of Greater Germanism (which bore no resemblance to the true state of German–Habsburg relations) in the same way that others equated the Czechs with the pan-Slav menace. Neither threat was as crystallized as the other believed, but they were powerful rallying symbols none the less.

In 1899 at Brünn, a compromise was worked out to hold the Austro-Hungarian empire together as a democratic federation of nationalities. But this spirit of compromise was shortlived. In 1904 debates flared up again within the trade unions.[70] When these debates spilled over into the *Gesamtpartei* the integrity of the party as well as the empire were put at risk.

> It was no longer a matter of obtaining concessions or even rights, certainly no more a situation where Czechs were being, for pragmatic reasons, granted facilities for a supra-national body. The Czechs were striving to secure attributes, conditions, resources, assets, institutions, instruments of a nation in the form of an integrated pattern. The Czech workers under the leadership of the Czech Social-Democratic party were out to assume the role of the national class of the Czech nation in the making. For the purpose of leading and moulding the nascent Czech nation, they needed to assume the powers, to play the part, to perform the tasks of the national class. For the political organization alone, without the powerful base and the economic power provided by trade unionism was not enough.[71]

Ironically, what had driven the Czechs to this end was their ambition to fulfil Marx's directive that the workers should strive to become the national class. In doing so they demonstrated the contradiction between nationally defined socialist movements and the ideological and organizational dictates of supra-national and international socialist organizations. Despite the mediation efforts of the Communist International at a series of so-called 'unity conferences' the rifts were unbridgeable. The united Austrian Social Democratic Party broke up in 1911.

The collapse of the *Gesamtpartei*, like the revolutions of 1848, was a sign of things to come. As will be pointed out below, the contradictions which led to its dissolution manifested themselves again during the First World War, in the debates over self-determination in Russia and then the Soviet Union, and later in relations between the People's Democracies and Moscow and in intra-state politics in federal Yugoslavia.

LUXEMBURG AND KAUTSKY

For the orthodox and left wing members of the First International, views like those of Bauer and Renner bordered on heresy and were responsible for the breakup of socialist movements along national lines. Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky epitomized the excesses of the Marxist monistic materialist approach, rejecting any compromises of Marx's linear logic of the progression of forces from feudalism through capitalism to socialism. Although they often disagreed with each other over certain issues, both were bound to a limited analysis of the national phenomenon by an epistemological stance which could only recognize the position of a so-called superstructural phenomenon in terms of a chain of causality directly derived from the conjunctural relations of classes in a limited historical setting.[72]

For Kautsky each national community or nationalist movement had to fit into the process of social transformation determined by universal laws. Consequently the national phenomenon could only be properly understood within a framework compatible with the teleology of a universal and linear process of social evolution which leads to the eventual dissolution of the nation.[73] As he implied when stating that 'the good of our nation is not the guiding light of our action',[74] internationalism, not nationalism, should be the goal of every good socialist.

Kautsky put particular stress on the linguistic component of nationalism. He felt that in breaking down linguistic barriers, one could break down national divisions. Therefore he suggested that just as larger economic units would assimilate smaller ones, smaller linguistic units should be assimilated into larger ones. The process would actually be interconnected, for the smaller ones would have to learn the language of the larger economic units in order to do business with them and in the process would inevitably realize the economic benefit of becoming part of the larger unit.

In a similarly simplistic generalization, Kautsky – who was greatly influenced by Darwinism[75] – argued that the more developed a state, the greater its ethnic homogeneity. In this materialistic survival of the fittest, economic and linguistic assimilation was the only hope for those states which were heterogeneous and 'abnormal'. Otherwise, like unripe grapes on the vine, they would wither and die.[76]

Ironically, Kautsky was a case in point of a socialist who became greatly affected by the nationalization of socialism. His comments concerning internationalism were influenced by his belief that the Austrian empire should be held intact under German leadership. The linguistic and national minorities to which he referred were those groups like the Czechs,

Slovenes and Croats, who he perceived as threatening the integrity of the Austrian empire. Indeed, his pro-German bias was such that he went on to support Germany's entry into the First World War, a stance which roused the wrath of Lenin.

One Social Democrat who remained uncompromising to the end was Rosa Luxemburg. Despite being Polish, she spoke out adamantly against self-determination in general and for the Poles in particular. Encouraging workers to develop their national consciousness was regarded by Luxemburg as a complete repudiation of classical Marxism and potentially damaging to the cause of the international proletarian revolution. She maintained that by emphasizing nationalism one would give the workers the idea that their exploitation and bad conditions were the result of the nationality of their oppressors rather than the capitalist system.[77] It would thereby force the workers to identify their interests with the bourgeoisie, since the bourgeoisie were at the forefront of national movements. This would in turn pit workers of one nation against another, which would be a betrayal of the ultimate goal of workers of the world – unity. Thus, for her, there was either imperialism or socialism, but no middle ground.

She worried that recognition of self-determination for Poland would trigger a series of similar movements which would 'lead to the dissolution of the compact political struggle of all proletarians in each state into a series of fruitless national struggles'.[78] Consequently, Luxemburg was very outspoken in her opinion that Polish workers should unite with Russian workers to forward the cause of international revolution, rather than with the Polish bourgeoisie to push for Polish self-determination. She maintained that national self-determination by one group would lead to calls for self-determination by others – a cycle destructive to establishing the conditions necessary for the growth of internationalism. She was so adamant in this view that in 1893 she broke away from the Polish Socialist Party and founded the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania in order to campaign against the creation of a separate Polish state. She did not subscribe to Marx's view (supported by Lenin) that national revolution could be the trigger for social revolution, but maintained that imperialism was so all-pervasive that national revolutions were simply power moves which were exploited by the Great Powers in their bigger imperialist game. For Luxemburg, the goal was to overthrow the whole capitalist world through international proletariat revolution, not to chisel away at its edges by supporting petty national struggles.

She felt that there was no choice but for the international socialist movement to emphasize social rather than national emancipation. Her view was that national oppression is only one aspect of the process of

oppression in general, which is the direct result of the division of societies into classes: consequently, the main task of the working class was to abolish the very root of the system of oppression, the class society. Since all forms of oppression were derived from the need to sustain class divisions, the emancipation from class societies would necessarily bring about the end of the oppression of nations.[79]

Following from this logic, it was up to the workers to help develop capitalism. Peter Zwick sees the irony in Luxemburg's theory, for what she was in essence saying was that 'the working-class movement was to contribute to the ultimate collapse of capitalism by doing everything possible to help it develop'.[80] By developing capitalism, the conditions for the growth of socialism would be put in place. Only when socialism was in place could national self-determination be considered. As she wrote in the *Junius Pamphlet* of 1916: 'International socialism recognizes the right of free independent nations with equal rights. But socialism alone can create nations, can bring self-determination of their peoples.'[81] There is a flaw in this argument, namely why and how does socialism create nations if nationalism (and presumably nations) are an epiphenomenon of capitalism? As internationalism is neither cosmopolitanism nor anarchy, there are still going to be nations in an international socialist system. Does this mean that internationalism would create conditions where, because the class system would be abolished, oppression of one nation by another would automatically be done away with, or does it mean that once workers controlled their states they, being of internationalist perspective, would be able to solve inter-national grievances? These questions, left unanswered, would come up again most notably in the context of national Communism, as will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Luxemburg's insistence on sticking to the iron laws of economic determinism show up the shortcomings of her own, and again Marx's, inability to come to terms with these questions and the broader issue of nationalism. As Gilbert Badia concludes in *Rosa Luxemburg*: '*Contradictoire et controverse, le problème national dont Rosa Luxemburg avait bien vu l'importance, mais non la solution, demeure un des problems capitaux de notre epoque*.'[82] She would not be the last.

LENIN

On the question of nationalism, Lenin tried to steer a course between the orthodox left wing and the social democratic right. The outcome of this compromise illustrates the inherent dilemma of communism. Ideologically

his underlying argument sided with the orthodox left. As he stated in 'Critical Remarks on the National Question': 'Marxism cannot be reconciled with nationalism, be it even the "most just", "purest", most refined and civilised brand. In place of all forms of nationalism Marxism advances internationalism, the amalgamation of all nations in the higher unity.'[83] However, when it came to addressing the political realities of the nationalities question in Russia, Lenin espoused the right of self-determination, a policy that allowed for even more political independence for national groups than the Austro-Marxist notion of 'national cultural autonomy' that he so bitterly attacked.

Having lived in Kraków, Lenin was familiar with the nationalities problem within the Austro-Hungarian empire and with the debates that were going on within the Austrian Social Democratic Party. He rejected their notion of 'national cultural autonomy', calling it reactionary – a force which 'drugs the minds of workers, stultifies and disunites them in order that the bourgeoisie may lead them by the halter'.[84] As he articulated in his 'Theses on the National Question' (1913), national cultural autonomy was a negative and potentially divisive phenomenon as it contradicted the internationalism of the class struggle of the proletariat, made it easier for the proletariat and the masses of working people to be drawn into the sphere of influence of bourgeois nationalism and was 'capable of distracting attention from the task of the consistent democratic transformation of the state as a whole, which transformation alone can ensure... peace between nationalities'.[85]

Lenin's criticism of national cultural autonomy was due in large measure to his belief in the merits of orthodox, as opposed to reformist, Marxism. He was quick to reiterate the Marxist dogma that 'the slogan of working-class democracy is not "national culture" but the international culture of democracy and the world-wide working-class movement'.[86] The existence of national movements was merely a superstructural response to the requirements of the bourgeois class.[87] Nationalism, being an epiphenomenon of capitalism, would wither away if one dealt with its source – economic inequality. Thus as he noted in 'Critical Remarks on the National Question': 'Those who seek to serve the proletariat must unite the workers of all nations, and unswervingly fight bourgeois nationalism, domestic and foreign. The place of those who advocate the slogan of national culture is among the nationalist petty bourgeois, not the Marxists.'[88] His criticism of the Austro-Marxists was also based on the political consideration that advocating a policy of 'national cultural autonomy' in Russia would undercut centralism (a key prerequisite for the dictatorship of the proletariat) and would be explosively divisive.

The Austro-Marxist scheme was devised for addressing the national minorities question in a multi-national state, where the nationalities were relatively even in size and where there were benefits to be had from being part of a large economic unit, provided separate cultural identity (and, to an extent, political autonomy) were maintained. The situation was profoundly different in Russia. There national groups were considerably more numerous and varied in size. There was also the significant difference that one overwhelmingly dominant national group – the Russians – had historically dominated their neighbours. In addition the Bolsheviks felt that the tsarist system was so entrenched that a scheme, like that envisioned by Bauer and Renner, which sought to reform the empire relied too much on the benevolence of the ruling powers. Thus for the Bolsheviks, revolution, not reformation, was the order of the day. As Lenin wrote in a letter to Gorky, 'No, we shall never have such dirty business as in Austria. We shall never tolerate it!'[89] He therefore saved some of his harshest criticism for advocates of national cultural autonomy, like the Caucasian socialists and the Jewish Bund, who he regarded as destabilizing threats, criticizing them as vulgarizers, opportunists and distorters of Marxism. Ironically, as will be pointed out in the next chapter, Lenin became quite an authority on these deviations.

Lenin realized the power and expediency of nationalism and therefore, at least during the First World War, did not go as far as Luxemburg and others in pushing the concept of internationalism. He felt that just as capitalism was a stage that had to be passed through to get to communism via socialism, national self-determination was a stage on the road to internationalism. As he wrote in 'The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination' (1916):

> In the same way as mankind can arrive at the abolition of classes only through a transition period of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, it can arrive at the inevitable integration of nations only through a transition period of the complete emancipation of all oppressed nations, i.e., their freedom to secede.[90]

Based on the Marxist notion of the benevolence of the workers, the supposition was that once the ruling classes were overthrown, the masses would recognize their solidarity in the framework of internationalism.

> By transforming capitalism into socialism the proletariat creates the *possibility* of the abolishing national oppression; the possibility becomes *reality* 'only' – 'only'! – with the establishment of full democracy in all spheres, including the delineation of state frontiers in accordance with

> the 'sympathies' of the population, including complete freedom to secede. And this, in turn, will serve as a basis for developing the *practical* elimination of even the slightest national friction and the least national mistrust, for an accelerated drawing together and fusion of nations that will be completed when the state *withers away*.[91]

The key, then, was to push for internationalism while remaining sensitive to the sources of discontent which fuelled nationalism. Thus Lenin (like Bauer) seems to suggest that nationalism is, in large part, a psychological phenomenon. One could placate national emotions by avoiding oppression and chauvinism: get rid of exploitation and there would be no fertile soil in which nationalist sentiment could grow. Recognition of the equality of nations, not national differences, had to be stressed, for the unity of proletarian solidarity and comradely unity in the workers' class struggle called for the fullest equality of nations with a view to removing every trace of national distrust, estrangement, suspicion and enmity. He believed that the recognition of the equality of nations and languages would assuage the political drive for self-determination. It is worth noting that he believed that this would eliminate national friction and national suspicion, but not necessarily nations.

Lenin's support of self-determination was conditioned by the political and demographic situation in Russia. Like the Austro-Marxists, he was concerned by the potential divisiveness of nationalism on the workers' movements, and thus recognized the importance of the national reality, not *per se*, but in order to free the workers' movements from its weakness.[92] Russia, being a 'prison of nations' (a term which was first used to describe the Austrian empire) was ripe for revolution. As he wrote in 1916:

> In Russia, where the oppressed nations account for no less than 57 per cent of the population, or over 100 million, where they occupy the border regions, where some of them are more highly cultured than the Great Russians, where the political system is especially barbarous and medieval, where the bourgeois-democratic revolution has not been consummated – there, in Russia, recognition of the right of the nations oppressed by tsarism to free secession from Russia is absolutely obligatory for Social-Democrats, for the furtherance of their democratic and socialist aims.[93]

However, Lenin's concern was not so much with the interests of the 'democratic and socialist aims' as in consolidating the position of the Bolshevik party. He realized that the success of the revolution depended less on gathering together all the true believers than on corralling all the

malcontents.[94] Having seen the appeal that nationalism had in mobilizing the masses among national groups from Finland and Poland, through the Baltics, across the Caucasus and as far as Central Asia in the revolution of 1905 and the reaction to the Imperial Manifesto and Prime Minister Stolypin's election law of 1907,[95] he sensed that the Bolsheviks could gain the support of nationalities all over the empire, and pre-empt a potential alliance between Mensheviks (who advocated national cultural autonomy[96]) and non-Russian socialist parties, by advocating freedom from chauvinism, assimilation, Russification and any kind of privilege and inequality.

Like Marx and Engels, he saw the tactical importance of nationalism in advancing strategic objectives. Thus he wrote in 'The Right of Nations to Self-Determination', 'to brush aside mass movements once they have started, and to refuse to support what is progressive in them means, in effect, pandering to nationalist prejudices, that is, recognizing "one's own nation" as a model nation.'[97] This was in keeping with his earlier remarks in 'The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up', when he wrote, 'Whoever expects a "pure" social revolution will *never* live to see it. Such a person pays lip-service to revolution without understanding what revolution is.'[98]

In order to gain popularity and legitimacy and in order to steal nationalism's thunder, Lenin had to channel nationalist aspirations. The party would get nowhere if it failed to do so; neither would the proletarian revolution, which was being 'obscured and retarded by bickering on the national question'.[99] Lenin showed his political motivation in using the slogan of national self-determination when he wrote in 'The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination' (1916):

> Increased national oppression under imperialism does not mean that Social-Democracy should reject what the bourgeoisie call the 'utopian' struggle for the freedom of nations to secede but, on the contrary, it should make greater use of the conflicts that arise in this sphere, *too*, as grounds for mass action and for revolutionary attacks on the bourgeoisie.[100]

One year earlier, in what amounted to an admission that an appeal to the masses in the name of communism without using nationalism would gain little support, he wrote:

> The Russian proletariat cannot march at the head of the people towards a victorious democratic revolution (which is its immediate task), or fight alongside its brothers, the proletarians of Europe, for a socialist

> revolution, without immediately demanding, fully and [unreservedly], for all the nations oppressed by tsarism, the freedom to secede from Russia. This we demand, not independently of our revolutionary struggle for socialism, but because this struggle will remain a hollow phrase if it is not linked up with a revolutionary approach to all questions of democracy, including the national question. We demand freedom of self-determination, *i.e.*, independence, *i.e.*, freedom of secession for the oppressed nations, not because we have dreamt of splitting up the country economically, or of the ideal of small states, but, on the contrary, because we want large states and the closer unity and even fusion of nations, only on a truly democratic, truly internationalist basis, which is *inconceivable* without the freedom to secede.[101]

He thus resolved that one of the party's main tasks was to 'insist on the promulgation and immediate realization of full freedom of separation from Russia for all nations and peoples who were oppressed by tsarism, who were forcibly retained within the boundaries of the states, i.e., annexed'.[102] He went on to declare that: 'Full freedom of separation, the broadest possible local autonomy, guarantees for the rights of national minorities elaborated in detail – such is the programme of the revolutionary proletariat.'[103]

This position is rather odd coming from the man who was so adamantly opposed to the notion of 'national cultural autonomy'.[104] Whereas Bauer had said that nations should be encouraged to develop autonomously and to enjoy freely their national *culture*, Lenin was suggesting that nations should be encouraged to develop autonomously and develop their *political* self-determination, for only then would the oppressed nations temper their demands for independence. As Raymond Pearson points out, 'The Leninist line of 1913–1917 could only be interpreted as contradicting the fundamental internationalism of Bolshevik ideology, which was geared towards extending the jurisdiction of socialism to the wider world, not surrendering territory unconditionally to the rival force of nationalism.'[105]

But the reason that Lenin goes even farther than Bauer while emphatically criticizing the repercussions of 'national cultural autonomy' is that his idea of self-determination is both cynical and based on a limited understanding of the forces that drive nationalism. He regarded nationalism as a defensive phenomenon, a reaction to oppression. Like Marx, he believed that it had no dynamic of its own. Therefore, if one got rid of the element of oppression, nations would have no reason to seek self-determination. Once nations would have the freedom to separate, they would either not want to, or would separate only to realize that being part of a union of

larger economic units was more viable. He therefore developed the maxim that the right to separate implies the right to unite. The union would be strong, as it would be based on voluntary association. The element of compulsion having been eliminated by socialism, the proletariat of all nations would willingly abandon their irredentist aims and a process of 'drawing together' and 'fusion' would begin. In other words, it was a policy that advocated disunion for the sake of union. This, according to Stalin, was perfectly logical. 'Just think – disunion for the purpose of union! It even smacks of the paradoxical. And yet this "self-contradictory" formula reflects the loving truth of Marxian dialectics which enables the Bolsheviks to capture the most impregnable fortresses in the sphere of the national question.'[106] The extent to which this dialectic was indeed self-contradictory will be noted in Chapter 3, where it will be shown how the nationalities took Lenin's offer of self-determination at face value and broke away from Russia. It will be also be noted how Communism's 'loving truth of Marxian dialectics' was impregnated by nationalism and not vice versa.

One of the major weaknesses in Lenin's view of the national question was the fact that he believed self-determination meant 'only the right to independence in a political sense, the right to free political secession from the oppressing nation', rather than being self-determination for its own sake.[107] Recognition of the right to self-determination could not be equated with advocating secession, just as allowing for the possibility of divorce did not mean that one actively supported breaking up marriages. To be against the oppression of one nation was not to be for the goals of those being oppressed. Consequently, as he states, the demand for self-determination 'is not the equivalent of a demand for separation, fragmentation and the formation of small states. It implies only a consistent expression of struggle against all national oppression.'[108] But, as was concluded earlier in the examination of the characteristics and components of nationalism, 'a consistent expression of struggle against all national oppression' is to seek political and cultural autonomy that reflects the will of a common historically and collectively determined consciousness. Thus it is obvious that the right to independence in the 'political sense' is identical to the demand for secession, or at least greater autonomy.

Lenin saw things differently. As Connor notes, his strategy was predicated on the belief that the best way to dissipate a grassroots demand for independence was to proffer that very independence. He hoped that support for the slogan of self-determination, rather than acting as a stimulant to nationalism, would prove to be an anaesthetic.[109] By conceding all, or rather by seeming to concede all to nationalism, one was in fact promoting internationalism.

The fact that Lenin felt that he could advocate self-determination without delivering on it relates back to Engels' firm belief in the benevolence of the proletariat. Other conditions being equal, he thought, the class-conscious proletariat would always stand for the larger state.[110] This stance is ironic, as Lenin was forming his views on the national question during the First World War. The fact that workers of the world backed their own governments to defend the national interest did not lead Lenin to reappraise the Marxist view of the natural internationalist predilection of the proletariat. Instead he dug in his heels and said that the socialist opportunists, not Marxism–Leninism's view of nationalism, were misguided, and that the solution to this predicament lay in stressing ideological orthodoxy to bring the heretics back into the fold. He did not bother to examine why they had left the fold in the first place.

Lenin blamed the rise of socialist opportunism on national cultural autonomy because he felt that it threw the workers into the arms of their national bourgeoisie. Those workers who placed political unity with 'their own' bourgeoisie above complete unity with the proletariat of all nations were acting against their own interests, against the interests of socialism and against the interests of democracy.[111] Such workers were those who abandoned the international movement for 'defence of the fatherland' during the First World War. For Lenin 'defence of the fatherland' was not akin to self-determination, for one was allying oneself with the internal oppressor – the bourgeoisie – in a war against a foreign oppressor who had duped its own proletariat into thinking it too was fighting a war in defence of the fatherland. As he wrote in 1916: 'To embellish imperialist war by applying to it the concept "defence of the fatherland", i.e., by presenting it as a democratic war, is to deceive the workers and side with the reactionary bourgeoisie.'[112] Socialists, like Kautsky, who 'treated the Basle manifesto in the same way that Wilhelm II treated Belgian neutrality' were branded as social-chauvinists; Socialists in words, but chauvinists 'consummated by opportunism' in deeds, who 'in vulgar alliance with the bourgeoisie and General Staffs were helping "their own" bourgeoisie to rob other countries, to enslave other nations'.[113]

Of course there are exceptions, for Lenin also said that 'defence of the fatherland' in a war waged by a nationally oppressed country against the national oppressor was legitimate. What we have, then, is a throwback to Marxist relativism wherein a war is 'just' or 'unjust' depending on how it aids the international proletarian revolution. Lenin himself asserted: 'Marxism, which does not degrade itself by stooping to the philistine's level, requires an historical analysis of each war in order to determine whether or not *that particular* war can be considered progressive, whether

it serves the interests of democracy and the proletariat and, in *that* sense, is legitimate.'[114] In recognizing the historical legitimacy of certain national movements one had to strictly limit oneself to what is progressive in such movements. Failure to do so would result in an apologia for nationalism and bourgeois ideology, obscuring proletarian consciousness.[115]

Lenin set the criteria for what made a war either 'progressive' or a 'wholesale deception of the people' by arguing that:

> If it was an imperialist policy, i.e., one designed to safeguard the interests of finance capital and rob and oppress colonies and foreign countries, then the war stemming from that policy is imperialist. If it was a national liberation policy, i.e., one expressive of the mass movement against national oppression, then the war stemming from that policy is a war of national liberation.[116]

When one talks of culture one must therefore distinguish between the true national culture, waiting to be released by the proletarian revolution, and the bourgeois culture which speaks in the name of the nation but which is really the culture of the limited interests of the bourgeoisie. One also has to distinguish between oppressors and oppressed at the national and international level.[117] The workers of both groups had a role to play in building international proletarian solidarity. As Demetrio Boersner observes,

> In a truly dialectical spirit, Lenin sees the revolutionary forces struggling for dissociation on the one hand and for union on the other. While one branch of the International Party – the party section of the oppressing country – fights for the right to secession of the subject nationalities, the other branch – the section of the oppressed country – fights for the unity of the workers of both nations.[118]

This relationship would later be extended to explain the role of members of the Comintern. The workers of the colonized countries would fight to overthrow the imperialists, while the workers of the dominant country would try to agitate for their colonies' right to be independent. This, it was argued, would lead to the unity of the workers of the 'oppressed' and 'oppressing' states and, in the process, lead to the collapse of capitalist imperialism.

If by throwing off the oppressor within the nation, the proletariat fulfils the Marxist ambition of 'becoming itself the nation', does this not suggest that the nation is something worth preserving? Is it then the state which must wither away, the nation or both? Or neither? Judging by his comments from 'On the National Pride of the Great Russians' (1914) one concludes that Lenin thought that the Russian nation was worth preserving.

In a passage reminiscent of those cited earlier, which demonstrated that Marx and Engels were not immune to their own German nationalism, Lenin writes:

> Is a sense of national pride alien to us, Great-Russian class-conscious proletarians? Certainly not! We love our language and our country, and we are doing our very utmost to raise *her* toiling masses (i.e., nine-tenths of *her* population) to the level of a democratic and socialist consciousness. To us it is most painful to see and feel the outrages, the oppression and the humiliation our fair country suffers at the hands of the tsar's butchers, the nobles and the capitalists. ... it is impossible, in the twentieth-century and in Europe ... to 'defend the fatherland' otherwise than by using every revolutionary means to combat the monarchy, the landowners and the capitalists one's *own* fatherland, i.e. the *worst* enemies of our country.[119]

In *The State and Revolution* he suggests that the state is also worth preserving. He writes:

> It follows that under communism there remains for a certain length of time ... a bourgeois state – but without the bourgeoisie! This may appear a paradox or simply a dialectical riddle, which is often a charge laid against Marxism by people who have not gone to the slightest bother to study its extraordinarily profound content. In point of fact, life shows us remnants of the old surviving in the new at every step, both in nature and in society. And Marx did not arbitrarily insert a tiny piece of 'bourgeois' right into communism, but took that which is economically and politically inevitable in a society emerging out of the womb of capitalism.[120]

Thus in both of these passages we see the beginnings of an argument that would be expanded by Stalin, namely that, even in a communist society elements of the state and the nation would have to be preserved. Indeed, as will be pointed out below, the role of both the state and the nation would be accentuated and strengthened under Communism rather than encouraged to wither away.

STALIN

In *The Difficult Dialogue* Ronaldo Munck makes the observation that only 2 to 3 per cent of Marx's and Engels' work dealt with nationalism, as opposed to 25 per cent of Lenin's output and 50 per cent of Stalin's.[121]

Although one wonders how Munck came up with these figures, they certainly illustrate the point that Stalin devoted considerable attention to the question of nationalism.

Stalin's first work on the subject came in 1904 with 'The Social-Democratic View of the National Question'. It is not a particularly noteworthy or original piece (he took a very orthodox line, condemning Armenian federalism and Georgian bourgeois nationalism), but it does show that from an early stage he was giving considerable thought to the origins and dynamics of nationalism, particularly within the Caucasus.

Stalin was asked by Lenin to go to Vienna in 1912 to study and refute the theories of the Austro-Marxists.[122] The outcome of this study was 'Marxism and the National Question'.[123] Some historians dismiss this work as being a regurgitation of the orthodox Marxist–Leninist view of nationalism; others claim that his contribution to the work was very limited.[124] Certainly Stalin makes several predictable statements that are in line with those of Lenin, but if, as he states, the 'consistent Social-Democrats must work solidly and indefatigably against the nationalist obfuscation',[125] one cannot help but be rather surprised at how his views cause him to come across as a rather 'inconsistent' Social Democrat.

First, the fact that Stalin sees the nation as an entity worth defining implies that he regards it as more than an epiphenomenon. Second, the way he defines it puts him at odds with the traditional Marxist–Leninist view of the nation as having no character of its own.

Surprisingly, he calls Bauer's definition of the nation 'the most complete'; more surprising is the fact that he feels that it is not complete enough. Using very un-Marxist terminology he agrees with Bauer that a nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up.[126] If, as many suggest, Stalin was merely writing what Lenin wanted to hear, he would hardly have referred to a nation as a stable community and would not have referred to its rather nebulous 'psychological make-up'. Nor would he have said that one cannot talk about a community of culture (or fate) without rooting the national culture to impressions derived from the nation's environment and 'conditions of life'. The implication is that the nation is permanent, and is the result of forces that are not merely economic. This gives us a clear insight into Stalin's view of the nation, a view which significantly affected his later policies. As Eric Cahm writes:

> The national reality being permanent, so were the differences and the antagonisms and the relations among nations, much as the relations

> between the social classes, expressed themselves in terms of struggle. Out of temperament, Stalin – even if he was not aware of it – attached more importance to nations than classes. He continued to reverse the priorities in Lenin's thinking and considered history to have on the whole a national dynamic. Doubtless he never admitted this, but his actions betrayed it.[127]

The events of 1917 would move Lenin, Stalin and the Bolsheviks away from theory and into the complexities of running the first socialist state. As Chapter 3 will point out, they repeated many of the patterns of behaviour which characterized Marx's and Engels' reaction to the events of 1848. Chief among these was the tendency to subordinate theory to practice.

3 From Socialist Theory to Communist Realpolitik

The events of 1917 caused Lenin, Stalin and the Bolsheviks to move from the realm of theory to the very real daily concerns of fighting the civil war and governing the country. Peace, the agrarian revolution and freedom for the nationalities had rallied peoples of diverse economic and ethnic backgrounds behind the Bolshevik cause. In particular, the October Revolution proved that advocating self-determination was an effective way of combining national discontent with social discontent. As E. H. Carr remarks in *The Bolshevik Revolution*,

> unqualified recognition of the right of secession not only enabled the Soviet regime – as nothing else could have done – to ride the torrent of a disruptive nationalism, but raised its prestige high above the 'white' generals [and, one could add, the Provisional government] who, bred in the pan-Russian tradition of the Tsars, refused any concession to the subject nationalities; in the borderlands where other than Russian, or other than Great Russian, elements predominated, and where the decisive campaigns of the civil war were fought, this factor told heavily in favour of the Soviet cause.[1]

Having overthrown the old order, however, the Bolsheviks faced a daunting task – living up to the expectations that they had created. This would prove difficult, for they inherited most of the tsarist empire and the nationalities problems that came with it. Having ridden the nationalist tiger into power, the key now was to tame it. Tactics and slogans which had been used in opposition had to be rethought to take into account the need to consolidate power rather than to overthrow it.

Therefore, after the Bolsheviks seized power from the Provisional Government in November 1917 a central issue became not how to use nationalism as a destructive force, but how to reconcile socialism, internationalism, democratic centralism and the established tsarist legacy of unitary empire with the potentially explosive forces of Russian, anti-Russian and inter-ethnic nationalism.[2] This process of reconciliation and synthesis would become the greatest test for the Bolsheviks. Reconciling nationalism with communism on paper was one thing: showing how a viable dialectic could be achieved politically was quite another. The way that the Bolsheviks dealt with nationalism during this crucial period became a

precedent for later efforts at controlling it. The fact that the methods used by Lenin and, to a greater extent, Stalin exacerbated rather than ameliorated the situation meant that future Communist regimes looking to this period as a model started from a false set of premises, and by pursuing similar policies were doomed to deepen inter-national fault lines rather than bridge them.

To a greater extent than with Marx and Engels, theory under Lenin and Stalin gave way to *realpolitik*. After all, unlike Marx and Engels, the Bolsheviks after 1917 could not afford the luxury of only theorizing about nationalism: their very survival depended on dealing with it effectively within the context of domestic and international affairs. Their problems were compounded by the fact that they had come to power in an extremely heterogeneous country made up of over 100 nationalities which together made up almost half of the population and which, in many cases (like the Kazakhs and Georgians), had significant historical grievances with the Russians. Marxism's Western European perspective had not envisioned a revolution in such circumstances. Austro-Marxism, although suitable for considering the demands of nationalities within an empire, also had limited applicability in the Russian context.

Dealing with these unique and difficult circumstances led the Bolsheviks to make significant concessions and compromises which contradicted prerevolutionary ideology. Many of these concessions were shrewd and tactically successful in the short term, but they also set in motion a pattern of behaviour that undercut several key Marxist tenets, a cyclical pattern of action and reaction (outlined in greater detail below) which led to an unravelling of classical Marxism and the growth of socialist patriotism, the precursor to national Communism. As will be pointed out in subsequent chapters, the example that this set for Communist parties within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was to have a major impact on the collapse of Communism within Eastern Europe and the USSR.

SHORT-TERM CONCESSIONS WITH LONG-TERM REPERCUSSIONS

Only days after overthrowing the Provisional government, the Bolsheviks issued the 'Rights of the Peoples of Russia' which supported 'the right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination, even to the point of separation and the formation of an independent state'.[3] A similar appeal was made to the 'Muslim toilers of Russia and the East'.[4] Words were followed by action when on 25 October the People's Commissariat of Nationalities

(*Narkomnats*) was created. The Commissariat, which was headed by Stalin, set up regional offices (called commissariats or sections) to deal with nationality issues on a case-by-case basis. In most regions these offices were headed by local nationals. The first office was opened in Poland in November 1917, and others were subsequently opened in the Baltics, Central Asia, Ukraine, White Russia, the Caucasus and for other national minorities on Russian soil like the Germans, Czechs, Slovaks and Yugoslavs; sixteen in all.[5]

A sign of how far the Bolsheviks were willing to sacrifice their pre-revolutionary principles can be noted in the fact that they established a commissariat for Jewish affairs and another for Muslim affairs. A commission was later set up to look at Turkestani affairs[6] and efforts were made to support Roma (gypsy) culture as well. This recognition of extra-territoriality was a major ideological concession when one considers the vehemence with which Lenin and Stalin had attacked the Bundists, the Mensheviks, the 'Muslim opportunists', the Armenian Dashnaktsutium movement and the Austro-Marxists, all of whom had espoused the policy of national cultural autonomy. Only months previously the Seventh All-Russian Conference of the Social Democratic Labour Party (the RSDLP, and the antecedent of the Bolshevik party) had passed a resolution on the national question that stated:

> National cultural autonomy artificially divides the workers living in one locality, and even working in the same industrial enterprises, in accordance with their membership of a particular 'national culture'; in other words it strengthens the ties between the workers and the bourgeois culture of individual nations, whereas the aim of the Social-Democracy is to strengthen the international culture of the proletariat of the world.[7]

Backtracking on extra-territoriality and national cultural autonomy was symptomatic of the Bolsheviks' willingness to make short-term concessions on certain issues in order to keep the integrity of the Russian empire more or less intact and, quite simply, to hold on to power. They felt too that real power lay in state and Party structures, and a limited amount of national and local autonomy would not seriously undermine the power of the central government. Consequently, self-determination for nationalities was tolerated whereas independent Communist parties organized nationally were out of the question.

The 3 March 1918 treaty of Brest-Litovsk was another example of this willingness to make short-term concessions in order to consolidate the Party's position for the long term. It was signed at a time when the Austro-German armies had advanced a considerable distance into Russia. The Treaty

was a repudiation of the 1914 London Declaration wherein Russia, along with France and Great Britain, had pledged not to make a separate peace with Germany. But Lenin argued that such bourgeois agreements were no longer valid. Clearly neither were his old arguments against opportunism.[8] Peace was made at the expense of vast amounts of territory in order that the Red Army (which had only been formed less than two weeks earlier on 23 February) could consolidate its gains elsewhere. As a result of the Treaty, Ukraine, Finland, Poland and the Baltic states became nominally independent within the sphere of the Central Powers. This was a short-lived arrangement that changed with the defeat of Germany in November 1918.

By late 1918, in issues relating to the nationalities, the Bolsheviks were riding the tide of events, not precipitating them. Encouraged first by the support of the Central Powers after Brest-Litovsk and then by the collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, the defeat of Germany and the West's (particularly Woodrow Wilson's) support for self-determination, many nationalities on the periphery of the Russian empire used the opportunity afforded by the chaos of the civil war to escape from the 'Prison of Nations'. During the revolution Red Army units had often been organized according to nationality. After Brest-Litovsk many of these units defected *en masse*.[9] Once they returned to their native soil they augmented native political organizations and provided them with military power.[10] 'It was under such circumstances that the national councils, bolstered by sentiments which had matured in the course of the year, proclaimed their self-rule, and in some cases their complete independence.'[11] In December 1917 Finland declared its independence. Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania followed in 1918. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia formed the Democratic Federative Republic of Transcaucasia in April 1918, but only one month later split up to seek independence individually. Poland declared its independence in November of 1918 and Belorussia followed in June 1919.

However, this independence was due more to the insecurity of the region's traditional great powers (Turkey, Austria, Germany and Russia) than to the fortitude of the breakaway states. Social and economic considerations had as much to do with pursuing independence as ideological self-determination. As Alexander Motyl notes: 'Nationalist goals were achieved where the balance of resources and therefore the structure of incentives permitted it. In so far as local forces were inherently disadvantaged against either the Reds or the Whites, survival meant receiving requisite outside assistance and/or succumbing to externally generated pro-independence pressures.'[12] This point is central to Ronald Suny's argument concerning the breakup of

the Russian empire. He sees concern for the amelioration of social issues as the key determinant in how nationalities reacted to the opportunity afforded to them by the collapse of central control.

> Because ethnic solidarity, activism, Russophilia or Russophobia were very often primed by social discontents, where nationalist leaderships were able to combine social reform with their programs of self-determination, autonomy or independence, their chances for success were increased. Where social, particularly agrarian, reform was delayed or neglected, ethnic political aspirations alone did not prove strong enough to sustain nationalist intellectuals in power. For ethnic leaders who faced a peasant majority indifferent to their claims of power and caught up in an uneven struggle with the Bolsheviks, an appeal to the Great Powers of Central and Western Europe became the last resort.[13]

One must therefore put the nationalist movements of the post-Revolutionary period into context. Whereas non-Russian peasants did not automatically opt for the national programs of their urban ethnic leaders,[14] they did not necessarily follow the urban Bolsheviks either. Their loyalty was won over by those who best provided for their basic needs. In most cases it was national leaders who professed to know their people best and, grabbing the flag, rushed into the gaping power vacuum.

The effectiveness of the national leaders and the pull of nationalism was such that the Bolsheviks realized that if they were to gain popular support, relying on the promise of ameliorating social inequality would not be enough. Therefore, although one could argue that nationalism was not the sole force that caused the break-up of the Russian empire, it was a significant enough element that the Bolsheviks were forced to modify their ideology – indeed, to repudiate certain basic tenets of classical Marxism – in order to claim it as a positive influence in building Communist society. One of the most significant of these compromises was federalism.

THE FEDERALIST CONCESSION

Originally Lenin had been adamantly opposed to the idea of federalism. In a letter to the Caucasian Bolshevik leader Sunen G. Shaumyan in 1913 he unequivocally stated: 'We are in principle against federation – federalism weakens economic ties... You want to secede? To hell with you.'[15] As late as 1917 he had written in *The State and Revolution* that 'Marx disagreed with both Proudhon and Bakunin precisely on the question of

federalism... Federalism as a principle follows logically from the petty-bourgeois views of anarchism.'[16] He considered federalism divisive and counter to the centralizing imperative of Communism.

But by 1918 federalism was a compromise that had to be made in order to take into account the nationalist sensibilities of the border areas while still keeping the basic territorial integrity of the former tsarist empire intact. Nevertheless, it was seen only as a transitional phase. A unitary, supranational Soviet state was still the overall goal. Lenin felt quite confident that this would be attainable as long as the Communist party remained centralized.

The Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic [RSFSR] was adopted by the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 10 July 1918. As far as federal constitutions go it is vague and legally very tenuous, but it is interesting to note that the Bolsheviks felt that they needed such a constitution at all. They were concerned enough about nationalism to create at least the façade of federalism. In other areas like agrarian and economic reform (for example War Communism) they were less concerned with such niceties.

The very inclusion of the word 'Federated' in the title of the Constitution speaks volumes. So too does the inclusion of several Articles which outline – at least on paper – the truly federal and voluntary nature of the republic. For example, Article 2 states that the RSFSR is established on the basis of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national republics. Article 4 contains a reference to the RSFSR as being based on a 'democratic peace of toilers... on the basis of the self-determination of nations'. Article 8 reinforces this point by stating that:

> desiring to create a really free and voluntary, and consequently all the more complete and lasting, union of the toiling classes of all nations in Russia, the Third Congress of Soviets confines itself to establishing the fundamental principles of the federation of the Soviet Republics of Russia, leaving it to the workers and peasants of each nation to decide independently at their own plenipotentiary Soviet congresses whether and on what conditions they wish to take part in the federal government and in other federal Soviet institutions.[17]

These clauses were more descriptive than operative, for there were no measures included to explain how the provisions could be implemented or which nations made up the federation. The effect was to a create a Russian republic of undefined territorial extent[18] that could be enlarged or (theoretically) diminished in the future. As much of a sham as the 1918 constitution was, it created a precedent which would come back to haunt the Communists.

Political recognition in the constitution was granted on the basis of nation-based territorial divisions, thereby justifying the continuance rather than the withering away of nations.

THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Another dangerous precedent was the repeated use of the term 'self-determination' during the Bolsheviks' first two years in power. This was due in large part to Lenin's stature within the party and his personal views on the issue. Many within the Party, including Stalin, were opposed to holding out the promise of self-determination now that power had been won. But even in the face of strong resistance, particularly from Nikolai Bukharin, Lenin – for the tactical and ideological reasons outlined in Chapter 2 – remained an outspoken advocate of the right to self-determination. Tactically he used it as a ploy, thinking that nations would either not separate because they no longer felt threatened or would separate only to realize that some sort of union with Russia was in their best interests. Ideologically he seems to have genuinely believed that self-determination, or at least the right to self-determination, was a key instrument for solving the nationalities problem and accelerating the international proletarian revolution. It was not that he had any particular disposition toward nations as such, but simply that he felt that nationalism was predominantly a psychological phenomenon activated by fear of oppression. If one removed the threat of oppression the national groups would unite voluntarily, and one could get on with the more pertinent issues involved in building the Soviet Union and advancing the international proletarian revolution. This, of course, assumed that the nationalities which sought self-determination would adopt socialist governments whose leaders would think the same way as Lenin.

As late as the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (March 1919) he adamantly defended his view. His argument at the Congress was based on the notion that self-determination had to be allowed to run its course in order to burn itself out. In repudiation of his earlier thesis that self-determination should concentrate on the self-determination of the working class only (a position advocated by Stalin and Bukharin during the Congress), he declared that

> Our programme must not speak of the self-determination of the working people, because that would be wrong. It must speak of what actually exists. Since nations are at different stages on the road from medievalism

> to bourgeois democracy and from bourgeois democracy to proletarian democracy, this thesis of our programme is absolutely correct. With us there have been many zig-zags on this road. Every nation must obtain the right to self-determination, and that will make the self-determination of the working people easier.[19]

He used the example of the Finns to illustrate his point:

> The Finns have experienced the dictatorship of Germany; they are now experiencing the dictatorship of the Allied Powers. But thanks to the fact that we have recognised the right of nations to self-determination, the process of differentiation has been facilitated there. I very well recall the scene when, at Smolny, I handed the act to Svinhufvud – which in Russian means 'pighead' – the representative of the Finnish bourgeoisie, who played the part of hangman. He amiably shook my hand, we exchanged compliments. How unpleasant that was! But it had to be done, because at that time the bourgeoisie were deceiving the people ... by alleging [that] the Muscovites, the chauvinists, the Great Russians, wanted to crush the Finns. It had to be done.[20]

His logic can be summarized as follows: one must split nations apart in order to break the imperialist chains and then draw them back together again on the basis of proletarian solidarity.[21] Like the advice given to Little Bo-Peep, he was convinced that the best way to win back the empire was to leave the nationalities which were pushing for self-determination alone and they would come home.

In a sense Lenin's support for self-determination was making a virtue out of necessity.[22] He seemed to admit as much when he said:

> We cannot refuse to recognize what actually exists; it will itself compel us to recognise it. ... We cannot help reckoning with the fact that things are proceeding in rather a peculiar way, and we cannot say: 'Down with the right of nations to self-determination! We grant the right of self-determination only to the working people.' This self-determination proceeds in a very complex and difficult way. It exists nowhere but in Russia, and, while foreseeing every stage of the development in other countries, we must decree nothing from Moscow.[23]

By harping on national self-determination and creating conditions where the national groups could easily break away, the Bolsheviks only encouraged the fissiparous tendencies which were causing the collapse of the Russian empire. Lenin had unlocked the door of the prison of nations, thinking that once the prisoners saw the outside world, promises of

renovations and more equitable treatment would be enough to make them stay. He was wrong. As Walker Connor remarks, the Revolution exposed the fallacy that states, upon being offered independence, would not take it.[24] In dealing with nationalism, Lenin – and Stalin after him – took on many characteristics of the sorcerer's apprentice.

THE SORCERER'S APPRENTICE DILEMMA

It may have been a while since you saw Mickey Mouse as the sorcerer's apprentice in Walt Disney's *Fantasia* (based on Goethe's *Der Zauberlehrling*), so I will briefly recap the story. When the sorcerer is away, the young apprentice responsible for drawing water from the well spots his master's magical hat sitting on the chair and puts it on. Unhappy with carrying buckets of water back and forth all day, he decides to use some of the hat's magical powers to make his life easier. He casts a spell on the broom and it grows arms and legs and begins to carry the buckets to and from the well.

Contented at the prospect of the broom doing all the work for him, the sorcerer's apprentice dozes off in his master's chair and dreams about using his new-found magical powers to control the stars, clouds and waves. This dream of controlling the elements is disturbed by a sudden bump. The sorcerer's apprentice awakens with a start to discover that his chair is floating. The broom has done its job too efficiently and the basin has overflowed!

In a desperate attempt to stop the flooding the sorcerer's apprentice picks up an axe and smashes the broom into little pieces. Unbeknownst to him this exacerbates the situation rather than solving it. Each one of the splinters becomes a broom with arms and legs and all the new brooms begin to carry buckets to and from the well. The water level rises and rises until the apprentice is sucked into a whirlpool that is about to drown him when suddenly the sorcerer returns, picks his apprentice out of the water and casts a spell that causes the brooms to disappear and the water to subside.

To summarize, the Sorcerer's Apprentice Dilemma is when one tries to use something for one's own ends without fully appreciating the course of events that using the instrument in question would set in motion. One achieves the desired result in the short term, but the means used to achieve this end take on a momentum of their own and the user loses control. To ameliorate the situation the user resorts to drastic action, which has the unintended result of aggravating the situation by multiplying the problem

severalfold. Ultimately one is defeated by the compounded effect of the process that one had initially thought could be harnessed to one's benefit.

The parallel is quite obvious. Lenin was desperate for relief from the nationalities crisis. He saw the potential for using nationalism for his own ends: espousing national self-determination offered a way of using that force to his advantage. But this set in motion forces which were too great for him to control, and one nationality after another broke away using the very slogan that he had offered them. Lenin thought that he was rectifying the situation by offering a federal solution and Commissariats. As we shall see, this in fact made the problem worse.

It was Stalin who, upon Lenin's death, picked up the axe and made matters worse by smashing the figurative national brooms. As will be pointed out, through his policies of indigenization, sham federalism, 'nationalist in form, socialist in content' and socialist patriotism he multiplied his problems severalfold and set in motion a flood that would threaten to swamp Communism on several occasions. Subsequent Communist leaders, particularly Khruschev and Gorbachhev, would don the magical cap as well, but none would be able to reverse the turbulent waters which Lenin unleashed and which Stalin churned into a whirlpool. Unfortunately for the Communists, there was no sorcerer to rescue them from the flood of their own making, and in 1989 they drowned.

CONSOLIDATING THE REVOLUTIONARY GAINS

By 1919 it was the tide of nationalism and not proletarian internationalism which was rising. Not only were states breaking away from Russia, but the world revolution was getting off to a sputtering start. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire and the defeat of Germany did not herald the beginning of the predicted socialist revolution in Europe. Rather, in 1919/20 a series of setbacks befell the social democratic and communist parties of Europe. Communist experiments in Finland, Italy, France, Hungary, Germany and Austria all failed. The socialist parties who made the most gains were those who, as in Britain and Czechoslovakia, disassociated themselves from Bolshevik rhetoric and tactics.

The final nail in the coffin came in August 1920 when the Red Army was repulsed from Warsaw. Under the Treaty of Riga, signed in March 1921, Russia gave up claims on considerable amounts of Polish territory. This treaty, which followed others which were signed with each of the Baltic republics in 1920, effectively delineated the borders of Bolshevik

Russia and symbolized the transition of Russia from being an amorphous base of world revolution into being a state within the international system.

This change in status led to a corresponding change in strategy. Although the Civil War ended in 1920, it was becoming obvious that neither a world nor a European revolution was imminent. Faced with the stubborn refusal of history to arrive on time and in the right places,[25] Lenin was forced to make overtures with the West and shore up security at home. The Bolsheviks moved from the offensive to the defensive in order to consolidate their position until the time was ripe for revolution: a process which took several forms.

Domestically it meant an end to War Communism and the introduction of the New Economic Policy. In foreign affairs the Bolsheviks sought to improve relations with Britain and Japan. A treaty which resumed trade with Great Britain, so recently the target of Bolshevik anti-imperialist diatribes, was signed in March 1921.[26] The Treaty of Rapallo was signed with Germany in 1922, and other friendship and trade treaties were signed with Turkey and Afghanistan. In 1922 the Bolsheviks took part in the Genoa conference. In a sign of things to come, they acted on behalf of those 'independent states' which were formerly part of the Russian empire.

The Bolsheviks needed to reincorporate the territories which had broken away. As Raymond Pearson remarks in *Soviet Federalism, Nationalism and Economic Decentralisation*:

> a territorially tiny, land-locked and economically deprived 'rump Russia' would be incapable of socialist development, could only bring discredit upon the international socialist cause and might prove irresistibly vulnerable to Western military intervention. To capitulate to separatist nationalism could only peripheralize and diminish the Bolshevik state to a degree which imperilled its ideological and practical prospects for survival in the wider, relentlessly antagonistic capitalist world.[27]

Besides, from a purely practical point of view, the Bolsheviks knew full well the strategic importance of the republics and the significance of their natural resources.

Official policy, therefore, became one in which union was stressed, not as an end in itself, but as a way of protecting the nationalities from capitalist encirclement. Stalin made this argument very clear when presenting his 'Theses on the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Connection with the National Problem' to the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1921.

> In isolation, the existence of the various Soviet republics is uncertain and unstable, because of the menace to their existence offered by the capitalist states. The joint interests of the Soviet republics in the matter of defence, in the first place, the restoration of the productive forces shattered during the war, in the second place, and the fact that the Soviet republics which are rich in food must come to the aid of the Soviet republics which are poor in food, and in the third place, all imperatively dictate the political union of the various Soviet republics as the only means of escaping imperialist bondage and national oppression. Having liberated themselves from their 'own' and 'foreign' bourgeoises, the national Soviet republics can defend their existence and defeat the combined forces of imperialism only by amalgamating themselves into a close political union, or not at all.[28]

By 1920 'not at all' was not an option that the national republics were free to exercise. In December 1919 Ukraine was reincorporated into the Bolshevik state. In 1920 Azerbaijan, Belorussia and Armenia were reincorporated and Georgia was brought back in, after considerable difficulty, in March 1921.[29] Although these countries had been ripe for socialist revolution and had had active Communist parties, the way in which the takeovers were orchestrated dampened the appeal of communism and made the Soviet model synonymous with the loss of national independence. Despite having played on the disloyalty of the nationalities to undermine the tsarist empire, the Bolsheviks seemed to underestimate the potential effect of dashing the hopes of the nationalities in the new Soviet arrangement. This was a fatal flaw and would leave the central government forever looking over its shoulder, for 'people whose temporary co-operation was purchased by the promise of seperation from the state cannot, following the reneging on that promise, be expected magically to have developed a fondness for that same state'.[30]

However, the point should not be overlooked that many nationalities willingly rejoined the Communist camp. They regarded the Bolsheviks as the potential guarantor of their independence – or at least their security *vis-à-vis* hostile neighbours. This was particularly the case in Central Asia. Thus, ironically, many nationalists joined the Communist Party and/or advocated closer ties with Russia to protect their national interests: 'they appealed to the revolution not to dilute their identity but to enhance it'.[31] This, too, set up a potentially explosive situation, as these peoples, when taking communism at face value, tried – like the Russian Bolsheviks – to make communism fit their own domestic conditions. As an early manifestation of

regional nationalism (based on Islamic and pan-Turkic elements), it was the first example of a rival centre of communist thought to challenge the Bolshevik hegemony. Although it was allowed to blossom in the short term, it was stamped out with the arrest of its leader, Sultan Galiev, in 1923 and the break-up of Turkestan into seperate republics. Nevertheless, this type of national communism had struck a chord in the Central Asian region and remained as an example for future generations.

Others made economic agreements with the RSFSR out of necessity. The Bolsheviks played on this insecurity by enacting legislation (between 1919 and 1922) that stressed co-operation between the RSFSR and its neighbours, beginning with labour commissariats but gradually incorporating defence, finance and foreign affairs. All-Russian commissariats and government agencies began to take an increasingly active role in the affairs of their neighbours, often to the point of violating the respect for sovereignty which had so recently been made in solemn treaties. As Samuel Bloembergen suggests, the effectiveness of these diplomatic initiatives was such that the December 1922 Union Treaty (between the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia and Transcaucasia) was more a recognition of the status quo than a significant new initiative.[32]

FEDERALIST IN FORM, CENTRIST IN CONTENT

The Bolsheviks could afford to take this more assertive and centrist approach for, unlike only a few years earlier, the Party was now in a position of strength. By 1919 the Bolsheviks had gained control over the Soviets and effectively eliminated opposition from the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (CEC). At the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 fractionalism was formally abolished. The bloody suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion was a clear sign of how far the Party was willing to go to consolidate its position. Power became even more centralized when Sovnarkom, an executive body headed by Lenin, came to supersede the CEC. Gradually the state powers of the Sovnarkom were taken over by the Party's Politburo. In this way Party and state powers became one and the same. Those who refused to co-operate with the new line were branded as protecting their own bourgeois interests, for if the Party was the representative of the people and the Soviet Union was the carrier of international revolution and defender of worker's rights, loyalty to the Party was loyalty to Moscow, which in turn was inextricably linked to one's loyalty to the international proletarian

struggle. Of course, argued Stalin in 'Policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question in Russia' (1920), nations still possessed the right of self-determination, 'but the question here is not the indubitable rights of nations, but of the interests of the masses of the people both in the centre and in the border regions ... and the interests of the masses render the demand for the secession of the border regions at the present stage of the revolution a profoundly counter-revolutionary one'.[33]

This view was repeated more starkly in 1923, when in his 'Reply to the Discussion on the Report on National Factors in Party and State Development' Stalin said: 'It should be borne in mind that in addition to the right of nations to self-determination, there is also the right of the working class to consolidate its power, and the right of self-determination is subordinate to this latter right.'[34] This was a clear repudiation of the position Lenin had outlined at the Eighth Congress in 1919, and for that reason shows the extent to which Stalin was becoming more powerful within the Party. His line of argument now centred on the self-determination of the proletariat, and not nations. This view was clear from his remarks in 'National Factors in Party and State Affairs': 'national peace and national freedom may be considered assured if the peasantry and the other petty-bourgeois sections of the population follow the proletariat, that is, if the dictatorship of the proletariat is assured'.[35] The reasoning was that all nationalities had joined the Union out of their own free will. Now that the Party had come to personify the General Will, it knew what was best for the people. Besides, the nationalities enjoyed autonomy within the RSFSR and under the Union Treaty so they already had all the self-determination that they needed. Provided that everybody followed the Party, which after all was the vanguard of the dictatorship of the proletariat, everybody's national grievances would be solved. Boiled down to its simplest terms, the state was the guarantor of the nations.

Thus, by an ingenious paradox, guaranteeing self-determination became a justification for strengthening the Party. As Boersner remarks,

> Since the Bolshevik Party was considered the purest representative of the workers, this new doctrine of proletarian self-determination enabled the Party to substitute itself for the people in fighting for territorial union with Russia. This new interpretation also offered the Bolsheviks an excuse to intervene by force and to carry out an annexationist policy, since secession from Soviet Russia had become synonymous with counter-revolution.[36]

In this way the Soviet state became the embodiment of the Revolution and the Communist party the embodiment of the proletariat. In addition, the

Russian Communist party became the first among equals, as all national communist parties became, by party statute, subordinate to it.

Following that logic, what was good for the Party and the state was good for the nationalities. And since a strong, centralized government was of paramount importance at this particular time, talk of regionalism and federalism gave way to discussion about amalgamation. Stalin, who had always been sceptical about promoting self-determination and federalism, was the most vocal supporter of amalgamation. In 'The Amalgamation of the Soviet Republics' (1922) he wrote, 'The Soviet power is so constructed that, being international by its intrinsic nature, it systematically fosters the idea of unity among the masses and impels them towards amalgamation.'[37] To a point this view was not that far from Lenin's, who – drawing from Engels' analysis of the Swiss federal system – remarked in *The State and Revolution* that: 'The greatest amount of local, regional and other types of freedom known in history was given by a centralist and not a federal republic.'[38]

But in 1922 Lenin would not go as far as Stalin in advocating the creation of a Soviet Union along the lines of the RSFSR. Whereas Stalin called for an extension of the 1918 constitution to make all of the neighbouring republics 'autonomous' administrative units within RSFSR, Lenin, fearing reaction to what he saw as creeping Great Russian chauvinism, called for a more equal union of relatively sovereign republics.[39] Although Lenin's health was declining, his stature was still significant enough to force Stalin (who was chairman of the commission in charge of drafting the new constitution) to back down on his 'autonomization' scheme.

SHAM FEDERALISM

The Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was adopted by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on 6 July 1923 and ratified by the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets on 31 January 1924. It built on the Union Treaty of December 1922 to which the Turkmen and Uzbek republics were added on 13 May 1925.[40] Five years after the revolution most of the Russian empire was back together.

One can immediately see the difference between this constitution and that of the RSFSR through the title (which does not include the word 'federated') and the wording of the Declaration (Part One), which states that circumstances 'imperatively demand the unification of the Soviet republics into one union state, capable of ensuring external security, internal economic

prosperity and the free national development of peoples'. This was explicit recognition of Stalin's paradoxical assertion that centralization would ensure the free national development of peoples. Exclusive administrative jurisdiction assigned to the republics was limited to agriculture, education, internal affairs, justice, public health and social security. But even this was largely symbolic, as the constitution did not provide for appeal by republican authorities against acts of the all-union Central Executive Committee and its Presidium, while both of these supreme central organs were given all-embracing powers to revoke any acts of the republican authorities, including legislative acts of republican Congresses. For example, under Articles 20, 31 and 32 the CEC had the right to suspend or annul all decrees, orders and regulations of the central executive committees, congresses of soviets and the people's commissariats of the republics, while Article 42 ironically states that the central executive committees of the union republics and their presidia may protest against the decrees and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, without suspending the implementation of such decrees and orders.

This was obviously sham federalism, a façade for defending the unitary principle. But it did, nevertheless, legitimize federalism. Some observers have suggested that this is of little relevance. For example, Soloman Schwarz wrote:

> A number of fair-minded if misguided critics have asserted that even if the Soviet State was not formed by consent but by manoeuvre ... it has given some expression to the concept of self-government for the national minorities. This argument would be significant if the united and autonomous republics, the national oblasts and national okrugs, were really self-governing units. But their autonomy is reduced to naught by the unconditional submission of all organs of the Communist Party and to the strict centralism within the Communist Party itself.[41]

And yet, as he grudgingly admits towards the end of his article, 'though "national self-determination" in the governmental sense has proven to be a fiction, the term has another broader application – the question of the free development of the national culture'.[42] Precisely so. And here Schwarz has made the same mistake as Bauer, Renner, Lenin and Stalin. In Chapter 1 it was explained how culture is a central element of nationalism, that its symbolic outer manifestations are a celebration of national values and history, and how national form begets national content. National cultural self-determination in a multinational state is inextricably linked to political and economic self-determination. It builds on the elements

of sovereignty which are outlined in the 'fictitious' constitution and thus plants the seed for future crises. Reluctantly recognizing the force of nationalism, Soviet federalism was designed to license the undesirable in order to contain it.[43] But it did not. Potential sources of tension were increased rather than diminished, since, under the constitution, the federal structure and the earlier policies of indigenization, conflicting claims became institutionalized and thereby imbued with 'objective' respectability and 'subjective' national identity.[44] As Connor points out:

> Demarcating the borders of the administrative unit gives geographic precision to the more shadowy notion of the ethnic motherland. Constitutionally declaring the unit to be 'sovereign' or 'autonomous' legitimizes the idea of self-rule. Giving the unit an ethnic designation conveys the idea that the unit's proper *raison d'être* is the safeguarding and promotion of the national interests of the people so designated. Adorning the unit with its own government as well as other appurtenances of political individuality (seals, flags and the like) conditions the people to think in terms of their particular unit rather than in terms of the entire state.[45]

Imagine if Europe only existed as a collection of peoples from different cultures and, in an effort to promote European federalism, they were organized into administrative units along national lines. These units would begin to define their interest in terms of their separate national cultures rather than as Europeans. The comparison may seem contrived, but I think the point is made. In the Soviet context, the federal structure became a convenient container and preserver of national consciousness. In effect, it created national Communism in the Soviet republics.

> [It] has offered major Soviet minority groups a form of nation-statehood which has provided a sense of psychological satisfaction in the search for identity and belonging in the descriptionless world of proletarian uniformity. The mobilization aspect also actually accelerated national cohesion by encouraging institution-building, education, urbanization and, ultimately, a sense of pride in national accomplishments.[46]

As Chapters 5 and 6 will point out, this led to a federal system in which local leaders increasingly had to consider the interests of their constituents *vis-à-vis* the centre and neighbouring republics at the expense of socialist internationalism. The republics, not the centre, thus became the focus of identity. This perpetuated and, indeed, strengthened nationalism. To paraphrase Connor, if the masses, encouraged by the government's support for national forms, continued to think of themselves as Russians, Georgians,

Latvians, Armenians and so on (especially as the distinction of ethnicity was made in their passports), then, depending upon which conviction was felt primarily, there would emerge either national socialists or socialist nationalists: but not nationless socialists.[47] Consequently, in those republics with weak or multiple national identities, Stalin's policies created the very conditions (like those noted in the cases of the French and Industrial Revolutions) which led to the growth of national consciousness. In those republics with already-established identities, Stalin's policies triggered an awakening similar to that which occurred in Central and Eastern European countries in the late nineteenth century. Ironically, therefore, in many Soviet republics nationalism was a by-product or epiphenomenon of Communism. Again we see a manifestation of the Sorcerer's Apprentice Dilemma. Whereas Lenin thought that he had smashed the brooms, they had in fact been splintered by constitutionally recognizing them (however tenuously) in a federal structure which included the right of self-determination. Stalin then enacted a series of policies that made national cultural autonomy even more viable and, as a result, the nationalities problem threatened to overflow.

A SUPERSTRUCTURE WITH WEAK FOUNDATIONS

One tactic which had the dual effect of strengthening the roof of the Communist superstructure, while simultaneously weakening its foundations, was in the centralization of the *Narkomnats*. From the beginning the *Narkomnats* had been a rather cynical exercise in making the nationalities feel as though their grievances were being dealt with when in fact their organizations were being infiltrated (through organs like the Central Information Bureau) with an eye towards their indoctrination and control. Ironically, even as the commissariats were deceiving the nationalities, the central government was keeping its eye on the *Narkomnats*. For example, as Sidney and Beatrice Webb point out in their fascinating study of the Soviet Union[48] (fascinating not least because of the insight it provided into the mentality of its authors), the People's Commissar for Nationalities was expressly empowered to appoint his own residual agent in the capital city of each autonomous region to watch over the execution of the decrees of the federal central authority of the Russian Soviet Republic.[49] In many cases these envoys, for their own political reasons, restricted the competence of the national officials and institutions. Some had an axe to grind with the local nationality, others did so in order to endear themselves to Stalin. For his part, Stalin was able to use the *Narkomnats* as a way of expanding his personal power base in the regions.

Gradually, although the pretence of caring for national grievances was maintained, the effective powers of the various Commissariats were rolled back. More and more attention was focused on using the *Narkomnats* as an agency of control and indoctrination as opposed to its original function as a sounding-board for national grievances. This gradually extended to economic control as well. For example, in November 1920 the *Narkomnats* assumed jurisdiction over the agencies of the autonomous regions and republics (which in effect destroyed their autonomy). On 4 December 1920 a decree was passed which stipulated that the *Narkomnats* would be personally represented in the governments of the republics and the autonomous regions of the RSFSR as well as in the independent republics on its periphery. This meant that all initiatives had to be channelled via Moscow, and the system thereby became an agent of centralization and an accomplice of the Party.[50] This also effectively sanctioned pro-Communist agitation in independent states, and was a precursor to the federal constitution of 1924.

But the *Narkomnats* became unwieldy for, as its mandate widened, it overlapped those of other central bodies. In 1924, when the new Constitution was approved, the Commissariat was dissolved and its Council of Nationalities became, through the addition of representatives of the fully-fledged Soviet republics, the second chamber of the legislative branch of the government of the USSR. The creation of this second chamber was yet another act in the charade for, although insisting that the creation of the Council of Nationalities was a representational and effective body, the national representatives had become so Party-controlled that they became little more than a multinational rubber stamp of the Council of the Union. In addition, the national republics and autonomous regions were represented 'equally', which meant that the RSFSR (with 15 autonomous republics and regions) held an absolute majority.

Yet even in the case of the *Narkomnats* one must consider the inherent contradiction. True, on the one hand it proved effective as an instrument for maintaining a point of assembly during troubled times between the dispersed fragments of the former Russian empire, and for bringing them nearly all back, when the troubles were past, into the fold of the Soviet Union.[51] But in the process it legitimized national territorial arrangements and organized what in many cases had been disorganized non-national units into nationally conscious ones, thus fuelling national identity instead of dampening it. In some cases, most notably in Central Asia, it created national identity where previously none had existed, a 'crime' for which men like Sultan Galiev would later be blamed.[52] For example, breaking up the Turkic lands into five separate republics did not dampen Turkish

identity, but created a potentially explosive situation by grafting a previously unfelt national identity on to a strong religious and ethnic one. The *Narkomnats*' presumptuous tactics in non-RSFSR lands were also self-defeating, for they had the effect of rallying people against the Communist government rather than for it. The top-down approach to solving national issues created a centre-*versus*-peripheries divide. For all of these reasons the Soviet Union became, to use Suny's expression, 'an incubator of new nations',[53] many of which would have to wait 70 years to hatch.

Another example of the self-created internal contradiction can be seen in the *Comintern*. When it became apparent that the proletarian revolution was stalled in Europe, Lenin switched the focus of agitation to the East. The vehicle for this agitation was the *Comintern*, founded in March 1919. The Third World Congress of the Communist International, which took place in Moscow in June 1921, sought to define a new era in the world revolution. The new revolution would concentrate on defending the proletarian heartland.

As with the nationalities policy in the Soviet Union, the world revolution, if it was to be successful, would have to have a strong centre. *Narkomindel* (the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs), like the *Narkomnats* within the territories of the former Russian empire, endeavoured to promote revolution and infiltrate governments in Europe and throughout the world both diplomatically and clandestinely.[54] As it developed it became increasingly centralized and therefore less democratic and less international. For example, the 21 conditions of membership stressed the importance of defending the Soviet Union. Accepting these conditions subordinated the national Communist parties to the Soviet-dominated Executive Committee of the Communist International. Just as the Communist Party was the representative of the proletariat, so the Soviet Union was to be synonymous with world revolution. By 1928 fidelity to the Soviet Union had become an explicit condition of membership in the *Comintern*. Russia was the one country where proletarian revolution had occurred, so its model (including all its flaws and inherent contradictions) became universal. Like the *Narkomnats*, its chain of command became very top-down. As Stern points out, the fact that the *Comintern* was increasingly autonomous and held its conferences before national Party congresses meant that it was going to be increasingly difficult to oppose the *Comintern* line and retain Party membership.[55]

And yet, as with the *Narkomnats*, although the surface was being strengthened the foundations were very weak. Centralization cut off the Party from the subtleties and diversity of the world movement: so, although, they encouraged national movements, they were not always able

to control them. This point was picked up by Leon Trotsky, who observed: 'Messianic nationalism is complemented by bureaucratically abstract internationalism. This discordance runs through the whole programme of the *Comintern*, and deprives it of any principal significance.'[56] This made it hard to win popular sympathy and to react to rapidly changing events on the ground. It was not flexible enough to deal with the subtleties of individual movements, and therefore had a tendency to support parties that pursued policies beneficial to the political interests of the Soviet Union (or, more to the point, Russia) and not necessarily the international Communist movement. Among colonial groups the *Comintern* was willing to support national movements, like those of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, Reza Shah in Iran and King Amanullah in Afghanistan, as long as they were anti-imperialist; but it crushed socialist movements that were anti-Russian (i.e. in the Ukraine and among the Central Asian and Trancaucasion republics).[57] This course of action was due in large part to the fact that the Bolshevik leadership saw successful national Communist parties as being capable of operating beyond Moscow's control, or even as being potential rivals. The most obvious example was its support for the Kuomintang in China.[58] The limits of this policy became shockingly apparent in April 1927 when Chaing Kai-shek's troops massacred the Chinese Communist forces in Shanghai.[59] To many observers, particularly Trotsky, this hypocrisy was self-defeating. Concerning Stalin's behaviour towards China he wrote:

> In the epoch of the revolutionary ascent he resisted the withdrawal of the Chinese Communist Party from the Kuo Min Tang. In the epoch of the counter-revolutionary dictatorship, he resists the mobilization of the Chinese workers under the slogan of democracy. This amounts to wearing furs in summer and going naked in winter.[60]

In this respect Stalin was opportunistically supporting the revolutionary nature of nationalism in the same way as Lenin had expiditiously supported self-determination.

Talking out of both sides of their mouths became a serious liability for the Communists. Over time their contradictory policies became logically untenable and could only be imposed by force. For example, in preaching self-determination for the Third World and denying it to the Ukrainian and Georgian Communist parties they assumed that they could say one thing to one group and deny it to another without suffering any consequences.

The irony is that the Communists seemed sensitive to the fact that overly centralist domination would be badly received. Time and again verbal assurances were made to assuage the fears of the nationalities. As Stalin

remarked, 'Cavalry raids with the object of "immediately communising" the backward masses of the people must be discarded for a cautious and well-conceived policy of gradually drawing these masses into the general stream of Soviet development.'[61]

Stalin stressed that national cultures, education and languages had to be encouraged and local soviet organs had to be staffed by representatives of the local proletariat: 'Only in this way can an unbreakable spiritual contact be established between the masses and the government and only in this way can the Soviet government become comprehensible and dear to the toiling masses of the border regions.'[62] This was the naissance of the policy of *korenizatsiia.*

KORENIZATSIIA

Korenizatsiia can be translated as either 'nativization' or 'indigenization'. The idea was based on the notion that the best way to win over a nationality was to win over its mind. To do this one had to speak to it in its own language, use its national symbols, and be sensitive to its national culture and history. It also entailed an affirmative-action programme of cadre recruitment.

Stalin outlined the policy of *korenizatsiia* at the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the RCP which took place in June 1923. He told the Conference:

> A Communist in the border regions must remember that he is a Communist and therefore, acting in conformity with the local conditions, must make concessions to those local national elements who are willing and able to work loyally within the framework of the Soviet system. This does not preclude, but, on the contrary, presupposes a systematic ideological struggle for the principles of Marxism and for genuine internationalism, and against the deviation toward nationalism. Only in this way will it be possible to eliminate local nationalism and win the broad strata of the local population to the side of the Soviet regime.[63]

Concretely this precipitated several contradictory policies. On the one hand the state and Party apparatuses on the local level had to be purged of all nationalist elements. But in order to 'conduct systematic and persevering work to make the state and Party institutions in the republics and regions national in character', Stalin stressed the importance of using the local language in the conduct of affairs, developing the national cultures and the means to disseminate them (national clubs, schools and institutions

of higher learning, publishing houses) and building up national units in the armed forces. This was to go hand in hand with economic incentives that would allow the less-developed areas to advance, thereby getting rid of economic inequality as a stimulant for arousing nationalist feelings. He called for providing the national republics with land and agricultural credits, co-operatives, technical schools, factories and mills. In an effort to foster ethnic homogeneity he even called for the slowing down of population transfers. At the same time, he noted the importance of enlisting members of the local intelligentsia into the Party and the usefulness of putting loyal officials from the areas in question into positions of authority. As Chapter 5 will show, these policies had a profound influence on Khruschev's nationalities policy of the late 1950s.

The Communists felt safe in pursuing such a course, not only because they underestimated nationalism, but because they felt that they had enough means of coercion at their disposal through the state and Party at a supranational level to be able to render nationalism meaningless. But indigenization, like sham federalism before it and like the policy of 'national in form, proletarian (or socialist) in content' after it, planted a major contradiction in the system. It led to the flourishing of national culture, created a nationally conscious political élite, formally institutionalized ethnicity in the state apparatus and reinforced the territorial division of the Union.[64] It also fostered a system where there were distinct advantages to be gained by being part of the dominant *ethnie*. The rights and status of national groups depended not on ideals of democracy or even class, but such characteristics as the location, size and stability of the republics and the percentage of the titular national group in its community. The rapid industrialization that accompanied *korenizatsiia* also led to greater national control over the means and distribution of production, which fostered a sense of 'domesticism'.

With the rapid rise in urbanization, workers and peasants moved into the cities, presenting the Party with a dilemma. Just as the First World War demonstrated how it was difficult to separate socialist parties from their national roots, the migration of rural people to the cities highlighted how parochial the interests of the workers and peasants could be. Despite a considerable barrage of propaganda, the rural populace displayed little empathy with communism. As Richard Stites points out, 'urban civilization did not efface rural mentalities; rather the opposite occurred... Russian political culture became peasantized'.[65]

One can look for a parallel between the Soviet dilemma and the situation faced by the 'intellectual awakeners' of the nineteenth century. Here was a mass of people who, to use Nairn's expression, had to be invited

into history. But in the Soviet case there was no language in which the greeting card could be written, save appeals to peasant culture and national tradition. After all, there was very little shared sense of Soviet experience or Soviet consciousness. The solution, at least in the short term, was to sugar-coat the Soviet pill in a national shell. The official credo for this policy became 'national in form, socialist in content'.

NATIONAL IN FORM, SOCIALIST IN CONTENT

In what would later prove to be one of the greatest undoings of Communism, Stalin developed the idea that something could be national in form as long as it was socialist in content. This idea was first laid out in a speech delivered at the University of the Peoples of the East on 18 May 1925.[66] It is worth looking at a lengthy extract from that address in order to appreciate the thought process behind this concept which was so representative of Communism's attempts to control nationalism and, because of the inherent contradiction which it created, so instrumental in Communism's demise. Yet as we do so, let us recall what Lenin said about reconciling nationalism and communism in 'Critical Remarks on the National Question' (1913).

> Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism – these are two irreconcilably hostile slogans that correspond to the two great class camps throughout the capitalist world, and express the *two* policies (nay, the two world outlooks) in the national question ... The proletariat cannot support any consecration of nationalism; on the contrary, it supports everything that helps to obliterate national distinctions and remove national barriers; it supports everything that makes the ties between the nationalities closer and closer, or tends to merge nations. To act differently means siding with reactionary nationalist philistinism.[67]

Only a few years later Stalin was arguing in the following way:

> How is [national culture] to be made compatible with proletarian culture? Did not Lenin, even before the war, say that there are two cultures – bourgeois culture and socialist culture – and that the demand for national culture is a reactionary demand of the bourgeoisie, which strives to infect the minds of the workers with the virus of nationalism? How are we to render the development of national culture, the development of schools and courses in the native languages, and the training of Communist cadres from among the local people, compatible with the

> building of socialism, with the building of proletarian culture? Is this not an irreconcilable contradiction? Of course not! We are building a proletarian culture. That is absolutely true. But it is also true that proletarian culture, which is socialist in content, assumes different forms and methods of expression among the various peoples that have been drawn into the work of socialist construction, depending on differences of language, customs, and so forth. Proletarian in content and national in form – such is the universal human culture towards which socialism is marching. Proletarian culture does not cancel national culture, but lends it content. National culture, on the other hand, does not cancel proletarian culture, but lends it form. The demand for national culture was a bourgeois demand as long as the bourgeoisie was in power and the consolidation of nations proceeded under the aegis of the bourgeois system. The demand for national culture became a proletarian demand when the proletariat came into power and the consolidation of nations began to proceed under the aegis of the Soviet government. Whoever has not grasped the fundamental difference between these two situations will never understand either Leninism or the essence of the national question from the standpoint of Leninism.[68]

The last sentence is misleading, for what is being described here is not so much the essence of the national question from the standpoint of Leninism, but rather, the essence of the national question from the standpoint of Stalinism. The origins of Stalin's views go back to 'Marxism and the National Question' (1917). As noted in the previous chapter, Stalin had a very territorially defined concept of the nation and, from studying the works of Bauer and Renner, also understood that language and a nation's 'psychological makeup' were derived from and inextricably linked to its deep national cultural history. What is clear from the above excerpt is that Marx's claim that the proletariat should become the leading or national class had now been fulfilled, that national culture was proletarian culture and *vice versa.* But that still does not explain why this proletarian nationalism would get rid of national distinctions and barriers, support for which Lenin had described as 'reactionary nationalist philistinism'. The closest we get is the explanation given in 'The National Question and Leninism' (1929) in which Stalin (echoing Bauer's views) stresses that nations are strengthened by socialism – they do not wither away. He writes:

> The fact of the matter is that the elimination of the bourgeois nations signifies the elimination not of nations in general, but only of the bourgeois nations. On the ruins of the old, bourgeois nations, new, socialist nations arise and develop, and they are far more solidly united than any

> bourgeois nation, because they are exempt from the irreconcilable class antagonisms that corrode the bourgeois nations, and are far more representative of the whole people than any bourgeois nation.[69]

This philosophy, which explicitly condones national Communism, would have significant consequences on the fate of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Tellingly, his argument does not explain how a socialist nation, 'more solidly united and virile than any bourgeois nation',[70] would get along with other socialist nations who are also presumably similarly united and virile. As subsequent chapters will demonstrate, this omission led to a considerable amount of debate on the nature of relationships between socialist nations and states.

Stalin's writings and tactics were ambivalent in other areas of the nationalities policy as well. Consider the argument made in 'Deviations on the National Question' (1930).

> The blossoming of cultures national in form and socialist in content under the proletarian dictatorship in one country, *with the object of* their fusion into a single, common, socialist (both in form and content) culture, with a single, common language, when the proletariat is victorious throughout the world and socialism becomes an everyday matter – such is the dialectical nature of the Leninist presentation of the question of national culture.[71]

Both logically and practically, this position was untenable. Was it to be blossoming or fusion? These two are mutually exclusive, and yet encouragement of their simultaneous development remained one of the cornerstones of Soviet nationalities policy into the 1960s.

Coming up with this type of convenient catch-all philosophy and then calling it a dialectic was symptomatic of Stalin's interest in the practical use of Leninist gadgets rather than in the Leninist laboratory of thought.[72] In a system where national culture overlapped with administrative units defined according to the dominant nationality, the encouragement of the blossoming of cultures would seem to necessitate a very loose confederal arrangement, not a strongly centralized federation. The growth of national culture is the antithesis of fusion and is made more acute by threats to it.

Stalin argued that nationalism and internationalism were mutually supportive, not mutually exclusive. He wrote the 'universal proletarian culture does not preclude, but rather presupposes and fosters national culture, just as national culture does not nullify, but rather supplements and enriches universal proletarian culture'.[73] This presupposes that national culture is somehow isolated from national identity and there is no link between

culture and politics. Acculturation of socialist nations to a super-national 'socialist internationalist' identity would therefore be a seamless transition. In Stalin's view, therefore, what we have is a dialectic and not a contradiction. He argues, 'Whoever has failed to understand this peculiarity and this "self-contradictory" nature of our transitional times, whoever has failed to understand this dialectical character of historical processes is lost to Marxism.'[74]

Since Marx and Engels had not come up with a satisfactory explanation of the relationship between communism and nationalism, it is easy to concur with Stalin that one who does not understand the dialectical character of historical processes as explained by the Communists is indeed lost to Marxism. The fact that Marxism was lost to nationalism meant that, in repeating the same arguments as his predecessors, Stalin was perpetuating the contradiction between them rather than achieving their synthesis. The fact that his successors used many of the same arguments meant that the trend was continued. Stalin's logic and the policies which he introduced are therefore representative of a cyclical pattern of behaviour which characterized Communists' treatment of nationalism from Marx to Yeltsin.

A CYCLICAL UNDOING

The model outlined below is designed to show the recurrent pattern of Communism's action and reaction *vis-à-vis* nationalism and the effect that the repetition of this cycle had on undercutting Communism's ideological tenability, political legitimacy and systemic integrity.[75]

In its most basic form the model comprises three elements. They are:

1. official words and actions (stemming from a desire for legitimacy) stressing support for nationalism which are subsequently or simultaneously undercut by:
2. actions to support statism and centralism (so as to hold on to power and ensure ideological conformity) which have the effect of:
3. neutralizing nationalism in the short term but, in the process increasing anti-state and pro-national sentiments which, in large part, feed off of the opportunities afforded by the seemingly token gestures mentioned in (1) and the sense of national identity which is strengthened by the reaction to (2).

This has already been evident in the Bolsheviks' use of 'self-determination', 'federalism', *korenizatsiia* and 'nationalist in form, socialist in content'. Other examples will be cited throughout this book. To elaborate on

the three basic elements of the model, one can consider the following nine stages of the cyclical pattern of behaviour.

1. An ideological concession is made to appease nationalist sentiment (usually characterized by a keyword or phrase).
2. The ideological stance is taken at face value by the nationalities causing the authorities to lose control of the situation.
3. The regime tries to regain control of the expectations which it has unwittingly raised, and hedges its position by putting its own official (qualified) interpretation on the initial ideological stance. In an effort to gain legitimacy, tactical political decisions are made to accommodate concern of the nationality or nationalities.
4. These concessions are, however, undercut by simultaneous decisions by the regime that effectively negate the spirit and letter of them.
5. Even the cosmetic concessions ('nationalist in form') create expectations among the national group(s) because of the internal dynamics of nationalism which the Communists failed to appreciate. The tacit *approval of nationalism in form leads to attempts by the national* group(s) to gain liberalization and/or autonomy. Or, put in other words, they try to make real the content which is celebrated in the form.
6. Concessions are given to a point in the belief that they will dampen criticism and nationalist feeling.
7. These further concessions cause expectations to be raised even higher.
8. This provokes a significant reaction from the central government as it feels that its position is being undercut. The reaction is said to be justified because of the need to protect the primacy of the state.
9. The act of reimposing the state's authority highlights the incongruency of the state with the underlying national political culture and the cognitive dissonance between nationalism and Communism. Short-term stability is reimposed, but in order to retain a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of its people and to placate nationalist sentiments, the regime is forced to make some form of concession and the process begins again.

As the above-mentioned cycle goes around and around, the regime's ideological justifications become weaker, and the feeling of national consciousness, and the discontent aroused when it is denied, becomes stronger. That is not to say that the regime necessarily becomes weaker; having a monopoly of the means of coercion, it may always resort to force. However, the baldness of this use of force will only serve to highlight the

regime's lack of popular legitimacy and, by extension, how far it has deviated from representing the national political culture. This often causes disillusionment among the élites and discontent among the masses.

Therefore we are looking at an irreconcilable contradiction rather than a dialectic. The difference between an irreconcilable (antagonistic) contradiction and a dialectic may seem obvious, but it is worth spelling out, as the Communists were fond of calling contradictions dialectics in the hope that these contradictions would somehow solve themselves in the end. In a Hegelian dialectic there is a synthesis between two antithetical notions. Where there is no synthesis, the contradiction is irreconcilable or antagonistic and thus the theory or political system is exploded. This is what we have in the case of Communism's relationship with nationalism. Communist theorists and practitioners had believed that, as socialism developed into Communism, antagonisms would fade away and only unharmful contradictions would remain.[76] This was explicitly stated, for example, in the Final Declaration of the meeting of 81 Communist parties in December 1960, which read, 'One of the great achievements of the world socialist system is the confirmation in practice of the Marxist–Leninist thesis that the antagonism among nations diminishes with the decline of the antagonism among classes.'[77] But this did not come to pass in relation to nationalism, for, as will be pointed out in Chapters 5 and 6, the more the cycle went around the more the antagonistic nature of the contradiction between nationalism and Communism became apparent.

The reason that nationalism and communism did not merge into a dialectic is that the Communists had no desire to achieve a meaningful synthesis with nationalism. They did not try to reconcile the contradiction, but tried to eliminate it by pursuing policies of 'compulsive homogeneity'[78] or assimilation. The only exception was when they felt that nationalism could be used to further their own ends. But even this was done cynically; it was not a recognition of nationalism in its own right. Connor makes a cogent observation when looking at Lenin's reaction to nationalism which is applicable to most, if not all, of his successors.

> The situation would be quite different had Lenin ascribed some positive value to national pluralism. But Lenin made clear that pluralism, which for a time was to be encouraged, had no intrinsic value beyond serving as a necessary stage at which national identities had withered away. To many Marxists, therefore, attempts to telescope this process would be as logical as telescoping the revolutionary process itself.[79]

This cycle occurred simultaneously on a national and international level: on a national level, between the centre and the nationalities within

the USSR and later within the respective People's Democracies of Eastern Europe, and on an international level between the USSR and the People's Democracies. (This cyclical pattern of behaviour is perhaps also applicable to explaining nationalities policies within other communist countries like China; but that is beyond the scope of this study.) Some of the cycles were chronologically longer than others, and in some cases certain steps were skipped. The intention is not to reduce all relationships concerning nationalism in the Communist world into the rigid framework of a convenient theory. Nevertheless, the paradigm helps to reinforce a theme which is being stressed throughout this book, namely the cumulative effect of Communism's reactive and rather cynical attempt to control nationalism.

SOCIALIST PATRIOTISM AND THE HISTORYLESS SOVIETS

Returning to Stalin's nationalities policy, if things national in form were permissible in the component national parts, why not the Soviet Union as a whole? This was easier said than done. In building a sense of patriotism, Stalin could not appeal to people's sense of civil nationalism because the Soviet Union was not a civil society. The only available option was to develop a distinct Soviet culture that could create a series of symbols and foci of allegiance. This was difficult for, following Stalin's own criteria, a nation must share a common language, common territory, economic life and national character. The USSR lacked a common language and national character. Furthermore, since the shared experience of the Soviet people was a mere 15 years, Engels would have referred to the Soviets as a 'historyless' people. There were certainly powerful images like the Revolution and the lives and works of Lenin and Stalin which could be used to foster a common Soviet consciousness. But this Soviet culture had limited appeal: it was swallowed by the intellectuals and apparatchiks, but not by the mass of workers and peasants.

As it was very difficult to build popular support through a largely 'imagined' supra-national Soviet identity, it became necessary to incorporate aspects of non-Communist history and culture. Lenin had realized this early on. In his speech to the Eighth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (1919) he said: 'Socialism cannot be built unless we utilize the heritage of capitalist culture. The only material we have to build communism with is capitalism.'[80] Stalin reminded his people of this in 1930 when he wrote in 'Deviations on the National Question' that 'it would be foolish to imagine that Lenin considered socialist culture to be a non-nationalist culture, which did not possess a definite national form'.[81] The idea that one

could have a national element to socialist culture justified building socialism in one country and legitimized the concept of socialist patriotism.[82]

SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY

The concept of socialism in one country was first formulated in the fall of 1924, but really only took off in 1929. It was a policy that sought to develop a sense of socialist patriotism, the very term that Lenin had used as an insult to describe the socialist 'opportunists' who had backed their own governments during the First World War.[83] And now here was Stalin advocating socialist patriotism as the highest Communist virtue. His motivations for doing so were similar to those of nationalists in other countries: he needed to find domestic solutions to his country's problems. This sense of urgency was heightened by the fact that international or even European revolutions seemed out of the question for the moment, and the USSR was being threatened by capitalist encirclement. 'Exhausted and disillusioned, Bolshevik Russia was withdrawing into her national shell, feasting her sore eyes on the vistas of socialism in one country.'[84]

Part of the process of creating a Soviet identity was to instil a sense of pride in the Soviet motherland. The idea was that the Soviet citizen would develop a genuine (as opposed to false 'bourgeois') sense of Soviet patriotism that was in harmony with workers of other nationalities within the USSR and throughout the world. It was a patriotism fuelled by respect and love for the most progressive features and traditions of the nation, yet devoid of the reactionary sting of nationalism.[85] But why and how? Wasn't socialism in one country a significant deviation from the spirit of socialist internationalism? Isn't socialist patriotism a contradiction in terms?

Trotsky, who had his own agenda in opposing Stalin, certainly thought so. In *The Permanent Revolution* (1931) he pointed out the ideological contradiction in Stalin's arguments.

> To attempt, regardless of the geographic, cultural and historical conditions of the country's development... to realize a fenced-in proportionality of all the branches of the economy within national limits, means to pursue a reactionary utopia. If the heralds and supporters of this theory nevertheless participate in the international revolutionary struggle... it is as hopeless ecelectics, they mechanically combine abstract internationalism with reactionary utopian national socialism.[86]

Trotsky argued that carrying out such a policy would lead to the collapse of Communism in that country, since it would be isolated and brought down from forces from within and abroad.

> The socialist revolution begins on national grounds. The maintenance of the proletarian revolution within a national framework can only be a provisional state of affairs, even though, as the experience of the Soviet Union shows, one of long duration. In an isolated proletarian dictatorship, the internal and external contradictions grow inevitably together with the growing successes. Remaining isolated, the proletarian state must finally become a victim of these contradictions.[87]

To prevent this situation from occurring, Trotsky advocated a policy of permanent revolution.

This line of argument has striking parallels to Marx's observations in the *Communist Manifesto* on the demise of the bourgeois class. Just as Marx pointed out that the contradictions within capitalism mean that the growth of modern industry 'cuts from under its feet the very foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products',[88] Trotsky suggested that the growth of state-centric, nationalistic socialism would lead to the collapse of socialism within the USSR (unless there was a permanent revolution). Although he did not mean it quite this way, what he was in fact concluding is that national socialism (or national Communism, as it will be referred to in later chapters), like capitalism, produces, above all, its own gravediggers. Subsequent chapters will provide evidence that bears out Trotsky's assertion.

THE GROWTH OF THE STATE

For Stalin, the key to building socialism in one country was rapid growth. This meant a rise in urbanization, accelerated industrial production and the collectivization of agriculture. All of these processes necessitated the strengthening of the state.

Rapid growth was introduced with the first Five-Year Plan in 1929. Under the plan, mega-projects in transportation, industry and irrigation were introduced that quickly transformed the whole complexion of life in the Soviet Union. The rate of growth was so phenomenal that the Soviet Union 'moved from the wooden plough to Sputnik in 40 years'.[89] Stalin, who became Party leader in 1929, increasingly associated his own fortunes with those of the USSR. This was evident by the cult of personality which began with the lavish celebrations of his fiftieth birthday in 1929. Strengthening his own position and that of the state completely destroyed the Marxist vision of the vanishing state and the self-functioning economy.

These changes had a profound effect on the nationalities. Most significantly, collectivization, urbanization and large-scale production effectively

meant the end of the government's conciliatory view of the kulaks. In forging ahead with the construction of the Soviet super-state one no longer had to pay such close attention to issues like indigenization which had been introduced to appease the nationally conscious peasantry. In 1925 Stalin had written that 'the peasant question after all constitutes the basis and intrinsic essence of the national question'.[90] By eliminating the peasant problem he assumed that he was eliminating the nationalities problem as well.

Administratively, this change was reflected in the fact that in 1930 the People's Commissariat for Nationalities was dissolved and Party apparatuses were no longer exclusively concerned with nationality issues.[91] Practically, the methods used to achieve this transformation were extreme. Collectivization, and the Terror which accompanied it, led to mass deportations, tens of thousands of deaths, the slaughter of thousands of livestock and the devastation of the countryside. Ukraine and Kazakstan were particularly hard hit.

Soon the Terror spread beyond the nationalities question to consume all those who stood in the way of progress, or at least all those who were perceived as being a threat to Stalin. The effects on the Party and Soviet society were devastating. Many of the brightest minds in the Party (men like Zinovyev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Radek and Trotsky) were dismissed from the Party and in many cases killed. By 1938 Stalin was the only living member of the 17-member Politburo of 1932.[92] The pervasive sense of insecurity which came as a result of the Purges meant that, more than before, party officials came to owe their positions (and their lives) to their superiors rather than their immediate colleagues or their rank-and-file electorate, and thereby effectively became the representatives of the centre in the local organizations.[93] Party Congresses became rubber stamps for the Central Committee. In 1937 the purges spread to the armed forces, where 14 of 16 of the army's top generals and two-thirds of all officers above the rank of colonel were purged. In all, by the end of the Purges in 1938, at least three million people had been killed and millions of others had been sent to labour camps because of 'oppositionist' or 'anti-Soviet' activity. All of this was done in the name of protecting the interests of the state and defending socialism in one country.

Socialist patriotism was a reflection of Stalin's pride in the advancement of the Soviet state, coupled with his continued sensitivity to the fact that the state needed a foundation of legitimacy that went beyond coercion and the cult of personality. But as the development of the Soviet state was anathema to the growth of a civil society, socialist patriotism took on the dichotomous characteristics of the most superficial aspects of pan-Soviet

folkloric kitsch and the most basic elements of Russian nationalism. Any remaining manifestations of 'bourgeois nationalism' were quashed. Significantly, by the early 1930s the latter was a greater crime than Great Russian chauvinism. Indeed, Great Russian chauvinism was becoming something of a virtue. For example, in 1938 Russian became compulsory in all schools and Latin script was replaced by Cyrillic in the alphabets of the Soviet Muslim peoples. Russian history and its heroes were lauded in school books, popular prose and art.

The highest echelons of the Soviet Communist Party were now moulding themselves in the very image of the imperial power which they had fought so hard to overthrow just a few years earlier. Stalin went so far as to portray himself as the successor to all those who had made the Russian Empire great before him – men like Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. This neo-imperialism masquerading as socialist internationalism recreated the animosity between centre and periphery which the Bolsheviks had so effectively harnessed in the years leading up to the 1917 revolution. This time, however, the nationalities were better educated, better mobilized and more nationally conscious than a generation earlier, as urbanization, mass education and programmes like indigenization had heightened their sense of identity. The affirmative nationalities policies of the 1920s and early 1930s had found a receptive audience, and the passions that had been aroused could not so easily be replaced by an artificial Soviet identity, especially as that identity came to look increasingly like Russian chauvinism.

THE 1936 CONSTITUTION

Stalin tried to reverse the earlier trend towards federalism with the 1936 Constitution. It made *de jure* the already *de facto* process of centralization. For example, Article 14 listed the numerous areas over which the Union had jurisdiction, while Article 15 stated that 'the sovereignty of the union republics shall be restricted only [*sic*] within the limits specified in article 14'.[94] Article 15 stated the contradictory notion that the USSR should protect the sovereign rights of the union republics – which in effect negated their sovereignty.

The Constitution was not completely lopsided in favour of the central government. Article 17 maintained that the republics had the right to secede. The fact that these articles refer to sovereignty – for the first time – means that sovereignty of the republics and not just the Union was now officially recognized. In addition, the 1936 Constitution legitimized the aspirations for statehood of several national groups. The Transcaucasus

were divided up and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia became full Union republics. So too did Kazakstan and Kirghizstan, thereby bringing the number of Union republics up to eleven. Implicit in this transformation was that statehood (or, at least, union republic status) was an evolutionary process that was condoned by the Soviet system. This was reinforced by the creation of a hierarchical system of classification which started with the designation of national areas, and progressed through to autonomous region (*oblast*), autonomous soviet socialist republic (ASSR) up to full socialist republic. Republican status was therefore something that was to be aspired to.

The creation of these administrative designations meant that in the same way that the pursuit of national interests of the republics led to centrifugal tendencies within the Union, the aspirations of the smaller autonomous groups could destabilize the republics. In Azerbaijan the creation of the Nakhichevan ASSR and the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh, both of which had sizeable Armenian populations, was a time bomb which ticked relatively undetected until the late 1980s. The creation of the Abkhaz ASSR, the Adjhar ASSR and the South Ossetian autonomous region in Georgia also created a situation where regional concerns would threaten (and indeed continue to threaten) the integrity of the larger republican administrative unit. Legally this was complicated by the fact that the autonomous regions, autonomous republics and union republics were all authorized by the 1936 constitution to draw up their own constitutions.

Nevertheless, all of these constitutions were subordinate to the Soviet one, and national interests were to be set aside for the greater good. Article 133 of the Constitution makes this very clear.

> Defence of the fatherland shall be the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. Treason to the motherland – violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, damaging the military power of the state or espionage – shall be punishable with all the severity of the law as the gravest malefaction.[95]

This sense of duty to the fatherland became even more pertinent during the Second World War.

THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

During the Second World War, or Great Patriotic War as the Communists called it, Stalin appealed to the national feelings of his people. He associated

himself with Russia's historic victories and its great leaders and generals. The Communist Party and the Red Army were portrayed as the heirs to the great traditions of the nation. Ranks were reintroduced in the military, and the oath of the Red Army was changed. Whereas formerly the Soviet recruit undertook to 'pledge all deeds and thought to the great aim of emancipating all workers' and declared himself ready to fight 'for the Soviet Union, for socialism and the brotherhood of peoples', he now swore to 'serve to his last breath his people, his homeland, and the Government of the workers and peasants'.[96] The 'Internationale' was replaced by a new anthemn, based on A.V. Alexsandrov's 'Hymn of the Bolshevik Party', which gave all praise to Stalin and the glories of the Soviet Union.

But such cosmetic changes did not address the underlying nationalities problems. The Molotov–Ribbentrop pact sanctioned Soviet expansion into Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia, part of ethnic Poland and Bessarabia. During the war Finland relinquished Karelia, and Bessarabia and northern Bukovina were added (from Romania) to the former Moldovian Autonomous Soviet Republic and granted union republic status, bringing the total number of union republics to 16.[97] All of these annexations were 'legally' confirmed through subsequent treaties, but the fact that the Soviet Union included so many anti-Russian and anti-Soviet peoples threatened to explode the nationality problem even further. So too did the large-scale deporatations of Kalmyks, Karachai, Balkars, Chechens, Latvians, Estonians, Ukrainians, Germans and Crimean Tartars. These deportations and the subsequent population transfers of ethnic Russians into the areas from which these groups had left did little to solve the national question – instead, they created deep grievances which became central to the political culture of these nationalities. The nationalities also reacted defensively to the glorification of all things Russian.

THE PARADOX OF COERCION AND THE EXAMPLE OF NATIONAL COMMUNISM

On the surface, Stalin emerged from the Second World War stronger than ever. The Soviet Union was considerably larger, Communism had proved itself stronger than Fascism and equal to capitalism and the Red Army occupied strategic areas throughout Central Europe. But despite heavy-handed assimilation, Russification and mass deportations, the nationalities question in the Soviet Union was not solved. No amount of assimilation could completely wipe out a nation's culture when that culture was allowed to keep its national forms. Indeed, the threats which Stalin's policies posed

to that identity added new, powerful shared experiences to the national identities, and rallied peoples in defence of their way of life and the very survival of their culture.[98]

Furthermore, although some may argue that Stalin effectively quelled local nationalisms, the fact that he used Great Russian chauvinism (and socialist patriotism) to achieve this set the precedent for future Communist leaders that national Communism was a viable option. As Chapter 4 will show, this had a significant impact on the post-war Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, whose peoples had much richer national histories than most of the republics of the Soviet Union.

4 Heirs to the Great Traditions of the Nation

A great deal has been written about the process of Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe.[1] The Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia is no exception.[2] In published studies, however, there is an area usually marginalized: namely, the attempts by the Communist parties to gain legitimacy through portraying themselves as the heirs to the great traditions of the nation.[3] This is the topic of the present chapter. In order to focus on this issue more precisely, the case of Czechoslovakia from 1945 to 1953 will be used, although where appropriate the examples of other countries will be drawn upon.

The immediate post-war period was as instrumental in shaping the destinies of the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe as the October Revolution and the civil war had been in establishing the Soviet Union. What will become apparent is that, just as the Bolsheviks had to make ideological and political compromises to accommodate the very nationalism which they used so successfully to come to power, the leaders of the People's Democracies rode the nationalist tiger to great effect in order to gain power, but also had considerable difficulties living with the consequences of the bureaucratic and ideological frameworks and expectations which they created in the process. For the Bolsheviks the way out of the dilemma was federalism. For the leaders of the Communist parties of Eastern Europe the solution was socialist patriotism. But, as Chapters 5 and 6 will show, these solutions, although effective in the short term, were fraught with internal ideological and political contradictions and eventually exacerbated rather than ameliorated the situation, ultimately leading to the breakup of the Communist bloc and the Soviet Union.

Czechoslovakia is an interesting case, for as Peter Hruby points out, 'Czechoslovakia could be viewed as a laboratory testing Soviet ideology and methods in an industrially and educationally developed European environment, whose cultural and political past markedly differed from Russia.'[4] Indeed, these characteristics made Czechoslovakia markedly different from most of its Eastern and Central European neighbours. In the inter-war period Czechoslovakia's per capita gross domestic product was among the highest in Europe,[5] it had a social welfare system on a par with those in the most developed Western European countries and, unlike most of its neighbours, it was not ruled by a dictator but by the

'philosopher-President', Thomas Garrigue Masaryk. It had its share of nationalities problems (Sudeten Germans, Poles, Czech–Slovak relations, Slovak–Hungarian relations, the Ruthenian issue) but these were dealt with relatively even-handedly. Some, therefore, might point out that looking at Czechoslovakia is like looking at the exception rather than the rule: but this is all the more reason to choose it as a case study. If it can be shown how the Communist Party tried to gain legitimacy in an economically advanced country with long traditions of humanism and social democracy, it can be concluded that the process would have been much easier in countries more susceptible to infiltration.

The conventional wisdom among many scholars is that, in building a Communist society, man had to be freed from his past as it was a burden to progressive development.[6] This chapter will show that this is not the case; rather, the Communist parties (particularly in Czechoslovakia) tried to capture the past in order to use it for their own ends. They used the nation's history – twisted it, and in many cases rewrote it beyond recognition. This was all in an effort to control the nation through its past, rather than to eliminate that past altogether. They knew that, without controlling the nation's history, they could not control its political culture. Without controlling, or at least being seen to represent, its culture they could never gain legitimacy. Thus, as will be pointed out in the case of Czechoslovakia, the use of national symbols and appeals to national sentiment did not die out after the coup of February 1948. In fact, as Chapter 5 will show in greater detail, Communist élites became increasingly reliant on nationalism to legitimize their regimes.

What will be demonstrated in this chapter is that, like Lenin and Stalin before them, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia became both master and slave to the power of nationalism. The Party was able to use nationalism effectively in coming to power, but discovered its corrosive nature once that power had been attained. It will be shown that the difference between the pre- and post-coup use of nationalism was not so much in the degree to which nationalism was used, but rather, in the rate of its success. In the former period the Communist Party was able to tap into popular sentiment. In the latter, the lack of congruence between the use of national symbols and real political action caused them to lose credibility.

THE IDEOLOGICAL DILEMMA

The goal of the Communist parties in the immediate post-war period was not to destroy the nation, but rather to claim it as their own. Fulfilling

Marx's advice from the *Manifesto*, they wanted to become the national class. This view was clearly articulated by the then deputy premier of Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald, in a speech at a conference of Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCz] officials in Slovakia on 1 April 1945 when he said:

> The strength of the bourgeoisie hinges not only on police batons but on the fact that it has always passed itself off as representing the entire nation, that it has always asserted its class interests in the name of the entire nation, and that in many cases it has been able to set us apart from the nation and to portray us as agents of a foreign power. Times today are completely different. The nation is seeking a new leader, and this can only be the working class and we, the Communist Party, as the party of the working class. And this is the very point [why it is necessary] for us to assert ourselves as the leading force. Today we are waging a struggle with the bourgeoisie for the trust of the nation.[7]

To put it more bluntly, the CPCz, like all Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, wanted to gain power and, like Lenin in 1917, they realized that nationalism was a vital force that could be harnessed to achieve that end. Some leaders (like Gottwald, Gomułka and Tito) seem to have believed in the possibility of a type of Communism which reflected the national identity, while others merely used nationalism as an instrument for the acquisition of power. Regardless of the motivation, the fact that the People's Democracies were not incorporated into the Soviet Union meant that although they were Communist they were not Soviet and therefore retained a sense of national identity.

Most of the People's Democracies had well-established national and, in some cases, social democratic traditions. Most were also relatively homogeneous, and the élites had the same nationality as the masses. By claiming to be heirs to the great traditions of the nation, the Communist parties took on a certain obligation to continue upholding those traditions. In most cases, these traditions were in diametrical opposition to the spirit of Stalinism and Marxism–Leninism. By playing the nationalist card, therefore, the Communist parties put themselves in a precarious position. On the one hand adopting the nationalist mantle could win them a sense of legitimacy and popular support at the expense of close relations with Moscow and fellow bloc members. On the other hand fulfilling the obligations of loyal Soviet satellite could be popularly perceived as an abrogation of the commitment made to uphold the nation's identity. The one exception was the Yugoslav Communist Party, which gained popularity by opposing nationalism in favour of federalism, although one could argue that in the

process they were advocating Yugoslav nationalism.[8] The increasingly independent policy that led to their dismissal from the Cominform in 1948 would seem to bear this out.

Despite the inherent dangers of adopting a nationalist line, it was a risk that many leaders felt was worth taking. Gottwald's remarks to a session of the central committee of the CPCz in November 1948 help to explain why.

> There were here such wiseacres, quasi-Marxists, who ... considered it our mistake that especially since May 1945 we had spoken about the Communists having to be the leading force of the nation. They said: 'What has this in common with Marxism and Leninism? After all, the Communists are part of the working class, the leading force of the working class! What's all this about the leading force of the nation! You're smashing up the concept of the Communist Party!' I think that our Central Committee is mature enough to comprehend at once the absurdity, the Trotskyist nature, of such a 'critique'. After all, the whole sense of our struggle was to win our way to the head of the nation, so that the nation, this means above all its working strata ... should respect us, acknowledge us as it own Party. We strove and fought by word and deed ... so that the running of the nation's affairs should pass out of the hands of the bourgeoisie, out of the hands which had many times sold this heritage of the nation, into our hands. That was the task of our struggle – and now comes this quasi-Marxist who says what's all this, are you pretenders to the role of the nation's leaders? Yes, and thank God we won ourselves that role, because without the leading role of the Communists in the nation, without the majority of the nation acknowledging us as their head, their brain, their leader, the bourgeoisie would not have been isolated; there would have been no Victorious February; and we would not be sitting here.[9]

THE POST-WAR MOOD

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was the only legal Communist party in Eastern Europe during the inter-war years: the Party was declared illegal in Hungary and Poland in 1919, in Yugoslavia in 1921, and in Bulgaria and Romania in 1924 (in Albania it did not exist until after the Italian occupation of 1939).[10] The CPCz had considerable popularity in the early 1920s under Bohumir Smeral: it could claim over 350,000 members on its foundation in 1921. But membership dropped dramatically

in 1929 when Klement Gottwald took over, for he was popularly perceived as following a dogmatic Moscow-centric line rather than the more independent policy of his predecessor. He did not deny close links with the Soviet Union; indeed, he flaunted them. In a parliamentary debate in 1929 he attacked his critics by remarking: 'You are saying that we are under Moscow's command and that we go there to learn. Yes, our highest revolutionary staff is Moscow and we go to Moscow to learn. And do you know what? We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian Bolsheviks how to break your necks, you patriots.'[11] The Party's membership figures did not reach 1921 levels again until 1943.

Ironically, membership rose again dramatically in the late 1930s and early 1940s precisely because the Communists became the very type of people which Gottwald once so disparagingly attacked – patriots. During the war the Czechoslovak Communists, who were in exile in Moscow, made considerable mileage out of the fact that the West had let down Czechoslovakia through its capitulation on the Sudeten issue at Munich in 1938 and its silence during the German occupation of what became the Reichsprotectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in 1939. They found a sympathetic audience in claiming that the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Soviet Union were the only two groups who stood up for Czech and Slovak national interests. As Josef Korbel eloquently puts it, the wound of Munich was 'a willing host to communist infection'.[12] Salt was rubbed in this wound by the minimal amount of support that Czechoslovakia gained from the West during the war in its times of most dire need. For example, there was considerable bitterness that the Allies did not support the Slovak Uprising of August 1944, or that the American forces stopped 60 miles outside of Prague in May 1945 instead of liberating the capital. It was the Communist partisans and the Red Army who were therefore portrayed as the saviours of Slovakia and the liberators of Prague.[13] Of course it was never mentioned that Prague was already liberated by the time that the Red Army arrived on 9 May.[14]

The CPCz also played on traditional feelings of pro-Russian and pan-Slavic sentiment. They claimed that the Soviet Union (and not Britain) was the first to recognize Edvard Beneš' London government in exile.[15] They also noted the strong bonds between Slavs which were in evidence at the wartime All-Slav Congresses in Moscow (which Beneš attended in 1941). And indeed, they had a point: because of the agreements made by the Big Three at Teheran – and subsequently Yalta and Potsdam – the Soviet Union was Czechoslovakia's closest ally. This had been acknowledged by Beneš when he went to Moscow and signed a Czechoslovak–Soviet Treaty of Alliance in December 1943. The bitter irony was that

Beneš was convinced that friendship with Russia would buy respect for Czechoslovakia's independence and for the principle of non-interference in her internal affairs.[16]

On the ground, the Communists were active in the partisan movement. This gave them two distinct advantages. First, they could hail themselves as defenders of the Czech and Slovak nations by pointing to the number of men who died fighting to liberate the Czech lands from the German Protectorate and Slovakia from Nazi influence. Second, they could use their well-established underground networks to eliminate non-Communist partisans and gain control of areas left ungoverned by the German retreat. As was the case in other Eastern European countries (particularly Yugoslavia and Poland), the Communists were able to exploit the post-war power vacuum better than any other party because they were quite simply the best organized. In Czechoslovakia, this was most evident in the way that they were able to gain control over the National Committees. As Karel Kaplan remarks, when a village or town was liberated, the Red Army commissars brought in a group of Communists; other political persons were forbidden to enter because officially the area was still a theatre of war. A National Committee (on the model of those set up at the beginning of the First Republic in 1918) was 'elected' on the street and the Communists then took control.[17]

Although the Communists gained positions of power through manipulation, they also won popularity through capitalizing on the overwhelming desire for change. As Hugh Seton-Watson observed in 1945:

> By a process similar to that used on Pavlov's dogs... the word 'Communism', whose political significance is unknown to the Eastern European peasants, has come to be associated with the fight of brave men and women for freedom, has become associated with civil liberties. The consequence is that Russia is regarded by large numbers of peasants [and one could include intellectuals], who are not members of any organized Communist Party, as a country where the common people is in control.[18]

In Czechoslovakia, and throughout Eastern Europe, there was a pervasive sense that the old order had failed and a new society had to come into being that would never again repeat the mistakes of the past. For many the Communists were least associated with that past and were thus the most qualified to lead the world into the future. They were ideally placed to take advantage of the hope for 'a new world of social solidarity through social revolution, creating nations that were at last proud to be free, exempt from minority national problems, and superior to the exhausted capitalist

nations of the West'.[19] Little did people know that this would set in motion a much more devastating round of brutality. As the protagonist of Ivan Klima's *Judge on Trial* (1992) remarks when looking back on the immediate post-war period:

> Convinced I had to do something to ensure that people never again lost their freedom, so that they should never again find themselves in hermetically sealed surroundings with no chance of escape, ruled solely by butcher's knives, I prepared to become a foot-soldier of the revolution, a hobby horse for a new generation of butchers to mount, and wielding their cleavers drive the scattered human herd into rebuilt enclosures, and set to with their knives to carve out the splendid future.[20]

The Communist Party benefited from the fact that non-Communist members of the government and wide sections of the population wanted changes that traditionally were considered the territory of socialist parties. As M. R. Myant writes in *Socialism and Democracy in Czechoslovakia 1945–1948*:

> There was a deep craving for national unity and a widespread longing for a restoration of the Czechoslovak state. There was, however, no escaping the fact that the pre-Munich republic had ended in disaster. Calls for its restoration were therefore frequently combined with strong criticisms of the ideas on which it had been based, and above all of its inclusion of large national minorities, its dependence on France and its capitalist system.[21]

Thus the irony of the immediate post-war period was that the most radical social and political changes were being advocated by the mainstream non-Communist parties. There was widespread support for nationalization of industries, utilities, insurance companies and banks:[22] by late 1945 two-thirds of the Republic's industries were nationalized. There were also adamant calls for the eviction of national minorities. The Communist Party initially advocated a measured approach to both of these issues, but then incorporated both as central planks in its Party platform. By championing fundamental national and social changes they stole the thunder of their two strongest political opponents, the National Socialists and the Social Democrats.

The fact that a party whose ideology was, theoretically, so fundamentally based on internationalism, could shamelessly sell itself as being more nationalist than the nationalists seems to have a serious logical incongruency. It is a incongruency which Minister of Information Václav Kopecký did not deny but rather boasted of in his speech to the 8th Congress of the CPCz in 1946.

> We are realizing the dream of whole generations of our nation ... We are building a Czechoslovak state without Germans or Hungarians, as a national state of Czechs and Slovaks (applause) in which the new Czechoslovakia fundamentally differs from the old Versailles and old German Czechoslovakia, which was a national state with a strong proportion of minorities from other nations. We are thus putting into practice the most national programme, one which nobody before could have devised and whose realization others did not want ... We are realizing this most national, anti-German programme as communists who have always voted for internationalism and who do not and will not give up the idea of the international brotherhood of the working class.[23]

During the post-war period this type of nationalist policy was pursued by Communist parties in other Eastern European countries as well. The Polish Communist Party claimed to be the one most qualified to retain the Oder–Neisse territories acquired from Germany at the end of the war,[24] while the East German Communist Party pledged to its people that it would restore those very same territories. The Hungarian Communist Party gained support by vowing to regain Transylvania, while the Romanian Communist Party pledged to defend the country's frontiers against the ambitions of its neighbours. The Albanian premier Enver Hoxha consolidated his position within the Albanian Communist Party by stressing his country's sovereignty and rooting out pro-Yugoslav members of the Party, like Interior Minister Koci Xoxe. Bulgaria and Yugoslavia clashed over claims to Macedonia, and Yugoslavia and Albania squabbled over Kosovo.[25]

The Parties were as adept in domestic political manoeuvring as they were in championing national causes. This was particularly the case in their manipulation of the National Fronts. There was a great deal of popular support for a centralized body that would co-ordinate post-war reconstruction. Through the use of these fronts,[26] the Communists were able to use the excuse of national unity to cloak their underlying political aspirations. As a result, the National Fronts became effectively that – fronts behind which the Communists were able to manoeuvre themselves into positions of power.

One point which the CPCz repeatedly stressed was that the National Front should not contain war profiteers and traitors. The definition of 'traitor' was made wide enough to act as a convenient pretence for getting rid of political opponents. Along with the other five parties which made up the Front, they forbade the restoration of Fascist parties or parties that had played a role in the Munich Agreement. This conveniently included the

two parties which had traditionally held the greatest amount of support in the countryside, the Agrarian Party in the Czech republic and the People's Party in Slovakia.

Members of nationalities who had participated in 'anti-state activities'were also labelled as traitors. Following the presidential decree of 21 June 1945 the majority of the country's German-speaking population[27] (2.7 million) and its Hungarian minority[28] were evicted. The Communists made sure that this policy did not extend to brother Slavs – the Poles and Ukrainians (most of the latter were incorporated into the USSR anyway when Ruthenia, or Carpatho-Ukraine, was annexed in June 1945[29]). Although it was Beneš and not the CPCz who had initiated the decree (and the later land reforms known as the Beneš Decrees), the Communists gained from it the most as they controlled the Ministry of Agriculture (which oversaw land and farm credit distribution) and had a leading official in the Office of the Resettlement of the National Land Fund. Unsurprisingly, those regions most affected by land distribution voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Communist Party in the May 26 elections of 1946. The CPCz won a significant majority of the vote in Moravia (34.5 per cent) and Bohemia (43.25 per cent) – 38 per cent overall. In the areas from which Sudeten Germans had been expelled they polled over 65 per cent. This mirrored similar developments in neighbouring countries. For example, the September 1944 decision by the Lublin government to divide up estates of over 100 hectares effectively eroded the power base of the Polish United Workers Party chief opponent – Stanislaw Mikołajczyk's Polish Peasant Party. Land redistribution was also used to great effect by the Romanian National Democratic Front, the Hungarian provisional government, the Fatherland Front in Bulgaria (through its control of the State Land Fund) and the Communist parties of Albania and Yugoslavia.[30]

THE PROBLEM WITH SLOVAKIA

Despite the strong showing of the Communist party in the Czech lands, the 1946 elections demonstrated that support for the Communists was low in Slovakia. In the immediate post-war period the Communists had spoken out in favour of Slovak nationalism. They were acutely aware of the Slovaks' desire for independence which had manifested itself during the Second World War, particularly during the National Uprising of 1944. They never lost an opportunity of pointing to the 1945 Košice program which recognized Slovakia as an autonomous part of the republic. Indeed, Gottwald called the Košice program the Magna Carta of the Slovak

nation.[31] The Communists also catered to Slovak national sensibilities by recognizing the Slovak Communist Party (CPS) as distinct from the Czechoslovak Communist Party. This, along with the recognition of the Slovak National Council and the Board of Commissioners (its executive organ), was designed to give the Slovaks a sense of nationalism in form, if not in content.

But this changed when the Democratic Party took 62 per cent of the vote in the 1946 elections. The Communists' poor showing can be attributed in part to the fact that the organizational base of the CPS was weaker than that of the CPCz, and also to the fact that Slovaks had a very vivid memory of the behaviour of the Soviet 'liberators' who, as in Hungary and Poland, raped and pillaged their way across the country in 1945. The Slovak Communists had also made themselves unpopular by attacking the Catholic Church. In addition, unlike in the Czech lands where the Ministry of Agriculture was in the hands of Communist officials, the Slovaks could not fall back on handouts of land to win them votes.

After their humiliating defeat in the 1946 elections, the CPCz played down their previous support for Slovak nationalism and played up the merits of 'Czechoslovakism' (a position also supported by Beneš). They pushed hard for, and obtained, the execution of the leader of the wartime Slovak clerico-Fascist state, Father Jozef Tiso. They destabilized the political situation in Slovakia, and when it was unstable they called for drastic means to stabilize it. Anyone who spoke out against Czechoslovak federalism and democratic centralism (which, to the Slovaks, smacked of historic Prague-centric condescension) were branded as being part of the Slovak national bourgeoisie. Even prominent members of the CPS, like Vladimir Clementis and Gustav Husak, were criticized and tried for this offence.

The May 1948 constitution made previous concessions to Slovak nationalism a legal fiction as the Board of Commissioners was weakened (and eventually disbanded in 1960) and power was centralized in the Federal Assembly in Prague. By 1950 the Slovak National Council (which was designed to have control over local bodies) was stripped of almost all of its powers. Similar moves were made within the Party when in July 1948 the CPS was subordinated to the CPCz. But, as was pointed out in the case of the Soviet republics, the fact that federal forms existed – even if their powers were limited – meant that the possibility of using them in a meaningful way continued to exist. The fact that those forms were offered and then cynically taken away, indeed, only served to heighten the sense of grievance. As Carol Skalnik Leff points out in *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia*, the creation of agencies and bureaucratic structures

devoted to Slovak interests engendered a tendency to defend those interests, and this in turn fostered the crystallization of national sentiment as an active force within the governing élite which would be released when circumstances would permit.[32] This sense of grievance was heightened by the 1960 constitution which effectively killed the idea of federalism by legally defining Czechoslovakia as a unified socialist state. As will be pointed out in the next chapter, it was this sense of nationalism unfulfilled – particularly within the Slovak Party élite – that led to calls for reform within the CPCz in 1963 and ultimately to the dramatic events of 1968.

SPIN-DOCTOR NEJEDLÝ

In the Czech lands the Communists took a different tack. Here the nationalist ticket was played to the full as they tried to portray themselves as the heirs to the great traditions of the nation. The most high profile exponent of this view was Zdeněk Nejedlý (1878–1962).

Today most people would regard a good deal of Nejedlý's work as bunk. Even those who write histories of the period cannot resist characterizing him in some way: Korbel calls him a 'cantankerous communist',[33] while Edward Táborský refers to him as 'Red Grandpa'.[34] But, however one may regard him, his work was seen as being in the vanguard of the Party's views on history and the national culture in the 1940s and early 50s, and therefore gives us a useful insight into the thinking of the time.

Nejedlý was the first Professor of Musical Science at Prague's Charles University. As will be explained in greater detail below, his main area of interest was the life and music of Bedřich Smetana. His musical interests also included the songs of the Hussites, of which he published a three-volume set. He also published monographs on Masaryk (1930) and Lenin (1933). When the war broke out he, along with the majority of Czechoslovak Communists, moved to Moscow, where he took the Chair in Czech history at the State University. He also became vice-president of the All-Slav Committee. In the National Front government he was minister of Education and Culture from 1945 to 1946. Between 1946 and 1948 he was Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, and in 1948 he returned to the post of Minister of Culture. In 1952 he became the first chairman of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and, in that capacity, automatically became a minister without portfolio. He was considered such a prominent person that in 1948 his seventieth birthday was feted in grand style at the National Theatre,[35] in 1952 his seventy-fifth birthday was celebrated by a postage stamp, and a commemorative coin in memory of the

hundredth anniversary of his birth was minted in 1978. These were accolades usually only conferred upon the president or prime minister.

Nejedlý's self-professed life's work was to resurrect and glorify all that was good in the Czechoslovak national heritage.[36] He can be considered an intellectual awakener of sorts: he felt that the Czechs and Slovaks (although he only usually referred to Czechs) had a rich cultural tradition, but one which had been buried by years of foreign influence. In 1946 he wrote, 'We are not bereft of cultural values. We lacked – and in many respects still lack – only a sufficiency of national awareness for us to tell ourselves, to convince ourselves, what a culture we have.'[37] This role as intellectual awakener became tied in with his political mandate, which was to show that the Communists were the heirs to all positive attributes of Czech and Slovak culture and history. This view was clearly set out in a presentation that he made to the First Central Conference of Ideological and Educational workers of the Czechoslovak Party in January 1948, when he remarked that the key to progress was in understanding one's history. Quoting Marx, he said that only when we know the development of a thing can we understand the thing itself. This, he argued, was of particular importance to the Czechs for whom, due to a legacy of subjugation, a knowledge of history was of great national necessity. During the darkest days the Czechs drew inspiration from years of a better past, when the common man was pre-eminent. He wrote, 'If we take a look at the overall trend of our national history, we see that our strength always lay in the rising up of the common folk, and in this way it followed the path of progress.'[38] For example, he attributes the loss of the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) to the fact that the nobles who were fighting the battle did not have the support of the people. Conversely, Jan Hus was so successful because he was backed by popular support. Self-evidently the Communists were, in Nejedlý's mind, the inheritors of the latter and not the former tradition. Ironically, as will be pointed out below, while professing to defend the best traditions of the nation, the Communist Party became the very embodiment of many of the qualities against which the Czechs had fought throughout their history.

Nevertheless, in the period leading up to the coup of February 1948 the Communists were relatively successful in reflecting the Czech political culture. One of the most representative works of their attempt to show a continuity between the past and themselves comes in Nejedlý's book *Communists: Heirs to the Great Traditions of the Czech Nation* (1946).[39] The book has never been translated into English, which is unfortunate as it is a classic example of the Communists' attempts to reconcile national traditions with Communism. To fill that historical gap in the following pages

it will be quoted from at length, and other contemporary sources will be drawn upon which were influenced by Nejedlý's work.

Nejedlý begins his argument by remarking that the Communists differ from the old pre-war social democrats, for not only do they not undervalue national feeling and, with it, national culture, (something, he argues, often done by 'those who interpreted internationalism as anationalism'), but, on the contrary, they exalt nationalism 'as a great and significant force, and thus formulated their relationship to it and the nation in a completely different way'.[40] The Communist use of national culture also differs from the bourgeoisie's approach for, said Nejedlý, the nation's history is the people's history and the bourgeoisie fears the people. This is not the case with the Communists.

> On the contrary, we welcome everything which strengthens and rouses the people. That is the sense and aim of all our work and efforts. We can therefore look respectfully and directly, with a firm gaze, into the face of all the greatness that is concealed in Czech history, and which our people have preserved to this day as a valuable heritage and a living tradition.[41]

To reinforce his argument he refers to the fact that Lenin once said that the Communist takes over the inheritance of every good thing that was carried out and created before him, hence also the good and fine traditions of his nation and culture.[42]

Nejedlý felt that recent history entitled the Communists to see themselves as the heirs and upholders of the nation's history and culture. He writes:

> As far as our patriotism is concerned, I believe that we demonstrated it well in 1938 when the other parties and political and non-political activists succumbed to fear and were willing to hand over their native land to the enemy. Who was it, who at the forefront raised their voice and called for the defence of our land? Once again it was the communists... Thus it is possible to say that this prevailing view in itself demonstrates that our relationship towards our nation, its traditions, culture and present-day development is a warm and genuine one.[43]

The Communists were the representatives of the common people, and the common people were the defenders of the nation and bearers of the national traditions. As Nejedlý writes, 'It was always the common classes which were our own nation, and it was they who took over the old and created new national traditions in keeping with the new era, thus leading it – as they lead it now – ever onwards.'[44]

JAN HUS – A GOOD COMMUNIST

One of the greatest historical traditions to which the Czechoslovak Communists considered themselves to be the rightful heirs was that of the Hussites.[45] Nejedlý writes:

> There among the Taborites the present-day nation sees the true Czech spirit, the true national strength and idea, making a clear distinction between what was truly Czech and what was not, and who was or was not a bearer of it and hence who is or is not worthy to remain in the nation's memory as a representative of the true national Czech tradition. In this as well we communists are of course at one with the national tradition. The people's revolutionary Tabor, not the double-dealing bourgeois Prague, is the tradition of the nation, and this is our keynote.[46]

Hus's anti-establishmentarianism and communalism were stressed rather than his piety and pursuit of the truth. Nejedlý even went so far as to suggest that if Hus had been alive in the 1940s he would probably have been a Communist!

> I know Hus very well, and have concerned myself with him and his work since my youth, and I have always been surprised at how little Hus was a theologian, how little he pondered on the existence and qualities of God. He was, however, deeply impressed by and interested in the people, namely their suffering, and gave a captivating account of the contrasts (thus sparking the outrage of his common listeners) between the way the people lived and the way the nobility, namely the church hierarchy, lived ... The religious form of his narration ... is evidently only an outer shell which he used in the struggle against the powerful church because it also supported its worldly interests with religious reasoning. It would therefore be quite unhistorical to think that nowadays Hus, not needing such an outer shell which would indeed be a hindrance, would be a priest as he was at that time. Today Hus would be the head of a political party, and his platform would not be a pulpit but the Prague Lucerna Hall or Wenceslas Square. His party would have a great deal in common – and of this we can be convinced – with us communists.[47]

This continuity between Jan Hus and the CPCz was analogous to the GDR regimes' treatment of Martin Luther in the 1980s, which will be examined in Chapter 6.

The fighting spirit of Jan Žižka and his 'Warriors of God' was held up to be the precursor of Communist militarism. A propaganda poster of the

period showed a partisan with a rifle in one hand, his other hand clenched in determination as a Hussite warrior looks over his shoulder in stoic approval. Nejedlý wrote in 1946,

> We state our allegiance to Hus and the other Hussite revolutionary heroes with sincerity, from the depths of our soul and with our whole heart. We would not mind at all if Žižka reappeared today among us along with his mace, his possibly rather primitive but undeniably effective methods which helped create order in the world 500 years ago.[48]

He would not have to wait long for the Party to use Žižka-like tactics to create order.

OTHER SELECTIVE MEMORIES

The more recent the history, the more difficult it was to portray events in class-based terms. Most notably, Nejedlý and his followers had a great deal of trouble in explaining the national revival of the nineteenth century. For example, he did not seem to be able to come up with a reasonable argument to dispute the fact that the Revival was motivated in large part by the bourgeoisie who funded most of the national projects (art galleries, banks, the exhibition park). The National Museum, its journal and a subcommittee of the museum group known as the *Matice česka* were at the very centre of the Czech national and intellectual movement and were mainly funded by the Czech bourgeoisie. But Nejedlý scoffs, 'As if a museum could revive the nation!'[49] It is not that he dismisses the importance of culture in nationalism; rather, he demonstrates a very selective notion of what aspects of national culture are progressive.

This attitude allowed him to pick and choose who was or was not a good nationalist and, by extension, a good Communist. Interestingly, all the figures that are chosen are from the distant past. There is no mention of prominent personalities from the First Republic, even prominent Communist personalities from the inter-war period. Those figures that are praised are from the nineteenth-century awakening, the very same period in Czech and Slovak history which Engels had so hysterically attacked when calling the 'miserable national independence' movement a 'cowardly, low betrayal of the revolution' (see Chapter 2). The Communists of the 1940s were therefore arguing the very antithesis of the position taken by the classical Marxists. Suddenly the 'historyless' Czechs and Slovaks had a vibrant history, one to which the Communists were the 'rightful' heirs. For example, Palacký, Šafařík, Kollár and Havlíček (key founding

fathers of the national revival) were given high praise. Palacký in particular took on a cult status. In art it was Myslbek (sculptor), Aleš, Navrátil and Mánes, in literature Jirásek, and in music Smetana.

The use of Smetana is a particularly interesting case. Nejedlý lived and worked for a long time in Litomyšl, East Bohemia,[50] where Smetana was born, and for that reason seems to have developed a deep – one might say obsessive – interest in his life and work. He spent many years writing a seven-volume biography of Smetana (of which only three volumes were published), published his own musical magazine, called *Smetana*, between 1910 and 1915, organized Smetana festivals and, in 1929, founded the Smetana museum in Prague.

Nejedlý bemoans the fact that Smetana's diaries and notes are unpublished, 'denying the broader public the opportunity of finding out what a revolutionary Smetana was, how he was through and through a man of the left, and how unusually politically aware he was'.[51] Some of the socialist undertones are quite obvious in Smetana's work, says Nejedlý. For example, 'The whole of *The Bartered Bride* is, after all, the struggle of a simple common lad against the rural bigwigs and their accomplices until his ultimate joyful victory.'[52] And his masterpiece *Ma Vlast* [*My Country*] is not so much a celebration of the beauties of the Czech countryside as a celebration of the national struggle to defend the spirit of Tabor. It is therefore quite natural, says Nejedlý, that it is very often played in Moscow, indeed that it should be played at the opening of one of the congresses of the Communist International.[53]

Interestingly, Nejedlý did not accord similar praise to the music of Dvořák. Although Dvořák drew on folk motifs, for example in the *Slavonic Dances*, he was regarded as being something of a cosmopolitan.[54] Perhaps this can be attributed to the fact that he wrote the *New World Symphony* in America, although an equally plausible answer stems from the fact that Nejedlý quite simply did not get along with him. It seems to be more than mere coincidence that this aversion to Dvořák started around the same time as Dvořák refused to give Nejedlý permission to marry his daughter.[55]

Today Nejedlý's assertions may seem ridiculous. But the Communists were not the first to pick and choose people and events from the past in order to gain legitimacy. The nineteenth-century awakeners had used similar tactics. Indeed, the parallel between the Communists and the nineteenth-century intellectuals is very striking, especially in their use of historiography. But this approach could only work if the causes being championed enjoyed wide popular support and if there was congruence between political decisions and the underlying national political culture and identity.

As was noted in Chapter 1, in order for a regime to gain legitimacy there must be a morally satisfying relationship between political symbols and the political reality to which they refer. By 1947 that relationship was becoming significantly less morally satisfying than it had been in the immediate post-war period.

TIGHTENING THE SCREWS

In 1947 the activities of the CPCz became more extreme. In June Stalin forced Gottwald to back down on accepting aid from the Marshall Plan.[56] In September the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was formed, and it became evident that any 'Czechoslovak road to socialism' would have to go via Moscow. The worsening relationship between the USSR and the West (due to the Truman Doctrine, containment and the exclusion of Communists from coalition governments in France and Italy) signalled the need to tighten up relations within the socialist camp. The result was a reaction from the Kremlin similar to that of the Bolsheviks in 1920/21, namely that the defence of the heartland of world Communism now took priority over the concerns of any of the component parts. As a result, the officially sanctioned policy of 'coordinated diversity' gave way to centralized conformity. Goaded on by Moscow and chastized by fellow socialists for taking so long to come to power, the CPCz accelerated its revolutionary activity. Opinion polls showed that the Party's popularity was dipping, and that the chance of winning 51 per cent of the vote in the next election was slim.[57] What could not be done legally, therefore, would have to be achieved by force and deception. The Communists were in an ideal position to do so, for by 1947 they had control over the key ministries of the Interior, Information, Education, Social Welfare and Agriculture. They also controlled significant sectors of the police and the Revolutionary Trade Unions, and they maintained the neutrality of the army.

Their tactics continued to become bolder. In 1947 they made more effective use of the Action Committees (which were tasked with purging anti-Communists) and mobilized a 'people's militia'. They tried to rouse their waning political fortunes by proposing a tax on all property over one million crowns (the so-called 'millionaire's tax'), but lost that vote. They then rallied all the now well-entrenched means of agitation and coercion at their disposal. For example, they prevented the supply of newsprint to rival newspapers. They even tried to assassinate three non-communist ministers – Jan Masaryk, Petr Zenkl and Prokop Drtina – through parcel bombs.[58]

All of these intrigues did very little to rouse the non-Communist parties. They behaved as if they were operating in a normal parliamentary democracy. The National Socialists, even after the 1946 elections, were so confident of their eventual pre-eminence that they did not seek to build an anti-Communist coalition. Beneš relied on a rather naive faith in the strong democratic traditions of the people. Alternatively, one could argue that, since Munich, he had seen which way the wind was blowing and that it was better to hang on to the few levers of power that he had than throw them all away through fruitless resistance (as had been the case with the Polish democrats). In all fairness, by that point the non-Communists had little choice. As Kaplan explains:

> What most limited the activity of the non-Communist opposition was that it was permanently tied to the Communist Party, obliged to co-operate with it because of Czechoslovakia's foreign-policy orientation of alliance with the Soviet Union and the country's inclusion within the Soviet sphere of influence. Their anti-German policy forced the non-Communists ... into co-operation with the Soviet Union and prevented them from recognizing changes that were taking place in Germany and in the attitude of the Great Powers towards Germany.[59]

In addition most Czech and Slovak politicians, particularly Beneš, saw Communist participation in the government as the main defence against Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the Republic.

By early 1948 the tactics of the Communists were becoming too much for some of the non-Communist members of parliament. In February twelve ministers resigned over what they quite rightly interpreted as political interference in the hiring and firing of police officers. They hoped that their actions would lead others – particularly the Social Democrats – to resign, thereby creating a new round of elections. As it turned out, the Social Democrats and others, including Jan Masaryk, did not resign.[60] This gave Gottwald the upper hand. Arguing that it was the non-Communists and not he who was provoking a constitutional crisis, Gottwald stated that he would withdraw the Communist party's support from the government if the resignations of the objecting non-Communist ministers were not accepted. Beneš took a few days to consider the issue, and on February 25th accepted Gottwald's virtual ultimatum. The resignations were accepted. As Kaplan writes in *The Short March*, 'In February 1948 the non-Communist opposition came face to face with the consequences of their earlier political illusions and capitulations, their want of experience in power conflicts, unrealistic estimations of their own strength, and ignorance of the nature of their opponent.'[61] Gottwald filled the vacancies

with Communists and 'fellow travellers', creating a new, overwhelmingly pro-Communist government.

MORE NATIONALISM, NOT LESS

As with Lenin in 1917, the dilemma for the Communists on coming to power was in fulfilling the expectations that had been raised in order to gain the popular support necessary to win that power. Either one had to follow through on the promises given at the risk of jeopardizing one's ideology and destabilizing one's power base (in the case of the USSR, the risk was breaking up the Union; in the case of the People's Democracy it was straining inter-bloc relations) or one had to renege on these promises and risk losing popular support. Keeping control of the state was relatively easy if one had the means of coercion at one's disposal: keeping control of the nation required an infinitely more delicate approach. The Communists were aware of the need to consolidate their control over the nation and not just the state, and therefore continued to play the nationalist card in the immediate post-coup years.[62]

Therefore although the CPCz's takeover in February 1948 and its subsequent victory in the May elections of that year put Czechoslovakia firmly in the Soviet camp and ushered in an era of Sovietization, it is only half true to argue, as Korbel does, that 'as soon as the Party seized power the last vestiges of national loyalty were quickly abandoned'.[63] By following orders from Moscow the Communist Party leadership was certainly disloyal to the nation. Their support for the excommunication of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June 1948 would also suggest that they had surrendered their own country's right to individuality and independence in the process.[64] But the *appearance* of being seen to be loyal to the nation was not abandoned. They knew that their popular acceptance 'depended on the degree to which they were or appeared to be national, and not in the degree to which they gave proof of their Marxism–Leninism'.[65] The Communists had seen in 1947 and '48 that national symbols and heroes were stronger rallying forces than Party propaganda. The well-attended meetings of the Czech legionnaires (particularly in July 1947), celebrations of Jan Hus day (7 July), the founding of the republic (28 October) and the birthday and death of T. G. Masaryk gave the Communists cause for concern.[66] Since these figures and sentiments could not be completely erased from the collective national memory, at least in the short term, they would have to be co-opted. By doing so the Communists hoped to be seen to be upholding national traditions, and thereby maintaining legitimacy,

while at the same time neutralizing the effects of those very same traditions. This fits in with the observations of sociologist David Kertzer, who notes that 'dramatic discontinuities threaten the integrity of any political organization. In the face of such a threat, potent symbolic means must be used to legitimate both the changes and the powerholders responsible for them.'[67] Interestingly, Marx had made a similar observation in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852) when he wrote:

> Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under given circumstances chosen by themselves, but under given circumstances directly encountered and inherited from the past. The tradition of all the generations of the dead weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem involved in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never before existed, it is in such periods of revolutionary crisis that they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow names, battle cries and costumes from them in order to act out the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language.[68]

In the immediate post-coup period the CPCz certainly tried to use time-honoured disguises and borrowed language in order to usher in a new stage in the country's history. The pertinence of controlling the national culture, and by extension its political culture, can be noted in the fact that in 1949 expenditure on 'cultural values' was the largest single item in the budget. It is also interesting to note that Gottwald and his successors were eager to occupy Hradčany castle (the symbolic seat of the Czechoslovak president) in order to cloak themselves in the mantle of national respectibility.[69] But the difference between the pre- and post-coup period was the incongruency between what the regime professed to be doing and what it actually did, something which broke down its sense of legitimacy. The most salient examples of this incongruency and its effects can be seen in the Party's treatment of the Sokols and the memory of T. G. Masaryk.

SOKOL – CLIPPING THE FALCON'S WINGS

Sokol was created in 1862 by Miroslav Tyrš.[70] Inspired by Greek history and culture, Tyrš set up athletic clubs across Bohemia. Under the slogan 'healthy mind, healthy body', these clubs became centres for gymnasts and the physically fit of all ages to come together to do group exercises. The focus in the Sokol (which means 'falcon') was on teamwork and

fitness; the humanitarian philosophy of human brotherhood was its predominant ethos.[71] But there were also strong nationalist overtones to the organization. As stipulated in its statutes, the goal of the Sokol was 'by education of the body and spirit, by physical energy, by art and by science, by all moral means, to revive the fatherland'.[72] In 1882 the first *slet* (literally 'landing' or 'flocking') took place. Over 700 participants came together from Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Croatia and America to perform a mass gymnastic display. By the turn of the century, thousands were participating in the *slets* and hundreds of thousands were turning out to watch. As well as the massed gymnastic displays, the highlight of the *slet* was a re-enactment of an historical event. At the fifth *slet* in 1907 the battle between Jan Žižka and the Germans was re-enacted; in 1912 the scene was the battle of Marathon; 1920 a festival for the freedom and independence of the Republic; and in 1926 the scene was entitled *Kde domov můj* (the title of the national anthem), a celebration of the beauty of the Czechoslovak countryside. Eventually, attending a Sokol festival became something of a patriotic duty. For example, Sokol members made a vow shortly before Czechoslovakia gained its independence in 1918 to defend the sovereignty of the unarmed republic.[73] A similar pledge was made at the 1938 *slet*, where over 200,000 people took part. With a fly-over by the Czechoslovak airforce, and the presence of many young Czechoslovak men in uniform, it was as much a display of patriotism and military preparedness as gymnastic ability. Not surprisingly, one of the first acts that the Nazis performed when they took control of the Czech lands in 1939 was to round up and imprison over 20,000 Sokol members.[74]

The Communists were more subtle. At first they tried to woo the Sokol. With over one million members in 3,391 locales,[75] it was not a force that could easily be willed away. Whereas in 1929 Gottwald had called the Sokol 'a chauvinistic organization of the bourgeoisie',[76] in an address to young Communists in 1947 he proclaimed the old slogan 'Every Czech – a Sokol'.[77] But anti-Communist reaction during the 1948 *slet* showed that this was a vain attempt at winning support.

The *slet* of July 1948 was the scene of a showdown for the heart of the nation. The major themes were the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Czechoslovak republic, the 100th anniversary of the All-Slav Congress and the 600th anniversary of the founding of Charles University. But the date that was on most people's minds was that of 25 February, when the Communists came to power. After the formal *slet*, Sokol members took part in an impromptu march through Prague chanting patriotic slogans. The marchers were eventually dispersed by the police and a Communist-organized counter-protest.

Fearing the ability of the Sokol to mobilize its members for events other than recreation, the Communists then tried to amalgamate it with other organizations like the Boy Scouts, the Workers' Gymnastic Movement, Sporting Unions and the Union of Czechoslovak Youth.[78] When that failed they tried to infiltrate it by appointing a new leadership. But as Chalupa points out in *Rise and Development of a Totalitarian State*:

> Despite long years of expulsions and of demotions of Sokol functionaries, the old-time Sokol units, bound with discipline, common thinking and ties of friendship of long standing, formed entities which could at least by passive resistance sabotage the attempt to transform the physical and moral Sokol education into an introductory lesson in military training and political indoctrination.[79]

The Communists then tried to set up parallel organizations. A Czechoslovak Union of Youth (CSM) was created in 1949 for those between the ages of 14 and 24, with those under the age of 14 to be in the Pioneers. It attracted over one million members to its ranks in the first year of operation; but many of these young people joined more out of complicity than enthusiasm.[80]

Eventually the government decided to purge the Sokol leadership, split up its local units and completely reorganize the whole structure of physical education, clubs and sporting organizations. But in doing so they still tried to keep some of the old Sokol imagery alive. For example, they created the Tyrš Physical Fitness Medal for high proficiency in sports. They also kept the idea of the *slets* by organizing *spartakiada*. The first *spartakiada*, held in 1955, although very much in the vein of the Sokol *slets*, stressed socialist patriotism, world peace, and fraternal allegiance to the USSR rather than historical and national themes. In explaining how this differed from the Sokol, a writer in the party magazine *Nová Mysl* commented:

> The first nationwide *spartakiada* differs from all earlier great gymnastics celebrations in so far as in it, for the first time, appears a real unified gymnastics movement. It is certainly no coincidence that only in the people's democratic state is the unification of sport and physical education made possible. From experience and the history of our physical education we know that in the bourgeois government the unity of physical education and sport did not exist. The bourgeoisie did not seek unity, rather sought to keep massed and sporting organizations apart because they were mortally afraid of the unity of the workers.[81]

This was a classic example of keeping something national in form, but making it socialist in content.

MASARYK

Initially the Communists tried to claim T. G. Masaryk, architect of the First Republic and President from 1918 to 1935, as one of their own. As with other areas of Czech history, they were selective in their approach as to what aspects of Masaryk's work could be considered progressive. They stressed his democratic and humanistic works, his opposition to Hitler, and his anti-clericalism. Nejedlý in particular made many an impassioned speech in support of Masaryk.[82] Party officials, including Gottwald, attended the 98th anniversary of Masaryk's birth on 7 March 1948 and the 100th anniversary in 1950. But Masaryk presented a problem, for he was the personification of a political culture that had been both very immediate and very popular. He had spoken for values which the Communists only mouthed; social justice, truth and humanism. He thus represented a value system and even a cult of personality which made the empty platitudes of the Communist leadership sound rather hollow.

In the early 1950s the Party did its best to ignore his legacy as much as possible: when he was mentioned it was only in connection to his pre-1917 works. But by 1952 indifference had given way to open hostility. As much as the Communists tried to sell themselves as the heirs to the great traditions of the nation, they obviously felt that they were not striking a chord with the people. Masaryk's name was publicly attacked and his character destroyed. In a book entitled *T. G. Masaryk's Antipopular Politics* (1953) the former much-loved 'philosopher-president' was accused, among other things, of being a Fascist, a conspirator in a plot to murder Lenin and an anti-Communist campaigner.[83] The fact that most Czechs and Slovaks knew this to be completely false made the tactics of the Communists look pathetically obvious.

There are two possible explanations as to why the Communists chose this path. On the one hand, the leaders of the CPCz may have felt sure enough of their position that they no longer needed to continue the pretence of being the heirs to Masaryk's republic. Alternatively, and more in keeping with the argument that has been outlined thus far, the reason for attacking Masaryk so vehemently may have been because of the Party's perceived position of weakness, not strength. As Richard Hunt points out, 'The very fact that the Czechoslovak Communists have chosen Masaryk for public attack indicates a pronounced fear of the democratic ideals that are associated with his name. Certainly if those ideals were uninfluential, the Communists would not bother to abuse his memory, because they would not be afraid of it.'[84] Czechoslovak society was entering what Václav Havel described as the 'Culture of the Lie'.[85]

KEEPING THE NATIONAL FORMS

Although the 'Culture of the Lie' went hand in hand with Sovietization and even Russification (Russian became compulsory in schools in 1948) the party still stuck to national forms in some areas. However, cultural activity became concentrated in those 'safe' areas of the nation's history which could be easily made to conform to the Party's ideological needs. Whereas previously the Communists had tried to portray themselves as the defenders of the best aspects of culture, they gradually abandoned this in favour of superficial support for synthetic culture. As Claude Karnouth remarks: 'All spontaneity is fixed within the rigid framework of houses of culture which, from village, factory and school all the way to the capital, duplicate the Party's political apparatus on the cultural plane.'[86]

Attractive, entertaining and easily appreciated elements of peasant culture were supported. Folk songs were published and folk dance groups were sponsored. The art of Mikolas Aleš and Josef Mánes (particularly those works which depicted Hussite scenes, the romantic life of the peasants or landscapes)[87] and the sculptures of Josef Myslbek (which concentrated on legendary Czech heroes or the common working people) were displayed throughout galleries of the republic. In Slovakia the poems of Hviezdoslav were lauded. High praise was also heaped upon Alois Jirásek (described by many as the Czech Sir Walter Scott), particularly those of his works which described the life and times of Jan Hus. In 1949 a drive was started to print large numbers of Jirásek's works,[88] and in 1951 a Jirásek museum was opened at the Hvězda castle on White Mountain in Prague.[89] As Táborský points out, the irony was that 'this man whom the communist rulers attempt to present almost as an anti-bourgeois tribune of the class struggle was actually a resolute anti-communist'.[90]

Tabor was restored and archaeological research was carried out on several Hussite castles. The renovation of Hus's Bethlehem chapel in Prague was completed with great fanfare in 1952. Academically, the Hussite phenomenon was invigorated by the writings of Josef Máček.[91] His most famous work, *Husitské revolucní hnutí* [*The Revolutionary Hussite Movement*] (1952) was followed by five others and inspired a flurry of books and articles on the subject.[92] Many of these works were published under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences (which was opened in 1952) and in its journal *Československý Historický Časopis* [*The Journal of Czechoslovak History*]. As with Nejedlý's writings in the pre-1948 period, the writers in these various publications stressed the continuity between the traditions of Tabor and the Communist Party. F. Kavka wrote in 'The Hussite Tradition – A Great Source of Strength in the Struggle of

Our People' which appeared in *Nová Mysl* in 1953, 'Rarely do we find in the history of another nation an example which from the distant path could be used as such a strong case for the revolutionary path of the present.' He goes on, 'The Hussite tradition, from the beginning a living one among people of the resistance movement, created suitable ground for the stimuli of the proletariat revolution in that it demonstrated how the October Revolution is the logical culmination of the path which the Taborites embarked upon.'[93]

The Hussite tradition was even used to glorify the Communist Party leader and Czechoslovak President Klement Gottwald in death. In 1953 the building which had been constructed to commemorate the Czech Legionnaires was converted into a Gottwald mausoleum. Looking over the mausoleum is a statue of Žižka sitting on his horse – bandage over one eye, mace held defiantly aloft. The statue had been built to commemorate the Legionnaires, but with the internment of Gottwald its significance had been changed. Instead of guarding the soldiers who fought their way across Russia and who epitomized the spirit that founded the First Republic, Žižka was now seen to be guarding the tomb of the heir to the great traditions of the nation. This was tangible evidence of the Party's attempt to keep the spirit of Žižka alive and to claim him as one of their own.[94]

A similar link with the past was forged in Hungary, where the focus of attention was Dozsa, the leader of the abortive peasant uprising of 1514. The story of Dozsa was co-opted to suit the Party's purposes as a national class warrior.[95] For example, the painting of Dozsa and his men preparing for battle, entitled 'Before the Storm', was the centrepiece of the Second Exhibition of Hungarian Art in 1951.[96] Dozsa was a useful figure, for not only did he, like Žižka, 'represent' the militant national-socialist but he could also be pointed to as a model of the revolutionary consciousness of the agricultural classes. The Hungarian Communist Party also tried to portray the Kuracz struggle against the Hapsburgs, and the 1848 revolutions as class conflicts. Statues of Kossuth were erected. Any creative artist who glorified the positive aspects of these periods (like Jenó Rákoczi, Sándor Petöfi and Endré Ady) was highly praised. The regime also went to great lengths to publicize its efforts at reconstructing Budapest and churches throughout the country, particularly the massive cathedral at Ezstergom. Reconstruction on an even greater scale and significance took place in Poland, where the Communists ordered that Warsaw's old town should be rebuilt in its nineteenth-century (bourgeois) style brick by brick.

POSTAGE STAMPS

It may seem a small thing, but a cursory examination of postage stamps of the time tells us a great deal about the Communist's use of national figures and symbols. After all, most people did not read the Party journal *Nová Mysl* or the works of Nejedlý, but they did post letters.

In 1947 the Czechoslovak stamps displayed national themes: remembrance of the Nazi destruction of Lidice (in retaliation for the assassination of Reichsprotector Reinhard Heydrich), a stamp commemorating the tenth anniversary of the death of Masaryk, a stamp of Beneš, athletes paying homage to the republic and so on. 1948 carried on in a similar vein, with a commemorative stamp for the 11th Sokol Congress, stamps of Charles IV and King Wenceslas, the Centenary of the Constituent assembly at Kroměříž (with a picture of Palacký) and even a stamp which came out on 28 October to commemorate 30 years of independence. Communist themes also became common; for example, there was a stamp marking Gottwald's fifty-second birthday, and a commemorative stamp of the fifth anniversary of the Czechoslovak–Russian alliance. In 1949 there was a stamp of Lenin, a stamp of Gottwald addressing a rally and fairly predictable depictions of 'Girl Agricultural Worker', 'Workers and Flag', 'Industrial Worker', 'Modern Miner' and a stamp of Stalin. But then one also finds a stamp commemorating the 125th anniversary of the birth of Smetana. In 1950 and all the way through to 1954 stamps were issued commemorating the 130th anniversary of writer Bozena Němcová, the birth centenary of composer Zdeněk Fibich, a stamp of Dvořák, Jirásek, Kollár, Myslbek, Aleš, and Janáček. Even the seventieth anniversary of the National Theatre (the jewel in the nineteenth-century revival's crown) was honoured in November 1953. Jan Hus, Jan Žižka and the Bethlehem chapel turn up a few times too, particularly on Army Day stamps.

SOMEWHERE BETWEEN COSMOPOLITANISM AND 'BOURGEOIS-NATIONALISM'

It is ironic to think that all this national reconstruction and nationalist cultural revival was going on at the same time as political trials, usually against people whose crime was 'bourgeois-nationalism' or 'Titoism'. Leading party figures like Lucretiu Patrascanu in Romania, Władysław

Gomułka in Poland, Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria and Lazlo Rajk in Hungary were all tried for this offence. In Czechoslovakia, although much was still being made of the great heroes of the national revival, the Slovak 'deviationists' were being singled out for anti-Party activity.

The paradox of this situation comes to light when one looks at the contradictory charges levelled against the 'bourgeois nationalists' in 1950. They were accused of having been guilty of bourgeois-nationalist attitudes in the 1930s and having injured the struggle for national liberation, especially the national uprising in Slovakia; of having allied themselves with the Slovak capitalists against the Czech nation and the Czech working class; and of wavering in their attitude to the Soviet Union.[97] In effect, they were being accused of anti-patriotic nationalism. This rather confusing notion can be clarified slightly by remembering the distinction made earlier between state and nation. These party members were betraying the interests of the state (or, more specifically, its élite) by supporting national interests which jeopardized the imperative of ideological conformity and the security of the bloc. In many cases Jewish party members were singled out for these offences. In the Doctor's plot in the Soviet Union, the Slańsky trial in Czechoslovakia and the trials in Romania and Hungary there was always a link made between traitors and Zionism. This phenomenon would be in evidence again in the power struggle between the Polish interior minister Mieczysław Moczar and Gomułka in 1967/68 when Moczar used anti-Semitism as an excuse to stamp out revisionists. Targetting whole peoples (in this case the Jews) in such a way was contrary to the spirit of socialist internationalism.

In all of this there is the added irony that the only charge more grievous than being a nationalist was being a cosmopolitan. Even at the height of Stalinism and the political trials, Kopecký was telling the audience of the First Ideological Conference in Brno (1952), 'The fight against cosmopolitanism, the fight against all trends of anationality, the fight against half-heartedness in national feelings and the fight against all unpatriotic tendencies is the most important directive.'[98] The attack was leveled against American 'international imperialism' and Masaryk's 'universal humanism'. But the Communists were on very shaky ground here, for they risked explicitly discrediting the reputation of Masaryk and implicitly attacking the internationalism of communism. In short, they were walking a very perilous tightrope in an effort to gain legitimacy. As will be noted in Chapter 5, the inability to tackle this semantic dilemma properly led to a drawn-out ideological and political debate about the merits and limits of socialist patriotism and national Communism.

ANTITHESIS OF THE POLITICAL CULTURE

In *Communists, Heirs to the Great Traditions of the Czech Nation*, Nejedlý remarks:

> I can thus justifiably sum up by saying that whichever aspect of our national traditions we turn to, we always come eventually to the same conclusion: that it is us, the Czech communists, who are true to them even today, who receive them and continue in them. The way in which we stand out is in the wholeheartedness with which we hark back to these traditions ... For us, the celebration of great events and figures of our history and national culture is not an empty formality such as that which we encounter so often ... We take the content of these traditions, events and deeds seriously and truly, and do not take cheap advantage of them for 'patriotic purposes' as many of our bourgeoisie have done.[99]

These words would prove to be empty promises within less than a decade, as the central problem for the Communists would be that although they would continue to use national form, they became completely out of touch with the content.

The Communists effectively became the enemy of everything they had professed to defend.[100] As the Party's own Action Programme of 5 April 1968 would state: 'The stage of development of the socialist states at the beginning of the fifties and the arrest of the creative development of knowledge concomitant with the personality cult conditioned a mechanical acceptance and spreading of ideas, customs, and political conceptions which were at variance with Czechoslovak conditions and traditions.'[101] They had boasted of their defence of the nation in times of adversity, but within months of taking over power they showed themselves to be puppets of Moscow. As David Paul remarks, the Czechoslovak Communists 'became a sort of colonial élite dependent on the imperial centre, and their resulting image as representative of the foreigner has tended to discredit them among their subjects as much as their insensitivity to public opinion'.[102] One thing the Czechs and Slovaks had always prided themselves on was their national independence, especially in the face of foreign domination. *Narod Sobe*, the nation for itself, which is written above the stage of the National Theatre, was a widely held sentiment during the National Revival. The Communists had made many converts in the late 1930s by criticizing the West and the capitulators of Munich for selling out the nation. Now they had fallen into the same trap. As de Dubnic and Reisky

note, 'It is difficult for the Communist engineers of the mind to channel national patriotism into the stream of socialist patriotism as long as the hegemony of the Soviet Union is a reality and the memory of a free country has not faded.'[103]

The Communists had posed as the heirs to the Hussites and to all the great Czech and Slovak humanists and internationalists. Yet Hus, Komensky, Masaryk and others had all been defenders of truth, freedom of conscience, social democracy (in one form or another) and justice. By the early 1950s Czechoslovak society was characterized by mendacity, inequality, injustice and Stalinist pseudo-socialism. Increased centralization of state functions, a gradual diminution of the role of government and a corresponding rise in the monopoly of power in the Party, interference with the independence of the justice system, control of the media and the replacement of individual freedom with group action went against the whole nature of the Czechoslovak political culture. Its values, the essence of its national identity and, indeed, the very foundations of society were rocked by the political trials of 1950 to 1954. They also seriously discredited Marxism–Leninism. As Jiri Pelikán writes:

> In contributing to a loss of values in society the trials diminished in particular the value of human life, and also such values as honour, responsibility, especially political responsibility, comradeship, friendship, justice and truth – those fundamental principles of Marxist policy. In other words, values which were part of the heritage of Marxism and should have demonstrated the merits of socialism were trampled underfoot. Herein lay one of the most potent sources of the social crisis, which also precipitated a crisis of confidence in which the victims were, at first, certain Party leaders, later all of them (with the exception of Gottwald), and indeed the entire regime.[104]

The trials were the final nail in the coffin for any illusions which people might have had that the Communists were indeed heirs to the great traditions of the nation. For reasons stated earlier, after the Second World War Communism had enjoyed popular appeal. The Communists had articulated many feelings which found resonance with the national will. But this enthusiasm evaporated after 1948, for the nation's determination to realize the proclaimed social and economic programme which the Communists had promised was undermined, while the State, now subjected to the Party, became an instrument of consolidation of the power of the managerial group instead of the means of implementation of the programme as originally conceived.[105] The result was that the political culture was driven

underground, but only just below the surface. When challenges to the regime were made, those symbols held most dear by the people quickly came back into evidence. For example, during the disturbances of 1 and 2 June in Pilsen which followed the promulgation of the 1953 Currency Reform Act (effectively wiping out a fair percentage of people's savings) workers rioted, attacked public buildings and beat up officials. In this spontaneous demonstration they chanted support for Beneš (who by that time had been dead five years) and carried pictures of Masaryk through the streets.[106]

THE DILEMMA OF SOCIALIST PATRIOTISM

The inherent danger in pursuing nationalism in a socialist country was outlined in the introduction to this chapter, but it bears repeating, for it is of central importance to this book and will be the focus of the next chapter. By presenting themselves as being defenders and inheritors of all that was good in the nation, the Communist Parties of the People's Democracies put themselves in a precarious position wherein, on the one hand, representing national interests could win them legitimacy at the expense of close relations with Moscow and fellow bloc members, while on the other hand, fulfilling the obligations of loyal Soviet satellite would be popularly perceived as an abrogation of the commitment to uphold the nation's sovereignty and identity. In effect the Communists were in a no-win situation. They needed nationalism to hold on to legitimacy, but the more they stressed those national symbols the more they showed themselves to be the antithesis of what those symbols represented. They were caught in the Sorcerer's Apprentice Dilemma and the cyclical pattern of behaviour which was outlined in Chapter 3. This was not only the case in Czechoslovakia, nor (as will be pointed out in the next chapters) only in the immediate post-war period. The remarks of an observer of the historiographical debates within the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party in the 1960s are applicable to all countries of the region.

> As long as the Communists cling to their ideology and try to use national traditions for their own ends, no matter what they do they are likely to find themselves faced with ever more serious crises. To win popular support in the country the Communists would have to appeal to the Poles in the language they understand – which is not the language of Communism but that of Poland's national history.[107]

Stalin found a way around this dilemma by arguing that these two positions are not mutually exclusive, for nationalism could be replaced by socialist patriotism. This view, like everything else Stalin said, was echoed in the People's Democracies. The consequences that this policy had on inter-bloc and inter-republican relations are the focus of Chapter 5. But the ideological justification for advocating socialist patriotism is worth examining in the Czechoslovak case, because the arguments of the Czech ideologues cogently articulate the official Party line and in the process unwittingly highlight some of that policy's weaknesses.

In an article entitled 'For the People's National Culture', which appeared in *Var* on 1 April 1948, Nejedlý tried to refute the apparent contradiction between nationalism and Communism by arguing: 'Internationalism ... is not anationalism as people still mistakenly think. If I wish to be international, I must, on the contrary, be necessarily national as well, though not a nationalist.'[108]

Kopecký also attempted to reconcile the basic contradiction between nationalism and Communism in a 1952 speech entitled 'On Socialist Patriotism and Proletarian Internationalism'. It is worth quoting from the speech at length.

> It became evident that it is the worker who truly loves his country, that he loves his nation, its peculiar qualities, its culture, its history, and that he is proud of the revolutionary chapters of his nation's history. It became evident that it is the worker who deeply respects his nation's literary heritage, taking to his heart the works of national poets, writers, musicians, artists, taking to his heart national songs, national dances, and that he follows with sensitive involvement the life of his nation ... Lenin and Stalin explained that the class-awareness of the worker does not exclude national awareness, and that the class-related striving of the worker does not conflict with national efforts in their progressive sense. Lenin and Stalin explained that the feelings of proletariat internationalism do not in any way mean a denial of national and patriotic feelings in their progressive conception. In his well-known words about the national pride of the Greater Russia, Lenin taught us that the worker should share in the pride of his nation ... as a member of a governing nation, an all-powerful nation he can be aware of national pride, albeit in a different sense than bourgeois and social-patriotic chauvinists. He can feel this in the sense of pride about the better aspects of his nation's history, in the sense of pride imbued by the desire for my nation and my native land to be celebrated for its revolutionary progress and its great deeds for the

> cause of freedom, the cause of socialism, for universal humanitarian interests.[109]

One might observe here a slightly toned-down rhetoric in comparison to the rabid nationalist speeches of the pre-coup period, the reason being that Hungary and East Germany were now in the socialist camp and were therefore brothers instead of enemies. Also, the stress is more on patriotism than nationalism. But what is most striking is that Nejedlý and Kopecký do not explain the argument as to why socialists are less nationalistic than anybody else. Nejedlý is particularly unconvincing when he tells us that internationalists are non-nationalist nationalists. The persuasiveness of the arguments has not really developed very far since Engels told the 1845 London conference that workers are by their very nature international, while those in support of internationalism are made even less credible when one considers how they had so recently made such a point out of stressing their national credentials. Their lack of consistency created several problems and also provokes several conclusions.

Firstly, in terms of the sociological argument, what the Czechoslovak case suggests is that nationalism is not an invented tradition: it is very much the reflection of collective historical memory. That is not to say that nationalists do not rewrite history. In that respect the Communists were like the nineteenth-century awakeners. But that rewriting of history can only be taken to heart if it strikes a chord with the masses. The Communists realized as much, which is why they tried so hard to portray themselves as the heirs to the traditions of the nation. Initially they were quite successful in this regard. But when they tried to invent or reinterpret the nation's history in ways that were out of step with the political culture, they lost legitimacy.

Secondly, if the Communists were the heirs to the great traditions of the nation, than presumably the nation was something that was worth preserving. But what was a Communist nation supposed to look like, and how was it to relate to other Communist nations?

Thirdly, if the aspects of the nation which were glorified were predominantly cultural, that would suggest (as Bauer had insisted) that culture is a key component of nationalism. In addition, it is worth remembering that most of the sources of inspiration for the 'nation' to which the Communists professed to be the heirs were taken from historic, pre-capitalist societies, which suggests that there were elements of nationalism before capitalism. This, and the previous observations, deny the economically deterministic Marxist view of nationalism as an epiphenomenon of capitalism.

It follows that if nationalism is more than an epiphenomenon of capitalism, and Communists could also feel some affinity for their nation, then nations were surely not going to wither away, in which case relations between Communist states would be international. As the next chapter will show, this led to the need for a new definition of relationships between sovereign socialist states.

5 Socialist Patriotism or National Communism?

This chapter discusses how nationalism affected international relations among Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union between the death of Stalin in 1953 and the onset of 'normalization' in 1969. It suggests that once Communism was clearly established the national Communist Parties, including the leadership of the CPSU, were incapable of burying national differences. In many cases, rather than cementing over differences, the Parties actually became accomplices to the cracking of the so-called Communist monolith. In a situation parallel to that which led to the break-up of the socialist movement in the late nineteenth century, as outlined in Chapter 2, the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during the 1950s and 1960s bore out E. H. Carr's assertion that 'the socialization of the nation has as its corollary the nationalization of socialism'.[1]

The focus of this discussion will be wide in order to identify trends and patterns that were common to the whole region and therefore symptomatic of Communism's attempt to come to grips with nationalism. Theory as well as practice will be discussed. In looking at Eastern Europe, pivotal events like those in Poland and Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 will be given special attention. The Soviet–Yugoslav relationship will be touched upon in order to highlight the difficulties created by having socialism in more than one country, and Romania will be examined both as the most pronounced example of national Communism and also as an example of the effects of economic nationalism on bloc solidarity. A survey approach will be used when looking at developments in the Soviet Union in general. However, in order to investigate more closely the relationship between nationalism and Communism in the republics and how this affected relations between the republics and the centre, particular attention will be given to Lithuania under the regime of First Party Secretary, Antanas Sniečkus.

The aim of this chapter is to show that during the period 1953 to 1969, even in staunchly Stalinist Socialist republics, there was a creeping 'domesticism' – to use Brzezinski's oft-quoted expression – that led native politicians (for a variety of divergent reasons) to be increasingly sensitive to, or at least manipulative of, national concerns. The more that leaders came to associate themselves with the concerns of their people (i.e. nation),

the more inter-Party disagreements took on the characteristics of international conflicts. It was thus a short step from domesticism or localism (*mestnichestvo*) to national Communism.

It will be demonstrated that, due to a combination of factors, Communist leaders wittingly and unwittingly created a political atmosphere which heightened the sense of national consciousness among their élites and populations – a consciousness which, because of the dynamics of nationalism (laid out in Chapter 1), took on a political component. In most cases realization of this political element was antithetical to and incongruent with Communism. The most graphic evidence of this came in the streets of Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968. But there were equally significant shifts occurring more subtly and more gradually in many countries throughout Eastern Europe and in the socialist republics of the Soviet Union. As will be discussed below, Lithuania under the Sniečkus regime is a case in point.

Thus it will be demonstrated how the nationalization of Communism significantly altered the way Communist nations behaved towards each other. As Margot Light concluded in *Soviet Theory of International Relations*, due in large part to the consideration of national concerns Socialist international relations were not relations of a new type, but rather a traditional 'mixture of coercion and conciliation, based on a changing (and often not shared) perception of national and systems interests'.[2]

THE THEORETICAL PROBLEM

In terms of pure theory 'national Communism' is an oxymoron. On the one hand it suggests an adherence to basic Communist tenets, such as wholesale socialization of the means of production and the dominance of the Party; but on the other hand the national component implies that the state in question does not want to be subjected to interference and orders from an outside power (the Kremlin, or, in the case of a federation like Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, interference from a central government).[3] Allowing Communism to be conditioned and limited by national considerations is antithetical to both classical Marxist ideology and the politico-strategic imperatives of the Communist bloc as seen through the eyes of the Kremlin. Of course, relations between socialist states had always, theoretically, been based on the principle of sovereignty: bilateral treaties and constitutions were full of glowing references to the respect for sovereignty and the territorial integrity of fellow socialist states.[4] Even the Brezhnev doctrine, the very articulation of sovereignty denied, claims that 'socialist

states stand for strict respect for the sovereignty of all countries. We resolutely oppose interference in the affairs of any states and the violation of their sovereignty [*sic*].'[5] But these types of statement were an endorsement of socialist patriotism, not of national Communism. References to sovereignty were noble when applied to the Soviet Union (which itself was dominated by Russian national Communism) or the sovereignty of a state whose national interests coincided with those of Moscow. Other 'national deviations', however, were seen as a threat.

The true nature of inter-state relations in a socialist system was not something socialist or Communist theorists had given much thought to, as socialist international relations was considered, if not a contradiction in terms, at least a temporary condition that would be characterized by fraternal solidarity. As Robert A. Jones writes in *The Soviet Concept of Limited Sovereignty*, 'the problem of "socialist inter-state relations" was not only novel: it is highly probable that the founders of Marxism would have regarded it as absurd'.[6]

But due to the authoritarian centralism which Stalin instituted in order to hasten the onset of Communism (and, quite simply, to monopolize power), the state was strengthened: it did not wither away as anticipated by Marx and Engels. Indeed, as the previous chapter and the example of Russian national (or imperial) Communism in the 1940s under Stalin demonstrate, glorification both of the state and of the nation became a virtue. As a result, 'instead of being relegated to the museum of antiquities, the sovereignty principle was refurbished, anointed with doctrinal legitimacy and set in place as a central feature of international relations between socialist countries.'[7]

Ideologically, championing sovereignty is incongruous with a world-view that sees classes rather than states or nations as key actors in the international system. As Light points out, inter-state relations are based on the principles of international law and the acceptance of sovereignty.

> The concept of sovereignty is completely alien to class relations ... since Soviet analysts still rely on the assumption that 'working men have no country', which logically requires that workers have no interests and no loyalty outside of their class. While the goals of the state are to defend sovereignty and, by definition, separateness, the goals of the class are (and should be) to abolish national distinctions.[8]

Furthermore, to the extent that nationalism requires sovereignty for the nation to reach its fullest development, there is an irreconcilable conflict between the demands of nationalism and the requirements of internationalism.[9]

When there was socialism in only one country – the Soviet Union – this ideological incongruity was not exposed, for class and state were one and the same. It was assumed that the nationalities would acculturate to the supra-national Soviet identity or be assimilated.

Stalin approached relations with the People's Democracies in a similar vein. As one contemporary defined it in 1948: 'At the present time the sole and decisive criterion of proletarian revolutionary internationalism is: for or against the USSR, the fatherland of the international proletariat.'[10]

However, the states of Eastern Europe were different from most of the Soviet republics. Most had long, rich histories and highly developed national identities; many had experienced long periods of independence; some were more economically advanced than the Soviet Union; and two – Albania and Yugoslavia (and almost Czechoslovakia and Greece) – had instituted Communism on their own terms without the assistance of the Red Army. For these reasons, coupled with the fact that they were not part of the Soviet Union, relations between the People's Democracies and Moscow would have to be characterized in their own unique way.

Semantically the relationship became defined as socialist internationalism[11] as opposed to proletarian internationalism,[12] a distinction that implied a relationship between separate socialist states as opposed to workers of ill-defined 'international' identities. In real terms, it was defined by foreign-policy considerations, systemic factors and the course of events. The main catalyst for defining relations among socialist states was Josip Broz (Tito).

REVISIONISM

Stressing the principles of brotherhood and unity so central to the wartime struggle, Tito employed the device of socialist internationalism to successfully create a sense of Yugoslav state identity. This state identity was then used as a surrogate for nationalism and, in effect, became a kind of Yugoslav nationalism.[13] Manipulation of this identity proved so effective (in the short term) that Yugoslavia, the least nationally cohesive of all the Eastern European states, was the first 'People's Democracy' to challenge Soviet hegemony. As Tito demonstrated (and, ironically, as he would later discover within the Yugoslav context), national identity would not be erased in a socialist system.

Tito's writings demonstrate that he was aware of the complexities of nationalism in a multi-national system.[14] In an article entitled 'Responsibility for Unity' (1941) he remarked that 'genuine social and economic

advancement in multinational communities, as also in interstate relations, is unthinkable today without respect for, and assertion of, national features and the realization of equality among all nations and nationalities'.[15] This, of course, was referring to the complex situation in Yugoslavia; but the same logic held for relations within the Communist bloc as well. What Tito suggested was that administrative units, reflecting national concerns, were not incompatible with supra-national organizations or multinational states. He stressed that one could not overlook the place of the nation within the state and, by extension, the concerns of states within the socialist system (provided, of course, that the interests of the nation or state concerned did not jeopardize the security of the larger unit). This was made obvious by his famous quote: 'No matter how much each of us loves the land of socialism, the USSR, he can, in no case, love his country less.'[16]

This argument had profound repercussions on inter-bloc and Soviet–Yugoslav relations. If socialists could be patriots and have allegiances to a nation and/or state other than the USSR they would be in a constant process of defining their interests *vis-à-vis* other nationally conscious socialist states, or even other nationally conscious communities within them (as would become the case in Yugoslavia), on the basis of national as opposed to international criteria. That is not to say that Tito was advocating a system of international relations that was not based on socialist principles. In a sense what he was calling for was for relations within the socialist camp to be defined on the same basis as labour relations within Yugoslavia – a kind of self-management writ large.

Regardless of Tito's motivations, this first challenge to what had previously been a gospel of unquestioned truths sparked a wave of revisionism. By defying the orthodox doctrine he was calling into question the maxims on which that doctrine was based. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, this had a significant effect on relations between nationalities in Yugoslavia. In the bloc as a whole, it was a major challenge to Communism, for, as Brzezinski writes, 'relativization of a hitherto absolute ideology is often the first stage in the erosion of the vitality of the ideology. Erosion involves not mere changes in tactical considerations (the action programme) but fundamental uncertainties about the doctrinal component, perhaps even casting a shadow on some of the philosophical assumptions'.[17] He argues that 'revisionism was such erosion's harbinger'.[18] Simply put, 'If a universal truth lends itself to conflicting and incompatible interpretations, it ceases to be universal.'[19]

Revisionism was thus to Stalinism what nineteenth-century reformism was to Marxism. But at the same time it was more, because in the First

and Second Internationals the world socialist movement was not so closely controlled by one ideological centre. Now, just after the height of Stalinism, by questioning that centre Tito was setting in motion a process that would significantly redefine not only relations between the peripheries and the centre but also the very nature of the system itself.

The question which Tito's independent policy provoked was the one which had remained unanswered since Marx and Engels first wrote on nationalism: how does one define international relations in a state system with more than one Communist state? This was the burning question that Marx and Engels had dismissed as irrelevant, that Lenin marginalized until insisting on a federal solution for the USSR just before his death, and which Stalin, within the context of intra-Soviet relations, had made moot. As a result there was no precedent or doctrine to explain what was supposed to happen now that the 'proletarian revolution' had been successful and there was socialism in more than one country. For the first time Communists were faced with the fundamental nationalities question, and they did not have a satisfactory answer.

The reaction from Moscow was one of hysteria. Yugoslavia was accused of betraying the cause of international solidarity and taking up the position of nationalism.[20] It was excommunicated from the Comintern in June 1948. And why? Because it was trying to define international relations in the spirit of Marxism–Leninism. This was contrary to Soviet realpolitical objectives and Moscow's position as hegemon, and effectively exposed Moscow, not Belgrade, as the centre of national Communism, although few would dare say as much while Stalin was alive.

Tito's challenge left a dual legacy:

> for those in power the vitality of the Tito regime was a constant reminder of the danger that national movements could pose to Stalinism. On the other hand, for those out of power ... Tito's survival was proof of the necessity to adjust socialist goals to national conditions. Tito palpably demonstrated the futility of continued attempts to repress national movements in the name of an internationalist policy that was merely a thinly disguised expression of Soviet great-power chauvinism.[21]

As one observer wrote in 1958, Tito's denial of the CPSU's claimed role of supreme arbiter 'clearly constitutes the most important heresy of the present day revisionism, and the one from which all others follow. For without such authority Moscow could no longer fix nor enforce uniform criteria for determining what is heretical and what is not, and this in turn

would inevitably mean an end to monolithic discipline in the Communist movement.'[22] This monolithic discipline was further challenged when Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the People's Republic of China in September 1949.

There is a commonly held perception that with the Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe, concluding with East Germany in 1949, socialism in one country led to socialism in one bloc. It is certainly true that, by 1949, by using its local agents and the Red Army the Soviet Union had imposed a bloc of loyal satellites resulting in a high level of cohesion and uniformity within and between the Peoples' Democracies, whose constitutions paraphrased the Soviet constitution; whose government agencies were organized on the Soviet model; whose economic policies were based on Soviet theories; whose culture gained its 'inspiration' from the Soviet experience; and whose fashion and architecture even began to resemble their Soviet counterparts. As François Fejto writes: 'The methods used to unify and centralize the Soviet Union after the October Revolution were, after 1948, extended to the whole bloc. In this way a theoretical and practical system was evolved, incorporating all the economic, social and cultural activities of the countries as a whole, based on coercive integration.'[23]

But at the same time as the monolith was apparently being solidified, it was already cracking. Like the formation of the Soviet Union before it, Communism in Eastern Europe was a superstructure built on weak foundations. As a result of Tito's 'heresy', bloc solidarity eroded almost as soon as it had been formed.

Even by the most draconian Stalinist tactics, nationalism had not been eliminated. The extent to which this was so can be noted by the way that 'bourgeois nationalists' were so vehemently sought out in the purges between 1948 and 1953. If, by 1948/9, Communism was at its zenith, why were there still bourgeois nationalists about who had to be eliminated? If socialist internationalism had been achieved, why did fraternal socialist states have to be separated by guards, watchtowers and barbed wire?[24] Why were some nations (like East Germany, Hungary and Romania), despite the fact that their governments were now Communist, held responsible for the wartime actions of their non-Communist predecessors and made to pay heavy war reparations? Why were initiatives which stressed the spirit of socialist co-operation (like the Balkan Union and the Polish–Czechoslovak Collaboration Agreement) quashed? As Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated, part of the answer to these questions lies in the fact that Communist parties had played up their national credentials in order to consolidate their regimes, the worst offender being the Soviet Union itself

in the late 1930s and 1940s. Another contributing factor is that by keeping nationalism simmering and by instituting a series of almost Bismarckian bilateral treaties, Moscow could keep the states of Eastern Europe apart and carry out a policy of divide and rule. Ironically, whereas 'internationalism' had formerly been employed as a device aimed at hastening the demise of the 'horizontal' division of the world, it was now being used as a means of maintaining 'horizontal' divisions in forms which accorded with prevailing Soviet concepts of the USSR's interests.[25]

A NEW COURSE?

Life in the Communist bloc altered significantly with the death of Stalin in March 1953, and Moscow's nationalities policy in the Soviet Union and its relations with its Eastern European partners were no exception. In the struggle for succession, Lavrenti Beria sought to gain power by winning over the nationalities.[26] Ironically, while this policy was to prove his undoing, Nikita Khruschev upon coming to power also publicly embraced a more favourable stance toward indigenization and national flourishing.[27] This is symptomatic of a pattern of behaviour which surfaced during almost every leadership succession.

> Each changing of the guard (Stalin, Khruschev, and Brezhnev) brought an abbreviated period of national flourishing followed by a swing in favour of integration. The fact that each felt compelled, prior to consolidation of his power, to express support for the national aspirations of the minorities strongly suggests the existence of constituencies of real strength within the party apparatus, wherein the constituents were motivated by national considerations.[28]

As will be noted below, this pattern of behaviour applied to republic and state élites as well.

Between 1953 and 1955 dramatic changes took place within the domestic and international political environments. The feeling of terror eased with the end of the Purges, and a more liberal economic policy was laid out in Gheorghi Malenkov's New Course of 1953. This New Course went beyond economics: it offered a more relaxed form of socialism, with less emphasis on heavy industry and more on consumer goods, a relaxation of police terror and substitution of collective leadership for the 'cult of personality'.[29] There was hope for a new course in international relations as well when in January 1955 the Supreme Soviet declared that the state of belligerence with Germany had ended. This was followed by the Geneva conference of

the Great Powers, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria under the Austria State Treaty of 15 May 1955 and the admission of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria to the United Nations in December 1955.

Economic liberalization and a new spirit of compromise both within the Soviet Union and in its relations with the West signalled the possibility of a similar transformation in Eastern Europe. Hungary was one country where reform was pursued with particular enthusiasm. In June 1953 Prime Minister Imre Nagy launched the New Course. Nagy's plan, modeled on Malenkov's of the same year, presented a direct political challenge to the orthodox Stalinist regime of Matyas Rakosi. He sought to reduce the pace of development, emphasize light industry and the food industry more, reduce collectivization and restore private enterprise. He also called for religious toleration, more sensitivity to human rights and a rehabilitation of those accused of 'bourgeois nationalist' crimes.[30] This New Course was more than an initiative for economic change for, in a system where relations are defined on the basis of economic laws (which are accepted as universal principles), a change in economic policy invariably provokes a change in political direction as well. As Thomas Simons writes: 'In both Poland and Hungary, economic debate led straight into politics, because behind it lay the question of who was responsible for the errors and disproportions in the economy and why the leaderships had run so roughshod over local circumstances. The answer to these questions pointed to Moscow and raised the issue of national paths to communism.'[31]

Khruschev, who became First Party Secretary in September 1953, realized that in order to achieve a new workable relationship between the Eastern European Socialist states and Moscow (and to a less urgent extent between the republics and the centre) he would have to redefine the nature of the relationship. In addition, in order to attract support in the Indian subcontinent, Asia and the Middle East he would have to be seen to be supporting a policy favourable to self-determination. This concern had to be balanced with the threat that the cohesion of the Western bloc, built around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Council of the Western European Union, posed to the Communist bloc's security. Communist states would have to be kept happy, but kept together. This would require greater latitude for internal autonomy at the state (or republic) level while still maintaining the integrity of the bloc. This was very like the dilemma which Lenin had faced when advocating self-determination while trying to keep the Russian empire together after the Bolshevik revolution. As J. F. Brown notes, the goal for Khruschev throughout his tenure was to find the right balance between cohesion and viability.[32]

This meant patching up relations with Yugoslavia. The overture came in February 1955 with the issuance of a joint communiqué with Yugoslavia which accepted the doctrine of many roads to socialism. This was followed by a visit by Khruschev and Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin to Belgrade in May 1955 which concluded with the Belgrade declaration of 2 June.[33]

The message sent by these developments was further strengthened by the dissolution of the Cominform on 17 April 1956. The concluding paragraph of the statement officially disbanding the Bureau suggested that dictates from Moscow would no longer be the order of the day. Rather, by adapting Marxist–Leninist principles to 'the specific national features and conditions of their countries' Communist states would find new and useful forms of establishing links and contacts amongst themselves.[34]

This sentiment accorded very closely with the views espoused by the leader of the Italian Communist party, Palmiro Togliatti. In an interview published in 'Nuovi Arguomenti' in June 1956 he stressed that autonomy was the basis from which relations should be built among socialist states. Coining the term 'polycentrism', he proposed that the world Communist movement should be decentralized and that bilateral relations among Communist parties would be the most attractive formula for building harmony among Communist states.[35] By advocating multiple transnational trends towards socialism, he was implicitly challenging Moscow's leading role in world socialism and giving tacit approval to national Communism.[36] This was a revolutionary and highly influential view, but even more shocking was the fact that by 1956 Khruschev seemed to be saying the same thing.

The bombshell of the Secret Speech given at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 changed the whole complexion of Communist theory and practice in international relations. Although intended solely for a domestic audience (hence its secretive nature), the speech sent aftershocks rippling throughout the Communist world. By criticizing the way that Stalin had conducted affairs, both foreign and domestic, Khruschev was bringing into question the whole nature of the Communist system.

In his speech to the Congress Khruschev's views on nationalism echoed those of Lenin:

> far from erasing national differences and peculiarities, socialism, on the contrary, assures the all-round development and flourishing of the economy and culture of all the nations and peoples. It is our duty, therefore, not to ignore these peculiarities and differences, but to take most careful account of them in all our practical work in directing economic and cultural construction.[37]

His policies mirrored those of Lenin as well. In the Soviet Union, the speech marked the beginning of a new more decentralized federal arrangement on the Leninist model. This was particularly relevant in economic matters. A substantial number of industrial enterprises were put under the control of the republics. In addition, regional economic councils (*sovnarkhozy*) were established to provide the republics with a greater say in the formulation of economic planning. Republics were also given the right to issue their own laws concerning judicial proceedings and systems within their borders, the right to authorize the formation of *krais* and *oblasts* on their territory, and responsibility for the control of some transportation networks which traversed their republics. The impact of these economic reforms on the soviet republics will be looked at in greater detail in the section on Lithuania below.

The Soviet–Yugoslav Declaration of 20 June 1956 made clear that less dogmatism and greater decentralization were applicable to inter-bloc as well as inter-Soviet relations. The Declaration stated, 'The roads and conditions of socialist development are different in different countries ... and [the] tendency to impose one's own views in determining the roads and forms of socialist development are alien to both sides.'[38] This was a validation of the separate roads to socialism philosophy which Tito had been advocating since 1948. What the 'Declaration on the Re-establishment of Relations Between the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist Parties' suggested was that the central question was now no longer 'how many paths to socialism?' but 'how many socialist paths?'. Recognizing the possibility of different roads to socialism was like the Pope recognizing virtue in a national church.[39]

Seeking a more equitable relationship with Yugoslavia was just the beginning. Relations with all Eastern European states were to be put on a more equal footing, or at least the appearance of a more equal footing. The first step was to invigorate the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). CEMA, or Comecon, had originally been set up in January 1949 to counterbalance the Marshall Plan. Until 1955 it had achieved very little, acting chiefly as a body to register bilateral commercial agreements. In 1956 it was given new attention.[40] Khruschev had mixed motivations for doing so. On the one hand he realized the need for multilateralism to at least appear to be sensitive to the concerns of the satellites, something which became even more pressing after the events in Hungary and Poland. It also reflected a fairly genuine belief that by developing the economies of the Eastern bloc inequality would be eliminated and a new social consciousness would emerge that would transcend nationalism. More cynically, one can see in Khruschev's use of CEMA an attempt to replace the

dependency of bilateralism with the Moscow-centric dependency of multi-lateralism. He wanted to make Eastern Europe a branch plant economy with Moscow as its head office. Inter-bloc relations would be economically deterministic but politically controlled. As relations with Romania would demonstrate, this repudiation of Marxism would only serve to encourage economic particularism, protectionism, and specialization.

The creation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) had similar causes and effects. Concerned by the formation of NATO and particularly the membership of West Germany in that body, Khruschev set up the Warsaw Pact in May 1955. Like the CEMA, the Pact was a concession to Eastern European desires for multi-lateralism but also a ruse for increased centralized power in Moscow.

Just as decentralization was necessary within the USSR to increase productivity and dampen nationalist discontent, economic and political factors led to a realignment of the relationship between the USSR and its satellites. But, just as decentralization inflamed rather than abated nationalism in the Soviet republics (as will be demonstrated in the case of Lithuania), the quest for autarky among the Eastern European states broke down attempts at transnational co-operation and supra-national planning.

> So here was the paradox. Within the nation-centered, capitalistic West, integration was proceeding apace [through the Common Market and NATO]. The Socialist-bloc countries, on the other hand, remained largely within their national frameworks. And this in spite of the fact that regionalism among like-minded nations and internationalism among all countries formed part of their dogma and creed.[41]

As with the breakup of the *Gesamtpartei* in the nineteenth century, or the schisms in the socialist movement in the First World War, nationalism was once more showing itself to be a stronger force than socialism. In 1923 Stalin had stated that 'the irreconciable contradiction between the process of economic amalgamation of the peoples and the imperialist methods of accomplishing this amalgamation was the cause of the inability, helplessness and impotence of the bourgeoisie in finding a correct approach to the solution of the national problem'.[42] This observation seems more suited to the Communist world of the 1960s than the capitalist world of the 1920s.

Once again the same fundamental question (with its widespread theoretical and practical consequences) was forcing itself to the top of the agenda: could nationalism and Communism be compatible? It was a question to which, for the first time, Communists were giving some thought.

DJILAS AND NAGY ON NATIONALISM

Milovan Djilas' *New Class* (1957) and Imre Nagy's *On Communism* (1957) are two good examples of attempts by Communists to come to terms with nationalism and the concept of national Communism. It is telling that both works were written by members of the political élite and not the intelligentsia. The intelligentsia were traditionally the ones who pushed hardest for change, but in this case it is the leaders themselves who saw the need for Communists to take into account national conditions. This realization would seem to stem from a need for legitimacy – a legitimacy which could only be gained by taking into account the political culture and national identity of the people.

As the title implies, Djilas' book is an attack on the rise of a favoured élite in what was to have been a classless society. He suggests that the rise of this élite had an effect on national relations as well as social ones. 'International Communism, which was at one time the task of revolutionaries, eventually transformed itself, as did everything else in Communism, and became the common ground of Communist bureaucracies, fighting one another on national considerations.'[43] The battles between national bureaucracies changed the whole dynamic of relations between Communists with the result that: 'No single form of Communism, no matter how similar it is to other forms, exists in any other way than as national Communism. In order to maintain itself, it must become national.'[44]

However, Djilas does not see nationalism and Communism as contradictory. In fact, he regards national Communism as a vital component of Communism.

> National modifications in Communism jeopardize Soviet imperialism, particularly the imperialism of the Soviet epoch, but not Communism either as a whole or in essence. On the contrary, where Communism is in control these changes are able to influence its direction and even to strengthen it and make it acceptable externally. National Communism is in harmony with non-dogmaticism, that is, with the anti-Stalinist phase in the development of Communism. In fact, it is a basic form of this phase.[45]

This comment puts into perspective his famous remark about national Communism being Communism in decline. The quote in full reads that 'National Communism *per se* is contradictory. Its nature is the same as that of Soviet Communism, but it aspires to detach itself into something of its own, nationally. In reality, national Communism is Communism in decline.'[46] Based on his earlier remarks, what he is suggesting is that

national Communism is Stalinism in decline.[47] He realizes the potential for a violent clash between national variations of Marxism–Leninism (national Communism, in his definition) and Communism (or Stalinism). Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that he highlights the clash between Eastern European national Communism and Great Russian national (or imperial) Communism. He writes of the current (1954) predicament that:

> such a situation cannot remain long, because it conceals a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand national forms of Communism become stronger, but on the other, Soviet imperialism does not diminish ... even if it is possible to effect co-operation with respect to property ownership, it is not possible with respect to authority. Although conditions for further integration with the Soviet Union are being realized, those conditions which lead to the *independence* of the East European Communist governments are being realized more rapidly. The Soviet Union has not renounced authority in these countries, nor have the governments of these countries renounced their craving to attain something similar to Yugoslav independence. The degree of independence that will be attained will depend on the state of international and internal forces.[48]

This was the case in Hungary, where Imre Nagy tried to pursue a policy of national Communism which turned out to have an even more unsettling effect on relations within the Communist bloc than Tito's 'Yugoslav road to socialism'. Nagy's *On Communism*, written secretly between 1955 and 1956 when he was taking an enforced rest from power, was a defence of the New Course and as such was directly addressed to his former colleagues in the Hungarian Communist Party's Central Committee who (particularly Rakosi) had been opposed to that initiative, who had stripped him of all his responsibilities in mid-April 1955 and had even expelled him from the Party.[49] It is a revealing source from a man who saw the faults of the system from the inside out.

Nagy's observations highlight a point which has already been made on several occasions in this book, namely that there must be a congruence between the use of national symbols and the political action made in their name. In order for the state to control the nation it must be in tune with its political culture and represent its national identity. He writes, 'The inner tension in Hungary, which is chiefly political, is caused by the fact that the leadership is opposing ideals of national independence, sovereignty, and equality, as well as Hungarian national feeling and progressive traditions.'[50]

Nagy felt that revision was necessary, for Stalinism had moved Communism to a position that was antithetical to the spirit of Marxism–Leninism. He wrote in the introduction that

> the People's Democracy as a type of proletarian dictatorship under the mechanical interpretation of Marxism–Leninism, and the copying of Soviet methods under completely different internal and international situations, have resulted in the loss in its essence of the people's democratic character in all the People's Democracies. Serious contradictions have arisen between the form and substance of these democracies.[51]

Nagy was not advocating a departure from communism. Rather, his argument, like Djilas' and Togliati's, was a call for restoration of socialist values. He wanted to base relations between communist states on well-established Marxist–Leninist principles. He argued that the five principles spelled out at the Bandung Conference of 1955 – national independence, sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and the assurance of self-determination – were applicable to relations between all states, not only those in the Third World or the non-aligned movement. This was a veiled critique of the long-standing hypocritical Soviet policy of supporting self-determination in states opposing imperialism but denying it in those fighting against socialist imperialism. Nagy believed that by adhering to the five principles in relations between socialist countries, the socialist camp could become the rallying-point of independent sovereign countries possessing equal rights and respecting the principles of non-interference in each other's affairs. He argued that interfering in the realization of these five principles would be a recipe for disaster: 'The Party renounces acceptance of these principles, thus isolating itself from the majority of the nation – because it does not take into consideration national characteristics, traditions and other factors. As a result it comes into contradiction with itself.'[52] The more Stalinists try to enforce their dogmatic positions and schemes, 'the further away they get from Hungarian reality, the Hungarian peoples' aims and the national aspirations which cannot be disregarded.'[53] He writes quite prophetically that when the ruling class betrays the nation for its own ends, it is they and not the nation which are destroyed.[54]

In order to get out of this dilemma Nagy insists that the working class must base its internationalism on a strong foundation of nationalism: 'The working class cannot be international, in the interpretation of the idea by Marxist socialism, if its internationalism does not lie in devotion and faithfulness to its nation – and if it does not rest on accepting responsibility for

its own national independence, sovereignty and equality.'[55] Nagy knew that taking such a line in the contemporary situation would provoke resistance. He outspokenly remarked that in ensuring national independence and sovereignty, the working class 'will inescapably find itself in opposition to those cosmopolitan views which declare that the dogmas remaining from the ideological, autocratic rule of Stalin are binding principles of socialism in general.'[56]

And yet in terms of theory, in Nagy's argument (reminiscent of Lenin's support for self-determination and Djilas' belief in the possibility of national Communism) there would appear to be no contradiction between communism and nationalism; rather, only a contradiction between autocratic Stalinists who were blinkered by the rigidity of cosmopiltanist dogma, and true socialists who sought to build an international system that took into account national concerns.[57] He states: 'Can the working class be at one and the same time the chief pillar and vanguard in building socialism and in putting national ideals and aims into practice? Can the ideals of socialism, proletarian internationalism, and national independence be reconciled? These questions must be answered by an unqualified Yes.'[58] Paradoxically, the reason that he gives for this unequivocal assertion suggests that nationalism and communism *are* in fact irreconcileable. He writes that 'the five principles are guarantees that while advancing together inside the socialist camp, and continuing social, economic and cultural development under nationally specific situations, the independence, sovereignty and equality of the individual nations can be preserved'.[59] This rather illogically suggests that socialist countries could develop together – separately. Consequently one cannot help but be in agreement with Frederick Praeger that 'more clearly than any other document or statement that has come out of the Communist world, Nagy's argument reveals the insoluble contradictions besetting Communist dogma and practice'.[60]

POLAND: ELITES AND LEGITIMACY

In the spring of 1956 those contradictions were coming to the surface in Poland, and again it was members of the Communist élite who realized it. The change which occured in Poland, although supported by the masses, was not a people's revolution in the sense that the Hungarian Revolution was. Rather, it was very much an ideological struggle between two élites of the Communist Party.[61]

The death of First Secretary Bolesław Bierut on March 12 (during the twentieth party congress in Moscow), as well as the message which was

coming out of that very congress, shook up the Polish United Workers' Party, already in disarray after the revelations of the defected security police official, Colonel Józef Światło.[62] Not only were they forced to find a new leader, they also had to find one who could articulate a Party line which echoed Khruschev's new spirit of openness. That effectively ruled out anyone connected to the hardline Natolin group (named after the Warsaw suburb where the Stalinist faction met), and so Edward Ochab was selected as a fairly safe choice.

However, the course of events showed that changing the leader would be insufficient. Riots in Poznań in June were inspired in large part by dissatisfaction with the state of the economy. They were also tinged by anti-Russian sentiment: protestors attacked police stations in Poznań on June 28th chanting 'Down with the Russians'. That did not make it a national revolution. But what is telling is that these events caused a certain section of the Party élite to come to the conclusion that 'the only policy which could rally support among the population, without at the same time provoking Soviet intervention, was a more pragmatic form of Communism which took into account national characteristics and susceptibilities'.[63] What was going on was a crisis of legitimation created by the realization by some Party members that they had lost popular support or were at least in the process of losing it. This situation would be repeated a few months later in the Hungarian Communist Party, it would recur in Poland in 1970 and 1980 and it occured to a certain extent in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in the Yugoslav republics on several occasions and in the Soviet Union in 1990/91.

LEGITIMACY

What is legitimacy and why is it such a vital point, crucial to our understanding of the power of nationalism and its relationship to Communism? Legitimacy is inextricably linked with identity: 'If the interests inherent in identification are not met, then the social system is not legitimated.'[64] When transposed to political systems (as has already been demonstrated in the case of Czechoslovakia) where there is an incongruency between the political culture and the political system, the system will not be legitimated. This incongruence provokes crisis. As Rigby and Feher point out, a legitimation crisis is most serious when members of the ruling élite (or a section of the élite) lose confidence in the system which they are supposed to be perpetuating.[65] This is particularly relevant in totalitarian societies, where the élites hold a virtual monopoly of power. This point will be addressed further in Chapter 6, when 'leadership drift' in the 1980s is

analysed. The evidence presented so far would suggest that the catalyst for such a crisis is the realization by a native élite that it has lost popular resonance with the national political culture. Of course there is the problem of causation. It is often difficult to tell whether changes in élite perception and behaviour precipitate crises or whether crises precipitate changes in élite perceptions and behaviour. Fully investigating this phenomenon would require delving into a deep anthropological argument about cognition which is beyond the scope of this book. Nevertheless, what is clear is that there is a direct correlation between the two. The common denominator in both cases (in the time-period and countries that are being examined in this book) is nationalism.

Just as nationalism is often the root of the crisis, it is very often regarded by the élite as the solution as well. The reason is obvious. Since lack of congruence with the national culture is what has lost them popular support, being seen to represent national interests will win it back. Of course, one may argue that popular support is irrelevant in totalitarian societies. But judging by the riots in Czechoslovakia and East Berlin in 1953 and Poznań and Budapest in 1956, it was obvious that leaders of the People's Democracies could not afford to ignore the people.

The Party is in trouble when there is what Paul Lewis descibes as 'a legitimacy deficit'.[66] In the Communist system infighting, which occured as the result of one group trying to overthrow that faction within the Party which it perceived as responsible for the erosion of legitimacy, was a serious problem, for it ran the risk of bringing down the whole system. Since the Party was supposed to enjoy a monopoly of power, any challenges within the Party were challenges to the whole state-Party system, although this was more the case in Eastern Europe than in the Soviet Union. As Simons points out, the Communist regimes had only been in power in Eastern Europe for 10 years.

> Most of their populations had grown up under the old regimes, and remembered them even more fondly as the trauma of Stalinist industrialization proceeded. Policy changes in Eastern Europe did not mean just gains or losses for one or another faction, as they did in the Soviet Union. At least potentially, they threatened the very existence of the Communist regimes.[67]

THE POLISH EXAMPLE

In Poland the crisis of legitimation started as a battle between Muscovite pseudo-national Communists who supported the Party line of

Moscow-centric international socialism, the Natolin group, and native Communists who had taken Stalin's policy of socialist patriotism and adapted it to local conditions. Once the latter group prevailed through the election of Władysław Gomułka (who had advocated a Polish road to socialism in the immediate post-war period and was arrested for his views in 1951), the crisis then played itself out on the much bigger field of Polish–Soviet relations, where the same debates which had taken place within the Party now took on international significance. This confrontation has been documented in other sources.[68] Suffice it to say that the climax came with the unannounced visit of Khruschev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan and Molotov to Warsaw on 19 October during the Eighth Congress of the Polish Workers' Party. As a result of their meetings with Polish officials the Soviet leaders realized that they were up against a group of Polish Communists who had the support of heavily armed units from the Interior Ministry and Internal Security Corp willing to defend the interests of the Polish nation in the face of imposed socialist internationalism.[69] Khruschev would have to respect the fact that Gomułka would, as he said in his speech to the Party Congress that week, exercise 'the right of every nation to rule itself in a sovereign manner in its own independent country'.[70]

Gomułka became a national hero. Graphic proof came in the comparatively free election of January 1957, when he won an overwhelming majority of the vote (including 94.3 per cent in his own constituency).[71] As a result, the stakes for him became even higher. By taking on the role of defender of the nation he had to take steps to protect the country's national identity. This was a relatively easy step to make, for Gomułka had been arguing since 1947 that a Polish road to socialism should take into account Polish national peculiarities, including

> the specifics of the Polish agrarian scene and the rugged political and social individualism of the Polish peasant, the more advanced state of industrialization in Poland than at the comparable stage of socialist development in Russia, a close alliance with the USSR but not domestic subordination to it, and domestic autonomy without external ideological ambitions.[72]

It would be a Communist system, but it would be Polish.[73]

Unlike the cynical manipulation of national symbols which would be carried out in the 1960s, this was a genuine attempt to make the national culture part of official policy. Gomułka immediately made several concessions to the masses. He made peace with the Catholic Church and released Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, the Primate of Poland, who had been under house arrest for three years. The Soviet Polish-born general Konstantin

Rokossowski was removed and replaced by the Pole Marian Spychalski. He successfully carried out negotiations with Moscow, as a result of which Poland was partially compensated for trade losses suffered in the past. Soviet troops were withdrawn from Warsaw. Polish uniforms changed back to the national style. Terror was relaxed, with the dissolution of the dreaded Committee for Public Security (or UB). Over 80 per cent of collective farms were disbanded, Church properties were restored, a limited amount of privatization was allowed, and a certain amount of cultural and media freedom was granted. All of this was admissible to Moscow, as it did not challenge the security of the bloc. It was tolerated by the Polish people to the extent that they realized that it was the only available option. This ushered in the period of 'limited sovereignty' or, perhaps more accurately, self-limiting sovereignty.

HUNGARY: THE IMPORTANCE OF SYMBOLS

The revolt in Hungary gained its inspiration from the events in Poland. Reciprocally, its results had a profound effect on Gomułka and other leaders throughout the bloc who came to see the limits of national Communism. The difference between Hungary and Poland was that, unlike Gomułka, Nagy's 'national Communism involved him in a rejection of anything that restricted or violated his country's interests as defined in terms of building Communism, which in turn led him to adopt a position which was not only non-Stalinist but even non-Leninist, and much like Tito's'.[74] For example, his speeches were punctuated with expressions like 'my Hungarian brethren', 'patriots' and references to the 'national' government.[75] The revolution in Hungary in 1956 therefore can be regarded as national in form and content.

It is interesting to consider the importance of symbolism in the revolution – symbols which demonstrated the extent to which the regime was regarded as alien to the majority (national) political culture. The most poignant image is that of the Hungarian flag with the Soviet crest (introduced in 1949) cut out of the middle. This was graphic evidence of Nagy's assertion that the leadership had lost touch with Hungarian national identity and cultural traditions. (A similar image would be seen again in the Romanian revolution of 1990.)

Another symbolic event was the rehabilitation and reburial of Laszlo Rajk, the foreign minister in 1948, who had been purged for being a bourgeois nationalist. His reburial was attended by over 200,000 people on 6 October 1956. Nagy's reburial in June 1989 would also have great symbolic significance. In both cases there was a popular feeling that the

man in question, although a Communist, had been sympathetic to Hungarian concerns and that by reburying him publicly the regime was acknowledging that it had been wrong. It was also implicitly acknowledging that it knew that it would have to take into account popular concerns in order to retain a sense of legitimacy.

It is no coincidence that the group which was the driving force behind change in Hungary in 1956 (the Petofi Circle) was named after a poet of national resistance from the 1848 revolution. It is also telling that the rally of 23 October which led to a severe crackdown was mustered around the tomb of (Polish) General Józef Bem, hero of the 1848 revolution. Interesting too was Nagy's popularly received decision of 28 October wherein he promised to restore the Kossuth coat of arms (without the Apostolic Crown) to the Hungarian flag and reinstate 15 March (anniversary of the 1848 Revolution) as a national holiday. What was occuring was very much a national revolution.

With respect to the role of nationalism, and particularly national symbols, in the revolution in Hungary it is worth recalling the observations made in Chapter 1 about what happened in Europe in the early nineteenth century when the French Revolution was exported. On the one hand, just as countries defending themselves from Napoleon rallied around ideas which had fuelled the French Revolution, so too the reaction to Stalin's heirs was done in the name of Marxism–Leninism. On the other hand this was not just a battle between two interpretations of Communism. As in the case of reaction to France in the early 1800s, the states of Eastern Europe developed a sense of identity not only on the basis of ideas exported by their present aggressor, but by the collective consciousness which was awakened by a reactive perception of cultural and political threat from the aggressor.

Even though the revolution failed with the invasion of Soviet forces at the end of October, the very fact that it occured added a new very graphic and recent experience to the shared collective experience. It would subsequently be very difficult for the leadership to regain the national agenda: it had violated the national identity. It was now more obvious than ever that there was a dissonance between what was valued in the past and what was being imposed at the present.[76] As R. J. Crampton eloquently puts it, the condemnation of national Communism by the Party invited condemnation of the Communist Party by the nation.[77]

KHRUSCHEV: ANOTHER SORCERER'S APPRENTICE

Khruschev too had lost much credibility. On 30 October 1956 the Soviets issued a 'Declaration of the USSR Government on the Foundations for the

Development of Friendship and Co-operation Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States'.[78] Whereas actions following previous similar statements seemed to augur the possibility of a genuinely new and more equitable relationship between socialist states, the invasion of Hungary on 4 November made the Declaration's platitudes espousing respect for territorial integrity of states, sovereignty and non-interference in each other's affairs look incredibly cynical. It was now obvious that the sentiments expressed in this text, the agreements with Yugoslavia and the secret speech were not applicable where the security of the USSR was concerned.

It was now also apparent that Khruschev's policies of late 1955 and early 1956 had created circumstances which he had not anticipated. What he seemed to overlook by allowing for more openness and sensitivity to national concerns was that 'To the degree to which East European Communist regimes attained the domestic stability and popular acceptance held desirable for them, they would be the more susceptible to nationalist infection, which under the circumstances was bound to damage Soviet interests'.[79] The situation was complicated by the increasing assertiveness of the Chinese Communists.[80] Mao Tse-Tung's talk of 'unity and diversity' fell on receptive ears in Eastern Europe: the most captive audience was in Enver Hoxha's Albania, which defected from the bloc in 1961.

Between 1956 and 1961 Khruschev's views on the nationalities policy within the USSR and the state of international relations in Eastern Europe were characterized by the ambiguous approach of alternatively (and often simultaneously) advocating flourishing (*provetanie*) and drawing together (*sblizheniye*). This was the result of his realization that he 'had to establish some sort of harmony between the demands of Communism as an international revolutionary movement and Communism as a constructive national undertaking'.[81] As Carl Linden makes very clear, his machinations were not so much a sign of political incompetence or indecisiveness as they were outward manifestations of the intense, complex internal battle he had to wage in order to sustain his leadership within the CPSU.[82] His policies were also affected by the fluctuations of Soviet relations with China, the West and the rest of the Communist bloc (particularly Albania and Yugoslavia). The most vivid example of the resultant ideological ambiguity came in the 1961 Party Programme, which claimed that 'under socialism the nations flourish and their sovereignty grows stronger', yet only a few sentences later he declared that 'the boundaries between the Union republics of the USSR increasingly are losing their former significance'.[83]

Of the two, the focus was clearly more on the merging rather than the flourishing of nations. This applied to relations in Eastern Europe as well

as the Soviet Union.[84] For example, in his report to the Supreme Soviet on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution (1957) Khruschev backtracked on the notion of alternative 'paths' to socialism. In response to events in Hungary and Poland he attacked his critics as wanting to advance to socialism 'singly, scattered, so to speak, floundering about separately, moreover on different paths. If this view were adopted, there would be so many "paths" that people would lose their way as in a forest and would not know how to reach their great goal.' He concluded that there could be only one 'highroad to socialism', the one that had already been laid and tested.[85] And yet in the Soviet Union, which had already taken the highroad to socialism, he said that 'far from erasing national differences and peculiarities, socialism, on the contrary, assures the all-round development and flourishing of the economy and culture of all the nations and peoples'.[86] This was repeated at the twenty-first Party Congress in 1959, when he stated that successful Communist Parties were those which 'apply revolutionary theory creatively and take account of the national and historical features specific to their countries'.[87]

Khruschev was stuck in the cyclical pattern of compromise and crackdown outlined in Chapter 3. Every time he felt that he was rectifying the situation, he unwittingly unleashed new centrifugal forces. The ambivalence created by Khruschev's dilemma allowed the socialist states and the Soviet republics a considerable amount of room for manoeuvre. Romania is a case in point.

ROMANIA AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

The subject of Romanian nationalism has been extensively covered elsewhere,[88] but for the sake of thoroughness and in an effort to highlight certain trends common to the whole bloc it is worth identifying the salient features of her drift towards national Communism.

The main catalyst for the rise of national Communism in Romania was a defensive reaction to the perceived threat of a loss of autarky. The climax came in June 1962 when Khruschev proposed the establishment of a bloc-wide supra-national planning authority and an investment plan for the exploitation of raw materials. Because Romania's economy was driven by food, raw material and energy exports, Romanian Communist Party leaders felt that the proposed arrangement would lead to specialization among the bloc countries, and that this would result in Romania being reliant on other countries within the bloc for heavy industrial products. This fear of dependency was coupled with a sense of grievance over the high price that

Romania had paid for war reparations and joint companies (called *Sovroms*) with the USSR. They did not want to become an oil, petrochemical, or agricultural reserve for CEMA, or a manpower reserve for the WTO. In short, they felt that they had been exploited in the past, and under Khruschev's proposed reforms for a socialist division of labour they were about to be exploited again.

This perception of threat brought on a drive for greater industrialization and autarky. This was evident in the Third Economic Plan of 1960 and particularly in the Party's push to develop the steel industry through construction of a massive steel mill at Galati, in the face of resistance from Moscow and other steel producers within the bloc, like Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

Romania insisted that it would only base its co-operation with other socialist countries on the principles of national sovereignty and independence, peaceful coexistence, equality of rights, fraternal aid and non-intervention in internal affairs.[89] This was articulated in an official statement entitled 'Stand of the Romanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problems of the International Communist and Working-Class Movements' which was issued on 22 April 1964. In it, Gheorghe Georghiu-Dej attacked the idea of the Comecon (or any other superstate body) that would undercut the autarky of individual states.[90] Denying states the right to control their own economies was, he argued, a violation of socialist principles.

> The planned management of the national economy is one of the fundamental, essential, and inalienable attributes of the sovereignty of the socialist state – the state plan being the chief means through which the socialist state achieves its political and socio-economic objectives, establishes the directions and rates of development of the national economy, its fundamental proportions, the accumulations, the measures for raising the people's living standard, and cultural level. The sovereignty of the socialist state requires that it effectively and fully avails itself of the means for the practical implementation of these attributes.[91]

Dej was speaking of sovereignty and autonomy as if they were objective laws of social and historical development! This was a radical new interpretation of socialist theory: in effect, he was going beyond Marx's assertion that 'in order for the exploitation within and between nations to come to an end, the proletariat must rise to be the national class'. He was arguing that once they were the national class, their nation should not be exploited by others within the system. In theory, this accords with Marxism, but in practice it was a threat to Communism.

Dej, and Nikolai Ceauşescu after him, promoted the concept of the nation to a place on the same level as that of the state. In a report made to the 9th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party on 19 July 1965 Ceauşescu wrote: 'Following the disappearance of the exploiting classes the nation has grown stronger and its unity has been cemented. It is only under socialism that the real community of economic interests, the common socialist culture of all citizens who live on the same territory can fully express themselves'.[92] As Schöpflin notes, this statement implies, first, that the nation is a living reality and will continue to exist in the future; and second, that all the past efforts of the nation have come to triumph under socialism and the leadership of the Communist Party.[93] As Schöpflin goes on:

> [this interpretation] denies the sanctity of the role of the working class in society and accords this role to the socialist nation. The class struggle is, in effect, declared to be over and the Communist Party itself has been converted into an élite party representing the entire nation, which does no more than to deploy Marxism–Leninism 'creatively' in the interests of the nation. The implicit and to some extent explicit argument runs that the socialist content of this socialist nationhood will ensure that the socialist nation will be different from the bourgeois nation, because it is, by definition, progressive.[94]

This effectively creates a situation in which Romanian society is 'socialist in form and nationalist in content'.

What is apparent is that although socialism may develop within a country to the point where the proletariat becomes the leading class (and economic inequality is eliminated), it does not necessarily follow that there will be an equality of states within the socialist system. Where levels of growth and prosperity differ, there is always the possibility for competition and confrontation. That, after all, is the point that Marx and Engels stressed in the *Communist Manifesto* (and which Tom Nairn lays out very clearly): unequal development provokes crises. And here was proof of their claim, manifesting itself in the Communist bloc!

As noted in Chapter 1, in trying to propel itself forward a society turns inward. At the same time as turning inwards, the national community also looks backwards, using examples of past national glories for inspiration. After the Second Party Congress of 1955 Gheorghiu-Dej felt confident enough of his position *vis-à-vis* the Muscovite faction to reinterpret recent history and play up the role of the Communist Workers' Party in the advances made since 1945. By the 1961 plenum he went so far as to call the Muscovite faction, led by Ana Pauker, the agent of a foreign power,[95]

and played down the role of the Soviet Union and even the Communists in the takeover of 1945.

The more distant past was also reassessed and rewritten. Historiography became a central concern of the government. In 1964 Dej introduced the Daco-Roman theory, which asserted that there was a direct line between the ancient Dacians[96] and the present day Romanian state. Links to Romania's ancient Latin culture were stressed in philology. Phonetical changes which had been made in the 1940s and early 50s in an effort to make the language more Slavonic were dropped, and archaeology was used to prove continuity between the past and the present.

This served several functions. The most basic was to establish a link between past glories and the present regime. Ceauşescu, echoing sentiments which were noted in the Czechoslovakian context, even said in a speech in 1966, 'We, Communists, are the continuers of whatever is best in the Romanian people.'[97] Increasingly this attempt to show a continuity with the past became inextricably linked with the cult of personality surrounding Ceauşescu. In 1968 he modestly elevated himself to the rank of great historic leader in the image of Michael the Brave,[98] and by the 1980s he was so completely intoxicated with his historical importance that he considered his personal power to be synonymous with that of the nation.

Stressing continuity with the past had profound repercussions on territorial disputes. Archaeological 'evidence' and claims of direct ancestry from the Dacians effectively legitimized the government's ambitions for a Greater Romania that included Moldova and Transylvania. This served to annoy the Soviets, who had seized control of Bessarabia and Bukovina in 1940, and to further arouse animosities which had been festering in the Hungarian community since the return of Transylvania to Romania in 1945.

A nationalities policy was imposed on Transylvania after 1958. Hungarian schools were merged with Romanian ones, and the Hungarian Bolyai University was merged with the Romanian Babes University in Cluj (Kolozsvar) on 3 July 1959. This ushered in a period of Romanianization of almost all facets of Hungarian education and culture in Transylvania. The Hungarian Popular Federation was disbanded and in 1960 the Magyar Szekely Autonomous area was changed into the Mures–Magyar Autonomous area, and its administration was reorganized to include Romanian districts, thereby diluting the culture, demographic position and power of the Hungarian community. In 1967 the region was abolished altogether as a distinct administrative unit. The Hungarian government, very much under Moscow's thumb after 1956, offered little resistance.

The Romanian leadership also became more assertive in its relations with the Soviet Union. It requested the withdrawal of Soviet troops from

Romania, granted in 1958, and in 1964 it was bold enough to criticize the Soviet annexations of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina which had occurred after the Second World War (which meant a loss of 20 per cent of its territory and 15 per cent of its population).[99] These claims came at the same time as a little-known text by Marx called 'Notes on the Romanians' – a critique on tsarist Russia's annexationist policies in Bessarabia – was being printed in vast quantities and enjoying wide popularlity. This uncharacteristic anti-Russianism was also evident in decisions to change Russian place-names to Romanian, to stop the mandatory learning of the Russian language and to close the ('Maxim Gorky') Russian cultural centre.

It was not only relations with Russia that were affected. Romania took a neutral stance in the Sino–Soviet dispute, frustrating all Moscow's attempts to convene an international conference that would condemn the Chinese. It sought closer diplomatic and trade relations with the West, particularly France and West Germany. It voted quite independently in the United Nations, and was the only member of the socialist bloc not to condemn Israel in the six-day war of June 1967. It also developed close relations with the United States to the extent that President Nixon visited Bucharest in 1969, and took an independent line within the bloc by making a *rapprochement* with Albania and Yugoslavia. It refused to attend the high-level conference of Soviet and East European leaders in East Berlin in June 1963; furthermore, it took a very cool line towards relations with East Germany, which was pushing hardest for close economic relations within the bloc. Ceauşescu (who became leader on Gheorghiu-Dej's death in March 1965) refused to attend the Communist summit in East Berlin on the occasion of Walter Ulbricht's 70th birthday, and then went one giant step further by establishing full diplomatic relations with West Germany in 1967.

Romania not only scuttled most attempts to integrate the bloc economies through Comecon, but stymied plans for greater co-ordination of armed forces in the WTO as well. It did not take part in WTO manoeuvres, and refused to extend the 20-year military treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union when it expired in 1968.[100] The Romanian leadership argued that, just as supra-national organizations were anathema to the economic development of socialist states, military blocs were incompatible with independence and national sovereignty.

This independent national approach broadened the Party's base of popular support. In 1965 the name was changed back to the Romanian Communist Party,[101] in effect dropping an appeal strictly made to workers (or classes) and instead becoming a national party.

The case of Romania demonstrates that, as in Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia and Albania, there was 'a trend towards a change from the practice of suppressing domestic nationalism from the power base of Soviet support to that of criticizing, and sometimes opposing, the Soviet Union from the power base of domestic nationalism'.[102] As François Fejtö writes, the trend in Romania shows that even the

> once ultra-Stalinist Gheorghiu-Dej came to the same conclusion as the Hungarian Imre Nagy and the most radical revisionists of 1956: that the independent national state is the necessary intermediary in the progress of society ... Socialism (supranational or centralized) does not guarantee independence, but on the contrary fully realized independence enables the nation to develop socialism, and may serve as the basis for regional groupings and an international order.[103]

To some extent the independent stance taken by the Romanian Communist Party was the result of manipulation of latent nationalism to serve the political and economic aims of the Party, state and, to an ever-increasing degree, the Ceauşescu clique. But one must not overlook the extent to which the Romanian case, like others, was an example of the national culture influencing the Party rather than *vice versa*. There is much to be said for Katherine Verdery's interpretation of the cause and effect of nationalism in Romania, particularly under Ceauşescu:

> Although Ceauşescu may have brought the national discourse back into public usage, he assuredly did not do so from a position of dominance over its meanings. Rather, he presided over the moment when the Marxist discourse was decisively disrupted by that of the Nation. From then on, the Party struggled to maintain the initiative in the use of this rhetoric. If national ideology struck outside observers as the most salient feature of Romanian politics, this was not because the Party emphasized nothing else but because the Nation was so well entrenched discursively in Romanian life.[104]

This goes for all countries of the Communist bloc, even the most conservative, such as Czechoslovakia.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE LIMITS OF NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

Some might argue that the events leading up to and including the Prague Spring had very little to do with nationalism. They would argue instead

that the events of 1963 to 1968 were an attempt to promote political pluralism and economic liberalization. Yet, ironically, one of the major reasons cited by the Soviet leadership and its allies in the bloc to justify their intervention in Czechoslovakia was that nationalism had to be quashed. This was also a common theme in retrospective analyses by Communist writers.[105] In a sense they were right, for although this was not a bourgeois reactionary revolution in the way that they portrayed it, it was in its essence a national and liberal revolution in the same way that the French and American Revolutions and the revolutions of 1848 were both national and liberal.

Both the Czechs and Slovaks sought a realization of their political culture. They wanted socialism with a national face. As François Fejto writes: 'The renewal, the political awakening that took place at the beginning of 1968, had many and complex causes, but its principal source lay in the deep desire of the Czechs and Slovaks to rediscover their confused and repressed identity, and to restore the continuity between their past and their future.'[106] The Czechs had a long history of humanism and social democracy. They sought greater intellectual freedom, economic liberalization and pluralism within the bloc. This amounted to 'socialism with a human face'. The Slovaks, traditionally more clerical and conservative, also sought pluralism, economic liberalization and intellectual freedom, but *vis-à-vis* Prague rather than Moscow. 'Political co-ordinates of the majority of the Slovak élite differed from those of the Czech reformers in as much as they regarded the solution of the national problem as a precondition for democratic reforms in society.'[107]

One of the common catalysts in both halves of the country was the overwhelming sense of economic grievance. The mega-projects and over-industrialization of the 1950s had generated unsustainable growth. As Ota Sik, the architect of Czechoslovakia's economic reform between 1965 and 1968, points out, technological backwardness, a distorted production structure, wasteful utilization of material inputs, decelerating growth of labour productivity, and inflationary pressures caused by over-emphasis on heavy industry all combined to produce a decline in the rate of growth and, indeed, recession between 1962 and 1964.[108] Since the Party was quick to take the credit for everything good that occured within the state, it also had to face up to the fact that it was responsible for the system's shortcomings. As Antonín Novotný was both Party Secretary and President he personally had a lot to account for, especially as he professed to be a loyal servant of Moscow yet resisted Khruschev's push for reform.

In order to revitalize the economy Novotný was obliged to decentralize certain economic functions and show greater sensitivity to market forces.

These moves were in line with similar reforms, even among hard-line Communist regimes, throughout the bloc. A New Economic System was introduced in East Germany in 1963/4, economic reforms were carried out in Hungary in 1965 and Kosygin's relatively liberal reforms of 1965 demonstrated that change was also possible in the USSR.

Economic liberalization had the knock-on effect of raising calls for the rationalization of political structures as well, especially in Slovakia, where members of the Slovak intelligentsia, bureaucracy and even members of the Slovak Communist Party blamed the stagnating economy on Prague's bureaucrats and traditional Czech insensitivity to Slovakia. As noted in Chapter 4, this sense of historic grievance was very profound. The Slovaks felt betrayed by the Czech failure to live up to the 1918 Pittsburgh agreement (in which Masaryk had promised them autonomy), the reneging of the Kosiče Programme (which had been reversed in the early 1950s and all but completely destroyed by the 1960 Constitution) and the effect of the Purges, which had singled out a large number of Slovak Communists as 'bourgeois nationalists'. One of the main calls of the Slovaks was for an equal federal structure and a strengthening of the Slovak National Council.

The debate became very vocal in 1962 when the Slovak press and even Slovak Party members demanded a reinvestigation of the Purges. Novotný tried to dampen Slovak resistance by rehabilitating several 'bourgeois nationalists' in 1962/3, including Vladimír Clementis (the former foreign minister, executed in 1952) and Gustáv Husák. Two Commissions, the Kolder Commission and the Barnabite Commission, were set up to look into the injustices of the Purges with particular reference to Slovakia. In September 1963 Novotný relieved Viliam Široký (the head of the Czechoslovak government and former grand inquisitor of the Slovak party during the Purges) of his duties.[109] As part of these changes Alexander Dubček became head of the Slovak Communist Party. By 1964 no-one occupied a high position in the Slovak Communist Party who had been a member of the leadership in 1954.

The purge of the Slovak Party organization had replaced those whose loyalties were primarily with Prague by Communists who could be generally depended upon to support the Slovak viewpoint.[110] Furthermore, these Communists were not afraid to push the national cause onto the federal agenda. This had the effect of legitimizing a further opening-up of the whole Slovak question, one which manifested itself in several ways.

The 150th anniversary of the birth of L'udovít Štúr, creator of the modern written Slovak language and leader of the anti-Hungarian revolution in 1848, was officially celebrated on 19 October 1965. There was also a significant reassessment of the 1944 Slovak National Uprising, to the extent

that the role of the Soviets and even the Communists was downplayed and the role of the nationalists was accentuated. The first major anniversary of the Uprising was celebrated in August 1964 in the presence of Khruschev, and it became an annual event thereafter.

The Matica Slovenská, established in 1863 to promote the development of Slovak literary and artistic culture, was revived. The most significant development came on 17 June 1968, when the Slovak National Council allowed the Matica to resume many of its former activities (which had been phased out in the early 1950s), including its right to publish scholarly material.[111]

There were similar changes in the Czech republic as well. There was a revival of associations which had been banned in the 1950s (like the Sokols and the Boy Scouts); new associations – particularly in the field of human rights and among youth – sprung up, and creative artists, the intelligentsia and journalists all took advantage of the relative amount of liberalization to test the limits of cultural and political expression. The mid-1960s saw a renaissance of Czech and Slovak culture, particularly in film, literature and the performing arts. The Czechoslovak pavilion at Expo '67 in Montreal was a testament to this explosion of ideas.

This cultural renaissance did not take place in a political vacuum. The Writers' Union in particular took up the cause of political reform, most notably in its Congress of June 1967. One of the most significant tracts of the period, Ludvik Vaculík's *2000 Words*, was very much inspired by the spirit of that Congress.

One of the most organized and active groups were the students. On May Day in 1964 there was a large anti-government demonstration by some 3,000 students, and there were large student protests again in October 1967. It is interesting to note that it was the generation that had grown up under Communism which was most disillusioned with the system.

That is not to say that Czechs and Slovaks rejected socialism outright. In a survey carried out in the spring of 1968 only 5 per cent of those polled expressed a desire to return to capitalist development, while an overwhelming 89 per cent wanted a continuation of socialism.[112] But what they wanted was a type of socialism that took into account national and human concerns. This sentiment was captured in the Party's Action Programme of 6 April 1968, that stated, 'Within the framework of democratic rules of a socialist state, Communists must strive for the voluntary support of the majority of the people for the Party line.'[113]

This would require major restructuring, for there was a popular perception that the Soviet model had been artificially imposed onto Czechoslovakia in 1948 and did not reflect the nations' identities. As had

been the case in Hungary and Poland, the challenge to the leadership was to match socialist policies to national conditions.[114]

Such dramatic change seemed imminent at the 14th CPCz Congress scheduled for August 1968, which looked set to approve a remodelled Party statute and elect a new Politbureau and Central Committee. The invasion by the Soviet Union and five other allies on 21 August 1968 showed that such national Communism had its limits. Sovereignty of socialist states was anathema to Communism, and as such would have to be limited. From now on the bloc would have to fall into line; any other alternative was considered too destabilizing.

However, the invasion was also a symbol of how hollow Communism had become. The reimposition of hardline Communist control and the 'normalization' that followed throughout the bloc reimposed order but, more clearly than ever before, it also demonstrated the extent to which Communism was out of touch with and, indeed, in opposition to the will of the people.

As with the failed revolutions in Hungary and Poland, the Prague Spring became part of the national collective experience and crystallized national resistance to the regime. Brezhnev would have done well to heed the advice that Engels wrote to Kautsky in 1882: 'One thing alone is certain: the victorious proletariat can force no blessing of any kind upon a foreign nation without undermining its own victory in so doing.'[115]

LITHUANIA AND THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF THE SOVIET MODEL

As things were deteriorating in Eastern Europe, Moscow was prone to point to relations between the republics of the Soviet Union as a model that should be copied throughout the bloc. After all, as Khruschev had the hubris to announce in 1962, the nationalities problem had been solved in the Soviet Union.

But inter-national relations in the USSR were far from harmonious, and although demonstrations of nationalism were more muted than in Eastern Europe, they existed none the less.

To look at the effects that Khruschev's and Brezhnev's policies had on intra-Union relations, the case of Lithuania will be used. Lithuania is interesting for several reasons. First, and most significantly, it was led by the same First Secretary, Antanas Sniečkus, for 33 years (1940–74). The fact that Sniečkus survived several changes in leadership and several significant changes in policy means that in tracing his personal career and the

fate of his regime one monitors a barometer of change which reflects the machinations of Soviet nationalities policies towards the republics. Second, the history of the Lithuanian Communist Party is profoundly different from that of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and therefore provides a contrast to the case study used in Chapter 4. Finally, Lithuania is an interesting case study as it was one of the states in the forefront of those calling for change in the 1980s. Trends which originated in the 1950s and 60s will shed some light on why Lithuania went the way that it did in the late 1980s.

It should be noted that the history of Lithuania during this period, like that of most former Soviet republics, has not been the focus of extensive scholarship, or at least extensive objective scholarship.[116] First-hand material of the time is only now becoming available. Second-hand sources almost invariably have either a strong anti-Communist bias or, conversely, reflect the officially sanctioned view. In addition to looking at primary sources, which in themselves do not tell the whole story, one is left to read between the lines and form opinions on the basis of subtle policy shifts and changes in élite behaviour. Nevertheless, based on interviews, archive material and a careful reading and evaluation of events, decisions and secondary sources, objective assessments can be made. Thomas Remeikis sums up the situation as follows in his exhaustive *Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania 1945–1980*:

> Very little direct testimony on national and religious dissent [in Lithuania] is available for the period between Stalin's death and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Dissent was relatively subdued and not productive of dramatic events or underground publications. National values were increasingly safeguarded and advanced through the established institutions and cultural activity in an extraordinarily subtle manner which can be described and analysed in spite of the fact that very few documents are available.[117]

ANATANAS SNIEČKUS AND THE LITHUANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Unlike in Czechoslovakia, the Lithuanian Communist Party [LiCP] never enjoyed significant popular support in the inter-war period. Membership never rose above 2,000 (less than 1 per cent of the population), and most of these people were Russians, Jews and Poles. Even after the war, membership was no higher than 6,000, again with minimal support from ethnic

Lithuanians.[118] Low participation by ethnic Lithuanians helps to explain why so many non-Lithuanian officials were brought in to run the Party after the Second World War. The exception was a small core of Lithuanian Communists who lived and were educated in other parts of the Soviet Union, mainly Moscow. The most important of these was Antanas Sniečkus.

Sniečkus (whose name in English means 'snowball') joined the Communist Party in 1920 at the age of 17, becoming active in the LiCP Secretariat in 1926. After serving several prison sentences for anti-state activities in the 1930s he was appointed First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party in 1936. He received most of his education in Moscow, and was very much the prototypical Moscow-trained, Communist stooge.

In the Second World War he was active in the underground and was highly trusted by his political masters in Moscow. His stature within the (illegal) party was such that he became First Secretary virtually unopposed in 1940. During the Soviet occupation of 1940–41, and after the Soviet takeover in 1945, Sniečkus rapidly developed a reputation for carrying out Moscow's orders to the letter. Unlike the Communist Party in some of the Eastern European countries cited in the previous chapter, the LiCP under Sniečkus (at least in the post-war period) wanted to destroy all links with the past. History books were burned, and he is even alleged to have been responsible for the destruction of a national monument in Kaunas.[119] He had no qualms about sending thousands of his compatriots (including his older brother) to Siberia.[120] Even his mother allegedly described him as a 'monster', and fled Lithuania in 1947, never to return.[121]

Sniečkus was trusted to such an extent that he was allowed an ever-increasing amount of freedom to pursue his own policies. Interestingly, by the mid-1950s those policies were becoming progressively more independent, and by the early 1960s he was openly disagreeing with Khruschev on decisions regarding the appointment of native cadres, heavy industry, culture and agriculture. By the late 1960s he was even affectionately referred to by some Lithuanians as '*seimininkas*', which can be translated as 'master of the household',[122] and at his death there was a genuine popular outpouring of grief.

Sniečkus is thus an interesting character, for during his lifetime he seems to have gone from devoted Stalinist to national Communist. He was a member of the CPSU Central Committee at the 19th, 20th, 22nd, 23rd and 24th Party Congresses, a Deputy to all USSR Supreme Soviets and a Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet Deputy. He was awarded, among other distinctions, the Order of Lenin for services to the Party and the Soviet state, not once but eight times, and was also named Hero of

Socialist Labour. And yet during his lifetime certain domestic pressures developed that forced his once-close relationship with Moscow to change (albeit more subtly than many of his contemporaries) to the point where he was popularly perceived as a defender of Lithuanian interests. His funeral is worth considering, for here was a man who had received innumerable state honours, was the longest-serving First Secretary of any Soviet Socialist republic and was a personal friend to many Party officials. And yet only one Politburo member, P. Masherov (First Secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party) and one member of the Central Committee, I. Kapitonov, attended his funeral.[123] Even Mikhail Suslov, his long-time friend and supporter, was not there. More telling still is the fact that the Lithuanian public came in droves. For three days there was a constant stream of people filing past his body lying in state. How and why did this conversion come about, and what does it tell us about national Communism? By looking at the situation in Lithuania several general conclusions will be drawn on the relationship between nationalism and Communism, for the forces which induced Sniečkus to undergo this transformation are demonstrative of pressures which were present to at least some degree in all of the Soviet Socialist Republics and many of their Eastern European counterparts.

The first observation which must be made about Sniečkus is that he was a consummate networker and a cagey political survivor. He was famous for his hunting parties and social gatherings. He not only befriended high-level Party members, but was also careful to cultivate good relations with junior officials. Not aspiring to any senior positions within the CPSU seems to have gone a long way in eliminating him as a threat in the eyes of his peers.

Sniečkus knew which way the wind was blowing when it came to changing policies to stay popular in the eyes of Moscow.[124] He was a Stalinist under Stalin, a liberal under Khruschev, and a hard-liner again under Brezhnev. One way to describe his behaviour would be as a political chameleon, although the characterization of him as a 'farmer who was quick to learn' also seems appropriate.[125]

Through all of the many changes in the Kremlin over the 33 years in which he was First Secretary, he was able to forward the interests of Lithuania. How was this possible? To a great extent he was the beneficiary of favourable demographic and historical circumstances. Due in large part to the insecurity caused by the eight-year guerilla war (1944–52), industrialization was very slow in Lithuania. And although Sniečkus had to deal with a lot of functionaries from Moscow (because the number of native cadres was very low, and most could not be trusted), he did not have to

contend with a rapid inflow of migrant workers who, in other republics, came with the development of heavy industry. Because industrialization was retarded until the mid-1950s (when policies of nativization and republic subsiduarity were being encouraged), the dynamics of growth were considerably different than those in neighbouring republics like Latvia and Belarus. By the time that industrialization took place, Sniečkus was firmly in control and was able to blunt its harmful effects. Another reason which might account for the shift from Stalinism to national Communism is Sniečkus' cadre policy.

NATIVE COMMUNISTS: THE ROLE OF THE NEW ELITE

Between 1947 and 1967 the proportion of ethnic Lithuanians in the Council of Ministers rose from 55 to 87 per cent. In 1971 87 per cent of the members of the Politburo and Secretariat of the LiCP were ethnic Lithuanians.[126] These increases were mirrored in the Party and state bureaucracy as well. By 1959 70 per cent of all employees in state and economic bodies were Lithuanian.[127] It is interesting to note that Lithuania had one of the lowest percentages of native Communist Party members in all-Union bodies (5.5 per cent in 1971), but one of the highest percentages of cadres in the republic Communist Party (67.1 per cent in 1970).[128] That would suggest that they did not like the CPSU, but saw the LiCP as a vehicle for career advancement and, perhaps, as a way of influencing developments in their republic – a common characteristic in many Communist parties. Since membership in the Party was the only tolerated outlet for political activity, 'the object of politics was not to cultivate communism as a means of revolutionizing the world but rather its opposite: infuse it with locally acceptable, eclectic, popular or bureaucratic content'.[129] Not surprisingly, this view is often retrospectively put forward by those who were in the Lithuanian Communist Party at the time. For example, the former Lithuanian president Algirdas Brazauskas, a Sniečkus disciple and former First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, remarked at a rally in the summer of 1995 that

> many energetic people of our land joined the Communist Party not because they were fierce advocates of Soviet socialism. Party membership was only a cover to preserve Lithuania's identity. Due to their intelligent manipulations, the [Soviet] colonization of Lithuania did not reach dramatic dimensions, while the larger cities, especially Vilnius, even became more Lithuanian. It is not necessary to explain that this process differed from the goals of the USSR.[130]

This is certainly an overstatement, and analysing it fully would cause one to wade into a controversial topic of debate that still rages in Lithuania. Nevertheless, there is a grain of truth in what Brazauskas said, and the phenomenon is worth closer examination.

Part of the significant rise in nativization in the Party can be attributed to the fact that young, skilled specialists were needed to fill the increasing number of positions which opened up as a result of the expansion of various state bureaucracies. Because of the emphasis on higher education in the republic there was no shortage of Lithuanians to fill these positions. Another reason lay in the fact that by the mid-1950s, after the purges and the conclusion of the guerilla war, non-Lithuanian Communist officials (particularly in the Central Committee of the Vilnius Communist Party and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) were encouraged to leave the republic, and their positions were filled by the younger generation of ethnic Lithuanians.

Lack of competence was often the excuse given for dismissing old or non-Lithuanian officials. It was difficult for non-natives to move into these vacated positions, as knowledge of the Lithuanian language was a virtual prerequisite for government service. Sniečkus was roundly criticized for this practice in 1959 when Khruschev began to play down the merits of nativization, but despite some high-profile firings of ministers and the rector of Vilnius University, Sniečkus does not seem to have wavered from this policy[131] and even seems to have been able to dull the effects of the cadre exchange policy which was laid out by the 1961 Party Program of the CPSU.

The younger Communist cadres were part of what Djilas termed the 'new class'. More technocratic than ideological, this generation had different perspectives and expectations from those men of Sniečkus' generation:

> They grew up in a climate of resurging cultural nationalism and normalization of Party and government activity. These people have shown as much enthusiasm and concern for Lithuanian cultural heritage as most of the intelligentsia. They did not have to be anti-Lithuanian, unlike the youth of the post-war years, who grew up during the intense struggle between Communism and nationalism, and for whom Communism and nationalism were mutually exclusive.[132]

This raises an interesting point, namely that by the late 1950s and early 60s Communism and nationalism in Lithuania were not necessarily mutually exclusive. How was that so, and how did it manifest itself?

Influenced in part by Khruschev's managerial style of leadership and partly by the opportunities which were afforded them under the new

system, this generation of apparatchiks looked at economics as a function of politics, and not vice versa. The 'new class' were bureaucrats, and as such they had a vested interest in promoting and protecting conditions which were favourable to them. They were obviously not interested in rocking the boat, but they also knew that it was in their own best interests to be big fish in their own pond. What resulted was what Walker Connor has aptly described as 'bureaucratic ethnocentrism',[133] or what Gregory Gleason describes as 'bureaucratic nationalism'.[134] It is worth noting that bureaucratic ethnocentrism was a considerably more pronounced factor in the Caucasus and the Central Asian republics, where ethnic and kinship ties overlapped with professional cliques. This helps to explain the subsequent problems with nepotism and corruption which surfaced in the 1980s.

Members of this élite were interested in their own power, and by extension, collectively they were interested in their state's power *vis-à-vis* other bloc members and the USSR. This became increasingly obvious as the economies of the Soviet republics became more equal, for republican leaders found themselves competing with like-minded leaders for similar pieces of the pie. A caution should be voiced here. The élites were interested in greater control, not independence. In most cases they were not nationalists either. However, in fighting to maintain control over the economy and the state bureaucracy they accentuated the place of the nation. The reason for this lies in the very nature of the Soviet system. The national Communist élites had a stake in the system, but more salient was their desire to protect their place within that system. In that sense the system encouraged parochialism. As noted in Chapter 3, administrative units were organized territorially and designated by the name of the majority nationality, thereby officially sanctioning the continuance of that titular nationality's cultural and political identity. Republics had their own state structures, ministries and jurisdictions. They were separated from other republics; all links (transportation, communication, economic and political) went via the centre, fostering a sense of centre-*versus*-periphery mentality. This was particularly the case in questions of resource distribution.

DECENTRALIZATION AND PROTECTIONISM

In the mid-1950s Khruschev had begun to pursue a policy of decentralization in planning and economic management in order to improve efficiency. The most dramatic change came in February 1957, with the introduction of the *sovnarkhoz* system. Decentralization went even further in May, when the republics were given the power to run virtually all industries and

construction companies on their territory. Decrees of 29 August 1957 and 22 June 1959 even went so far as to enhance the powers of the council of ministers of the federal republics.[135] These moves heightened the sense of ethno-bureaucratization which had been brewing since the death of Stalin (and had arguably been there since the first round of *korenizatsia* in the 1920s). As Motyl points out, and as will be noted in Chapter 6 when similar dynamics within Yugoslavia will be examined,

> the purpose and logic of decentralization compel peripheral élites to focus their initiative and energies on the territorial unit they administer, the republic; otherwise they would be incapable of implementing decentralization's original mandate – improved efficiency, better decisions, and a better system. Finally, and most important, decentralization arms the periphery. It gives local élites the means to pursue their goals effectively. That is, it provides them with resources or with greater control of resources.[136]

When taken to its logical end, this domesticism or localism becomes national Communism.

> The periphery converts the authority granted to it under conditions of systemic decentralization into greater sovereignty. The periphery must act in this manner if it wants to fulfil the centre's mandate; it must pursue its own interests, accumulate resources, and mobilize constituencies if it hopes to succeed. Ironically, however, in acting in this manner, the periphery begins to undermine the centre's position of political and economic dominance *vis-à-vis* itself.[137]

As already witnessed when tracking the rise of domesticism in Eastern Europe, under these conditions a certain implicit national perspective is inevitably acquired by even the most loyal Soviet functionaries when they are assigned to specific tasks within the framework of more loosely defined ideological conceptions.[138]

The gains made by the republics under the *sovnarkhoz* system were later reversed. The Lithuanian economic council was merged into a regional economic council (the Council of the Western Economic Region) that included Latvia and Estonia and, after 1963, the Kaliningrad oblast. Regional councils were also created in Transcaucasia and Central Asia.[139] Furthermore, in March 1963, for the first time, a Supreme Economic Soviet of the USSR was created to supervise all existing economic councils plus the USSR State Planning Committee, the USSR's State Committee for Construction and all state committees for managing trade and industry. The pendulum swung back even further when ministries that

were previously under the jurisdiction of the republic, or at least jointly union-republic (like education), were made all-Union in 1965 with Brezhnev's policy of recentralization.

But recentralization had the unintended result of strengthening the national tendency of republic officials, who now had to fight for budget appropriations against the central government and other republics. This heightened the sense of competitiveness rather than of co-operation.

SNIEČKUS AS A NATIONAL COMMUNIST?

Sniečkus fought for Lithuanian interests, especially in agriculture. On many occasions he publicly rebuked the central government for being insensitive to Lithuanian conditions. For example, at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 he criticized 'serious shortcomings in the guidance of agriculture by Party and Soviet agencies in the republic'. Although he accepted that the republic's Party organization had to bear some of the blame, he chastized the USSR Ministry of Agriculture for not taking 'sufficient account of the specific features of the Lithuanian republic. There have been instances where officials of the Union ministry have not only failed themselves to study the specific features of the republic's agriculture, but at times paid no attention to local officials.'[140]

This theme was repeated in 1958 when he called for regional factors to be taken into account when reorganizing the Machine Tractor Stations (MTS).[141] He called on the central government to allow collective farmers to own tractors and other farm machinery, as the system of using those provided by MTS was proving ineffective. He also called for more local control of agriculture in order for officials to react to district concerns more effectively.[142] The MTS debate is a classic example of how Sniečkus was able to win favour in Moscow and at home. By backing MTS reform he was both supporting Khruschev (who was fighting for such a policy in the face of stiff opposition in the Politburo) and winning the support of Lithuanian farmers, who had a lot to gain by having more control over their land and its resources. Sniečkus, who came from a farming background, was quite proud of his accomplishments in creating smallhold farms. He allowed farmers to own 16 acres of land and up to 40 livestock.[143] Perhaps it was because of this limited amount of privatization that Lithuania was one of the few republics where meat was seldom in short supply.

Sniečkus' determination to exercise control over agriculture in the republic did not go unnoticed. Khruschev was particularly outspoken in his criticisms of Lithuanian agricultural policy in his report to the March 1962

plenary session of the Party Central Committee. As Lithuania is very reliant on animal husbandry, Sniečkus was opposed to replacing grassland acreage with maize – Khruschev's pet project. In fact, he gave specific instructions to ignore Moscow's directives and carry on planting traditional crops, while only planting maize by the side of the roads so that visiting officials would be impressed.[144]

In his 1962 report Khruschev remarked:

> The harmfulness of the grassland farming system is obvious. But it cannot be said that its advocates are abandoning their stand. They try stubbornly to defend it... a group of scientists of the Agricultural Research Institute of Lithuania... claim that grasses should constitute the foundation of the feed base for animal husbandry and insist on not only on preserving the present area but on considerably increasing it.[145]

Sniečkus repented, but was quick to turn the knife (after Khruschev's departure) in 1965 when he wrote in an article which appeared in *Pravda* that:

> The subjectivism and stereotype in solving practical tasks of agricultural production that once existed exerted a negative influence on the state of affairs in farming and livestock raising in the Lithuanian republic, as elsewhere. The one-sided, indiscriminate criticism of grass planting, which in our conditions rightfully occupies an important place in the fodder balance, inflicted substantial damage on agriculture, especially the fodder base and animal husbandry.[146]

Sniečkus' domesticism was not limited to agriculture: he also tried to prevent the type of population transfers that were swamping other Soviet Socialist Republics like Kazakhstan and Latvia. These transfers, which amounted to colonization, were the result of the development of heavy industry in those republics. It was a process which Sniečkus and the native élite wanted to avoid. This issue had to be handled delicately. The dismissal of Estonian party officials in 1951 and Latvian officials in 1959 who tried to reverse the effects of rapid industrialization showed the limits of the Kremlin's tolerance for meddling by native Communists.

To dampen the effects of industrialization, a system of decentralized urbanization through dispersal of industry was set up wherein development of small-scale, specialized industries was encouraged in several medium-sized provincial cities where rural labour could easily and cheaply be absorbed by industry.[147] The process was successful, for the republic retained its high level of ethnic homogeneity. Thanks to this policy and a high birthrate, the percentage of ethnic Lithuanians in the republic actually increased from 79.3 per cent to 80.1 per cent between 1959 and 1970.[148]

Besides agriculture, animal husbandry, metallurgy and electronics the economy was oriented towards small-scale, sustainable projects like forestry, textiles, clothing manufacture and food production. The exception was in power, chemicals and petro-chemicals.[149] Considerable All-Union and republican investment went into a series of large-scale projects during Sniečkus' term of office: in 1960 the Kaunas Hydroelectric power station, capable of producing 100.8 MW (384 million kWh) was concluded; the Azotas chemical fertilizer plant (employing over 4,000 people), the Kaunas synthetic fibre plant and the Vilnius Polymer product plant were completed in 1965; Vilnius' third thermal power station was updated between 1965 and 1969; the Lithuanian power station which generates 9 billion kWh of power was completed in 1968; the Lietuvos Buitiene Chemija solvents, chemicals and cosmetics plant was completed in 1970. For the most part these projects were initiated by the republic, and energy or products which they produced was used domestically.

Sniečkus adamantly opposed the construction of a nuclear power station in Lithuania and, during his lifetime, successfully prevented the construction of such a station. After his death construction of the Ignalia nuclear power station went ahead, the first reactor being completed in 1983, the second in 1987. It currently supplies energy to Lithuania, Latvia and Belarus, and is one of the biggest nuclear power plants in Europe. In an ironic twist, the town that was built up around the plant was named Sniečkus.[150]

It is also telling that an oil-refining plant (in Mazeikiai, close to the Latvian border) was only completed in 1980. A previous proposal by Moscow to build a refinery in Jurbarkas (on the Nemunas river close to Kaliningrad) was the source of heated debate[151] to the extent that the project was delayed and then modified. Sniečkus, an avid angler, made sure that the site was changed to Mazeikiai and assurances of strict environmental controls were given.

One has to question Sniečkus' motivation. He was unquestionably a canny political opportunist: the fact that he could survive for 33 years is the greatest testament to that. But did he eventually feel an affinity to Lithuania that went beyond a simple politically motivated desire to hang on to what amounted to his personal fiefdom? Walker Connor suggests that a question like this should be approached with great caution. He makes the point that 'while Communist leaders may fall victim to the national virus, the fact that they have disguised themselves as nationalists in order to manipulate national aspirations is not in itself an adequate symptom that they themselves have succumbed to the disease'.[152] This is true to a point. For example, the dismissal of the Moscow-appointed

Second Secretary, Boris Sharkov, in September 1961 was a power play, not really a nationally inspired move. Unlike the previous Second Secretaries, Alexander Isachenko and Alexander Trofimov, Sniečkus could not control Sharkov and had him reappointed to Archangel.[153] Resistance to the merger of Kaliningrad with Lithuania was surely motivated in large part by the same concerns: he saw such a move as challenging his authority. But to a certain extent, when a Lithuanian leader is dismissing a Moscow-appointed Second Secretary to secure his own power base, or resisting territorial rearrangements of the USSR, where is the boundary between the symptom and the actual illness of nationalism?

There are two points to consider in response to Connor's remark. First, as Motyl notes, if one acts like a nationalist one is (in most cases) well on the way to being one: 'They act as if they believed that their unit of governance should be sovereign and its interests paramount, and by acting as if they were nationalists they become nationalists *malgré soi*; that is they become contextual nationalists.'[154] This was clearly the case in other republics. The most well-known is that of Pyotr Shelest, leader of the Ukrainain Communist Party between 1963 and 1972. Shelest staunchly defended Ukrainian autarky, promoted the recruitment of native cadres and increased the profile of the Ukrainian language and culture. For this he was eventually removed from his post.[155] His is not an isolated case. The leaders of Armenia (1959), Azerbaijan (1959), Kazahkstan (1959), Latvia (1959), Uzbekistan (1959), Kirghizia (1961), Tadzhikistan (1962), Turkmenistan (1963) and Georgia (1965) were all removed for 'national deviation' of some kind or another. In some cases these charges were a convienent excuse for getting rid of disloyal leaders, but where there is smoke there is fire.

Second, although Sniečkus and Communist leaders like him may not themselves have been nationalists, they created an environment where national identity could be preserved and, in many cases, where national consciousness could be strengthened. They may have been bureaucratic nationlists, but when ethnicity overlaps with culture and has a loaded economic element the result is political. Take, for example, Sniečkus' cultural policy. At the Tenth Congress of the Party in February 1958 he spoke at length about the merits of national tradition.

> While exposing the bourgeois order, we communists value greatly all that was created in various areas of life by the Lithuanian nation during the bourgeois years ... Any nihilism concerning the heritage of the Lithuanian literature and art of the past and of folk art is foreign to us ... we cannot also tolerate the behaviour of those workers (functionaries),

far removed from life, who are sceptical in such questions as the development of national cadres and the use of native language, etc.[156]

He even took part in the traditional national celebration of St John's night on 23 June of that year.

Sniečkus' cultural policy was also evident in heritage preservation. Between 1951 and 1959 the magnificent Trakai castle, site of the capital of the medieval Lithuanian kingdom, was restored. So too was the upper castle on Gediminus hill in Vilnius, Medininkai and Birzai castles and Verkiai Palace. Significant archaeological work was carried out across the republic, and several historical monuments were erected and restored.[157] As in other republics (most notably the Ukraine and Russia) an Authority for the Preservation of Museums and Cultural Monuments was set up in 1963.[158] In addition, the old towns of Trakai, Kaunas, Vilnius and Kedainiai were restored, and in 1969 were declared urban architectural monuments. Granted, this work was not officially sanctioned. Most of it was organized by the intelligentsia. But work of such an extensive nature could not have gone on without the tacit approval of the regime, and there is no question that it enjoyed the backing of Sniečkus.

Indeed, Sniečkus was not afraid to stand up to his critics on the issue of culture. The restoration of Trakai castle was criticized by Khruschev at a meeting of Soviet councils on 21 December 1960 and was the subject of an *Izvestia* article entitled 'Is it Time to Restore Castles?'. Sniečkus admitted that there were some excesses in the allocation of funding of heritage preservation projects, and that 'a critical approach was often lacking when determining objects for restoration', but stressed that Trakai castle was a popular tourist destination for workers and a symbol of the struggle against the Teutonic Knights and, as such, a worthy example of the spirit of Soviet patriotism.[159] Ironically, Khruschev is alleged to have bought this argument to the extent that on foreign trips he would point to the renovation of Trakai castle as a prime example of the way that Soviets proudly preserved their past. It is also interesting to note that Sniečkus catalogued and requested the return from Russia of several items of Lithuanian heritage which had been taken from the country during the tsarist period.[160]

A cultural renaissance also took place in other areas. The Poet Laureate, Jonas Maironis, was rehabilitated, and the painter Mikalojus Ciurlionis (1875–1911), considered by many art critics to be as important as Kandinsky, went from 'decadent' to Lithuanian socialist patriot almost overnight.[161] The state promoted the travel of the folk song and dance group Lietuva and, in 1967, a republic-wide folk art and sport festival was

held. Folk themes became extremely prevelant in art and literature.[162] Folk-song and -dance groups proliferated. One observer quotes the staggering figure of 220,000 singers, dancers, musicians and amateur group members in Lithuania in 1960, amounting to one in every 15 Lithuanians.[163] National forms were also evident in sport, as teams were allowed to wear *Lietuva* on their uniforms.

Sniečkus followed a national policy in education as well. Lithuania was one of the few republics where education was entirely in the native language. Prospective students had to pass an entrance exam in Lithuanian in order to enter Lithuanian universities. Administrators designed and implemented reforms that allowed for 11 years of education in schools, the extra year focusing mainly on Lithuanian subjects. An overwhelming percentage of published materials was in Lithuanian.[164]

One exception to Sniečkus' relative tolerance of nationalism was his strong censure of the Catholic Church. He implemented Khruschev's directives on religion with vigour. This can be explained by the fact that, unlike other sectors of national life, he saw the Church as a rival rather than a potential tool. In retrospect his concerns were well-founded, as dissent, when it did materialize, came through the Church. The underground journal 'Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church' became a mouthpiece not only for the Church, but for human-rights organizations and nationalists.[165]

Opposition to Sniečkus became more pronounced in the early 1970s, climaxing with the death of a 19-year-old student, Romas Kalanta, who burned himself to death in Kaunas in front of the theatre where the Soviet state had been declared in 1940.[166]

The rise of dissent in Lithuania in the late 1960s and 1970s indicates that, in conformity with a pattern already noted in several instances, Sniečkus had created heightened expectations but could not allow them to be fulfilled, as that risked compromising his own authority and undercutting the integrity of Communism and the needs of the system. Once again we see the antagonistic contradiction between nationalism and Communism.

CONCLUSION

By 1968 Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia had all been affected by nationalism to the extent that – in one form or another – they directly challenged the *status quo* in the Communist bloc. Nationalism manifested itself in different ways – ethnic, civil, economic, populist. It was a vehicle through which individuals

sought to express their identity (often in opposition to the state), and a means by which the states (or Soviet republics) sought to define their interests within the super-state structure. Of course, there is a danger in lumping together a number of different phenomena and calling them all nationalistic. But, as nationalism is in many respects a self-defining phenomena, and the peoples and leaders in question defined their interests in national terms, although they may not have been nationalists their divergent motives fuelled a national cause and strengthened their national identities. It would be safe to say, as Paul Lendvai did in 1969, that 'despite two decades of professed adherence to the social gospel known as Marxism–Leninism, the quest for national identity has proved more powerful than ideological bonds. Nationalism has become a primary factor, both reflecting and promoting the changing nature of relations between the Communist-dominated smaller states and the Soviet Union.'[167] As noted, it was also affecting the political legitimacy of regimes within Soviet republics, relations among Soviet peoples and relations between the republics and the centre.

The limits of sovereignty were clear, but obvious too was the power of nationalism. Moscow and many of its Soviet and East European satraps had been able to contain nationalism, but they were fighting a rearguard action with no prognosis of either a successful resolution or an idea of how long the struggle could continue.

6 The Contradiction Apparent

The previous four chapters have argued that because of Communism's inability to come to terms with nationalism an ever-widening gap between national political cultures and Communist ways was opened up, which manifested itself in a cyclical pattern of action and reaction that centrifugally pulled the regimes ever farther from legitimacy. Although there were some observers, even Party élites, who were conscious of this phenomenon at the time (especially after the events of 1956), it was not until the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 that the antagonistic nature of the contradiction between nationalism and Communism became apparent for all to see.

The so-called 'normalization' of the post-invasion period only served to institutionalize the status quo and all of its inherent contradictions. There was nothing 'normal' about it at all: indeed, it was the restoration of abnormality.[1] This system, characterized by repression, cultural dogmatism and rigidity, continued through the introduction of Gorbachev's *glasnost* and *perestroika* in the mid-1980s.[2] As a result, although the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent 'normalization' provided the Kremlin with a decade of relative stability, the ban on structural political reform imposed in 1968 meant that pressure for change could only come outside the system, thus making it that much harder to control.[3]

This chapter will analyse where that pressure for change came from and how it manifested itself, particularly in its national forms. It will also look at the undercurrents of opposition in the 1970s and 1980s and examine how and why these bubbled up to the surface in an unprecedented explosion of nationalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It will be demonstrated how, despite years of experience to draw from, the Communist leaders continued to follow the same patterns of behaviour as their predecessors when trying to come to terms with nationalism. These observations will bring to light the fact that whereas previously the leaders had been able to overcome the ideological and political discrepancies created by the incongruence of nationalism and Communism, by the 1980s the contradictions within the system had become so acute and the leaders' grip on power so tenuous that the cycle was finally broken. The result was that nationalism played a significant role in the collapse of communism.

CAPTIVE MINDS

In the late 1960s and early 1970s a sense of resignation spread over many of the peoples of Eastern Europe as they came to realize that the possibilities for change were limited by the dictates of central Party policy. In 1956, and again in the mid-1960s, it had looked as if liberalization or some form of national Communism would be possible. But after the crackdown in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 the parameters of freedom were clearly defined by the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty. As a result, people tended to retreat to their own private worlds. A symbolic manifestation of this collective withdrawal was the marked rise in the number of country homes and urban garden plots. Although due in large part to the rise in urbanization, a lack of private property and a concerted government policy to encourage recreation, there is a certain metaphorical poignancy in the way that people throughout the Communist bloc took Voltaire's advice to heart and tended their own gardens. It was one area of their lives that they could control, one small patch of peaceful greenery in an increasingly impersonal and absurd system.

Nevertheless, as repressive as the system had become, the developments in the bloc since Stalin's death meant that although Stalinist techniques and phrases could be reimposed they would not go unchallenged. Although there was a submissive docility to the general population, it was increasingly evident that it was the rulers rather than the ruled who had captive minds.[4] Having completely discredited their position as heirs to the great traditions of the nation, the leaders showed themselves to be trapped by the constraints of the system and the rigid barriers of their increasingly hollow ideology. They still could rule by force, for they controlled the state and its means of coercion, but they lacked the power that comes through legitimacy since they held little sway over the nation.

Since the national Communist parties had been stripped of the mantle of protector of the nation, they had to seek legitimacy elsewhere. Increasingly they sought to stress their credentials of legitimation through 'substantive rationality'.[5] This shift in emphasis from defender of the nation to provider of the feast (or at least the daily bread) was aptly described by one observer of Gustav Husák's Czechoslovakia as the policy of three 'C's: coercion, consumerism and circuses.[6] This policy of consumer socialism catered to people's desire for material comfort: the implication was that, although sovereignty would be limited, the state would do its best to make life relatively comfortable. In Hungary this was referred to as 'goulash communism'.

> People came to feel that, under Kadar [who had pursued a relatively liberal economic policy since 1957], they were getting the best they could possibly expect from a Communist regime. This did not, however, imply any greater commitment to the ideological tenets in the name of which the regime ostensibly claimed to rule. It reflected rather a shift in the basis of the regime's own claim to legitimacy.[7]

POLAND: NATIONAL SYMBOLISM IN A WORKERS' REVOLUTION

Poland under Edward Gierek was a classic example of a regime that operated on the basis of a social contract of consumer socialism. The price of many goods, particularly meat and dairy products, was kept artificially low. In the early 1970s cars were mass-produced in an effort to create what one author describes as 'Fiat-Polski patriotism',[8] and thousands of new flats were constructed.[9]

Gierek tried to appeal to national sentiments as well. In 1971 he ordered the reconstruction of the royal castle (*Zamek Królewski*) in Warsaw which had been destroyed during the war. This, like the reconstruction of other historic sites, such as Malbork castle in the north, was reminiscent of the post-war reconstruction of Warsaw which was commissioned by the Communist government. In another small but symbolic gesture designed to demonstrate his regime's continuity with the past glories of Poland, he had the historical paintings of the Romantic nineteenth-century Polish painter Jan Matejko moved from the National Gallery to the Castle when construction was completed in 1974.[10]

But the extent to which Gierek could play the nationalist card was limited. Arousing Polish nationalism meant reviving memories of past struggles between Poland and its two traditional enemies, Germany and Russia. The Soviet Union was now a 'socialist brother', and after the visit of the West German Chancellor Willy Brandt to Poland in December 1970, and the signing of the 'normalization treaty' between the GDR and Poland that recognized the Oder–Neisse line, it was hard to portray West Germany as a threat.[11] One could no longer quote the old Polish adage, 'as long as the world exists a Pole shall not be a brother to a German.'

It was not only the nationalist appeal that was running into trouble. Castle reconstruction, flat building, the mass production of automobiles and fixed pricing all came at a heavy cost. The oil crisis of 1973 and the subsequent debt crises made consumer socialism an increasingly expensive

proposition. Poland became dependent on Soviet and Western loans. Austerity measures had to be introduced, but the December 1970 riots in Gdańsk, Gdynia and Szczecin (which cost Gomułka his job) showed the danger in raising prices – in this case by 20 per cent. The government attempted to impose price hikes by 60 per cent in June 1976, but these too were reversed after widespread rioting in Radom.

The riots of 1970 and 1976 were a reaction to the government's failure to hold up its half of the social contract. What was supposed to have been a new stage of 'developed socialism' was proving to be retarded. This begged the question: if the regime's only basis for legitimacy was substantive rationality, and that was betrayed, what did the Party stand for?[12] Furthermore, the strikes pitted Polish workers against what was supposed to be the Polish workers' state. By using force to put down the workers, the regime completely discredited itself in the eyes of its people. How could this happen in a country run by the Polish United Workers' Party? This question was articulated most cogently by Solidarity, which emerged out of the inter-factory strike committees in August 1980. It sought to fight for the rights of the workers and fill the yawning gap between the family and the nation.[13] By doing so, along with the Catholic Church and organizations like the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) it became one of the few representative structures in Polish society. Its legitimacy lay with the support that it democratically gained from the workers and farmers, and it also sought to gain legitimacy as the rightful spokesman for the nation as a whole. This was reflected in its use of religious and national symbols.

As Timothy Garton Ash observed, the Church and the nation held strong popular appeal during the troubled times of the 1970s. 'People lifted their heads from the hopeless queues and the empty shelves to symbolic, patriotic and utopian goals – to the cross and the eagle.'[14] Solidarity tried to satisfy both yearnings.

What had begun as an economic protest became a social protest, and the social protest was, at its core, a moral one.[15] Because this movement had such a broad base of support (including members of the Party) and was directed against the state in defence of the nation, it was simultaneously a national protest. The soul of the nation was the battlefield, and national symbols were the weapons. Control of the present was fought out in terms of control over the past. As one contemporary observer noted, 'Each side, calling for unity, considers itself the exclusive representative for the entire nation and refers back to the same traditions to cement their claim.'[16]

In a society where throughout the previous two centuries state institutions had been, for the most part, the instruments of foreign oppression,

control of the state was often anathema to control of the nation. In that respect, the Polish case clearly illustrates the importance of the distinction between state and nation made in Chapter 1. As one Polish political scientist puts it: 'The "mere state" is an artefact, a soulless machine, while a nation is a community held together by ties of common history and by the common political will to preserve, or regain, its independent statehood.'[17] The state/nation distinction was evident in the conflict between the PUWP and Solidarity.

The ties of common history in Polish society had long been preserved by the Catholic Church. As a result, the Church was a central element in any movement which sought popular legitimacy. Religious imagery was evident at many Solidarity functions. Lech Walesa wore a picture of the Black Madonna of Częstochowa[18] as a lapel badge, and her portrait hung outside the Lenin shipyards in Gdańsk during the strikes. Mass was said at many Solidarity rallies, and pictures of Karol Wojtyła, elected as Pope John Paul II in October 1978, were frequently in evidence.

The Communist authorities had tried to ally themselves to the Church in the past. It will be recalled from Chapter 5 that one of Gomułka's first actions on coming to power was to release Cardinal Wyszynski. The crowds which greeted the Cardinal during his travels around Poland between 1957 and 1966 in the buildup to the 1966 millennium celebrations of the founding of the Catholic Church (also known as the Great Novena) demonstrated the extent to which he and the Church were powerful mobilizing symbols. Indeed, the depth of public support shown to him made his crusade a 'travelling referendum on the Polish Communist regime'.[19]

An even more dramatic referendum came with the visit of Pope John Paul II to Poland in June 1979. The message of truth and solidarity which he preached presented a direct challenge to the state authorities, and clearly showed the gulf that existed between the state and its people.

The one rather tenuous aspect of the country's history where the Communists felt that they could gain credibility was by stressing their links to Poland's military heroes, particularly Marshal Józef Piłsudski. For example, in 1978 the national holiday of 7 November (the celebration of the October revolution in the Gregorian calendar) was officially changed to 11 November (the day that Piłsudski had begun acting as provisional Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish republic).[20] This is ironic, as in 1918 the Communist parties[21] had been adamantly opposed to independence. The decision to celebrate the 11th as a national holiday instead of the 7th was therefore a significant break with past practices and a clear attempt by the regime to use commonly accepted national symbols to gain legitimacy.

There was considerable debate over the 3 May national holiday as well. The official holiday was 1 May, but 3 May was the commemoration of the anniversary of the 1791 constitution.[22] Celebrations of the parallel holidays were often in competition, particularly in May 1981.[23]

The internal contradictions of Polish society were resolved by force with the imposition of Martial Law on 13 December 1981. Ironically, even here the country's new leader, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, tried to stress his national credentials. In his address to the nation on 13 December he quoted the first lines of the national anthem (often sung at Solidarity rallies) that 'as long as we live Poland is not lost'.

In a situation analogous to the post-coup period in Czechoslovakia in 1948 (analysed in Chapter 4), after the imposition of Martial Law and the creation of the (interestingly named) Military Council of National Salvation, more, not less, attention was paid to national symbolism. This would suggest that, despite the overwhelming show of force, Jaruzelski was very conscious of the need for legitimacy. He tried to portray himself as a new Piłsudski, appealing to the patriotism of the Polish army.[24] In fact, there was a Piłsudski renaissance of sorts. In the late 1980s, to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of Poland's regaining of independence, the authorities issued a special coin and postage stamp featuring Piłsudski. In addition, a small shipyard in Gdańsk and a number of streets in several provincial towns were named after him.[25]

Even before the imposition of Martial Law, Jaruzelski had tried to demonstrate his links with Poland's military history. During the May Day celebrations in 1981 he and the First Secretary, Stanisław Kania, did not follow the usual route past the Palace of Culture but instead marched past the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.[26] He also appealed to the nationalist and military constituency by trying (unsuccessfully) in 1983 to get back from England the remains of wartime Commander-in-Chief and Prime Minister Władysław Sikorski – who since 1945 had been considered a non-person by the state.[27]

But this type of superficial patriotism rang hollow. Jaruzelski's tacit support for the rather shady national socialist Grunwald Patriotic Union (who disliked KOR, 'national nihilism', Jews and 'decadence', yet professed to be patriots and supporters of the Church and state)[28] and his wholehearted support for the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth ('a loosely knit and artificially blown up mass organization of Jaruzelski regime supporters')[29] did little to win him appeal among the masses. These bodies characterized the crudest and most synthetic aspects of Polish nationalism.

The true essence of the nation lay elsewhere. As Pope John Paul II wrote in an encyclical about human labour: 'The history of our nation – condemned many times to death – proves that it has survived and

preserved its identity, not because of physical strength, but exclusively because of its own culture.'[30] That culture was the receptacle of a national identity and collective consciousness based on traditions and values which the Communist Party and state, despite their efforts to the contrary, threatened rather than upheld. It was a culture which, in the face of adversity, managed to endure; and it helped to create conditions that softened up the ground to the extent that Poland was one of the most fertile climates for the changes which were afforded by Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika.*

ATTEMPTS AT STRENGTHENING NATIONALIST CREDENTIALS

Although the imposition of Martial Law marked the clinical death of Marxist ideology in Poland and exposed the ageing members of the PUWP as emperors with no clothes, there were other pretenders to the national Communist thrones in Eastern Europe who, in a pinch, were still willing to wrap themselves in the nationalist mantle. For many leaders, this was the only remaining source of legitimacy when economic growth rates declined.

However, in many Communist states, stressing links to the past risked opening old wounds, especially in those Communist countries with sizeable national minorities and/or long-standing historical grievances with their neighbours. This was fundamentally un-Marxist and potentially destabilizing: 'In regarding the consolidation of the state as synonymous with the well-being of their ethnic group, and by treating ethnic minorities as "objectively different", East European élites strengthened ethnic divisions and guaranteed that minority nationalism would be passionate and exclusionary.'[31] Ironically, therefore, whereas in the 1930s and early 1940s Communism had gained considerable support from minorities and those who opposed Fascism, by the 1970s (as a result of the post-war trend towards officially sanctioned national Communism) the appeal of Communism for many was that it preserved the status of the majority *ethnie.*

Although this changed to some extent when all Eastern European states (with the exception of Albania) became signatories to the Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975, on the whole their human-rights records were abysmal. This stemmed in large part from the traditional Marxist notion that individualism was bourgeois; attention should instead be on the greater good – usually the dominant nationality. It also had a great deal to do with the fact that singling out minorities (often Jews and Roma)[32] was

an easy way to win popular support. As a result, nationalism became more and more a part of mainstream Communism.

In Albania, Enver Hoxha used historical figures like the fifteenth-century hero George Kastrioti-Skenderberg to build up a type of national Communism which associated his cult of personality with the greatness of past heroes. Invariably these figures had fought for Albania's independence – a reflection of Hoxha's fiercely independent stand within the Communist bloc.[33]

In East Germany, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) spent a great deal of effort in appropriating German history for the purpose of political legitimization and in presenting the GDR as the true inheritor of all positive German historical traditions.[34] For example, in 1980 the selected works of Carl von Clausewitz were published. In the same year an equestrian statue of Frederick the Great was re-erected on Unter den Linden. In 1982 the life and works of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe were lauded, and similar attention was given to Richard Wagner. One of the most celebrated 'rehabilitations' was in 1983, when the 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther was celebrated with great fanfare.[35] In these and other events, the SED claimed to be more German than the West Germans, who were accused of letting their cultural history be eroded by Western influences. In an effort to strengthen their credentials, they stressed 'German values' that were coterminous with socialist ones (order, hard work, discipline, a sense of community).[36] But this could only go so far. As Rigby and Feher point out, 'legitimacy cannot be adequately supported by social policy alone; normative satisfaction must come from areas in which the regime is constrained from taking effective action by its own legitimating ideology, as well as by political limitations'.[37]

In Hungary, Janos Kadar knew that if he was going to gain popular support by acting as protector of the national culture, he had to speak for all Hungarians – which included that third of the population that lived outside Hungary in the historic, pre-Trianon Treaty (1920) lands of St Stephen (Transylvania, Slovakia and Vojvodina). Consequently the thousandth anniversary of St Stephen's birth was celebrated with great fanfare on 20 August 1970.[38] Kadar's regime also officially sponsored the 250th anniversary of the Battle of Mohacs in 1976 and allowed debates on the status of Hungarians in Slovakia and Transylvania to be reopened.

A great deal of effort went into securing the return of the crown of St Stephen. The crown is a symbol of Hungarian sovereignty, the link between Church and State, and has deep historical patriotic significance, as St Stephen ruled over Greater Hungary. The king's legitimacy over the nation rested in the crown: the Communists hoped that they could gain

that sense of national legitimacy by getting it back.[39] The crown and all the coronation regalia (sword, mantle, orb and sceptre) were returned by the United States (who had held them for safe keeping during the Second World War) in a solemn ceremony in the Hungarian parliament on 6 January 1978.[40] But the return of the crown was little more than symbolic, as Kadar, conscious of the lesson of 1956, was restrained by the limits of socialist internationalism, and therefore unable to press too hard in forwarding the rights of Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia and Yugoslavia.

Nikolai Ceauşescu's more independent position in the bloc allowed him to pursue a much more heavy-handed nationalist agenda. He stressed the notion of Romania for Romanians to the point of open conflict with the Hungarian minority, particularly in Transylvania. For example, in 1983 there were officially sponsored events to mark the 75th anniversary of the annexation of Transylvania to Romania. The situation became particularly acute in 1988, when Ceauşescu (who equated himself with Michael the Brave) began destroying Hungarian villages in Transylvania as part of his 'systemization' process.[41]

Minorities were also a bone of contention between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. There the question concerned the status of Macedonians in Pirin Macedonia (which Bulgaria maintained did not exist). Bulgaria did not recognize the Macedonians as a national minority, rather as Bulgarians, and also considered the Macedonian language as a dialect of Bulgarian. In March 1978 the Zhivkov government sponsored massive centennial celebrations in commemoration of the Treaty of San Stefano. The treaty, which liberated Bulgaria from the Turks in 1878, assigned all of Pirin Macedonia to Bulgaria. To some extent this was a function of Moscow-prodded agitation against Yugoslavia;[42] but beyond that the 1978 celebrations contained a heavy dose of nostalgic revisionism in favour of the recreation of a Greater Bulgaria. The sentiment was exaggerated in the October 1981 celebration of the 1,300th anniversary of the Bulgarian nation,[43] an unabashed attempt to portray the Communist leadership as the heirs to the great traditions of the nation. One of the mottos of the anniversary was 'We are Building the Fourteenth Century of Bulgaria'. No doubt there were cynics in the crowd who pointed out that a motto more reflective of conditions in Bulgaria in the 1980s would have been achieved by leaving out the words 'the' and 'of'.

Burgeoning Bulgarian nationalism affected the country's minorities as well as its neighbours. Turks and Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks) together made up more than 10 per cent of the population. In the early 1980s the government put considerable pressure on the minorities to assimilate.

This included a campaign (known as the 'regenerative process') of forced name-changes (mainly in 1984 and 1985), the curtailing of Turkish-language publishing, teaching and broadcasting and the transformation of Islamic cemeteries into Christian ones.[44] The government stressed mono-ethnicity as a positive characteristic,[45] saying that such moves were

> drawing the reactionary Turkish influence from our co-citizens so that they can live without contradiction ... With full justice we can say that we are returning to our Bulgarian family our dear brothers and sisters for whom the conqueror had darkened the national consciousness for centuries. The people is blood of our blood, flesh of our flesh.[46]

Appeals to blood and flesh were a long way from Marxism. This was, as one observer has put it, 'xenophobic communism'. ' "Xenophobic communism" is besieged communism in quest of the lowest national common denominator ... what makes "xenophobic communism" *sui generis* is the fact that its ideological enemies are indistinguishable from its national ones.'[47] This was raw nationalism, and, like consumerism, it could keep the regimes going for a while; but the contradiction which it posed to socialist internationalism threatened eventually to break down the Communist system. The effect of similar contradictions were evident in the most multinational socialist state, Yugoslavia.

YUGOSLAVIA

The problem of nationalism in Yugoslavia centred around constitutional and economic issues. But, as has already been noted (particularly in the case of the Soviet Union), these issues seldom operate in isolation; and as debates in these areas unfolded, deeper cultural and ethnic animosities were dredged up. This is not to say that conflict in Yugoslavia was inevitable, due to deep-seated, even primordial, cultural differences. Rather, the use of nationalism in Yugoslav politics was very much a function of instrumental élite behaviour within and among the republics. As Gary Bertsch summarizes when analysing mass behaviour and public opinion in Yugoslavia in the late 1960s:

> National feelings lay beneath the surface and did not re-emerge until portions of the leadership seized upon deep-seated economic, political, and status frustrations and started to account for them in national terms. Since the élite interpretations of the situation seemed plausible, increasing numbers of people began to accept and use the national-based explanations as release mechanisms to vent their own frustrations.[48]

This would be the case again in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the early 1990s.[49] It was not supposed to have been that way.

With a slight variation on Marxism, the Yugoslav Communists believed that with the growth of socialism and the elimination of inequality, nationalism would not necessarily die out but would at least be neutralized. Like Lenin, they thought that the most sound way of recognizing nationalism while being able to control it was through a federal structure. The federal formula had been devised during the Second World War by the Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation (AVNOJ). Despite, or perhaps because of, numerous constitutional changes,[50] the balance of power between communal republican and federal institutions was never satisfactorily or definitively resolved in the post-war period. Furthermore, although constitutional changes were introduced to institutionalize new channels for conflict resolution, as in the Soviet Union, the resulting arrangements were structured in such a way that they focused debate on administrative units defined territorially, thereby unwittingly reducing many issues to questions of ethnicity rather than federal administration. As a result, the solution became part of the problem.

> It has always been hoped that workers' self-management would create communities of economic interest, based on proletarian solidarity, which would be able to combat particularistic nationalism. This theory did not consider sufficiently that the workers participating in self-management and in various forms of self-government were all members of a discrete nationality and tended to organize their area of competence along ethnic lines.[51]

The 'self' in self-management came to be defined ethnically. This was an unintended side-effect of Tito's attempt to assuage calls for pluralism by offering regional pluralization (decentralization to regional Communist élites) in place of political pluralization (the institution of multiparty democracy). This sowed the seeds of its own destruction as it prevented the development of any popularly based parties that transcended ethnic lines.[52]

Even the Communist Party was organized along ethnic lines. As the name given to the Party in 1952 suggests, the Yugoslav Communist Party was a League of Communists (YLC). As a result, even inter-Party debates took on a national element. This became even more the case after the downfall of the conservative wing of the League and its leader Vice President Alexander Rankovic in 1966. More power was given to the Council of Nationalities, including the right of approval for all legislation. After 1967, republican Party organizations were convened before the Party Congress of the YLC, and therefore fulfilled more than a rubber-stamp function.

As part of this trend (in a course of events reminiscent of the collapse of the *Gesamtpartei*), it was agreed at the 9th Party Congress in 1969 that the League statutes would separate the party from the state. This reduced the power of the League organs and gave more administrative latitude to the republics. It also led to more squabbling, as now state bureaucratic as well as Party executive organs became the battleground for inter-republican interests.

Yugoslavia's federal arrangement was complicated by the fact that the republics were not ethnically homogeneous. There were more than half a million Serbs in Croatia (12 per cent of the population), more than a million Serbs in Vojvodina (more than 50 per cent of the population), and the population of Kosovo was more than 80 per cent ethnic Albanian. There was a sizeable Albanian population in Macedonia (20 per cent), and Muslims[53] comprised 13 per cent of the population of Montenegro. The most ethnically heterogeneous republic was Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the population, in 1981, was 44 per cent Muslim, 33 per cent Serb and 17 per cent Croat.[54] Ethnicity was thus a factor in intra- as well as inter-republican politics. More autonomy for the republics usually meant more control for the majority ethnic group. As in the Soviet Union, political leaders defending local and economic interests were regarded (and increasingly saw themselves) as national leaders defending vital national interests.[55] This often led to a situation where the minorities felt threatened, causing them to turn to their extra-republican titular majority for support. Nationalism and ethnicity, strengthened by decentralization, therefore not only threatened to break the republics away from the control of the federal government (and fundamentally redress the basis of the Yugoslav federal arrangement), but it also threatened the territorial integrity and internal stability of the individual republics.

Ironically, therefore, what was occurring in Yugoslavia was a microcosm of the process that Tito had initiated in the Communist bloc. For the sake of efficiency and in order to take into account national identity, units of the whole were being encouraged to pursue their own paths. But just as 'many roads to socialism' threatened the integrity of the Communist bloc, taking decentralization and republican self-management to its logical end in Yugoslavia threatened the existence of the federation.

As in the post-war period, stressing 'Yugoslavism' was one alternative. Using force against those who challenged 'socialist patriotism', as was the case in the crackdown against the Albanian population in Kosovo in 1968 and 1981, was another.[56]

But both of these options had their limitations. Using force to solve inter-republican disputes risked civil war. In a way, stressing 'Yugoslavism'

was almost as fractious. 'Yugoslavism' held appeal for those who felt either that the federal government represented their interests or, alternatively, that their republican administration did not. Although 'Yugoslavism' was adopted by many citizens (at least as half of a dual identity), it was felt most strongly by those who were national minorities. As 40 per cent of Serbs lived outside Serbia, it was they who felt the closest affinity to the federal system (and its capital in Belgrade) and, at the same time, often felt marginalized in republics other than Serbia-Montenegro. As a result, for many Serbs and non-Serbs 'Yugoslavism' (rightly or wrongly) became synonymous with defending Serbian interests. This became most apparent in the late 1980s when Slobodan Milosovic rose to power on a nationalist and 'unitarist' platform, but it was also evident in federal economic relations earlier on.

The leaders of the northern regions (Slovenia, Croatia, and Vojvodina) favoured devolution of power as they regarded the centralized system as a drag on their development. They resented having to share their wealth – particularly their hard currency – with the South (a policy which was initiated under the Kidric plan of 1945), and they were unhappy about the amount of money which they considered was wasted through the establishment of inefficient 'political factories'. They were also irked by the amount of income which they had to transfer to the poorer republics through the Federal Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Republics and Kosovo (FADURK) which was set up in 1965. This was evident in the prolonged dispute in 1970 over the refinancing of FADURK loans.[57] They wanted more liberalization of banking,[58] and felt that growth of firms in Belgrade offered proof that business in the capital had gained a privileged position as a result of the intervention of the federal government.[59]

For their part, the conservative leaders of the less-developed South sought to block any moves which would undermine the centralized system which they regarded as a safeguard for maintaining a relative amount of parity between the republics. They also attributed the discrepancy of wealth between north and south to the north's exploitation of southern raw materials, which were used in the light and consumer industries that generated the foreign capital which Slovenia and Croatia were so keen to retain.

Nevertheless, as Sabrina Ramet points out, the issue was not a cut-and-dried question of North versus South along economic grounds. 'The Croats and Slovenes transformed economic issues – decentralization of economic decision making, dismantling of central planning, and curtailment of aid to unprofitable enterprises in the south – into political issues – opposition to Serbian hegemony and support of "liberalization"'.[60]

The argument in 1969 between Slovenia and the federal government concerning the failure of the Federal Executive Council to properly support a proposal to the World Bank for road construction between Slovenia and Austria was a case in point.[61] So too were open disagreements between Zagreb and Belgrade on a number of issues. In the latter case, economic disagreement reopened historic debates about relations between Croats and Serbs.

The Croats, the highest earners of foreign capital in Yugoslavia, contested the right of the central government to take the foreign currency which Croatia earned and exchange it in the National Bank (in Belgrade) for dinars. The Croatian government felt not only that the rate of exchange was unfair but that the money should be retained by Croatia for its own investment purposes. This crisis stirred up deeper issues, like the language question (which had been brewing since a major row in 1967 over the purity of the Croatian language[62]), abolition of the Federal tax structure, debates about past atrocities, rehabilitation of Croatian national heroes (including King Petar Kresimir IV, Stejpan Radic founder of the Croatian peasant party and particularly Josip Juraj Jelacic, hero of the 1848 revolution),[63] restoration of the pre-Communist Croatian flag, use of Croatian as the language of command in Croatian regiments and home-basing of Croatian recruits. Some went so far as to call for a seat for Croatia in the UN and even independence. They wanted to build socialism in one republic, on their own terms.[64] This was not a movement involving only students and the intelligentsia. As had been the case in Czechoslovakia in 1968, calls for reform had the support of the republican bureaucracy. Many members of the Communist Party even joined the Matica Hrvatska (the Croatian nationalist cultural and publishing organization). It is also significant that '*Nasa lijepa Domovina*' – a song long banned in Croatia because of its association with the Fascist Ustashi – was not only tolerated but was adopted by the Communists as the Croatian national anthem.[65] As in other Eastern European countries and Soviet republics, the Catholic Church (which, as in Poland, played the role of protector of the nation[66]) also became involved in the nationalist movement.

The situation came to a head in the 'Croatian Spring' of 1971, culminating in student protests in Zagreb in December. Although republican leaders (both Croats and Serbs) were purged, the roots of the problem were not removed. By the constitutional amendments of June 1971 the Presidency of Yugoslavia became collective.[67] A type of affirmative action was introduced to ensure that there was relatively equitable representation of the country's nationalities in almost every state office including the armed forces. This only served to institutionalize political correctness

ad absurdum in all levels of government. Under amendment 33 of the 1971 constitution, the so-called 'Coordinating principle', the republics and autonomous provinces were allowed to participate directly in the work of all federal government organs. Since, under this system, there had to be prior consultation on almost every issue, the system went from being one of checks and balances to one of complete gridlock. Indeed, the powers of the federal government were limited to such an extent that they only really had jurisdiction over national defence, international relations, preservation of the unity of the Yugoslav market and protecting the foundations of the socialist system.[68] Furthermore, through the 1974 constitution the federal units gained quasi-federal autonomy.[69] By the 1980s each federal unit had its own Bureau of Foreign Relations and its own Coordination Commission for Economic Relations abroad; bilateral contacts between Yugoslavia's federal units and foreign states became commonplace.[70]

This system could work to an extent when Tito played the role of final arbiter. But when he died its contradictions were laid bare. As one contemporary wrote: 'By its very nature, the Yugoslav decision-making process is highly conflictual. Rather than repressing regional economic and nationality conflicts, the communist leadership has given them institutional expression.'[71] This would become painfully obvious by the late 1980s and even more graphic with the violent break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

BREZHNEV

Although the fissures that were splitting Yugoslavia were considerably deeper than those which were evident in the Soviet Union, by the mid-1970s it was becoming increasingly apparent that there were also cracks below the surface in the USSR. Although Leonid Brezhnev proclaimed in a speech on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the USSR in 1972 that 'the national question, as it came down to us from the past, has been resolved completely, definitely and irrevocably',[72] all was not well.

Brezhnev's claim that a new historical community of Soviet people had become a reality[73] (a claim also made in the preamble to the 1977 constitution) was a gross exaggeration. Even where a Soviet culture had taken root, nationalism had not disappeared. Communism had, irrefutably, led to a narrowing of cultural differences. Common planning and production techniques created similarities across the Union. To a great extent, styles of architecture and clothing became standardized and curriculum and mass culture became 'Sovietized'. Increasingly Russian came to be used as a

lingua franca. Common public healthcare, universal education, social security, guaranteed work opportunities, improvements in mass transportation and an increase in public recreation facilities went a long way in levelling many of the previous disparities between men and women and between urban and rural areas.

But despite the levelling of class and gender, town and country there was not a correspondingly significant diminution of ethnic and national divisions. Closer inter-ethnic contact (through migration, the media, education and the armed forces) did not necessarily lead to assimilation. For example, by 1979 (except for Armenia at 66 per cent and Tadzhikistan at 78 per cent) in all of the Soviet republics at least 80 per cent of the titular nationality lived within their own republic.[74] Indeed in many cases assimilation strengthened national particularism as many people came to realize not only how different they were from members of other Soviet nationalities but that the concept of proletarian internationalism was a rather empty vessel. Although Brezhnev claimed that Soviet culture was 'socialist in content, diverse in its national forms and internationalist in its spirit'[75] on the whole, it was Soviet in form but meaningless in content. By being all things to all peoples it meant very little to almost anybody. As S. Enders Wimbush pointedly remarks in reference to the Central Asian republics: 'Common sense suggests that 14 centuries of brilliant Irano-Turkic–Islamic culture cannot be quickly swept away by 68 years of Russian-dominated Marxist–Leninist pseudo-culture, among whose highest offerings – by the Soviets' own admission – figure the complete works of Leonid I. Brezhnev.'[76] The same held true for other nationalities, particularly in the Baltics and the Causcasus, who had long and rich histories.

It is interesting to note that Brezhnev seems to have been somewhat sensitive to this fact. In a statement from the same speech cited above he makes the remarkable admission that:

> It should not be forgotten that nationalistic prejudices and exaggerated manifestations of national feeling are extremely tenacious phenomena that are deeply embedded in the psychology of people with insufficient political maturity. These prejudices continue to exist even in conditions in which objective preconditions for any antagonism in relations between nations have long since ceased to exist.[77]

This is revealing, for it suggests that if nationalism manifested itself in the Soviet Union it was due either to political immaturity (which would be a damning admission after fifty years of Soviet socialism) or because of some deep-seeded 'prejudices' that even the wonders of the Soviet system could not solve.

What Brezhnev failed to take into account was that the so-called 'conditions in which objective preconditions for any antagonism in relations between nations' had *not* 'long ceased to exist' within the Soviet context. Indeed, as has been pointed out in Chapters 3 and 5, such antagonisms were in many cases exacerbated by the Soviet system.

Firstly Sovietization, often equated with Russification, led to reactive nationalism as people strove to accentuate their cultural uniqueness in order to prevent the erosion of their national identity.[78] This reactive nationalism was due in many cases to the in-built prejudices of the Soviet system which precluded equality for all national groups. Glass ceilings in the military and state bureaucracy had the effect of creating 'enforced parochialism'.[79] Nationalities became more conscious of their uniqueness because they were constantly treated as if they were different and in many cases second class.

Paradoxically, as has been demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 5, the system, while marginalizing these peoples, also allowed them to preserve and in some cases develop their national identities. This included the designation of one's ethnicity in one's passport, the preservation of national forms, history and folklore (which, for example, allowed for the perpetuation of folk festivals in the Baltic republics) and the use of national languages in republican schools and parliaments.

Secondly, as was the case among Yugoslav republics and some of the People's Democracies (particularly Romania's relations with Comecon), attempts at levelling standards throughout the Union led to a heightened sense of economic nationalism among those states that felt that they were being short-changed by the system. This left the central government in a precarious position, for the lack of development in the poorer republics reinforced traditional national culture, while the process of development in the more affluent ones resulted in a new type of intense, urban-centred ethnic identity (particularly in the Baltic republics).[80] As noted in the case of Yugoslavia, Communism may well have been able to reduce economic inequalities within republics but it did not necessarily reduce inequalities between them.

In these two respects Communism, in the Soviet context, unwittingly created many of the prerequisites for the development of national consciousness, noted in the discussion of the Industrial and French revolutions in Chapter 1. Urbanization, the growth of literacy and a reaction to a foreign culture led to a rise in national consciousness among what were now socially mobile and well-educated populations. These factors, coupled with dissatisfaction over uneven development, an affinity with a clearly defined territory and a sense of common linguistic and cultural identity

(in many cases also a common historical grievance) all combined to raise national consciousness in many Soviet republics.

Thirdly, 'Sovietization' led to a crisis of identity among those people (including Russians in ever-increasing numbers) who may not have had a nationalistic affinity to their titular ethnic group yet could not identify with proletarian internationalism and therefore felt somewhat rootless in the Soviet Union. By the late 1970s many of the aspects of Communism which had made it a powerful identity principle had lost their appeal. Many of its prophets had been debunked and excommunicated. It was hard to justifiably speak of a new historical community of Soviet people when that country's history, only three generations old, had been rewritten and reinterpreted so many times. There were few elements of a supra-national identity which were common to all ethnic groups of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, if socialism was to have been the basis of a new community, and yet that ideological and economic experiment was failing (even by its leaders' own admission), what was the basis of the common consciousness? Conversely, if socialism had now been achieved, where was the pay-off? Were lengthy queues, shoddy products, and polluted environments the only results of forty years of socialism? People had been promised a new Jerusalem for so long, yet all they saw were dark satanic mills. 'The longed-for modernisation was never achieved... scientific socialism just could not cope with science.'[81] The young in particular were disaffected by what they saw as a world of little opportunity and brazen hypocrisy. Their today was the tomorrow that their parents had been promised one generation earlier. Not only did the present look bleak, the future didn't seem to hold much potential either. Ironically, therefore, it was this generation, which had grown up under Communism, which was most critical of the system. Those who had exposure to the West through travel, television, radios and pop culture saw 'with their own eyes the noxious evil of the capitalist West – and they rather liked it'.[82] This did not necessarily make them nationalistic, but it hardened their opposition to the *status quo*. As there were few avenues for dissent, just as in the mid-nineteenth century in Central Europe and during the October Revolution in the Russian empire, nationalism became a mobilizing force for change.

ANDROPOV

Yuri Andropov came to power in November 1982 pledging to solve the outstanding problems left over from yesterday.[83] One of the main areas that he set out to tackle was the degeneracy, mismanagement and lack of

productivity that he attributed to attempts by the leaders and bureaucracies of the national republics to either subvert unpopular policies or to enrich the regions at the expense of the central government.[84] This led him straight into the nationalities question.

In his keynote address on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the USSR, he went beyond Brezhnev's assertion that the nationalities question had been 'solved successfully, solved finally and irrevocably' by proclaiming that 'for the first time in history, the multinational composition of a country has been changed from a position of weakness to a position of strength'.[85] But despite this certitude, Andropov, like Brezhnev, also sounded a note of caution. He warned:

> The successes in resolving the nationalities question certainly do not mean that all the problems engendered by the very fact of life and work of numerous nations and nationalities in the framework of a single state have disappeared. This is hardly possible as long as nations exist, as long as there are national distinctions. And they will exist for a long time, much longer than class distinctions.[86]

This, like Brezhnev's disclaimer of five years previously, is extremely significant in terms of the evolution of socialist theory on the nationalities question. What Andropov was very clearly saying is that nations and national distinctions have an identity independent of class. If this is true, then nationalism is not an epiphenomenon of capitalism. Presumably nationalism can therefore be present within the Communist system. This should not be a revelation to the reader as it has been the contention of the previous four chapters. What is interesting, however, is that by the 1980s the Communist leaders were being forced to voice this conclusion themselves.

The fact that Andropov and others spent a great deal of time looking at ways of eradicating or at least calming 'national arrogance and disrespect'[87] would suggest that such characteristics still existed. Indeed, he admitted that nationalism is 'sometimes nourished by our own mistakes in work'.[88] However, Andropov's term in office was too short to significantly address these mistakes. The same can be said for his short-lived successor, Konstantin Chernenko, who, in a keynote address to the Central Committee in June 1983 (before he became General Secretary) at least recognized the fact that 'the resolution of the nationality question as it has been handed down to us from the past in no way means that this question has been removed from the agenda altogether'.[89] As his successor, Mikhail Gorbachev, would discover, this proved to be a prophetic understatement.

GORBACHEV AND THE WINDS OF CHANGE

Gorbachev, who became General Secretary of the CPSU on 14 March 1985, had little experience in dealing with nationalities problems. Unlike most of his predecessors, he had never been posted to a non-Russian republic. His views on the subject were therefore rather theoretical. His ideas on solving the nationalities problem followed a very Marxist line, namely that the diminished inequality and increased prosperity which could be brought about by economic change (*perestroika*) would reduce national differences.

Nationalism was not initially regarded by Gorbachev as being a significant threat in its own right. In fact, at the 27th Congress of the CPSU in March 1986 he boldly stated that:

> The solution to the nationalities question is an outstanding accomplishment of socialism. The victory of the October Revolution forever put an end to national oppression and inequality among nations and ethnic groups... Ethnic conflicts became a thing of the past, and fraternal friendship, close co-operation and mutual assistance of all peoples of the USSR became a way of life.[90]

However, like Andropov, he soon came to regard nationalism as a threat which could limit the prerogatives of central government officials who were trying to carry out reform.[91] He felt that reform necessitated administrative restructuring at the republican level. On the one hand, he embraced the policy of republican self-management (*khozrachet*). On the other, he felt that this policy could only work if corrupt and 'bureaucratically nationalist' forces were rooted out. This trapped him in the same dilemma that Khruschev had faced in the late 1950s and which Tito had muddled through in the late 1960s. As Motyl points out:

> To the extent that, as most economists argue, centralization inevitably leads to crisis-like situations demanding economic decentralization as a cure, the Soviet state would appear to be caught in a vicious circle of its own making. Just as decentralization effectively addresses the problems inherent in economic centralization, so, too, it inevitably sets loose forces that threaten the stability of the system.[92]

The solution, in Gorbachev's eyes, was to allow for decentralization but to replace the leaders who were abusing their positions. This was like stirring up a hornet's nest. Leaders of several republics (for example Sh. Rashidov in Uzbekistan, G. Aliev in Azerbaijan, D. Kunaev in Kazakhstan and V. Shcherbitsky in Ukraine) had developed such wide

networks of personal control based on patronage and nepotism that they, and the élites which benefited from this system, had a lot to lose from reform. Since these leaders and élites stressed their national credentials in order to win popular support, any move to depose them became a national and not merely an administrative issue.

Three weeks after Gorbachev became General Secretary, several Estonian Communist Party officials were expelled from the Party on charges of corruption. Similar allegations were levelled against members of the Communist Party of Georgia in May 1985. The anti-corruption drive grew throughout 1985 and 1986, particularly in Central Asia. Indeed by 1987 all five first secretaries of the Central Asian republics were replaced for one reason or another. The most high-profile case was the dismissal of Dinmukhammed Kunaev from the position of First Party Secretary in Kazakhstan in December 1986. This was met by rioting in the streets of Almaty. The wrath of the Kazakhs was raised, not only by his dismissal, but by the fact that he was replaced by a Russian, Gennady Kolbin.

The riots in Kazakhstan seem to have jolted Gorbachev awake to the complexities and potentially destabilizing effects of the nationalities problem. As he attributed the degeneracy of the nationalities situation to 'a violation of the Leninist principles of the nationalities policy'[93] his solution was to look back to the Leninist model of federation for inspiration. In his speech on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution he said 'Let us act in a Leninist way: Let us do all we can to develop the potential of every nation, of every one of the Soviet peoples.'[94] His interpretation of Lenin's approach to federalism led him to advocate the simultaneous development of a strong centre and strong republics. He also called for unity with national diversity. Concretely, as Gorbachev proposed to the 19th Extraordinary CPSU Conference on 28 June 1988, this would involve limiting the role of the Party, empowering the Soviets, allowing some multi-candidate elections, increasing the powers of local government, creating a new Congress of People's Deputies, and establishing the post of President.

These policies echo Lenin's concurrent support of self-determination and federalism and Khruschev's policy (first practised by Stalin) of simultaneously encouraging 'flourishing' and 'drawing together'. But this time around, implementing such a 'dialectical' policy was infinitely more difficult as the republics were now much more nationally conscious and they had little faith in the central government whose claims to legitimacy were becoming increasingly weak. For many republics, a plan for federation that contained a strong centre was unacceptable as it seemed to offer too

little, while a plan that left little authority to the central government seemed to make the federation superfluous.[95]

Furthermore, federalism was only part of a much bigger package. 'In the national republics and in Moscow, the extension of glasnost to the national question opened the door to an ever-widening public discussion of highly sensitive issues, a virtual outpouring of long-suppressed resentments, and growing demands for policy changes.'[96] This included calls to fill in the 'blank pages' of Soviet history. The impact was particularly strong in the Baltic republics, where a more open dialogue on the 'secret' Molotov–Ribbentrop pact called into question the legality of the annexation of the three republics. Other nationalities, like the Jews and Armenians, with historical grievances against the central government also began to raise previously taboo issues. Some of the most high-profile demonstrations were held by the Crimean Tartars, who staged protests in Moscow, Ukraine and Uzbekistan to draw attention to the mass deportations which they had suffered under Stalin.

Gorbachev's statements and policies had an effect as dramatic as, but even more widespread than Khruschev's secret speech. By contributing to the erosion of the core values and institutions which had long served as the integrating forces in the Soviet multinational system, Gorbachev's reforms brought into question the entire definition of the Soviet political community, and provoked a reassessment of the nature and future of the Soviet federation and the whole Communist bloc.

One of the most fundamental reassessments was Communism's relationship with the West. As early as the 27th Party Congress in 1986 Gorbachev spoke of maintaining and developing relations between the USSR and capitalist states 'on a basis of peaceful coexistence and businesslike, mutually beneficial co-operation'.[97] This was not just talk. Several summits were held with the Americans, Gorbachev and other senior officials held frequent contacts with world leaders, progress was made on nuclear disarmament and arms control issues and greater attention was paid to human rights, especially within the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Accommodation with the West allowed for a reassessment of relations with the Eastern bloc. By the late 1970s the Eastern European satellites had become a burden, running up a negative balance of trade and relying ever-increasingly on Soviet subsidies.[98] If the Soviet Union was to turn its economic performance around, this haemorrhaging of money and resources would have to be stopped.

In rhetoric significantly stronger than any earlier calls for polycentrism or 'many roads to socialism', once so adamantly opposed by the Soviet

leadership, Yegor Ligachev on a trip to Hungary in April 1987 told Communist officials that 'every nation has a right to its own way'.[99] On a trip to Belgrade in March 1988 Gorbachev spoke of the need to clear up 'difficulties inherited from the past' and said that the strength of socialism lies in its diversity: 'that is why we highly value the organic combination of each party and state with respect for each other's mutual interests, views and experience and regard it as a sign of the maturity of relations between socialist states'.[100] One year later, on 8 July 1989, Gorbachev told leaders at a Warsaw Treaty Organization meeting in Bucharest that 'there is a new spirit within the Warsaw Treaty, with moves towards independent solutions of national problems. We recognize the specifics of our parties and peoples on the path towards socialist democracy'.[101] This was followed by the coining of the so-called Sinatra Doctrine by foreign ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimov who told an American television audience on 25 October 1989 that Communist states would be allowed to do it their own way.

By asking the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe to follow the example of *glasnost* and *perestroika,* Gorbachev may have thought that he was opening a sluice. In fact, he was opening the flood gates. The flood, when it came, came with a vengeance, as there had already been streamlets below the surface for some time.

THE BUCKETS OVERFLOW

In an open letter to Gustav Husak in 1975, Czechoslovakian dissident Václav Havel wrote, 'A secret streamlet trickles on beneath the heavy cover of inertia and pseudo-events, slowly and inconspicuously undercutting it. It may be a long process, but one day it must happen: the cover will no longer hold and will start to crack.'[102]

By the mid-1980s that streamlet was being fed by many sources, and it gradually swelled into a bubbling brook. A strong counterculture was alive throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. This was evident in the proliferation of *samizdat* publications, the popularity of flying universities, the increasing rebelliousness of youth and the rise in popularity of Western culture and rock music. Controlling people's minds became increasingly difficult, as transistor radios and photocopy machines were more readily available, and access to the Western media and foreign countries was more common.

Dissent centred around a number of issues, including the degradation of the environment (particularly after the Chernobyl disaster), the defence

of human rights and religious freedom. The quest for civic freedom, the desire to Test the West (as a cigarette ad put it) and disillusionment with the Communist system were perhaps the strongest motivating factors for change.

In many cases nationalism was not an issue. But one of the characteristics of nationalism is that it is, to a certain extent, a process; people struggle not necessarily for the nation but through it. For example, the French and American revolutions were as much revolutions of ideas as they were national revolutions. What is important, however, is the fact that when the ideas (whether they be based on ethnicity, autarky, self-determination, civil rights or a number of other factors) which are being fought come to be shared by a majority, or at least an influential portion, of society, they become defining elements of the national political culture and collective consciousness and therefore mobilize the nation. In that respect, because of its malleability, nationalism can be a mobilizer or receptacle of dissent. As Smith writes in *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, 'The very ambiguity and haziness of nationalistic concepts and sentiments constitute its greatest asset. Its interpretation can be varied with greater subtlety and its many facets can unite quite disparate outlooks and interests in a common pursuit.'[103] Under Communism, nationalism became a unifying instrument by default as all the third roads were lumped together with the ideologies of the past which were denied articulation. It was perhaps as a result that the old and young alike tended in moments of liberalization to gravitate towards a nationalist cause.[104] Therefore, although nationalism alone did not necessarily bring people into the streets, it was a common denominator for them once they got there.

Of course People Power, manifested by nationalistic demonstrations, was not the only element contributing to the weakening of Communism. Communism was rife with a number of internal and systemic contradictions which have been outlined elsewhere. What is clear, however, is that nationalism – with its ability to harness a nation's social, political and cultural aspirations – was one of the strongest winds blowing across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

These winds of change presented many Eastern European Communist leaders with a serious predicament. Since the Prague Spring, most regimes had owed their survival to Moscow and not to popular legitimacy. As a result, they ran the state without, in most cases, the support of the nation. Now that Gorbachev was, in effect, encouraging them to pursue national communism (or socialist democracy taking into account national considerations) they were put in an untenable position for, by having carried out Kremlin directives, they had lost the support of the people a long time ago.

How could they follow the new Party line and, as Gorbachev had said on a trip to Prague in April 1987, be responsible to their people? This dilemma manifested itself as 'leadership drift'.

Leadership drift is both a cause and a consequence of systemic disorder:[105] it is the phenomenon of incoherence in politics that is reflected in an episodic breakdown of the function of leadership.[106] This breakdown was due in large part to the ideological incongruence between reality and what the leadership professed to represent. One of the elements that brought this cognitive dissonance into focus was the, by now very obvious, antagonistic contradiction between nationalism and Communism. As Brzezinski points out, 'cynicism combined with institutional interests can for a while support the corrupted ideological edifice, but inside there develops an emptiness and the corrosive feeling that the structure of power no longer has any justification and legitimacy'.[107]

It has been argued throughout that an episodic breakdown of the function of leadership had been occurring in Eastern Europe since 1948 (most intensely in 1956, 1968 and 1980/81). The events of 1989 were the accumulation of a series of cycles which had been revolving for 40 years. In that sense they were, quite literally, a revolution – another turn of the cycle as Communist regimes tried to come to terms with a number of factors including nationalism. This time, however, conditions were such that the system broke down, the regimes could not reassert their authority and the contradiction between nationalism and Communism was exposed as being too antagonistic.

What happened as a result is well documented.[108] In the space of a few months, a Solidarity-led government was formed in Poland, in Hungary the leading role of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party was abolished, the entire politburo of the GDR resigned on 8 November and the next day the Berlin Wall came down. On 10 November the Zhivkov regime fell in Bulgaria and one week later the Velvet Revolution began to sweep through Czechoslovakia. By Christmas the Ceauşescus were rounded up and shot. Despite (or perhaps because of) the transformation of Slobodan Milošević from Communist to nationalist, Yugoslavia also showed signs of internal instability.

EXPLOSION OF THE DIALECTIC

While these events were unfolding in Eastern Europe, a new wave of nationalism was sweeping across the Soviet Union. As mentioned earlier, Sovietization during the Brezhnev era had heightened national consciousness

among many of the nationalities. With the radical changes introduced by Gorbachev, national Communism, and in some cases just nationalism, was strengthened. To some extent this was fostered by the cultural and scholarly intelligentsia – the 'intellectual awakeners' – who made full use of the opportunities afforded by the new spirit of openness. However, equally influential were the political elites of the republics – the so-called new class of national cadres – who had benefited from and propagated national Communism since the 1960s. Representative of this group were men like Vaino Valyas in Estonia, Anatoli Gorbunovs in Latvia and Algirdas Brasauskas (a Sniečkus disciple) in Lithuania, all of whom took an active role in popular fronts which arose in their republics in the late 1980s.[109] However, having gone down this route they had to see it through, and they too became Sorcerer's Apprentices as they eventually became washed away by the pace and enormity of change.

The main problem was that although the popular fronts were rainbow coalitions of diverse interests (which often included large numbers of the Russian minority) they quickly took on a dynamic of their own wherein the nationalist agenda was pushed to the fore. Issues became defined in terms of defending the interests of the dominant culture. Politics, therefore, became focused on ethnicity rather than citizenship, which not only had a significant effect on relations between the republics and the centre but also had far-reaching and destabilizing effects on inter-ethnic relations within the republics in the post-independence period.

National Communism also flourished among those leaders who had little interest in *glasnost* but who realized the benefits of catching the wave of nationalism. As a result,

> in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, the old elites dressed up in nationalist garb to preserve their dominion and suppress democratic movements. Even in those southern republics, like Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and, to a lesser extent, Kazakhstan, where popular democrats were able to remove or reduce the power of the Communists, the deep infrastructure of clan politics remained in place.[110]

In these republics, the uninterrupted power of the national *nomenklatura* depended to a great extent on the continued demobilization of their populations.[111] The fact that the *nomenklatura* lived well in the Soviet system helps to explain why, although they sought to maintain their hegemony, they did not seek devolution of the Union. This type of national Communism was characterized by a merging of ethnic and bureaucratic interests. The resultant ethno-oligarchy often ruled with a heavy hand,

inflaming ethnic sensitivities and often causing violent reactions among minority populations. This was evident in conflicts between the Georgian authorities and the ethnic minorities in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, disagreements between Armenians and Azeris including pogroms and open conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (which openly pitted two Communist parties against each other along national lines), the three-way split of Moldova (between Moldovans, a Slavic 'Dniestr Moldavian Republic' and a 'Gagauz Republic') and tensions in parts of Central Asian republics, such as anti-Semitic pogroms and inter-ethnic sectarian rioting in the Fergana Valley region of Uzbekistan in June 1989, when thousands of unemployed Uzbek youths attacked Meskhetian Turks. For a variety of reasons, therefore, by the late 1980s national and ethnic crises were manifesting themselves throughout the Union.

Russia was no exception. Russian nationalism had always been a central feature of Soviet Communism, especially under Stalin. By the late 1960s and early 1970s it manifested itself as defensive nationalism rather than chauvinism. As economic levels became more equal throughout the Union, there was a growing sense among many Russians that 'equalization' was highly unequal and that they were being hard done by in the system. This became coupled with concerns about the environment, resentment of Russian boys dying in Afghanistan and the threat posed to Russian culture and religion by Sovietization. In moderate cases, for example in the writings of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, emphasis was laid on preserving Russian rural heritage and cultivating closer links to the Orthodox church. Other groups, like the Union for the Spiritual Rebirth of the Fatherland and *Otechestvo* ['Fatherland'], sought to reassert Russian national identity in more activist ways. The logical progression was the development of Russian voting blocs within parliament.[112] As with the popular fronts and the ethno-oligarchies, ethnicity was the defining feature of many of these groups' platforms. The most extreme example was the National Patriotic Front also known as *Pamyat* ['Memory'] which played on xenophobic, anti-Semitic chauvinism that pictured the Russians as a disadvantaged nation victimized by foreigners and the non-Russians of the USSR.[113] Such sentiments were also prevalent in the so-called 'Intermovements' which grew up in the Baltic republics, Moldova and Ukraine in reaction to the Popular Fronts.

Constitutionally, the effort to strengthen Russian identity manifested itself in the founding of the Russian Communist Party in June 1990. One of the central aims of the party was to push for economic restructuring and a transition to a market economy. But they soon went further. At the inaugural Congress of the RSFSR People's Deputies in June 1990 there was

talk of wresting control over resources, giving priority to republican laws over all-Union ones, and even achieving sovereignty.[114] 'Indeed, the Russian government was repeating the actions which had been severely criticized by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR only two years earlier, when such measures had been adopted by the Baltic republics, Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan.'[115] If Russia, the heartland of the Union, was becoming nationalistic and talking of sovereignty, what future was there for the Union?

The fact that the situation could get so out of hand is reflective of the naïve optimism of Gorbachev who, like his predecessors, underestimated the force of nationalism. Between 1987 and 1990 he made a number of decisions through which he may have assumed that he was controlling the increasingly outspoken nationalities but was, in reality, contributing to the cyclical pattern of behaviour which was now spiralling out of control to the extent that the whole wheel risked falling off of its axis.

The stages of the cycle were becoming shorter and more acute. Concessions followed by reactions followed by further concessions became the order of the day as the central authorities tried to appease nationalism without completely undermining the integrity of the Union. In most cases the impetus for making such concessions was political rather than ideological. Hanging on to the republics rather than defending 'socialist internationalism' was the determinant of Gorbachev's policies. Internationalism, therefore, gave way to pragmatic devolution on the premise that more power to the component parts of the USSR would strengthen rather than undermine the Union. Illustrative of this was a resolution 'On Inter-Ethnic Relations', passed at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference on 30 June 1988, recommending that 'taking into account new realities, legislation pertaining to Union and autonomous republics and autonomous *oblasts* and *okrugs* should be developed and renewed, reflecting more fully their rights and duties and the principles of self-management and representation of all nationalities in the organs of power in the center and locally'.[116]

These 'new realities' were most dramatic in the Baltic republics. There national movements sprung up in the late 1980s and pro-independence demonstrations became more common and more outspoken.[117] The constitutional crisis deepened on 16 November 1988, when the Estonian Supreme Soviet adopted changes in the Estonian Constitution which reserved for the republic the right to veto all-Union legislation. The amendments, which amounted to a declaration of sovereignty, also declared that the land, natural resources, industry, banks, and general capital in the Estonian republic were the property solely of the Estonian SSR. This became known as the 'Estonian Clause'.[118] Although the presidium

of the USSR Supreme Soviet declared the Estonian provision unconstitutional, within ten days it issued a decree recognizing the necessity of a legal system based on sovereign state principles guaranteeing the republics their political and socio-economic interests and protecting and developing their sovereign rights within the USSR.

Gorbachev, like Lenin, seems to have assumed that the republics, or at least their leaders, would not exercise their right to separate if it was granted to them. Like Lenin's espousal of self-determination, Gorbachev seems to have been operating on the premise that economic self-interest of the republics and the internationalist disposition of Soviet peoples would keep the Union together. Although it may seem naïve, Gorbachev wrote as late as July 1988, 'I am convinced that our people, who have gained immense internationalist experience, won't allow anybody to encroach upon the cohesion of the Union, the friendship and brotherhood of the people of all nationalities living in our Motherland.'[119] This was wishful thinking.

YELTSIN AND EXPRESSIONS OF 'SOVEREIGNTY'

By 1989, with reform spreading throughout Eastern Europe, there were many voices on the inside who were 'encroaching upon the cohesion of the Union'. One of the loudest was Boris Yeltsin, who was elected to the Congress of People's Deputies in March 1989 with overwhelming popular support and the backing of the influential Interregional Deputies Group.

As noted earlier (especially in the succession fight between Beria and Khruschev in 1953/4), nationalism is often employed as a tactic within leadership struggles. Yeltsin's rise to power was no exception. In this case the stakes were high, for Yeltsin was gambling with the Russian Federation using the republics as bargaining chips and Gorbachev had everything to lose.

Yeltsin tried to consolidate his position by gaining the favour of the nationalities. For example, he supported official bilingualism for Latvia and was outspoken in his calls for sovereignty for all three Baltic republics. He went so far as to call for the transformation of the Soviet Union into a union of autonomous states on an equal footing.[120] This had striking parallels to Lenin's use of the nationalities issue to gain support of the non-Russian peoples during the October Revolution.

But Yeltsin too became a victim of the Sorcerer's Apprentice Dilemma and could not have predicted the forces which his calls for sovereignty and autonomy unleashed, not only in 1989 but when the Russian Federation pushed for its independence in 1991.

By 1989 it was clear that centrifugal nationalistic forces threatened to break up the USSR. On 9 April 1989 hundreds of demonstrators were hurt and 19 killed in Tbilisi when Soviet troops attacked a crowd calling for an end to 'Russian imperialism' and for Georgian independence. On the other side of the country, the Lithuanian Supreme Council passed a declaration of sovereignty on 18 May 1989 and Latvia followed on 28 July 1989.

In a situation reminiscent of the discussions on federalism and 'self-determination' which took place between 1917 and 1922, the years between 1988 and 1991 were preoccupied with discussions about 'sovereignty' and finding a constitutional arrangement that could balance the interests of the republics and the centre. This time, however, the shoe was on the other foot and the republics rather than the central authorities dictated the pace and extent of change. Thus, to a greater extent than with Khruschev, the central question of Gorbachev's tenure was finding the right balance between cohesion and viability.

At first Gorbachev, like the Bolsheviks, seemed willing to make only short-term concessions in hopes that the problem would eventually go away. However, as the granting of those concessions caused change to take on its own momentum, he seems to have resigned himself to the need (one could almost say inevitability) of longer-term restructuring.

In September 1989 the Central Committee plenum on the nationality question devised a 'Draft Nationalities Policy of the Party Under Present Conditions' which allowed for a federal arrangement between the republics and the centre. It called for a strengthening of the powers of the smaller administrative units (as well as a broadening of their competences), an enhancement of 'national autonomy' and vowed to take into account 'relations not only between national-state formations within the Union, but also between nations, ethnic groups, and national groups in republics and regions'.[121] There was talk of protecting national minorities[122] and even extra-territoriality. *The possibility of signing a new Union Treaty was also raised.*

As well-intentioned as this may have been, it served only to highlight divisions rather than eradicate them. Many republics, especially the Baltics, were taking Gorbachev's calls for change at face value and, capitalizing on the support of Yeltsin and the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, were pushing the bounds of autonomy ever further.[123]

COLLAPSE OF THE UNION

Many of the central government's policies, therefore, were simply making a virtue out of necessity. On 27 November 1989 the Baltic republics were

granted dispensation to enact legislation restructuring their social and economic systems within the framework of USSR laws.[124] This legal dispensation was subsequently extended to other Union republics and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Provinces and Districts on 10 April 1990. The most comprehensive law setting out the respective competences of the federal and republican authorities was passed on 26 April 1990.[125] It provided that the republics would retain all powers that were not specifically delegated to the centre and would have economic autonomy. The Shatalin Plan for Economic Stabilization of 1 September 1990 went even further, saying that 'the Union republics, as sovereign states, bear fundamental responsibility for the economic development of their own territories'.[126]

Even when the Bolsheviks had allowed for a certain amount of autonomy for the nationalities, they had always insisted on the unity of the Communist Party. This too became unravelled in the Soviet Union when in December 1989 the Communist Party of Lithuania declared its independence from the CPSU. On 11 March 1990 the Lithuanian parliament declared its independence. Gorbachev made this *de facto* fracturing of the party along national lines *de jure* in February 1990 when he allowed for the amendment of Article Six of the USSR constitution (the Article which sets out the leading role of the Party).

Nevertheless, with almost every concession came an attempt to keep the Union together and to keep Gorbachev in power. On 3 April 1990 a law on the declaration of states of emergency was passed. On the same day a 'Law on Secession from the USSR' was passed, in one respect setting out the procedure for secession yet at the same time leaving the ultimate decision as to whether or not the referendum results would be recognized in the hands of the central authorities. A law 'On the Foundation of the USSR Presidential Institution' passed at the 3rd Congress of People's Deputies created the post of president, thereby centralizing power in the hands of one man rather than the Party or representatives of the republics. The law gave Gorbachev considerable powers, including the right to invoke Martial Law in the interest of defence and security and the right to Presidential administration in union republics without the request of the republics or even without their consent. On 29 September 1990 he used his emergency powers to declare that the centrally planned economy would be maintained until at least the end of 1991.

Gorbachev tried to consolidate his position and that of the Union by reinvigorating federalism. On 11 June 1990 a New Federation Council convened at which Gorbachev called for a new Union Treaty and a new federation that would treat the republics as sovereign states.

This, in a sense, was in conformity with what the USSR was to have been, but in reality the idea of 'sovereignty' within the USSR had been used so cynically for 60 years that many of the increasingly nationalistic Soviet peoples felt that true sovereignty was impossible within the Union, and that independence was the only viable option.

This did not stop Gorbachev from trying to come up with constitutional arrangements that could keep the republics united. On 2 July 1990 the 28th Congress of the CPSU, in an effort to create a more representative distribution of power, voted to enlarge the Politburo to include the First Secretaries of the republican Communist parties. But this was too little too late.

Most republics were uninterested in what they perceived as rather cosmetic changes and felt confident that the days of Moscow using heavy-handed tactics in order to keep the Union together were over. Soviet forces had offered no resistance to the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and were now even being brought home. Furthermore, high-ranking officials, like foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, were acknowledging (in July 1990), 'It is time we understood that neither socialism, nor friendship, nor good neighbourliness, nor respect can rely on bayonets, tanks and bloodshed.'[127]

The agitation of the Interior Ministry (OMON) 'Black Berets' in Latvia in mid-December 1990, the resignation of Shevardnadze on 20 December warning of dictatorial forces and the bloody crackdown in Lithuania in January 1991 showed that there were still officials within the Politburo who were willing to rely on bayonets, tanks and bloodshed. By that point their hold on power was so tenuous that they had little else to rely on. Popular support for the leadership was low and there was no consensus on what form, if any, the USSR should take.

This was demonstrated by the country-wide referendum of 17 March 1991 on maintaining the USSR as a federated state. The question 'Do you consider it necessary to preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a union of equal sovereign states?' was deceptively worded as the USSR was not, nor ever had been, a union of equal sovereign states. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia voiced a resounding 'No' by holding their own referenda. Armenia, Georgia and Moldova also refused to take part. The Russian Federation, Ukraine and Kazakhstan all said that they would prefer to word their own question. The Russian Federation included a question on a directly elected president while Ukraine voted on staying in the Union 'on the basis of the declaration of the Ukraine's state sovereignty'. Strong support came only from the Central Asian republics, ethnic Russians living outside the RSFSR and among those nationalities that felt

they had more to gain than lose by being part of the Union. The fact that 76 per cent of those who voted were in favour of keeping the Union was therefore misleading, and in a sense irrelevant. In what was supposed to have been a vote that would solve the nationalities question once and for all, the fragility of the Union was exposed more starkly than ever before.

Clearly, if there was to be union, it would have to be a confederal one. Republics were already exercising the powers conceded to them by the laws enacted since 1987. Several republics now had popularly elected presidents, most notably Boris Yeltsin who was elected president in June 1991. Many had already declared their sovereignty and others their outright independence.

Confederal economic and political union was proposed in the so-called '9+1' agreement of 23 April 1991. This was to have been the basis of a new Union of Sovereign States (presented as a draft on 15 August 1991) to be signed on 21 August. But such an arrangement was anathema to Soviet Communism and the *raison d'être* of the Soviet Union. For that reason several hardline Communists launched a coup on 18 August 1991. This coup attempt was the last spasm of Communism, a political ideology that had been brain dead for some time but which had still been faintly breathing.

The demise of the USSR was quite swift after that. In a situation analogous to the post-Revolution power vacuum in 1917, the collapse of the coup ushered in a period of nation-building. Some nations were able to realize long-held dreams of national independence. Others had independence thrust upon them by circumstances.

The Soviet Union officially ceased to exist on 8 December 1991 and Gorbachev resigned on Christmas Day. Although a new Commonwealth of Independent States was cobbled together on 21 December 1991, events like the overwhelming support for independence in the Ukrainian referendum of 1 December indicated that the pulls of freedom were stronger than the push for union.

Nationalities problems did not die with Communism. They remained as potent factors in international and, increasingly, in intra-state relations. Already in 1990 several regions within the RSFSR had shown that they wanted a greater say in their own affairs. The Yakut-Sakh SSR declared its independence on 27 September 1990, Burya ASSR on 11 October 1990 and Bashkir ASSR on the same day giving itself the status of Bashkiristan SSR. Other areas like Tartarstan and Chechnya would later push for greater autonomy.[128] As already noted, at the time of the Soviet Union's collapse, ethnic conflict was flaring in a number of republics and was threatening to explode in areas of Eastern Europe, particularly Yugoslavia.

The plight of national minorities was a salient issue in several former Soviet republics and Socialist States. All of this suggested that for the same reasons that nationalism presented the Communists with so many problems, it would continue to be a force to be reckoned with in the post-Communist context.

CONCLUSION

By the time of its collapse, communism as an ideology had long since been discredited – in large part due to its inability to come to terms with nationalism. Communism as a political system had now also broken down, in large measure for the very same reason. In short, the fostering of internationalism had been a part of the Communist design; ironically, Communism's failure to cope with nations and nationalism contributed to the strains under which it withered away.

Although communism and nationalism may not be antithetical, the Communists did not achieve an effective synthesis. As discussed in Chapter 3, this was due in large part to their attempts to eliminate rather than accommodate nationalism. It also had to do with the ideological assumptions on which their world view was based and the operational parameters into which they were restricted by the systemic constraints of Communism.

As Cahm and Fišera remark,

> what is interesting here is the absolute contradiction discernible between the analyses and the conclusions of the Soviet rulers in this realm. In the world of Communist thought, one assumes that the change in socio-economic conditions inevitably produces a change in social consciousness. But the Soviet leaders – all of them – found out that, in respect of the national problem, this link between objective conditions in which society develops and social consciousness apparently does not exist. In other words, they ascertained and to a certain extent admitted that the national question escapes the historical dynamic upon which Marx constructed his entire system. However, it is precisely on national matters that the Soviet leaders preserved, kept intact a programme inspired by Marxian utopia. Everywhere else, confronted by reality, they progressively abandoned utopia.[129]

And so the basic contradiction between nationalism and communism, apparent from the time of Marx, was not bridged. Indeed, as noted by the cyclical pattern of behaviour and the policies adopted within the Eastern

bloc and the Soviet Union outlined throughout this work, the contradiction became ever more antagonistic to the point of being a major contributing factor in the collapse of Communism.

But was this contradiction unique to nationalism's relationship to communism or does the Communist experience augur menacingly for the prospects of accommodating nationalism with other political systems? That question is the focus of the last chapter.

7 Nationalism, Communism and the Politics of Identity

This concluding chapter will point out that Communism's 150-year experience of trying to come to terms with nationalism (particularly the 74 years between the October Revolution and the dissolution of the Soviet Union) raises fundamental questions about the nature of socialism and Communism, offers some important lessons for our understanding of the role of nations and nationalism in the international system, and invites discussion about the treatment of nationalism in the study of International Relations.

SHORT-SIGHTED POST-COMMUNIST HUBRIS

There is a danger in carrying out postmortems of Communism with an air of smugness. Such hubris overlooks the fact that the demise of Communism (which in itself may be overstated) leaves two fundamental points to consider. First, regardless of whether or not Communism is dead, the problems which socialism sought to address are still very much alive. Therefore a terminal crisis for Communism does not mean the end of crises for capitalism.[1] 'Because the sins of that system were in good measure traceable to borrowings from our own, Western culture, the story of these events has direct bearing on us and our future.'[2] Second, one of the factors which led to Communism's demise was its inability to come to terms with nationalism. There is no reason to believe that other supranational systems, like European federalism, could not share a similar fate. The theory of nationalism may well represent Marxism's great historical failure,[3] but non-Marxist sociologists, political scientists and practitioners have done little better.[4]

AN EXPLOSION OF NATIONALISM

With the collapse of Communism, many assumed that there would be a new world or at least a new European order. This was evident in the final document of the 1990 Paris Summit of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The Charter of Paris proclaimed that 'the era of confrontation and division in Europe has ended ... Europe is

liberating itself from the legacy of its past'.[5] But the process of drawing back the rusted façade of the Iron Curtain exposed the stench of nationalism and xenophobia, and the rot of years of neglect: neglect of the environment, infrastructure, democracy and the human condition. Thus, paradoxically, while liberating itself from the legacy of its recent past, Europe is also suffering from the legacy of its distant past and, as a result, although one era of confrontation and division in Europe has ended, another has returned.[6]

As Michael Ignatieff observes:

> With blithe lightness of mind, we assumed that the world was moving irrevocably beyond nationalism, beyond tribalism, beyond the provincial confines of the identities inscribed in our passports, towards a global market culture which was to be our new home. In retrospect, we were whistling in the dark. The repressed has returned, and its name is nationalism.[7]

Nationalism exploded across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is not so much the case that 'nationalism is back'[8] (for, as it has been argued throughout this book, it was always there) but that it was now much more apparent. Many of the nationalities debates and conflicts, which came to the surface in the post-Communist period, were not of a state to state variety, rather they stemmed from national minority disputes or ethnic tensions. The status and plight of national minorities was a bone of contention between the Hungarians and the Romanians, the Hungarians and the Slovaks, the Greeks and the Albanians, and between the Albanians and the Macedonians. Yugoslavia, the driest tinderbox, erupted in 1991 resulting in the division of the country along ethnic lines. In the former Soviet Union, the war in Nagorno-Karabkah raged on, ethnic conflict broke out in Georgia (in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Moldova was torn by competing national claims (particularly in the Transdniestrian region), Ukraine and the Russian Federation squabbled over Crimea and the treatment of the Russian minority, particularly in Latvia and Estonia, strained relations between the Russian Federation and its neighbours. Central Asia was not immune with Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan experiencing inter-ethnic tensions and Tajikistan being brought to the brink of civil war (albeit not for merely nationalist reasons). In Russia the limits of the federal arrangement were tested on several occasions with some regions pushing for greater autonomy while others, most notably Chechnya, sought outright independence.[9]

In this post-independence period (reminiscent of the years 1917–1920, which saw the collapse of the Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian

empires) many nations immediately sought to accentuate national forms. They issued postage stamps, passports, new uniforms for their militaries and raised the flags of their independent countries. They sought international recognition and membership in international organizations and proudly competed as independent countries in international sporting events.

Accentuating all things national was a natural manifestation of pride in a newly independent country. It was also a reflection of the fact that, just as nationalism was a powerful mobilizing force in the absence of any other avenues of dissent under Communism, it was also a useful mechanism for mobilizing popular support for those leaders stepping into the post-Communist breach.

Some, like Vladimir Mečiar and Slobodan Milošović, who had been national Communists under the old system, made an easy transition to more mainstream nationalism. As Vojin Dimitrijevic explains:

> Nationalism and the Bolshevik version of communism are intimately linked by collectivism and anti-individualism, which explains the ease with which many former members of the ruling party became nationalists and the frequent 'alliance of nationalist populism and party hard-liners', probably most conspicuous in Russia and various Serb states and para-states.[10]

Since nationalism was the only enduring identity after so many years of Communism, it, rather than civil society, was the foundation for most of the states in post-Communist transition. Many constitutions (like Slovakia, Romania, Serbia, and Croatia) explicitly stressed the ethnic nature of the state. Others, like some constitutions of the former Soviet republics, accentuated the primacy of the native language and introduced laws (particularly concerning citizenship) that made life difficult for the minority (usually Russian) populations. As almost none of the states in the former Communist block are ethnically homogeneous, this caused (and in some cases continues to cause) major friction between the titular majority and the national minorities. Particularly aggrieved were those groups (like the Russians and Serbs) who were formerly part of the dominant ethnic and cultural group and now perceive themselves to be a persecuted minority.

Were these explosions of nationalism the result of a particular convergence of historical circumstances that will eventually lead to a period of peaceful, liberal-democratic 'normalization' or will nationalism remain a force to be reckoned with in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for some time to come? It is, of course, impossible to answer this question conclusively; but based on the Communist experience with nationalism

there are several observations which can be made which have relevance to the contemporary world.

CAPITALISM, GLOBALISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF NATIONALISM

There is a sense, stated most outspokenly by Francis Fukuyama, that with the collapse of Communism we have reached the end of history. There also seems to be a prevailing assumption that with the advance of globalism, the spread of capitalism and the strengthening of liberal-democratic forms of government, most states are now reading from the same philosophical song sheet and, although they may have their differences, they are differences of degree rather than fundamental substance. According to this world view, it can be conjectured that as common values spread, national differences will diminish.

But regarding capitalism and globalism as the panacea to nationalism seems both naïve and ill-founded, especially when one considers the Communist experience. Although it may be overly simplistic to equate economic determinism with capitalism and 'socialist internationalism' with globalism, there are striking parallels which bear consideration.

The idea that affluence will somehow minimize inter-national friction seems ill-conceived.[11] Saying that rich workers are by their very nature somehow less nationalistic than poor ones is as unconvincing as Engels' and Lenin's assertions about the internationalist disposition of workers. Indeed, as was demonstrated in the late nineteenth century, the more affluent a worker becomes, the more he feels that he has a stake in the system. The corollary is, that the state needs the support of its professional classes and, therefore, will defend their interests. The result is what one observer describes as 'social nationalism'.[12] This type of nationalism is fostered by a sense that one's way of life and quality of life is under threat and must be protected. Referring back to Carr's assertion that the socialization of the nation has as its corollary the nationalization of socialism (or in this case capitalism) one can extrapolate that the defence of national socio-economic conditions will continue, indeed become more significant, in an increasingly inter-connected global village. This already manifests itself in attempts by some European states to tighten immigration, demonstrations against regulations of the European Commission and in protests against countries said to be using unfair trade practices. Thus in a complete contradiction to what Marx and Engels had predicted, workers of the world, especially in western Europe, seem unwilling to unite, despite the efforts

of their leaders.[13] Such frictions will remain in any system where development is unequal and where there is competition.

Of course competition does not necessarily mean conflict. Competition is healthy and in most cases international economic relations are carried out peacefully. Nationalism is, therefore, not strictly an epiphenomenon of capitalism. But by the same token, the spread of capitalism (particularly in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) is not necessarily going to alleviate nationalism.

Even if greater economic parity is achieved, cultural differences will remain. This is a vital consideration, for failing to take into account the cultural dimension of nationalism is precisely what tripped up the socialist theorists and Communist practitioners.

What we are witnessing, on the one hand, is a growing interdependence of the conditions of economic production and exchange, comporting a trend towards uniformity; yet this is dialectically accompanied by a new multiplication of cultural diversity. The latter manifests itself as a growing divergence of cultural identities, 'a search for specificity as the other face of emerging globalism'.[14]

It is therefore premature to suggest, as Khruschev did when referring to republics within the USSR in 1962, that borders are losing their significance. There is, unquestionably, closer international integration in communications, economics and transportation. There is also a growing sense of global norms and universally applicable ideas from production standards to human rights and economic theory.[15] But in all of these revolutionary changes, geography still matters: 'the weight on mankind of time and space, of physical surroundings and history – in short, of geography – is bigger than any earthbound technology is ever likely to lift'.[16] So too is identity, national and otherwise.

As noted by the negative reaction of the nationalities to Sovietization and of the People's Democracies to socialist internationalism, the rise of a supra-national identity can be disorienting and unwittingly increase national consciousness. This is as applicable to our contemporary environment as it was to the Communist one. As one writer put it, 'cultural homogenization has prepared the ground for nationalism: the more similar people become, the greater the urge to be different'.[17] Therefore, as Vincent Cable notes, '"Globalisation" may be changing the nature of national politics, but national it remains.'[18]

And herein lies the paradox. On the one hand, within the international system nations are losing their significance as the primary forum for economic and cultural life. But for that very reason people are reacting in a nationalistic way, for they feel a loss of identity. In many ways, the decline

of the nation, therefore, leads to a rise in nationalism. As Tom Nairn explains:

> The 'global continuum' of homogeneity of multinational industrial and commercial culture is *not*, in fact, something which as such tends to diminish ethnic unrest or remove the temptations of self-rule politics ... [On the contrary] the fact that the globe has grown smaller, and now has really one market place and economic system for the first time, is surely more likely to exacerbate rather than to appease an awareness of being left out, resentful determination to catch up, and efforts to mobilize opinion accordingly – all the basic staples of nationalist and separatist action.[19]

A CRISIS OF IDENTITY

Nationalism, in the post-Communist context is fundamentally a question of identity. Edward Mortimer of the *Financial Times* sums up the appeal of nationalism in the modern era when he writes:

> In this bewildering new world the nation-state is no longer the engine of modernization. Instead it has become the 'Jesus-rail' – the handle that a white-knuckled passenger clings onto shouting 'Jesus', as the car he is travelling in hurtles round a blind corner. The world is hurtling into the third millennium at terrifying speed, and we all feel the need for something familiar to hold on to: a community, a group with which we share language, culture and collective memory; a nation, in fact.[20]

Capitalism, which is basically as economically deterministic as communism, is not able to provide an identity solution. There are many observers, most of them Marxists, who therefore see the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of Communism in the Eastern bloc as potentially liberating events for socialism. Representative of this school of thought is Alex Callinicos who wrote in 1991 that 'the East European revolutions should be seen not primarily as a crisis of the left, but as an opportunity finally to free socialism from the incubus of Stalinism'.[21] Even non-Marxist observers point out that there were many positive attributes to communism, ones which are lacking in the capitalist system. Geoffrey Stern notes that 'even if "communism" has apparently failed as an economic model, a "scientific" theory ... there remains the ethic – the notion of fellowship, fraternity, commonwealth, which market forces cannot of themselves meet and satisfy'.[22] Even Pope John Paul II has observed that there were some

'seeds of truth' in communism, like concern for the community, which should not be destroyed.[23]

To some extent these views are rather romanticized, especially as most of the professed sense of community was forged in opposition to Communism rather than as a result of it.[24] Nevertheless, these observations highlight the fact that capitalism has many shortcomings and consequently, in standing over Communism's grave (if indeed it be buried) one should exercise some humility. As Richard Pipes warns, 'the collapse of communism should be for us not only a cause of rejoicing but also occasion to contemplate our own image in its shattered mirror'.[25] This is particularly relevant as regards Communism's inability to come to terms with nationalism.

The most fundamental lesson to be learned is that the problems faced by the Communists in coming to terms with nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had as much to do with the nature of nationalism as they did to the shortcomings and systemic contradictions of Communism. This is evidenced by the fact that the current rise of nationalism is not confined to the former Communist bloc. Nationalism and crises of identity are manifest throughout Western Europe and other parts of the world, for example in Quebec, Scotland, Catalonia, and Northern Italy.

In a situation parallel to that which occurred in the Communist bloc, the capitalist world is experiencing leadership drift due to a crisis of identity. 'The world's most common problem is legitimacy – the legitimacy of goals and the legitimacy of leaders ... The sense of the future has slipped badly, enfeebling the historic mission of nations as well as the ideal of the ultimate achievement of international comity.'[26] Many politicians are falling short of public expectations and as a result there has been an unprecedented rise in third-party candidates, the defeat of incumbents, a rise in populist (often right-wing) parties, and a search for alternative foci of allegiance like religion. It has also led to calls for 'self-determination' or 'sovereignty' among many groups like the Catalans, Corsicans, northern Italians, Scots and Quebecers (to name a few) who are unsatisfied with the status quo.

As Cable warns, 'There is [therefore] an urgent need for those concerned with politics and governance to understand not only what is driving political change but also how to manage the politics of identity: above all, perhaps, how to satisfy peoples' yearning for a sense of belonging and identity without unleashing destructive political forces.'[27]

LIVING WITH NATIONALISM

All of this begs the question as to whether or not a dialectic, or at least some sort of workable accommodation, of nations within states and states

within a supra-state system, is ever achievable. This is one of the central questions of our time and addressing it, at least in terms of theory, would require another whole book. But the reader should, nevertheless, come away with several conclusions based on the Communist experience which could contribute to a better understanding of some of the challenges which we face in coming to terms with nationalism.

The most important consideration is that nations show no signs of withering away and we should therefore learn to live with them. As James Mayall points out, 'there is no immediate prospect of transcending the national idea, either as the principle of legitimization or as the basis of political organisation for the modern state'.[28] Bearing this in mind, when dealing with nationalism we should seek palliatives rather than panaceas.[29]

> By recognizing that the nation-state will continue for the foreseeable future to be an influential form of polity-community, albeit one caught between globalism and localism, we can begin to avoid the potentially dangerous pull of each. We can begin to *re*construct the nation-state as a culturally based institution that qualifies the ravages of globalism while being open to cultural diversity within its borders; which works across and beyond the limitations of parochial localism while protecting the rights of minorities.[30]

The challenge, then, is to confront the root causes of nationalism while accepting the fact that national identities will persist. Recognizing the components of nationhood and the dynamics that spur individuals and communities to develop national consciousness is the first step. Creating proper frameworks to accommodate national identity is the second.

The first is difficult from an analytical perspective for, as has been demonstrated, nationalism is 'a sufficiently plastic notion to have been equated with all manner of contradictory phenomena'.[31] Nevertheless, as noted in Chapter 1, the amount of scholarship devoted to the study of nationalism has increased considerably in the past decade and our understanding of it has grown as a result. This greater understanding has increased our effectiveness in dealing with nationalism, particularly national minority issues.

The participation of former Communist states in organizations like the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have tempered (although not eliminated) aggressive nationalist manifestations within and between European states and have ensured that legislation has been introduced to protect national minorities. Particularly important in this regard are the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, and the Council of Europe's

Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Efforts by other governmental and non-governmental organizations have also been instrumental in building the foundations of civil society. Economic restructuring and closer integration between former Communist countries and the rest of Europe is also a positive step in reducing internal and interstate tensions.

A basic assumption when dealing with national minority issues is that 'democracy is the basis for the recognition of cultural diversity'.[32] Fundamental too is the protection of human rights: the individual should be protected in state and international structures regardless of his or her ethnicity or nationality. By developing legal frameworks which protect the individual, the citizen will develop a sense of civic as well as ethnic identity. This is in a state's best interest for only by feeling that they have a stake and a voice in the system will national groups participate in it.[33] Alienating national minorities because they are 'different' or 'a threat' will become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

That being said, a civic identity will never replace a national one – it will complement it. Some, like Jürgen Habermas, argue that a non-cultural definition of European identity – referred to as 'European constitutional patriotism' – should be fostered.[34] This may, hypothetically, be a good idea, but it underestimates the cultural component of nationalism and sounds about as hollow as socialist patriotism.

The key is to accommodate national identities within civic society. One approach would be to depoliticize nationalism. As E. H. Carr wrote, 'the divorce between nation and state, or between 'cultural nation' and 'state nation', would mean, expressed in simpler language, that people should be allowed and encouraged to exercise self-determination for some purposes but not others, or alternatively that they should 'determine' themselves into different groups for different purposes.'[35] This is tricky and takes us right back to the heart of the debate faced by the Communists concerning 'self-determination' and national form and content. Depoliticizing nationalism was the goal of the Austro-Marxists as expressed in their writings about national cultural autonomy, and the difference between *Staatsrecht* and *Nationsrecht*.[36] But when practically implemented in the *Gesamtpartei* and by the Russian Communists, it backfired for, as has been discussed, the link between national form and content is very close as culture is a key element of nationalism.

> In suggesting that culture be disengaged from polity, one may be asking for the impossible; over time, it is surely inevitable that people endow their associations with culture. This is the very essence of human social

> life. We may ask to disengage culture from polity for the common good, but there is an anthropological dynamic to endow polity with culture, to endow any social system with an appropriate identity-securing interpretative system.[37]

After all, this was the reason that Communists (despite the precepts of Marxism–Leninism) sought to portray themselves as heirs to the great traditions of the nation. They realized that they needed legitimacy – that they had to link the polity with the culture.

A second approach is to incorporate, as fully as possible, the political (as opposed to merely the cultural) aspirations of the nation(s) into the state. This 'challenge of diversity', as High Commissioner van der Stoel puts it, should stress inclusivity, promote individual rights and foster a social ethos of equality, mutual respect and participation.[38] This relates to what Arend Lijphart has termed consociational democracy. 'Rather than attempting to weaken or do away with segmental cleavages, consociationalism grants them explicit recognition and turns them into constructive elements within a larger political framework.'[39] This type of power sharing allows for a certain amount of autonomy while maintaining the cohesion of the state. However, as George Schöpflin points out, in most cases, in order for consociationalism to work 'society as well as leaderships, must be politically sophisticated'.[40] Even in such societies, for example Canada (on the issues of Quebec, federal–provincial relations and aboriginal rights), theory is often lost in practice.

The challenge is therefore to come up with new solutions to some very old problems. As one (post-modernist) commentator puts it, 'to rethink questions of political identity and community without succumbing to binary oppositions is to contemplate a political life beyond the constraints of sovereign states. It is to take seriously the possibility that new forms of political identity and community can emerge which are not predicated on absolute exclusion'.[41] This is as much a challenge to the study of International Relations as it is to political practitioners.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Due in large part to the influence of the Realists, the study of International Relations, in the past fifty years, has focused mainly on state actors and their interaction with other states in the international system. In this worldview, power and the utility of force are seen as the determinants of action

governing the behaviour of policy-makers, decision-takers and, by extension, the states that they represent.

Those IR theorists (realpolitical or otherwise) like Kohn, Carr, Hayes, Seton-Watson and Hobsbawm, who devoted considerable attention to nationalism, usually regarded it as an instrument of élite manipulation or a function of state control. Like Marx, they did not devote much attention to nationalism in its own right and therefore often overlooked and underestimated its role in international relations. The job of analysing nationalism was usually left to the sociologists.

It is no wonder that in a Europe which now faces the contradictory pulls of intra-state crises and federalism, the discipline of IR, so concentrated on inter-state behaviour and systems theory, is, like the international actors that it studies, also going through something of a crisis of identity.[42]

Realists have difficulties dealing with nationalism for many of the same reasons Marx did, namely that their approach is too positivist and 'scientific'.

> Realism was able to make a quick conquest [of the IR world] by importing a neat and powerful idea of science and showing how an economics-style analysis of nation states as pursuers of national interest scored high as a science. But it has since proved vulnerable both to changing ideas of natural science, which have undercut Positivism, and to hermeneutic ideas about how the social world should be understood.[43]

The realist and neo-realist state-centric and politically 'scientific' approaches are insufficient for analyzing and explaining the dynamics which determine statecraft and international relations in the late twentieth century.

> The combined effect of globalization and fragmentation has created new historical circumstances in which the continuation of traditional bounded political communities can no longer be taken as given and in which the discipline cannot be confined to analysing the ways in which bounded communities conduct their external relations within the unchanging circumstances of international anarchy.[44]

As this book has argued when looking at the effect that nationalism had on Communism, national interest is not necessarily determined by maximization of strategic and economic capability. Nor is the political sphere autonomous from all others.[45] Although, as realists maintain, national interest may be the overriding concern of decision-makers, that interest is significantly affected by relatively intangible concerns like morality and sentiment, culture, legitimacy, identity and not only power.

This highlights the fact that in studying International Relations, one must not limit one's focus to state actors at the expense of considering the role of nations and nationalism. One must take into account the significance of national identity and political culture and how this affects the legitimacy of the regime. The role played by the state in channelling, even manipulating nationalism, should also be considered. The basic consideration to be made is that one can not speak of national interest without understanding what constitutes the nation and how national consciousness acts as a determining variable in decision-making. This, as the Communists discovered, is difficult for nationalism defies convenient paradigms.

A rationalist approach is difficult, for many elements of nationalism are non-rational, sometimes irrational. Under the influence of nationalist sentiments people are prepared to sacrifice 'vulgar' rational interests in favour of 'noble' irrational demands like national survival, dignity and sovereignty.[46] As James Mayall cautions, 'ultimately, international society is an historical not a theoretical construct. Its moral order is neither functionally built-in nor guaranteed by the rationality of human nature'.[47]

To some extent this suggests that a behaviourist approach is suitable when analysing nationalism, although we are more interested in the behaviour of nations than that of the decision-makers.

Ironically, in terms of International Relations theory, a Marxist approach to nationalism still has considerable relevance. 'Marx and Marxism aimed to understand the possibility of communities which will replace alienation, exploitation and estrangement with freedom, co-operation and understanding in a world characterized by extraordinary levels of globalization and fragmentation. These remain the most pressing issues of the age.'[48]

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Communist experience with nationalism demonstrates the types of problems that one can encounter when trying to limit the effects of nationalism and minimizing the role of nations within an international system. Satisfying the quest of nations to maintain their identities, whether it be within states or as nation-states within the international system, need not lead to discord. There is not an inevitable basic contradiction between nationalism and internationalism. A synthesis is possible.

That being said, there are many theoretical and practical questions (which confronted the Communists) which must be addressed. These include striking a balance between self-determination and the territorial integrity of states, accommodating a limited amount of national cultural

autonomy without jeopardizing state security, balancing sovereignty and federalism and establishing frameworks for the protection of national minorities.

The starting point should be to put the *nation* back into inter*national* relations, not only in terms of an academic discipline but in terms of political reality. That is not to say that one should cater to nations at the expense of states; rather, it is to suggest that one should consider the reasons why nationhood remains a powerful mobilizing force and identity solution in a world experiencing simultaneous pulls towards globalism and localism, and to understand the characteristics of nationalism and the catalysts which heighten national consciousness so as to find ways of limiting nationalism's negative characteristics. The Communist experience with nationalism should act as warning for those who fail to heed this advice.

Notes

Chapter 1

1. There are, however, several books written before the collapse of communism that deal with the relationship between nationalism and communism. See e.g. Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist–Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Ronaldo Munck, *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism* (London: Zed Books, 1986); John Schwarzmantel, *Socialism and the Idea of the Nation* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Roman Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); J. L. Talmon, *The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1980); and Peter Zwick, *National Communism* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983).
2. Geoffrey Stern, *The Rise and Decline of International Communism* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990), p. xii.
3. Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto* (London: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 79.
4. Stern 1990, p. xii.
5. A. J. P. Taylor, Introduction, in *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 18.
6. *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 62.
7. Lenin made a similar distinction between Social Democrats and Communists during the First World War. See Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin* (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 147.
8. *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 62.
9. V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution* (London: Penguin, 1992; first published in 1914), p. 31.
10. Ephraim Nimni, 'Great historical failure: Marxist theories of nationalism', *Capital and Class*, 25 (Spring 1985), p. 70.
11. Stern 1990, p. xiii.
12. V. Chalupa, *Rise and Development of a Totalitarian State* (Leiden: H.E. Stenfert Krose N.V., 1959), p. 60.
13. Alex Callinicos, *The Revenge of History: Marxism and the East European Revolutions* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991), p. 15. For one of the most complete examinations of Stalin and Stalinism, see Part 1 of Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
14. George Schöpflin (ed.), *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (London: Muller, Blond & White, 1986), p. 132.
15. Bialer 1980, p. 15.
16. For a useful discussion of the differences between nation and state in Eastern Europe see Heinz Gartner, *State, Nation, and Security in Central Europe: Democratic States without Nations* (working paper 7; Laxenburg: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1995), pp. 1–15.

17. Geoffrey Stern, *The Structure of International Society* (London: Pinter, 1995), p. 96.
18. Definition of 'nation' and 'state' taken from Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 14. See also Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), pp. 3–7.
19. As cited in F. M. Barnard, *Herder's Social and Political Thought: From Enlightenment to Nationalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 54–76.
20. See Leonard W. Doob, *Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), *Nationalism* (A report by a study group of the members of the RIIA, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 28; and John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1982), as well as Istvan Hont, 'The permanent crisis of a divided mankind: "contemporary crisis of the nation state" in historical perspective', *Political Studies*, 42 (special issue 1994), pp. 166–223.
21. Doob 1964, p. 6.
22. See Walker Connor, 'A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group, is a ... ', in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1/4 (October 1978), pp. 379–88.
23. Smith 1991, p. 79.
24. This definition borrows heavily from those of 'nation' and 'nationalism' in Smith 1991, pp. 13, 14, 72 and 73.
25. For more on the politics of identity (which will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 7) see William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
26. The study of nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon. Although some books, like Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1926) and Rudolf Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture* (Los Angeles: Rocker Publications Committee, 1937) date from the inter-war years, the first major wave of study came after the Second World War. Edward Hallett Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: Macmillan, 1945), Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1945) and Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1948) were the three studies which best exemplify the new urgency with which historians and sociologists sought to explain nationalism's overwhelming significance in shaping world events. Subsequently the debate flourished, until by the 1980s nationalism became a course of study in many, if not most, academic institutions. Interest in nationalism was heightened by its positive effects in 1989/90 and its explosively negative characteristics which manifested themselves with particular vehemence in the early 1990s. Two major schools of thought on nationalism have evolved. One sees nationalism as a subjective condition – see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983) – while others feel that nationalism stems from a more objective set of circumstances: see e.g. Smith 1991. These two views are not mutually exclusive, as witnessed by Gellner 1983. Other seminal texts on the subject of nationalism are E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Elie Kedourie,

Nationalism (London: Hutchinson, 1960). A general survey of the subject can be found in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), *Nationalism* (Oxford Reader, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). A useful bibliography is contained in Paul James, *Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community* (London: Sage, 1996).

27. For an elaboration of this argument see James Kurth, 'Toward the postmodern world', *Dialogue* (February 1993), pp. 8–10.
28. Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (London: BBC Books, Chatto & Windus, 1993), p. 4.
29. For an examination of how a traditional sense of authoritarianism affected the region's political culture see Peter F. Sugar, 'Continuity and change in eastern European authoritarianism: autocracy, fascism and communism', *East European Quarterly*, 18/1 (March 1984), p. 18.
30. Alfred Cobban, *National Self-Determination* (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 53.
31. For a discussion of the ethnic conception of the nation see Smith 1991, pp. 11–14.
32. For a discussion of the importance of territoriality in its spatial and temporal components see Steven Grosby, 'Territoriality: the transcendental, primordial feature of modern societies', *Nations and Nationalism*, 1/2 (1995), pp. 143–62.
33. Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), p. 40.
34. For more see Walter Kolarz, *Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe* (London: Lindsay Drummond, 1946).
35. Schwarzmantel 1991, p. 26.
36. Rocker 1937, p. 43.
37. Gellner 1983, p. 55.
38. Tom Nairn, 'The modern Janus', *New Left Review*, 94 (November–December 1975), pp. 3–29.
39. Nairn 1975, p. 12.
40. Smith 1991, p. 10.
41. Hayes 1948, p. 12.
42. As cited in F. M. Barnard (ed.), *J.G. Herder on Social and Political Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 173.
43. John Hutchinson, *Modern Nationalism* (London: Fontana Press, 1994), p. 50.
44. Smith 1991, p. 78.
45. See Zwick 1983, pp. 4–7.
46. Smith 1991, p. 77.
47. As cited in R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Czechs and Slovaks* (London: Hutchinson, 1943), p. 152.
48. Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and its Alternatives* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1969), p. 45.
49. Gellner 1983, p. 100.
50. Ibid.
51. Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979), p. 143.
52. Barnard (ed.) 1969, p. 31. See also Grosby 1995.
53. See Anderson 1983. For an alternative look at the notion of 'imagined communities', see Anthony D. Smith, 'Gastronomy or geology? The role of

nationalism in the reconstruction of nations', *Nations and Nationalism*, 1/1 (March 1995), pp. 3–23. For a look at the concept of 'invisible entities', see Maurice Bloch, 'The past and the present in the present', *Man*, 12/2 (August 1977), pp. 278–92.

54. Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848–1918* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 157. For more on the role of elites in nationalism, see George Schöpflin, 'Nationalism, politics and the European experience', *Survey*, 28/4 (Winter 1984), pp. 67–86.
55. Tom Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (London: NLB, 1977), p. 340.
56. Gellner 1983, p. 57.
57. Smith 1991, pp. 91–2.
58. Charles D. Elder and Roger W. Cobb, *The Political Uses of Symbols* (London: Longman, 1983), p. 143.
59. Smith 1991, p. 77.
60. Ibid. p. 78.
61. See David W. Paul, *The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1979), p. 3 and Introduction.
62. Lowell Dittmer, 'Comparative communist political culture', *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 16/1&2 (Spring/Summer 1983), p. 23.
63. Paul 1979, p. 4.
64. David I. Kertzer, *Ritual, Politics and Power* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 6.
65. Paul 1979, p. 283.
66. Archie Brown (ed.), *Political Culture and Communist Studies* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984), p. 186. See also Stephen White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1979).
67. Bloom 1990, p. 52.
68. Gellner 1983, p. 1.
69. Breuilly 1982, pp. 1 and 2.
70. As cited in Erik Holm, *Europe: A Political Culture? Fundamental Issues for the 1996 IGC* (London: European Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), p. 8. For an historic overview of nation, state and the principle of sovereignty, see Hont 1994, pp. 166–231.
71. Sugar 1995, p. 11.
72. Ignatieff 1993, p. 3.
73. Cobban 1945, pp. 49–52.
74. Smith 1991, p. 74.
75. Smith 1979, p. 116.
76. Hans Kohn, *Nationalism in the Soviet Union* (New York: AMS Press, 1966), p. x.
77. Hutchinson 1994, p. 74.
78. Gellner 1983, p. 58.
79. Hayes 1926, p. 105.
80. Ibid. p. 115.
81. Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 23.

82. Julius Braunthal, *The Paradox of Nationalism: An Epilogue to the Nuremberg Trials* (London: St Botolph, 1946), p. 16.
83. Hayes 1926, p. 117.
84. George Weigel, *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 11.
85. Ferenc A. Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 498.
86. Taylor 1985, p. 36.
87. For more on communism as a religion, particularly in Russia, see Emil Lengyel, *Nationalism: The Last Stage of Communism* (New York: Frank & Wagnells, 1969), pp. 22–58.
88. Taylor 1985, p. 36.
89. Smith 1979, p. 126.
90. Ibid. p. 117.
91. These observations taken from Vali 1961, pp. 498–9.
92. Smith 1979, p. 144.

Chapter 2

1. Ephraim Nimni, 'Great historical failure: Marxist theories of nationalism', *Capital and Class*, 25 (Spring 1985), p. 58. See also Paul James, *Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community* (London: Sage, 1996).
2. Roman Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 32 and 49.
3. J. L. Talmon, *The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution: The Origins of Ideological Polarisation in the Twentieth Century* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1980), p. 8.
4. Régis Debray, 'Marxism and the national question', *New Left Review*, 105 (September–October, 1977), p. 30.
5. Karl Marx, as cited in V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution* (London: Penguin, 1992; first published in 1914), p. 46. Lenin does not quote the source.
6. Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto* (London: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 102.
7. In her thought-provoking book *Really Existing Nationalisms: A Post-Communist View from Marx and Engels* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Erica Benner argues that Marx and Engels never posited a zero-sum relationship between nationalism and internationalism. Her thesis is that, in their eyes, the main threat to international co-operation among workers came not from attempts by oppressed people to form separate states, but from the conservative and hegemonic internationalism of the dominant class. Under such a system there would be scope for both socialist nations and states. See particularly p. 200.
8. *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 95.
9. As cited in Ronaldo Munck, *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism* (London: Zed Books, 1986), p. 24.
10. Talmon 1980, p. 27.
11. Ibid. p. 38.

12. This sets off a whole debate among sociologists about whether national consciousness is created or grows of its own volition. Compare Gellner and Anderson with someone like Anthony D. Smith. For an overview of the debate between the organic or synthetic (invented) nature of nationalism see Anthony D. Smith, 'Gastronomy or geology? The role of nationalism in the reconstruction of nations', *Nations and Nationalism*, 1/1 (March 1995a), pp. 3–23.
13. Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist–Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 8.
14. Debray 1977, p. 26.
15. Tom Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (London: NLB, 1977), p. 337.
16. Debray 1977, p. 31.
17. Szporluk 1988, p. 164.
18. Horace B. Davis, *Nationalism and Socialism: Marxist and Labor Theories of Nationalism to 1917* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), p. 14.
19. Munck 1986, p. 23. See also Benner 1995, pp. 152–9.
20. As cited in Ian Cummins, *Marx, Engels and National Movements* (London: Croom Helm, 1980), p. 145.
21. Friedrich Engels, 'The Magyar struggle' (~8 January 1849), in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (hereafter *MECW*) (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975–93), vol. 8, p. 231.
22. Ibid. pp. 234–5.
23. Friedrich Engels, 'Democratic Pan-Slavism' (1849a), in *MECW*, vol. 8, p. 367.
24. Friedrich Engels, 'The Prague rising', NRZ (18 June 1848), in Fernbach (ed.) 1973, 127.
25. *MECW*, vol. 8, p. 377.
26. Friedrich Engels, 'Germany and Pan-Slavism', NRZ no. 185 (21 April 1855), in *MECW*, vol. 14, pp. 156–7.
27. See Cummins 1980, p. 42; Szporluk 1988, pp. 153–7; and Paul Vyšný, *Neo-Slavism and the Czechs 1898–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 6–8.
28. Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848–1918* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), vol. 2, p. 51.
29. A. J. P. Taylor, Introduction in *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 33. For an alternative interpretation see Benner 1995.
30. Connor 1984, p. 15.
31. Ibid.
32. Friedrich Engels, 'Germany: revolution and counter-revolution', as cited in Cummins 1980, p. 45.
33. Connor 1984, p. 15.
34. See Davis 1967, pp. 56–74.
35. Connor 1984, p. 19.
36. As cited in Lenin 1992, p. 16.
37. Edward Hallett Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: MacMillan & Co., 1945), pp. 19–20.
38. Geoffrey Stern, *The Rise and Decline of International Communism* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990), p. 22.

39. John Schwarzmantel, *Socialism and the Idea of the Nation* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 80.
40. Ephraim Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis* (London: Pluto Press, 1991), p. 63.
41. As cited in Nimni 1985, p. 23.
42. Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), *Nationalism* (A report by a study group of members of the RIIA, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 312.
43. As cited in C. D. Kernig (ed.), *Marxism, Communism and Western Society: A Comparative Encyclopedia* (New York: Herder & Herder, 1973), vi. p. 41.
44. As cited in Leszek Kolakowski and Stuart Hampshire (eds.), *The Socialist Idea: A Reappraisal* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974), p. 138.
45. Tom Bottomore and Patrick Goode (eds.), *Austro-Marxism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 44.
46. Otto Bauer, 'What is Austro-Marxism?' in Bottomore and Goode (eds.) 1978, p. 46.
47. Munck 1986, p. 41.
48. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, 'The Bolsheviks and the national question (1903–1929)', in Eric Cahm and Vladimir Claude Fišera (eds.), *Socialism and Nationalism* (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1978–1980), vol. 3, p. 114.
49. Connor 1984, p. 28.
50. Bottomore and Goode (eds.) 1978, p. 117.
51. Schwarzmantel 1991, p. 167.
52. For evidence of the national biases of the German members of the Austro-Marxists, see Andrew Gladding Whiteside, *Austrian National Socialism Before 1918* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 66–7.
53. Talmon 1980, p. 138. For more, particularly their opposition to Hungarian separation, see Oscar Jászi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 180–82.
54. From Karl Renner, 'Der Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen', as cited in Kann 1950, vol. 2, p. 161. For more on Renner see pp. 157–67.
55. For details see Whiteside 1962, pp. 96–9.
56. For more see Nicholas Stargardt, 'Origins of the constructivist theory of the nation', in Sukumar Periwal (ed.), *Notions of Nationalism* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 83–105.
57. Among the passages contained in the programme are:

    1. Austria is to be transformed into a democratic federation of nationalities.
    2. The historic Crown lands are to be replaced by nationally homogeneous self-ruling bodies, whose legislation and administration shall be in the hands of national chambers, elected on the basis of universal, equal and direct franchise.
    3. All self-governing regions of one and the same nation are to form together a nationally distinct union, which shall take care of this union's affairs autonomously.
    4. A special law should be adopted by the parliament to safeguard the rights of the national minorities.
    5. We do not recognize any national privilege; therefore we reject the demand for a state language. Whether a common language is needed, a federal parliament can decide.

The programme also declares 'that it recognises the right of each nationality to national existence and national development'. Ronaldo Munck, 'Otto Bauer: towards a Marxist theory of nationalism', *Capital and Class*, 25 (Spring 1985), pp. 86–7. For an analysis of the Brünn Congress and for more on the Austrian Social Democrats see Arthur G. Kogan, 'The Social Democrats and the conflict of nationalities in the Habsburg monarchy', *The Journal of Modern History*, 21/3 (September 1949), pp. 204–17.

58. Bottomore and Goode (eds.) 1978, p. 107.
59. Ibid. p. 109.
60. The resentment went both ways. Many areas where Czechs moved from the countryside to the cities and displaced German workers became hotbeds for German (Austrian) national socialism. See Whiteside 1962.
61. Bottomore 1978, p. 108.
62. Nimni 1991, p. 168.
63. Bottomore and Goode (eds.) 1978, p. 110.
64. Nimni 1985, p. 89.
65. Peter Zwick, *National Communism* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), p. 38.
66. Talmon 1980, p. 158.
67. Cahm and Fišera (eds.) 1978–80, vol. 2, p. 118.
68. Self-determination was in fact officially supported by the International at the London Congress of 1896. The text of the Congress's resolution read: 'This Congress declares that it stands for the full right of all nations to self-determination and expresses its sympathies for the workers of every country now suffering under the yoke of military, national or other absolutism. The Congress calls upon the workers of all these countries to join the ranks of the class-conscious workers of the whole world in order jointly to fight for the defeat of international capitalism and for the achievement of the aims of the international Social Democrats.' V. I. Lenin, 'The right of nations to self-determination' (1914), in *Lenin Collected Works* (hereafter *LCW*), vol. 20, p. 430.
69. John F. N. Bradley, *Czech Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1984), p. 61.
70. See Whiteside 1962, pp. 154–61.
71. Talmon 1980, p. 159.
72. Nimni 1991, p. 56.
73. Ibid. p. 49.
74. Schwarzmantel 1991, p. 76.
75. See the chapter entitled, 'German orthodoxy: Karl Kautsky', in Leszek Kolakowski (ed.), *Main Currents of Marxism: its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), vol. II, particularly pp. 32–40.
76. *LCW*, vol. 20, p. 397.
77. Schwarzmantel 1991, p. 135.
78. As cited in Richard Abraham, *Rosa Luxemburg: A Life for the International* (Oxford: Berg, 1989), p. 42.
79. Nimni 1991, p. 53.
80. Zwick 1983, p. 39.
81. Munck 1986, p. 53.

82. Gilbert Badia, *Rosa Luxemburg: Journaliste, Polémiste, Révolutionnaire* (Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1975), p. 483.
83. V. I. Lenin, 'Critical remarks on the national question' (1913), in *LCW*, vol. 20, p. 34.
84. *LCW*, vol. 20, p. 25.
85. V. I. Lenin, 'Theses on the national question' (1913), in *LCW*, vol. 19, p. 246.
86. *LCW*, vol. 20, p. 22.
87. Nimni 1991, p. 78.
88. Ibid. p. 25.
89. Demetrio Boersner, *The Bolshevik Revolution and the National and Colonial Question (1917–1928)* (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1957), p. 36.
90. V. I. Lenin, 'The socialist revolution and the right of nations to self-determination' (1916), in *LCW*, vol. 22, p. 147.
91. V. I. Lenin, 'The discussion on self-determination summed up' (1916), in *LCW*, vol. 22, p. 325.
92. Cahm and Fišera (eds.) 1978–80, p. 119.
93. *LCW*, vol. 22, p. 154.
94. Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, *Lenin and Comintern* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), vol. 1, p. 365.
95. The Imperial Manifesto strengthened the Russian character of the Duma to the exclusion of other national groups. The electoral law disenfranchised the peoples of Central Asia and drastically reduced the number of deputies from Poland and the Caucuses, thereby creating disaffected nationalities which became important allies to the Bolsheviks.
96. In August 1912, at the conference in Vienna (referred to by the Bolsheviks as the Conference of Liquidators) the Mensheviks and other right-wing Marxist groups concluded that national cultural autonomy was not contrary to the party's program of guaranteeing national self-determination. In 1917 national cultural autonomy became part of the Menshevik party platform. See Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917–1923* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 34.
97. *LCW*, vol. 20, p. 437.
98. *LCW*, vol. 22, p. 356.
99. *LCW*, vol. 20, p. 35.
100. *LCW*, vol. 22, p. 146.
101. V. I. Lenin, 'The revolutionary proletariat and the right of nations to self-determination' (1915), in *LCW*, vol. 21, p. 413.
102. V. I. Lenin, 'The tasks of the proletariat in our revolution' (1917), in *LCW*, vol. 24, p. 73.
103. Ibid.
104. See V. I. Lenin, 'Theses on the national question', *LCW*, vol. 19, pp. 243–51 for criticism of Bauer and Renner.
105. Raymond Pearson, 'Historical background', in Alastair McAuley (ed.), *Soviet Federalism, Nationalism and Economic Decentralisation* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), p. 17.
106. 'Deviations on the national question'. Extract from a report delivered at the 16th Congress of the CPSU, 27 June 1930, p. 262.

107. The precedent for this was Article 9 of the Party programme which was laid down at the All-Russian Social Democratic Labour Party's 2nd Congress of 1903. But this was a statement of principle, not of policy.
108. *LCW*, vol. 22, p. 146.
109. Connor 1984, p. 34.
110. *LCW*, vol. 20, p. 45.
111. *LCW*, vol. 19, p. 245.
112. V. I. Lenin, 'A caricature of Marxism and imperialist economism' (1916), in *LCW*, vol. 23, p. 35.
113. See V. I. Lenin, 'Opportunism, and the collapse of the Second International' (1916), *LCW*, vol. 21, p. 442.
114. *LCW*, vol. 23, p. 32.
115. *LCW*, vol. 20, p. 34.
116. *LCW*, vol. 23, p. 33.
117. For an examination of the origins of this concept in the writings of Marx and Engels see Benner 1995, 142–52.
118. Boersner 1957, p. 53.
119. V. I. Lenin, 'On the national pride of the Great-Russians' (1914), in *LCW*, vol. 21, pp. 103–4.
120. Lenin 1992, p. 89.
121. Munck 1986, p. 76.
122. Lenin's first choice was not Stalin, but the Armenian Stepan Shaumyan, author of *National Cultural Autonomy* (1906), who was not, however, able to go.
123. In *Stalin* (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 134, Isaac Deutscher claims that Stalin wrote a second essay on national minorities while in exile in Kureika (in the sub-polar tundra on the river Yenissey), but that essay was never published.
124. Some suggest that because Stalin's knowledge of German was limited Bukharin, who was in Vienna at the time, was a key contributor to the work. Others suggest Lenin wrote a good deal of it. For a discussion of the work's authorship see Samed Shaheen, *The Communist (Bolshevik) Theory of National Self-Determination* (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1956), pp. 66–72.
125. Joseph Stalin, 'Marxism and the national question' (1913), in *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (hereafter *MNCQ*) (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1936), p. 5.
126. Ibid. p. 6.
127. Cahm and Fišera (eds.) 1978–80, vol. 3, p. 122.

Chapter 3

1. Edward Hallett Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (London: Pelican Books, 1950), vol. 1, p. 263.
2. See Alastair McAuley (ed.), *Soviet Federalism, Nationalism and Economic Decentralisation* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), p. 15.
3. As cited in Branko Lazitch and Milorad M. Drachkovitch, *Lenin and the Comintern* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. 369.

4. See also Demetrio Boersner, *The Bolshevik Revolution and the National and Colonial Question (1917–1928)* (Westport, Conn.: Hyperion Press, 1957), p. 64.
5. See Carr 1950, pp. 281–91, and Lazitch and Drachkovitch 1972, p. 370.
6. See Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *The Great Challenge: Nationalities and the Bolshevik State 1917–1930* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1991), pp. 94–7.
7. 'Resolution on the national question'. Adopted by the Seventh All-Russian Conference of the RSDLP, April 1917, in Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (hereafter *MNCQ*) (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1936), p. 270.
8. For Lenin's justification for signing the Brest–Litovsk Treaty, see 'Theses by Lenin on the question of the immediate conclusion of a separate and annexationist peace (20 January 1918)', in Jane Degras (ed.), *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, vol. 1: *1917–1924* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 34–9, and 'Extracts from Lenin's speech to the Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party on the Brest–Litovsk peace' (7 March 1918), in Ibid. pp. 57–61.
9. One notable exception were the Latvian riflemen. As Andre Ezergailis points out in *The Latvian Impact on the Bolshevik Revolution, the First Phase: September 1917 to April 1918* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1983), the Latvian riflemen helped to stabilize the situation in Petrograd and Moscow, assured the safety of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, eliminated the 'threat' from the Constituent Assembly, gave muscle to the fledgling Cheka and played a significant role in the organization and early victories of the Red Army.
10. Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917–1923* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 52.
11. Ibid.
12. Alexander J. Motyl, *Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 117.
13. Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 79. For Suny's useful grouping of states into five categories see p. 30.
14. Ibid. p. 80. Support for the Communist Party among the peasants remained negligible into the early 1930s and, although participation in Party activity increased at that time, it was due to more effective means of coercion rather than increased popular support. For a detailed look at this phenomenon see Graeme J. Gill, *The Origins of the Stalinist Political System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
15. Samed Shaheen, *The Communist (Bolshevik) Theory of National Self-Determination* (The Hague: W. Van Hoeve, 1956), p. 76.
16. V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution* (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 48.
17. Aryeh L. Unger, *Constitutional Development in the USSR: A Guide to the Soviet Constitutions* (London: Methuen, 1981), p. 27.
18. Carr 1950, p. 149.
19. V. I. Lenin, 'Report on the Party Programme, Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.)' (19 March), in *LCW*, vol. 29, p. 174.

20. Ibid. p. 171.
21. Boersner 1957, p. 53.
22. Carr 1950, p. 265.
23. *LCW*, vol. 29, p. 175.
24. Walker Connor, *The National Question in Marxist–Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 61.
25. Robert A. Jones, *The Soviet Concept of 'Limited Sovereignty' from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Brezhnev Doctrine* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 8.
26. For Lenin's fascinating argument justifying this treaty, see 'Resolution on the Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on relations with the capitalist world' (16 March 1921), in Degras (ed.) 1951, pp. 236–7.
27. Raymond Pearson, 'Historical background', in McAuley (ed.) 1991, p. 17.
28. Joseph Stalin, 'Theses on the immediate tasks of the Party in connection with the national problem' (1921), in *MNCQ*, pp. 92–3.
29. See Nahaylo Bohdan and Victor Svoboda, *Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationality Problem in the USSR* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990), pp. 44–9.
30. Ibid.
31. Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim Nationalism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 46.
32. Samuel Bloembergen, 'The Union Republics: how much autonomy?', *Problems of Communism* 16/5 (September–October 1967), pp. 27–35.
33. Joseph Stalin, 'The policy of the Soviet government on the national question in Russia' (1920), in *MNCQ*, p. 80.
34. Joseph Stalin, 'Reply to the discussion on the Report on national factors in Party and state development' (1923), in *MNCQ*, p. 168.
35. Joseph Stalin, 'National factors in Party and state affairs' (1923), in Joseph Stalin, *Works* (13 vols.) (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), vol. 5, p. 188.
36. Boersner 1957, p. 62.
37. Joseph Stalin, 'The amalgamation of the Soviet Republics' (1922), in *MNCQ*, p. 123.
38. Lenin 1992, p. 67.
39. For a view of Lenin's views on autonomization, see notes 'On the question of nationalities or "autonomizing"' (30 December 1922: only made public in 1956), *Current Soviet Policies* II (1957), pp. 214–16. For a fascinating account of Lenin's resistance to Great Russian chauvinism in the final weeks of his life, see d'Encausse 1991, p. 132.
40. The Tadzhik Soviet Socialist Republic was created in June 1929.
41. Soloman M. Schwarz, 'Self-determination under the Communist regime', *Problems of Communism*, 2/5 (1953), p. 34.
42. Ibid. p. 34.
43. Pearson 1991, p. 28.
44. Shirin Akiner, *The Formation of Kazakh Identity: From Tribe to Nation-State* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995).
45. Connor 1984, p. 491.

46. Henry R. Huttenbach (ed.), *Soviet Nationality Policies: Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR* (London: Mansell, 1990), p. 20.
47. Connor 1984, p. 490.
48. See Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization*? (New York: Charles Scribner's & Sons, 1936). On the whole the Webbs were quite impressed by how the Communists dealt with the minorities; and with the Soviet system in general. In one section they write: 'Nowhere in the world do habit and custom and public opinion approach nearer to a like equality in fact.'
49. Ibid. p. 144.
50. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, 'Determinants and parameters of Soviet nationality', in Jeremy R. Azrael (ed.), *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 42–3.
51. Carr 1950, p. 290.
52. Galiev was in a no-win situation. His idea of a united Central Asian republic of Turan (in keeping with the Marxist idea of the viability of large economic units) was officially frowned upon, and yet at the same time he was accused of being a national deviationist.
53. Suny 1993, p. 87.
54. See Geoffrey Stern, *The Rise and Decline of International Communism* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990), pp. 49–51.
55. Stern 1990, p. 66.
56. Leon Trotsky, *The Permanent Revolution* (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1931), p. xiv.
57. See Bennigsen and Wimbush 1979, p. 76. See also the advice given by Zinoviev to the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union in Connor 1984, p. 60.
58. For an examination of the relationship between the Chinese nationalists and the CPSU, see Connor 1984, pp. 67–92.
59. See Boersner 1957, pp. 249–51.
60. Trotsky 1931, p. 110.
61. *MNCQ*, p. 86.
62. Ibid. p. 84.
63. Joseph Stalin, 'The general line of Party work on the national question' (1923), in Stalin 1953, vol. 5, p. 300.
64. Suny 1993, p. 102.
65. Richard Stites, 'Stalinism and the restructuring of revolutionary utopianism', in Hans Günther (ed.), *The Culture of the Stalin Period* (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 82.
66. The term was actually first coined by Karl Marx, in 'Critique of the Gotha Programme' (1875), in *Marx and Engels Selected Works* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991), p. 309, when he wrote 'It is altogether self-evident that, to be able to fight at all, the working class must organise itself at home *as a class* and that its own country is the immediate arena of its struggle. In so far its class struggle is national, not in substance, but, as the *Communist Manifesto* says, "in form"'.
67. *LCW*, vol. 20, pp. 26 and 35–6.
68. Joseph Stalin, 'The political tasks of the university of the peoples of the East' (18 May 1925), in *MNCQ*, pp. 209–10.

69. Joseph Stalin, *The National Question and Leninism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), p. 16.
70. Ibid.
71. Joseph Stalin, 'Deviations on the national question' (27 June 1930), in *MNCQ*, p. 261.
72. Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin* (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 239.
73. *MNCQ*, p. 211.
74. Ibid. p. 262.
75. Such a cyclical pattern has been implied by a number of authors but has never been clearly laid out nor characterized as a cycle whose stages are determined by nationalism. For one of the better evaluations of cause and effect relating to the cyclical pattern, see Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, 'Theories of socialist development in Soviet–East European relations', in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry (ed.), *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 221–53.
76. See Ernst Kux, 'Contradictions in Soviet socialism', *Problems of Communism*, 33/6 (November–December 1984), pp. 1–27.
77. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 12, p. 6.
78. Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1956), p. 70.
79. Connor 1984, p. 390.
80. V. I. Lenin, 'Report of the Central Committee, Eighth Congress of the R.C.P(B.)' (18–23 March 1919), in *LCW*, vol. 29, p. 156.
81. *MNCQ*, p. 260.
82. For a definition and discussion of socialist patriotism see Jones 1990, pp. 132–4.
83. See V. I. Lenin, 'The question of the unity of internationalists' (1 May 1915), in *LCW*, vol. 21, pp. 188–91.
84. Deutscher 1990, p. 295.
85. Jones 1990, p. 133. See also Archie Brown and Jack Gray, *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States* (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 259.
86. Trotsky 1931, p. x.
87. Ibid. p. xxxv.
88. *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 94.
89. Barbara Ward, *Nationalism and Ideology* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1967), p. 94.
90. Joseph Stalin, 'The national question in Yugoslavia' (30 March 1925), in *MNCQ*, p. 202.
91. Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), p. 141.
92. See Borys Levytsky, *The Stalinist Terror in the Thirties: Documentation from the Soviet Press* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1974).
93. Gill 1990, p. 47.
94. Unger 1981, p. 143.
95. Ibid. p. 157.
96. As cited by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), *Nationalism* (A report by a study group of the members of the RIIA, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 78.

97. The Karelo–Finnish union republic reverted to the status of Autonomous Republic in 1956.
98. One could argue that this was as much the case for some Russians as it was for members of non-Russian communities. Note e.g. the efforts of General Andrej Vlasov during the Second World War in Wilfred Strik-Strikfeldt, *Against Stalin and Hitler* (London: Macmillan, 1970) and Sven Steenberg, *Wlassow, Verräter oder Patriot?* (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1968).

Chapter 4

1. The definitive book on the subject is Thomas T. Hammond, *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1975). See also a special edition on the anatomy of Communist takeovers in *Studies of the Soviet Union*, 11/4 (1976) and Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985).
2. See in particular V. Chalupa, *Rise and Development of a Totalitarian State* (Leiden: H.E. Stenfert Krose N.V., 1959); Karel Kaplan, *The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia 1945–1948* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1987); Josef Korbel, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia 1938–1948: The Failure of Coexistence* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959); and M. R. Myant, *Socialism and Democracy in Czechoslovakia 1945–1948* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
3. Some texts which look at the Party's use of culture and national symbols and the wider issue of legitimacy and control are Chalupa 1959; Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, *Communist Propaganda Methods: A Case Study on Czechoslovakia* (New York: Praeger, 1960); I. Gadourek, *The Political Control of Czechoslovakia: A Study in Social Control of a Soviet Satellite State* (Leiden: H.E. Stenfert Krose N.V., 1953); David W. Paul, *The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1979); Edward Táborský, *Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948–1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), chs. 18–20, and D. E. Viney, 'Czech culture and the "New Spirit", 1948–52', *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 31/77 (June 1953), 466–94.
4. Peter Hruby, *Fools and Heroes: The Changing Role of Communist Intellectuals in Czechoslovakia* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. xv.
5. As Mark Harrison points out in 'GDPs of the USSR and Eastern Europe: towards an interwar comparison', *Europe–Asia Studies*, 46/2 (1994), pp. 243–59, it is difficult to calculate accurately the GDPs of these countries during the inter-war years. Nevertheless, based on his figures, and others that he cites, Czechoslovakia unquestionably had the highest GDP in Eastern and Central Europe, and at just under $2000 per capita (international dollars at 1980 prices) it ranked 11th in Europe and 15th in the world – slightly above Argentina, Austria, Chile, Ireland and Italy.
6. See e.g. Paul 1979, p. 3.

7. Klement Gottwald, *Selected Writings 1944–1949* (Prague: Orbis Press Agency, 1981), p. 29.
8. See Tito's 1939 speech, 'Peoples of Yugoslavia!', in Josip Broz Tito, *The National Question: Socialist Thought and Practice* (Belgrade: STP, 1983), pp. 23–7 for an example of his views on Yugoslavism. For a more general background, see chapters 1 and 2 of Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). For an alternative view see Ante Cuvalo, *The Croatian National Movement 1966–1972* (New York: East European Monographs, 1990), p. 124, where he argues that in Croatia the Party only attracted a mass following when they played up their Croatian nationalist credentials. He argues that for that reason the partisans gained a much larger following in Croatia than in Serbia and Montenegro, where the emphasis was more strictly on class.
9. Gottwald 1981, pp. 100–101.
10. R. J. Crampton, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 157.
11. As cited in Táborský 1961, p. 21.
12. Korbel 1959, p. 32.
13. For a typical example of this view, see Rudolf Slansky's speech to the 8th Party Congress of the CPCz on 28 March 1946, entitled 'Kommunisticka strana v boji za svobodu naroda' [The Communist Party in the struggle for the freedom of the nation], *Protokol VIII: Řádného Sjezdu Kommunistické Strany Československa ve dnech 28–31 března 1946* (Prague: Vydal sekretariát ústředního vyboru KSČ, 1946).
14. The Prague uprising began quite spontaneously on May 3rd, two days after the death of Hitler. Fighting spread throughout the city and was so intense that the Waffen SS commander called for air support and tank reinforcements on May 5th. The Czech resistance was aided by an unlikely source, the 1st Division of the Russian National Liberation Army, who were anti-communists and who had fought with the Germans on the Eastern front. Pilsen was liberated by the Americans on May 6th. Although General Paton had strict orders not to advance, the Germans feared the worst and capitulated. By the time the Red Army arrived there was only token resistance. For an in-depth and well-illustrated account of the German occupation of Prague up to and including the Soviet 'liberation' see Callum MacDonald and Jan Kaplan, *Prague in the Shadow of the Swastika* (Prague: Melantrich, 1995).
15. This is a rather bizarre claim, as Beneš' government was in exile in London. For the record, France was actually the first country to recognize the exiled Czechoslovak National Committee. It is worth noting that the Soviet Union (unlike most of the Allies) was one of the few countries to officially recognize Germany's annexation of Bohemia–Moravia. For more see Seton-Watson 1985, p. 162.
16. See Korbel 1959, pp. 50 and 97.
17. Kaplan 1987, p. 132. See also Korbel 1959, pp. 146–7.
18. Hugh Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1918–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), p. 263.
19. Thomas W. Simons Jr., *Eastern Europe in the Postwar World* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 44.

20. Ivan Klíma, *Judge on Trial* (London: Vintage, 1992), p. 69.
21. Myant 1981, p. 28.
22. For an examination of this phenomenon and a thorough overview of the immediate postwar period, see Karel Kaplan, *Znaronění a Socialismus* [*Nationalization and Socialism*] (Prague: Prace, 1968).
23. 'Ideova vychova a kulturni politika strany', speech by Vaclav Kopecký to the 8th congress of the CPCz March 30, 1946, in *Protokol VIII: Řádného Sjezdu Kommunistické Strany Československa*, p. 114.
24. For more on the nationalism of the post-war Polish Communists, see Z. Anthony Kruszewski, 'Nationalism and politics: Poland', in George Klein and Milan J. Reban (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1981), pp. 175–7.
25. For more see Robert R. King, *Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973).
26. For example, the National Front in Poland and East Germany, the Bulgarian and Yugoslavian Fatherland Fronts, the People's Independent Front in Hungary and the People's Democratic Front in Romania.
27. Similar expulsions took place in Hungary and Yugoslavia. See King 1973, pp. 52–3.
28. At the 1946 Paris Peace Conference the Western powers intervened on Hungary's behalf and the number of Hungarians to be evicted was reduced considerably.
29. Although Ruthenia was 'legally' annexed in 1945, the Soviets had exercised *de facto* control over the area since late 1944. The only consolation for Czechoslovakia was that in June 1945 its claim on Teschen (which was disputed by Poland) was supported by the Soviet Union – perhaps as compensation. For more on Carpatho–Ukraine, see King 1973, pp. 27–31.
30. See R. R. Betts (ed.), *Central and South East Europe 1945–1948* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950), pp. 8–9 and 102–3, and Seton-Watson 1985, pp. 265–7.
31. See Klement Gottwald, *Vybrane Spisy* [*Collected Works*] (Prague: Ústav dějin CPCz, 1955), vol. 2, p. 80.
32. Carol Skalnik Leff, *National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: the Making and Remaking of a State, 1918–1987* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 104.
33. Korbel 1959, p. 155.
34. Táborský 1961, p. 112.
35. Almost every major Czechoslovak politician was in attendance. Even Beneš, who was seriously ill, sent his greetings. The gala concert was conducted by Rafeal Kubelik. For an interesting account of the day see 'Jubilejni Zdenka Nejedleho', *Svobodne Noviny* (10 February 1948), p. 2.
36. See for example, 'Za lidovou a narodni kulturu' ['For the people's national culture'], *Var* (1 April 1948), for Nejedlý's views on the greatest of Czechoslovak national culture.
37. Ibid.
38. Zdeněk Nejedlý, *Kommuniste, Dedici Velikych Tradic Českeho Naroda* [*Communists, Inheritors of the Great Traditions of the Czech Nation*] (Prague: Prace, 1978: first published 1946), p. 11.

39. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the theme of Communists being heirs to the great traditions of the nation was used by Stalin to rouse popular support during the Great Patriotic War. It is very possible that Nejedlý, who, like many Czech and Slovak Communists, lived in Moscow during the war, was influenced by articles like Emel'ian Karoslavsii's 'Bolsheviks, the heirs of the best patriotic traditions of the Russian people', which appeared in *Pravda* (27 December 1941). For more on that article and others like it see Lowell Tillett, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), p. 62.
40. Nejedlý 1978, p. 13.
41. Ibid. p. 86.
42. Ibid. p. 13.
43. Ibid. p. 14.
44. Ibid. p. 35.
45. See e.g. the speech of Gottwald at the 7th Congress of the 3rd International in 1935, or his speech entitled 'O Klasickem dedictvi Česke kultury (10 November), *Nová Mysl* 2 (1948), p. 523.
46. Nejedlý 1978, p. 20.
47. Ibid. pp. 43–4.
48. Ibid. p. 85.
49. Ibid. p. 85.
50. There is still a statue of Nejedlý in Litomyšl.
51. Nejedlý 1978, p. 69.
52. Ibid. p. 68.
53. Ibid. p. 71.
54. Dvořák wrote several works which Nejedly could have classified as patriotically socialist, had he been so inclined. They include a cantata called *Heirs of the White Mountain* and a *Hussite* overture. For more on how Dvořák incorporated Czech musical and literary themes into his music see Leon Botstein, 'Reversing the critical tradition: innovation, modernity, and ideology in the work and career of Antonín Dvořák', in Michael Beckerman (ed.), *Dvořák and his World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 11–55.
55. Karel Kaplan, interview with the author, 3 April 1995.
56. When Gottwald returned from being dressed down in Moscow he took heavily to drinking. This might suggest that he realized that the notion of a Czechoslovak road to socialism was now impossible. For more on the extent to which Gottwald was a national Communist, see Gordon Skilling, *The Interrupted Revolution* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), pp. 22–5. Gomułka felt a similar sense of disillusionment in 1947. This seems to indicate that there were Communists who genuinely believed that it would be possible to balance national and Communist interests. It is worth noting that the chairman of the Estonian Communist Party, Johannes Vares-Barabus, committed suicide in 1946 as the result of the blatant contrast between his expectations for Estonia's future, which motivated him to become the main architect of her sovietization, and the reality over the Soviet Estonia over which he presided. See Graham Smith (ed.), *The Baltic States: The National Self-Determination of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), p. 99.

57. Kaplan 1987, pp. 106–7.
58. Korbel 1959, p. 187.
59. Kaplan 1987, p.123.
60. Masaryk's motivation for staying on is unclear. Unclear too are the circumstances surrounding his death on 10 March 1948 when he was either pushed or fell from his bathroom window in the Czernin Palace. For a fascinating account of the circumstances leading up to his death, see Claire Sterling, *The Masaryk Case* (Boston: Nonpareil Books, 1969).
61. Ibid. p. 186.
62. One of the most vivid examples of this was in the GDR which, in its 1949 constitution, declared itself to be the continuation of the Reich.
63. Korbel 1959, p. 236.
64. François Fejtö, *A History of the People's Democracies: Eastern Europe Since Stalin* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), p. 173.
65. Raymond Aron, 'On polycentrism', *Survey*, 58 (January 1966), p. 13.
66. Reports of these gatherings can be found in *Svobodne Noviny* (1946–48).
67. David I. Kertzer, *Ritual, Politics and Power* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 45.
68. Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1978), p. 9.
69. Richard F. Staar, *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 64. Ironically, when Václav Havel became President in 1990 he was reluctant to move into Hradčany, as it symbolized the seat of the Communist President.
70. For more on the history of Sokol and the philosophy of Tyrš, see *Čas*, 5 (June 1994).
71. Gadourek 1953, p. 152. Sokol members often wore distinctive falcon feathers in their caps.
72. As cited in R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Czechs and Slovaks* (London: Hutchinson, 1943), p. 212.
73. Information taken from 'Sokol takes flight again', *The Prague Post* (4–10 May 1994), p. 4 and *Čas*, 5 (June 1994).
74. Ibid.
75. Gadourek 1953, p. 153.
76. Korbel 1959, p. 29.
77. As cited in Ibid. p. 137.
78. Gadourek 1953, p. 153.
79. Chalupa 1959, p. 250.
80. See the examples cited in Taborsky 1961, pp. 38 and 39.
81. Zdeněk Pěnkava, 'V přípravě spartakiády zesílit ideologickou práci v tělovýchově a sportu', *Nová Mysl*, 9/2 (February 1955), p. 163.
82. See e.g. the excerpt of his speech given at the 98th anniversary of Masaryk's birth (7 March 1948) on the front page of *Svobodne Noviny.*
83. For details on this and other examples of the Communists' attempts to rewrite history, see Joseph S. Roucek, 'Soviet nationality policy: Pan-Slavism as an ideological weapon', *Problems of Communism*, 3/4 (July–August 1954), pp. 20–28. See also de Dubnic 1960, pp. 196–9, and Táborský 1961, pp. 136–40.

84. Richard Hunt, 'The denigration of Masaryk', *Yale Review*, 43 (Spring 1954), p. 418.
85. See Václav Havel, 'The power of the powerless', in his *Open Letters: Selected Writings 1965–1990* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), pp. 125–214.
86. Claude Karnouth, 'National unity in central Europe: the state, peasant folkore and mono-ethnism', *Telos*, 63 (Fall 1982), p. 103.
87. For the official line on art, see e.g. 'Boj Proti Kosmopolitismu Je Cesta K Socialistickemu Umeni', *Vytvarne Umĕni*, 7 (1952), p. 357.
88. An analogous situation occurred in Poland, where the writings of Adam Mickiewicz were officially lauded and circulated in large quantities.
89. In the introduction to Jirásek's *Legends of Old Bohemia*, printed in 1951 (beautifully illustrated with drawings by Mikolas Aleš), Gottwald writes, 'I declare my allegiance to Jirásek, who has much in common with us, much more than old capitalist societies. In his work, he masterfully comprehended which of our traditions lead forward, towards freedom and the flourishing of our nation. His work therefore teaches us the correct view of our past, it strengthens our national self-awareness and fills us with historical optimism and faith in the creative power of the people.'
90. Táborský 1961, p. 567.
91. For an analysis of how Máček's work changed between the 1950s and 1970s see Hruby 1980, pp. 161–5.
92. See Václav Murdoch, 'The age of John Hus in recent Czechoslovak historical literature, (1948–1960)', in Miloslav Rechcigl Jr. (ed.), *Czechoslovakia Past and Present* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), pp. 581–93; and Stanley Z. Pech, 'The Marxist interpretation of the Hussite movement', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 4 (1959), pp. 199–212.
93. F. Kavka, 'Husitská tradice – veliký zdroj síly v boji našeho lidu', *Nová Mysl*, 7 (1953), pp. 608 and 616.
94. Gottwald's embalmed body was removed in 1962.
95. For more on the Dozsa Revolt and the historiography surrounding it, see Gabriel S. Pellathy, 'The Dozsa revolt: prelude and aftermath', *East European Quarterly*, 21/3 (September 1987), pp. 275–95.
96. See Andras Renyi, 'Historical painting as a Hungarian paradigm', in Peter Gyorgy and Hedvig Turai (eds.), *Art and Society in the Age of Stalin* (Budapest: Corvina, 1992), pp. 38–48.
97. Jiri Pelikán, *The Czech Political Trials 1950–1954* (London: MacDonald, 1971), p. 89.
98. As cited in J. Máček, 'Proti kosmopolitismu ve vykladu nasich narodnich dejin' ['Against cosmopolitanism in the interpretation of our nation's history'], *Nová Mysl*, 8 (1952), p. 635.
99. Nejedlý 1978, pp. 84–5.
100. This phenomenon was not limited to Czechoslovakia. Tibor Frank argues in 'Nation, national minorities and nationalism in twentieth-century Hungary', in Peter Sugar (ed.), *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Washington: American University Press, 1995), p. 236, that the systematic campaign of the Rakosi regime against the nation's history, and the fact that it made discussion of the Trianon Treaty and its consequences on the Hungarian diaspora taboo, were 'instrumental in bringing about the revolution of 1956'.

101. 'Action programme of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia', in Robin Alison Remington (ed.), *Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), p. 90.
102. Paul 1979, p. 15.
103. de Dubnic 1960, p. 50.
104. Pelikán 1971, p. 146.
105. Chalupa 1959, p. 144.
106. See Otto Ulč, 'Pilsen: the unknown revolt', *Problems of Communism*, 14/3 (May–June 1965), pp. 46–9.
107. Adam Bromke, 'History and politics in Poland', *Problems of Communism*, 15/5 (September–October 1966), p. 71.
108. Zdeněk Nejedlý, 'Za lidovou a narodni kultur', *Var* (1 April 1948), p. 15.
109. Václav Kopecký, 'O socialistickém vlastenectví a proletářském internacionalismu', *Nová Mysl*, 2 (February 1952), p. 86.

Chapter 5

1. Edward Hallett Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1945), p. 20.
2. Margot Light, *The Soviet Theory of International Relations* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988), p. 204.
3. Edward Táborský, *Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948–1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 123. A useful definition also comes in Yaroslav Bilinsky, 'Mykola Skrypnuk and Petro Shelest: an essay on the persistence and limits of Ukrainian national Communism', in Jeremy R. Azrael (ed.), *Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices* (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 106, which describes Ukrainian national Communism as 'an attempt to establish a Ukrainian state, based on Ukrainian national culture but led by the Communist Party and oriented toward the achievement of Communist political, economic and social goals'. In describing what she refers to as 'communist nationalism' in post-war Bulgaria, Maria Todorova says that it was nothing but a 'transvestite, ordinary nationalism', in her 'The courses and discourses of Bulgarian nationalism', in Peter F. Sugar, *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Washington: American University Press, 1995), p. 91.
4. See e.g. the first communiqué of Comecon 22 January 1949 that made the respect for sovereignty its cornerstone. The communiqué and an analysis of it can be found in Michael C. Kaser, *Comecon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 11–15.
5. 'The Brezhnev Doctrine', Nov. 12 1968, in Gale Stokes (ed.), *From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
6. Robert A. Jones, *The Soviet Concept of 'Limited Sovereignty' from Lenin to Gorbachev: the Brezhnev Doctrine* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 4.
7. Jones 1990, p. 11.
8. Light 1988, p. 325.
9. T. Gilberg and J. Simon, *Security Implications of Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 86.

10. As cited in Robert C. Tucker, 'The psychology of Soviet foreign policy', *Problems of Communism*, 6/3 (May–June 1957), p. 5.
11. For full definition see Jones 1990, pp. 128–9.
12. '"National and Internationalist tasks" converge in proletarian internationalism into a concept of patriotism directed at co-operation and common revolutionary struggle – the opposite of nationalism which pursues specific mutually conflicting national interests.' Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, '"Socialist Internationalism" and Eastern Europe: a new stage', *Survey*, 22/2 (Spring 1976), p. 41.
13. A slightly alternative interpretation is put forward by Walker Connor in *The National Question in Marxist–Leninist Theory and Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 550. He believes that 'state-communism' is a more accurate term than 'national communism' to describe Tito's behaviour and philosophy. Walker writes that, in his unrelenting struggle to preserve his state communism against the internal divisive forces of Croatian, Slovenian, Serbian and other nationalisms, 'Tito was unquestionably acting as in internationalist rather than a nationalist, and in his struggle against Moscow to preserve state communism, it is far easier to see forces of egocentrism at work than those of ethnocentrism.'
14. In George Klein and Patricia V. Klein, 'Nationalism vs. ideology: the pivot of Yugoslav politics', in George Klein and Milan J. Reban (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1981), pp. 247–79. George and Patricia Klein make the observation that, 'unlike the Soviet ideologues, the Yugoslavs had never claimed in their official writings that they had found the ultimate and universal solution to the nationality problem. They accepted the possibility that a multinational socialist state would have to live with the tensions generated by its inherent situations,' p. 256.
15. Josip Broz Tito, *The National Question: Socialist Thought and Practice* (Belgrade: STP, 1983), p. 191.
16. As cited in Stokes 1991, p. 60.
17. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 511.
18. Ibid. p. 512. This point is laid out in detail by Donald S. Zagoria, 'The spectre of revisionism', *Problems of Communism*, 7/4 (July–August 1959), pp. 14–21.
19. Raymond Aron, 'On polycentrism', *Survey*, 58 (January 1966), p. 10.
20. See Cominform Resolution, 'The situation in the Communist party of Yugoslavia', in Robert H. McNeal, *International Relations Among Communists* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 65. See also 'Tito vs Moscow: 25 years after (1948–1973)', Part One: *RFE/Yugoslavia, 14 June 1973.* A Second Cominform resolution, passed at a secret meeting in Budapest in November 1949, demanded Tito's overthrow for being a 'Fascist spy' and 'Fascist murderer'. See 'Twenty years after: Second Cominform resolution calling Tito "Fascist Murderer"', *RFE/Yugoslavia, 17 November 1969.* The full Soviet–Yugoslav debate is recorded in Margaret Carlyle (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 304–405.
21. Peter Zwick, *National Communism* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), p. 88.

22. Zagoria 1959, p. 16.
23. François Fejtö, *A History of the People's Democracies: Eastern Europe Since Stalin* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), p. 174.
24. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, 'Post-Communist nationalism', *Foreign Affairs*, 68/5 (Winter 1989/90), p. 5.
25. Jones 1990, p. 80.
26. Connor makes the observation that Beria had to be eliminated, not because of his flagrant appeal to non-Russians within the Party, but because this ploy might actually work. Connor 1984, p. 554. See also Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., 'National cadres as a force in the Soviet system: the evidence of Beria's career, 1949–1953', in Azrael (ed.) 1978, pp. 144–86.
27. Connor 1984, p. 554.
28. Ibid. p. 555. See also Azrael (ed.) 1978, p. 178 on the effect of nationality on patron–client relationships.
29. R. J. Crampton, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 276.
30. See extracts from a speech to the Hungarian National Assembly, 4 July 1953, in Denise Folliot (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs, 1953* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 177–81.
31. Thomas W. Simons, Jr., *Eastern Europe in the Postwar World* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 95.
32. J. F. Brown, *Eastern Europe and Communist Rule* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 42.
33. For more on the Soviet–Yugoslav *rapprochement* and the Belgrade Declaration see Richard Lowenthal, 'New phase in Moscow–Belgrade relations', *Problems of Communism*, 4/6 (November–December 1955), pp. 1–10. Lowenthal makes the point that, despite Moscow's recognition of different pathes to socialism, Khruschev applied this only to China and Yugoslavia who had already taken such paths, whereas Tito interpreted Khruschev's endorsement as applicable to all Communist countries. See p. 9.
34. As cited in Zwick 1983, p. 93.
35. See Joan Barth Urban, *Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: From Togliatti to Berlinger* (London: I.B. Tauris & Company, 1986), pp. 225–33.
36. Ibid. p. 232.
37. Leo Gruliow (ed.), *Current Soviet Policies II: the Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and its Aftermath* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 53. In Jones 1990, pp. 24–31 and p. 44, the author develops the link between pre- and post-war theories of international relations even further. His thesis is that 'far from precipitating a sharp break in Soviet theory, the advent of the Peoples Democracies and the emergence of "socialist international relations" resulted, in large measure, in the adaption and transposition of pre-war Soviet doctrines to that of the USSR's post-isolation environment.'
38. As cited in McNeal 1967, p. 86.
39. *Le Monde* 4 June 1955, as cited in Geoffrey Barraclough and Rachel F. Wall (eds.), *Survey on International Affairs 1955–56* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 136.
40. See Brzezinski 1967, pp. 461–2.

41. Emil Lengyel, *Nationalism: The Last Stage of Communism* (New York: Frank & Wagnells, 1969), p. 92. For more on all aspects of the Comecon, see Kaser 1967.
42. Joseph Stalin, 'Theses on national factors in party and state development', *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (hereafter *MNCQ*) (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1936), p. 138.
43. Milovan Djilas, *The New Class* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1957), p. 174.
44. Ibid. p. 174.
45. Ibid. p. 184.
46. Ibid. p. 190.
47. See also Milovan Djilas, 'Lenin on relations between socialist states' (abridged translation of an article from the September 1949 issue of *The Communist*), published by the Yugoslav Information Centre, New York, 1950, particularly pp. 29–35.
48. Djilas 1957, p. 182.
49. Rakosi and the conservatives viewed Nagy as a threat. They accused his New Course as compromising the economy. He was seen as Malenkov's disciple, and when Malenkov was stripped of power in February 1955 Nagy was removed soon after. For a full account see Charles Gati, 'Imre Nagy and Moscow, 1953–1956', *Problems of Communism*, 35/3 (May–June 1986), pp. 32–49.
50. Imre Nagy, *On Communism* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 40.
51. Ibid. p. 8.
52. Ibid. p. 26.
53. Ibid. p. 31.
54. Ibid. p. 24.
55. Ibid. p. 27.
56. Ibid. p. 25.
57. This sentiment was echoed in the broadcast of Radio Rajk on 5 November 1956, which concluded, 'Those who cooperate with the occupying colonial power ... are traitors not only to Hungary but to communism, and we shall fight them. Comrades, the place of every honest Hungarian Communist is on the barricades.' See Richard Lowenthal, 'Ferment over Eastern Europe', *Problems of Communism*, 5/6 (November–December 1956), p. 7.
58. Nagy 1957, p. 27.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid. p. vi.
61. Ferenc A. Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 263.
62. See Geoffrey Stern, *The Rise and Decline of International Communism* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1990), p. 167.
63. Konrad Syrop, *Spring in October: The Polish Revolution of 1956* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1957), p. 81.
64. William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 48.
65. T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Fehér (eds.), *Political Legitimation in Communist States* (Oxford: Macmillan, 1982), p. 46.
66. Paul G. Lewis (ed.), *Eastern Europe: Political Crisis and Legitimation* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 13.

67. Simons 1991, p. 89.
68. See e.g. Hansjakob Stehle, *The Independent Satellite: Society and Politics in Poland Since 1945* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965).
69. See Mark Kramer, 'New light shed on 1956 Soviet decision to invade Hungary', *Transition*, 2/23 (15 November 1996), p. 36.
70. Speech cited in Syrop 1957, p. 107.
71. Nicholas Bethell, *Gomulka, His Poland and His Communism* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1969), p. 233.
72. Brzezinski 1967, p. 361.
73. For Gomułka's speech to the PUWP which launched national Communism in Poland see Sugar 1995, pp. 252–6. See also his speech to a mass meeting in Warsaw 24 October 1956, in which he outlines his vision of socialist international relations. In one passage he states that within the framework of the socialist camp 'every country should have full independence and sovereignty, and each nation's right to sovereign government in an independent country should be fully and mutually respected'. In Noble Frankland (ed.), *Documents on International Affairs, 1956* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 449.
74. Ibid. p. 221.
75. See e.g. Nagy's broadcast of 28 October 1956 in which he refers to the necessity of 'guaranteeing our national freedom, independence, and sovereignty', or his speech of 30 October which concluded with the slogan 'Long live a free, democratic and independent Hungary'. Both speeches can be found in Frankland 1959.
76. See Archie Brown (ed.), *Political Culture and Communist Studies* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984), p. 265.
77. Crampton 1994, p. 273.
78. The declaration is quoted in *Soviet News* no. 3502 (Wednesday 31 October 1953), pp. 1–2.
79. Melvin Croan, 'Moscow and Eastern Europe', *Problems of Communism*, 15/5 (September–October 1966), p. 61.
80. See John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino–Soviet Dispute* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
81. Brzezinski 1967, p. 265.
82. Carl A. Linden, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957–1964* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966). This is the theme of the whole book, but see particularly p. 207. For a discussion of Tito's rather similar dilemma, see Steven L. Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 26–7. See also James G. Richter, *Khrushchev's Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1994).
83. *Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1963), p. 115.
84. It is worth noting that a similar debate was being carried out in Yugoslavia at the same time, where the relative merits of merging or unitarianism (creating a sense of *Jugoslovenstvo* or Yugoslavness) was being backed by the conservative faction of the party (and the less developed republics), while confederalism was being forwarded by the liberal faction (with the support of the more developed republics).

85. 'Khruschev's anniversary report to supreme Soviet', *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 9/45 (18 December 1957), p. 16.
86. Gruliow (ed.) 1957, p. 53.
87. Leo Gruliow (ed.), *Current Soviet Policies III: The Documentary Record of the Extraordinary 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 56.
88. See particularly Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
89. These basic tenets of international law and international relations were recognized as principles for governing relations between socialist states by the 1960 Moscow Declaration.
90. Significantly, when the 'Further Deepening and Perfecting of Co-operation and Development of Socialist Economic Integration of Member Countries of CEMA' was agreed upon in 1971 there was no supra-national body, and the voluntary nature of CEMA was stressed. For more see John Michael Montias, 'Background and origins of the Rumanian dispute with Comecon', *Soviet Studies*, 16/2 (October 1964), pp. 125–51.
91. As cited in McNeal 1967, p. 128.
92. George Schöpflin, 'Rumanian nationalism', *Soviet Survey*, 20(2–3) (Spring–Summer 1974), p. 92.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid. p. 93.
95. Kurt London (ed.), *Eastern Europe in Transition* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 109.
96. The Dacians were an ancient kingdom which are alleged to have lived on the territory of present-day Romania. Historians claim that when the Romans abandoned Dacia in AD 270 the native population stayed behind. For more on the history and the historical controversy see James Ermatinger, 'Ceauşecu's nationalism: ancient Dacian translated into modern Romanian', in Richard Frucht (ed.), *Labyrinth of Nationalism Complexities of Diplomacy: Essays in Honor of Charles and Barbara Jelavich* (Columbus, on.: Slavica, 1992), pp. 180–89. See also 'The Daco-Romanian Empire', in Walter Kolarz, *Myths and Realities in Eastern Europe* (London: Lindsay Drummond, 1946), pp. 171–88.
97. As cited in Verdery 1991, p. 117.
98. See Stephen Fischer-Galati, 'The continuation of nationalism in Romanian historiography', *Nationalities Papers*, 6/2 (Fall 1978), pp. 179–84, particularly p. 183.
99. For more on Romanian–Soviet relations on Moldova, see Charles E. King, 'Soviet policy in the annexed East European borderlands: language, politics and ethnicity in Moldova', and Adrian Pop, 'When the mouse challenges the cat: Bessarabia in post-war Soviet–Romanian relations', chapters 4 and 5 of Odd Arne Westad, Sven Holtsmark and Iver B. Neumann (eds.), *The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945–89* (London: St Martin's Press, 1994).
100. Graeme J. Gill, 'Rumania: background to autonomy', *Survey*, 21/3 (Summer 1975), p. 99.
101. That had been the name of the Communist Party until February 1948.

102. Gill 1975, p. 106. There is also evidence that Bulgaria almost followed a similar trend. On 7/8 April 1965 Bulgarian police foiled a conspiracy by the army and ex-partisan elements to establish a regime on the Romanian model, Communist, but independent of Moscow. See London (ed.) 1966, p. 111.
103. Fejtö 1971, p. 183.
104. Verdery 1991, p. 125.
105. See e.g. Karel Pomaizl, *Nacionalismus – jeho zdroje a projevy* (Prague: Academia Praha, 1986). For the official justification and explanation of the invasion see 'Defense of socialism is the highest internationalist duty' in *Pravda*, (22 August 1968) reproduced in Robin Alison Remington (ed.), *Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 299–323.
106. Fejtö 1971, p. 146.
107. Robert W. Dean, *Nationalism and Political Change in Eastern Europe: The Slovak Question and the Czechoslovak Reform Movement* (Denver, Colo.: University of Denver, 1974), p. 3.
108. Ota Sik, 'The economic impact of Stalinism', *Problems of Communism*, 20/3 (May–June 1971), p. 7.
109. For a look at the issue of rehabilitation and the Slovak issue in general see Stanley Riveles, 'Slovakia: catalyst of crisis', *Problems of Communism*, 17/3 (May–June 1968), pp. 1–9.
110. Ibid. p. 4.
111. See David W. Paul, *The Cultural Limits of Revolutionary Politics: Change and Continuity in Socialist Czechoslovakia* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly 1979), pp. 233–4.
112. See Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz, 'Public political opinion in Czechoslovakia during the Dubcek era', in E. J. Czerwinski and Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz (eds.), *The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on Eastern Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 3–41.
113. 'Action program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia', in Remington 1969, p. 99.
114. See Zwick 1983, p. 108.
115. Letter from Engels to Karl Kautsky (in Vienna) (London, 12 September 1882), in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Marx and Engels Collected Works* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1992), vol. 46, p. 322.
116. For an interesting article on this subject, see Virgil Krapauskas, 'Marxism and nationalism in Soviet Lithuanian historiography', *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 23/3 (Fall 1992), pp. 239–60.
117. Thomas Remeikis, *Opposition to Soviet Rule in Lithuania 1945–1980* (Chicago: Institute of Lithuanian Studies Press, 1980), p. 15.
118. V. Stanley Vardys (ed.), *Lithuania Under the Soviets: Portrait of a Nation, 1940–1965* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 115. This figure is a bit misleading because there were many Lithuanians, even in political life, who supported the Communist Party but were not members. Most notable among these was Justis Paleckis (Sr.), who was a leading figure of the liberal Populist Party and later became chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.
119. See T. Zenklys, 'Pasibaigusi Lietuvos gyvenimo epocha', *Akiraciani*, 3/57 (March 1974), p. 6.

120. Close to 300,000 Lithuanians were deported and/or killed by the Soviets between 1940–41 and 1945–59. Total losses (due to the war, German occupation and the guerilla war) for the period 1940–1959 totalled approximately 1,090,000. See Pranas Zunde, 'Demographic changes and structure in Lithuania', *Lituanas* (Fall/Winter 1964), pp. 5–15.
121. See Vincas Rastenis, 'A "diehard Kremlinist": A. Sniečkus, chief Communist in Lithuania', *The Baltic Review*, 9 (31 December 1956), p. 37.
122. Remeikis 1980, p. 75.
123. Thomas Remeikis, 'Political developments in Lithuania during the Brezhnev era', in George W. Simmonds (ed.), *Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin* (Detroit: Detroit University Press, 1977). Remeikis makes the observation that there was a disproportionately high number of Marshals and generals at the funeral as if 'to communicate to the Lithuanian people a warning of the futility of national separatism', p. 170.
124. A graphic example of Sniečkus' desire to be on the winning side can be seen in his notes from June and July 1957. Judging by the large number of corrections and revisions on his reports on the debates which were going on in the Presidium between Khruschev and the anti-Party group he seemed to have been very careful about who he would back until it became clear which side would win. Even when Khruschev came out on top he hedged his bets by criticizing the anti-Party group, but also upbraiding Lithuanian writers and artists for not pursuing an orthodox line of socialist realism in their work. Lietuvos Visuomenes Organizacijs Archyoas (LVOA) 16895.2.74.
125. Interview with Justis Paleckis, Jr. on 19 October 1995. An example of his 'cunning peasant ways' can be seen in the way that he avoided getting dismissed from office. Apparently the knives were out for Sniečkus on a number of occasions. Some people have even suggested that had he not died when he did he would have been replaced. His ploy was that whenever he knew that he was in danger of being dismissed he would circulate a rumour that he was preparing to resign. The Kremlin, realizing that it could not find a suitable replacement, would invariably urge him to stay. Sniečkus' peers and superiors knew very well that dismissing such a popular and powerful leader would only add to his cult of personality. For more on attempts to get rid of him, see Vytautas Tininis, 'In power: Anatanas Sniečkus as a politician', in *Politika* 14, pp. 23–8, and Zenklys 1974, p. 9.
126. Remeikis 1977, p. 166.
127. For more detailed figures, see Vytautas Tininis, 'Lietuva ir A. Sniečkus: 1955–1960' [Lithuania and Sniečkus], *Lietvuos*, 20/55, p. 11.
128. See Zev Katz (ed.), *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities* (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 125 and 449, and Remeikis 1977, p. 166.
129. Alexander J. Groth, *Major Ideologies: An Interpretive Survey of Democracy, Socialism and Nationalism* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), p. 165.
130. As cited in 'Fostering Lithuania's identity under Soviet rule', *Transition* (8 September 1995), pp. 54–5.
131. See Tininis 1992, p. 11.
132. Vardys (ed.) 1965, p. 120.
133. Connor 1984, p. 293.

134. Gregory Gleason describes this phenomenon in his *Federalism and Nationalism: the Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 83–103.
135. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, 'When the "prison of peoples" was opened', as reprinted in Rachel Denber, *The Soviet Nationality Reader: The Disintegration in Context* (London: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. 3, p. 96.
136. Alexander J. Motyl, *Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 95. See also Richard Ericson, 'Soviet economic structure and the national question', in Alexander Motyl (ed.), *The Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 246–7 on the clash between branch/functional and territorial principles.
137. Ibid. p. 96. See also Grey Hodnett, 'The debate over Soviet federalism', *Soviet Studies*, 18/4 (April 1967), pp. 458–81; reprinted in Denber (ed.) 1992.
138. Brzezinski 1967, p. 52.
139. These councils were never fully developed, as they were phased out when Khruschev was dismissed in 1964.
140. Speech by A. Sniečkus to the 20th Party Congress, reported in *Pravda* (19 February), as cited in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 8/9, p. 24.
141. Machine Tractor Stations (MTS) were the agricultural equivalent of heavy industrialization. It gave the regime control over the organization and production of the collectivized peasantry.
142. As reported in *Pravda* (6 March), p. 3, as cited in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* X(10), p. 18.
143. Interview with Justis Paleckis, 19 October 1995. Substantiated by Sniečkus expert Vytautas Tininis in interview with the author on 21 October 1995.
144. Author's interview with Tininis, 21 October 1995.
145. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 14/8, p. 15.
146. 'Turn decisions of CPSU Central Committee plenary session into reality: for close alliance of science and production', *Pravda* (18 April), p. 2 in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 17/16, p. 35.
147. Remeikis 1980, p. 82.
148. Ibid. p. 87.
149. For more on Khruschev's scheme to promote the massive expansion of petro- chemical industries (particularly chemical fertilizers for agriculture), see Linden 1966, pp. 187–91.
150. The name has since been changed to Visaginas.
151. See Remeikis 1980, pp. 82–4, and 'Protest against industrialization ills in Lithuania', *The Baltic Review*, 33 (January 1967), pp. 22–3.
152. Connor 1984, p. 544.
153. There were several jokes at the time about how this was the first time a Lithuania sent a Russian to Siberia.
154. Motyl 1990, p. 96.
155. For more on Shelest see Azarel (ed.) 1978, pp. 119–32, and Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 283–4.

156. As cited in Vincas Trumpas, 'The problem of cultural heritage', *Lituanas*, 3 (1961), p. 69. This quotation is ironic when one considers how vehemently Sniečkus attacked the so-called 'single current' theory, a theory which regards the development of Lithuanian history and culture as an organic process unrelated to the framework of Marxist–Leninist ideology.
157. For more on the restoration of historic sites and monuments in Lithuania, see Jurgis Gimbutas, 'The protection and restoration of architectural monuments in Lithuania after 1950', in Rimvydas Silbajoras (ed.), *Mind Against the Wall: Essays on Lithuanian Culture Under the Soviet Occupation* (Chicago: Institute of Lithuanian Studies Press, 1983).
158. These were often hotbeds of nationalist opposition. See Azrael (ed.) 1978, p. 377.
159. LVOA F.16895 ap.2 b. 329.
160. LVOA 16895.2.329.
161. For more on artist and composer Ciurlionis (who is virtually unknown outside Lithuania) see Juozas Pivoriunas, 'The Lithuanian individualist', *Lituanas*, 11/4 (Winter 1965), pp. 5–16; Joan M. Vastokas, 'M. K. Ciurlionis: abstraction and the visionary experience', *Lituanas*, 21/2 (Summer 1975), pp. 15–38, and several articles in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of his death in *Lituanas*, 7/2 (June 1961).
162. See Bronis Vaskelis, 'The assertion of ethnic identity via myth and folklore in Soviet Lithuanian literature', *Lituanas*, 19/2 (Summer 1973), pp. 16–28.
163. 'Acculturation and socialization in the Soviet Baltic Republics', *Lituanas*, 18/4 (Winter 1972), p. 32.
164. For precise figures see Remeiikis 1980, p. 27.
165. For more, see chapter 2 of Michael Bourdeaux, *Land of Crosses: The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Lithuania, 1939–78* (Chulmleigh: Augustine, 1979).
166. For more on the rise of dissent, see V. Stanley Vardys, *The Catholic Church: Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1978).
167. Paul Lendvai, *Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans* (London: MacDonald, 1969), p. xvi.

Chapter 6

1. Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (London: Granta Books, 1991), p. 299.
2. Janusz Bugajski and Maxine Pollack, *East European Fault Lines: Dissent, Opposition and Social Activism* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), p. 29.
3. Paul G. Lewis (ed.), *Eastern Europe: Political Crisis and Legitimation* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 167.
4. For the most eloquent essay on this subject, see Václav Havel, 'The power of the powerless', in his *Open Letters: Selected Writings 1965–1990* (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), pp. 125–214.
5. T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Fehér (eds.), *Political Legitimation in Communist States* (Oxford: Macmillan, 1982), p. 51.

6. J. F. Brown, *Eastern Europe and Communist Rule* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 296.
7. Lewis 1984, p. 89. See also Tamas Aczel (ed.), *Ten Years After: A Commemoration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1966), pp. 142–3.
8. Rudolf Jaworski, 'History and tradition in contemporary Poland', *East European Quarterly*, 19/3 (September 1985), p. 350.
9. For more, see Adam Bromke, 'Poland under Gierek: new political style', *Problems of Communism*, 21/5 (September–October 1972), pp. 1–19.
10. Kristian Gerner, *The Soviet Union and Central Europe in the Post-War Era: A Study in Precarious Security* (Lund: Esselte Studium, 1984), p. 56. General Wojtech Jaruzelski made a similar gesture in 1985 when he put on public display one of Poland's most famous and highly politicized paintings, the *Panorama of Racławice*, that depicts a Polish victory over the Russian army in the late eighteenth century. See Robert Zuzowski, 'The impact of nationalism on Communism: the case of Poland', *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 19/1–2 (1992), p. 15.
11. East Germany had already recognized that border in the 1950 Zgorzelec Treaty.
12. See Lewis 1984, pp. 32–3.
13. Ash 1991, p. 78.
14. Ibid. p. 106.
15. See Ibid. p. 223.
16. Jaworski 1985, p. 355.
17. Andrzej Walicki, 'The three traditions of Polish patriotism', in Stanisław Gomułka and Antony Polonsky (eds.), *Polish Paradoxes* (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 30.
18. The Black Madonna at Jasna Góra monastery is revered among Poles and is the object of annual pilgrimages by Catholics. It is venerated as the patron saint of the nation and is seen as Poland's protector in times of danger and consoler in times of need. The icon was even crowned Queen of Poland by King Jan Kazimierz in 1717 as a token of gratitude to the Pauline monks who helped him fight off the Swedes. It is interesting to note that a stamp commemorating the 600th anniversary of the Black Madonna was issued by the state in 1982. For details of the 600th anniversary of the Black Madonna see *Radio Free Europe (RFE) Situation Report Poland*, 15 (30 August 1982), pp. 18–20.
19. George Weigel, *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 115.
20. Gerner 1984, p. 57.
21. Rosa Luxemburg's Social Democracy Party of Poland and Lithuania, and the Polish Socialist Party, who together formed the Communist Workers' Party of Poland in December 1918.
22. For more, see Jan Kubik, 'Polish May Day celebrations in the 1970s and in 1981', *Polish Review*, 34/2 (1989), pp. 99–116.
23. See 'Poland's two May anniversaries', *RFE Situation Report Poland*, 8 (14 May 1981), pp. 4–8.
24. See Ash 1991, pp. 262–4.
25. Robert Zuzowski, 'The impact of nationalism on Communism: the case of Poland', *History of European Ideas*, 18/1 (1994), pp. 38–9.

26. Kubik 1989, p. 105.
27. Sikorski died in a plane crash in Gibraltar on July 1943. In 1970 there was talk of returning his remains to Poland, but the Polish authorities refused to bury him in Wawel Castle. In early 1981 the Polish war veterans' association tried again, but they were blocked (as in 1983) by British insistence (on strong lobbying from the Polonia movement) that conditions in Poland were not yet suitable. See *RFE Situation Report Poland,* 10 (5 July 1983), p. 25, and *RFE Situation Report Poland,* 9 (29 May 1981), pp. 9–13.
28. For more on the GPU see *RFE Situation Report Poland,* 9 (11 June 1983), pp. 9–10. See also Anna Sabbat-Świdlicka, 'The rise and fall of the Grunwald Patriotic Union', *RFE Background Report Poland,* 213 (13 October 1982).
29. 'The PRON Congress', *RFE Situation Report Poland,* 9 (11 June 1983), pp. 1–8, and 'From national front to patriotic movement of national rebirth', *RFE Situation Report Poland,* 17 (6 October 1982), pp. 23–30.
30. As cited in Ash 1991, p. 239.
31. Thomas W. Simons, Jr., *Eastern Europe in the Postwar World* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 23.
32. See Otto Ulč, 'Communist national minority policy: the case of the gypsies in Czechoslovakia', *Soviet Studies,* 20/4 (April 1969), pp. 421–43. For accounts of the situation of gypsies in Hungary see 'Hungary's gypsies', *RFE Situation Report Hungary,* 9 (12 April 1978), pp. 5–7, and 'Gypsies: Hungary's largest ethnic minority', *RFE Situation Report Hungary,* 40 (3 November 1976), pp. 3–5.
33. See Bernard J. Fisher, 'Albanian nationalism in the twentieth century', in Peter F. Sugar (ed.), *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Washington: American University Press, 1995), p. 45–7.
34. Ronald D. Asmus, 'The GDR and Martin Luther', *Survey,* 28/3 (Autumn 1984), p. 127.
35. See Ibid. pp. 124–56.
36. George Klein and Milan J. Reban (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnicity in Eastern Europe* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1981), p. 93.
37. Rigby & Fehér (eds.) 1982, p. 117.
38. For an account of the anniversary, see *RFE Situation Report Hungary,* 33 (25 August 1970), pp. 10–12.
39. See *RFE Situation Report Hungary,* 34 (9 November 1977), p. 3.
40. The crown is now on display in the National Museum in Budapest.
41. See e.g. the debate over the 'History of Transylvania', in Ştefan Pascu, Mircea Muşat & Florin Constantiniu, 'Romanian historians on Transylvania', in Gail Stokes (ed.), *From Stalinism to Pluralism: A Documentary History of Eastern Europe Since 1945* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 229–31.
42. See e.g. 'The divisive issue of Macedonia: Yugoslav attitudes and suspicions', *RFE Background Report Yugoslavia,* 99 (6 June 1975).
43. See *RFE Europe Situation Report Bulgaria,* 14 (23 October 1981).
44. George Schöpflin (ed.), *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (London: Muller, Blond & White, 1986), p. 306.
45. See Stanko Todorov, 'Name changes in Bulgaria', in Stokes (ed.) 1991, p. 232–4.

46. Ibid. p. 234.
47. Michael Shafir, 'Xenophobic communism – the case of Bulgaria and Romania', *The World Today*, 45/12 (December 1989), p. 209. For further elaboration of the concept of 'xenophobic communism', see Ibid. pp. 208–12. This phenomenon has also been described as 'chauvino-communism'. See George Schöpflin, 'Nationalism and ethnicity in Europe, east and west', in Charles A. Kupchan (ed.), *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 37–65 particularly 64–5.
48. Gary K. Bertsch, 'Currents in Yugoslavia: the revival of nationalisms', *Problems of Communism*, 22/6 (November–December 1973), p. 13. For a more general examination of the role of élite manipulation in ethnic crises, see Stuart J. Kaufman, 'An "instrumental" theory of inter-ethnic war', *Review of International Studies*, 22 (1996), pp. 149–71.
49. Michael Ignatieff, 'Ethnic Cleansing and Pan Ethnicity', paper presented at the Workshop on Ethnicity and International Relations, 23–4 November 1995, Chatham House, London.
50. As Klein and Reban point out, this was particularly the case with the Council of Nationalities. The Council was established by the Constitution of 1946 as the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly. Under the Fundamental Law of 1953 it merged with the membership of the lower chamber, the Federal Council. Under the Constitution of 1963 it was an upper chamber, only to re-emerge in the amendments of 1968 as the lower chamber. In the Constitution of 1974 it again emerged as the upper chamber of the Federal assembly, the status that it held in the Constitution of 1946. Klein and Reban (eds.) 1981, p. 252.
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52. Ramet 1992, p. 251.
53. Muslims were officially recognized as a nationality in 1968. For a commentary on the repercussions of this, see George Schöpflin, 'Nationality in the fabric of Yugoslav politics', *Survey*, 25/3 (Summer 1980), pp. 8–9.
54. Figures based on the 1981 census in *Statisicki Godisnjak Jugoslavije*, Godin 36, Socijalisticka Federativna Republika Jugoslavija, Belgrade 1989. See also the 1991 figures in Sugar 1995, pp. 352–3.
55. Dennison I. Rusinow, 'Unfinished business: the Yugoslav "national question"', *American Universities Field Staff Reports*, 35 (1981), p. 7.
56. See Mark Baskin, 'Crisis in Kosovo', *Problems of Communism*, 32/2 (March–April 1983), pp. 61–74; and Elez Biberaj, 'The conflict in Kosovo', *Survey*, 28(3) (Autumn 1984), pp. 39–57.
57. See Paul Shoup, 'The national question in Yugoslavia', *Problems of Communism*, 21/1 (January–February 1972), p. 21.
58. 'The leaders of the developed regions sought to enhance their power over the formulation of central policies in order to restrict the autonomy of the central bodies and thereby limit, if not reduce, the transfer of resources out of their regions. The leaders of the underdeveloped regions also sought to enhance their role in central decision making. But they did so in order to

preserve, if not enlarge, those transfers.' Steven L. Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 62. See also pp. 54–6 for an explanation of why the southern regions were becoming increasingly dependent on banks for investment capital.

59. Shoup 1972, p. 21.
60. Ramet 1992, p. 17.
61. For more see Burg 1983, pp. 88–100.
62. In March 1967 a 'Declaration on the Name and Use of the Croatian Language' proclaimed the full separation of the Croatian language from Serbian. This broke the 1954 Novi Sad agreement that had created a common Serbo-Croat language. Interestingly, many signatories of the 1967 agreement were also signatories to the 1954 agreement.
63. The Croats wanted a statue of Jelacic, which had been removed from Jelacic (subsequently Republic) Square returned. See Schöpflin 1980, p. 134; and Ramet 1992, p. 110.
64. 'The Croatian spring, 1971: socialism in one republic?', *Nationalities Papers*, 10/2 (Fall 1982), pp. 221–31. See also Burg 1983, pp. 138 and 149; Ramet 1992, pp. 126–7; and George Schöpflin, 'The ideology of Croatian nationalism', *Survey*, 19/1 (Winter 1973), pp. 123–46.
65. Shoup 1972, p. 23.
66. For more on the role of the Church see Ramet 1992, p. 111, and Pedro Ramet, 'Religion and nationalism in Yugoslavia', in Pedro Ramet (ed.), *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics* (Durham: Duke Press Policy Studies, 1984), pp. 163–5.
67. Under the 1971 amendment the Presidency was to be composed of the presidents of the republican and provincial assemblies, two members elected by each of the republican assemblies and one member elected by each of the provincial assemblies (23 members in all). Under the 1974 constitution the Presidency was reduced to nine members – one representative from each republic, the provinces and the party.
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69. Ramet 1992, p. 75.
70. Ibid.
71. Burg 1983, p. 347.
72. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (*CDSP*), 24/51 (22 December 1972), p. 6.
73. Ibid. p. 8.
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75. *CDSP* (22 December 1972), p. 8.
76. S. Enders Wimbush, 'The Soviet muslim borderlands', in Robert Conquest (ed.), *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 220.
77. *CDSP* (22 December 1972), p. 9.
78. For a sociological explanation of this phenomenon, see William Bloom, *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 143.

79. Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 102.
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82. Ash 1991, p. 27.
83. As cited in Ernst Kux, 'Contradictions in Soviet socialism', *Problems of Communism*, 33/6 (November–December 1984), p. 1.
84. Gregory Gleason, *Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), p. 16.
85. 'Andropov keynotes USSR anniversary', *CDSP* 34/51, p. 4 as reported in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, 22 December.
86. Ibid.
87. See 'Supreme Soviet Presidium takes action' as reported in *Pravda* (13 January 1982), in *CDSP* 35/2, p. 13.
88. Andropov keynote, p. 5.
89. As reported in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, 15 June 1983, in 'Chernenko keynotes CC Session', *CDSP* 35/24, p. 9.
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94. In *CDSP* 39/44 (2 December 1987), p. 9.
95. See the remark of Kestutis Girnius in Alastair McAuley (ed.), *Soviet Federalism, Nationalism and Economic Decentralisation* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), p. 171.
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97. *The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 27th Congress of the CPSU* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1986), p. 66.
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112. See Nicolai N. Petro, 'Rediscovering Russia', *Orbis*, 34/1 (Winter 1990), p. 37.
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Chapter 7

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LCW *Lenin Collected Works*

MECW *Marx and Engels Collected Works*

MNCQ *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question*

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